

Annual Report

(short version)

2013

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1 On the Work of IFSH 2013 – Director's Foreword

2013 was a year of continuation of the successful work at IFSH during which, simultaneously, important foundations for the future were also established.

Among the various scientific, consulting and networking activities, four of them, which emphasize the international importance of IFSH in its thematic areas, will be singled out here:

- At the beginning of July a workshop on the future of conventional arms control in Europe, which was largely conceived at IFSH ("The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Goals, Ways and Means"), took place at the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS) in Berlin. The workshop brought together more than 60 participants from some two dozen countries, two-thirds of them government representatives, one third from think tanks and academic institutions. The goal of the event, which was officially organized jointly by the Federal Foreign Office, the Center for OSCE Research (CORE) at IFSH and BAKS, was the discussion of possibilities for overcoming the crisis in European arms control policies.
- In October, the first meeting of the "Deep-Cuts Commission" took place in Hamburg. High level German, American and Russian experts are represented in the commission. The goal of this enterprise, which was organized by IFSH in cooperation with the Arms Control Association in the USA and the Russian MGIMO and largely financed by the Federal Foreign Office, is the development of a package of recommendations on how further nuclear disarmament can be advanced. A document, in which a relevant strategy is laid out, will be presented publicly in the spring of 2014. Thereby, IFSH and its partners hope to be able to give nuclear disarmament new impetus.
- An OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions was founded at the strong initiative of IFSH. The network was presented to the public in the middle of June within the framework of the Security Days organized by the OSCE Secretary General. Meanwhile 31 scientific institutes from 26 OSCE participating States are taking part in the network, which is coordinated in Hamburg. Financing for one of the first joint projects on a comparison of national threat perceptions was received from various foreign ministries. The network is a part of the effort to strengthen peace and security in the Eurasian-Atlantic space, in which CORE has taken a leading role.
- In September, IFSH, together with other participating scientists at the KlimaCampus of the University of Hamburg, organized an international workshop under the title "Gendering a Sustainable Future: Conflict, Genocide and Climate Change". The participants dealt in depth with the connection between gender and conflict/mass violence, on the one hand, as well as between climate change and conflict and between climate change and gender, on the other hand. These topical areas, which have received little attention in scientific research up to now, will be further developed at IFSH.

These and other activities show the high regard for IFSH in academic and societal circles with respect to important thematic areas of European and international peace and security policy. Other indicators for this are the requests for expertise by the media and decision-makers at national and international levels.

The indicators, which are, once again, found in the statistical part of this annual report, also reflect this. In 2013, staff members took part in more than 140 hearings and internal discussions in

parliaments, ministries and international organizations. The reputation of IFSH among the public at large, is shown by, among other things, the demand by the media for IFSH expertise. In 2013, staff members of IFSH gave 180 interviews. In addition there were many dozen newspaper articles, current position statements and blog posts. Further indicators, such as more than 160 lectures and participation in podium discussions, are evidence for the attention the IFSH receives in German and European peace research.

A vital foundation for the impact of IFSH in public and in political consultation is its scientific competence. In recent years, the scientific output has risen continually. Important indicators for this are the scientific publications

The goal, pursued for some years instead of increasing the number of publications, as in the past, but rather increasing their placement in refereed formats, is clearly reflected in the numbers in the statistical appendix. On average, over the last few years, the number of publications in competition has increased. Thus, both the number of the refereed publications as a whole and the number of those in scientific publications has grown significantly. Converted to full-time equivalents, the scientific staff members have published, on average, two refereed articles each. There remains a need to catch up in publications on the list of particularly high level journals (Thomson Reuters World of Knowledge-List, aka ISI list), where, however, growth can be seen from year to year.

The expansion of scientific achievements has been made possible first and foremost by the level of third-party financing. In recent years, this level has increased by around a million Euros a year, with more or less stable basic funding of somewhat over 1.5 million Euros. The proportion of both the new third-party funds acquired as well as the third-party expenses in the total IFSH budget was 39% in 2013.

Among the various funds acquired in the last year for interesting projects, two in particular should be mentioned. First “Russia and the West: New Approaches to Explaining Russian Foreign Policy” (ZEUS-10-F-01). This project was given a grant by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Second, in a competitive bidding process, the IFSH received the contract to conduct an analysis of the security policy risks for the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK). The project is being carried out in close cooperation with the BBK, through which insights into the way these authorities work have resulted.

An important aspect of the work of IFSH is promotion of junior staff. A high percentage of the teaching in the much-sought-after program, “Master of Peace and Security Studies”, is carried out by the IFSH scientific staff, who incorporate their research into their lectures. In addition, they are increasingly involved in teaching in other programs. The doctoral program of the IFSH was reformed in 2013 in order to reflect the trend towards greater engagement in doctoral studies. Doctoral candidates at IFSH are already largely integrated into graduate schools in Hamburg (SICS, HIGS, GIG). This cooperation will be further developed.

2013 was a special year, not only due to the experiences and successes mentioned. After long negotiations, a cooperation contract was signed with the University of Hamburg. In the contract, the expanded cooperation of recent years in research, teaching and promotion of junior staff, was put on a new legal basis. One topic of intensive discussions with the University of Hamburg in 2013 was the establishment of a joint junior professorship in the area of International Relations, with special focus on international arms control and disarmament.

In 2013 as well, a cooperation contract was signed with the GIGA. Here too, a good level of cooperation had already developed, particularly in the area of teaching and junior staff promotion.

Cooperation in the area of research has the potential for development. On the one hand, the IFSH can profit from the broad competence of GIGA in methodological and theoretical questions and, on the other hand, also offer GIGA specific expertise in the area of peace and security, as well as the EU and Russia. The comparative regional approach in the research, which GIGA has chosen as a focus, can be expanded to further regions. An additional area of possible cooperation is regional studies on Central Asia. Here, the IFSH, with its first Central Asia Day in 2013, advanced the networking of the research being conducted in Germany. But there is also regional competence on Central Asia at GIGA, which would lend itself to increased cooperation.

The adoption of a new work program, "Peace Strategies Today – Peace and Security Policy at the Breaking Points of Globalization" offers an excellent basis for the further development of the IFSH.

The point of departure for the work program is the observation that "peace" and "peace policy" have lost significance as concepts compared to "security" and "security policy". This is the case for both the international academic discussion as well as for politics. The loss of significance of "peace" as an analytical term and "peace policy" as a guiding principle is, according to the basic assumption of this work program, primarily a consequence of changed global conditions, which can be summarized in the term "globalization." First of all, beyond the end of the East-West conflicts, in the course of a diverse globalization process, societies have grown together and conflicts have been defused but, on the other hand, new divisions and cracks have developed. This has already been comprehensively researched, with, however, the focus on economic and political consequences of globalization. Only relatively few – and often contradictory – articles deal with the effects on peace and security. With this work program, the IFSH consciously wants to move the terms "peace", "peace strategies" and "peace policy" in a globalizing world back to the center. Thereby, it will not be primarily the presumed "sunny side" of globalization, but its potential "shadowy side" that will be studied; that is, not the pacifying effects, but rather its fissures and fractures which, in turn, can result in endangerment for peace and security. Typically, these challenges are seen, first and foremost, as security policy problems, which, as such, must be confronted with defense, containment or combat

Within the framework of the work program, IFSH is researching, in particular, the extent to which traditional liberal peace strategic approaches are appropriate for these problems or the extent to which alternatives might be better ways to confront them. Assumptions of liberal peace theories are tested as to whether they capture the reality of a globalizing world and its fissures. The strategies and current policies derived from them should, therefore, be studied with an eye to whether and to what extent the development and use of collective force at the breaking points of globalization can be hindered.

Important considerations in the adoption of the new work program, in addition to the expected yield of scientific knowledge, were also the promotion of a unique scientific characteristic and political relevance. Furthermore, the work of IFSH will continue to comprise scientific research as well as social and political consultation and the promotion of junior staff and teaching.

With the analytical connection of fundamental approaches of peace research to the challenges of the current security policy, the IFSH sets itself apart both from other peace research institutions as well as from security and regional research. With its combination of a fundamental peace policy question – the appropriateness of liberal peace strategies – with topical areas of current political significance, the new work program offers good opportunities for gaining attention and a hearing in politics and the society.

New organizational structures were connected with the introduction of the work program. The tried and tested organization into three departments (two centers and an interdisciplinary working group) was complemented by three cross-sectional working groups. Their task is primarily filling out and further developing the content of the ideas and approaches outlined in the work program. The new matrix structure, which was introduced in 2013, must first prove its worth, but it was introduced with a view to a possible restructuring of the departments. The changes in personnel make-up, which lie ahead in the next few years, due to the ages of the directors of the Institute and departments, is a further reason to create and try out new organizational forms. The efficiency of the new organizational structure will be continually reviewed to avoid, in particular, the development of any unproductive duplication.

Departures and the hiring of new staff in 2013 more or less balanced out. About half of the scientific staff is financed by third-party funding. The increasingly tighter financial framework for basic funding makes it increasingly difficult to retain junior scientific staff beyond the end of externally financed projects. Thus in 2013 the IFSH lost good junior staff to, among other institutions, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs – SWP in Berlin. Meanwhile, four former IFSH scientific staff members are working there.

In 2013, the first IFSH plan for the promotion of women, which was adopted in 2008, ran out. The most important goal of an increase in the quota of female employees in the area of research to 45 percent was almost achieved (44 percent). Altogether, the quota of women among the employees of IFSH was 47%. The upcoming change at IFSH will allow for setting more ambitious goals in the coming five years, within the framework of the equal opportunity plan, particularly in the area of management personnel, in which women are, at present, significantly underrepresented.

The success of an institute such as IFSH rests on many factors. Of primary significance is the support of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg. A further important element is the cooperation with the University of Hamburg. In recent years, the cooperation with GIGA has also continually increased. In addition, IFSH cooperates with many scientific partners inland and abroad, in teaching and training, in projects, programs and beyond. In 2013, the IFSH organized conferences and workshops with a total of ten partners, the overwhelming majority of which, with strong international participation. A long-term and good cooperation is that with the Federal Armed Forces, which has, for many years, sent officers to the Institute with complete scientific freedom. Last, but certainly not least, the willingness of the IFSH staff to take on new challenges on a solid, professional basis should be noted. In the future, continuity and renewal in a highly motivated team will also be the basis for the success of the work of the IFSH

February 2014

Michael Brzoska

2. Scientific Organization of the IFSH

Box: IFSH Mission Statement

IFSH staff research the terms and conditions of peace. They analyze, test and develop strategies for the avoidance and reduction of collective violence. The particular approach of the IFSH lies in the analytic coupling of the fundamentals of peace research with current security policy questions. The IFSH combines excellent research with interdisciplinary teaching, the promotion of junior staff and practice-relevant consultations with political and societal actors. The IFSH, as an independent scientific institute, cooperates with institutions in the metropolitan region of Hamburg, as well as with national and international partners.

The name of the IFSH is associated with a multifaceted task: On the one hand, the IFSH is firmly anchored in peace research with its requirement to serve peace through research at a high scientific level. On the other hand, the IFSH is expected to deal particularly with security policy questions, that is, with questions which the political decision-makers must ask strategically and on a daily basis. Thereby, by statute, the emphasis is on questions of German and European policy. Here, the IFSH wishes to consult, but also to work out independent recommendations with a critical external viewpoint.

With the combining of peace research and security policy, the IFSH has unique characteristics in the scientific landscape. This is expressed in the thematic orientation of the IFSH, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in its work organization.

While challenges to international organizations through transnational violent actors was in the foreground of the scientific work of the previous work program, the new work program decided upon in 2013, addresses itself to the topic of "Peace strategies today – peace and security policy at the breaking points of globalization."

The common element of the new work program is the study of the appropriateness of liberal peace strategies for successful peace and security policy under the conditions of dynamically progressing globalization and the resultant fissures in the world society. Rhetorically, peace policy in Germany and Europe largely follows the considerations of liberal peace strategies, which were developed in the 1960s and 1970s. With globalization and the end of the Cold War, however, the material bases of these considerations have changed. Transnational actors have increased in significance, as analyzed in the previous work program. State actors in Asia and Latin America, particularly the regional powers, question liberal peace concepts. Peace is no longer only a problem of the periphery. The inner stability of modern industrialized states is also at risk.

The changed conditions suggest the need for an objective review of the appropriateness and scope of liberal peace strategies. Fundamental assumptions, such as the peace-promoting effect of democratization and economic globalization should be questioned. The new work program delivers an analytical framework for this, which will be concretized in projects over the next five years.

The work program comprises three research clusters in which the effects of the global changes are to be reviewed for the appropriateness of liberal peace theories and the peace strategies derived from them. These are:

– A structural change in the form of violence,

– A change in the global power structures and norms.

– A new potential for intrastate violence

The three clusters are to be linked through the following overriding central questions.

1. To what extent do the conditions of peace postulated by liberal peace theories still conform to the current parameters of the global change? How do they differ from them?
2. To what extent must the established peace theories and strategies, as well as agendas and instruments, particularly those of German and European peace and security policy, be changed or adapted, considering the changed parameters?

Important considerations in the development of the new work program were, besides the expected scientific knowledge, also the potential political relevance. The work of the IFSH should continue to comprise scientific research and social and political consultation, as well as the promotion of junior staff and teaching. With the new work program, the development of a longer-term peace policy agenda will be advanced.

Through the combination of a fundamental peace policy question – the question of the appropriateness of liberal peace strategies – with topical areas of current political significance, will be ensured, so that the IFSH will continue to attract attention and a hearing in politics and society. The professional reputation with the public at large and with political decision-makers in Germany, which the IFSH has acquired over many years, is a valuable asset that will be retained and further developed with the new work program.

The scientific work at IFSH includes various forms, from the individual study of a scientist, to the cooperation in projects, to joint projects by the entire research team. A characteristic of the work of the IFSH is its interdisciplinarity. Represented here are social sciences, the humanities and natural sciences.

The primary organizational forms of the Institute were and continue to be the three departments, CORE, ZEUS and IFAR, of which two are organized as centers and one as an interdisciplinary working group. The departments are responsible for the planning and implementation of research work as well as the personnel organization in their areas of competency. They have at their disposal, scientific competence and are closely networked with decision-makers. Examples for this are the close relationships and the high standing of CORE in the OSCE and its participating States, which is reflected in, for example, the regular training of diplomats for the current chair or the high regard for IFAR in questions of arms control and disarmament, which allowed the IFSH to start the “Deep-Cuts Commission” in 2013 with experts from the USA, Russia and Germany.

In addition to the three departments, the IFSH, with its new work program, introduced a matrix organization for the strategic further development of research activities in 2013. Three cross-sectional working groups have the task of advancing the scientific work on the three topical areas of the working program (structural changes in the forms of violence, changes in global power structures and norms and the potential for violence within societies). Here, the IFSH staff who work on the projects/project ideas allocated to the research cluster will be networked beyond the departments and supported and accompanied in the initiation of pan-working group projects.

Research Topics in the Matrix Organization of the IFSH

IFSH **Interdisciplinary competencies**	**Departments and their core competencies**	**Cross-sectional Working Groups**		
		Structural changes in forms of violence	**Changes in global power structures and norms**	**Intrastate potential for violence**
European Peace and Security Policy Conflict analysis Security Governance Arms Control Effectiveness analysis	**CORE** Peace and Security Policy of the OSCE, the OSCE as an organization; Eastern Europe, Central Asia		Perspectives for a Eurasian-Atlantic Peace Order	Violence potential Main focus: Central Asia/ Northern Caucasus
	ZEUS Peace and Security Policy of the EU, CSDP Missions, Federal Armed Forces, EU neighboring regions, transnational violent actors	Use of force by states, groups of states and non-state actors	Europe as peacemaker?	Violence potential Focus – EU Europe
	IFAR Disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, risk technology, climate change and security	Military technology and proliferation	Perspectives for arms control in the Eurasian-Atlantic space	

4. Cross-sectional Working Groups

4.1 Cross-sectional Working Group 1 – Structural change in violence

Cross-sectional Working Group (CSWG) 1 deals with a particular current aspect of the work program. As the relevant statistics on interstate wars and on political and societal violence suggest, a change in the form of committing collective violence has occurred. Interstate wars have become rare. The number and intensity of intrastate wars remains high, but significantly lower than in the final decades of the 20th Century. For other forms of non-state political violence, such as terrorism, the trends are unclear. At the same time, military spending world-wide has risen to a historically high level. In the course of globalization, ever more actors have military-relevant technologies at their disposal. Today, the risks of proliferation of nuclear technology and the possibility of misuse by state and non-state actors are greater than ever. New weapons technologies are developed, the use of which in classic military conflicts, but also in asymmetric wars, is intended to create advantages. Last but not least, through such technologies and their dissemination – an example is armed drones – the risk that the existent legal and ethical restrictions on state violence will be weakened, increases.

However, the analysis cannot stop here for, parallel to the changes described, a shift in the perception of security problems has taken place. An example for this is the emergence of the concept of risk in the scientific and political debate. Even in Europe, many people feel more insecure subjectively, despite objectively proven security gains, than they did during the Cold War. An increasing "securitization" or "riskification" of globalized living conditions has contributed to ever more new alleged risks being discovered. Security policy, in turn, has reacted to this shift with an expanded range of measures. The development of missile defense systems, international interventions under the leadership of Western states or the use of drones within the framework of networked warfare, are examples of this.

These and other changes in the use of collective force, but also the perception of the risks of violence, put the dominant peace strategies in Europe and Germany to the test. For the peace policy derived from them is geared, above all, towards the creation and implementation of "softer " and "harder", legally binding behavioral norms through institutions of reconciliation of interests, as well as the restriction of the use of collective violence through equal participation. Strong international organizations, democratization at all levels and a domestic and international order considered as just, are, thereby, instruments, which are seen as particularly important.

In the first place, the changed forms of violence call into question the appropriateness of interstate arrangements for containing violence. Are legal policies and state control mechanisms still appropriate for containing collective violence and, if so, what forms are suitable and on which societal level? How can the new, i.e. civil society, actors be integrated into control regimes? Are the basic assumptions of liberal peace theories about the perceptions of risks and security still in accord with the current societal preferences?

Secondly, the changes force a rethink about the classification of the various forms of violence. This is shown, for example, in the demarcation of "war" and "peace". Liberal peace strategies assume the distinctiveness and separateness of violence and other forms of collective action. Up until now, modern societies have been characterized by a strict functional separation of collec-

tive violence from all other functional areas – the military as an institution, the international humanitarian law as an area with special rights, security problems as a justification for a state of emergency. However, can the peace of the liberal peace theory still serve as an orientation for peace policy in times of advanced globalization in which the customary dividing lines are increasingly erased?

Finally there is the question of the dynamics of changed forms of collective violence. New combinations, comingling and interactions of various dimensions and kinds of conflicts stand out. Central questions, such as those about friend or foe or the actual occurrence of an attack can often no longer be answered. Are the changes in the forms of violence processes independent of each other or are they connected with each other by, for example, substitution processes? How do new kinds of military and risk technologies change the decision processes of political and military decision-makers? Do they, for example, develop local forms of violence depending on external influence factors, such as the availability of modern technologies and external military intervention?

The IFSH has already done considerable preliminary work on processing the multifaceted questions, which have arisen from review and critical analysis of the changes in the forms of violence. They are present mainly in three areas: first of all, this work is on international violent actors, particularly in the areas of terrorism and piracy; second, research on international military interventions by European actors and third, work in the area of arms control, disarmament, proliferation of weapons systems and military technology. The future thematic development in the cluster "structural changes in the forms of violence" will – wherever possible – build on this preliminary work.

In order to make an expansion of the topics of the new questions easier, the content work of the working group began in 2013 with some fundamental discussions. First, there was an analysis with statistical surveys of warfare in the world and the knowledge about the changed forms of violence that resulted from this. Subsequently, newer approaches in the research were discussed, which emphasized war violence as an important factor in the creation of overall societal developments. Finally, the results of the research on democratic peace, particularly on the legitimation of participation in wars by democratic states, were discussed.

The goal of the discussions in the Cross-sectional Working Group (CSWG) 1 is the development of new ideas and projects in the thematic areas outlined, as well as linking them to the lead questions of the work program. It is not the goal to answer all of the questions posed here in great depth. The staff members in the working group have very different disciplinary backgrounds and their professional expertise is also quite different. Nevertheless, the initial group meetings have shown that all participants have profited from the discussions on fundamental topics. The interdisciplinary working group is a platform for linking and expanding upon professional knowledge, which will be used increasingly in the future, also for the individual contributions of the participants, in the form of presenting planned projects and publications, as well as for discussion of project applications.

4.1.1 How dangerous are armed drones for liberal peace?

Michael Brzoska

The development of armed drones is one of the most active areas of current military research and development[1]. Even though few armed forces are already using armed drones, it is widely predicted that more countries will acquire them. However, there is also much debate about the advisability of this trend.[2]

The prediction of an increased use of armed drones is based on the technical characteristics of a class of weapon systems, which can be used for a wide range of military applications without endangering a pilot. Often, however, armed drones are said to be particularly attractive because of one of their potential missions, namely the precision attack of identified individuals or small groups. It is assumed, at least by some, that armed drones will be a characteristic of future warfare, particularly in what is often called 'asymmetric warfare', that is, situations in which one side with clear superiority in traditional military terms is fighting another side, which is using technologically less advanced means. A particularly critical feature is the current practice by the US CIA to use armed drones for 'targeted killings' outside of immediate military confrontations.

The prime feature of drones is their promise to limit the number of fatalities compared to other weapon systems. This begins with soldiers of the armed forces operating the drones, but does not stop there. Drones can be and, most likely, are more precise in their attacks. In other words, if targets are properly identified, 'collateral' casualties, the number of victims who were not targeted, is comparatively lower than when attacks are carried out by other means, such as manned aircraft or artillery.

The intense controversies of recent years over armed drones are at least partly based on two different uses of such drones. Proponents generally emphasize their usefulness for traditional military missions, such as ground attacks, or, as a future option, in air defense. Critics often focus on the controversial legal and moral use of armed drones in 'targeted killings[3]' outside of zones of fighting. An example for such debates is the discussion over the procurement of a limited number of armed drones in Germany. While the government has emphasized that using drones outside of a military context would be illegal, other voices have pointed to the slippery slope towards 'targeted killings' presented by armed drones with their particular technical capabilities. The IFSH has contributed to the debate with a publication that contains both the argument that armed drones may reduce casualties and be advantageous to German armed forces when used to support ground troops, and the counterargument that it may lower the threshold for using violence, lead to proliferation of armed drones, promote the trend towards the automation

1 A recent report by the European Union Institute for Security Studies suggests that by 2025 "remote-controlled weapon systems" will be one of the three "key sectors" for the "(r)evolution in military affairs" currently underway. Rogers, James and Andrea Gilli, Enabling the future: European military capabilities 2013-2025: Challenges and avenues, Report No. 16, Paris, May 2013, pp. 21-23.

2 For a comprehensive study of the future use of unmanned systems, including drones, see Thomas Petermann and Reinhard Grünwald, Stand und Perspektiven der militärischen Nutzung unbemannter Systeme. Büro für Technikfolgenabschätzung beim Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin 2011, http://www.tab-beim-bundestag.de/de/pdf/publikationen/berichte/TAB-Arbeitsbericht-ab144.pdf. The IFSH contributed to the major background report of this study within a consortium led by the University of Dortmund. The report can be found at http://www.ifsh.de/IFAR/pdf/StandPerspektMilUMS2008.pdf.

3 ' Targeted killings' are a broad feature of warfare. However, the term has become identified with surprise precision attack outside of combat situations.

of warfare and lower inhibitions about the use of force because of the technical features of armed drones[4].

As reflected in a large and quickly growing body of literature on drone warfare, these issues are important in themselves. They are also interesting, however, in view of the IFSH research program adopted in 2013. One of the hypotheses of the research program is that certain technological changes, of which armed drones are an example, are challenging liberal peace theory. This text provides some initial insights into this particular aspect of the increased use of armed drones.

Liberal peace theory is understood here as an outgrowth of liberal theory as it has developed since the period of enlightenment. Modern liberal peace theory comprises a cluster of theoretical underpinnings and practical prescriptions developed by thinkers on war and peace in the 1970s and 1980s, based on the ideas of major liberals beginning in the 18th century. Important names include Immanuel Kant, Richard Cobden, John Stewart Mills and Woodrow Wilson, who believed that war within and between states should and could be eliminated through a combination of domestic and international reforms, including democratization, human rights, rule of law, free trade, equal economic opportunities and strong international organizations[5]. It stands in contrast to a realist peace theory which emphasizes the balance of power and the predominance of states in the international system as well as a revolutionary peace theory, which sees little prospect for peace prior to a social revolution, and a post-liberal peace theory, which stands between liberal and revolutionary peace theory in positing the need for fundamental change in the relationships between the 'Global North' and the Global South' as well as between individuals and states. The European Union has declared itself a liberal peace power in the wording of major documents. In terms of declaratory policy, NATO also has adopted a liberal peace agenda.

Liberal peace theory is not free of contradictions. While liberal peace theorists aim at the elimination of war, they generally do not reject the use of military force under specific circumstances. In addition to cases of self-defense, many are also willing to use force in order to prevent major violations of human rights. As the debate over the 'responsibility to protect' shows, many, but certainly not all, liberals accept the idea that war may sometimes be necessary for peace. However, even such liberals insist on the aim of abolishing war. Still, the defense of liberal values may require a sparse and strictly controlled use of force, as a 'last resort' when other measures have failed. Correspondingly, most liberals argue for a 'demilitarization' of society, including a separation of the civilian and military spheres of society.

The primary aim of the liberal peace theory is the pursuit of peace. Modern peace theory has, therefore, focused on the development of ways to better promote and sustain peace. However, as the use of force cannot be ruled out, liberals have, over time, also developed principles on war.

A preliminary analysis indicates that liberal thinking on war is based on three objectives. One is the separation between war and peace. Liberals generally acknowledge that war is categorically different from the 'normal', that it has its own rules and stipulates behavior that would not be acceptable in peacetime. They generally accept that a different set of laws governs times of war and times of peace. However, wartime rules and behavior should be restricted as much as possi-

4 Christian Alwardt, Michael Brzoska, Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Martin Kahl, Götz Neuneck, Johann Schmid, Patricia Schneider, Braucht Deutschland Kampfdrohnen? Hamburger Informationen, July 2013.

5 See e.g. the discussion in David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

ble. In particular, they should not spill over into peacetime. They should also not harm those who behave peacefully in times of war. This is one reason why liberals have been keen on the protection of non-combatants in wartime.

Another objective is a legal framework for the conduct of warfare, a 'warfare rule of law'. There is a long tradition of debates on rules governing the right to go to war ("jus ad bellum"). Liberals, beginning with Kant, have argued for the restriction of such rights. Conflicts within and between states should be solved peacefully, through law and arbitration. The authority to go to war, if conflicts cannot be solved peacefully, should lie with participatory international organizations. Furthermore, beginning in the mid-19th century, liberal intellectuals, in particular, pressured governments to adopt legal documents regulating warfare ("jus in bello"), restricting, for instance, or, in rare cases, prohibiting the use of certain weapon systems. Much of liberal thinking on the proper use of military force is enshrined in international public and, particularly, humanitarian, law which, however, reflects compromises with non-liberal ideas, such as the predominance of the interests of states.

The ultimate objective of the liberal peace theory is the limitation of violence. This is another reason for arguing for the separation between combatants and non-combatants in warfare. It finds expression, for instance in the principle of proportionality in humanitarian law. Violence should be used as sparsely and selectively as possible to achieve a desired military objective. All elements of the last sentence are important: violence should be limited and it should be linked to a desired military objective. Violence as revenge or 'enemy reprisals' as they were called earlier, are not acceptable. In recent years, the limitation of the numbers of fatalities has acquired additional aspects. Originally focusing on civilians, increasingly the objective includes all victims on all sides of a conflict. This seems reflective of a general "humanitarian turn" of the 1990s, which is in line with liberal thinking of focusing on individuals rather than their affiliation.

These three objectives can be identified in global rules of warfare but are particularly pertinent were liberalism is strong. Still, liberal states use force frequently, though with major differences among themselves in terms of justification and conduct of force. Nevertheless, liberal states fighting wars are under domestic and international political pressure to portray their military actions as being consistent with their liberalism. In a globalized world, with global media presence and instantaneous communication as well as a spread of communitarian ideas of global citizenship, it has become increasingly difficult to cordon-off war zones in which the usual liberal rules do not apply.

Do the possibilities offered by armed drones undermine the objectives of liberal peace? The distinction between the use of armed drones within wars and for "targeted killings" outside of zones of fighting becomes crucial for answering this question.

In situations where armed drones are merely an additional weapon system, their use does not infringe on the separation between war and peace, the first objective of liberal peace theory listed above. They are clearly used as instruments of war. Second, at least currently, armed drones are no challenge to the existing legal framework for conducting war. This may become different with further automatization of armed drones, particularly the delegation of the decision to kill to the software on board the independent drones. Drones are strong candidates for such automatization because of the vulnerability of the data links used to control drones currently in use. However, there are strong reservations, including in armed forces, against such automatization, and current drones are not automatic in this sense. Finally, drones are generally

a more precise weapon system than alternative systems, such as cruise missiles or fighter aircraft, used by armed forces to attain the same military objectives. Their use will generally result in fewer victims. A case can be made, that the higher degree of precision may lead to decisions to use force in situations where the risk of large number of casualties would not permit it. However, recent wars, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, indicate that, while casualties on all sides are to be avoided, the danger of 'collateral' damage has not ruled out the use of force. Armed drones are only moderately different from modern manned aircraft in this respect.

Arguments are quite different for the case of "targeted killings", the use of armed drones outside of zones of frequent fighting. Such use is a violation of the first objective of liberal peace theory, of the separation between war and peace. The US government, in defending its use of armed drones is undercutting this objective with its argument that it is in a global war with al-Quaida. The separation between zones of fighting and zones of peace is negated. In this limited respect, its argument and behavior are symmetrical with Al-Qaida's, which sees itself in a global fight against a 'Crusader-Zionist alliance'. There is also another element of symmetry between the use of drones for "targeted killings" and attacks by terrorist organizations, such as Al-Quaida. While drones are generally directed against identified "high-value" targets, they also instill fear in the wider population in areas where they are used. Terrorist attacks by organizations affiliated with Al-Qaida, while clearly aiming to produce terror among civilians, are, interestingly, mostly aimed at 'high value' targets, such as government offices or aircraft, and not at the easiest targets that could be hit.

In the view of most legal experts, the use of armed drones outside of zones of fighting also violates the rules of warfare. Obviously, this issue is linked to the one mentioned in the previous paragraph: If it is legal to declare the whole world as a zone of fighting, as Al-Qaida and the US government have done, then it can also be argued that the use of armed drones is legal wherever they are used. However, such views run counter not only to the objectives of liberal peace theory but also to liberal thinking more broadly. It reverses the relationship between the two spheres of law mentioned above: the laws of warfare would trump the laws of the civilian sphere; the legal exception would become legal normality. Such views also undermine adherence to international public law. The declaration of global war against Al-Qaida has a very weak legal basis in Article 51 of the UN Charter, allowing for US self-defense. The US government's view greatly expands the concept of self-defense, contrary to the words and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, not to mention liberal peace theory.

Somewhat more complex are considerations of the third objective. The higher degree of precision generally ascribed to drones makes it likely that fewer people will be killed in attacks by armed drones than would be in attacks with missiles or fighter aircraft. However, it is questionable whether this is a valid comparison, as this comparison assumes that such attacks would be carried out in similar numbers. While the US government has used cruise missiles and fighter aircraft outside of war zones against terrorist organization before, in Sudan in 1998 and in Afghanistan prior to 2001, for instance, such attacks were rare compared to recent attacks with armed drones in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. There are, thus, indications that the availability of the more precise armed drones may have lowered the threshold for the use of violence outside of zones of fighting.

In summary, armed drones are a threat to the objectives of liberal peace theory. In zones of fighting, the threat is currently very limited, mostly to more theoretical than practical issues as long as automatization does not go much further. In such zones, armed drones are actually sup-

porting liberal peace theory, to the extent that they are more precise than alternative weapon systems. The use of armed drones outside of zones of fighting, however, undermines liberal peace theory. It is contrary to several of its objectives, including the separation between war and peace, legal restrictions on warfare and the limitation of casualties. In some sense, it mimics attacks by terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida. While armed drones are instruments of asymmetrical warfare in current zones of fighting, they are somewhat symmetrical to targeted terrorist attacks outside of such zones.

However, asking whether and how drones are undermining the objectives of liberal peace theory is only one side of the coin. Interestingly, the use of armed drones is not only contradictory with respect to the objectives of liberal peace theory when it comes to fighting wars, but their use is also attractive within a liberal peace paradigm. Crucial in this context, is their purported precision leading to the limitation of fatalities.

As mentioned above, liberal peace theory strictly limits, but does not negate, the use of force. If war is necessary and legal, for instance for humanitarian purposes, it is permissible according to most liberal peace theorists. However, proportionality requires that the expected fatalities be outweighed by the humanitarian benefits of using force. Drones carry the promise of limiting fatalities. The availability of armed drones may, therefore, render war permissible from the point of view of liberal peace theory, where it would not be in the absence of armed drones.

Some recent wars indicate that this is not just a theoretical argument. Governments have been influenced in their decisions to go to war by the likelihood of fatalities. Both in the Kosovo war in 1999 and in the Libyan war in 2011, external involvement in fighting was limited to air power. A primary reason for not involving grounds troops in both cases was the fear of fatalities. In both cases, the air war limited, in situations of air superiority, the dangers to soldiers of external forces. Similarly, discussions on external military involvement in the war in Syria in 2013 focused on aerial bombing.

The Syrian case also indicates the partial shift in the consideration of fatalities outlined above. One of the reasons for not intervening was the argument that bombing would increase the number of fatalities, presumably mostly Syrian government troops, but also civilians, without leading to success. Bombing to punish the Syrian government for the use of chemical weapons, as planned for a while by Western governments, would have constituted an enemy reprisal if it had resulted in major numbers of victims on the Syrian government side. While US President Obama was willing to accept this effect, the majority of the US Congress seemed not to be.

Already in the Kosovo war, external powers were criticized for the number of civilian victims caused by bombing. In order to counter similar criticism in the Libyan war, external forces very carefully chose targets to avoid civilian casualties. Confirmed by independent investigations, for instance by Human Rights Watch, they were quite successful. More extensive use of armed drones might have further limited damage.

Within zones of fighting then, the greatest danger to liberal peace theory comes, ironically, from within the theory. The objective of limiting casualties may have the counter effect of making more wars permissible. The promise of fewer victims may lower the threshold of war.

Armed drones are less a cause than an expression of a contradiction in liberal peace theory. By permitting “good wars”, if they are justified on the basis of the principles of legality and proportionality, a more precise weapon system will increase the likelihood of wars, all other things

being equal. Liberal peace theory is oblivious to this shift in the reduction of the costs of going to war as long as the decisions are not only based on cost-benefit considerations, but are also in line with its objectives.

However, such decision-making may also be influenced by the further proliferation of armed drones. For one thing, further proliferation increases the likelihood that they will be used for 'targeted killings'. Such use undermines international law. Secondly, automatization may weaken the authority of international humanitarian law. As a result, the objectives of liberal peace theory of a strong warfare rule of law may be undermined.

Even in countries, where governments have rejected the use of drones for 'targeted killings', decision-makers need to consider the long-term consequences of the introduction of armed drones, including its effects on liberal peace theory.

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4.2 Cross-sectional Working Group 2 – Change in global power structures and norms

Cross-sectional Working Group (CSWG) 2 is dealing with the consequences of the global shift for international norm setting, norm implementation and the settlement of peace-endangering problems. The starting point here is the assumption that international power and influence shifts will change power relationships in the international space and will, thereby, noticeably influence the existing international order. These shifts go hand-in-hand with a relative loss of power in the USA, the economic rise of China and a range of other states of the global south, as well as a weakening of the economic and political position of the West. However, they are also triggered by erosion and differentiation processes, which have been caused by globalization and, in the course of its advancement, new, influential socially "unregistered" actors, such as globally acting private economic concerns, have appeared on the world political stage. With this development, many of those starting points and conditions, mentioned in liberal peace theories as prerequisites for peace, are apparently called into question, here, in particular, the democratic nature of states and the integration of actors into international regimes and sets of rules. It is open whether and how this leads to greater differences and tensions, more conflict and a reduction in regulation in the international arena.

For, it is still not clear, how the organizational potential of the "new" actors is shown and how the normative, political and cultural differences between them and the "established" actors will affect global peace policy. Will they reject the existing political, institutional and cultural order, adapt to it or take it over? How do authoritarian state leadership, on the one hand, and the increasing economic intertwining and erosion of territorial borders, on the other hand, affect the preference for action of such states as China in the international context? Why do democratically constituted states such as Brazil and India not associate themselves unreservedly with the western-liberal positions? What role do historical development paths play for the current interpretations and positioning in the international arena? Is the western, normative interpretation monopoly breaking down? What form of responsibility can, will, should non-state actors take on? The effect of global power shifts on "established" actors of the West also moves into focus here. The changing possibilities for influence and expectations and their effects on preferences and normative orientations of "western" actors need to be studied.

In light of these questions, the CSWG 2 wants to focus its attention, within the framework of the new work program, on two concrete research areas: first, on the question of the degree to which Europe, especially those states comprising the European Union, can continue to act as peacemakers. Thereby, it will be considered which normative ideas are guiding the actors integrated into the EU today and whether these are valid as guiding principles in the face of globalization. Coupled with this is the question about the stability of the common normative peace order within the EU space, which has evolved since the second half of the 20th century and, in line with liberal peace theories, incorporates those conditions necessary for a stable peace. However, if the European peace project loses its attractiveness internally, what appeal do it and its imbedded norms and values still have externally? And basically, what possibilities for configuration of it do German and European actors still have in the international arena?

A further focus of the working group is the question of the perspectives for a Eurasian-Atlantic peace order and the competition expected under globalization conditions between the Western-liberal model of state and peace-building and other normative models in this space. Ultimately,

regional and on-going norm competition also affect the ability to promote peace globally. How, then, can we deal constructively – globally and with respect to peace policy – with the "new" powers, which sometimes have competing norm orientations? And how can influential "unregistered" actors, such as globally acting concerns, for instance, be responsibly integrated into institutional contexts? The concepts of *global* or also *regional governance* that are to be developed for the globalization context, must continually keep in mind this tension between difference and cooperation and find a way to deal with the expected and potentially enduring differences.

In the first meeting of CSWG 2 since September 2013, the initial foci for the discussion were identified. These include first an analysis of the narrative "rising powers": How will the rise of new powers be conceived in the literature? Which areas/levels will be covered by this ascendency? How do established actors react to this? What adaptation strategies do they follow? Where will ambivalences and contradictions become clear? A further focus of discussion is the term "order". The group deals with concepts of order (and changes in order) in the modern world, its structural creating elements as well as the theoretical imbedding of such concepts. Also closely tied with the term of order is the concept of region or regionalism. Under the conditions of global change, the tension between global order, on the one hand, and regionalization, on the other hand, becomes especially apparent here.

The discussions in the working group on fundamental theoretical and empirical aspects of the work program will inform the work of its members and take it forward in content. For this purpose, it is planned that it will be discussed with the colleagues participating in the CSWG as a further element of the research project and to tie it thematically to the key questions of the work program

4.2.1 Theories of stable peace: The concept of a security community in light of the approaches to new powers

Wolfgang Zellner

The attempt to understand the conditions for the creation of zones of stable peace or, less ambitiously, the absence of war, has always represented a key question in the discipline of International Relations. According to Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett "theories of international relations that explain the absence of war can be categorized according to whether they see structure comprised of material forces alone or of material and normative forces." (Adler/Barnett 1998a: 10). But also, within the category, which includes material and normative factors, there is an extremely broad spectrum of approaches, which argue at very different levels of abstraction. The fact that most discussions are conducted *within* the individual approaches and not *between* them, leads to a fragmentation of the debate, which is not conducive to its productivity. One example of many involves, on the one hand, the debate over a "security community" (SC), which has gained in significance since the new constructivist interpretation of the original work of Deutsch (1957) through Adler and Barnett (cf. Adler/Barnett 1998 (Eds.)). On the other hand, Amrita Narlikar and colleagues have initiated a debate on the topic of "negotiating the rise of new powers", i.e. negotiating patterns between rising and established powers in key questions of global *governance*. Both strands of literature are highly relevant for the new work program of the IFSH – "Peace Strategies Today – Peace and Security Policy at the Breaking Points of Globalization" and, in particular, for its research cluster 2 "Change in global power structures and norms", which asks: "How must global cooperative structures be arranged in the Eurasian-Atlantic space, so they can contribute to peace?" And: "How can we deal constructively and in a way that promotes peace with "new" global powers, which are developing an increasing internationally transformational potential?" Apparently these two questions, which roughly reflect the two theoretical lines above, are very closely linked and can only be answered in connection with each other. This approach seeks to identify some weaknesses in the SC debate and then to confront this debate with the discourse on rising powers, so as to sharpen the research questions and make them more precise.

The debate over security communities

The seminal work by Deutsch and his colleagues, "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience" (Deutsch et al. 1957), was largely forgotten for decades. Only after its rediscovery and new constructivist interpretation by Adler and Barnett in their 1998 volume "Security Communities", did the discussion reach a second phase – a decade after the end of the Cold War. This yielded a substantial body of literature, in the English-language area, in particular, Adler and co-authors, Bellamy 2004, Flynn/Farrell 1999, Kupchan 2010, Pouliot 2008 and others. This literature also includes articles on international organizations which function as "security community-building" organizations (Adler 1998, see further below), as well as Acharya 2001 on the ASEAN, Ngoma 2003 on the *South African Development Community* (SADC), and Adler himself on the OSCE (1998). The few German-language publications came from Müller (2003), Conrad (2008) and Koschut (2012). Only recently has Mayer (2014) written a not-yet published critical literature review. Since the entire debate cannot be reproduced in detail here, its most important dimensions and concepts will be presented through the article by Adler and Bennett

These two authors "define a pluralistic security community as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change." (Adler/Barnett 1998b: 30). "A community is defined by three characteristics. First, members of a community have shared identities, values, and meanings. (...) Secondly, those in a community have many-sided and direct relations", and thirdly, "communities exhibit reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism" (Ibid. 31). What is called "characteristics" here could also be understood as conditions for or constitutive elements of a security community. The authors add: "[P]ower plays a major role in the development and maintenance of security communities" (Ibid: 39), but do not explain in what relation power stands to the aforementioned normative and transactional factors. The process towards a security community is conceived in three stylized phases "three stylized phases" [...] – "nascent", "ascendant" and "mature" (Ibid: 48). International organizations are seen as drivers of this process. They "are sites of socialization and learning, places where political actors learn and perhaps even 'teach' others what their interpretation of the situation and normative understandings are." (Ibid. 43). In another article on the "OSCE's security-community building model" Adler introduces seven "community-building functions" of the OSCE: "It promotes political consultation", "sets liberal standards", "attempts to prevent violence", "helps develop the practice of peaceful settlement", "builds mutual trust by promoting arms control agreements", "supports assistance to newly independent states", and "provides assistance to post-conflict rehabilitation" (Adler 1998: 132).

The hottest debates in the SC literature raise the question of whether security communities are only possible between democratic states – according to the basic assumption of the literature on democratic peace, which still represents the majority view – or whether they are also possible between authoritarian states or even in a mixed set of democratic and authoritarian states. Although Deutsch and his colleagues have not positioned themselves clearly here, the title of their book, which deals with a "political community" in the "North Atlantic Area" (Deutsch et al. 1957) suggests that they share the argument of democratic peace. However, if one looks at the cases on which Deutsch's work is based (and by contrast to the bulk of contemporary theory production, it is based on extensive historical research), then it can be seen that this is not at all the case because the majority of the ten cases dealt with are located in the pre-democratic periods, for instance, the struggle for German unity since the Middle Ages, culminating in the unification of Germany in 1871", or "the problem of Italian unity since the end of the eighteenth century" (Deutsch et al. 1957: 16/17). Therefore Adler/Barnett correctly find that: "The Democratic Peace literature has, by definition, coupled the absence of war to a particular type of state and thus has narrowed considerably the Deutschian framework." (Adler Barnett 1998a: 13). Both authors argue that, from the perspective of various theoretical orientations, there are many possible explanations for the absence of war" (Ibid.). Charles Kupchan, who also rejects the theorem of democratic peace, contributes to the argument with the comment "[a]s a starting point, responsible governance, rather than liberal democracy, should be adopted as the standard for determining which states are legitimate and in good standing" (Kupchan 2012: 189).

Security Communities – critical and too little discussed elements

To further develop the SC approach or – in the language of the IFSH work program – to analyze "how [...] global cooperative structures [must] be shaped in the Eurasian-Atlantic space" – it is of central importance to identify the weak or too little discussed elements of this concept. *First,* the relatively high abstraction level of the SC debates – identity, values, significance, reciprocity – makes it difficult to translate key terms into empirically verifiable factors. This acquires im-

portance by the fact that the current SC debates, despite some articles on regional organizations, are based far less on historical research than is the work of Deutsch. *Second,* the SC debate has a clear regional focus. Adler and Barnett "define a pluralistic security community as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states" (Adler/Barnett 1998b: 30). But this regional focus is scarcely mentioned in the context of global developments. So, for example, it is obvious that one can no longer imagine the future of Central Asia – one element of a possible Eurasian SC – without taking into account the influence of China. *Third,* there is scarcely any differentiation between SC and military alliances against others. To be sure, Kupchan does write: "Zones of stable peace can take three different forms – rapprochement, security community, and union." (Kupchan 2010: 8). But that does not solve the problem, since military alliances represent something between détente and union parallel to SC: This is all the more significant since military alliances, such as NATO, are sometimes viewed as SC. *Fourth*, many SC studies have difficulty integrating the factor of power, probably because of their dominant constructivist directions, although Adler/Barnett grant that it "plays a major role" (Adler/Barnett 1998b: 39). While the role of international organizations in the development of SC is appropriately illuminated, this is far less so the case for states. However, without considering the role of the individual states, it is neither possible to understand the activities of international organizations, which depend on state action, nor to place regional SC efforts in the context of activities of established and emergent global powers. *Fifth*, the entire SC debate has a clear focus on the establishment and development of SC and less on their collapse or destruction. Adler and Barnett only address this question briefly saying that "the same forces that 'build up' security communities can 'tear them down'" (Adler Barnett 1998b: 58). It is, however, in no way clear that the "build-up" runs parallel to the "break-down" processes. This is all the more significant in the current crisis in the EU where it would be of central importance to have effective instruments for studying the further development of the Union. And *sixth*, ultimately, the key debate – on whether SC states can join with non-democratic regimes – quite apart from the plausibility arguments with the criteria, which are offered in the debates – cannot be decided. These deficits do not diminish the value of the SC debate, which dares to think and to theorize that which was, for a long time, held to be impossible, i.e. that a comprehensive stable peace is possible. The current concept does, however, need further development

The Discussion on "Negotiating the Rise of New Powers"

In a special issue of "International Affairs" (Nr. 3/2013), Amrita Narlikar and a number of colleagues began a large-scale attempt to analyze the relationship between the rising powers (here Brazil, China and India) and the established powers (USA, EU) in the production of global goods or even a kind of global order. "A central goal is to analyse systematically the nature of the relationships between these diverse actors." (Narlikar 2013: 564). Thereby, this group of articles does not deal directly with the question of a SC. But they do deal with negotiation processes on the provision of basic global goods, which represent the prerequisites for any form of SC. Thereby, they show potential to raise questions, which are of significance for the further development of a concept of a SC.

The relationship among these five powers is studied through the focus on their negotiating behavior. "The rise of new powers is thus fundamentally a story of bargaining and negotiation." (Ibid: 561). In particular, the authors are studying the "negotiation behavior" of the powers, i.e. their "negotiation strategy, coalitions and framing." (Ibid: 564). Most important here, is the differentiation between "distributive or value-claiming at one end and integrative or value-creating strategies at the other." (Ibid: 565). In her summary, Narlikar notes that the "negotiating behav-

iour of the rising powers does not reveal a clear alternative vision of global order, or the desire for a complete overhaul of the current order. Consequently, the rise of new powers does not pose a direct or immediate threat to the system. However, the reluctance of the rising powers to take on new responsibilities amid expectations from the 'distracted incumbents' that they share the burden of providing global public goods not only makes the system more prone to deadlock, but also heightens levels of distrust, thereby increasing the risk of destabilization." (Ibid: 576). This means that the rising powers are (still) not prepared to take over the costly responsibility for the production of global goods, while the ability of the established powers to supply these goods is declining. While the three rising powers exhibit a range of distinctions in their hesitation to take on new responsibility, a detailed look at the USA and the EU is even more interesting for our research interest since they are the (group of) states, from which we generally expect the greatest contribution to the project of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian SC.

According to Vezirgiannidou, the "US [sits] at the core of the current system, with a principal role in governance institutions. [...] However, the US cannot deal with global issues like nuclear proliferation, terrorism and financial governance without cooperating with others, especially rising powers. So it faces a double dilemma: how can it preserve its unique position in the system and at the same time obtain cooperation"? (Vezirgiannidou 2013: 636). Although the author finds that "there is no 'grand strategy'" (Ibid: 640), he does, nevertheless, identify some elements of the strategic behavior of the USA. One is partial disengagement and less leadership by the USA in the cases of reform of the UN Security Council or the NPT (cf. Ibid. 640-643). Another concerns the hesitation (such as with the reform of the financial institutions) and a stronger emphasis on informal institutions (cf. Ibid: 645-647). Moreover, he emphasizes that the "rather heavy-handed and largely distributive approach towards minor powers [adds to] the long-held perception that the US applies double standards" (Ibid: 644). The USA grasps at hard distributive behaviors, where core interests are affected, and in other cases shows selective engagement and leadership. Altogether, it displays elements of relative weakness.

The diagnosis for the EU is even worse. The EU is facing a double challenge: On the one hand, as a union of states, it needs a strategic orientation. But the "problem in today's EU is that this shared strategic sense is difficult to discern" (Smith 2013: 656). On the other hand, the "nature of the challenge from rising powers [is] one of a scope, scale and variety not experienced by the Union at any point in its existence." (Ibid: 663). Both are exacerbated by the deep internal crisis of the Union. Consequently, in "relation to Russia and China in particular, [this can] lead to major elements of fragmentation around an apparent commitment at the rhetorical level to common EU positions." (Ibid: 666). All in all, the EU exhibits signs of absolute weakness: "the EU is now a long way outside its comfort zone and it is difficult in the current circumstances to see how it can retrieve the situation." (Ibid: 671).

Implications for the Discussion on Security Communities

Even this very brief discussion allows us to formulate some implications for the discussion on security communities. *First*, the discussion on SC should be more strongly contextualized in both a spatial and a temporal respect. On the one hand, developments outside of the Eurasian-Atlantic space should be considered more closely. On the other hand, whether certain assumptions and elements of thought still represent reality, should (also) be considered. For example, 15 years ago, NATO membership for Russia could still have been contemplated without taking the China factor into consideration; today, this can no longer be done. *Second*, the debate should focus more strongly on states as analytical units, in addition to international organizations (IO). States

use international organizations as stages to advance their policies and they design the policies of these international organizations. *Third,* the power factor should be more strongly integrated into studies of SC. Values, identities and significance and the socialization processes related to them are of importance, but without the ability of sustainably effective actors (a euphemism for power holders), they are less – or even not at all – significant. The challenge is to develop research designs which integrate normative and power factors. *Fourth* and finally, we need a more concrete debate. If normative convergence is of significance – and it *is* highly significant – then expressing this fact is not the result, but only the beginning of a research process to find out where we are today in the matter of normative convergence vs. divergence. The future will show whether that is sufficient to give the debate over a SC a new push. Nevertheless, even this small article shows that it is worthwhile confronting together two lines of thought about global change, such as that on SC and that on global negotiations

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4.3 Cross-sectional Working Group 3 – Intrastate potential for violence

The subject of the Cross-sectional Working Group (CSWG) 3, is the question of which conflict-laden distortions within states, especially in Europe, have currently arisen or could arise in the future through processes determined by globalization. It also deals with what such a development would mean for the liberal peace theories. In this sense, within the working group, this is about the "inner side" of the liberal peace model under globalization conditions.

Altogether, liberal peace theory is the concept of peace as a societal process, in the course of which, the collective use of force becomes ever less likely. Liberal peace theories give significant weight to the democratization of ruling systems and the creation of rule of law since they link the decision on war and peace to the will of the society. The exponents of these theories see these intra-societal processes in close relationship with an increasing interstate integration on various functional levels. A further central element of many liberal peace theories is the reference to the peace-making significance of increasing distributive justice both at *intra*state and *inter*state levels.

In the course of globalization, however, two processes, running simultaneously, can be identified, through which the bases of democratic policy in Europe could be decisively changed. Hereby, basic assumptions of liberal peace theories would also be questioned: for one thing, the political ability to negotiate and the legitimacy of democratic governments will be increasingly limited. This happens, for instance, due to globally acting societal actors, such as large international businesses making important decisions without the participation of these governments. At the same time, however, these decisions affect the citizens represented by these governments. On the other hand, the transfer of decisions to democratic, but only weakly legitimated, international organizations diminishes the agreement between rulers and the ruled. In the course of the financial crisis, the limits of the economic and political doable with respect to the effectiveness of "unregistered" actors, acting across borders, were already tangible. The financial crisis shows that "integration" must not necessarily be conducive to stability and peace, but can also bring new challenges and, possibly, even risks and dangers for security and peace.

When it comes to serious social distortions in connection with globalization processes, even in democracies that have previously been considered stable, then it is conceivable that, here too, conflicts of interest can no longer be dependably headed off through rules and procedures accepted by all sides. The liberal peace theories allocate to the state specific conflict-regulating roles and postulate a consensus between rulers and the ruled, as well as a congruent relationship of identity and legitimation. How can the politicization and articulation of interests needed to balance societal demands be assured now, when, in face of complex global problems, decisions are, more and more, delegated to the international level or are made directly by powerful transnational actors? Possible consequences of such a diminishment of the consensus between those subject to the rules and those making the rules can be not only "passive" loss of trust in the elected governments, but can also cause radicalization and violence. On the other hand, however, they can also lead to the creation of new societal groups, which can promote a peaceful, productive change. These kinds of processes have long been observed in other regions of the world with a lower level of economic development and societal differentiation. For the IFSH, the Central Asian region is of particular interest due to preliminary work. The observation and analysis of intrastate distortions, their connections with globalization, as well as the way in which state institutions in this region deal with various forms of protest and resistance are, therefore, parallel objects of the work of the CSWG 3. The observation of the distortion, protest and radicaliza-

tion as well as the state reactions to these developments, both in the liberal democracies of Western Europe and in the authoritarian states of Central Asia, enables, through the comparison, important insights for a peace theory under globalization conditions.

In the first discussions of the working group in 2013, the following longer-term foci for further work resulted: An initial focus was the discussion of possible mechanisms for defining those bases of democratic states whose continued existence presumes liberal peace theories, as well as a critical analysis of state measures, which are taken to maintain societal order. Here, it must first be clarified, which statements of liberal peace theories on questions of the economy and distribution apply, what they say to societal division through economic inequalities and to the relationship of identity and legitimation. Then the attention of the CSWG is turned to possible consequences of societal division through economic inequalities in developed democracies, as well as the forms and the intensity of intrastate violence. It is a question of which processes of politicization and radicalization are observed in the Eurasian space and the extent to which these processes can lead to conflict and violence. Which conflict-promoting divisions are to be expected through globalization-induced processes such as, for instance, the growing inequality in Europe? Which new intrastate demands will be formulated into state policy and how can the state do justice to these demands? Beyond this, to what extent can democratic principles, such as representation and participation, still develop conflict-binding effects under the conditions described? Where are concrete fissures and starting points for regress already showing?

We are also keeping an eye on which ruling techniques European institutions and national governments – here, first and foremost, security institutions and powers – are using to address losses of legitimation and how they react to outbreaks of violence. There is also a range of possible reactions that could be considered, among them control of violence, repression and surveillance. However, an analysis of governance techniques should also reveal subtler methods of political rule. Here a keyword is the term “gouvernementalité“.

The subject matter of the discussion in the working group will also be the way in which politicization and radicalization could bring about peace bonuses, when, for instance, through them, awareness for social and political deficiencies can be raised, the relevant political debate initiated and societal changes promoted in a peaceful way. Also considered are the identification option competing with or rejecting liberalism and the perspective of a systemic critique of power.

Mentioned in the initial meetings of the working group in 2013 were texts on liberal peace theory, on possible mechanisms of dissolution of the intrastate bases on which liberal peace theories rest and texts, which have as their subject matter the state measures for maintaining societal order. In the meetings, which followed, a discussion of the room for maneuver of the welfare state of Western democracies – also through text readings and supported by newer empirical studies – as well as the problematization of the market orientation in developing countries, post-conflict societies and former socialist states, took place. Beyond text perusal, the projects, publications and ideas for applications by the participants will also be presented.

4.3.1 The civilisational hexagon and rule of law outside of Europe

Sebastian Schiek

The CSWG 3 of the IFSH is studying new intrastate potential for violence as a consequence of globalization-determined change processes within nation-states and societies. While, hereby, the regression of individual elements of the civilisational hexagon is the focal point for Europe, the question of the degree to which the eight elements can be realized at all for the region of Central Asia must be asked.

The eight elements of the civilisational hexagon set conditions for the pacification of "modern" societies, which are all equally necessary. Nevertheless, a hierarchy or also a chronology of these eight elements can be found in Senghaas: The monopoly on violence is in first place and afterwards the rule of law, affect control and democracy follow. This sequence corresponds to the process-sociological reconstruction of European state building according to Elias, but also to Max Weber's understanding of state building. Senghaas' model has stimulated a broad debate over the implications of its Eurocentric orientation and over its universal application (cf. i.e. Jaberg 2011). Rather than continuing these rather theoretical debates, it will be shown here using the example of Kazakhstan, how the process of rationalization of the state occurs as a possible basis for the rule of law in societies outside of Europe. The case of Kazakhstan is particularly interesting for this, due to its state hybridism between patrimonial power structures and rationalization processes. The rationalization process studied here is relevant for conflict theory in a double sense: 1) The patrimonial-authoritarian leadership in Kazakhstan can certainly secure the state monopoly on violence in the form of a negative peace and can generate a certain measure of legitimacy with respect to its people. But the rationalization represents the attempt to counteract the risk of destabilization of the patrimonial-authoritarian rule, which has been clearly shown by the electoral revolutions in many post-Soviet states. 2) However, the modernization process itself is also conflictive without, however, giving any indication of a current potential for violence.

The civilisational hexagon serves as a foil in the analysis, on the basis of which the deviation from the ideal is detected and, thereby, indicators of the conflictive process can be acquired. This foil deals with a snapshot of European peace conditions of the post-war time. In order to study structural similarities and differences in state-building outside of Europe empirically, recourse to Elias' process method as well as Weber's ideal types of patrimonial and rational rule makes sense. Here, rationalization of the state means a de-patrimonialization and is, thereby, always in a tense relationship with patrimonial rule. This process is conflictive to the extent that it produces winners and losers.

Rational rule inside and outside of Europe

The rationalization of the ruling systems in Europe is closely connected with the phase of absolutism, the expansion of capitalism and the development of the power group of the Bourgeois. In France, it was Louis IX, in particular, who initiated the disempowerment of the old, patrimonial nobility and the rise of lawyers, the new "state nobility" (Bourdieu). In Germany, the reformers, under Frederick the Great, succeeded in taking away from the patrimonial class, extensive traditional rights. The absolutist ruling systems had become so complex that a rationalization was unavoidable, an argument that Elias summarized in his model of administrative instruments.

Ultimately, however, the rise of capitalism, as a form of the economy and as a cultural program, advanced the principle of rationalization within the society and thereby also changed the basis of the state, a key argument of Max Weber. Hereby, two groups developed a robust interest in a rational state: within the state, the lawyers, whose knowledge could be valued economically as social capital only in a constitutional state. Outside the state, the capitalistic bourgeois were dependent on the predictability of state dealings. The rationalization process created the structural and cultural basis for the later "break-through" into a democratic mass state.

State-building outside of Europe was induced first in the time of colonialism and is frequently characterized in the post-colonial phase through authoritarian and patrimonial rule. In contrast to Europe, however, this state-building took place simultaneously with the attachment to the capitalist world market and under the critical observation and intervention of west-oriented world societies. From this "simultaneity of inequality", the following hypothesis can be derived: *Between simultaneous state-building and modernization/rationalization practices, there is a tension that causes practical dilemmas and generates contradictory strategies by state actors.*

Case Study: State building and rationalization in Kazakhstan

The question of the readiness to modernize in states outside of Europe is frequently answered in the scientific literature at the actor's level and purely voluntarily. According to this, it is the egoistic interest in acquiring wealth as well as the lack of will of state actors that hinder the introduction of democracy and the rule of law; quite in contrast to the oppositional "civil society" that strives for both of these values.

However, the case study showed that the notion of an antagonism between the "bad" state and the "good" civil society, which is particularly dominant in Czempiel, is misleading. First of all, the divide runs between *arrière-garde* and *avant-garde* – also within the state – and, at the same time, a not-insignificant segment of the population profit from the status quo as "sub-tenants" of the power. But even the demarcation between groups of actors within the state is problematic: The dilemmas, which result from the non-simultaneous development, extend into the habitus of the actors and create contradictory strategies of action.

Formal statehood in Kazakhstan is colored by the colonialism of the Russian Empire and the subsequent Soviet time. Both phases led to a deep social change, which was shown in the (forced) settlement policy of the former nomads, the industrialization and the nationalization of the society, as well as the great significance of the state bureaucracy. The bureaucratic rule was, however, also clearly colored by patrimony, which was shown through the strong monopoly of power of the (Communist) Party, the patronage, corruption and the great significance of the informal economy. During 1991, the West, in particular, demanded democratization and the rule of law from Kazakhstan, but the societal and state conditions were unfavorable at the time of independence: on the societal side, there was scarcely any experience of state-free public life or political participation; the state, on the other hand, represented a complex ruling and economic system, which was difficult to control. Patrimonial practices, such as, for example appropriation of public property introduced in the 1980s was structurally anchored in the habitus of state actors. Thus, an urgent task was to disentangle the industry from Moscow, which seemed impossible without foreign capital. A consequence of this was the strong entanglement of Kazakhstan with the world market from the beginning of its independence.

These structural requirements blended with the dynamics of privatization and democratization. Privatization had already begun before the political shift in Eastern Europe and was forced in the 1990s; the first constitution of 1993 still had a democratic character. The combination of these structures and processes created unfavorable, centrifugal forces for the central state: the cultural and social capital for appropriation was concentrated, first and foremost, in the hands of state actors as well as a small minority of *non*-state actors. The informal appropriation within the framework of privatization led to an independence of the administrative class, which was no longer mandatorily dependent on support from the central state. As a further dynamic, power centers outside the state, which banded together with groups within the state, came into existence for the first time. Both dynamics meant a loss of power resources for the central state and joined with the third dynamic, double accumulation. Its logic lies in the fact that state and economic actors must accumulate political and economic power in order not to lose both. As a consequence of this new dynamic, the state field was colored from the beginning by battles between competing groups over economic and state resources

The ambivalence of patrimonial consolidation of power

These strong centrifugal powers cannot be subsumed under terms such as liberalization or compared with the democratic competition in stable, established states. Rather, they represent an extremely dynamic and, in the final analysis, the contingent state-forming process – through which it was not yet decided whether the societal power was concentrated within or outside of the state field. Retrospectively, other strategies against the shift in power balances would also have been conceivable. *De facto,* the reconsolidation of power by President Nazarbayev was, however, strongly guided by his socialization in patrimonial socialism and, as a result, initially led to a reproduction of patrimonial statehood with changed conditions, namely the establishment of a patrimonial capitalism and the connection to the world market. In addition to a patrimonial strategy of inclusion of all relevant actors, the consolidation had informal and formal elements. Informally, it consisted first of patrimonial control over the privatization process to finance his rule. Characteristically, one of the Kazakh oligarchs was soon considered to be the "treasurer" of the presidential family. Second, Nazarbayev had already ended the democratic phase in 1994 and followed a strategy of successive power monopolization, which reached its high point in 2007. At the same time, however, modernization rhetoric was apparent from the mid-1990s, which acquired practical relevance in the years that followed and, thereby, went beyond "mere" rhetoric. The grounds for the modernization lie in the economic structure, the earlier connection to the world market, the person of Nazarbayev and, in general, political power considerations as well. The patrimonial monopoly of power turned out to be ambivalent: on the one hand, it secured Nazarbayev 's power and the state's relative capacity to act; on the other hand, it immediately proved to be a structural brake on the reform project.

Dilemmas of the conservative modernization

Empirically, it can be concluded that the project of conservative modernization in Kazakhstan, is advancing partial modernization without fundamentally disassociating from authoritarian, patrimonial-bureaucratic rule. The modernization is oriented on the model of industrialized states in Asia and, thereby, follows a kind of industrialization to diversification of the rentier economy and the rationalization of rule at the administrative level necessary for that. These economic and political reforms are mutually dependent on each other: a successful industrialization promises stable financing of sovereignty and a minimizing of negative consequences of the rentier econo-

my and, thereby, eases a rationalization of the state. A successful rationalization of the administration is, in turn, a condition of industrialization. However, as can be shown empirically, patrimonial retention of power and simultaneous modernization are in an ambivalent state of tension. A dilemma results from this because the two goal categories, patrimonial retention of power and modernization, cannot be implemented to the same degree. Methodically, the process of uncovering the modernization dilemma is not new. Migdal and Schlichte, for example, with the category of the president or modernization dilemma, have referred to the relationship between ruler and society. The following dilemmas of rationalization refer, above all, to the relationship between ruler and staff. The strategy of administrative rationalization in Kazakhstan comprises three building blocks: A separation of the levels of politics and administration, a rationalization of administration as well as a transfer of power from politics to administration. The reform project can best be summed up as a power play between the president and the patrimonial power elites whose object is the expropriation and re-appropriation of opportunities for acquisitions. In the final analysis, the attempt at administrative rationalization is weakened through the resistance of the staff, but also through the contradictory strategies of the president himself. To explain this, the following dilemma can be reconstructed:

	Logic of securing power	**Logic of modernization**
1. Inclusion dilemma (also Schlichte)	Inclusion (Consequence: corruption)	Fighting corruption (FC)
2. Tension dilemma	Tension/conflict (Consequence: Corruption, limited ability to act)	Rational state, separation of politics and administration and state and economy
3. Control dilemma	Big Shuffle/Corruption (Consequence: limited ability to act)	Stability/FC
4. Patrimonialization dilemma	No centers of power outside of the state	(Partially)-autonomous class of industrialists.

Klaus Schlichte's inclusion dilemma, already described, also applies to Kazakhstan: One of the consolidation strategies of Nazarbayev was the inclusion of all relevant actors. Until the latter part of the first decade of the 21st century, actors were only excluded on the basis of breaches of loyalty, but not because of corruption. One consequence of this was the strengthening of corruption, which is in conflict with the logic of modernization.

The dilemma of tension refers to a technique for the creation and maintenance of a comprehensive monopoly of power (cf. the administrative instrument in Elias): The stability of the ruler is based, first and foremost, on the power groups within the state not stopping their competition with each other. Thereby, on the one hand, a conspiracy by these groups against the president is prevented but, above all, the competing groups are dependent on the regulating high-level ordering authority. These tensions have also not declined in Kazakhstan either and are still promoted by, for instance, the creation of "competing authorities" (already presented by Weber as the predecessor of the separation of powers). These competitive battles are in clear contradiction to the model of the legal-rational institutional state, which is supposed to be established within the framework of conservative modernization. In connection with this, there is a further

dilemma, the control dilemma. The centrifugal forces of patrimonial ruling systems are balanced by relevant centripetal techniques. Among them are the permanent rotation of state employees within the state and the control technique of corruption. The first of these limits the emergence of power accumulation; the latter makes it possible to punish disloyal clients. Both are in contradiction to the logic of modernization, which requires an "inner" stability as well as containment of corruption. Finally, in relation to the industrialization, a higher level patrimonialization dilemma can be detected: in the patrimonial-bureaucratic state of the Kazakh type, societal power is concentrated within the state, through which the establishment of a partially-autonomous class of industrialists is prevented.

The case study shows that the rationalization of state rule in contexts outside of Europe occurs under different political and societal conditions than in Europe and which – even with the best will of the actors – is confronted with difficulties, which are produced by the unequal development of rule in the global community. There is an intense debate on the questions of democratization and autocratic consolidation in states outside of Europe. However, questions of rationalization still remain underexposed and, thereby, still constitute a knowledge gap. This gap is also insofar, relevant to peace policy, because patrimonial-like states, such as Kazakhstan can, in fact, temporarily secure a negative peace, but long-term it will come under pressure due to the internal contradictions of patrimonial-authoritarian rule, in particular, under the influences of globalization.

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9. Annex

9.1 Projects

CORE

1. Larger Research Projects

CORE-10-F-02	Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy: Genuine Search for Partners or Camouflage for Unilateral Ambitions?
CORE-12-F-01	The Role of Informal „Networks of Trust" for Peace in the Ferghana Valley (1992-2013). A Comparative Analysis
CORE-10-F-06	The Afghanistan Polices of the Central Asian States
CORE-12-F-02	Establishing an OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions

2. Publication and Smaller Projects

CORE-10-P-02	OSCE Yearbook (German, English, Russian)

3. PhD Projects

CORE-11-NF-01	CFE and the Disintegration of the Cooperative European Security Order
CORE-12-NF-01	The problems of correlation between Western values and Islamic traditions in the context of democratization in Tajikistan: secular-Islamic dialogue as a factor of stability in the region

4. Consultancy Projects

CORE-10-B-01	CORE Framework Projects (Federal Foreign Office)
CORE-10-B-04	OSCE-related Information Service Activities
CORE-10-B-02	OSCE-related Training for Officials from the Swiss MFA (OSCE Chairmanship 2014)
CORE-12-B-01	Workshop in Tajikistan on the Afghanistan Conflict and its Impact on Central Asia
CORE-12-B-02	Expert workshop "Intrastate political developments and the cooperation with European partners. Discussion on the Viewpoint from the Ukrainian Province"

ZEUS

1. Larger Projects

ZEUS-14-F-01	On the role of the EU and its member states in the change in forms of violence
ZEUS-13-F-01	Organized criminality and local capacity-building as a challenge to the maritime security of Germany and the EU
ZEUS-10-F-04	The Palestinian state project in light of the power shifts in the Middle East
ZEUS-13-F-03	Piracy and maritime terrorism on the sea route Hamburg-Shanghai: Effects on socioeconomic dynamics and political conflicts on sea routes and the security of sea travel
ZEUS-14-F-02	Maritime Security
ZEUS-10-F-02	TERAS-INDEX. Terrorism and radicalization – Indicators for external influencing factors
ZEUS-10-F-03	Theory and Structural Change of Violent Conflicts
ZEUS-10-F-01	Striving for respect: A study of the socio-emotional dimension of Russia's relationships with the West
ZEUS-11-F-02	Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe (ANVIL)

ZEUS-13-F-04	A Comparative Study on Islamist and right-wing extremist radicalization and de-radicalization processes
ZEUS-13-F-05	Contested Principles, Contrasting Practices: Security Relations in Russia and the EU's 'Shared Neighbourhood'
ZEUS-13-F-06	VOX-Pol. Violent Online Political Extremism (VOPE). Virtual Centre of Excellence for Research in Violent Online Political Extremism (Joint Project).

2. Publication and Smaller Projects

ZEUS-11-P-01	Assessing the Impact of EU External Governance
ZEUS-11-P-02	The Challenge of Security Governance

3. PhD Projects

ZEUS-07-NF-03	Changes in elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the transition
ZEUS-07-NF-06	A comparative assessment of police missions in the Common Security and Defence Policy (Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo). Is there a European Union strategy for CSDP police intervention in the making?
ZEUS-08-NF-01	The internationalization of terrorist violence – causes and conditions
ZEUS-09-NF-02	The relevance of rationalist approaches in the analysis of terrorism and anti-terror policy
ZEUS-07-NF-01	Conflict prevention and crisis management of the EU: Limits and chances for coherent management in the European multilevel system

4. Consultancy Projects

ZEUS-07-B-01	International Baudissin Fellowship-Program

IFAR

1. Larger Projects

IFAR-13-F-01	Globalizing Zero: Next Steps
IFAR-11-F-02	Cyber Attacks – A New Threat for International Security?
IFAR-12-F-01	Climate Change and Security (CLISAP.2 C4)
IFAR-10-F-01	Deterrence, Disarmament and Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe

2. Publications and Smaller Projects

IFAR-13-P-02	New Ways in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Arms Control
IFAR-09-P-04	Verification und Monitoring of International Agreements (including CTBT)
IFAR-13-P-01	Weaponization of Space and Arms Races in Asia
IFAR-12-P-06	New Strategic Arms

3. PhD Projects

IFAR-12-NF-01	Verifikation und Monitoring nuklearer Abrüstung
IFAR-08-NF-02	Seasonal Modeling of Regional Water Flow Amounts from the Viewpoint of Climate Change
IFAR-09-N-01	Conflict Factor Forest Protection? Analysis of the Effects of Forest Protection Measures on Conflict Formation in Selected Regions of the Amazon Basin

4. Consultancy Projects

IFAR-08-B-02	Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
IFAR-08-B-01	Consultation for the Arms Control Department of the Federal Foreign Office

Cross-institutional Projects

1. Larger Projects

IFSH-13-F-01	Transnational Violent Conflicts
IFSH-13-F-02	Environmentally determined migration and conflicts in the Arab space
IFSH-13-F-03	Risk analysis for disaster prevention

2. Publication and Smaller Projects

IFSH-07-P-01	Peace Report
IFSH-11-P-01	Russia's "Status-Quo" Strategies

4. Consultancy Projects

IFSH-08-B-01	"European Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr" Commission at IFSH
IFSH-07-B-02	Academic Reconstruction of South Eastern Europe

9.2 Publications 2013

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9.3 Statistical Data

1.1 Number of Research Projects

2010-2013 according to the approved research plan

	2010	Exter-nally financed	2011	Exter-nally financed	2012	Exter-nally financed	2013	Exter-nally financed	2014 planned	Exter-nally financed
IFSH over all	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	3	2
CORE	5	0	5	1	5	1	4	4	5	4**
ZEUS	8	4	9	6**	10	6**	12	8*	12	9****
IFAR	6	3	5	4***	7	4***	4	4	4	3
Total	21	9	20	12	23	12	23	16	24	18

* 1 partially financed by IFSH
** 3 partially financed by IFSH
*** 2 partially financed by IFSH
**** 6 partially financed by IFSH

1.2 Junior Staff, Consultancy and Smaller Projects

	2010	Exter-nally finan-ced	2011	Exter-nally financed	2012	Exter-nally finan-ced	2013	Externally financed	2014 planned	Exter-nally financed
IFSH over all	5	2	5	2	6	1	4	1[3]	6	3[4]
CORE	10	7[2]	7	6[1]	8	7[1]	8	7	11	8[3]
ZEUS	19	13[2]	13	13[2]	13	12[2]	8	4[4]	4	4[4]
IFAR	15	5[4]	11	3	8	4	9	5[4]	8	5[4]
Total	49	27	34	24	35	24	29	17	29	20

[1] 5 partially financed by IFSH.
[2] 3 partially financed by IFSH.
[3] 1 partially financed by IFSH.
[4] 2 partially financed by IFSH.

1.3 Scientific Staff

Persons, status at year's end (full time equivalents in brackets)

	2009	Externally financed	2010	Externally financed	2011	Externally financed	2012	Externally financed	2013	Externally financed
Institute-wide	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	2	1
CORE	6	3[1]	6	3[1]	6	3[1]	7	4[2]	7	2
ZEUS	8	3	11	7[1]	10	6	10	6[1]	11	6[2]
IFAR	4	3	5	4[1]	6	4[1]	7	3[1]	8	4[2]
Total	**19** (13,27)	**9**	**23** (18,95)	**14**	**23** (19,12)	**13**	**25** (18,23)	**13**	**28** (17,69)	**13**
Women	7	4	12	6	13	8	12	6	13	6
For Information only: Number of doctoral candidates	19	17	22	20	21	20	18[3]	16	15[4]	13
Women	11		12		9		8		8	

[1] 1 partially financed by IFSH.
[2] 2 partially financed by IFSH
[3] In addition, there are nine external doctoral candidates, who take part in the doctoral seminars to some extent but do not fall under the supervisory program.
[4] In addition, there are ten external doctoral candidates, who take part in the doctoral seminars to some extent but do not fall under the supervisory program.



Guest Scientists

Cumulative number of persons over the respective years

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Institute wide	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**1**
CORE	**2**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**4**
ZEUS	**3**	**5**	**3**	**3**	**1**
IFAR	**1**	**1**	**2**	**-**	**-**
Total	**7**	**10**	**7**	**5**	**6**
Women	**2**	**2**	**3**	**2**	**3**

1.5 Third Party Financing and Third Party Commitments

Actual Expenditures (in Euro) / IFSH 2009-2013, Third Party Financing and Donors

Research Unit	Donor		Year				
			2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
ZEUS	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	245	76.229	94.015		16.995,51
		Foundations	18.370	9.750	14.536	12.089	
		DAAD	32.623	41.327			13.672,50
		BMBF		202.488	371.961	313.738	182.203,28
		EU	58.287	13.464		54.762	68.913,52
	Federal Ministries						
	Federal States		-	-			20.000,00
	EU			-			
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		-	5.241			
	Research Stipends		33.690	27.242	24.000		
	Other		10.702	10.520	11.022	981	327,11
Total ZEUS			**153.917**	**386.261**	**515.534**	**381.570**	**302.111,92**
CORE	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	-	-			
		Foundations			19.890		
		DAAD	31.477			37.875	47.839,70
		BMBF					
		EU					
	Federal Ministries		218400	206.682	214.048	236.668	243.276,98
	Federal States		-	-			40.614,46
	EU		-	-			
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		76.424	11.314	8.235		6.981,12
	Research Stipends		26.925	24.700	12.000		
	Other					3.543	7.926,73
Total CORE			**353.226**	**242.696**	**254.173**	**278.086**	**346.638,99**
IFAR	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG		-			
		Foundations	62.185	45.214	68.464	27.695	39.924,06
		DAAD					
		BMBF					
		EU					
	Federal Ministries		8.750		51.966		113.605,44
	Federal States		32.334				9.800,00
	EU		-	-			
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.				19.292	9.580	421,30
	Research Stipends			-			
	Other			7.339	1.494	11.186	5416,60
Total IFAR			**103.269**	**52.553**	**141.216**	**48.461**	**169.167,40**
Institute wide	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	20.391	84.810	90.750	82.972	57.724,11
		Foundations	1.300		25.000		4.050,00
		DAAD					
		BMBF					
		EU	7.935	57.937	94.549	26.456	
	Federal Ministries		35.100	32.175	70.200	77.200	99.610,73
	Federal States		6.799	11.025	9.198		2.625,79
	EU			-			
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		24.432	38.702	5.688		
	Research Stipends		4.000	8.000			9.351,32
	Other		80.350	67.491	60.451	42.985	54.845,38
Total IFSH wide			**180.307**	**300.140**	**355.836**	**229.613**	**228.207,33**
IFSH altogether	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	20.636	161.039	184.765	82.972	74.719,62
		Foundations	81.855	54.964	127.890	39.784	43.974,06
		DAAD	64.100	41.327		37.875	61.512,20
		BMBF		202.488	371.961	313.738	182.203,28
		EU	66.222	71.401	94.549	81.218	68.913,52
	Federal Ministries		262.250	238.857	336.214	313.868	456.493,15
	Federal States		39.133	11.025	9.198		73.040,25
	EU			0			
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		100.856	55.257	33.215	9.580	7.402,42
	Research Stipends		64.615	59.942	36.000		9.351,32
	Other		91.052	85.350	72.967	58.695	68.515,82
Total IFSH			**790.719**	**981.623**	**1.266.759**	**937.730**	**1.046.125,64**

a) Third Party Funding Received by IFSH in the years 2009-2013 (in Euros)

Research Unit	Donor		Year				
			2009	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
ZEUS	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	226.200				180.400
		Foundations			24.800	11.070	
		DAAD	45.962	50.734	1.649		16.590
		BMBF		1.040.750			167.175
		EU			143.765		
	Federal Ministries						
	Federal States		-			20.000	
	EU		-				
	Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		-		10.000		
	Research Stipends		40.618	15.622	24.000	16.500	
	Other		6.000	9.900	53.000	8.833	46.010
Total ZEUS			**318.780**	**1.117.006**	**257.214**	**56.403**	**410.175**
CORE	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	-				
		Foundations			24.890		
		DAAD	41.590			56.110	43.451
		BMBF					
		EU					
	Federal Ministries		220.650	239.572	225.739	248.012	280.962
	Federal States		-			43.000	
	EU		-				
	Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		-		14.666		17.949
	Research Stipends		26.925	24.700	12.000	36.720	
	Other		71.742				
Total CORE			**360.907**	**264.272**	**277.295**	**383.842**	**342.362**
IFAR	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	-				
		Foundations			47.988,5	42.385	
		DAAD					
		BMBF					
	Federal Ministries		8.750	41.585	75.000		122.662
	Federal States		28.600			9.800	
	EU		-				
	Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		-		30.888	6.392	
	Research Stipends		-			12.460	
	Other		14.980	88.621	1.290		46.010
Total IFAR			**52.330**	**130.206**	**155.166,50**	**71.037**	**168.672**
Institute wide	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	420.000			208.200	
		Foundations	3.300		25.000		
		DAAD					
		BMBF					
		EU					
	Federal Ministries		35.100	37.500	70.000	77.200	77.000
	Federal States		10.000			2.800	10.000
	EU		-				
	Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		-				
	Research Stipends		12.060		25.250	8.000	8.000
	Other		45.500	6.000	22.000	33.000	
Total IFSH wide			**525.960**	**43.500**	**142.250**	**329.200**	**95.000**
IFSH altogether	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	646.200			208.200	180.400
		Foundations	3.300		122.678,5	53.455	
		DAAD	87.552	50.734	1.649	56.110	60.041
		BMBF		1.040.750			167.175
		EU			143.765		
	Federal Ministries		264.500	318.657	370.739	325.212	480.824
	Federal States		38.600			75.600	10.000
	EU		0				
	Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		0		55.554	6.392	17.949
	Research Stipends		79.603	40.322	61.250	73.680	8.000
	Other		138.222	76.589	73.290	41.833	92.020
Total IFSH			**1.257.977**	**1.554.984**	**828.925,5**	**840.482**	**1.016.209**

Development Third Party Funding 2009-2013



1.6 Publications

	2009	Peer re-viewed	**2010**	Peer re-viewed	**2011**	Peer re-viewed	**2012**	Peer re-viewed	**2013**	Peer re-viewed
Books	18	6	13	4	10	3	7	4	11	4
Book chapters	62	7	65	13	83	15	42	13	41	13
Articles in scientific journals	45	13	29	11	28	8	39	18	26	20
In ISI[6] journals	0	0	1	1	6	6	7	7	9	9
Working papers/studies	22		16	-	27	1	18	-	5	1
Other	24	1	35	-	49	7	40	6	45	0
Total	**171**	**27**	**158**	**28**	**179**	**34**	**146**	**41**	**128**	**34**
In German	95	12	79	13	121	13	69	5	75	6
Publications per scientific staff member [7]	12,88	1,13	8,33	1,47	8,92	1,69	5,32	2,13	7,23	1,92

6 Publications listed on the Thomson Reuters Work of Knowledge-List (ISI-list).
7 In full-time equivalents

Publications



1.7 Publications by research units

	2009	Refereed	**2010**	Refereed	**2011**	Refereed	**2012**	Refereed	**2013**	Refereed
Institute wide	34	5	27	4	61	3,5	18,8	6	32,5	5,5
In German	24	2	18	1	42	-	8,3	1	28	1
Publications per scientific staff member [1]	34	5	27	4	61	3,5	18,8	6	17,75	3
CORE	45	4	48	9	37	4	18,3	5	13	5
In German	19	2	19	3	22	1	4,3	1	3	-
Publications per scientific staff member [1]	7,5	0,66	10,66	2	7,59	0,82	3,57	0,97	2,78	1,07
ZEUS	65	14	56	12	60	23,5	37	11	56	24
In German	43	7	36	7	42	10	13	3	33	6
Publications per scientific staff member [1]	18,41	3,96	7,59	1,62	6,34	2,48	4,48	1,34	7,5	3,21
IFAR	27	3	27	3	21	3	22,8	3	26,5	3,5
In German	10	3	11	2	14	2	5	1	9	-
Publications per scientific staff member [1]	9,85	1,09	8,43	0,62	4,44	0,63	5,9	0,77	7,1	0,93

1 Calculated as the quotient of publications and number (in full-time equivalents) of scientific staff

1.8 Additional Indicators of the Research Work 2013

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Participation in Parliamentary hearings	15	15	19	5	13
Participation in internal discussions in Ministries	46	49	65	45	48
Participation in hearings/discussions in Ministries/Parliaments and international organizations abroad			31	65	80
Lectures	105	118	139	85	129
Podium discussions	32	29	33	37	38
IFSH conferences [1]	9	16	20	6	25
Teaching by staff (semester weeks, 2 semesters p.a.)	41	38	47,5	46	62
Completed doctorate[2]	3	2	2	1	3
Completed Master's degrees [2]	28	28	23	25	23

1 Organized by IFSH or jointly organized workshops and conferences with partner(s)
2 Number of students advised by IFSH staff

1.9 Conference and Media Activities

Topic	Lectures	Podium disc.	Conferences	Interviews	Total
Current security policy questions (also terrorism)	59	11	49	93	212
Disarmament/Arms control	18	6	14	18	56
European security	4	2	12	8	26
OSCE	18	4	7	–	29
Regional conflicts	11	4	8	38	61
Peace research (also IFSH)	12	6	3	9	30
Other	7	5	13	14	39
Total	129	38	106	180	**453**

1.10 Comparison of Conference and Media Activities 2009-2013

Year	Lectures	Podium disc.	Conferences	Interviews
2013	129	38	106	180
2012	118	30	116	152
2011	139	33	127	183
2010	118	29	117	190
2009	105	32	90	145