


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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/ European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

Challenges and Prospects

When foreigners come to Germany to speak about European foreign policy and defence, their 'Stichwort' is almost always: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities. It should no longer be any secret that one of France's and Britain's strongest motives in launching (at St. Malo) the process that led to the EU's new Security and Defence Policy was the hope of kickstarting the better adaptation and use of European military resources for new post-Cold War tasks, in Germany above all. They have arguably had quite a bit of success, or at least more than NATO could have had in its own; despite the fact that the Alliance has been taking major decisions, and asserting pressures, for military transformation from as far back as 1994. It is just as obvious that things need to go much further, but I don't particularly want to use time in this talk to pursue that point in detail – for two reasons. The less important one is that I am not a military-technical specialist. The more important reason is that no-one, least of all myself as the Director of a peace research institute, should see defence and security capabilities as an end in themselves or as necessarily a good thing in themselves. The question is what they are needed for; and I have a suspicion that one of the reasons why Germany and other Euro-

pean countries have not yet been ready for a more genuine revolution in their approach to defence and security is that no-one has yet fully and convincingly answered the question 'Warum' – 'wofür' – cui bono? The ESDP was launched in fact, essentially as a capabilities programme related to a set of purely generic military scenarios; without threat analysis, without strategic plan or military doctrine, without the formulation of a more general security philosophy. Even today, the EU's draft constitution and the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council last December have only filled the gap partially, and in very broad and still ambiguous terms, while the debate continues on how to formulate an EU military 'strategic doctrine' or whether we want one at all.

What I would like to do, therefore, today is to address one macro-question about the purpose or 'finalité' of the EU's external security and defence policies, and four middle-level questions that flow from it. I will draw attention on the process to some practical or 'micro'-questions that may be particularly critical or, at least, particularly timely at this stage. My focus will be mainly on the security (in the broadest sense) and de-

fence dimensions of the EU's work because that is what I know best, but at least some of the larger questions will, I hope, have resonance for the non-security dimensions of European common foreign policy and indeed for other EU external policies as well.

My big question may at first surprise you: is the European security and defence policy really designed to serve the needs, interests and values of the EU and of Europe generally, or of someone or something else? My answer is that at first, it undoubtedly had goals and motives lying outside the sphere of European integration proper. Just as one statesman spoke in the past of 'calling the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old', I believe that not just the UK which pushed the ESDP initiative, but many other Europeans who supported it, saw it as a new way of promoting reform and renewal in *NATO*. Not only would any new capacities created be available for NATO as well as EU missions, but NATO's role in supporting the EU Headline Goal forced an updating of the Alliance's own defence planning system; the EU's requirement for planning and command-and-control support for its own missions consolidated NATO's shift of military focus away from territorial defence to the 'new tasks', and so on. In the event, the fact that two out of three of the EU's first military missions (and by far the largest ones) involved taking over operations from NATO has ensured that this inter-institutional dynamic remains dominant even at the day-to-day level of ESDP work.

At higher political level, the UK believed in 1999 and perhaps still believes that any short-term US concerns over the motives and impact of ESDP would be less important than the US's longer-term realization that Europe was getting ready at last to bear a fair share of its own security burdens, something which should surely strengthen rather than endanger the overall trans-Atlantic partnership. Of course, you may point out that many people in France had exactly the opposite motive, to build up ESDP as an alternative to the Atlantic defence framework; either with the idea of hastening the end of the latter which was more of a hindrance than help for tackling the new security agenda, or at least, of getting some kind of reinsurance ready in case NATO should collapse of its own accord. But my point still stands, namely that these were motives that *took their start* in the US/European strategic space and used the EU framework, as it were, instrumentally. This helps to explain why the first key design features of ESDP, including the guidelines for its relations with NATO, were kept so close in practice to the corresponding features in the former Western European Union (WEU) and WEU/NATO relations, rather than looking for precedents within the EU itself. It also explains why, in preparing the ESDP's constituent documents, there was such a fierce debate about the formula indicating that

the EU would carry out military operations only "where NATO as a whole was not engaged". On any objective view this was surely a non-issue, given that there were more than enough NATO members in the EU to block any attempted initiatives there that ignored NATO's interests, and that there were more than enough cases for intervention to keep both institutions busy, and that their respective choice of missions would be dictated in practice by their very different strengths and weaknesses. If, however, EU/NATO relations as a part of the reinvention of transatlantic strategic partnership were (for many people) what the ESDP was all about, it was quite natural that this question of formal precedence between the Alliance and its new 'young brother' should be the question of all questions to resolve clearly at the outset.

The trouble with this whole policy approach is that the younger brother image actually makes no sense for the EU: the EU is more like a fat woman alongside NATO's thin and muscular man. For the EU, ESDP is only a small addition to an already very wide, almost full-spectrum range of competences, policies and resources relevant to security promotion and crisis management, whereas for NATO military action is a central and (for good or ill) increasingly an almost exclusive focus. Thus while it may make sense to talk about EU action 'complementing' or 'completing' NATO's capacities in terms of military intervention as strictly defined, in the big picture of post-cold war security the boot is very much on the other foot: it is the Union that has the wide range and NATO that provides a pretty specialized add-on. Moreover, while I have argued for the importance of the Atlantic-related motivation in the shaping of ESDP, it is clear that this was not the whole story and that there was also, if only at subterranean and subconscious level, a logic *internal* to the process of European construction that made the breakthroughs of St. Malo and of Helsinki possible at this particular time in history. You could relate it to the 'deepening' of integration through the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, including perhaps especially the historic integration of internal security cooperation under Pillar Three into the Treaty structure; or you could relate it – as I am more tempted to do – to the *widening* of the EU's security horizons and responsibilities through the enlargement process, the shift to a strategy of eventual full integration for solving the Balkans problem, and perhaps even the change in nature of the Europe/Russia relationship.

In any event, the question I would like to bring to a point now is: are the years from 2005 onwards the time when the EU should and will start following its *own* logic more in the development of ESDP, and other people's logic less? Leaving aside the question of desirability, I could provisionally offer some hypotheses

about why this might be *feasible or probable*, for example:

- because US behaviour under the second Presidency of George W. Bush continues to alienate (all) Europeans, and thus to make the different values of and basis for purely European security cooperation even clearer;
- because the Europeans learn the lessons of Spring 2003 and refuse to be split again as they were over the outbreak of the Iraq war, which could lead to a kind of further *Flucht nach vorn* as they attempt to guarantee their future unity through new formal common structures and doctrines;
- because it becomes clear that NATO has become historically weakened or at least, narrowed and altered beyond repair, meaning that it is a waste of time to try to manipulate the ESDP as a tool to 'save' NATO and that we do perhaps need to start looking at it as something more like an eventual successor or replacement for the Alliance;
- because the actual nature of security crises over the next few years throws the focus back on fields that are more relevant to EU competences and/or unique EU strengths; and/or
- because the internal dynamism of EU politics while we are waiting for ratification of the new constitution, and engaging in painful negotiations about the future budget, might push both old and new members towards fresh efforts in ESDP as one area where unity can be built relatively cheaply and particularly visibly.

There are probably more factors that could be mentioned, and there are certainly some that would push in the opposite direction. For today's purposes, however, I would like to go on to ask a second set of questions about what a European security and defence policy that expressed the EU's own logic and Europe's own identity and interests would look like. They will cover (i) what kind of security we want to provide for ourselves at home, (ii) what security functions the EU should have towards the wider world, (iii) what mix and balance of tools we need for the purpose, and (iv) how far the ESDP, and CFSP generally, is or should be based on the wishes of European citizens themselves.

'Real' European defence?

When ESDP was launched in the neutral European capital of Helsinki at end-1999, it could not have been made clearer that this initiative was 'only' about military crisis management, and not about 'real' defence – i.e. the direct protection of European territories against military attack – which would remain the business of

NATO. This formula reflected a sensitive compromise at the time between France, the UK, and the EU's non-NATO members: but the dividing line it tried to create by no means looks so clear in the light of other realities about the EU, both old and new. In the beginning, Monnet and Schumann invented the EC for a fundamental security purpose i.e. to make it impossible for countries within Western Europe ever to fight each other again. They succeeded splendidly; and the benefits of this no-war zone have recently been spread across the whole Eastern side of Europe, and should soon also cover the Balkan states who have experienced real war in Europe within as recently as a decade. Since the 1950's, the EU has become in practice the first place we look for our security in our own homes and countries across a whole string of functional fields: energy supply, protection of the environment, aviation and maritime safety, nuclear safety, the handling of animal and human disease epidemics, the control of exports of dangerous goods, and more recently the coverage of all aspects of frontier security and the combating of crime, smuggling and terrorism through Justice and Home Affairs cooperation and the Schengen system. In this last area, the recent high profiling of terrorist threats to internal security and the real-life tragedy of Madrid in March last year have spurred European leaders to adopt a highly original 'solidarity' commitment to each other, promising to come to each others' aid if any EU member is attacked by terrorists, and to do so with all necessary means – including military ones. With this (at least in principle), the range of security protection that the Union provides for its citizens has come almost full circle, leaving only the one specific and rather narrow case of a traditional military attack on our countries as still primarily someone else's business.

In fact, as you will know, the EU's new draft Constitution does contain a clause committing EU members to show solidarity by reaching jointly to a military attack on their territory as well. But this is undermined by language stating that NATO has priority in this regard for its members, and that the distinct national defence policies of the EU's six neutral or neo-neutral member states are not affected. It is evident that, in practice, ESDP is *not* occupying itself with organizing EU members' armed forces for territorial defence, and it has not faced up (perhaps for obvious reasons!) to questions such as whether this defence could be effective without the dedication of at least some nuclear forces to the EU. Should we see this as, in fact, a perfectly pragmatic compromise, designed inter alia to avoid chopping off the one main branch that NATO is now sitting on before it is ready to fall of its own accord? Or can this only be seen as an interim 'fix' from which a policy truly reflecting the Union's own logic and interests will

have to move on, towards something that matches more closely the words in our Treaty and Constitution about an eventual ‘common defence’?

There are two essentially temporary and contingent reasons for saying No, i.e. the concern already mentioned not to determine NATO or alienate the Americans needlessly, and the difficulties involved for the six EU states who have so far declined to exchange defence guarantees. There is a more general argument that points in the same direction, i.e. that the whole question of territorial military defence is now outdated, since the risks are infinitesimal of Europe ever being attacked in that particular way again by Russia or any other state – as distinct from terrorist or other non-state attacks that are already catered for. On this argument there is no merit in destroying a NATO commitment what already exists and has some residual merit in tying the Americans to us, but no sense in taking trouble to create a new commitment in the EU or any other setting. Without necessarily coming down on one side or other of the argument myself, let me just list some points that go the other way:

- it is now EU doctrine that national armed forces may be used cooperatively within our own territory to meet terrorist attacks and their consequences, and also natural disasters and accidents that may threaten life and property in similar ways such as floods, power cut-outs or collapse of supply networks and communications. At present EU countries have widely varying rules for using military assets in this context and the planning of effective Europe-wide responses will have to surmount major obstacles of both a practical and political kind. To try to solve this problem, and also the existing one of streamlining EU armed forces for crisis management missions, without giving EU planners effective competence to address the role of *all* national forces – and to discuss openly the possible need for resource shifts or new kinds of double-hatting between internal and external, territorial and non-territorial defence functions – is starting to look increasingly impractical and unreasonable: while practical experience suggests that this kind of incoherence and institutional demarcation at European level only makes it easier for individual states to delay facing up to the real needs of defence reform. (The same argument about the EU needing to see and draw conclusions from the whole defence picture applies in a much more obvious way to the recently enhanced efforts to foster effective European defence *industrial* cooperation though the EU);
- secondly, to the extent that traditional military defence may still be needed, we cannot necessarily count on NATO to plan and provide it any longer in

practical terms, even if the legal and political significance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty can be preserved. Since the Prague decisions of 2002 NATO has been working more or less exclusively on planning and executing overseas missions: it no longer has any overall defence plan for Alliance territory and it has only the lightest of ‘footprints’ on the territory of its new Central European members and the Eastern Länder. This increasingly non-territorial approach by the Alliance as a whole reflects the similar shift in the USA’s national defence policy, which now sees overseas military bases increasingly as jumping-off points for action into hostile territory, rather than as part of a defensive network involving permanent integration with the forces of host nations. These trends are more likely to be accelerated than reversed under the second George W. Bush Administration. They open up the prospect that, unless the EU can move towards being prepared more openly to guarantee its own territory, the Europeans will find themselves with an overall deficit in strategic protection all too soon, and in circumstances where their actual territorial responsibilities and vulnerabilities have greatly increased and are likely to increase further (if Turkey joins, up to the borders of Iran, Iraq and Syria!) through Enlargement. In such a case, showing that Europe is ready to shoulder the main burden of its own safety in the existential sense (not just local crisis management!) could become no longer a matter of impressing the Americans as it was supposed to be at St. Malo and Helsinki, but a straightforward demand of our own self-preservation as a community and as a continent;

- thirdly, common defence has not been – even in the NATO context – just a response to outside threats, but also an inwardly generated expression of the Europeans’ wish to give up nationalistic approaches to defence and security for ever. It means giving up the options, not just of attacking neighbours, but of failing to help them in their hour of need. NATO’s large permanent multinational formations, mainly created in German territory, used to both symbolize this anti-nationalist dimension of the new European defence culture and help to maintain it by the day-to-day mixing of military cadres at all levels and their experience of common dangers and trials. Much of this system has now gone for good, and although European forces working together in the Balkans or on overseas deployments may have very intense experiences of the same kind, the ad hoc nature of these missions means by definition that not all allies can have the same experience, or have it consistently with the same partners. The EU already does create this kind of ‘socializing’ experience and community-building effect through

the way it brings national experts together in all other fields of its competence, and it hopefully does so for the rather limited number of officers who work in the EU Military Staff and the EU Military Committee in Brussels. Certain EU countries have been striving for many years to achieve the same kind of effects at operational level through the permanent structure of the Eurocorps and other similar 'Euro-forces'. The question should perhaps be raised, in today's new context, whether the responsibility is perhaps shifting towards the EU to create a much more ambitious and comprehensive experience of 'collectivity' for its military élites, and to act once again as the first line of defence against military 're-nationalization', as it did back in 1948 when the first Brussels Treaty created the first supranational defence guarantee between a number of European states – even before NATO had been invented. The practical side of this argument will be picked up again when I come to my third large question about capabilities.

European defence in and for 'a better world'?

For the moment, however, let me move on to my second question which is about the scope and nature of external operations under an EU-driven ESDP. Speaking here in Germany, I may start from the view regularly expressed in your official statements and opinion polls alike that ESDP is essentially an instrument for use in Europe's near neighbourhood. It is a view shared by Austria, Spain, and some smaller states but not by Britain and France, who have always seen European defence as naturally a global matter, even before the 2003 European Security Strategy document proclaimed that 'With today's threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad'. The Scandinavians and some Central Europeans, for their part, see the critical question not as the location or intensity of EU operations but as whether they are properly mandated, preferably by the UN. Now, the early experience of ESDP might seem to vindicate your view: apart from one small operation in the Congo last year, all the EU's operations including its police ones, the new and rather unusual law-and-order mission to Georgia, and the major operation now starting in Bosnia-Herzegovina have taken place well within the OSCE area. Does this, however, truly represent the EU's own logic, and thus offer a pattern likely to be maintained into the future? Looked at more closely, all the EU's operations in the Balkans, except one police one (in Bosnia-Herzegovina), have been taken over from NATO at a stage when the problems of the countries concerned needed to be resolved primarily by political and economic transformation – in the direction of EU membership! – thus making the military task more of an instrumental one, requiring especially close

coordination with civil efforts. In short, I would argue that the EU is taking over these jobs not because they particularly play to its military strengths but because they can only be completed successfully with its civil ones. Moreover, the EU did not have to muster the political will and unity or take the political risks required for the *first* intervention in any of these cases, and I have my doubts whether it would find it easy to be the 'first in' in any wholly new crises arising in our near abroad. Would EU politicians want to take the lead in a crisis in the Caucasus, facing the risk either of acting with, or acting against, Russian forces? Would France agree to an intervention in Algeria or Spain to an action in Morocco, with all the neo-colonial overtones it would carry? More generally and perhaps more seriously, I would argue that the EU's supreme security instrument in its own wider region has always been the enlargement process, including the transformation of political and broader security philosophies that it demands from its candidates, as now highlighted in the latest decisions on Turkey. Secondary but still valuable tools are the EU's new 'partnership' arrangements in the zone from Belarus down to Egypt, which include specific security aims and conditionalities, and the programmes of functional security cooperation that the EU is developing with relevant neighbours to tackle problems like terrorism and non-proliferation, smuggling and illegal migration. In none of these, it seems to me, does the *active and operational* use of ESDP assets play much of a part, although sharing ESDP's norms and lessons with the candidate states is now part of the enlargement process, and (in my view) the topics of defence reform and assistance could and should be developed much more explicitly in other partnership relations as well.

Paradoxically, seen on a purely European logic, there may be greater comparative advantage in the use of the EU's military instrument in more distant regions: (a) because the EU has fewer alternative forms of direct engagement to offer such countries (certainly not the integration process), and (b) because there is less risk that the EU will be interpreted as acting in its own selfish territorial interests, and thus as becoming itself a kind of party to the problem. There are actually two more 'selfish' types of action that the Europeans have taken together in the past and could still probably reach consensus on repeating under ESDP, namely the evacuation of their own citizens from a danger spot, and naval actions to protect the free passage of shipping by patrolling and/or mine clearance. But most of the realistic 'out-of-area' scenarios would involve European tasks and motives that are 'softer' at least in the political sense, ranging from traditional peacekeeping as in the Congo, through more specialized humanitarian or perhaps disarmament-related tasks, to disaster relief of the sort we have recently witnessed US forces carrying out on a grand

scale in South-East Asia. The new EU Security Strategy rightly argues that Europeans have an interest in doing these things even where there is no direct link to their own affairs, as a demonstration of their commitment to the international order and to universal values, and as a contribution both to the settlement of existing crises and the alleviation of distress that could lead to more conflicts in future. If we think along these lines, it will become clear that the 'softer' and more unselfish the ESDP's goals are meant to be, the more global in principle should be their implementation, and vice versa.

Now, I am well aware that this line of argument alone cannot overcome all reservations about a global ESDP in Germany or elsewhere, especially against a background where Britain and France have associated the idea of long-range missions with stricter technical standards for the contributing forces, and with keeping open the options of military strikes against targets related to terrorism or proliferation. Personally, I think a lot of this problem goes back to the frustrations Britain and France face in trying to make demanding standards 'bite' on their neighbours' military planning in a framework that is only supposed to be 'about' properly mandated crisis management. (Cf. the arguments above about how much easier the planning debate would be in some ways if we could only start talking about 'real' defence). On any realistic view, if the more aggressively inclined Europeans want to strike against terrorists or WMD possessors they will go off and do it in ad hoc coalitions, just as has happened within the membership of the UN and NATO. However, I would not deny that there are large problems of principle, of a somewhat different kind, that lie in the way of pursuing any full-out 'globalization' of ESDP. There is the question of excessively 'militarizing' the image of the EU, whose peaceful and non-threatening nature has so far served it in very good stead. There is the risk that if the EU goes global *without* properly working out first what its own special aims and principles are, it will be dragged into unconscious imitation of or politically motivated competition with the US and NATO, thus losing sight of its proper comparative advantages and probably generating more political problems than it solves. There is the uncomfortable fact that Europe *does* have some specific, quite selfish, interests in the wider world such as securing the sources and transit of vital strategic commodities, protecting its expatriates and overseas investments, choking off disruptive immigration at source, and so on: a properly designed policy would have to face up to this, and should debate the proper line and balance between using ESDP (and CFSP generally) for such ends, and donating resources for the more 'global community'-oriented missions that I mentioned above.

Capacities and coordination

The last point under this heading is also the one with which I want to start my third main question: namely, the balance and relationship between developing the EU's military instruments and its non-military ones for external policy objectives. In the early days of ESDP, as I mentioned at the beginning, it sometimes seemed that EU defence capabilities were being built up for their own sake – or for someone else's. A programme for building *civilian* intervention capabilities was included from the start, but it only covered resources to be deployed in the same manner as military ones, e.g. for police tasks or other temporary and operational work in the security or, possibly, political institution-building fields. The policy was hardly 'joined up' at all with other areas of CFSP such as the pursuit of arms control and disarmament, with export controls, or with regional security strategies using primarily diplomatic, political and economic levers. The missing links in this respect have to some extent been provided at the analytical level by the European Security Strategy (ESS), and by the widening of the definition of ESDP tasks (to include some clearly arms control and security assistance-related ones) in the new Constitution. Implementation of the Constitution's institutional provision notably on a single EU Foreign Minister, single external affairs service in Brussels, and strengthened EU representation network world-wide ought to improve coordination and, even more important, unity of purpose and culture across this set of traditionally 'second pillar' instruments. Since last year in particular, there has also been a much better understanding of the complex interface and continuum between external defence and security instruments and the necessary development of the EU's *internal security* space, especially in regard to terrorism. The Strategy and Constitution, however, give no real clue on how the future ESDP is meant to 'join up' with European policies and instruments currently lying in Pillar One and traditionally managed by the Commission, such as humanitarian assistance and broader aid policy, trade and financial policy, functional realms of security such as energy policy or transport security or the environment – not to mention the ongoing Enlargement process.

That this problem is more than just a conceptual one is shown by the challenges the EU is now facing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a new military operation will have to be coordinated with an existing police one and with a wide range of EU civilian inputs and broader security goals, in a setting where several other international organizations are engaged, and against a policy background where a long-term accession process is seen as the ultimate guarantee for stabilization. As so often in the past, 'learning on the job' should help to

solve the specific problems of multi-functional engagement for the EU in this relatively familiar, if still far from simple, 'near abroad' environment. The lessons can, however, only be a first and not necessarily representative starting point for addressing the corresponding questions more globally. When the EU acts outside its own territory, should its military arm be the servant of, and at best a facilitator for, its political, economic and humanitarian engagement; or should the latter tools themselves sometimes be subordinated to a security or 'strategic' aim of sufficient importance? What would that mean in practical terms for the Commission's rights vis-à-vis the now more settled and institutionalized leadership of the European Council? Equally important, since everything starts and ends with money, how much in the way of resources should the EU be putting into its specific, positive, defence and security instruments (including the collaborative development of European armaments), as against expenditure on arms control and weapons disposal, more functional dimensions of security, or humanitarian and other assistance policies aimed at peace and sustainable development? I am not going to try to offer answers and I don't believe there are any easy ones; but I would underline here that a purely EU-based approach to ESDP would make it more vital than ever to address the question, given that this multi-functional competence combined with large-scale, concrete, non-military *resources and instruments* is the EU's only truly unique feature in the world of security (as compared especially with NATO and the OSCE).

While on the subject of EU capacities, a lot more could be said in detail about the next stages in developing military ones, notably in the framework set by the EU's new Headline Goal for 2010, the plan to set up Battle Groups, and the new potential linkage between operational plans, capabilities and equipment provision offered by the European Defence Agency (EDA). I have, however, excused myself at the start from saying much about this, so I will limit myself here to just one point. What is striking about the new set of military goals adopted last year is that, while still remarkably vague about just what missions should be carried out, they all create pressure for greater ongoing *integration* of European forces – not just in the context of the multinational Battle Groups, but also through the undertaking given to the UN (in an Memorandum of Understanding on UN-EU cooperation) to look at the possibility of a kind of permanently available EU 'standby force', and through the EDA's mandate to develop joint equipment programmes that are matched more directly to the needs of European forces operating jointly in the field. One can see how this trend has been driven by practical considerations, partly because it allows even closer scrutiny of various countries' performance and pushes them more forcefully towards common reform solutions; but partly also because such

deeper-reaching standardization, integration and specialization offer the only real hope of squeezing out more deployable capacity from essentially static European defence budgets. Politically and in principle, however, it is a fascinating development because it can be read as the EU's starting to take over NATO's former role of force de-nationalisation and integration, in a way that now extends equally to six non-NATO states; and because it has the practical effect of 'interfering' with nations' defence planning across the board, long before the Union has claimed any officially 'joined-up' competence for advising on matters other than crisis management. It would not be the first time in the EU that practice has out-run doctrine, and it is not likely to be the last.

The 'will of the people'?

This brings me rather neatly to my last question: do European publics realize this is going on, and if they did, would they accept it? Opinion polls actually suggest a high level of support right across the EU for general progress in common foreign, security and defence policies, but it is commonplace to note how quickly different countries' conceptions, priorities, and self-imposed limitations in this field start to diverge as soon as it comes down to particulars. Somewhat paradoxically, however, one might argue that such popular preferences matter less in the field of common defence (and other external) policies than in others, because all EU states to differing degrees treat these as matters primarily for the national executive to decide. National parliaments can rarely control the sums of money used by governments for ad hoc security missions, as distinct from the regular annual defence budget. The European Parliament, as we know, has virtually no binding powers in this field at all (although it is good to note that Solana and others in the relevant Brussels organs are trying to communicate with it more freely and regularly). In consequence, several EU governments have been able to take steps such as joining the US-led coalition in Iraq (or more to the point currently, have not withdrawn from it) against the clearly expressed majority view in their public opinion. Given that ESDP missions will be launched by inter-governmental decision in the EU Council structure, EU governments collectively could act if they wished with a similar freedom from democratic constraints, and in practice some potentially risky decisions (like Operation Artemis in the Congo) have already been taken at a speed that itself ruled out any kind of meaningful national consultation. I am well aware of the arguments in favour of doing things this way, in terms of being able to react fast to real threats and urgent cases of human suffering, as well as the slightly less noble motive of making the EU look good and strong and purposeful in the international community's

eye. However, I would beg to raise the question whether it is safe in the longer term to run European Security and defence as an executive, élite programme without either adjusting it to expressed popular wishes or, conversely, making a proper effort to explain it to Europe's peoples and to encourage their active support.

As more EU countries move away from conscript or volunteer forces to permanent professional ones, it may become easier to supply the men for any given mission regardless of broader public attitudes; but this trend creates some normative risk of political misuse of European forces, and perhaps even of misconduct by them. It provides a further argument for what I said above about the need for the EU to play some normative role, at least at the collective European level, by accustoming national forces to work together in responsible and non-nationalistic style – on which logic, a true 'European army' might ultimately be a more democratic solution than the absence of one! Most important, however, in purely practical terms, the rapidly growing connection and interdependence between Europe's internal and external, military and non-military security strategies will make it less and less sensible and feasible for governments to ignore in their external actions the views and needs of those same European citizens who will very much need to be

mobilized and disciplined for the inward-looking and civil dimensions of the enterprise.

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I asked near the beginning of this presentation whether the years from 2005 would be the time for the EU to start doing its own business for its own reasons, in ESDP and in its foreign and security policies more broadly. My own view is that the answer should be Yes, and my guess is that it will be. As mentioned, part of the short-term motivation for this is likely to come from anti-US feelings, but I do not believe that an EU security policy that is true to European ideals is against the USA's interests or indeed anyone else's interests in the longer run. In purely practical terms, Europe is likely to be inefficient and half-hearted if it only plays with the idea of defence to serve someone else's purposes, or to impress someone else, or to annoy them. It can only act with conviction and longer-term efficiency if it can offer its own soldiers, its decision-makers and its citizens an answer to the question 'Warum'. And to my mind the best and only answer lies in the very special thing that our European Union is, and the very special things that it can and must offer to the world.