

Annual Report

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1 On the Work of IFSH 2014 – Director’s Foreword

The year 2014 could go down as an historic turning point in recent history. Striking were, above all, the war in Ukraine and the military successes of the extreme Islamist forces in Syria and Iraq with the merger into the “Islamic State” (IS).

At first glance, there are no visible similarities between these two wars. In the Ukraine, a political crisis over the further international course of the country escalated into the illegal take-over of a part of the country by Russia and a civil war. Parallel to this, the relationship between Russia and the West deteriorated fundamentally. IS profited from the war chaos in Syria and from the political discrimination against the Sunnis in Iraq. The origin of IS is the Sunni resistance against the US intervention and occupation of Iraq after 2003.

Despite the very different constellations and processes of formation which led to the wars mentioned, it is striking that, in both cases, confrontations between western-liberal and other values and societal models are a part of the conflict. In the Ukraine, the success of the protest movement on Maidan, which was influenced by western liberal ideas, was a trigger for the violent countermovement, massively supported by Russia. In Syria and in Iraq, efforts to make western-oriented political and military forces strong, failed. Rather, as an unwanted side-effect, they promoted radical groups prepared to use violence.

The IFSH work program adopted in 2013 involves the study of the appropriateness and sustainability of the liberal peace model. The crises in the year 2014 show the timeliness of this program. For the question of contradictions and limits of a policy, which aims to create peace through democratization, human rights protection, the market economy and the rule of law, is at the heart of the work program with its three clusters: “Changes in the forms of violence”, “Changes in global power structures and norms” and “Intra-societal potentials for violence”.

Beyond this aspect directly connected with the work program, other problems, for which particular competence is available at the IFSH, came to the fore with the crisis in Ukraine. First and foremost among them was the relationship between the West and Russia. The events in Ukraine and the consequences for the relations between Russia and the West suggested the need for a rebalancing of elements of the work program. Therefore, questions about alternatives, with which the escalation of the crisis can be countered, carry particular weight. In addition to these fundamental tasks, others arise, related to the analysis of the conflict in the Ukraine itself, to the consequences for the European security architecture or to the effects on arms and arms control. On one of these aspects, the study of trends in the use of collective war-like violence, which became clear in the war in Ukraine, there is, in this annual report, an article by Hans-Georg Ehrhart, on the other research projects are carried out at the IFSH. The focus of the studies on the European security architecture lies in works on the significance of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In the area of arms and arms control, there are studies on nuclear weapons, conventional armed forces in Europe as well as “new” technologies. such as cyber weapons and autonomous systems, on the IFSH project list.

The high relevance that the topics of the European peace and security order gained in 2014 – including their institutional form and questions of arms control – corresponds both with the direction of the work program and with the traditional priorities of the work at the IFSH. Some topical areas which, in the past, were sometimes seen as hardly viable for the future have moved back to the forefront of political interest. This applies particularly for the research on the OSCE.

With the Center for OSCE Research, the IFSH has a small but, on a global scale, a leading institution in this research area. With the selection of Germany as Chair for the Organization in 2016, good opportunities for political consulting are, thereby, opening up, for the IFSH

The current crises to which, in addition to those mentioned, came a new war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, led to a strong demand for scientific expertise at the IFSH. Due to the focus on the analysis of peace and security policy problems in Europe, the staff at the IFSH, was particularly well-positioned to advise on the crisis in Ukraine, as well as on the fundamental confrontation between Russia and the West, and to inform the public. Thereby, the IFSH is endeavoring to link consultation and information activities closely with the research.

Two projects carried out in 2014, which will also be continued in 2015, are worthy of mention in this connection:

- In 2014, the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, founded and organized by Wolfgang Zellner, published its first joint report, "Threat Perceptions in the OSCE Area". A further report with the title, "The Future of OSCE Field Operations", followed shortly before year's end. Meanwhile the Network comprises more than 40 academic and research institutes from 32 countries. It is, thereby, an instrument of communication in the preliminary stages with state actors and a contribution to confidence-building among the OSCE participating states.
- The trilateral *Deep Cuts Commission*, coordinated by the IFSH, is one of the few fora in which Russian, German and American scientists can confer together about questions directly related to peace and security, with the goal of a consensual publication. The basis is, apart from the expertise provided by the commissioners, a series of working papers. Even if an immediate effect on the nuclear policies of the USA and Russia can scarcely be expected considering the general tension, the commission is still an important forum for dialogue and the negotiation of compromises among experts who are independent, but mostly close to their governments.

Both of the projects mentioned combine research and consultation. They are applied as "Track 1.5" processes: They are carried out in close contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but with scientific autonomy of the participants under the leadership of the IFSH

Reflections of the public awareness of the IFSH, apart from the projects mentioned are, among other things, the numbers cited in the appendix to this Annual Report, on the scope of the public relations work and political consultation by members of the IFSH staff. In 2014, staff members took part in 134 hearings and internal discussions in parliaments, ministries and international organizations. The reputation among the general public is demonstrated by, among other things, the requests by the media for the expertise of the IFSH. In 2014, some 235 interviews with IFSH staff were registered. Further indicators, such as 112 lectures and participation in 35 podium discussions, are evidence of the interest in the IFSH by the public.

Even if consultation is able to gain greater significance for the IFSH in the coming years, research remains the basis for the work of the Institute. Important developments here were, among other things, the agreement with the GIGA on research cooperation on Central Asia. The work on the work program in force between 2008 and 2013 has largely been completed with the key results collected in an anthology. Some larger projects were completed in 2014. Among them were a "Risk Analysis for Disaster Prevention", commissioned by the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK). It contains an estimate of the short-, middle- and long-term military and terrorist threats, as well as technological trends which influence such threats. A

further completed project is TERAS_INDEX, which examined whether German foreign and security policy has any influence on Islamist radicalization in Germany. In the results, this connection was shown to be of only limited relevance. In the milieus studied, German foreign policy was only used in exceptional cases as legitimation for radicalization

Radicalization remains a research topic at the IFSH – which suggests the timeliness of the “foreign fighters” who were drawn as supporters of the IS in the war in Syria and Iraq. There is a brief survey of this in this year’s annual report. The thematic priority for 2015 is the cooperation in an international project on online radicalization that was begun in 2014. A range of other projects were also begun in 2014, such as a project on “resilience”, a concept that originally came from environmental analysis and policy which, meanwhile, is also used in security policy in general and, in particular, in the discussion on dealing with the consequences of climate change. This project is a part of the research at the IFSH on the relevant consequences of climate change for peace and security.

However, not all projects which should have gotten underway in 2014, will also be carried out. The competition for third-party funding in the area of research is great, with the approval quota by the German Research Foundation or the European Union in the smallest two digit percent region. Several research applications by the IFSH that received positive expert opinions were, nevertheless, not approved. All in all, the result for the acquisition of third-party funding for 2014 was satisfactory with 875,873€. It was over the target figure of 50 percent of the institutional support, but in 2015 this may lead to a reduction of third party funding. There is an ever-greater gap between the declared societal need for research on peace and security and the available expertise at the IFSH through doctoral and post-doctoral support, on the one hand, and the available financial means on the other hand. One consequence is the exodus of qualified young researchers to other research institutions, universities and international organizations. Four young researchers alone from the IFSH have been hired by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs – SWP) in Berlin in the last few years. The IFSH also continues to hire young researchers, but the room for maneuver has grown narrower. In 2015 there will be a counterpoint to this: for the first time, a joint junior professorship position with the University of Hamburg will be advertised and filled.

Even under the more difficult conditions and the particularly strong demand in 2014 for IFSH expertise, efforts were continued to achieve high numbers in the performance indicators, which, in science, are considered a central credential of qualitatively high standing of scientific research. The total number of publications in 2014 increased slightly (157 compared to 128 in 2013), while the number of peer-reviewed publications went down slightly (33 compared to 34 in 2013). The main reason for this is the strong demand for texts on the current situation, in particular on the war in Ukraine and the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West. The number of publications in journals, especially high-level journals (Thomson Reuters World of Knowledge-List) stayed the same with nine.

Research at the IFSH is closely connected with the promotion of young researchers and teaching. A high proportion of teaching in the “Master of Peace and Security Studies” course is carried out by scientists from the IFSH who incorporate their research into their lectures. In 2014, 24 students earned their Master’s degrees. The number of doctorates was, with four, above average which should also be the case in 2015 due to a change in the Ph.D. regulations at the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences. The cooperation with GIGA in the area of doctoral supervision was also expanded. Both GIGA and IFSH plan to reduce the number of doctoral candidates in the future.

This Annual Report would be incomplete without acknowledgements. Thanks go first to the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg which generously supports the work of the Institute. We are also much obliged to the countless cooperation partners in Germany and abroad. Finally, the commitment and the competency of the IFSH staff, which they have shown again in 2014, must be mentioned

February 2015

Michael Brzoska

2. Scientific Organization of the IFSH

Box: IFSH Mission Statement

IFSH staff research the terms and conditions of peace. They analyze, test and develop strategies for the avoidance and reduction of collective violence. The particular approach of the IFSH lies in the analytic coupling of the fundamentals of peace research with current security policy questions. The IFSH combines excellent research with interdisciplinary teaching, the promotion of junior staff and practice-relevant consultations with political and societal actors. The IFSH, as an independent scientific institute, cooperates with institutions in the metropolitan region of Hamburg, as well as with national and international partners.

The name of the IFSH is associated with a multifaceted task: On the one hand, the IFSH is firmly anchored in peace research with its requirement to serve peace through research at a high scientific level. On the other hand, the IFSH is expected to deal particularly with security policy questions, that is, with questions which the political decision-makers must ask strategically and on a daily basis. Thereby, by statute, the emphasis is on questions of German and European policy. Here, the IFSH wishes to consult, but also to work out independent recommendations with a critical external viewpoint.

With the combining of peace research and security policy, the IFSH has unique characteristics in the scientific landscape. This is expressed in the thematic orientation of the IFSH, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, in its work organization.

While challenges to international organizations through transnational violent actors was in the foreground of the scientific work of the previous work program, the new work program decided upon in 2013, addresses itself to the topic of "Peace strategies today – peace and security policy at the breaking points of globalization."

The common element of the new work program is the study of the appropriateness of liberal peace strategies for successful peace and security policy under the conditions of dynamically progressing globalization and the resultant fissures in the world society. Rhetorically, peace policy in Germany and Europe largely follows the considerations of liberal peace strategies, which were developed in the 1960s and 1970s. With globalization and the end of the Cold War, however, the material bases of these considerations have changed. Transnational actors have increased in significance, as analyzed in the previous work program. State actors in Asia and Latin America, particularly the regional powers, question liberal peace concepts. Peace is no longer only a problem of the periphery. The inner stability of modern industrialized states is also at risk.

The changed conditions suggest the need for an objective review of the appropriateness and scope of liberal peace strategies. Fundamental assumptions, such as the peace-promoting effect of democratization and economic globalization should be questioned. The new work program delivers an analytical framework for this, which will be concretized in projects over the next five years.

The work program comprises three research clusters in which the effects of the global changes are to be reviewed for the appropriateness of liberal peace theories and the peace strategies derived from them. These are:

- A structural change in the form of violence,
- A change in the global power structures and norms.
- A new potential for intrastate violence

The three clusters are to be linked through the following overriding central questions.

1. To what extent do the conditions of peace postulated by liberal peace theories still conform to the current parameters of the global change? How do they differ from them?
2. To what extent must the established peace theories and strategies, as well as agendas and instruments, particularly those of German and European peace and security policy, be changed or adapted, considering the changed parameters?

Important considerations in the development of the new work program were, besides the expected scientific knowledge, also the potential political relevance. The work of the IFSH should continue to comprise scientific research and social and political consultation, as well as the promotion of junior staff and teaching. With the new work program, the development of a longer-term peace policy agenda will be advanced.

Through the combination of a fundamental peace policy question – the question of the appropriateness of liberal peace strategies – with topical areas of current political significance, will be ensured, so that the IFSH will continue to attract attention and a hearing in politics and society. The professional reputation with the public at large and with political decision-makers in Germany, which the IFSH has acquired over many years, is a valuable asset that will be retained and further developed with the new work program.

The scientific work at IFSH includes various forms, from the individual study of a scientist, to the cooperation in projects, to joint projects by the entire research team. A characteristic of the work of the IFSH is its interdisciplinarity. Represented here are social sciences, the humanities and natural sciences.

The primary organizational forms of the Institute were and continue to be the three departments, CORE, ZEUS and IFAR, of which two are organized as centers and one as an interdisciplinary working group. The departments are responsible for the planning and implementation of research work as well as the personnel organization in their areas of competency. They have at their disposal, scientific competence and are closely networked with decision-makers. Examples for this are the close relationships and the high standing of CORE in the OSCE and its participating States, which is reflected in, for example, the regular training of diplomats for the current chair or the high regard for IFAR in questions of arms control and disarmament, which allowed the IFSH to start the “Deep-Cuts Commission” in 2013 with experts from the USA, Russia and Germany.

In addition to the three departments, the IFSH, with its new work program, introduced a matrix organization for the strategic further development of research activities in 2013. Three cross-sectional working groups have the task of advancing the scientific work on the three topical areas of the work program (structural change in violence, changes in global power structures and norms and the potential for intrastate violence). Here, the IFSH staff who work on the projects/project ideas allocated to the research cluster will be networked beyond the departments and supported and accompanied in the initiation of pan-working group projects.

Research Topics in the Matrix Organization of the IFSH

IFSH Interdisciplinary competencies	Departments and their core competencies	Cross-sectional Working Groups		
		Structural changes in forms of violence	Changes in global power structures and norms	Intrastate potential for violence
European Peace and Security Policy Conflict analysis	CORE Peace and Security Policy of the OSCE, the OSCE as an organization; Eastern Europe, Central Asia		Perspectives for a Eurasian-Atlantic Peace Order	Violence potential Main focus: Central Asia/ Northern Caucasus
Security Governance Arms Control	ZEUS Peace and Security Policy of the EU, CSDP Missions, Federal Armed Forces, EU neighboring regions, transnational violent actors	Use of force by states, groups of states and non- state actors	Europe as peacemaker?	Violence potential Focus – EU Europe
Effectiveness analysis	IFAR Disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, risk technology, climate change and security	Military technology and proliferation	Perspectives for arms control in the Eurasian-Atlantic space	

4. Cross-sectional Working Groups

4.1 Cross-sectional Working Group 1 – Structural change in violence

Cross-section Group (QAG) 1 dealt with two aspects which are of particular significance for the credibility and the future of liberal peace policy: Changes in the way in which organized violence is planned, justified and used by non-state actors, states and federations of states, as well as the development, acquisition and proliferation of arms technology. The starting point is, thereby, the question of the degree to which and how the conditions for liberal peace theory are influenced by doctrinaire, conceptual and arms-related technical developments and their proliferation and implementation. For the peace policy derived from them is oriented, above all, at the creation and implementation of “softer” and “harder” legally binding behavioral norms through institutions of balancing interests, as well as containing the use of collective force through equitable participation. Strong international organizations, democratization at all levels and domestic and international order perceived to be just are, thereby, instruments, which are considered to be particularly important.

As the relevant statistics on interstate wars and on political and societal violence suggest, a change in the form of committing collective violence has occurred. Interstate wars have become rare. The number and intensity of intrastate wars remains high, but significantly lower than in the final decades of the 20th Century. For other forms of non-state political violence, such as terrorism, the trends are unclear. At the same time, military spending world-wide has risen to a historically high level. In the course of globalization, ever more actors have military-relevant technologies at their disposal. Today, the risks of proliferation of nuclear technology and the possibility of misuse by state and non-state actors are greater than ever. New weapons technologies are developed, the use of which in classic military conflicts, but also in asymmetric wars, is intended to create advantages. Last but not least, through such technologies and their dissemination – an example is armed drones – the risk that the existent legal and ethical restrictions on state violence will be weakened, increases.

However, the analysis cannot stop here for, parallel to the changes described, a shift in the perception of security problems has taken place. An example for this is the emergence of the concept of risk in the scientific and political debate. Even in Europe, many people feel more insecure subjectively, despite objectively proven security gains, than they did during the Cold War. An increasing “securitization” or “riskification” of globalized living conditions has contributed to ever more new alleged risks being discovered. Security policy, in turn, has reacted to this shift with an expanded range of measures. The development of missile defense systems, international interventions under the leadership of Western states or the use of drones within the framework of networked warfare, are examples of this.

These and other changes in the use of collective force, but also the perception of the risks of violence, put the dominant peace strategies in Europe and Germany to the test. For the peace policy derived from them is geared, above all, towards the creation and implementation of “softer “ and “harder”, legally binding behavioral norms through institutions of reconciliation of interests, as well as the restriction of the use of collective violence through equal participation. Strong international organizations, democratization at all levels and a domestic and

international order considered as just, are, thereby, instruments, which are seen as particularly important.

In the first place, the changed forms of violence call into question the appropriateness of interstate arrangements for containing violence. Are legal policies and state control mechanisms still appropriate for containing collective violence and, if so, what forms are suitable and on which societal level? How can the new, i.e. civil society, actors be integrated into control regimes? Are the basic assumptions of liberal peace theories about the perceptions of risks and security still in accord with the current societal preferences?

Secondly, the changes force a rethink about the classification of the various forms of violence. This is shown, for example, in the demarcation of “war” and “peace”. Liberal peace strategies assume the distinctiveness and separateness of violence and other forms of collective action. Up until now, modern societies have been characterized by a strict functional separation of collective violence from all other functional areas – the military as an institution, the international humanitarian law as an area with special rights, security problems as a justification for a state of emergency. However, can the peace of the liberal peace theory still serve as an orientation for peace policy in times of advanced globalization in which the customary dividing lines are increasingly erased?

Finally there is the question of the dynamics of changed forms of collective violence. New combinations, comingling and interactions of various dimensions and kinds of conflicts stand out. Central questions, such as those about friend or foe or the actual occurrence of an attack can often no longer be answered. Are the changes in the forms of violence processes independent of each other or are they connected with each other by, for example, substitution processes? How do new kinds of military and risk technologies change the decision processes of political and military decision-makers? Do they, for example, develop local forms of violence depending on external influence factors, such as the availability of modern technologies and external military intervention?

The focus of the substantive work of the QAG1 in 2014 was, first, the analysis of current military interventions and second, the connection between high technology and change in warfare as well as trends in the collective use of force.

The intervention by France and some other countries in Mali showed tendencies, which could indicate new forms of outside military intervention in the European periphery (see also the article by Hans-Georg Ehrhart). French troops did, to be sure, form the “spearhead” of the intervention, but soldiers from African countries quickly took over important tasks. Very early, a program was also launched to train the Mali armed forces. All in all, the cutback of the Western troop presence in Mali to a large extent and the build-up of local structures happened much more quickly than in other interventions, such as in Afghanistan. The question arises of whether Mali is the first example of “post-modern” intervention, in which Western armed forces have a very limited significance and the primary interest of Western interveners is in the build-up of a local “coalition of the willing.”

Another form of “post-modern” intervention, but with classic models, can be seen in the warfare in East Ukraine. The East Ukrainian separatists had military support from Russia. However, they provided – at least for long periods during the battle – the most soldiers by far. In the QAG, various concepts were discussed, among them “hybrid warfare”, to analyze the continuities and changes which war in East Ukraine displayed.

The second topic of the QAG 1 in 2014 was the question of the shifting relationships between warfare and modern arms technology, above all as they are developed and procured in the USA. Initiated through the debate on armed drones, but going beyond this, the driving forces for the development of new arms technology, among other things, was discussed controversially. For, on the one hand, inherent in scientific knowledge and technological progress is an immanent tendency to create new weapons technologies and, on the other hand, decisions on the financing of research and procurement of new weapons systems must frequently be politically justified and legitimated.

The goal of the discussions in the cross-sectional working group (CSWG) 1 is the development of new ideas and projects in the thematic areas outlined, as well as linking them to the lead questions of the work program. The study of the intervention policy of Western countries, in particular the EU, takes place, above all, by posing the question of the degree to which liberal peace strategies are compatible with or even driven by them. This question is in the foreground with respect to the observation and analysis of arms technological developments.

4.1.1 Russia's unconventional ("hybrid") War in Ukraine: Structural Change of Collective Violence as a Challenge for Peace Research

Hans-Georg Ehrhart¹

The IFSH is an institute dedicated to peace and security policies in times of increasing globalization. The structural change of violence forms one of three clusters in the medium-term working program of the IFSH. War, as a specific kind of collective violence, usually adapts to the respectively prevailing conditions. The number of classic conventional wars decreased over the last decades. In lieu thereof irregular wars between governmental and non-governmental actors occur. This development is visible even in this young 21st century. However, both kinds of war can be combined to become an unconventional war or, what is termed in popular language a "hybrid war"; a development which seems to gain importance and which can be observed in Ukraine. Hybrid wars are just as much a challenge for European security policies as it is for peace research.

Russia's annexation of Crimea and the open political support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine on the one hand and its covert military support on the other hand are signs for a violent approach, which came as a surprise to many observers. The international community is pushed hard to react properly to this challenge. One reason seems to be the alleged "completely new kind of warfare",² as frequently stated by observers. Politicians feel uncertain how to handle the situation and how to name this phenomenon. US president Obama evaluated Russia's behavior as an incursion, others use the words aggression or invasion³; NATO calls it a "hybrid" warfare⁴. However, the right technical term here is "unconventional warfare" and this is no new concept at all. With the war in Ukraine this form of collective violence is on the agenda again, with unforeseeable consequences for Europe.

Unconventional ("hybrid") War

Basically, unconventional war refers to a violent conflict fought in a covert manner while the line of fencing is unclear. States use this practice by supporting an insurgent movement, either to force the host government to a certain behavior or to overthrow it⁵. The affected state then engages in counterinsurgency. Usually the insurgents are called terrorists in order to deprive them of any legitimacy⁶. The unconventionally operating state, however, tries to support the insurgents in the most covert way possible.

According to American understanding, unconventional warfare is a form of irregular war. A directive of the US Department of Defense classified irregular warfare as just as important as

1 Dieser Artikel basiert auf meinem Beitrag „Russlands unkonventioneller Krieg in der Ukraine“, erschienen am 17. November 2014 in der Zeitschrift „Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte“.

2 Vgl. z.B. Hannes Adomeit, Die Lehren der russischen Generäle, in: Neue Züricher Zeitung, 18.7.2014 <http://www.nzz.ch/international/die-lehren-der-russischen-generale-1.18345696> (10.9.2014).

3 Andrew Higgins/Andrew E. Kramer, An Invasion in Ukraine? It's Hard to Say, in: International New York Times, 5.9.2014, S. 1, 4.

4 NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, Ziffer 13 (18.10.2014).

5 Vgl. Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, November 2010, TC 18-01, S. 1-1.

6 Vgl. dazu grundlegend: Beatrice Heuser, Rebellen, Partisanen, Guerilleros. Asymmetrische Kriege von der Antike bis heute, Paderborn 2013.

traditional warfare. It aims at countering irregular threats of state and non-state actors⁷. Indirect and asymmetric approaches are preferred, but usually the whole range of possibilities is used to exert influence (i.e. open and covert, military and civil, diplomatic and economic as well as informational and propagandistic actions). Moscow used all these tools of unconventional and irregular warfare in Ukraine. Hence, the political term of “hybrid war” is suitable in this case.

Before Russia annexed Crimea, Putin started a divisionary tactic. Without prior notice, he put large parts of the army on alert and conducted a maneuver with more than 150.000 troopers. While Western observers were busy looking at the western and central administrative districts of the army, Moscow increased the number of troopers deployed in Sevastopol. Another 22,000 soldiers were added, leaving Crimea with a number of 32,000 Russian soldiers including the special forces of the secret services and the armed forces of the newly established command for special operations. Masked, but disciplined and determined men in battle-suits without national emblems – the so-called “green men” – were always present when local pro-Russian forces occupied buildings of the Ukrainian State. A propagandistic story was told about an autonomous grass-roots movement, which wants the unification with Russia to escape the “fascist threat” from Kiev. A referendum arranged at short notice and the formal accession of Crimea to Russia on March 18th 2014 formed the supposed legalization of a clear violation of international law⁸.

Russia used a similar approach in Eastern and Southeastern Ukraine. In contrast to the annexation of Crimea, however, the conflict here escalated to a civil war with more than 5.000 casualties. The “green men” acted in concert with the local armed insurgents mainly in the territorial entities of Donetsk and Luhansk. This time, however, Russian volunteers and fighters from the Caucasus participated, Chechen groups subordinated to the Russian secret service GRU in particular. Russian propaganda paints a picture of volunteers who fight for the self-determination of Russians and against the Fascists from Kiev⁹.

Yet Russia supports the separatists in both leadership and equipment, even though Moscow did not officially recognize the two autonomous people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk¹⁰. After Kiev increased its military pressure on the insurgents, Russia reacted with military operations close to the border to deliver a credible threat of force. It also increased arms transfer to strengthen the separatists and launched unilateral humanitarian aid. In this way Russia could distract from the actual events and gained greater domestic support. In addition, a new front line was opened in Southeastern Ukraine in order to relieve the pressure on the separatists in the East, to get access to the Sea of Azov and maybe even to create the option for a land bridge to Crimea¹¹. Corresponding to the essence of unconventional wars, however, the number of Russian troops involved while being officially in vacation remains unclear.

7 Department of Defense, Directive 3000.07, 28.8 2014, Abs. 3a und 1a <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf> (10.9.2014).

8 Vgl. Adomeit, (Anm. 2); Tim Ripley/Bruce Jones, How Russia annexed Crimea, in: Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2.4.2014, S. 5.

9 Vgl. Florian Hassel/Sonja Zerki, Kaukasische Krieger, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2./3.8.2014, S. 8; War by Any Other Name, in: The Economist, 5.7.2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21606290-russia-has-effect-already-invaded-eastern-ukraine-question-how-west-will> (10.9.2014).

10 Michael R. Gordon/Andrew Higgins, Russian Artillery Moved to Ukraine, in: International New York Times, 23./24.8.2014, S. 1, 4.

11 Andrew E. Kramer/Michael R. Gordon, New Front Opens in Ukraine Conflict, in: International New York Times, 28.8.2014, S. 1, 6.

Military Doctrine and Military Reform

Unconventional warfare is not in the standard repertoire of the German Federal Armed Forces and irregular warfare did not receive any attention by the German government until recently. This is a major difference to the US and Russia. Both countries conceptualize, teach and plan unconventional warfare. And when it is deemed necessary to achieve a certain political goal, it is practiced, too. The Russian military doctrine from 2010 characterizes contemporary military conflicts as a connection of military and non-military means. Furthermore, Russia emphasizes the increased importance of information warfare in achieving political goals, either without military actions or to prepare those actions¹².

After analyzing Western civil-military activities in Libya and Syria and during the “Color Revolution” in Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004, Moscow realized that the boundaries of war and peace had become blurry and the rules of war had changed. Russian Chief of General Staff Wasily Gerasimov infers therefore the following insights: non-military means, asymmetric actions and the usage of precision-guided weapons, Special Forces and internal opposition forces gain in importance. Furthermore, information operations play a major role. On the one hand, Russia tries to protect itself against such partially new forms of war. On the other hand, Russia for the first time applies this practice in a modernized form in Ukraine¹³.

Both, the organization and training of illegal, armed groups in Russian or allied territory and provocative military maneuvers in neighbouring states are classified as military threats by the doctrine¹⁴. Besides the defence against aggressions and measures for peacekeeping, the protection of Russian citizens in foreign territory in case of an armed attack is seen as a legitimate function of the armed forces¹⁵. President Putin clarified this passage of the military strategy in his programmatic speech to the Russian Ambassador Conference on July 1st, 2014. With respect to “our compatriots” in the Ukraine he said: “When I speak of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens I am referring to those people who consider themselves part of the broad Russian community, they may not necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they consider themselves Russian people”.¹⁶

Although Russia is experienced in covert warfare as well, it has been less prepared, technologically and doctrinally, than the USA. After negative experiences in the war against Georgia, which was fought partially with unconventional means, Russia initiated an extensive military reform. The aim was to create smaller units capable of operating easier, more flexible and in better networks. They should be able to operate fast in local or regional conflicts rather than in large-scale conventional battles, which for Russia is unlikely, too¹⁷. Reforms, however, are expensive. Therefore Russia increased its defense budget from \$61 billion to \$85 billion from

12 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 5.2.2010, Abs. 12 und 13, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf (10.9.2015). In reaction to the Ukraine crisis Russia adopted a adapted military strategy at the end of 2014. This version was not yet available before the publication of this contribution. See TASS, Putin endorses updated version of Russia’s military doctrine, <http://itar-tass.com/en/russia/769463> (7.1.2015).

13 Vgl. Janis Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, National Defence Academy of Latvia, Policy Paper Nr. 02, April 2014; Peter Pomerantsev, How Putin is Reinventing Warfare, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/05/how_putin_is_reinventing_warfare (10.9.2014).

14 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, (Anm. 12), Abs. 10c und 10d.

15 Ebenda, Abs. 20 und 27j.

16 President of Russia, Conference of Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives, 1. Juli 2014, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/22586> (10.9.2014).

17 Vgl. Dmitry Gorenburg, The Russian Military under Sergei Shoigu: Will the Reform Continue? 16. Juni 2013, <http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2013/06/16/the-russian-military-under-sergei-shoigu-will-the-reform-continue/#more-1318> (10.9.2014).

2008 to 2013¹⁸. The current ten-year program for armament modernization until 2020 provides another \$700 billion for military spending.

The actor's aims

Usually, unconventional warfare serves a political-strategic objective. In the case of the violent conflict in Ukraine, Russia and the West pursue completely different goals, though. Russia pursues the logic of political Realism, which highlights categories such as power, influence and balance. In this logic, Ukraine should be kept within the sphere of influence, and its approximation to NATO should be prevented. In Russian military strategy of 2010 NATO enlargement and the relocation of military infrastructure to Russian borders are described as “main external danger”¹⁹. Moreover, Moscow wants to implement the project of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which would have significantly less clout without Ukraine. Even though a Ukrainian membership is unlikely at the moment, Russia wants to keep its influence in the East of the country. Perhaps Russia hopes that the expected social and economic disruptions will in the long-term change Ukraine's situation as a whole to its favour. Until then, however, Russia could support the formation of a quasi-governmental unit called “Novrossiya” or “New Russia” without advancing the formal separation of Ukraine.

For Russia it is not only about Ukraine. Rather, it fears for its position in the world and for its national security²⁰. Its struggle for status and its opposition against a US-dominated world order certainly find support by China and other powers. The second aspect requires, according to Russian thinking, the integration of the “near abroad”. It provides a minimum level of strategic depth and seems to be necessary after decade-long economic and ethnic interweavements. Russia has left no doubt that it would not accept a Western disregard of Russian security interests. Its reaction during the Georgian conflict was a clear warning. In a pinch, Russia creates frozen conflicts. One may dismiss this attitude as old thinking, but it guides current Russian politics. Last but not least the Russian leadership is following normative and domestic objectives. On the normative level it proclaims the right of Russia to go its own way and cherishes its special values by demarcating itself from Western mass culture and permissive lifestyles. On the domestic level its primary objective is staying in power by nationalist ideology, control of the media, and authoritarian practices.

The West in turn thinks more in the logic of Liberalism, which highlights democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The strategic aim is Ukrainian self-determination and its integration to the West. On the one hand, this would be in line with the principle that every European state can theoretically become a member of the EU, given it represents the values of the EU and it is ready for accession in material terms. On the other hand, this goal can be interpreted in a geopolitical sense. The project of the “Eastern Partnership”, launched in 2009, was also a reaction to the Georgian War; Russia's answer came with the EAEU. The next step in the race of competing integration concepts was taken when Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova signed the Association Agreement in Brussels on June 27th 2014.

18 Vgl. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database (10.9.2014).

19 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, (Ann. 12), Abs. 8a.

20 Vgl. Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020, <http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020>.

A NATO membership as wished by the Ukraine is not yet on the political agenda of the alliance, but there is an approximation that could amount to a de facto membership. At the NATO summit in Bucharest President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel prevented President Bush's suggestions to include Ukraine and Georgia into the program for future NATO membership. Nevertheless, both countries were promised that these doors remain open. Already in 2008, Putin received this as a military threat²¹. After the Russian annexation of Crimea, General Secretary Rasmussen confirmed the general openness towards an accession²². Moreover, the US awarded Ukraine with the status of a "major non-ally", allowing extensive military and economic support²³. The measures agreed upon on the Summit in Wales are supposed to strengthen the feeling of security. Amongst others, NATO plans to show more presence in the region and to improve the structural conditions for that by creating a rapid reaction force, including Land, Air, Naval and Special Forces. In addition, the alliance wants to prepare better against unconventional warfare. On the one hand it wishes to increase deterrence and to confirm the commitment to Member States in case of an attack. On the other hand, however, it wants to avoid a break of the NATO Russia Founding Act.

Consequences for Europe and Challenges for Peace Research

It is probably undisputed that the conflicting parties – meaning Russia and the West as well as Ukraine and the separatists – have to find a political solution sooner or later. The problem is that they have to find a common denominator, because the longer it takes, the higher the costs borne by each party. Given the mutually exclusive political and strategic goals, both sides run the risk to completely slide into the logic of a zero-sum game – which threatens to divide Europe once again. To make matters worse, both Washington and Moscow seem to be convinced that if times goes by they might be on the winning side. Wisely, the West ruled out a military option which goes beyond improving the Alliance defense. Further economic sanctions by the EU and further countermeasures by NATO would probably just heat up the spiral of escalation.

New and old forms of unconventional and irregular warfare reinforce this negative development. From a Western perspective, Russia's military support for the separatists and the expansion of the conflict to Southeast Ukraine clearly belong to the methods of unconventional warfare. Yet, from a Russian perspective, NATO's support for the reform of the Ukrainian security institution, possible deliveries of military equipment by the US²⁴ and other states²⁵ and the countermeasures taken by NATO constitute to the very same course of action.

The consequences for Europe are difficult to predict. Perhaps those are right who predict a new Ice Age between the West and Russia or even a direct military confrontation 25 years after the end of the Cold War²⁶. But there is also the possibility of a long period of simultaneous confrontation and cooperation not leading to a "hot" conflict, even if covert measures cannot be

21 Vgl. Steven Erlanger, Putin, at the NATO Meeting, Curbs Combative Rhetoric, New York Times, 5. April 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/05/world/europe/05nato.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0 (10.9.2014)

22 Vgl. „Door to NATO Remains Open for Ukraine“, in: Euronews, 26.2.2014, <http://www.euronews.com/2014/02/26/door-to-nato-remains-open-for-ukraine/> (10.9.2014).

23 Ukraine Business Online, U.S. Grants Ukraine non-NATO Ally Status, <http://www.ukrainebusiness.com.ua/news/12586.html> (10.9.2014).

24 Vgl. den „Ukraine Security Assistance Act of 2014“, verabschiedet vom amerikanischen Repräsentantenhaus am 24. Juli 2014, <https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5190> (10.9.2014).

25 Vgl. Stephan Löwenstein, Ausgemusterte Panzer in die Ukraine, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1.10.2014, S. 2.

26 Igor Ivanov/Malcolm Rifkind, The Risk of a New Cold War, in: The New York Times, 3.8.2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/opinion/the-risk-of-a-new-cold-war.html> (10.9.2014).

excluded²⁷. Both options augur more instability as well as a dangerous potential for escalation. For a stabile settlement both protagonists would have to question their own political and strategic objectives and the measures employed. Unfortunately, they are not willing to do so yet.

A solution would primarily include renunciation of force, empathy and a common responsibility for security and peace-building. The main driving forces would be the interest in regional stability and mutual economic advantage. At first there would be a ceasefire, followed by confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and negotiations on the settlement of the Ukrainian Conflict. Such a settlement should constitute a compromise based on political self-determination, territorial integrity and non-aligned status²⁸ on the one hand, and economic support and interdependence on the other. Ukraine could cease to be a contentious object and take up a bridging function instead, despite its orientation to the West and its special status for renegade provinces. The Allies and Russia should advance the arms control and CSBM agreements, which both already exist within the framework of the OSCE. These agreements should be made applicable even to internal conflicts and operations of irregular forces²⁹. The creation of a verifiable treaty banning unconventional wars should be the aim.

It is certainly a long and winding road to the objectives outlined above. It needs a peace studies supported analysis of both “hybrid wars” and the way they can be contained and prevented. There is a great need for research, starting with the terms and concepts and empirical analyses of case studies up to the development of peace-science based proposals for handling the problem. In the 21st century this form of warfare seems to gain in importance, though the mixture of old and new manifestations is not yet identified clearly. Obviously, though, is that this form of war is costly and deeply destabilizing not just for the people directly affected in Ukraine, but also for external actors. Therefore unconventional (“hybrid”) wars and their dynamics must be explored while stabilizing and peace-promoting alternative strategies have to be developed.

27 Dmitri Trenin, The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great Power Rivalry, Carnegie Moscow Center, 9. 7. 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ukraine_great_power_rivalry2014.pdf (10.9.2014).

28 I a contested step Ukraine abolished its status of a non-aligned country in 23 December 2014. See BBC, Ukraine votes to drop non-aligned status, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30587924> (7.1.2015).

29 Vgl. Wolfgang Richter, Rüstungskontrolle und militärische Transparenz im Ukraine-Konflikt, SWP-Aktuell 59/2014.

Cross-sectional Working Group 2 – Change in global power structures and norms

Cross-sectional Working Group (CSWG) 2 is dealing with the consequences of the global shift for international norm setting, norm implementation and the settlement of peace-endangering problems. The starting point here is the assumption that international power and influence shifts will change power relationships in the international space and will, thereby, noticeably influence the existing international order. These shifts go hand-in-hand with a relative loss of power in the USA, the economic rise of China and a range of other states of the global south, as well as a weakening of the economic and political position of the West. However, they are also triggered by erosion and differentiation processes, which have been caused by globalization and, in the course of its advancement, new, influential socially “unregistered” actors, such as globally acting private economic concerns, have appeared on the world political stage. With this development, many of those starting points and conditions, mentioned in liberal peace theories as prerequisites for peace, are apparently called into question, here, in particular, the democratic nature of states and the integration of actors into international regimes and sets of rules.

In order to understand how the potential of “new” actors to shape affairs will be represented in the future and what consequences these shifts will have for international efforts at regulation – and, ultimately, for the Western liberal vision of peace and its establishment – it seems necessary to develop the empirical field which is taking shape at these fracture points. This is especially the case assuming, on the one hand, that through globalization, new, integrating systems structures, which force the actors to cooperative action, are created, but, on the other hand, so are disintegrating tendencies, such as regionalization and cultural and normative differentiation, which are accompanied by different concepts of order and change. What, then, are the crucial elements in today’s world that have structural effects? What are the normative, political and cultural frameworks for peaceful change and stable order in a world that is increasingly characterized by Western and *non-Western* societies? Where, and to what extent, are they compatible with each other? Where are the potentials for tension and conflict hidden?

Discussed in the QAG, in 2014, were those questions, which deal, in particular, with the prospects for an Eurasian-Atlantic peace order and the expected competition between the Western liberal model of state- and peace-building under conditions of globalization and other normative models in this space (Focal Point 2 of the research cluster). The literature used gave the first indications about which factors and frameworks have already been recognized in the literature as relevant. Thus, first it was a matter of a confrontation with the narrative of “rising powers” as well as the term “order” and its conceptualization under the conditions of globalization. The group paid particular attention to concepts which ascribe “multiple” forms of modernity (Eisenstadt) to the globalized world. On the one hand, these multiple modernities mutually influence each other. On the other hand, they produce and aggravate the tensions between universalistic and particularistic ideas of order, in particular when the bearers of these multiple identities consciously employ their various visions of the modernities politically. The topic of “simultaneity” and “non-simultaneity” was discussed in the context of a practical approach which describes (empirically referring to Russia), how micro-mechanisms and structures (*habits*, operational skills and material planning) characterize foreign policy behavior in social contexts. Structural elements were discussed from a general systems perspective. Thus the universalization of capitalism (even though in different forms regionally), under “decentralized globalization” conditions, promotes specific conflict formations (limited geo-

economic conflicts) while other (large geopolitical conflicts) are, on the other hand, unlikely. Such a way of looking at this also emphasizes the factor of economy and economic interdependencies as determining factors for a globalized order.

Following on the discussions, the QAG 2 will devote itself to its newly developed projects for 2015, in particular to the aspects of multiple perceptions, arrangements and constructions of legitimacy. One of the projects is studying the socio-structural basis of politics in non-Western societies using the example of the Central Asian region. Another is studying the constitution of identity and difference in the US discourse vis-à-vis China and Russia. The research project, "From Sustainability to Resilience: Ecological Concepts in international Security and Development Policy", is looking into a very current and little-researched phenomenon: the change in practices and concepts of security in international development and security policy through the influence of sustainability discourse. The project, "Good Governance for EU sustainable cooperation with the EaP neighbourhood" deals with a comparative study of central governance practices of the EU and Russia in a comparison of the relevant changes in the states under study, Belarus, Moldavia and Ukraine.

4.2.1 The “Magic” Triangle of Local Order. Prospects for a local Turn in Peace Building in the Kyrgyz Fergana Valley

Anna Kreikemeyer

In the following, the topic and the research design of a planned research project will be presented in summary.

The Topic

In almost every village in the Kyrgyz Ferghana Valley, efforts have been made from outside to support peace-building and reconciliation since the armed hostilities in Osch (2010). The donor community could scarcely be greater. A rough overview of the project documents the entire spectrum of liberal and post-liberal peace-building measures. A broad palate of *capacity-building* measures (lectures, training, seminars, workshops, dialogue platforms etc.) for various target groups (among others, local officials, police, teachers, youth, women) and in different areas (education, religion, tolerance, human trafficking, smuggling, border management, community policing, etc.) has been developed, often connected with infrastructure help, support for water management or in agriculture. In the conviction that universal values can be transferred to local cultures, well-educated staffs of international organizations and non-governmental organizations work with modern Western educational or social-pedagogical methods.

Both Central Asian experts as well as staffs of donor organizations almost unanimously criticize the meager results of such efforts. They are rooted in inadequate universalistic liberal concepts and in self-centered procedures, detached from the specific realities on the ground. Similar criticism of comparable efforts in conflict areas, such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Kosovo, is growing loud. There too, projects of a multitude of external actors have resulted in unintended results and counterproductive effects. Furthermore, insufficient conflict analysis and deficits in conflict-sensitive planning were obvious. Analyses of such projects reveal a widespread vertical orientation of the local population with respect to their elite leadership, as well as the precedence given to informal relationships at the local level. Even the World Bank recommends taking informality more strongly into account than current post-liberal concepts of *local ownership* do. Critical Central Asian experts recommend that donors promote Kyrgyz efforts at conflict management and enter into long-term commitments with local key persons and communities instead of supporting external actors.

The crisis in peace-building in the Kyrgyz Ferghana Valley reflects the general problems with Western, liberal interventions, which are driven primarily by global competition, but are also hindered by local resistance. The long-dominant approaches of liberal cosmopolitanism and of liberal peace in the spirit of the *Agenda for Peace* (1992) seem to have reached their limits. The generally assumed causal relationships between democratization, socioeconomic development and liberal peace are increasingly being questioned. Despite efforts to strengthen *local ownership*, post-liberal external interventions have, as yet, been unable to achieve sufficient legitimacy on the ground.

Against the background of this crisis of external peacebuilding, the new paradigm of the *Local Turn in Peacebuilding* (Mac Ginty/Richmond 2013, 2014) has awakened hope of being able to bridge the frequently lamented gaps between external concepts and local social order in non-Western societies. The Local Turn has developed an analytical framework to conceptualize peaceful action at the local level of post-conflict societies. A key term is the “local range” of

“everyday peace”. Mac Ginty and Richmond distance themselves from romanticism and define “local [peace as] the range of locally based agencies present within a conflict and post-conflict environment, some of which are aimed at identifying and creating the necessary processes for [... a local modus vivendi based on tolerance and coexistence ...] perhaps with or without international help, and framed in a way in which legitimacy in local and international terms converges”.³⁰ Furthermore, they have taken the view that local peace can also be influenced by multiple factors on (trans-)national and global levels. Disruptive factors, such as migration, growing individualism, religious radicalization, nationalism, corruption, smuggling, human trafficking or the interference of neighboring countries and/or regional powers, which mutually influence each other, can also bring about serious repercussions.

However, the question arises about whether the conditions for the *Local Turn in Peacebuilding* and the local social order in the Kyrgyz Ferghana Valley will fit together so easily. What makes the *Local Turn* interesting in a non-Western context is its normative openness and the basic assumption that each local order which is grounded in peace, has at its command, in principle, inherent capacities for peace and is able to create the conditions for peaceful coexistence. While external actors are not excluded from this concept, they are not seen as a necessary condition for local peace. In the Kyrgyz Ferghana Valley, this assumption was confirmed even against the background of difficult socioeconomic conditions and ongoing ethno-political tensions. In the crisis in Osch, various local actors were able to stem the violence – quickly and successfully – after a few days, without outside intervention. After the armed unrest in the ethnically torn city of Uzgen in 1990, traditional “networks of trust”, local officials, local NGOs, and the local population were able to prevent further outbreaks of violence despite continuing tensions. In April 2014, the resolute action of an individual local Mullah in a border conflict near Batken contributed to convincing a crowd of people to resist the temptation to use violence.

While involvement by citizens and local NGOs for tolerance, co-existence and welfare in the Kyrgyz Ferghana Valley is certainly possible, this primarily communitarian and post-Soviet culture, still operates to a great degree within the framework of the traditional social order. Particularly in rural areas, we are dealing with a Muslim and neopatrimonial order. The population is used to relying on the triangular interaction among patrons, who are responsible for resource allocation, the state bureaucracy and the Muslim elders. In this “magical triangle of local order”, economic, political and normative aspects of power are closely – and, above all, informally – connected with each other. The primacy of the informal over the formal is seen as a basic reality, which is reflected in the high significance of trust. The actors know, for example, about the “law of reciprocity” (whoever receives something knows that he/she must give it back someday). An ideal type of a “triangle of local order” can be seen as an indispensable condition for everyday peace at the local level. That is, so long as the poles of such a triangle are in balance with each other, local stability can be assured. It is not impossible, but more difficult to maintain, if the fragile balance between the aforementioned poles becomes shaky due to the concentration of power in one pole. This also applies to disruptive factors mentioned, which also weaken the capacities for peace-building among the local population.

The Research Design

30 Roger Mac Ginty/Oliver Richmond, *The Local Turn in Peace Building: a critical agenda for peace*, in: *Third World Quarterly*, 34(5) 2013, p. 769.

Media, politics – and, yes, also peace research – usually deal with violence, threats, risks and fears. This also applies to the Kyrgyz Ferghana Valley, over whose conflicts and risks of violence, countless reports and studies have been written. The planned project is innovative and suggests a change in perspective. While we are not ignoring conflicts, we are looking through the lens of everyday peace at the local level in this non-Western society. Our planned micro-level analysis is primarily interested in what the capacities and limits are for what the local order can contribute to everyday peace. Furthermore, we want to know how disruptive factors from outside the local level influence these capacities. Based on these results, we hope to determine the prospects for a *Local Turn in Peacebuilding* in a Central Asian context. We are pursuing three goals:

1. *Data collection*: In three case studies, we want first to try to understand the local social order by collecting empirical data on the structures and actors of the “triangles of local order” and the local population as well as local effects of multiple disruptive factors.
2. *Micro-level analysis*: Our second goal is to study, in a micro-level analysis, social practices of everyday local peace in the light of indicators of the *Local Turn*. Our central questions are: How do local actors contribute to everyday peace at the local level? Which social practices have proven to be legitimate, effective and sustainable from the perspective of the local population? Which effects do disruptive factors from outside the local level have on these social practices?
3. *Background Study and Contribution to Theory Development*: On the basis of a background study we want to record multiple disruptive factors and present them in their interactions. The results of our micro-level analysis are aimed at advancing the theoretical debate on the possibilities and limits of (authoritarian) stabilization in post-Soviet neopatrimonial countries.

Methodology. We are following a reflexive and context-sensitive approach and work with interdisciplinary qualitative methods. Against the background of a non-Western cultural context the field research is obligated to use a self-critical (reflexive) approach. It is advantageous that the researchers and doctoral candidates can cover all three of the local languages. Only native speakers can study sensitive points, such as local informal networks, power structures, identities or religion, in depth. The doctoral candidates will live for six months in the case study sites. The researchers will have shorter research stays on site. Both groups will use qualitative, pluralistic and complementary methods (sociological, ethnographic, social-psychological, *oral history* approach). With respect to the multiple disruptive factors, we will also record quantitative data (migration data, gas, water and electricity supplies, infrastructure, access to bazaars, internet cafés and youth clubs). Documents and statistics as well as secondary literature will also be evaluated. The interchange with members of (I)NGOs and international organizations, which are active in the case study regions, but also critical analyses of their reports and evaluations will also be considered useful.

Selection of Case Studies. We are collecting data in three case studies: the regions of Aravan and the cities of Kyzyl Kiya und Uzgen in the provinces of Osch und Batken. Our case study selection is aimed at sites with a high level of normality, with small differences. The region of Aravan, shaped by agriculture, allows us to study both small towns as well as country areas. The city of Kyzyl Kiya is a comparatively atypical industrial centre with a strong Soviet heritage. Uzgen is a traditional city with a familiar historical inheritance and an economic basis in trade and the agro

industry. All three areas are more or less affected by the widespread socioeconomic crisis, which is characterized by a lack of manufacturing industry, high unemployment, high population growth and high rates of migration. The effects of religious radicalization and intraregional tensions with the neighbors, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (border conflicts, repeated closures of the Uzbek gas pipeline in the winter), can be observed in all cases. All three areas are ethnically mixed. While Aravan and Uzgen have an Uzbek minority, Kyzyl Kiya is characterized by a narrow Kyrgyz majority and an extraordinary mixture of 50 ethnicities, among them Uzbeks, Russians, Tajiks, Tatars, Turks and other smaller groups. By contrast to Aravan and Kyzyl Kiya, Uzgen experienced a bloody conflict in 1990. External peace-building measures and other aid projects are being carried out.

The Research Team

We are planning to work in a team made up of five researchers and three doctoral candidates from various Central Asian countries and Germany. All of the researchers have empirical-analytical research competencies, experiences in international cooperation and speak very good English and Russian. Three of them speak the local languages of the Ferghana Valley. They can evaluate the political developments in their home countries impartially.

The Results

We are planning to prepare a background study with contributions from all of the colleagues. On the basis of the data collection of three researchers and three doctoral candidates, we will publish, in international peer-reviewed journals, two joint articles on the topical area of local social order and on the connections with social practices of everyday peace (*Local Turn*) as well as four individual articles on interactions with multiple disruptive factors and further development of theories on authoritarian stabilization. Furthermore, we will organize two workshops with representatives of the local order and the donor organizations active in Kyrgyzstan, at the Jalalabad University (2017) and at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek (2018). The project integrates a training component: three doctoral candidates from the Ferghana countries will take part in the research process and, under supervision and with the possibility of attending the Graduate School in Hamburg, can write their doctoral theses on a topic connected with the research project.

4.3 Cross-sectional Working Group 3 – Intrastate potential for violence

Liberal peace theory is the connecting point for the cross-sectional Working Group 3. Altogether, liberal peace theory is the concept of peace as a societal process in the course of which the collective use of violence becomes ever less likely. One of its bases is the culture of violence-free conflict resolution within (democratic) states. Liberal peace theories give significant weight to the democratization of ruling systems and the creation of rule of law since they link the decision on war and peace to the will of the society. The basic thesis of the working group is that the foundations on which liberal peace theories rest are coming under pressure or changing in the course of globalization. When it comes to serious social distortions in connection with globalization processes, even in democracies that have previously been considered stable, then it is conceivable that, here too, conflicts of interest can no longer be dependably headed off through rules and procedures accepted by all sides. Possible consequences of such a diminishment of the consensus between those subject to the rules and those making the rules can be not only “passive” loss of trust in the elected governments, but can also cause radicalization and violence. On the other hand, however, they can also lead to the creation of new societal groups, which can promote a peaceful, productive change. In accordance with this, consequences for conflict resolution internally as well as outwardly can be expected, depending on how integrative and disintegrative developments interact. Governments can react to these developments with changed conflict resolution mechanisms, but also with repression and increased surveillance.

In the cross-sectional working group, these interactions were discussed intensely in 2014 in relation to different topics and topical areas and were condensed, to some extent, into further research questions and projects. Discussed was the question of how capable nation states still are of acting (particularly in the area of taxes and welfare) in a time of globalization and – more specifically – how much “security” the states in Europe can still offer or should promise to their citizens. In this connection, questions of the preservation and the generation of political legitimacy were discussed in depth. Furthermore, the working group focused its attention on the thematic complexes of politicization, protest and radicalization, as well as state governance techniques, here, above all, on those which are used by security institutions and powers.

A new research project on the thematic complex of radicalization and violence was presented in the QAG in 2014. It is studying radicalization and political violence from the perspective of subcultures. The question broached in the MAP about how security institutions and powers react to new domestic challenges (in this case, the phenomenon of terrorism), dealt with the project, “Politicizing Precaution? The Legitimation and Contestation of Mass Telecommunication Surveillance in Liberal Democracies”, which was discussed in the QAG in 2014 and then submitted to the Gerda-Henkel Foundation.

All of the aforementioned research projects deal with societal and political processes (radicalization, political violence, terrorism) as well as the management of them in liberal/European states. A further project discussed in the QAG and submitted to the VW Foundation, studies the concepts and practice of legitimacy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Yet another project, that was also discussed in 2014 in the QAG, is to work out a comparison of which processes and forms of protest and radicalization can be observed in non-, semi- and unconsolidated democracies (in the Eurasian space), what causes them and the extent to which they can lead to troubling upheavals and to violence (A comparative study of social-political protest processes in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine). Such a comparison makes it easier to understand which forms of protest, radicalization and violence could be “typical for the system” and which actually occur globally. All of the projects are planned to be financed through third-party funding.

4.3.1 Foreign fighters: An overview of existing research and a comparative study of British and German foreign fighters

Reem Ahmed and Daniela Pisoiu

Introduction

The current conflict in Syria is attracting an unprecedented amount of foreign fighters who have travelled there to join the rebels. Given the high and immediate policy relevance of the topic, the kinds of knowledge we have at the moment on foreign fighters is in the majority empirical and descriptive, rather than analytical and theoretical. So far, studies have gathered data on the numbers of foreign fighters having left Europe or the West in general (or more rarely countries in the Middle East), and their demographic and socio-economic profiles, as well as mapped the propaganda and recruitment strategies of the IS and affiliated disseminators, including the foreign fighters themselves. Efforts have also been undertaken towards establishing a definition of foreign fighters, notably as different to that of terrorists. Far less known are the reasons behind both the travel to, and the return from Syria, i.e. individual motivations. This is not due to a lack of interest in this topic, but rather due to issues of data validity. Studies usually rely on data such as socio-economic and demographic profiles and individual statements online, which can only offer limited information on individual subjective motivation. Nevertheless, a number of insightful theories on motivation have been proposed and these include those relating to grievance about the conflict and a willingness to help those suffering under Bashar al-Assad, issues about shared identity and ideology, as well as the idea of a jihadi “subculture”.

The study here aims to provide a sample of British and German foreign fighters in order to gain an insight into their profiles. The results are interesting as many differences can be noted between the two country samples, especially relating to socio-economic and educational backgrounds. The German foreign fighters are less educated and coming from lower socio-economic strata than the British ones. Also a higher proportion of the German foreign fighters had been previously involved in crime, some in terrorism related offences. In terms of similarities, the majority of recruits from both countries are male, young, and were single at the time of leaving to Syria.

Numbers and recruitment

Since summer 2013, the amount of foreign fighters in Syria topped historical numbers of past conflicts involving Islamic overseas militants (Hegghammer 2011 pp.53-4; 2013a). The Washington Post recently collected empirical data from studies by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), the Soufan Group, and the CIA, and from these estimates, calculated that 15,000 militants from 80 countries have involved themselves in the conflict (Washington Post 2014). Based on the data from the Soufan Group, around 2,391 fighters from Western countries are in Syria, with 85% of this number coming from Europe (Barrett 2014 p. 13).

The large number of fighters joining the Syrian civil war points towards an impressive and effective recruitment strategy, which involves savvy use of social media and attractive propaganda from the fighter groups and other proponents. In the ICSR “#Greenbirds” report, Carter, Maher & Neumann (2014) sought to ascertain who inspires Western foreign fighters by analysing their interests through Facebook “likes”, and Twitter “retweets”. The findings indicate

that the recruits do not necessarily receive their information from the official channels provided by the fighter groups, but rather through spiritual authorities who are sympathetic to the rebel cause as well as other fighters who are already in Syria. These disseminators are particularly powerful, because on the one hand they offer religious legitimacy, and on the other, the fighters offer a direct account of life on the front lines and an advisory platform to potential recruits (pp.1-17).

Social media has not only facilitated recruitment, but its open-source nature has provided a wealth of information available, which has allowed for detailed profiling, empirical analysis, and insight into motivating factors (see for example: Barrett 2014; Carter et al. 2014; Hegghammer 2013b; Weggemans, Bakker & Gril, 2014; Zelin, Kohlmann & al-Kouri 2013).

Theorising foreign fighters: definition and motivation

Defining foreign fighters

As it stands, there is limited theoretical literature on the topic (Hegghammer 2011 p.54). This is because the concept is caught somewhere between acts of international terrorism and local insurgency. Thus, Hegghammer aimed to establish a clear definition of this actor group, where an explicit distinction is made between foreign fighters, local insurgents, and transnational terrorists (ibid pp.54-8). Building on an earlier definition by Malet (2013)¹ with the aim of establishing a stricter criteria, Hegghammer (2011) characterises a foreign fighter as an unpaid, non-citizen who joins an insurgency with no existing affiliation to any official military organization (pp.57-8). Carter et al. (2014), however, accept Hegghammer's definition under the condition that payment is not included as a factor, as some jihadist groups are known to remunerate their fighters (pp.9-10).

Why are they going?

Grievance

Zelin (2013) writes that the most commonly cited motivations for foreign fighters lie within the injustice of the Syrian Civil War and a willingness to step in due to the inaction of the international community. Barrett (2014) sought to explore this empirically by comparing twitter tweets concerning Gulf and Middle Eastern Politics to the Syrian Civil War over the same one month period. As posts related to the Syrian Civil War and foreign fighters in particular showed a much higher level of response by retweets and comments, Barrett assumed that this result illustrates that many people feel personally affected by the Syrian conflict and thus feel an obligation to do something about it (pp.18-20).

Identity

A second explanation for the motivation of Western individuals to join the jihad draws on analogies with previous waves, and revolves around the idea of collective identity, which in turn is rooted in either ideology or ethno-religious belonging. Hegghammer (2011) traces the origins

1 First noted in his earlier PhD dissertation, Malet (2013) defines foreign fighters as "noncitizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts" (p.9)

of the Islamic foreign fighter movement back to the 1970s pan-Islamist identity movement, which was the product of exiled Muslim Brotherhood activists from Egypt, Iraq, and Syria who established non-violent international Islamic organisations and universities mostly in the Hijaz region in Saudi Arabia (pp.89-90). These organisations set up global networks with the aim of distributing Muslim aid whilst at the same time, they were espousing powerful discourse about the outward threats that Muslim nations faced and the need to protect them. These activists were able to promote their strong messages of inter-Muslim solidarity, which in turn allowed for the first successful mobilisation of foreign fighters that went to fight in Afghanistan during the 1980s (ibid, pp.56-7). In reference to Syria, Hegghammer (2013a) hints back to this theory, and argues that the high numbers of foreign fighters in this conflict is due to the increased ease of access to pan-Islamic propaganda on the Internet, which effectively reaches a larger audience. Malet (2009) also takes an identity approach, as he argues that local conflicts are often framed in a defensive way by recruiters to encourage outsiders who share some kind of affiliation with the insurgent group, be it religion, or ethnicity, to join the conflict and protect their shared identity (pp.99-100).

Ideology

A third motivating factor relates to ideology. Barrett (2014) attributes some motivation to jihad and martyrdom. Given that Syria features in Islamist narrative as the land of jihad, it is unsurprising that recruiters have used this rhetoric successfully to encourage young Muslims (p.18). However, Zelin (2013) argues that it is important not to assume that all foreign fighters are jihadists as he found that foreign recruits join three distinct groups: those affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA); independent local forces; and “so-called jihadists”, whose ideology is similar to al Qaeda.

Subculture

A fourth explanatory approach might revolve around the concept of subculture, a thesis already voiced in relation to “regular” jihadis (i.e. the ones who have not travelled to Syria, see for example Dantschke 2013; Hemmingsen 2015; Pisiou 2015). In the case of the foreign fighters, this would mean that individuals join the Syrian jihad for the sense of adventure, the fame, the chance to be part of something exciting and exclusive, and to project themselves on a world stage. Within the jihadi subculture, individuals pursue a particular lifestyle, marked by a strong presence of various specific subcultural elements such as music, clothing and symbols. A cursory look over the kinds of postings foreign fighters spread on social media would seem to support this thesis.² Selfies depict poses with guns and weaponry and Hollywood style professional pictures with anti-Western and jihadi slogans. There is the propagation of lifestyle: “jihadi hipster” with modern clothes and hairdos, gangsta cool, with villas, swimming pools and women, and testosterone kicks captured in lines such as “real struggles need real men”, all wrapped up in religiously inspired recipes encouraging polygamy, the hijab, and martyrdom.³

2 See for example: Roussinos (2013) reporting for *VICE* - original pictures taken directly from foreign fighter social media accounts

3 See: <http://r-tawheed.tumblr.com/>. Rayat Al-Tawheed is effectively the “mouthpiece” for British fighters from London that support IS (TRAC 2014)

A sample of foreign fighters from the UK and Germany

This study sought to obtain a sample of British and German foreign fighters in order to capture their profiles. The data was collected mainly from media reports. Our sample comprises 54 individuals – 34 British and 20 German, in roughly equal shares deceased, and still currently in Syria or in custody. While clearly not representative for all the foreign fighters originating in these two countries, it yet allows for a few key observations and comparison to current research:

1. There are clear similarities with existing studies regarding the age range and sex of the foreign fighters as most of those in the sample are young males, with 15% of females from the UK, and 10% from Germany. 88% of the total fighters in the sample were aged between 16 and 30 when they left for Syria. This correlates with Maher's (2013) ICSR insight, and the information published by Barrett (2014);
2. Most notably, in terms of socio-economic status and occupation, there are clear discrepancies between the British and the German samples;⁴ (see Figure 1 below and Figure 2 below representing the distribution of a total of 41 and 46, on whom this kind of information could be found respectively);
3. There is also a high discrepancy between the education levels. In the UK sample (on information that could be found), one third of the foreign fighters were university educated or about to attend university. Around 15% attended a private or Grammar school⁵, and 93% had at least attended school until 16⁶. In the German sample, from those that were known, 17% attended a Gymnasium, 25% attended a Hauptschule, and 17% attended a Realschule. From the sample, only one fighter attended university;
4. The British foreign fighters in our database match Maher's (2013) assessment as many were of south-Asian ethnic origin, and either university educated, or about to attend university. In comparison to the Dutch sample offered by Weggemans et al. (2014), the profiles more closely match our German sample as the authors found that the boys came from lower socio-economic backgrounds, with an even mix of Islamic immigrant, or Dutch origins;
5. Our findings also confirm Barrett's (2014) analysis that many fighters are second or third generation immigrants. However, our sample of Germans also showed a high percentage of Muslim converts (40% vs. 12% in the UK);
6. Only roughly a quarter of the total sample (50 on which this information could be found) had a criminal record, whereby the percentage was higher in the German sample: 35% vs. 17%. Some of the individuals had been previously convicted or investigated for terrorism related offences; this might involve the question whether imprisonment as opposed to other strategies such as re-integration in society might be the more adequate option for known jihadis.

4 We defined the three categories in the following way: poor background - the person lives in a deprived area, is receiving state benefits, or has intermittent employment; working class - blue collar work; middle class - white collar work or if the individual went to private school

5 Grammar schools are exclusive state schools

6 Attending school until 16 in the UK means completing first school degree (GCSEs)

Figure 1 Distribution by socio-economic background





Figure 2 Distribution by occupation



Conclusion

While the theoretical grounding on the topic of foreign fighters is limited, existing studies nevertheless offer some insight into numbers, profiles, recruitment strategies and possible motivational mechanisms. The study we conducted on a sample of British and German foreign fighters shows that the majority of recruits from both countries are male, young, and were single at the time of leaving to Syria. A series of differences were also noted between the two country samples, especially relating to socio-economic and educational backgrounds. Overall, the results on the British and German sample broadly confirm others dealing with British and respectively Dutch foreign fighters.

In terms of motivation, by viewing the phenomenon through the lens of collective identity, Malet and Heghammer argue that careful framing of the local conflict encourages those from abroad to join their fellow men in the struggle to protect their shared identity that is under attack. Framing

and discourse have proved to be central to the recruitment of jihadists in Syria. This is evident in the empirical studies discussed above, as well as from anecdotal accounts in the press. As the ICSR “#Greenbirds” report shows, foreign fighters are influenced and motivated through successful framing of the conflict by disseminators, as well as encouragement and legitimacy from spiritual advisors. Furthermore, positive framing directly from the fighters themselves has encouraged fellow Muslims to join the “five star jihad”. This, along with the images and eulogies afforded to martyrs also drives the propaganda message that this is a “worthy cause” to protect Muslims under threat by the Assad regime. The subcultural aspect remains a relatively underdeveloped field of study, yet initial empirical observation warrant more intense preoccupation with this facet of the Syrian jihad.

The empirical studies also demonstrated the importance of open-source information and social media in tracking foreign fighters and determining their influences and motivations. The Syrian conflict is the first in which researchers have had access to this type of rich information and data. However, due to the growing concern of the accessibility of these pages and their impact on online radicalisation and influencing more young people to go to Syria, Twitter and Facebook have taken many of the foreign fighter accounts down, which will undoubtedly affect further research that relies on this method. More problems for research arise because the nature of the conflict does not allow for the extraction of accurate numbers of foreign fighters, and much of the research on this topic has relied heavily on estimates.

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9. Annex

9.1 Projects

CORE

1. Larger Research Projects

Signature	Title	QAG
CORE-10-F-02	Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy: Genuine Search for Partners or Camouflage for Unilateral Ambitions?	2
CORE-10-F-06	Die Afghanistan-Politiken der zentralasiatischen Staaten	3
CORE-12-F-02	Fortführung eines OSCE Network of Academic Institutions	2
CORE-14-F-03	Power Strategies and Co-operation in Eurasia	2
CORE 14-F-05	Peacebuilding by Local Non-State Institutions in the Kyrgyz Fergana Valley	2
CORE 14-F-06	Reconstructing Political Legitimacy in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan)	2
CORE-14-F-07	Security Communities – Conditions for Establishment and Failure	2
CORE 14-F-08	Enhancing EU Civilian Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Capabilities (EU-PeaceCap)	2

2. Publication and Smaller Projects

CORE-10-P-02	OSZE-Jahrbuch (deutsch, englisch, russisch)
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3. PhD Projects

CORE-11-NF-01	CFE and the Disintegration of the Cooperative European Security Order
CORE-12-NF-01	The problems of correlation between Western values and Islamic traditions in the context of democratization in Tajikistan: secular-Islamic dialogue as a factor of stability in the region
CORE-13-NF-01	NATO's Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Implications for Regional Security Arrangements in Central Asia

4. Consultancy Projects

CORE-10-B-01	Rahmenprojekt Auswärtiges Amt
CORE-10-B-04	OSZE-bezogene Informationsdienstleistungen
CORE-10-B-02	OSCE-Related Training for Officials from the Serbian MFA (OSCE Chairmanship 2015)
CORE 14-B-01	Training on Running a Chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation for Mongolian officials from the capital and the Vienna OSCE delegation

ZEUS

1. Larger Research Projects

ZEUS-14-F-01	Zur Rolle der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten beim Formenwandel der Gewalt	1
ZEUS-12-F-02	Das palästinensische Staatsprojekt in Lichte der Machtverschiebungen im Nahen Osten	2
ZEUS-14-F-02	Maritime Sicherheit	1
ZEUS-10-F-02	TERAS-INDEX. Terrorismus und Radikalisierung – Indikatoren für externe Einflussfaktoren	3
ZEUS-10-F-03	Theorie und Formenwandel von Gewaltkonflikten	1
ZEUS-10-F-01	Das Streben nach Respekt: Eine Untersuchung der sozio-emotionalen Dimension in Russlands Beziehungen zum Westen	2
ZEUS-11-F-02	Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe (ANVIL)	-
ZEUS-13-F-04	Eine vergleichende Studie der individuellen Motivationen in islamistischen und rechtsextremistischen Radikalisierungs- und Deradikalisierungsprozessen	3
ZEUS-13-F-05	Contested Principles, Contrasting Practices: Security Relations in Russia and the EU's 'Shared Neighbourhood'	2
ZEUS-13-F-06	VOX-Pol. Violent Online Political Extremism (VOPE). Virtual Centre of Excellence for Research in Violent Online Political Extremism	3
ZEUS-14-F-03	Frieden durch Kooperation? Die EU und asiatische Regionalorganisationen	2
ZEUS 14-F-05	Liberale Demokratien und das Risiko Terrorismus: Auf dem Weg zu einer einheitlichen Präventionslogik?	3
ZEUS 14-F-07	Radicalization and political violence from a subcultural perspective	3
ZEUS 14-F-06	Perception, Identity and the Changing Global Order: Construction of China and Russia in American Security Policy Discourse	2

3. PhD Projects

ZEUS-07-NF-06	A comparative assessment of police missions in the Common Security and Defence Policy (Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo). Is there a European Union strategy for CSDP police intervention in the making?
ZEUS-07-NF-01	Konfliktprävention und Krisenmanagement der EU: Grenzen und Chancen des kohärenten Handelns im europäischen Mehrebenensystem

4. Consultancy Projects

ZEUS-07-B-01	Internationales Fellowship-Programm Graf Baudissin
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IFAR

1. Larger Research Projects

IFAR-11-F-02	Cyber Attacks – Eine neue Bedrohung für die Internationale Sicherheit?	1
IFAR-10-F-01	Challenges to Deep Nuclear Cuts, Phase II	1
IFAR-14-F-01	Neue Technologien und die Zukunft der Kriegführung	1

2. Publications and Smaller Projects

IFAR-13-P-02	Neue Wege bei der nuklearen Nichtverbreitung und Rüstungskontrolle	1
IFAR-09-P-04	Verifikation und Monitoring internationaler Verträge inkl. CTBT	1

3. PhD Projects

IFAR-12-NF-01	Verifikation und Monitoring nuklearer Abrüstung
IFAR-08-NF-02	Zeitliche Modellierung regionaler Wasserflussmengen unter dem Gesichtspunkt klimatischer Veränderungen und möglicher Konfliktpotenziale
IFAR-09-N-01	Konfliktfaktor Waldschutz? Analyse von Auswirkungen von Waldschutzmaßnahmen auf Konfliktformationen in ausgewählten Regionen des Amazonasbeckens
IFAR 13-NF-01	Erweiterte Abschreckung aus der Sicht von Protégé Staaten: Die osteuropäische Debatte über die B61-Verlängerung in Europa
IFAR 13-NF-02	Strategische Kultur und die Zukunft der Nuklearen Ordnung: Die Nuklearwaffenpolitiken Frankreichs und Großbritanniens

4. Consultancy Projects

IFAR-08-B-02	Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
IFAR-08-B-01	Beratung der Rüstungskontrollabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes

Cross-institutional Projects

1. Larger Research Projects

IFSH-13-F-01	Transnationale Gewaltkonflikte	Altes AP
IFSH-13-F-02	Umweltbedingte Migration und Konflikte im arabischen Raum	3
IFSH-13-F-03	Risikoanalyse für den Katastrophenschutz	1
IFSH-14-F-01	Good Governance for EU sustainable cooperation with the EaP neighbourhood	2
IFSH-14-F-02	Understanding, assessing and dealing with subjective (in)security in Europe (UASIS)	3
IFSH 14-F-03	Von Nachhaltigkeit zu Resilienz: Ökologische Konzepte in der internationalen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik	2
IFSH 15-F-03	Klimawandel und Sicherheit (CLISAP.2 C4)	

2. Publication and Smaller Projects

IFSH-07-P-01	Friedensgutachten
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4. Consultancy Projects

IFSH-08-B-01	Kommission „Europäische Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr“ am IFSH
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9.2 Publications 2014

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9.3 Statistical Data

1.1 Number of Research Projects

2010-2014 according to the approved research plan

	2010	Davon extern finanziert	2011	Davon extern finanziert	2012	Davon extern finanziert	2013	Davon extern finanziert	2014	Davon extern finanziert
IFSH übergreifend	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	3	2
CORE	5	0	5	1	5	1	4	4	4	4**
ZEUS	8	4	9	6**	10	6**	12	8*	7	6*
IFAR	6	3	5	4***	7	4***	4	4	2	1
QAG 1									3	0
QAG 2									11	8**
QAG 3									5	3
Gesamt	21	9	20	12	23	12	23	16	35	24

* 1 partially financed by IFSH

** 3 partially financed by IFSH

*** 2 partially financed by IFSH

1.2 Junior Staff, Consultancy and Smaller Projects

	2010	Externally financed	2011	Externally financed	2012	Externally financed	2013	Externally financed	2014 planned	Externally financed
IFSH over all	5	2	5	2	6	1	4	1 ³	2	1 ³
CORE	10	7 ²	7	6 ¹	8	7 ¹	8	7	8	8 ³
ZEUS	19	13 ²	13	13 ²	13	12 ²	8	4 ⁴	8	5 ³
IFAR	15	5 ⁴	11	3	8	4	9	5 ⁴	11	5 ⁴
Total	49	27	34	24	35	24	29	17	29	19

¹ 5 partially financed by IFSH.

² 3 partially financed by IFSH.

³ 1 partially financed by IFSH.

⁴ 2 partially financed by IFSH.

1.3 Scientific Staff

Persons, status at year's end (full time equivalents in brackets)

	2010	Externally financed	2011	Externally financed	2012	Externally financed	2013	Externally financed	2014	Externally financed
Institute-wide	1	-	1	-	1	-	2	1	2 (2)	1
CORE	6	3 ¹	6	3 ¹	7	4 ²	7	2	6 (4,98)	3 ²
ZEUS	11	7 ¹	10	6	10	6 ¹	11	6 ²	11 (7,39)	6 ⁵
IFAR	5	4 ¹	6	4 ¹	7	3 ¹	8	4 ²	5 (2,82)	3 ²
Total	23 (18,95)	14	23 (19,12)	13	25 (18,23)	13	28 (17,69)	13	24 (17,19)	13
Women	12	6	13	8	12	6	13	6	12	7
For Information only: Number of doctoral candidates	22	20	21	20	18 ³	16	15 ⁴	13	9 ⁶	
Women	12		9		8		8		4	4

¹ 1 partially financed by IFSH.

² 2 partially financed by IFSH

³ In addition, there are nine external doctoral candidates, who take part in the doctoral seminars to some extent but do not fall under the supervisory program.

⁴ In addition, there are ten external doctoral candidates, who take part in the doctoral seminars to some extent but do not fall under the supervisory program.

⁵ 3 partially financed by IFSH

⁶ In addition, there are 13 external doctoral candidates, who take part in the doctoral seminars to some extent but do not fall under the supervisory program.

1.4 Guest Scientists

Cumulative number of persons over the respective years

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Institute wide	2	1	1	1	2
CORE	2	1	1	4	3
ZEUS	5	3	3	1	-
IFAR	1	2	-	-	1
Total	10	7	5	6	6
Women	2	3	2	3	2

1.5 Third Party Financing and Third Party Commitments

a) Actual Expenditures (in Euro) / IFSH 2010-2014, Third Party Financing and Donors

Research Unit	Donor		Year				
			2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
ZEUS	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	76.229	94.015		16.995,51	51.973
		Foundations	9.750	14.536	12.089		2.737
		DAAD	41.327			13.672,50	
		BMBF	202.488	371.961	313.738	182.203,28	114.134
		EU	13.464		54.762	68.913,52	63.901
	Federal Ministries						
	Federal States					20.000,00	
	EU						
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		5.241				
	Research Stipends		27.242	24.000			
Other		10.520	11.022	981	327,11	4.906	
Total ZEUS		386.261	515.534	381.570	302.111,92	237.651	
CORE	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	-				
		Foundations		19.890			9.286
		DAAD			37.875	47.839,70	38.279
		BMBF					
		EU					
	Federal Ministries		206.682	214.048	236.668	243.276,98	302.896
	Federal States		-			40.614,46	2.385
	EU		-				
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		11.314	8.235		6.981,12	50.803
	Research Stipends		24.700	12.000			
Other				3.543	7.926,73	17.060	
Total CORE		242.696	254.173	278.086	346.638,99	420.709	
IFAR	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	-				
		Foundations	45.214	68.464	27.695	39.924,06	
		DAAD					
		BMBF					
		EU					
	Federal Ministries			51.966		113.605,44	63.591
	Federal States					9.800,00	22.682
	EU		-				
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.			19.292	9.580	421,30	
	Research Stipends		-				
Other		7.339	1.494	11.186	5416,60	4.645	
Total IFAR		52.553	141.216	48.461	169.167,40	90.918	
Institute wide	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	84.810	90.750	82.972	57.724,11	81.418
		Foundations		25.000		4.050,00	
		DAAD					
		BMBF					
		EU	57.937	94.549	26.456		
	Federal Ministries		32.175	70.200	77.200	99.610,73	106.719
	Federal States		11.025	9.198		2.625,79	174
	EU		-				
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		38.702	5.688			
	Research Stipends		8.000			9.351,32	
Other		67.491	60.451	42.985	54.845,38	95.198*	
Total IFSH wide		300.140	355.836	229.613	228.207,33	283.509	
IFSH altogether	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG	161.039	184.765	82.972	74.719,62	133.391
		Foundations	54.964	127.890	39.784	43.974,06	12.023
		DAAD	41.327		37.875	61.512,20	38.279
		BMBF	202.488	371.961	313.738	182.203,28	114.134
		EU	71.401	94.549	81.218	68.913,52	63.901
	Federal Ministries		238.857	336.214	313.868	456.493,15	473.206
	Federal States		11.025	9.198		73.040,25	25.241
	EU		0				
	Prv. Economy/IO/Foreign Admin.		55.257	33.215	9.580	7.402,42	50.803
	Research Stipends		59.942	36.000		9.351,32	
Other		85.350	72.967	58.695	68.515,82	121.809	
Total IFSH		981.623	1.266.759	937.730	1.046.125,64	1.032.787	

Of this 14,500 Euros comes from funds of the IFSH Supporters Association

b) Third Party Funding Received by IFSH in the years 2010-2014 (in Euros)

Research Unit	Donor		Year				
			2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
ZEUS	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG				180.400	
		Foundations		24.800	11.070		
		DAAD	50.734	1.649		16.590	
		BMBF	1.040.750			167.175	
		EU		143.765			180.523
	Federal Ministries						
	Federal States				20.000		
	EU						
	Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.			10.000			
	Research Stipends		15.622	24.000	16.500		
	Other		9.900	53.000	8.833	46.010	4.896
	Total ZEUS		1.117.006	257.214	56.403	410.175	185.419
	CORE	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG				
Foundations				24.890			13.700
DAAD					56.110	43.451	43.844
BMBF							
EU							
Federal Ministries		239.572	225.739	248.012	280.962	326.377	
Federal States				43.000			
EU							
Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.			14.666		17.949	55.480	
Research Stipends		24.700	12.000	36.720			
Other							
Total CORE			264.272	277.295	383.842	342.362	439.401
IFAR		Science-driven third party allocations	DFG				
	Foundations			47.988,5	42.385		
	DAAD						
	BMBF						
	EU						
	Federal Ministries		41.585	75.000		122.662	86.901
	Federal States				9.800		30.000
	EU						
	Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.			30.888	6.392		
	Research Stipends				12.460		
	Other		88.621	1.290		46.010	
	Total IFAR		130.206	155.166,50	71.037	168.672	116.901
	Institute wide	Science-driven third party allocations	DFG			208.200	
Foundations				25.000			
DAAD							6.162
BMBF							
EU							
Federal Ministries		37.500	70.000	77.200	77.000	38.580	
Federal States				2.800	10.000		
EU							
Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.							
Research Stipends			25.250	8.000	8.000	56.400	
Other		6.000	22.000	33.000		33.010	
Total IFSH wide			43.500	142.250	329.200	95.000	134.152
IFSH altogether		Science-driven third party allocations	DFG			208.200	180.400
	Foundations			122.678,5	53.455		13.700
	DAAD		50.734	1.649	56.110	60.041	50.006
	BMBF		1.040.750			167.175	
	EU			143.765			180.523
	Federal Ministries		318.657	370.739	325.212	480.824	451.858
	Federal States				75.600	10.000	30.000
	EU						
	Priv.economy/IO/Foreign Admin.			55.554	6.392	17.949	55.480
	Research Stipends		40.322	61.250	73.680	8.000	56.400
	Other		76.589	73.290	41.833	92.020	37.906
	Total IFSH		1.554.984	828.925,5	840.482	1.016.209	875.873

1.6 Third-Party Funding per Researcher according to Departments (in full-time equivalents from FHH Core Funding)

a. Acquisition (in Euro)

Year	ZEUS	CORE	IFAR	IFSH wide	Average IFSH
2010	273.575	82.585	76.322	43.500	155.670
2011	66.378	97.984	65.196	142.250	82.194
2012	14.589	80.809	39.465	329.200	73.623
2013	98.505	123.374	74.142	95.000	99.492
2014	45.445	146.467	59.643	134.152	83.099

b. Expenditures (in Euro)

Jahr	ZEUS	CORE	IFAR	IFSH wide	Average IFSH
2010	94.602	75.843	30.805	300.140	98.270
2011	133.041	89.814	59.334	355.836	125.608
2012	98.699	58.544	26.923	229.613	82.142
2013	72.553	124.915	74.359	228.207	102.421
2014	51.888	140.236	46.386	283.509	98.360

1.7 Publications

	2010	Peer re-viewed	2011	Peer re-viewed	2012	Peer re-viewed	2013	Peer re-viewed	2014	Peer re-viewed
Books	13	4	10	3	7	4	11	4	12	5
Book chapters	65	13	83	15	42	13	41	13	43	6
Articles in scientific journals	29	11	28	8	39	18	26	20	43	22
In ISI³⁷ journals	1	1	6	6	7	7	9	9	9	9
Working papers/ studies	16	-	27	1	18	-	5	1	21	0
Other	35	-	49	7	40	6	45	0	38	0
Total	158	28	179	34	146	41	128	34	157	33
In German	79	13	121	13	69	5	75	6	76	8
Publications per scientific staff member³⁸	8,33	1,47	8,92	1,69	5,32	2,13	7,23	1,92	9,13	1,91

37 Publications listed on the Thomson Reuters Work of Knowledge-List (ISI-list).

1.8 Publications by research units 2010-2014

	2010	Davon referiert	2011	Davon referiert	2012	Davon referiert	2013	Davon referiert	2014	Davon referiert
IFSH übergreifend	27	4	61	3,5	18,8	6	32,5	5,5	44*	5
Davon auf Deutsch	18	1	42	-	8,3	1	28	1	29 (7)	0
Publikationen pro wissenschaftlich Beschäftigter-/Beschäftigtem ²	27	4	61	3,5	18,8	6	17,75	3	22 (9,5)	2,5 (1)
CORE	48	9	37	4	18,3	5	13	5	24,75	4
Davon auf Deutsch	19	3	22	1	4,3	1	3	-	7	1
Publikationen pro wissenschaftlich Beschäftigter-/Beschäftigtem ²	10,66	2	7,59	0,82	3,57	0,97	2,78	1,07	4,97	0,8
ZEUS	56	12	60	23,5	37	11	56	24	61,5	20
Davon auf Deutsch	36	7	42	10	13	3	33	6	29	5
Publikationen pro wissenschaftlich Beschäftigter-/Beschäftigtem ²	7,59	1,62	6,34	2,48	4,48	1,34	7,5	3,21	8,3	2,7
IFAR	27	3	21	3	22,8	3	26,5	3,5	25,75	4
Davon auf Deutsch	11	2	14	2	5	1	9	0	13	2
Publikationen pro wissenschaftlich Beschäftigter-/Beschäftigtem ²	8,43	0,62	4,44	0,63	5,9	0,77	7,1	0,93	9,1	1,4

* Also contains the publications, published under IFSH by Reinhard Mutz, guest researchers and the post-doc scholarship recipients. The publications of the two identified in the budget (Brzoska, Fröhlich) are in parentheses.

1.9 Additional Indicators of the Research Work 2013

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Participation in Parliamentary hearings	15	19	5	13	4
Participation in internal discussions in Ministries	49	65	45	48	41
Participation in hearings/ discussions in Ministries/ Parliaments and international organizations abroad		31	65	80	89
Lectures	118	139	85	129	112
Podium discussions	29	33	37	38	35
IFSH-conferences¹	16	20	6	25	14
Teaching by staff (semester weeks, 2 semesters p.a.)	38	47,5	46	62	44,5
Completed doctorate²	2	2	1	3	4
Completed Master's degrees²	28	23	25	23	24

¹ Organized by IFSH or jointly organized workshops and conferences with partner(s)

² Number of students advised by IFSH staff.

1.10 Conference and Media Activities 2014

Topic	Lectures	Podium disc.	Conferences	Interviews	Total
Current security policy questions (also terrorism)	81	15	52	133	281
Disarmament/Arms control	4	2	7	18	31
European security	6	2	4	17	29
OSCE	8	5	9	7	29
Regional conflicts	6	8	7	38	59
Peace research (also IFSH)	2	3	1	9	14
Other	5	1	1	13	20
Total	112	35	81	235	463

1.11 Comparison of Conference and Media Activities 2010-2014

Year	Lectures	Podium disc.	Conferences	Interviews
2014	112	35	81	235
2013	129	38	106	180
2012	118	30	116	152
2011	139	33	127	183
2010	118	29	117	190