

Michael R. Lucas

**Nationalism, Sovereignty, and Supranational  
Organizations**

Heft 114  
Hamburg, April 1999



## Contents

Introduction	5
Part 1	
Nation-states and Supranationality	7
1.1 <i>The transformation of sovereignty</i>	7
1.2 <i>Globalization and “glocalization“</i>	11
1.3 <i>The creation of nation-states and IGOs</i>	12
1.4 <i>IGOs, nationalist movements, and nationally defined sovereignty</i>	13
1.5 <i>Multiculturalism and post-modernist social-political reform</i>	16
1.6 <i>The dialectic of modernism and post-modernist reform</i>	18
1.6.1 <i>Premises of the modern state and multiculturalism</i>	18
1.6.2 <i>Nation-state formation in the ex-Soviet space</i>	19
1.7 <i>IGOs, NGOs, and nationalist movements</i>	21
Part 2	
Nationalism	25
2.1 <i>Competing theoretical approaches</i>	25
2.2 <i>Classifications of theories of nationalism</i>	26
2.3 <i>Problems of defining nationalism</i>	27
2.4 <i>Small- and large-state nationalism</i>	28
2.5 <i>Hroch’s historical analysis of self-determination</i>	32
2.6 <i>The state-centered approach</i>	36
2.7 <i>Modernization theories of nationalism</i>	37
2.8 <i>The critique of modernization theories</i>	41
2.9 <i>Individualistic versus collectivistic nationalism</i>	47
2.10 <i>The search for a broader synthesis</i>	48
2.11 <i>From a modernist to post-modernist perspective</i>	49
2.11.1 <i>Weaknesses of Gellner’s theory</i>	50
2.11.2 <i>“Modular man“ and multiculturalism</i>	52

Conclusion	57
Abbreviations	61
Bibliography	62

## **Introduction**

In discussions of the future of the state, it is commonly argued or simply assumed that the role of the nation-state is dramatically diminishing as a result of economic, cultural and other forms of globalization. The realist school of international relations, on the other hand, is based on the proposition that the state and state sovereignty remain the undiminished nuclei of the international system. Another school of thought stresses the marked increase of nationalist movements that are striving to become independent nation-states, especially since the end of the Cold War. An alternative, more comprehensive approach focuses on the dialectical interaction of states and multilateral and non-state actors.

What follows is an attempt to clarify and illuminate the emergent supranational context of contemporary nationalism and the nation-state. Part 1 takes up the consequences and implications of globalization for the future of the nation-state, national sovereignty, Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). I will also discuss the upsurge of nationalism and ethno-nationalist movements in the light of the acceleration of globalization and supranational trends since the end of the Cold War. The re-emergence of traditional and new forms of nationalism pose the question whether or not nation-states today are becoming more nationalist or, as globalization implies, more multinationalist and multicultural. I take up this question in relationship to IGOs and their role in creating new nation-states, in providing increasingly urgent but still incomplete forms of global governance, and - in collaboration with NGOs - methods of crisis-management and preventing violent ethno-nationalist conflicts.

In Part 2, I critically review theories of nationalism and their failure to fully recognize the larger global and supranational context of nationalism and the nation-state. I begin with a brief summary of the general problems of this research field, including the lack of definitional consensus concerning its

core concepts, such as nation, the nation-state, and nationalism. This is followed by a critical analysis of selected theories. I focus on those schools of thought most relevant to the questions addressed in Part 1, including the uneven supranationalization of the nation-state, globalization, multiculturalization, and the upsurge in new nationalist movements following the end of the Cold War. I also take up and critically assess the on-going debate between 'modernization' theorists of nationalism who emphasize the progressive socio-economic transformation of modern society and theorists of ethno-nationalism who criticize the premises of the modernization school and fault its failure to sufficiently recognize the enduring ethnic, pre-modern components of contemporary nationalisms.

## Part 1

### Nation-states and Supranationality

#### 1.1 *The transformation of sovereignty*

Supranational trends place the nation-state, national movements, and various other manifestations of “nationalism“ beyond the insularity of purely national-domestic frames of reference and activity. Such insularity has always been, to a greater or lesser extent, an ideological chimera. States and nation-states by their very nature have been only relatively insular at any time during their history. They have always existed and have been shaped by their larger international environment. Nevertheless, the consolidation of the nation-state and the ideological images and notions of nationalism are inseparable from inflated notions of such independence.

Supranationalism<sup>1</sup> has tended to erode certain norms, prerogatives, and images of national sovereignty, without however, fundamentally altering the position of the nation-state as still the single most important actor in the international system. Yet globalization, deregulation, privatization, and

---

<sup>1</sup> In this essay I will use the terms *supranational organization*, *Supranational Organizations* (SNOs), and *supranationalism* to refer to all organizations, institutions and political and social processes involving more than a single state or at least two non-state actors from different nation-states. *Supranational* will thus encompass formal organizations, institutions, and political and legal agreements related to transnational interaction. These range from the cross-border movements of people, commodities, and information (and the agreements and political frameworks that legitimize and regulate these) to more structured, formalized inter-state activity organized and supervised by multilateral institutions and organizations, including IGOs. The broad definition of the term *supranational* in this essay is akin to the term *transnational* but differs from it in that *supranational* is not intended to focus primarily on the distinction between the state as an actor in international politics versus non-state actors acting alone or together with state-actors. The purpose will be rather to suggest and illustrate the continued decline and the crisis of the independence of the nation-state both as a political actor and as a justifiable ideological stereotype and construct.

related political-economic trends that have become more pronounced since the end of the Cold War are profoundly affecting contemporary nation-states and reshaping the cooperation, rivalry and conflict among the various supranational actors.

The concept of Supranational Organizations (SNOs) reflects the expanding interaction of non-governmental actors with states, Transnational Organizations (TNOs), and IGOs.<sup>2</sup> As this interaction has increased, it has

---

2 Some authors use the term and concept of IGOs interchangeably with *International Organizations (IOs)*. The term *international organization* is sometimes used to refer to the *process* of international politics structuring itself into cooperative bodies of various kinds, while *International Organizations (IOs)* designate formal structures that arise out of this process (Archer, 1993, 2). The term International Organization (IO) will be used in this essay as a broad category to refer to IGOs, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and internationally active NGOs. The term Transnational Organizations (TNOs) will include -- in addition to INGOs and NGOs -- Business INGOs (BINGOs), which are also known as Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), and Multinational Corporations (MNCs). For a more detailed discussion of the terminology of IOs, see Archer, 1993; Feld et al, 1994; and Union, 1998.

IGOs are usually based on international treaties, which formally bind member-states to uphold the organization's charter and to pursue its official goal of interstate economic, political, security, or cultural cooperation. IGOs are most notably distinguished by their institutional framework, which varies according to the IGO's purpose, its area of activity, the size of its membership, the geopolitical constraints under which it has to operate, and the specific nation-states that comprise it.

IGOs are comprised not only of sovereign nation-states (i.e., governments in the strict sense of the term) but also IGOs, which are represented with nameplates and have voting rights. A number of European IGOs also include in their family of institutions parliamentary assemblies, in which the national, elected political parties of each member-state are represented. Examples include the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (COE), the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Union of International Associations in their standard reference work provides data on "federations of international organizations," "universal membership organizations," "intercontinental membership organizations," and "regionally oriented membership organizations" (Union, 1998). Under the rubric "other international bodies" are "organizations emanating from places or persons or other bodies," "organizations of special form," and "internationally oriented national organizations." The UN bases its relatively broad definition of an IO on whether or not the organization was established by an agreement among governments. When this is not the case, the organization is considered by the UN as a NGO (Union, 1998, 1761). The general, relatively unspecified criteria of the UN definition of different types of organizations are not universally accepted, especially regarding the classification of NGOs. For more detailed and systematic criteria for defining and classifying NGOs that more accurately reflect their explosive growth in recent years, see Union (1998) and earlier editions of this



tended to shift and perforate the boundaries separating the realm of government and states from non-governmental actors and institutions. IGOs, while primarily defined and controlled by states, have become inseparable from and dependent on NGOs.

Apart from states acting alone or in concert, IGOs stand at the high end of the scale of politically structured cooperation. In terms of functional competence, resources, legal authority, and political power in international relations, IGOs are the most important multilateral actors in the international community.<sup>3</sup>

The relationship of nation-states to IGOs is sometimes sovereignty-enhancing, sometimes sovereignty-limiting. Whether it is one or the other depends partly on one's definition of sovereignty. It is often overlooked that a state can often enhance its sovereignty through the agency of an IGO and the collective action of an IGO or coalition of IGOs. The decisions and actions of an IGO may express the general, collective interest of all its member-states, but nevertheless at the same time benefit some of its members more than others. Major powers, hegemonial states, and

---

valuable resource.

3 The term *international community* will be used in this essay to refer to international organizations, multilateral institutions, INGOs, states, and national publics. In its current political and international legal context, the term *international community* is not free from ambiguity. As a result of the end of the East-West conflict, the term is becoming synonymous with values that are often considered or taken for granted as "universal" but are Western in their origin and contemporary meaning, including democracy, rule of law, and human rights. The *international community* can also refer to the collective of nations, within which there are non-democratic regimes that do not subscribe to the corpus of "Western" values. Another ambiguity of the term *international community* is linked to those actors in international politics who are present by virtue of their exclusion, namely, refugees, who now number 13.2 million people (State of the World Refugees, 1997) and whose numbers are still growing. Condemned to live and migrate in a world of nation-states to which they do not officially belong, these stateless communities and individuals tend to receive greater political recognition and consideration of their plight in the universe of IGO and NGOs, than they do within individual states. Notwithstanding these ambiguities, for the sake of simplicity I will use the term *international community* in this essay in all the above senses and rely on the context to make clear my meaning in each instance.

superpowers can and do use IGOs as instruments to implement their national policies.

National governments are obliged to adopt domestic policies that are formally in accord with treaties and agreements of the IGOs in which they participate. Yet the international judicial system is not equipped with monitoring and implementation mechanisms to prevent or rectify most violations of this formal norm of international politics and law.

Executive governments also use their nation's international agreements and IGO commitments to promote the passage of domestic draft legislation. International commitments to IGO agreements are sometimes invoked to gain domestic popular and legislative approval, especially in the case of unpopular policies. During the Cold War the notion of "NATO alliance commitments" was often put forth by successive US administrations that sought approval of foreign military budgetary outlays. European governments similarly invoke "Brussels" (the inter-governmental headquarters of the EU) to explain and justify unpopular austerity policies to their publics.

The actual breath and scope of state sovereignty, either past or present, should not, however, be overemphasized. It is often falsely assumed, as Holton reminds us, that there was a golden age when states exercised absolute control over their territory and the movement of people and resources across their territory (Holton, 1998, 83). The sovereignty of nation-states has always been conditioned by a variety of limiting factors. These include recognition by other states, the degree of development and integration of the international system, and the types of control that any centralized government administratively and in other ways is able to exercise over its territory and its population.

Today, nation-states are less independent and sovereign than they were in former times prior to the proliferation of IGOs, NGOs and other SNOs. The nature and limits of state sovereignty are being transformed from

“above“ by SNOs (sometimes by coalitions of IGOs and NGOs) and from “below“ by NGOs and grassroots movements whose demands are in part transmitted by domestic lobbies and NGOs. While the distinction of politics from “below“ and from “above“ is useful, it is also problematic to the extent, as already discussed, that IGOs work together with NGOs. This activity on the part of NGOs extends from promoting the demands of grassroots movements within IGOs to providing UN weapon inspectors in Iraq following the Gulf War. Coalitions of IGOs and NGOs help to nurture civil-societal movements for greater democracy and human rights in post-communist societies. NGOs also ally with individual states in IGOs in order to criticize particular member-states that fail to meet their international obligations and violate international humanitarian law. Coalitions of this kind have become a recognized part of international politics, although they attenuate and violate the traditional notion of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

States jealously guard their sovereignty as nation-states. But as a result of the growth and integration of the international economy their sovereignty has become politically and economically more mediated by the sovereignty of other states and by IGOs. States have become weaker in their capability to act unilaterally but “stronger“ in their capability to act regionally and globally through various forms of collective action. Such action can have a net effect on their power and influence as “independent“ states. It affects their domestic legitimacy and also impacts on different kinds and dimensions of nationalist sentiment and nationalist movements.

### *1.2 Globalization and “glocalization“*

The traditional paradigm of state sovereignty has a strongly “spatial,“ territorial bias. The territory of a nation-state tends to mark the accepted boundary separating internal and external affairs. Globalization tends to “de-spatialize“ the notion of sovereignty by merging what is internal and external, making it difficult or impossible to cleanly separate the two. In the

case of the EU, the boundaries that circumscribe national and European policy have been eroded -- in some cases eliminated -- by the progress of the European unification. Robertson's useful concept and term 'glocalization' attempts to theoretically capture the inter-penetration of the local and global and how they co-determine each other (Robertson, 1995).

As IGOs and other inter-state SNOs play a larger role in domestic and global policymaking and policy implementation, the distinction between domestic issues and extra-domestic affairs of state, including regional and global issues, becomes less clear. International legal and political commitments pertaining to human rights, environmental protection, health, crime, commerce, labor practices, intellectual property, and scientific research co-determine domestic policies today.

Global problems, such as the ecological challenges of the abused biosphere, the worldwide health effects of exponentially increasing social interactivity, including changing dynamics of epidemics, pandemics, and other health risks, are examples of the challenges that states perceive first as domestic threats. But they recognize that they have a vital interest in combating such problems collectively. IGOs provide relatively stable, accessible multilateral frameworks for cooperative dialogue, decisionmaking, and decision-implementation for coordinated common action.

Globalization has also attenuated the social and cultural dimensions of state sovereignty of modern nation-states by making culturally relatively homogeneous polities more multicultural and multilingual, notwithstanding reluctance of many governments to formally recognize such changes. This process places states in greater social-cultural proximity to one another. The separation from the nationally, culturally "other" is radically reduced because of the expanding multicultural, multinational mix in one's own country.

### *1.3 The creation of nation-states and IGOs*

Nation-states create IGOs, and the establishment of new nation-states presupposes their recognition by IGOs. IGOs and other SNOs actively assist in establishing new nation-states.<sup>4</sup> IGOs also establish new IGOs and other types of SNOs. Increasingly this activity includes establishing organizations to promote the creation and funding of NGOs. The UN family of IGOs and other international bodies is the most important example of this process. Other examples include Europe's regional IGOs, such as the OSCE, COE, EU, and NATO.

While some IGOs were set up by states before the heyday of modern nation-state nationalism (after 1830), IGOs only assumed an important historical role with the predominance of the nation-state in international politics. The increase of nation-states, especially since the end of World War II, has continued to generate the need for additional and new kinds of IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs.

During the post-World-War-II era, the UN played a key role in the transition of anti-colonial, nationalist movements into independent nation-states, particularly in Africa and Asia. Following the Cold War, complex formal and informal coalitions of IGOs and other SNOs have helped to midwife the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet empire. Among the twenty-seven new states that joined the UN between 1990 and 1995 many were ex-Soviet republics.

#### *1.4 IGOs, nationalist movements, and nationally defined sovereignty*

The international system today is comprised of interlocking networks of

---

<sup>4</sup> The creation of new states as a broad global trend is reflected in the increasing percentage of the world's peoples that are represented in major IGOs, most importantly, the UN. In 1969, 75% of the world's peoples were represented in the UN. By 1994, the UN represented 99.9% of the world's peoples (Commission on Global Governance, 1995, 8).

IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs. IGOs are mutually linked through overlapping memberships, formal and informal inter-organizational consultation at the

diplomatic, expert, and inter-personal levels, and through cooperation in field operations.

The complex interaction of states, IGOs, NGOs and other SNOs has become a political environment in which ethnic and religious groups, national minorities, and linguistic communities demand greater recognition and often different forms of self-determination. Such movements, many of which espouse nationalist aims, agitate politically for support of their claims at the local and national level, and increasingly in IGOs and other multilateral bodies. Nationalist movements today often ally with INGOs or, as already mentioned, become themselves transnational movements active in IGOs and other SNOs. Such activity is an example of the “glocalization“ of nationalist movements and nationalist phenomena and the supranational context of nationalist movements today. The struggle for independence in Kosovo in Serbia is a good example of a multi-leveled conflict unfolding both locally and nationally in the state of Serbia (which is defending its sovereignty claim over the mountainous enclave), in Albania, and throughout the Balkans. At the regional and global level, NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the UN, and the Contact Group of major powers have intervened in the name of international security in order to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict.

States conduct an increasing amount of their extra-domestic policymaking through the mediation of IGOs and networks of IGOs and other SNOs. Bilateral and multilateral state activity (outside of IGOs) as a rule is supposed to conform to the state’s international obligations and agreements, although this is often not the case. The increased weight of IGOs and other SNOs tends to attenuate the national framework of state legitimacy by “bonding it“ in specific, carefully spelled-out, delimited ways with the sovereignty of other national states through international norms, rules, treaties, and cooperative activities. When a nation-state signs on to an international human-rights political agreement or a legally binding treaty, its legitimacy as a nation-state is no longer only based on its national sovereignty but also linked to the governments and citizens of other nation-

states. These other polities are also signatories of the document. Their citizens may even look to other nation-states to help safeguard their rights as individuals and members of their nationally defined society and as members of an supranationally evolving, albeit still only embryonic global, civil society.

The greatly expanded intervention-type activities of the UN Security Council following the end of the Cold War are cited by Feld as an example of the erosion of the traditional principle of national political sovereignty and jurisdiction (Feld et al. 1994, 5). Specific examples include the Security Council's work in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict rehabilitation (Armstrong, 1996, 125-131).

Another example is the post-Cold-War OSCE. If a crisis or conflict within a member-state is deemed to threaten regional stability and security, the OSCE can decide to take action against the state (Lucas, 1995d). Such intervention is also a departure from the rule of non-interference by states in the internal affairs of other states.

Major interventions by IGOs in inter- and infra-state conflicts have failed to prevent their escalation into military violence and the mass killing of civilians. The armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, in Rwanda in 1994, and in Kosovo in 1998 are examples. The international machinery for timely conflict prevention and conflict cessation is still too constrained by the rules and political culture of national state sovereignty to prevent instability, war, and gross violations of international and humanitarian law. Even the genocide of 800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda and neighboring states in East Africa in late 1994 was allowed to continue while the international community stood by (Gourevitch, 1998).

Although the formal possibility of limited intervention in a conflict may exist, IGOs often fail to muster the political will of their member-states to make full use of the procedures and instruments at their disposal. In some



cases, the constraints of sovereignty rules and bureaucratic inertia, which such constraints tend to create, combine with organizational and logistical weaknesses. This was the case when the UN failed to intervene to prevent the Rwandan genocide. The failure of the international community to intervene following Russia's military intervention in Chechnya in December, 1994, despite Moscow's gross violations of its OSCE obligations, is also an example (Lucas, 1996, 1998). Moscow was able to maintain that the conflict was an internal Russian affair, which was officially accepted by the United States and other major powers. Although the OSCE did send a mission to Chechnya, which was nevertheless unprecedented in the case of Russia, the OSCE diplomats could not halt the massive destruction that took place.

### *1.5 Multiculturalism and post-modernist social-political reform*

As the structure and dynamics of nation-states become increasingly mediated by inter-state and inter-societal relationships, legitimacy tends to take on supranational dimensions. The terms "modernity" and "modernization" are used to conceptualize the industrial transformation and political-economic consolidation of the modern nation-state. They are core concepts of the "modernization" school of theorists of nationalism, which will be discussed in greater detail in Part 2. Building on this terminology for our purposes here, we can use the term *post-modern* to capture a number of the emerging supranational dimensions of the nation-state. While *post-modern* forms of legitimacy and state behavior develop within the traditional "modern" nation-state, they also conflict with a number of its characteristics and values. A locus and manifestation of this conflict is multiculturalism.

The social and cultural basis of the modern nation-state is unevenly becoming multiculturalized. At play here are the "bottom-up" dynamics of grassroots social and political movements and the "top-down" acts of institutionalization and legitimation by the state. Through national legislation

and policymaking, the state is under pressure to recognize the demands of a new diversity of cultural, ethnic, gender and other politicized groups (having different nationalities) for recognition, social protection, and economic enfranchisement. Globalization and its wide-ranging consequences have accelerated the multiculturalization of national politics. The incessant movements of people (migration, tourism, etc.,) across different national borders has exponentially increased. These flows have also put into question many of the traditional cultural, communication, and other boundaries linked to respective nation-states. Migration movements tend to flow in the direction of relatively more open and prosperous, democratic nation-states. These act as economic and cultural magnets for other nationalities and create cultural hubs that reflect and project through global channels of communication and culture new values reflecting these changes. Historical and cultural images of the past, present, and future tend to be brought together in kaleidoscopic "recombinations" that generate a "glocalized" sense of time and space.

"Multiculturalism" as a term is often used to refer to the differentiation of rivaling, polarized groups in the trenches of on-going "culture wars." Yet multiculturalism also refers to eclectic mixtures and cross-cultural patterns in everyday lifestyle, art, fashion, religious practice and politics that stimulate and reflect a more profound, more richly colored and nuanced model of cultural and political pluralism. It is based on more pronounced forms of individualism and group particularism made possible, somewhat paradoxically, by a greater freedom and tolerance anchored politically and legally within the international community and states, IGOs, and other SNOs.

These forms of post-modernization also produce a violent backlash of religious, cultural and politically independent groups, communities, and even states that see their traditional way of life and beliefs threatened by disruption and possible destruction by outside forces over which they feel they have no control. This backlash includes religious-based or religious-

clothed extremism of the fundamentalist type that does not know how to deal with post-modernist change and rejects politics for campaigns of violence and building terrorist TNOs.

Multiculturalism promotes supranational thinking and doing by undermining the ideal of one homogeneous national political culture emblemized through highly unified national symbols characteristic of the traditional, modern nation-state. Part 2 of this essay will discuss this point further in the context of theories of nationalism.

### *1.6 The dialectic of modernism and post-modernist reform*

#### *1.6.1 Premises of the modern state and multiculturalism*

Social and political multiculturalization has become unmistakably evident today in the changing policies, self-representation, and values of the nation-state as a subject of international politics. The supranational dynamics of globalization pressure individual states to recognize, despite their reluctance in this regard, the extent to which the composition of their respective populations and thus also their “national culture“ has become (or always was) multicultural and multinational.

Multiculturalization erodes some of the basic premises of nation-state formation and national unification that became entrenched in the international system in the heydays of 17th, 18th and 19th century nationalism. These include the fundamental aim of creating centralized, more or less exclusionist national cultures, a highly unified, externally protected territorial space, homogenized national symbols out of pre-given, diverse cultural elements, and in not a few cases, national or quasi-national religions. These goals were often pursued by campaigns of discrimination, exclusion, and sometimes expropriation by the embryonic central governmental authorities against minority, ethnic, cultural, and religious groups (Zollberg, 1983).

This historical construction of the real and imagined (i.e. ideological) community of the nation-state was often contradicted by facts on the ground. The violence of nation-state construction was also softened and mitigated by the maturation of liberal constitutional democracies. Nevertheless, the ideological oversimplifications of nation-building and campaigns of expropriation are inseparable from the modernization project that was concomitant with the early rise of capitalism, its conquest of the world, and its spread of the nation-state form. Its extension through the competitive, imperialist conquest of the Americas, Africa and Asia culminated in the 19th century and led to the series of inter-imperialist wars in the historical run-up to World War I.

#### *1.6.2 Nation-state formation in the ex-Soviet space*

One of capitalism's historic, 20th century triumphs was the titanic downfall of Soviet communism and the first break-through steps in the integration of ex-Soviet states and China into the multinational and multicultural networks of capitalist production, distribution, and consumption. This albeit crisis-ridden, uneven process of integration is being facilitated with the help of IGOs and other SNOs and is promoting the creation of additional supranational bodies and networks.

The end of the Cold War abolished much of the traditional insularity of former communist states. The integration of these newly independent regimes into the international community of states, IGOs and other SNOs has entailed two overlapping and partially contradictory processes. Firstly, new states have emerged that are based on traditional, modernist-type nationalism of nation-statehood. Secondly, a *post-modernist* process of supranational multiculturalization has tended to put into question many of the political and political-cultural traits and constraints of traditional, unitary nation-statehood.

In ex-communist, newly independent states, national governments are

confronted with the task of designing policies and development-paths that forge a compromise between the modernist and post-modernist, supranationalist projects. This is not easy due to the fact that these two approaches are at odds with each other. States that prioritize the modernist, ideologically dominant traits of nation-statehood to the exclusion of multicultural openness and pluralist political culture will tend to exclude themselves from the rapidly evolving “glocalized“ environment in which all nation-states increasingly find themselves. But the modern nation-state cannot truly open itself to its post-modern social and cultural environment without becoming self-critical of its traditional historical heritage and its own history of discrimination against “foreign“ and minority cultures.

The clash of these two political cultures forms a major source of political instability and the breakdown of nation-state order into ethno-nationalist conflict and civil war in states, such as the former Yugoslavia since the early 1990s and in Russia (for example, in its internal war with Chechnya). The lack of a democratic, pluralist political culture under communism ill-equipped both the former Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet Russia to deal with the double political culture shock of modern nation-state formation and post-modernist transition. Modernism is based on democratic institutions and values. Post-modernism requires not only democracy but also greater openness of the state toward notions of decentralization, devolution, subsidiarity, the granting of different degrees and types of autonomy to sub-national groupings that are demanding ethnic-political recognition, social protection, and cultural or ethnic legitimation. The newly independent states throughout the ex-Soviet space are doubly challenged by having been thrust into modernist *and* post-modernist, supranationalist transition simultaneously as a result of the end of communism.

The clash of the modernist and post-modernist transition is not confined to the newly independent states. As a result of globalization, this antagonism is being played out throughout the world. To different degrees, minority and multicultural social movements and trends have placed all central

governments under pressure to become self-critical of their traditionally narrowly defined national heritage. This self-questioning often concerns the role of historically dominant elites in discriminating against and suppressing minority cultures, social groups, and whole peoples whose cultures were often quite literally “smelted down“ in the crucibles of national unification.

The nationalist movements and conflicts today, including the ethno-national wars in post-communist Europe, the claims of native peoples and other social and ethnic groups throughout the world are challenging the traditional state, IGOs and other SNOs in their struggle to adjust to latter-day modernist and post-modernist trends. Politically neglected social-political constituencies are now demanding more loudly than formerly their basic human rights, political enfranchisement, and in many cases the restitution of individual and collective property wrested from them in past historical epochs.

### *1.7 IGOs, NGOs, and nationalist movements*

Virtually all the areas of activity of IGOs and NGOs impact nationalist movements directly or indirectly. Among the more important types of long-term projects that contribute to reducing infra- and inter-state nationalism are the following:

- promoting the rule of law and human rights
- fostering civil society and democracy in newly independent states
- promoting international understanding
- helping to establish cooperation and education infrastructures
- acilitating and organizing economic assistance
- combating regional and global problems.

IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs also act as forums or mediators for dialogue and negotiation of disputes between nationalist opposition movements or ethnic groups and individual states.

The dialogue-promoting and mediating activity of IGOs also occurs within organizations whose members include politically and militarily allied states. NATO, as a collective defense organization, is a good example. During the history of the alliance, Greece and Turkey, both of whom are members, have fallen into disputes that have threatened their peaceful bilateral relations and thus also the cohesion of the NATO alliance. These differences were peacefully managed as a result of their common alliance membership, their commitment to their alliance obligations, and the pressure and persuasion of other alliance members. NATO is an example of a specialized type of IGO, in which its traditional member-states and their respective military establishment have learned as a result of a half-century of experience to work together. Political disputes among NATO's members, some of which are nationalist in nature, have been in most cases subdued in the larger interest and goals of political-military cooperation, regional security, and stability.

IGOs and NGOs also provide humanitarian support for the civilian victims of wars and crises, including refugees and internally displaced persons. Once peace is established, IGOs and NGOs often provide resources for post-conflict reconstruction. Such aid can play a significant role in helping to stabilize peace and prevent a resurgence of tension and war.

With the downfall of Soviet Communism, the end of the East-West division of the world, and the eruption of ethno-nationalist movements throughout the East, a number of IGOs have adopted innovatory interventionary procedures. These have gone beyond the former limits imposed by the principle of non-intervention in the "internal affairs" of nation-states. What is accepted by the international community as "internal" to a particular state has changed, most importantly in situations in which an internal conflict can ignite a crisis or conflict in the surrounding (sub-)region or even globally.

Different types of IGOs and NGOs, often cooperating or acting in concert,

have been engaged in the former Yugoslavia and other parts of the Balkans, initiating projects in order to ease tensions, implement peace agreements, and promote post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction.

The challenges for the international community and the networks of IGOs and NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Albania have been a test case for the international community. The problems that they have had to deal with have also functioned as a catalyst of needed reform within major IGOs.

The international community was unable to prevent the wars in former Yugoslavia, the conflicts in ex-Soviet republics, including those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, to name several of the more familiar examples. But the major powers working with IGOs and other SNOs were effective at preventing such “hot spots“ from igniting a chain reaction of widening war. Contrary to fears that were prevalent in the early 1990s, these conflicts have been tentatively contained, though not fully settled. They have remained local hot or cold wars. In some cases, the danger of their widening beyond their present boundaries remains very real, as in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, and venues in the former Soviet Union.

The ex-Soviet republics provide examples of inter-ethnic tension between Russian minorities in the new former Soviet republics and the newly enfranchised majorities. In the Baltic states, the Russian minority under Soviet rule enjoyed a privileged social, political, and economic position. They lost many of their privileges and former status when the Soviet Union was dissolved and Estonia, Lithuania, and Letland became independent. Tensions between the Russian minorities and the majority national population became a source of brewing conflict between the respective Baltic states and Moscow. Problems of citizenship, pensions, jobs, and language requirements became the subject of acrimonious national political debate. Russia defended Russians in the Baltics who, Moscow insisted, had become the object of political, economic and social discrimination. The



OSCE, the COE and a number of other SNOs played a major role in advising Baltic governments on new legislation concerning these issues and in effect mediating between Moscow and the Baltic capitals. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is a post that was created in 1992 within the OSCE expressly for such interventions (Brett, 1993; Lucas, 1995d). Many of these missions, supplemented by work of NGOs, were successful in helping to prevent more serious conflicts.



## Part 2

### Nationalism

#### 2.1 Competing theoretical approaches

John Breuilly reminds us that nationalism is the most important political ideology of the modern era but also one which elicits the least agreement (Breuilly, 1996, 137). Breuilly's judgement is one of the few propositions about which most theorists of nationalism would concur. Theories of nationalism are often introduced by their authors with a discussion of the plethora of theories, definitions, and terms, and the elusiveness of arriving at a systematic approach to this troubled research field. For Breuilly, the explanation of the lack of consensus begins with the many angles from which nationalism can be theoretically and empirically investigated.<sup>5</sup> A second source of his dissatisfaction is the often-encountered failure in the vast literature of nationalism to find clearer distinctions between nationalism, nations, the nation-state, and national unity. There is, in addition, the "gulf between those who regard nationalism as the product, however exaggerated or distorted a form, of an underlying national reality, and those who regard it as myth, the cause rather than the product of nationality" (ibid.). A similarly troublesome divide separates those who view the nation as a *political association* and those who see it as a *cultural community*.

---

5 The list of different types of nationalism of the political scientist Max Sylvius Handman illustrates the tendency to differentiate and even define nationalisms in terms of a variety of political phenomena. Handman's nominally generous list include "oppression nationalism," "irredentist nationalism," "conscious nationalism," "subconscious nationalism," "hegemony nationalism," "particularistic nationalism," "marginal nationalism," and "nationalities in the minorities" (Handman, 1921, cited in Snyder, 1976, 32-33).

## 2.2 *Classifications of theories of nationalism*

Breilly also points to the universality and the power of nationalism, its vast range of cases and abundance of vested interests, which make concurrence in the ways of looking at nationalism a dim prospect. In addition, methodological problems plague the field, because nationalism combines descriptive and prescriptive claims<sup>6</sup> The result is a large output of new literature on nationalism that annually enlarges the field without diminishing the problem.

In his general classification of approaches to nationalism Breilly distinguishes the following:<sup>7</sup>

1. Particular histories of particular nationalisms;
2. General histories that see nationalism as an aspect of modernity and the making of modern times;
3. General historical approaches that view nationalism as a political expression of the emergence of nations and relate different nationalisms to the different types of nations; and
4. Studies that seek to go beneath the surface of nationalism to discover the underlying reality which is responsible for nationalism, which might be modern forms of class conflict, psychological losses of identity brought about by the erosion of tradition, or the needs of modernization and the development of new forms and patterns of communication and culture.

---

6 Stuart Woolf defines national identity as “an abstract concept that sums up the collective expression of a subjective individual sense of belonging to a socio-political unit: the nation state” (Woolf, 1996, 26). He goes on to point out: “Nationalist rhetoric assumes not only that individuals form part of a nation (through language, blood, choice, residence, or some other criterion), but that they identify with the territorial unit of the nation state. Such an affirmation is ideological, in that it describes as a reality an ideal relationship that nationalists wish to express” (ibid.).

7 For comparable classifications of approaches to nationalism, see in particular Smith (1983) who attempts a systematic overview and critical analysis of the different theories of nationalism. See also Snyder (1976) who belongs to an earlier generation of theorists.

James Goodman provides a classification of five broad categories of theories of nationalism useful for focusing on contemporary debates. He distinguishes the following approaches (Goodman, 1996, 13-33):

1. 'Ethno-national' theories that stress the ethnic components of nationalism and attempt to explain the affective, subjective power of nationalism;
2. Modernization theories, which emphasize the role of socio-economic factors in the emergence of national identity, most importantly industrialization;
3. 'State-centered' theories that link nationalism to the state system and international relations;
4. 'Class-centered' theories, which relate class relations and the impact of industrial capitalism on nationalist movements; and
5. 'Uneven development' theories, which focus on the wider international and transnational setting in which nationalism is reproduced and which integrate a broad range of economic, cultural, and political relationships within and between societies.<sup>8</sup>

### *2.3 Problems of defining nationalism*

Louis Snyder provides the following detailed definition of nationalism based on the characteristics of the modern nation-state:

“that sentiment of a group or body of people living within a compact or a noncontiguous territory using a single language or related dialects as a vehicle for common thoughts and feelings, holding a common religious

---

<sup>8</sup> Goodman uses Anthony Smith as an example of ethno-national theories and Karl Deutsch and Ernest Gellner as exponents of the modernist school. For the state-centered approach, John Breuilly is briefly summarized. Eric Hobsbawm, Samir Amin, and Jim Blaut represent the 'class-centered' theories of nationalism of oppressed classes. Under 'uneven development theories,' to which Goodman devotes the most attention, are grouped Benedict Anderson, Charles Tilly, Miroslav Hroch, and Tom Nairn.

belief, possessing common institutions, traditions, and customs acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history, venerating national heroes, and cherishing a common will for social homogeneity“ (Snyder, 1976, 25).

Snyder warns students of nationalism about his highly composite definition.<sup>9</sup> He emphasizes the varieties of nationalism, its changing character and the insurmountable difficulties of giving it a precise, satisfying definition. He cautions his reader that any one of the individual elements that he attributes to nationalism in his definition may be lacking without affecting its validity. Nationalism, he then adds, with an almost Dante-esque resignation not uncommon in the field, is surrounded by “a thick, almost impenetrable intellectual smog,” suffused with “paradox, inconsistency, and contradiction“ (ibid., 3).<sup>10</sup>

In his over-all approach, Snyder stresses nationalism’s psychological roots, its link to the need of human beings for security, and, on the more objective side, nationalism’s complex combinations of political, economic, social or cultural elements.

Nationalism is a historical chameleon. It takes on different characteristics depending on the historical period under investigation. It proclaims liberalism and democracy at one moment only to turn into a mobilizing force and justification of authoritarianism and totalitarianism the next. In our contemporary world of competing nationalisms, these two general types

---

9 See Hobsbawm, 1992, Chapter 1, for a brief history of how terms, such as “nation,” “people,” “homeland,” etc., gradually assumed their modern meanings and association with nationalism.

10 Hobsbawm notes in a similar vein that there are no satisfactory criteria for answering the question, what is a nation? He remarks that “there is no way of telling the observer how to distinguish a nation from other entities *a priori*, as we can tell him or her how to recognize a bird or distinguish a mouse from a lizard. Nation-watching would be simple if it could be like bird-watching“ (1992, 5). Hobsbawm elaborates his point by critically looking at common objective and subjective criteria for defining a nation, including language, ethnicity, and subjective claims by individuals or groups.

co-exist within and between states. This competition has intensified since the end of the Cold War and impacts and is impacted by supranational organization. The conflicts between different liberal and illiberal, state and sub-state, irredentist and multi-ethnic nationalisms are important dimensions of the debates both among theorists of nationalism and within diplomatic and expert circles in IGOs. Many IGOs and NGOs deal with conflicts between nationalist movements and nation-states on a daily basis.

#### *2.4 Small- and large-state nationalism*

For historian Eric Hobsbawm, nationalism is a historically changing entity, but belongs “to a particular, and historically recent, period“ and is related to “a certain kind of modern territorial state, the ‘nation-state’“ (1992, 10). Hobsbawm’s work is particularly valuable in placing post-Cold War ethnic nationalisms into historical perspective.

Hobsbawm argues that the type of self-determination nationalism fashionable today is based on what he calls the “Wilsonian-Leninist notion“ that triumphed with the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Enshrined in the treaty is the notion that independent statehood was a rightful claim of peoples demanding self-determination. The motto, “every ethnicity, every nationality, a state“ expresses the essence of this model of self-determination. Giuseppe Mazzini, the 19th century champion of Italian nationalism, is historically credited with this slogan, although not altogether correctly, as Hobsbawm shows. Yet, it pithily expresses the program of many of the ethno-nationalist movements that have erupted since the end of the Cold War whose goals have been to become nation-states, the most prized form of self-determination.

Hobsbawm emphasizes that nationalism as an ideology dates from the period of 18th and 19th century bourgeois liberalism. The nation-state developed in a world of multilingual, multicultural pre- and ‘proto-national‘ entities that evolved into nation-states. Liberal bourgeois nationalist

movements resulted in the large modern nation-states, and their formation often involved the assimilation or suppression of minority religious, linguistic and ethnic groups.

Hobsbawm also distinguishes between the classic *nation-building nationalism* of the period 1830-1870 and the nationalism between 1870 and 1914. In the earlier period, the principle of nationality was applied by Mazzini and other leading representatives of nationalist movements to would-be nations *of a certain size* (Hobsbawm, 1992, 31). This 'threshold principle' was based on the economic advantages of large, national units (a major justification for the formation of liberal states in the first place). Smaller nationalities, which would not have qualified as potential nations, would have included Sicilians, Bretons, Welsh and even the Irish. The large nation-states envisioned would have been comprised of different nationalities and were thus conceived as 'multi-national' (ibid., 32). Building nations was also viewed at that time as a process of expansion and unification based on the idea that social evolution "expanded the scale of human social units from family and tribe to county and canton, from the local to the regional, the national and eventually the global" (ibid., 33). On this model, not only would all Greeks or Italians or Germans come together in one state but also Serbs would merge with Croats into a single Yugoslavia and Czechs with Slovaks. Poles would combine with Lithuanians and Ruthenes. Multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multinational forms of interaction were understood as characteristics of these nation-states and the older, Western European nation-states, such as Britain, France, and Spain.

It was thus also widely accepted during the classical phase of nation-state formation that not all nationalities were destined to become states. In addition to the territorial 'threshold principle,' there were, according to Hobsbawm, three criteria which allowed a people to be firmly classed as a state. The first was their historic association with a current state or one with a lengthy and recent past. The second was the existence of a long-



established cultural elite possessing a written national literary and administrative vernacular. The third criterium was a proven capacity for conquest.

Hobsbawm uses his historical survey of the classical period of liberal bourgeois nationalism and the formation of the liberal state to criticize the notion of pure nation-states in which the 'nation' or ethnically homogenous dominant group is co-extensive with the national territory. While this notion defines abstractly what the 'nation-state' is supposed to be, it has existed in practice, as most theorists of nationalism agree, very rarely. As an ideology, however, this notion of the nation-state has served as a hot-house for inflated notions of self-determination for sundry peoples and ethnic groups. It has also been a potent ideological fertilizer for the excesses of racist and xenophobic nationalism, which is also one of Hobsbawm's main concerns in his historical account. He argues that ethnically homogenous states did not really exist in the 19th century, and ethnically pure states are not possible today, despite the efforts at different forms of 'ethnic cleansing' and 'unmixing of peoples.' Citing urbanization and industrialization, the massive movements and transfers of people across borders and continents, he reiterates the point that such forces undermine "the basic nationalist assumption of a territory inhabited essentially by an ethnically, culturally and linguistically homogeneous population. "[T]oday the typical 'national minority' in most countries receiving migration is an archipelago of small islands rather than a coherent land-mass" (Hobsbawm, 1992, 157).

Hobsbawm's critique hammers home the conclusion that self-determination-nationalism according to the motto "every ethnicity, every nationality, a state" is not a viable option for respective ethnicities demanding greater recognition and political legitimacy. Hobsbawm predicts that the type of nationalism on which such demands are based is unlikely to play a major role in determining the shape of the international system in the future.

In support of his prediction, one might add that the international context of ethno-nationalism today is qualitatively different from that of former periods of nation formation. As already discussed in Part 1, today's developed system of nation-states now encompasses much of the world's population. The activities of nation-states both domestically and internationally are mediated by expanding networks of interlocking IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs. These provide additional political arenas for nationalist movements to acquire legitimation and political enfranchisement without necessarily having to take on the burden of full-fledged statehood, which most of them would have great difficulty to sustain.

Here one has to be careful about the use of the terms "statehood" or "nation-statehood." A state in the international system today, with a number of exceptions, has its own armed forces, military-policy, foreign policy, currency, etc. Yet, not all nationalist movements that want to become independent states conceive of their statehood in these terms. An example is the movement for an independent Quebec. Creating its own armed forces and having an independent security policy, two traditional attributes of statehood, are not part of its program. For the Quebecois, independence is something less than forming a 100% separate state and something ambiguously more than achieving autonomous status.

### *2.5 Hroch's historical analysis of self-determination*

In his discussion of the origins of post-cold war movements for self-determination, Miroslaw Hroch cautions against calling these movements 'nationalist' (Hroch, 1995, 65-66). His analysis is useful in distinguishing historically different types of self-determination movements. He also explains why such movements in the 19th century did not aim at independent statehood, while so many ethno-nationalist movements today pose statehood as their primary demand. He defines nationalism *stricto sensu* as "that state of mind which gives an absolute priority to the values of one's own nation over and above all other values and interest groups" (ibid.,

65). Hroch prefers to call movements for self-determination 'national movements' and defines them as "organized efforts to achieve all the attributes of a fully fledged nation" (ibid., 66). Nationalism, as a state of mind, was present in national movements, but was, according to Hroch, only one of many forms of national and regional identities to emerge in these movements. He discusses the particular characteristics of the established nation-states of Europe whose development goes back to the Middle Ages-England, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and the Netherlands. They were ruled by homogenous elites and well-developed social strata that included the aristocracy and the emerging industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. They also had a highly developed national culture and language. In contrast to these states, more than twenty non-dominant ethnic groups were spread throughout the European continent in 1800, including the relatively homogenous nation-states mentioned above. These groups had 'exogenous' ruling classes and "occupied a compact territory but lacked their 'own' (that is, belonging to their own ethnic group) ruling class and continuous cultural tradition in their own literary language" (ibid., 66). At a certain point, some members of the ethnic group began to focus on their own ethnicity and to conceive of their group as a potential nation. They developed demands concerning the improvement of their national culture, focusing on language, the creation of a "complete social structure," including their own educated elites, and the achievement of equal civil rights and political self-determination (ibid.).

National movements in both Western and Eastern Europe developed, according to Hroch, in three structural phases. In Phase A, activists researched the linguistic, historical, and cultural attributes of their ethnic group. In Phase B, a group of patriots emerged who won over members of the ethnic group to the project of forming a nation. In Phase C, the national idea spreads, and a mass movement takes shape. An important difference between Western and Eastern Europe lay in the fact that Western national movements started their Phase B under conditions of a constitutional regime. Phase B in Eastern movements, in contrast, unfolded within the late

absolutist-feudal regimes, the Hapsburg empire, the Ottoman empire, Tsarist Russia, Prussia and Denmark.

In accounting for different types of national movements and whether or not they eventually achieved nation-statehood or merely one or another form of autonomous status depends, for Hroch, on a number of factors. These include the political system under which the national movement proceeded during Phase B and Phase C and the social structure of the non-dominant ethnic group. A third factor is the group's historical development.

Hroch distinguishes three levels or stages of national political programs that describe different types of demands for self-determination. The first is *substitution*, an elementary level of political programs, in which only "partial elements of politics entered into the national programme" (ibid., 70). Included here are attempts to keep the unity of the ethnic territory and thus to cultivate the image of 'the fatherland.' Hroch's point here is that linguistic and cultural demands sometimes temporarily substituted for some functions of explicit political aims. The second level consists in demands for *participation*, for example, in local (municipal) administration, in elected bodies at different levels of government (for example, the Reichstag and Landtag in Austria after the introduction of a constitutional regime in 1860). The struggle for participation posed four groups of demands that encompassed campaigns for municipal self-government; entry into all levels of state and regional administration; participation in legislative power, including courts of justice; and participation in executive power.

The third level or type of self-determination movement was *secession* based on the aim of the leaders of the national movement to achieve greater autonomy within what they considered 'their' territory. Hroch convincingly argues that until World War II in Austro-Hungary and in Russia, the demand for autonomy (not independent statehood) remained "the central point of the secessionist component in the programme of national movements" (ibid., 73). With the exception of the Magyars in Hungary,

whose national movement successfully ended in independence, “no relevant group demanded full independence“ (ibid.). With this historical evidence, Hroch argues that the theories of nationalism that define national goals solely as the struggle for independence are not empirically correct. The majority of national movements in Central and Eastern Europe achieved independent statehood, but this goal was not in their national programs, which were based on less ambitious goals. External factors, namely, World War I and the Russian Revolution in 1917, were responsible for the shift of direction and later goals of these movements. Once independence was achieved, it only then became the political bottom line for these new independent states. After independence was lost under fascism and later (for Central and Eastern European states) under Soviet rule,

national independence remained the core demand that would re-emerge with the end of the Cold War.

Hroch also points out that some movements did not achieve full independence in the inter-war period. Examples are the Slovenes, Slovaks, Croatians, Ukrainians, Macedonians and Belorussians. They became independent with the end of Soviet communism.

Hroch's analysis thus helps to illuminate how World War I and the October Revolution transformed the nature and the demands of self-determination movements. His analysis is suggestive in a number of ways concerning the relationship between national movements and supranational organization. World War I marked a turning point. It was a "total war" (Hawdon, 1996, 60) that required the states involved to strengthen their control over a substantial amount of the functioning of their national economies. The war fundamentally changed the supranational setting of self-determination and nationalist movements by ushering in, in the words of Hawdon, "a new level of functionalized rule" of the state. Because of the demands of total war in terms of organizing resources and mobilizing the population against a new array of weapons capable of unprecedented lethality, the state required a much higher magnitude of power. This expansion of centralized state power was reflected in the rise of fascism, socialism, and communism and the type of mass mobilization and intensified nationalism expressed by national populations that fervently supported their governments and their respective war aims. The war paved the way for the permanent installation of the "mixed economy." The state would henceforth play a much larger role in the economy. The international system also became more integrated. IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs would play a larger role but yet could not reverse the trend of expanding inter-state nationalism, including the isolationism of the United States that helped pave the way to World War II. In the new international setting, in which the traditional multinational, multi-ethnic empires disappeared and the nation-state was the primary and most powerful actor in the international system, the demand for statehood by

self-determination movements became much more widespread. The League of Nation became their most important champion.

Following World War II, states ascended new heights of power commensurate with the scale of the conflict. The term "super-power" was coined to express the new military and political position of the United States and the SU. The greater power of the nation-state and its reinforcement in the bloc system of the East-West conflict called forth a corresponding new wave of IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs.

## 2.6 *The state-centered approach*

John Breuilly links nationalism to the emergence of the modern state and its interaction with the international system of states. In differentiating his theoretical concerns from other theories of nationalism, his patience is short with approaches that favor cultural explanations and disregard the quest for state power by nationalist movements. "Other writers," he tells us, "have related nationalism to particular class interests or to the pursuit of large-scale social and economic change. Although *particular* nationalist movements can be illuminated by reference to the role of this or that class, or to the attempt to create a modern economy, I do not think that these matters should be made central to an understanding of nationalism *generally*. To focus upon culture, ideology, class or modernisation is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is primarily about control of the state. The central question, therefore, should be to relate nationalism to the objective of obtaining and using state power" (Breuilly, 1982, 1-2). Nationalism is thus a form of politics and generated by activities of the state.

Breuilly criticizes class-focused theories of the state by arguing that nationalism has no particular class character. He points out that classes are often divided on national issues and that diverse class fractions unite to

form national constituencies. Nationalist movements that aim at either reforming the state, separating from it, or assimilating into it are determined by the existing state apparatus and the “system of competing territorial states“ (Breuilly, 1982b, 365, as cited in Goodman, 1996, 21). But Breuilly also argues that this type of nationalism is an anachronism of the 19th century. In today’s inter-connected world, the state is not as independent in its activities and policymaking from other forces and actors in the international system as it was formerly. Here Breuilly implicitly broaches the question of the relationship of states to supranational organizations without taking it up. His analysis begs the question of the functions, achievements and deficits of IGOs in dealing with nationalism.

Breuilly links the erosion of traditional state sovereignty to what he views as the wider and dangerous dissemination of national rhetoric into avenues and niches of social political life where it does not belong. This spread of nationalist ideology can perhaps be interpreted as a symptom of the political vacuum left by the decline of national state sovereignty and the failure in IGOs to take up the slack in supranational governance. In studying the question of the decline of the nation-state and state sovereignty in this light, the student of nationalism and SNOs must also consider the counter-tendency, namely, the extent to which IGOs strengthen state sovereignty and state nationalism. Supranational organization provides traditional and new kinds of international legitimacy and power to nation-states, to both hegemonial and other major powers. It also provides smaller states with a formally equal voice in IGOs.<sup>11</sup>

### *2.7 Modernization theories of nationalism*

Karl Deutsch explains the development of nationalism by focusing on the

---

11 Small states often play an important role in breaking deadlocks in IGOs, when large powers cannot agree. During the Cold War, the coalition of Neutral and Non-Aligned States in the former CSCE repeatedly played a major role in working out successful compromise positions between East and West.



socio-economic requirements of modern industrial society. For Deutsch, nationalism is a distinctly *modern* phenomenon that is derived from the “mass mobilization of precommercial, predustrial peasant peoples“ and their transition to industrial economies (Deutsch, 1966, 190). In examining the deficiencies and confusion in traditional explanations of nationalism, Deutsch argues that the problem lies in placing the study of nationalism on a more scientific basis. His approach stems from the tradition of Enlightenment rationalism, specifically its scientific materialism and empiricism. He links nationalism with the historical, economic and political progress made possible by science and its application to politics and social life in general.

Social communication lies at the core of Deutsch’s theory of sovereignty, power, community and the nation. The nature of political power is dependent on the highly uneven distribution of “social communication facilities“ and of economic and cultural interdependence (Deutsch, 1966, 75; Snyder, 1976, 6). Under “communication facilities“ Deutsch includes a socially standardized system of symbols, including language and other codes, such as alphabets, systems of writing, calculating, in short, all channels and also infrastructures for storing, recalling, and recombining information. He defines a people in terms of communication, as a group of persons linked by specific “complementary habits and facilities of communication“ (Deutsch, 1966, 96). The development of the national culture of nation-states is a function of the quantitative increase in communication (for example, through transport, radio, and telecommunications). The resulting growth of functional interdependence shapes subjective, affective communication between individuals and modifies channels of culture and values (Deutsch 1966, 38; cited in Goodman, 1996, 16-17). In this way, the rise of industrialism and the modern market economy “offer[s] economic and psychological rewards to tense and insecure individuals - to men and women uprooted by social and technological change, exposed to the risks of economic competition, and taught to hunger for success“ (Deutsch, 1966, cited in Smith, 1983, 96).

Deutsch views nationalism through the prism of modernization, its effects on traditional social ties, and the sense of security and belonging destroyed by industrialism and the progress of market relations. The nation-state has the role of helping to create a new community and culture to replace what industrialism destroys. Nationality is achieved through advancing means of communication, that is, by creating “a community of complementary habits and facilities of communication.” (Deutsch, 1966, 96).

The nation-state, nationality, the increasing efficiency and functionality of infrastructures of communication in the broadest sense are for Deutsch motors of modernization and progress that are scientifically measurable and will eventually eliminate the unevenness of development among the world's peoples. Deutsch was so optimistic about nationalism as a force of modernization that he maintained in the mid-1960s that the “mobilization [of precommercial, preindustrial peasant peoples] and their transition to an industrial economy should be substantially completed within the next two generations“ (ibid., 190). While nationalism “ has grouped people apart from each other, and may for a time continue to do so, it is preparing them, and perhaps has already prepared them, for a more thoroughgoing world-wide unity than has ever been seen in human history“ (ibid., 191).

History has not born out Deutsch's bold prediction concerning the integration of precommercial, preindustrial peasant peoples, who still abound in abject poverty throughout the less developed regions of the world. Neither the pace of industrialization nor its impact has brought about “world-wide unity“ of peoples. Nor has it created a more balanced distribution of wealth, income, or access to the instruments creating wealth or for that matter to the resources of communication.

Deutsch's predictions were clearly overly optimistic and in the tradition of the Enlightenment's oversimplified view of human history and the role of reason. His naïve modernism and optimism infused his teleological sense of infinite progress through science and a vision of the progressive elimination

of

the

barriers between nation-states through advancing infrastructures, technologies, and increasingly complex cultures of communication.

Despite its oversimplifications, Deutsch's ambitious project to theorize modernization as a finite and measurable set of progressively developing modes of communication within and between nation-states takes on a new relevance in our post-modern, rapidly self-digitizing epoch. His theory views the world and everything in it, including nation-states, and by implication supranational organizations, through the prism of measurable data and communication (or in his terms, cybernetic) logic. He would have viewed the end of the Cold War and the contemporary revolution in computer, communication and other technologies, and their application at the state level and supranationally, as a confirmation of his approach and general conclusions.

Deutsch's reductionism certainly has its limits, which we will take up below. Yet, his work remains an ambitious and brilliant attempt to situate nationalism in the historical development of social communication. He analyzes the impact of communication technologies on the uneven development of nation-states and their integration as global communication networks. Deutsch's work is likely to be an important source of ideas and inspiration for the student of nationalism studying the current and future problems of the inter-relationship between supranational organizations and nation-states.

In order to illustrate this without going into detail, let us take the example of the relations among IGOs today. Part 1 of this essay briefly discussed the problems of coordination and collaboration between IGOs among themselves and with other actors on the stage of supranational politics. I discussed the need for reform, including technical and functional improvements, especially given the new challenges in the post-cold-war environment. Inter-organizational information flows and consultation among IGOs and relations between IGOs and NGOs have not caught up either

with current political needs or with technological advances, especially in dealing with crises, conflicts, and global problems. The activities of IGOs should be broadened, while bureaucratic redundancy with its attendant costs reduced. Using new technologies more systematically to advance the political activity and administration of IGOs, which are already years if not decades behind global corporations in integrating new technological advances into their operations, would be a positive advance. Such application of high technology in supranational politics is likely to become more urgent. For this purpose, both practical and theoretical work are necessary.

Certainly, the inter-organizational deficiencies of IGOs cannot be reduced to mere functional and technical problems. Functional changes in supranational organizations are complexly linked to power relationships. Political initiatives are necessary to improve inter-organizational communication and information flows through the application of new technologies. Internet-related technologies and applications (email, web sites, web commerce, web newscasting, etc.) are likely to have, as Deutsch's theory foreshadowed, a profound cultural-political impact on communication across national borders. The further development of new technologies is also likely to significantly affect the operations and effectiveness of IGOs functionally and politically, assuming the political will to support and not block such change more clearly emerges. It is already clear that the internet is having a profound effect on the interaction of societies throughout the world by eliminating many of the barriers to communication that have served as an enabling condition for the formation of nations and nationalism.

### *2.8 The critique of modernization theories*

Modernization theories of nationalism and the nation-state, including Deutsch's work, have fueled a number of highly controversial debates among theorists of nationalism. Anthony Smith has criticized the following three assumptions of the modernization theories of nationalism based on

communication theory:

“1 The process of ‘modernisation’, once set in motion, follows an inevitable progression with its own momentum, despite minor variations

2 This progression is basically modelled on the pattern of Western evolution [of nationalism and the nation-state]

3 The key to the ‘modernisation’ process is the growth of mobile personalities possessing the capacity to transmit information in a meaningful manner between individuals and groups; and this creates national cultures and communities“ (Smith, 1983, 96).

Smith elaborates his critique by arguing that the dyadic conception of ‘modernization’ and nationalism, which is Western in origin, is both ethnocentric and “crudely determinist“ (ibid.). It conceives of ‘modernity’ as an ‘end-state’ and “as an exclusive system of interdependent parts opposed to another homologous system called ‘tradition’; the assumptions, practices, institutions, roles and values of these total orders are diametrically opposite and separate“ (ibid.).

Smith’s own theory of nationalism assumes and convincingly demonstrates much greater continuity between modernity and pre-modern past. For Smith, the crucial defect of ‘communications’ theory is its lack of historical specificity, its omission of the “particular context of beliefs and interpretations“ within which information media operate (ibid., 101).

In his critique of ‘modernist’ theorists of nationalism, Smith concedes “that there have been important breaks in historical development and that one of them can be located in early modern Europe with the advent of the ‘rational’ state capitalism and industrialism“ (Smith, 1988). While it has its uses in historical explanation, he cautions that “this particular myth“ should not deflect our attention from the role of cultural and historical communities and identities in *pre-modern* periods.

Smith thus does not deny the importance of certain basic types of nationalism that result from the process of modernization in Deutsch's sense of industrialization and the corresponding development of social communication. But he repeatedly warns that too much emphasis on nationalism's modernizing potential and association with modernity "overlooks the importance of its ethnic roots in the past" (Smith, 1983, ix).

He also notes different types of statements about nationalism and calls for greater clarity and differentiation. For example, the *historical* assertion that nationalism as an ideological movement first emerged in the late eighteenth century Europe and is considered a specifically 'modern' phenomenon should be distinguished from the *sociological* claim that nationalism is itself a modernizing force that can be explained by anterior forces of modernization (ibid., x). The student of nationalism should not, according to Smith, neglect modernizing forces, such as capitalism, urbanization, bureaucratism, and science, but should also take into account ethnicity and the ethnic revival that began in the 1970s. Writing in the early 1980s, he called for a shift in nationalism research away from 'modernization' in the direction of ethnic studies. He argued such a focus was also necessary to move beyond the Eurocentrism prevalent in both historical and sociological approaches to nationalism.<sup>12</sup>

Although Smith is identified with an approach to nationalism that links it to its ethnic origins, he has tried to combine pre-modern and modern elements in his definition of the nation. He posits his definition as a critique of the Western modernist conceptions of the nation. This "civic conception treats nations as units of population which inhabit a demarcated territory, possess a common economy with mobility in a single territory-wide occupational and production system, common laws with identical legal rights and duties

---

12 It should be noted that Hans Kohn writing in the 1940s developed a theory and typology of nationalism that focused on the differences between Western and non-Western types of nationalism. Kohn contrasts the respective social-political and economic conditions of their respective development (Kohn, 1944; Kohn, 1949). For a concise overview of Kohn's work in this area, see Snyder, 1976, 29-32.

for everyone, and a public, mass education system“ (Smith, 1988). In Smith’s ethnic-based view, nations are “named human populations claiming a common ancestry, a demotic solidarity, common customs and vernaculars, and a common native history“ (ibid.). These are ethnic categories that infuse nationalism and explain its premodern ethnic core. An ethnic community, or *ethnie*, is defined by Smith as “a named human population possessing a myth of common descent, common historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a particular territory, and a sense of solidarity“ (ibid.).

Combining both the above pre-modern and modern characteristics, Smith defines the nation as “a named human population sharing a myth of common descent, historical memories and a mass culture, and possessing a demarcated territory, common economy and common legal rights and duties“ (ibid.). He recommends this definition because it allows for either a pre-modern or modernizing emphasis without falling into the common practice of irreconcilably opposing them.

Smith’s emphasis on the ethnic and ethnic-ideological components of nationalism helps to illuminate the historical background and pre-modern elements in extreme forms of ethnic nationalist mobilization that have re-emerged in recent years. Following the end of the Cold War, ex-communist societies that have not undergone the traditional Western process of “modernization“ have been particularly prone to extreme forms of ethnic mobilization. These have included ethno-nationalist war and inter-ethnic genocides, as have occurred, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in other parts of the former Yugoslavia since the early 1990s. Smith’s analysis is also useful in studying non-European nationalism and the effects of colonialism on ethnic and nationalist development in Africa, Asia, and Central and South America. His systematic studies of the theories of nationalism (1983) and the ethnic origins of nationalism (1986) provides a wealth of material on pre-modern forms and precursors of modern nationalism from different regions of the world and different epochs.



Since the Enlightenment, ethnic mobilization, according to Smith, derives from the opposition of a disaffected intelligentsia opposing inefficient and corrupt state structures that are not congruent with 'the ethno-nation.' This non-congruence generates disloyalty and disaffection that, if not remedied, will condemn the state to instability and possibly fragmentation. Smith distinguishes three great waves of nationalist mobilization. The first was the nineteenth century revolt against the imperial, autocratic state in the name of national popular sovereignty and national cultural self-determination. The second wave erupted with anti-colonial nationalism. The third wave of nationalist mobilization was the eruption of ethno-nationalism in western liberal democracies.

The major powers underestimated ethnic factors in the Balkans and elsewhere and the extent to which extreme nationalist leaders could mobilize popular fears linked to pre-modern ethnic myths of community and identity and past inter-ethnic conflict and war. The majority of the nationalist movements in the Balkans, the ex-Soviet republics, and the Russian Federation (including the anti-Russian war for independence in Chechnya) have long histories that pre-date their resurgence in late 1980s and 1990s. Some of these movements can be traced back to the 19th century and in a few cases much earlier (Minaham, 1996).

Smith's analysis begs a number of questions concerning the political interaction of IGOs and ethnic-nationalist mobilization. Ethnic nationalist movements today, particularly in areas that have received the most attention in the West, such as the former Yugoslavia, may be partially explainable by the pre-modern dynamics and legacies that Smith elaborates. Yet he fails to sufficiently note that the ethnic wars in the Balkans have not unfolded in a supranational vacuum devoid of IGOs, NGOs and other SNOs. The competition and cooperation of major powers acting sometimes in tandem with and sometimes in conflict with particular IGOs is also at play. The presence of these "larger-than-the-nation" political actors transformed the

Balkan ethnic-conflict arena into 'globalized' phenomena: the action and non-action of major powers (in the Contact Group, for example) and of IGOs

co-

determined the pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict stages of these ethno-national struggles.<sup>13</sup>

The global context of many ethno-nationalist conflicts and movements today poses largely still unanswered questions concerning how IGOs and other SNOs impact on the pre-natal aspirations, formation, and development of state-fragmenting, irredentist, separatist, and other forms of ethno-nationalism. Neither the modernist school of nationalism nor its critics, including Smith, have explicitly approached this issue.<sup>14</sup> Has the proliferation of IGOs and SNOs weakened or changed the nature of the nation-state during the Cold War era in a way that prepared the way for the eruption of ethno-nationalism in the aftermath of the East-West conflict? Are perhaps modernist biases or 'myths,' as Smith characterizes them (1988), getting in the way of how IGOs and the international community in general try to deal with ethno-nationalism? Can a new theoretical synthesis be developed that could take in the pre-modern, modernist, and what I have called in Part 1 of this essay the 'post-modernist' dimension of nationalism? Such a synthesis should be able to shed a more precise light on the relationship and interpenetration of the pre-modernist and modernist dimensions of nationalism. A synthesis of this kind has become one

---

13 Smith does argue, however, that globalization triggers ethno-national reaction because it is viewed by ethno-national communities as threatening to their identity (Smith, 1990, as cited by Goodman, 1996, 14).

14 The class-centered approaches to nationalism are better at capturing some of central supranational political dynamics that affect nationalist movements. Samir Amin, for example, explores the relationship between the dynamics of capitalism and the development of nationalist movements through the interaction of centers of capitalist accumulation in core national states and subordinate societies in the periphery. National class alliances are shaped by this process, which also determines national interests that are challenged, transformed and re-formed over time. Amin elaborates on how national class alliances play a central role not only in the core nation-states but also in the periphery. Subordinate societies in which local comprador elites ally with capital generate dependent forms of capitalist production in these peripheral countries (Amin, 1980; Goodman, 1996, 24-25). Amin's approach, like that of other 'class-centered' theorists of nationalism (Hobsbawm and Blaut [1987]) fail to take up the specific role of IGOs and other SNOs and how they impact on nationalist movements and nation-states.

of the major challenges of states, IGOs, and other SNOs that have to deal with complex ethno-nationalist movements as part of their daily work.

### *2.9 Individualistic versus collectivistic nationalism*

Liah Greenfeld differentiates between types of nationalism according to interpretations of the principles of popular sovereignty and equality.<sup>15</sup> She shows how these function in the definition of the “nation” adopted by particular groups. The nation can either be defined as a composite entity, an association of free and equal individuals, or in unitary terms, as a collective individual. The former definition gives rise to “individualistic nationalisms” and favors the development of liberal political arrangements:

“The interests of the nation, as well as its sovereignty or will, in this case, are but reflections of the interest of the majority of its members and their wills. The rights of individuals - human rights - are supreme among the nation’s values. The definition of the nation as a collective individual, by contrast, results in collectivistic nationalisms which tend to spawn authoritarian political arrangements. In this case, the nation is believed to possess a will and interests of its own, to which the wills and interests of its individual members are subservient and may at any moment be sacrificed” (Greenfeld, 1997).

Greenfeld derives from her distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism three types of nationalism: “individualistic and civic,” “collectivistic and civic,” and “collectivistic and ethnic.” Her differentiations are useful in examining contemporary nationalist movements and the problems faced by states and IGOs in resolving ethno-nationalist conflicts. In placing human rights at the center of her conceptualization, she incorporates into her approach a basic aim and “methodology” of IGOs involved in preventing and resolving ethno-nationalist conflicts and nurturing new independent

---

15 See in this context Greenfeld’s major historical work (Greenfeld, 1992).

states. To become a member of major IGOs, a nation-state must adopt a number of universally recognized human-rights commitments. Similarly, their implementation by states and or by conflicting parties in pre-conflict or post-conflict situations is an essential indicator to IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs of progress or regression.

Greenfeld's implicit "human-rights perspective" on nationalism provides a useful bridge between the intellectual domain of theories of nationalism and practical world of supranational politics that must grapple with different types of nationalist struggles throughout the world. The enormous expansion of the human-rights codexes of IGOs and other SNOs since the 1980s has given greater recognition and political-legal legitimation to a much wider array of political, religious, gender-, sex- and ethnic-based individual rights and -- to a lesser extent -- group rights. The OSCE, COE, and the UN have been at the forefront of this activity (Lucas, 1992, 1993 and 1995c). The human rights revolution has further legitimized an expanded ethnic, and cultural pluralism in supranational politics, diplomacy and grass-roots activism. Many previously neglected or suppressed claims of traditional groups and movements have woven themselves into the cultural-political fabric of national and international relations. Among them are communities that define themselves mainly in terms of their pre-modern traditions and their rights to live as individuals and communities according to their respective religious, cultural and societal traditions. Human-rights instruments have provided a means of "recombining" and mutually adjusting the pre-modern and the modern. The expansion of human rights codexes have helped nation-states to construct and legitimize a larger plurality of ethnic, cultural, and national groups within their national polities. Such an expansion has become politically and economically necessary today.

### *2.10 The search for a broader synthesis*

Theoretically fleshing out a "post-modernist" approach to nationalism would necessarily have to integrate both the ethno-nationalist approach reflected in

authors, such as Anthony Smith, and representatives of the modernist school. Ernest Gellner, a leading exponent of the modernist approach, is often targeted by critics of the modernization school. His work provides, however, a number of potential building blocks for a post-modernist synthesis. In what follows, I will attempt to briefly discuss Gellner in this light.

### *2.11 From a modernist to post-modernist perspective*

Gellner builds his theory of nationalism on the shoulders of Karl Deutsch's approach. Gellner focuses on the dynamic economic, social, and cultural elements of industrial modernization. These include the notion of a profound historical-cultural divide between agrarian and industrial society.

In feudal and agrarian societies, the given social structure predetermined the individual's social identity, social position, and life path (Gellner, 1997, 20). Individual existence was fixed and static. In industrial society, in contrast, with its need for an educated work force and labor mobility, citizens assume different roles in their lifetime. The individual must adjust to the condition of being "substitutable" within the workforce. Change is a constant condition of social life and work, made possible by a common, shared "high culture." In this environment, culture and nationalism become more important for the individual's identity, for his or her identification with the "imagined community" of the nation, and for the reproduction of a socially coherent, industrially functioning society. The state with its control over education and other infrastructures tries to create a nationally homogenized culture able to assimilate different cultures and groups, reduce social tensions between rulers and ruled, and integrate nationalist and other oppositions. The state compensates for the depersonalizing forces of modernization by re-socializing the individual in its national culture.

Industrial society produces what Gellner calls "modular man," individuals who are no longer bound to ritual, blood relations, micro-communities, but

share a common culture which is also co-extensive with the nation and society (Gellner, 1996, 97-108). Culture is also the medium of transmission through which the individual learns to wear and identify with the different roles and identities he or she will assume in life. Where blood relations, ritual and agrarian micro-communities are static, tradition-bound, and rigid, the cultural ether which the modern citizen breathes makes him or her responsive, dynamic and flexible. "Modular man is capable of combining into effective association and institutions, *without* these being total, many-stranded, underwritten by ritual. He can combine into specific-purpose, *ad hoc*, limited association" (ibid., 100). Unlike his peasant predecessor of the pre-modern era, modular man can perform highly diverse tasks because of the shared, common language of industrial culture. He is individualistic and egalitarian and forms the backbone of what Gellner calls "Civil Society" (ibid.). Because of modular man, the society with an industrial structure is also flexible, cohesive, and a machine of progress.

Gellner analyzes the interplay of affective and effective forms of communication and their relationship to nationalism. To the extent that social assimilation achieved through effective, functional communication is deficient, affective, cultural differences are heightened. These generate social differences and fragment the state-centered national community into oppositional nationalisms. The society tries to provide a structure to assimilate different groups and oppositional nationalist currents. To the extent that this does not succeed, the personal and cultural aspects of identity become more necessary and pronounced. The state compensates for the depersonalizing forces of modernization by re-socializing the individual into the "imagined community" of its national culture.

### *2.11.1 Weaknesses of Gellner's theory*

Like other theorists of nationalism, Gellner does not deal with IGOs or other SNOs, although his basic theses on modernization is suggestive concerning the impact of supranational organization on nationalism and the nation-state.

Just as the individual was socially, psychologically and culturally recast in the transition from agrarian to modern society, so too were states forced to develop a common “syntax and semantics“ to relate to each other in their interaction. We call this particular “high culture“ that is shared by states international diplomacy and international relations. Without it, neither modernization nor the types of nationalism it has generated, as theorized by Gellner, would exist. The larger context of supranationalism impacts on the objects of Gellner’s inquiry, including the ‘modern’ individual, identity and culture, identification of the individual with the nation-state, and how nationalism is felt and expressed by the individual.

Once supranationalism is brought into the discussion as a necessary (and missing) variable in Gellner’s theory, his notions of “modernity“ and “nationalism“ reveal their deficiencies as theoretical descriptions of the contemporary world. His notion of “nationalism“ oversimplifies modernization as a process of transformation because he reduces and constrains it within the nation-state, which is insufficient because it is clearly co-determined by its supranational environment. This short-coming in Gellner’s work leads to a number of contradictions in his notion of “modular man.“

The citizen-individual that Gellner portrays is flexible, open to change, and highly responsive to his/her multi-leveled environment. Given these characteristics, the modern nation-state with its penchant for a relatively uniform national culture and its nationalist prejudices is too narrow as an explanatory and “residential“ framework for this very cosmopolitan being. Gellner’s failure to situate his “modular man“ in the larger world beyond the national confines of the “modern state“ makes his national state into a theoretical procrustean bed. This is true not only in a cultural-geographical sense but also historically and trans-temporally. If “modular man“ were situated in the larger supranational world, it would also be easier to reconcile this creature’s “modernity“ with the “pre-modern“ cultures and ways of life that Gellner and other modernist theorists simplistically banish from their theoretical constructs.





### 2.11.2 “Modular man“ and multiculturalism

Gellner’s concept of “modularity“ could in many ways fit the multinationalist world of the kind that has become increasingly evident today as a result of globalization and supranationalization. The flexibility and adaptability of Gellner’s modular individual, and his/her ability to absorb new skills and cultural traits implicitly supercedes the limits of a highly cohesive and uniform political culture Gellner associates with the nation-state.

Similarly, Gellner’s notion of the nation-state appears somewhat anachronistic in today’s world in which the nation-state is being challenged by multiculturalization, multinationalism and supranationalization, as discussed throughout this essay. As a result of these processes, the uniformity of national culture and the “imagined community“ of the nation-state is undergoing erosion and transformation. These changes are perhaps most protrusively and provocatively visible in multinational corporations, “glocalized“ markets, global media, advertising imagery, and corporate culture. They are also visible in youth culture and in the role of IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs in their struggle to manage supranational problems that have penetrated the anachronistic insularities and inner cellular organs of the “modern“ nation-state.

In short, Gellner’s “modular man“ should not be taken simply for a nationalist, self-evidently ready to die for *his* nation-state, which is one of standard touchstones of genuine nationalism. “Modular man“ is more complex, not only in terms of his gender (he is also a “she“), but also more of a supranationalist in his/her *Dasein* and thinking about the world, work, personal identity, culture and nationalism.

In defense of modernization theorists, Gellner’s modernizing state or “Civil Society“ is equipped to adapt to the multicultural diversity that is evident today. This state is thus able to integrate the separate cultures and ethnic groups that have emerged or re-emerged to challenge the nation-state’s

anachronistically narrow political sovereignty and cultural hegemony. Today's post-modern, post-industrial, multicultural societies and enclaves are characterized by a qualitatively greater degree of cultural, ethnic, and life-style diversity than was accepted or possible only several decades ago. The "culture wars" that have accompanied the emergence of social movements since the 1960s reflect this diversity and an emergent "post-modernist pluralism."

A weakness of the modernization theories of nationalism is thus their failure to anticipate the extent to which *post-modernizing* trends have put into question the national-cultural cohesion and political-cultural coherence of the modern nation-state. Ethnic and minority movements often try to reconstruct their respective culture, ethnic roots, and elements of their forebears' customs and life-styles. Modernization and the culturally homogenizing nationalism of the modern nation-state tried to subordinate such movements and groups within a single, narrowly defined national heritage. The modern nation-state has discriminated against such cultures and minorities that became subordinate and largely hidden from sight, often culturally exiled to the bottom of the proverbial "melting pot." In many cases, these movements, ethnies, minorities, (and former majorities), including indigenous peoples, were simply suppressed, often with violence in the name of national unity, national culture, and national security. Black, indigenous peoples, and Hispanics in the United States and Canada, aborigines in Australia, the pre-colonial black nations in Southern Africa, Hungarians in Rumania, are examples.

Gellner insufficiently focuses on the historical exclusion of groups from citizenship and the nation-building project of modernization and the type of nationalism and nation-state political culture linked to it. Exclusion and often persecution of minority groups was often inflicted because of race, religion or ethnic identification (Zollberg 1983, 24).<sup>16</sup> This weakness conjures up

---

16 These were the victims of the modernization project of reconfiguring of geographical-

again Smith's general criticism of modernization theorists that they are insensitive to the pre-modern, ethnic origins of nationalism. For the same reason, Gellner's framework cannot adequately account for the re-emergence of pre-modern factors in industrial and post-industrial society and, more importantly how these "recombine" with the cultural traits of modernization.

The post-modern, multicultural and multinational trends of today are most pronounced in advanced liberal, constitutional democracies and civil societies in North America and Europe, but they are also evident as an unevenly evolving trend throughout the world. The advance of global multiculturalism has developed on the foundations of modernizing nationalism, the model of mass society it has bred, and the free-speech and human-rights culture of the constitutional liberal state.<sup>17</sup> A major thrust of post-modern movements has also been the deconstruction of "modernization" ideologies and their too narrowly unifying cultural nationalism.

In the domestic-global cultural environment of the late 20th century, the appeal of quasi-monocultural national narratives imposed by established elites has become less gripping, legitimate, or politically unifying and self-sustaining. Such dominant national narratives have given way to a

---

political space into nation-states and creating homogeneous national cultures. In the latter half of the 15th century when Spain emphasized religious unity as a central foundation for the constitution of itself as a modern state, Jews and Moslems were among the excluded and the nation-state's first refugees. The expelled Jews made up roughly two percent of the Spain's total population, or between 120,000 and 150,000 persons (Zollberg, 1983, 32). Spain is an example of how modernizing nationalism entailed a process of minority expulsion that was woven into the founding fabric of the European nation-state. Besides the Jews and Moslems, there were also the Protestants of the Low Countries and the Puritans and Quakers in England. There were also the French Huguenots and the more contemporary cases of stateless groups resulting from the dissolution of colonial empires in Africa and Asia and their reconfiguration as nation-states (ibid.,24).

17 Curiously, many of the staunchest defenders of post-modernism have tended not to notice these links and misunderstand them in their criticism and even rejection of liberalism and pluralism.

multicultural, more eclectic, nationalist ethos that has legitimized the deconstructionist critique of the modernizing state while taking advantage of its liberal, democratic, equalitarian ethos. It is natural that IGOs and other SNOs have generally been very supportive of these trends, in part because they contribute to greater inter-state mutual understanding, cross-cultural exchange, and cooperation. IGOs have thus helped nation-states adapt their practice of sovereignty to multiculturalization and to new formal and informal norms, including human-rights standards. Many of these standards, considered virtually unthinkable two decades ago, have become widely recognized, although not adequately implemented or enforced.

In sum, Gellner provides a number of important theoretical building blocks for a post-modernist theory of the nation-state and supranationalism. A “post-modern synthesis“ would have to incorporate pre-modern traditions and show how these interpenetrate with traditions of modernity. It would recognize that the “glocalized“ setting in which ethnies and cultures exist today have significantly modified them. This new environment consists of a highly diverse plurality of cultures, characterized by a high degree of interaction and “recombination“ in novel forms. Nationalisms are being further constructed and deconstructed at different interaction levels of social and political groups and inter-personal relations. The process as a whole is being impacted by and feeding back into culture industries, local, national and supranational politics, and nationalist movements.

The emerging post-modern plurality of cultures and communities is in a very early stage of development. Yet it is already developed enough to suggest that modernism and pre-modernism are in fact the two sides of the temporal and territorial ‘multiculturalization‘ of the nation-state conceptualized in a preliminary way in Part 1.



## **Conclusion**

In the foregoing analysis I have tried to show that nation-states, although bound by traditional constraints and prejudices of national sovereignty, operate today in an increasingly globalized, supranational environment. The discrepancies between the political and legal premises of national sovereignty and the demands of supranational realities have produced a multiplicity of economic, political-cultural and international-legal policy deficits. Their symptoms and results include the failure of the international community to act in a timely way to prevent the succession of wars in the former Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda, the conflict in Chechnya and, more generally, the upsurge in ethno-nationalist conflict since the end of the Cold War.

The end of the East-West conflict ushered in a new era of global economic and social openness and volatile waves of uneven, constructive and disintegrative transformation. The technological revolution continues to accelerate this process of change at the local, national, and global level at a speed that is significantly outpacing the adjustment of national and supranational political institutions. This gap has made it imperative that nation-states develop new strategies for achieving greater cooperation among international actors and new forms of supranational regulation and global governance functions.

The nation-state has remained the central actor in the international political system, although the state's prerogatives of national sovereignty are diminishing by being increasingly mediated and reshaped by IGOs and other SNOs. Given its position as a guarantor of democratic legitimacy based on popular sovereignty, the nation-state will and must remain an indispensable agent of promoting and institutionalizing new forms of supranational global governance. The latter are perceived by nation-states as both advantageous and threatening. The successful democratic nation-states of the world tend to have the greatest interest in propagating democratic principles, human

rights,

judicial institutions, geo-political openness and cooperation on level of supranational politics.

Nation-states are also under pressure of civil-societal forces operating both domestically and internationally to advance the forces of supranationalism. Nevertheless, states are reluctant to take needed, more far-reaching measures to reform their own nationally oriented domestic institutions and policymaking infrastructures out of fear of abdicating their sovereignty and potentially losing political power in the real-political pecking order of states.

Nation-states must develop in a more concerted manner multinational domestic and foreign policies in line with the de facto multinationalization of the nation-state, as discussed throughout this essay. Nation-states that fail to adjust their policies to multi-ethnic realities today will not be able to deal effectively with the challenges of supranational integration and their increasing impact on domestic politics of individual nation-states. Similarly, trying to sustain policies based on unreconstructed, traditional, ethnically and linguistically based notions of sovereignty and nation-state nationalism will only lead to isolation and insularity with painful social and economic consequences. These include the potential for civil strife and international conflict, as the case of the former Yugoslavia has tragically demonstrated. Adjustment might include, for example, domestic and inter-governmental reforms of citizenship laws, immigration regulations, and anti-discrimination legislation. As members of IGOs, nation-states are obligated to make a concerted, collective effort to enhance the monitoring and implementation of human-rights and other legal, political, and economic agreements in countries in which violations of international law repeatedly take place without rectification or remedy. These efforts must be further underpinned by building out additional supranational institutions, including the still controversial International Criminal Court and other global judicial organs.



Nation-states and IGOs cannot meet the expanding needs of the unevenly emerging, still embryonic supranational polity without also giving greater priority to promoting the formation of a supranational civil society. Here the input, collaboration, and political upgrading of NGOs and their social-movement constituencies at the domestic and supranational level are also imperative. In order to facilitate such needed reform “from above,” IGOs and their member-states must provide NGOs and their grass-roots constituencies, particularly in the developing world and newly independent states, more favorable conditions in order that they can more effectively provide development aid and inputs for economic stabilization, democratization and human-rights implementation. Such work is necessary in order to create viable and self-sustaining nation-states in the traditional modernist sense and at the same time to integrate such states in the emerging post-modernist, supranational global polity. The combination of these two partly overlapping and partly conflicting projects will remain one of the daunting reform challenges of the international community in the coming years.

In my analysis of nationalism in Part 2, I have tried to show that theories of nationalism have considered the nation-state, nationalism and national movements in an untenable isolation from their supranational environment of IGOs, NGOs and other SNOs. This deficit reflects not only the legitimate political weight and function of the nation-state but also its undeconstructed, ideologically inflated self-importance in international politics today. This deficiency in theories of nationalism tends to preclude a clear analysis of the operation of the nation-state and nationalism in the international system.

IGOs, NGOs, and other SNOs should be incorporated into the research field of nationalism studies. It would then become possible for theorists of nationalism to more fruitfully investigate the contradiction between globalization and the decline of traditionally defined national sovereignty, on the one hand, and the upsurge of self-determination nationalist movements striving for nation-statehood, on the other. Such nationalist movements and

the nation-states that result from them are increasingly co-determined in their formation and development by their supranational context, namely, IGOs, other IOs, and their member-states.

An additional problem in the theoretical analysis of nationalism is the polarization of theorists who focus on modernization from those who adopt an ethnic-nationalist approach. The modernization theories of nationalism help us to understand the revolutionary socio-economic consequences of past and present phases of capitalism's on-going technological revolution. But the critique of the modernization school of nationalism duly reminds us, most acutely in the work of Anthony Smith, that, notwithstanding the central place of economic and scientific progress, the latter cannot expunge the ethnic components of traditional and new forms of nationalism. Indeed, the post-modernist, multicultural transition of the nation-state and the international system today, as discussed in the foregoing pages, suggests that economic and technological change and its globalizing consequences require greater cultural, ethnic, religious, and political pluralism than the political culture characteristic of the traditional modern nation can accommodate. It is thus unlikely that globalization and international economic integration can succeed without the building out of a supranational civil society based on globally functioning democratic, human-rights based infrastructures.

## **Abbreviations**

BINGO	Business International Non-Governmental Organization
COE	Council of Europe
CSCE	Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (renamed OSCE)
EU	European Union
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MNE	Multinational Enterprise
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIS	Newly Independent States
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SNO	Supranational Organization
SU	Soviet Union
TNO	Transnational Organization
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank

## **Bibliography**

Amin, Samir (1980). *Class and Nation*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

Amin, Samir (1974). *Accumulation on a World Scale: a Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, Monthly Review Press, New York.

Anderson, Benedict (1991). *Imagined Communities*, Verso Press, London.

Archer, Clive (1993). *International Organizations*, Routledge, London and New York.

Armstrong, David (1996). *From Versailles to Maastricht, International Organisation in the Twentieth Century*, St. Martin's Press, New York.

Blaut, Jim (1987). *The National Question*, Second edition, Zed, London.

Breuilly, John (1985), "Reflections on Nationalism," in Woolf (1996). 137-154.

Breuilly, John (1982). *Nationalism and the State*, St. Martin's Press, New York.

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (1995). *Information zur politischen Bildung (No. 246): Internationale Beziehungen II: Frieden und Sicherheit in den 90er Jahren*, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn.

Commission on Global Governance (1995). *Our Global Neighborhood, The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Deutsch, Karl (1969). *Nationalism and its Alternatives*, Alfred Knopf, New York.

- Deutsch, Karl (1966). *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Second Edition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Massachusetts.
- Featherstone, Mike, Lash, Scott, and Robertson, Roland (1995). *Global Modernities*, Sage, London.
- Feld, Werner J., Jordan, Robert S., with Hurwitz, Leon (1994). *International Organizations*, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut.
- Fritsch-Oppermann, Sybille (1995). *Minorities, Autonomy and Self-Determination*, Evangelische Akademie Loccum, Loccum.
- Gellner, Ernest (1997). *Nationalism*, New York University Press, New York.
- Gellner, Ernest (1996). *Conditions of Liberty*, Penguin, London.
- Gellner, Ernest (1987). *Culture, Identity and Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Gellner, Ernest (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Goodman, James (1996). *Nationalism and Transnationalism, The National Conflict in Ireland and European Union Integration*, Avebury, Aldershot.
- Gourevitch, Philip (1998). *We Wish to Inform You That We Will be Killed Tomorrow With Our Families*, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York.
- Greenfeld, Liah (1997). "The Political Significance of Culture," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. IV, No. 1, winter/spring, 1997, p. 187-195.
- Greenfeld, Liah (1992). *Nationalism, Five Roads to Modernity*, Massachu-

setts: Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Handman, Max Sylvius (1921). "The Sentiment of Nationalism," *Political Science Quarterly*, No. 36, 107-14.

Hobsbawm, Eric (1992). "Whose Fault Line is It Anyway?," *New Statesman and Society*, April 24, 1992.

Hobsbawm, Eric (1990). *Nations, and Nationalism Since 1780, Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Hobsbawm, Eric (1983). "Inventing Tradition and Mass Producing Traditions," in Hobsbawm, and Ranger (1983).

Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence (eds.) (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Holton, Roland (1998). *Globalization and the Nation-State*, Macmillan Press, London.

Hroch, Miroslav (1995). "National Self-Determination from a Historical Perspective," in: Periwal, 1995, 65-82.

Hroch, Miroslav (1985). *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Kohn, Hans (1949). *The Twentieth Century*, Macmillan, New York.

Kohn, Hans (1944). *The Idea of Nationalism*, Macmillan, New York.

Lucas, Michael R. (1996). "The OSCE Code of Conduct and Its Relevance in Contemporary Europe," *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 47, no. 3, 223-235.

Lucas, Michael R. (1995c). "Der Europarat" in: Bundeszentrale (1995), 25-27.

Lucas, Michael R., (1995d). "Minority Rights and Consensual Intervention: Developments in the OSCE and their Inter-Organizational Context" in: Fritsch-Oppermann (1995), 229-269.

Lucas, Michael R. (ed.)(1993). *The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden.

Lucas, Michael R., and Kreikemeyer, Anna (1992). "Pan-European Integration and European Institutions: The New Role of the Council of Europe," *Revue d'integration européenne/Journal of European Integration*, XVI, no. 1, 89-107.

Lucas, Michael R. (1990). "The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Post-Cold War Era," *Hamburger Beiträge*, No. 48, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Hamburg, 1-144.

Minaham, James (1996). *Nations without States, A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements*, Greenwood Press, Westport and London.

Nairn, Tom (1977). *The Break-up of Britain*, New Left Books, London.

Periwal, Sukumar (1995). *Notions of Nationalism*, Central European University Press, Budapest and New York.

Robertson, Roland (1995). "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity," in Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson, 1995, 25-44.

Smith Anthony (1990). "The Supersession of Nationalism?" *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 31, 1/2, 1-32.

Smith, Anthony (1988). "The Myth of the 'Modern Nation' and the Myths of Nations," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 11, 1, 1-25.

Smith, Anthony (1986). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Smith, Anthony (1983). *Theories of Nationalism*, Holmes & Meier, New York.

Smith, Anthony (1981). *The Ethnic Revival*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Snyder, Louis L., (1976). *Varieties of Nationalism*, Holt, Rhein and Winston, New York.

Tilly, Charles (1975). *The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Tilly, Charles (1990). *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Union of International Associations (1998). *Yearbook of International Organizations*, 1998/99, vol. 1, Union of International Associations, Brussels, and K. G. Saur Verlag, Munich.

United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (1997). *State of the World Refugees*, United Nations, New York.

Woolf, Stuart (1996). *Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the Present*, Routledge, London and New York.

Woolf, Stuart (1996). "Introduction," in: Woolf, 1996, 1-39.



Zollberg, Aristide R. (1983). "The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 467, May, 24-38.