

## Anhang



## Common Purpose – Towards a More Effective OSCE\*

*Final Report and  
Recommendations of the  
Panel of Eminent Persons  
On Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE*

27 June 2005

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## Introduction: A Mandate for Change

Europe is going through a dynamic period of transition. It has experienced significant political and social changes. Much of what has been agreed since 1975 in Helsinki has been achieved. There has been substantial progress on the path of establishing democratic institutions and market economies. The Cold War division lines have disappeared. The OSCE has contributed to this progress.

New threats to international security and stability have emerged. Different historic backgrounds, the uneven pace of integration, economic growth and democratic development have led to the emergence of new problems in achieving comprehensive security.

Although the OSCE's ability to adjust in a flexible manner to the changing security environment is generally appreciated, its relevance, effectiveness and strategic orientation have been questioned. In 2004, most members of the Commonwealth of Independent States issued the Moscow Declaration and then the Astana Appeal to OSCE partners with a number of criticisms and suggestions for reforming the OSCE.

The underlying concern is whether the OSCE is living up to the expectations of building a Europe "whole and free", or whether new dividing lines are being drawn. Is the OSCE losing its focus and its relevance? Has it been applying double standards? Is there an imbalance between the dimensions and an exaggerated focus on countries East of Vienna? Does a real political will exist to make use of the Organization to solve problems related to the region's security issues? Such questions are being asked at the highest level.

Several Chairmanships have given reform a high priority. At the Ministerial Council in Sofia in December 2004, OSCE Foreign Ministers expressed their awareness of the need for a broad and thorough debate on reviewing and strengthening the role of the OSCE. They expressed the belief that the OSCE could be more effective, and therefore decided to establish a Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE. This was followed up by the Slovenian Chairmanship through the appointment of the signatories.

The mandate of the Panel is to give new impetus to political dialogue and provide strategic vision for the OSCE in the 21st century, to review the effectiveness of the Organization, its bodies and structures, and to provide recommendations on measures to effectively meet the challenges ahead.

The Panel has not reviewed global threats and challenges. This has already been comprehensively addressed, in the OSCE context, through the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century.

The Panel briefly assessed the strategic role and position of the OSCE in the European security network, considered how this role can be more clearly

defined and further strengthened, and provided recommendations on how this could be done.

These recommendations are designed to contribute to the High Level OSCE Consultations, to strengthen the long-term effectiveness of the Organization, for the benefit of improving security through co-operation in the OSCE area. The Panel trusts that the participating States will find its recommendations useful and that the outcome will contribute to revitalising the Organization.

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## 1. The OSCE's Position, Role, and Approach

### *1.1 Adapting to a new security paradigm*

1. The OSCE is an integral part of "European" security, including both the Transatlantic and Eurasian dimensions. In the network of European security organisations it is distinguishable by its broad membership, its comprehensive mandate and its activities in its field operations. The OSCE is the only regional Organization for co-operative security issues in which States from Vancouver to Vladivostok participate on equal terms. The OSCE's comprehensive approach to security is based on high-level political dialogue and a broad range of flexible institutions and instruments. The OSCE has a comprehensive approach to security, clearly expressed in a series of agreements and supported by instruments in all dimensions of security, to which all members have agreed. This combination has made the OSCE a useful service provider in all fields.
2. The old dividing lines of the Cold War no longer exist. As a consequence, the role of the OSCE, like other security organisations, is being adapted to this new security paradigm. While the OSCE, during the last 15 years, has continued to prove its value through its ability to respond adequately to new threats to European security, the Organization's agenda and its set of operational tools needs further improvement.

3. A rapidly evolving European and Eurasian landscape requires an organisation like the OSCE to play a constructive role in preventing the emergence of new dividing lines. Recent events show the need for the OSCE to manage and resolve crises, prevent conflict, and strengthen comprehensive security, regional co-operation and foster peace. Unresolved conflicts in the OSCE area are a concern to all participating States. States in which official institutions and their capacity to govern are still developing can benefit from OSCE assistance. Terrorism, trafficking (in particular in human beings), corruption and organised crime all profit from instability, which in turn has an impact on the security of all participating States.
4. The OSCE's consensus-based decision-making and co-operative approach make it a forum where all participants come together with an equal voice. It integrates all States with an interest and stake in European security. In that respect, it is a necessary, yet underused forum for comprehensive political dialogue on issues with an impact on security and co-operation across a vast area.
5. As a privileged member of the OSCE family, the Parliamentary Assembly can make a specific contribution. In particular it can play an important role in raising awareness of OSCE principles and commitments notably in national parliaments of participating States.
6. The relationship with NGOs is important and should be further developed. NGOs can provide useful information and be valuable partners in processes of broad consultations.

*1.2 Strengthening unity of purpose and effectiveness*

7. OSCE values and commitments are the bedrock on which the Organization stands. They constitute the principles and standards on the basis of which States participate in the OSCE. Therefore the most important step towards a stronger and more relevant OSCE is a firm recommitment to the standards and political commitments its leaders have signed up to since 1975. All OSCE commitments, without exception, apply equally to all participating States. Any action undertaken in accordance with one such commitment should be consistent with all other commitments. Raising awareness of OSCE commitments, and their full implementation by all participating States will enhance the profile of the Organization and the understanding of its relevance.
8. To increase the effectiveness of the OSCE, the Organization needs to create a stronger sense of common purpose among its participants, to make States feel that they have a stake in the Organization and that they are treated as equals. Such a development could be realised along the following lines:

- a) While retaining its comprehensive approach to security the OSCE should focus its work on those areas where it has comparative advantages and can add value;
- b) Strengthening trust and confidence between participating States as well as between groups of States is of crucial importance. The OSCE should play its role as an organisation for equal and even-handed co-operation and assistance in maintaining security and stability, and all OSCE instruments should be applied in this spirit;
- c) Identifying agendas, priorities and topics consistent with fostering compliance with OSCE commitments;
- d) The work of the Secretariat, Institutions and field operations of the Organization must be coherent and consistent with priorities of the OSCE set by the participating States so that the Organization has a common focus and external profile;
- e) The basic priorities and action plans must have a long-term perspective and be in line with the evolving security environment;
- f) A stronger focus and coherence of action would shape a stronger OSCE identity with a common perception of the OSCE's goals, both internally as well as for the general public;
- g) Stronger political leadership and management of the Secretariat, Institutions and field operations of the Organization should contribute to the desired coherence and long-term relevance and applicability of basic principles, while the different Institutions should retain their ability to make independent evaluations and take programmatic initiatives in accordance with their respective mandates.

### 1.3 *Relations with other international organisations and partners*

- 9. The OSCE's role as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter has been influenced by the enlargement of the European Union, NATO and the Council of Europe. This has led to an increasing overlap in memberships, mandates and capacities. Moreover, the role of the OSCE and how it is perceived vary in the different participating States, *inter alia* depending on their relationship to these other international organisations.
- 10. Managed well and taking into account the legitimate interests of all participating States, co-operation and co-ordination with other actors strengthen common and comprehensive security within the OSCE area. The main responsibility lies with participating States to ensure that policy planning looks at European security organisations in concert and not in isolation. The Panel recommends that:
  - a) The relationship with the UN should be further developed, taking into account the ongoing discussions on the reform of the UN to strengthen the complementarity between the UN and regional ar-

- rangements, for example in the regional implementation of global instruments, in conflict prevention and peace-building;
- b) Pragmatic and even-handed co-operation should be enhanced between the OSCE and other regional and sub-regional organisations especially in relation to crisis management, setting and implementation of norms, and operational activities;
  - c) On the basis of the Declaration on Co-operation endorsed in Warsaw on 17 May 2005 between the OSCE and the Council of Europe, further practical work should be carried out to fully realise the potential of this co-operative relationship;
  - d) Being an independent Organization with its distinctive mandate, relations between the OSCE and other international organisations in the European security network should focus on what the OSCE does best and where its added value lies;
  - e) The OSCE's role and comparative advantages should be regularly and systematically assessed as part of the agenda of the Ministerial Council and the Permanent Council.
11. Since security in the OSCE area is affected by international developments, particularly in adjacent areas, the OSCE has a clear self-interest in sharing its security-related expertise with its neighbours. The OSCE should remain prepared to consider invitations to contribute as appropriate to the development of security and democracy, particularly in Partners for Co-operation and neighbouring States, and in special cases outside the OSCE area.

#### *1.4 Comparative advantages and focus*

- 12. Making use of its comparative advantages, the OSCE should bear in mind its co-operative approach and should help States, at their request and invitation, to help themselves in the agreed areas. Assistance in capacity-building, with respect to implementing OSCE commitments should therefore be a main aim of operational activities.
- 13. In some OSCE priority areas, such as police training, rule of law and the fight against trafficking in human beings, the OSCE could take a leading role.
- 14. The OSCE is a norm-setter in areas covered by its comprehensive mandate. When requested, the OSCE should assist participating States to fulfil OSCE commitments. If asked, it could also encourage and assist within its competence participating States to adopt and implement the norms and standards set by other international organisations.
- 15. Under the prevailing circumstances and taking into account that the priorities for OSCE co-operation with participating States may vary from country to country, the Panel believes that the OSCE should give priority to:



- a) Enhancing political dialogue;
- b) Early warning and conflict prevention;
- c) Post-conflict rehabilitation including restorative justice and reconciliation;
- d) Arms control and confidence- and security-building measures;
- e) The fight against terrorism, extremism and organised crime;
- f) Promotion of police training, border management, the rule of law and democratic control of armed forces;
- g) Encouraging regional economic co-operation;
- h) Promotion of tolerance and non-discrimination, including respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and protection of freedom of the media;
- i) Election observation and the follow-up of recommendations;
- j) Institution-building and the promotion of good governance;
- k) The fight against trafficking in human beings, drugs and weapons.

## 2. Improving Comprehensive, Common and Co-operative Security

### 2.1 *New threats and challenges – the need for a cross-dimensional perspective*

- 16. Since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE/OSCE's commitments and activities have traditionally been divided into three baskets, or dimensions. This has been a convenient way to cluster issues into subject areas: the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions.
- 17. The CSCE/OSCE early on recognised that security is comprehensive and indivisible and that the dimensions are inter-linked. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan writes in his report *In larger freedom*, "not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other".
- 18. The OSCE's comprehensive approach to security, plus its comprehensive mandate, are two of its hallmarks and greatest strengths. Globalisation, increasing inter-dependence and the emergence of new threats to security in the OSCE region (including from non-state actors) have led to a further blurring of lines between dimensions and make a narrow one-dimensional approach less relevant. A cross-dimensional perspective is therefore needed more than ever, both in terms of a conceptual approach and in leading to co-ordinated, pragmatic activities. Such an approach underlines the crucial importance of all three dimensions in the context of comprehensive security. The OSCE is well-equipped and well-positioned to take such a cross-dimensional approach and put it into practice. Furthermore, effective multilateralism can enable collec-

tive action to tackle trans-national and cross-sector challenges. The Panel therefore recommends:

- a) High-level, high-profile meetings on thematic issues could be convened as necessary to focus attention on matters of relevance to all participating States. For example, decisions on the venue of future conferences on tolerance and non-discrimination should be decided taking into account the geographical diversity of States with multi-ethnic and multi-religious populations;
- b) Cross-dimensional approaches should be reflected in all aspects of OSCE activities, including meetings like the Economic Forum, the budget, Programme Outline and public relations material;
- c) In view of the specific structural and institutional set-up of the OSCE, a cross-dimensional approach implies the need for increased intra-Organizational co-ordination, particularly in relation to combating new threats to security;
- d) Cross-dimensional elements of strategies and projects should be strengthened by close co-operation with other regional and sub-regional organisations that offer complementary resources, capabilities and expertise.

## *2.2 The Politico-Military Dimension*

19. The OSCE has a well-earned reputation for dealing with the politico-military aspects of security. The OSCE's infrastructure and work in disarmament, arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) play an important role in fostering security in Europe and are an integral element of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security.
20. As the OSCE's work in the politico-military dimension was geared towards the military balances and strategic priorities of the 1980s and early 1990s, it should be brought up to date to deal with the challenges identified in the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century.
21. Other fundamental documents dealing with the political-military dimension, like certain elements of Chapter III of the 1992 Helsinki Document and the 1999 Vienna Document should be reviewed and brought up to date where necessary.
22. The OSCE could share its expertise in this dimension with others facing similar threats, particularly at the sub-regional level. In turn, it could if advantageous draw on the expertise and resources of others to make the most effective use of available capabilities.

## *2.3 The Economic and Environmental Dimension*

23. The Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension offers a good opportunity for addressing common economic and environmental challenges to security in the OSCE area. The OSCE will

never have the means and resources to be a major donor. Its niche is in addressing economic and environmental aspects of security in a holistic, cross-dimensional way that takes into account the comprehensive nature of security as a way of promoting co-operation and conflict prevention.

- a) The OSCE should strengthen its capacities including those on the ground to support and help in meeting local challenges by mobilising international resources and expertise possessed, for instance, by the World Bank, European Union, UN Development Program (UNDP), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), NGOs and others;
- b) Such an approach would highlight the OSCE's possibilities as a co-operative partner, and it would strengthen the link between economic development, inter-state economic co-operation, good governance and democratisation. By linking international actors with significant resources to host countries with specific needs, the OSCE could promote a programmatic approach without unnecessarily (and unrealistically) trying to develop and manage large-scale projects on its own;
- c) The OSCE should promote sub-regional co-operation, for example in south-eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia;
- d) Activities in the economic and environmental dimension should reflect the OSCE's role as a comprehensive security organisation. A good example is the Environment and Security Initiative, where the OSCE adds value regarding the security aspect, whereas the UNDP incorporates the development aspect and the UN Environment Program (UNEP) the environmental aspect;
- e) Environmental problems have important security aspects in fields that the OSCE could address, *inter alia* the growing problem of environmental refugees and internally displaced persons;
- f) Public-private partnership is crucial to achieve environmentally sustainable growth. The OSCE should promote the UN's Global Compact Initiative and similar initiatives.

#### 2.4 *The Human Dimension*

24. In the human dimension, encompassing human rights (including national minority rights), the rule of law, and democracy, the OSCE has developed comprehensive standards and commitments. OSCE participating States have agreed, for example in the 1991 Moscow Document, that commitments undertaken in the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned. The OSCE has a progressive approach to protecting the dignity of the individual. Human security in general, and the security of the individual in particular,

are seen as the individual and collective responsibility of all participating States. Human rights and security are inseparable.

- a) Monitoring of the implementation of human dimension standards is a particularly challenging and in many situations highly sensitive task. To encourage equal treatment and improve transparency, OSCE monitoring should be done in an unbiased and more standardised way.
  - b) The OSCE/ODIHR's work on electoral monitoring and assistance is an area where the OSCE has extensive experience and expertise and is widely known. It is important to improve and further develop a high OSCE profile on this issue to help participating States upon their request to implement the commitments they have already undertaken and to consider new commitments which correspond to evolving election issues, such as the introduction of new technologies.
  - c) Special attention should be devoted to election monitoring standards based on experience acquired. Criteria and methodology that ensure objectiveness, transparency and professionalism should be further developed and an approach taken that guarantees equal treatment of all participating States. The existing handbook on election monitoring and other election mechanisms and practices should be periodically updated with the active involvement of election practitioners from various election monitoring bodies;
  - d) Participating States concerned and ODIHR should be encouraged to pay more attention to post-election follow-up through dialogue and practical co-operative support. In addition, after consultation with the State concerned, ODIHR should report to the Permanent Council (PC) on election follow-up.
  - e) The OSCE should build on its work on tolerance and non-discrimination, and promote this theme across its full range of activities. ODIHR and other Institutions should make effective use of the data, information and existing analytical capacities of other international organisations and research institutes.
  - f) The OSCE should restructure the role currently played by the three Personal Representatives on tolerance and non-discrimination, incorporating the work of the Personal Representatives into the structure of the ODIHR in a suitable way.
25. If a Human Dimension Committee is established (see para. 32), the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) could be reduced to a maximum of five days. Upon invitation, the HDIM could be held outside Warsaw every second year in order to raise its profile and increase the sense of ownership among participating States.

### 3. The Structural Response

26. In order to improve its effectiveness, the OSCE requires structural reform. A number of changes are necessary to address the issue of the Organization's profile and identity, its management and leadership, its decision-making processes, how its field operations are run, and its operational capabilities.

#### 3.1 *Strengthening the OSCE's identity and profile*

27. The Panel believes it is important to raise the awareness of the OSCE in the participating States.
28. The OSCE's development from a conference to a full-fledged international organisation must now be completed, finally making "participating States" into "member States".
29. The OSCE's standing as an international organisation is handicapped by its lack of a legal personality. The lack of a clear status also affects OSCE personnel when stationed in crisis areas without the protection that diplomatic recognition would give them.
30. The Panel therefore recommends that:
- a) Participating States should devise a concise Statute or Charter of the OSCE containing its basic goals, principles and commitments, as well as the structure of its main decision-making bodies. This would help the OSCE to become a full-scale regional organisation;
  - b) Participating States agree on a convention recognising the OSCE's legal capacity and granting privileges and immunities to the OSCE and its officials. Such a convention would not diminish in any way the politically binding character of OSCE commitments.
  - c) The OSCE's profile among other international organisations would be raised by focusing more clearly on a limited range of priorities, giving a more public and long-term face to its leadership, and encouraging a stronger sense of ownership among its participants.
  - d) To make itself more accessible the OSCE should provide to the public a better understanding of what is happening within the OSCE. More efforts should be made to publicise and explain the important work of the field operations. Admission of the press or public to meetings of the Permanent Council should be considered more often. Deepening further the engagement with NGOs would also help to spread information about the OSCE's contributions to comprehensive security.
  - e) A long-term strategic perspective based on established OSCE strategies would be useful in order to improve planning and continuity and reduce the chance of priorities changing annually. This could be enhanced by giving the Secretary General a stronger role in ensuring consistency and continuity of OSCE priorities.

- f) The Permanent Council should play a leading role in adopting political priorities and planning activities of the Organization in accordance with Ministerial Council decisions and translating them into budget programmes.

### 3.2 *Improving consultative and decision-making processes*

- 31. The OSCE should actively use its potential as a forum for equal, meaningful and high-level political dialogue among all participating States.
- 32. One of the OSCE's strengths is its inclusiveness. This should be fully reflected in its consultative and decision-making bodies. In order to make these bodies more inclusive, inter-active and transparent, involving all participating States more actively and effectively, the Panel recommends:
  - a) To introduce a committee structure made up of three pillars corresponding to the traditional dimensions: a Security Committee, a Human Dimension Committee and an Economic and Environmental Committee. Such a Committee structure, sub-ordinate to the Permanent Council, would allow for more open exchanges, would focus the agenda of the Permanent Council and would raise its profile as a forum for political dialogue and decision-making.
  - b) The Panel was divided on whether the actual tasks and functions of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) could be fulfilled by the new Security Committee. One view was that the FSC should be transformed into the new Security Committee. The other view was that the FSC should be maintained with its autonomous status, fulfilling its 1992 mandate with its agenda updated. The latter position would mean that the new Security Committee would not substitute for the FSC but would only fulfil the non-military aspects of the politico-military dimension, not covered by the FSC.
- 33. The Panel further recommends:
  - a) To broaden the ownership of the participatory process by increasing the number of participating States involved in chairing committees;
  - b) That the OSCE should codify, revise and bring up to date its rules of procedure;
  - c) That consensus should be preserved as the rule for OSCE decision-making;
  - d) That in order to prevent protracted debates over senior appointments, participating States with candidates should not abuse the consensus rule by unilaterally blocking consensus;
  - e) That the countries that are blocking consensus should be identified;
  - f) That more effective use should be made of informal discussions, as a part of the decision-making process;

- g) That ambassadors-only discussions could be held in Vienna from time to time, to encourage a more open exchange of views on sensitive matters.
- 34. For a number of years, Ministerial Council meetings have been particularly difficult. The meetings (including the preparations thereof) are perceived to have been overloaded with reports and decisions that could have been dealt with by the Permanent Council. The Panel recommends:
  - a) Reviewing the preparations for the Ministerial Council and the traditional form of the Ministerial Council decisions. Concentrating the official results in an agreed political communiqué might help to regain the attention of the public for this central event in the OSCE's yearly work cycle.
- 3.3 *Clarifying the roles of the Chairman-in-Office and Secretary General*
- 35. In addressing the division of labour between the Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General, the Panel believes that it is necessary to have a more precise definition of roles in order to increase effectiveness and provide the OSCE with a clearer identity.
- 36. The role of the Chairman-in-Office should be to lead the political, rather than the operational activities of the Organization. The Chairman-in-Office's most important tasks, to be performed personally or through his/her representative, should continue to include:
  - a) Providing the executive political leadership of the Organization;
  - b) Preparing the Ministerial Council;
  - c) Preparing draft decisions and presiding over the discussions of the Permanent Council;
  - d) Introducing new political initiatives and proposals for political priorities for the Organization, to be submitted to the Permanent Council;
  - e) Assisting the participating States in building consensus.
- 37. Building on the Sofia Ministerial Council decision on the Role of the Secretary General (MC.DEC/15/04), the Panel recommends that the role of the Secretary General should be further enhanced so as to enable him/her to:
  - a) Be a public face of the Organization, to be able to communicate a long-term, coherent identity of the OSCE and its operations;
  - b) Play a greater role in identifying potential threats to regional security and bring them, after consultation with the Chairman-in-Office, to the attention of participating States;
  - c) Be more actively involved in developing the operational aspects of the OSCE's priorities;
  - d) Play a more active role in the operational management of field operations. As the development of events requires, the Secretary Gen-

- eral should report to the Permanent Council on field operation-related activities;
- e) Take the lead on OSCE's operational engagement in crisis situations;
  - f) Play a greater role in planning, by proposing multi-year objectives (including a budget perspective);
  - g) Play a more active role in co-ordinating OSCE activities, including through the hosting of at least one meeting a year with heads of Institutions;
  - h) Be the central point of contact for other international organisations and NGOs for all aspects of operational issues relevant beyond the mandate of individual OSCE structures and Institutions.
38. The enhanced and more active role for the Secretary General will entail:
- a) A continuous exchange of information and close co-operation between the Secretary General and the Chairman-in-Office;
  - b) The need for a strengthened Secretariat, organised to support the Secretary General as well as the Chairman-in-Office;
  - c) Better pooling and channelling of existing information particularly from OSCE Institutions, field operations and research centres as well as improved processing of such information, including the development of lessons learned and best practices.
39. The enhanced role of the Secretary General may necessitate the creation of the post of Under or Deputy Secretary General.
40. It may also entail the need for more resources to enable the Secretary General to effectively carry out his/her mandate.

#### *3.4 Enhancing field operations*

41. Field Operations remain an innovative and operational aspect of the OSCE's work, and deserve special attention. They are an asset and where possible should be even further improved.
42. The Panel makes the following recommendations for improving the effectiveness of field operations:
- a) Mandates must ensure that the objectives of the mission are clear and agreed between the OSCE and the host State;
  - b) Mandates should normally not be fixed for more than one year and could be renewable depending on the specific tasks and on the outcome of consultations with the host States;
  - c) To improve guidance and facilitate the regular evaluation of the work of field operations, realistic benchmarks should be established for measuring progress and duration of implementation of the mandate;
  - d) In order to strengthen accountability and political oversight Heads of Mission should personally present a report at least twice a year to



- the Permanent Council. In addition, they should also hold regular meetings with informal “Friends of ...” groups, where these exist;
- e) The Secretary General should take the lead role in the operational guidance of field activities;
  - f) Heads of Missions should submit regular and spot written reports to the Secretary General with a copy to the Chairman-in-Office;
  - g) Field operations should receive more specialised support, particularly in relation to all phases of capacity-building projects, from OSCE Institutions including more effective use of short-term staff visits;
  - h) Special attention should be paid to the issue of local staffing, particularly in order to build up national capacity to deal with issues covered by OSCE field activities, address salary discrepancies, and encourage staff rotation.
  - i) To take into account the broad spectrum of new threats and challenges and their cross-dimensional nature, the OSCE could consider developing a new type of thematic mission that could look at a specific issue in one country, or to ensure coherence in the work in a broader regional/sub-regional context.
  - j) The Panel underlines the importance of the process of selection of Heads of Missions being transparent and as competitive as possible. The nominations should be made by the Chairmanship in consultation with the Secretary General and the host country. To improve the actual situation, the Panel recommends making Heads and Deputy Heads of Mission posts open to public competition with salaries paid from the core budget of the OSCE. This could increase the professionalism of such posts and open them up to a broader pool of candidates.

### 3.5 *Strengthening operational capacities*

- 43. The Secretariat, Institutions, as well as Personal and Special Representatives all contribute to advancing the OSCE’s agenda. However, there is frustration among participating States, including Chairmanships, that current structures are not optimal for putting the political priorities of the participating States into operation. Against this background, the Panel recommends that:
  - a) Participating States should resist the proliferation of structures in the OSCE;
  - b) The appointment of Personal and Special Representatives should be for a limited period of time and focusing on a specific issue. Personal and Special Representatives should not build up separate operational capacities; rather they should make use of existing operational capacities in the ODIHR, the Secretariat and field operations;

- c) Employment should always be based on professionalism as well as reflecting gender and geographic balance. Without making the OSCE a career organisation, ways should be considered to enable the Organization to retain staff (subject to regular assessment) for a sufficiently long period in order to preserve continuity;
- d) The Panel underlines the importance of a clear and transparent system on the use of extra-budgetary contributions;
- e) The Secretariat should be re-structured to take into account political and operational changes, as well as reforms and changes in operational priorities.

## Annex I: Acknowledgements

### *The Panel*

*Nikolay Afanasievsky*, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Poland. He is a CSCE pioneer, having served with the Soviet Delegation at the negotiations of the Helsinki Final Act from 1973 to 1975. Later he served as the Ambassador of the USSR and subsequently the Russian Federation to Belgium and then France, as well as Deputy Foreign Minister. For the final meeting, Ambassador Afanasievsky was represented by Ambassador *Vladimir Shustov*, former Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the CSCE/OSCE.

*Hans van den Broek*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands from 1982 to 1992, and member of the European Commission from 1993 to 1999, responsible for enlargement and external relations. Presently he is Chairman of the Boards of a number of non-profit organisations such as the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, *Clingendael*, and the Carnegie Foundation.

*Wilhelm Höynck*, first OSCE Secretary General from 1993 to 1996, following a distinguished career in the Foreign Service of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1999 and 2001, he was Personal Representative for Central Asia of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office.

*Kuanysh Sultanov*, Deputy of the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan and Chairman of the Committee on Social and Cultural Development. Ambassador Sultanov previously served as his country's Ambassador to the People's Democratic Republic of China and non-resident Ambassador to Vietnam, Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

*Knut Vollebaek*, Ambassador of Norway to the United States. During his term as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, from 1997 to 2000, he was Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in 1999. Ambassador Vollebaek has chaired the meetings of the Panel as its *Primus inter Pares*.

*Richard Williamson*, a partner in the US law firm Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw. He has held a number of senior posts in his country's foreign service including Assistant Secretary of State at the US Department of State, Ambassador to the UN Offices in Vienna, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and as Ambassador and Alternative Representative to the UN for Special Political Affairs.

*Miomir Žužul*, Member of Parliament and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia, 2004-05. Previously he served as Croatia's Ambassador to the United States, after having served as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the UN in Geneva.

#### *Panel Meetings*

<i>Date</i>	<i>Venue</i>
17 February 2005	Brdo pri Kranju, Slovenia
10-11 March	Vienna, Austria
6-7 April	Warsaw, Poland,
4-6 May	Brussels, Belgium
1-3 June	Vienna, Austria

*The Panel was supported by, among others:*

#### *The Chairmanship-in-Office (focal point)*

*Ambassador Boris Frlec*, Head of the OSCE Task Force, Ljubljana

*Renata Marmulaku*, Counsellor, OSCE Task Force

*Tatjana Pirc*, First Secretary, OSCE Task Force

#### *The OSCE Secretariat*

*Walter Kemp*, Senior Adviser, Office of the OSCE Secretary General

*Keith Jinks*, Senior Press and Public Information Officer

*Hans-Michael Plut*, Deputy Director for Conference Services

#### *Personal Assistants*

*Andrey Rudenko*, Senior Counsellor, Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE (PA to Afanasievsky and Shustov)

*Arjen van den Berg*, Senior Policy Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague (PA to Van den Broek)

*Ricklef Beutin*, OSCE Desk Officer, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin (PA to Höynck)

*Akan Rakhmetllin*, Head of OSCE Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Astana (PA to Sultanov)  
*Tobias F. Svenningsen*, Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo (PA to Vollebaek)  
*David Kostelancik*, Deputy Political Counsellor, Mission of the United States to the OSCE (PA to Williamson)  
*Daniel Riđièki*, Adviser, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zagreb (PA to Žužul)

*Panel Guests*

*The following people were invited to brief the Panel:*

*Marco Borsotti*, UNDP Representative in Baku  
*Ambassador Liviu Bota*, Head of the Permanent Mission of Romania to the OSCE  
*Pieter De Crem*, Member of the Belgian Parliament  
*Ambassador Rolf Ekeus*, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities  
*Pieter Feith*, Deputy Director for External Relations and Politico-Military Affairs, Council of the European Union  
*Walter Gehr*, Project Co-ordinator, Terrorism Prevention Branch, UNODC  
*Professor Victor-Yves Ghebali*, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva  
*Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati*, Chairman of the Board, The Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy  
*Miklos Haraszti*, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media  
*Helga Konrad*, Special Representative to the Chairman-in-Office Against Human Trafficking  
*Ambassador Ed Kronenburg*, Director of the Private Office of the Secretary General of NATO  
*Dimitar Jalnev*, Programme Co-ordinator, Action Against Terrorism Unit, OSCE Secretariat  
*Ján Kubiš*, Secretary General of the OSCE  
*Dr. Dov Lynch*, research Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris  
*Spencer Oliver*, Secretary General, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly  
*Ambassador Roy Reeve*, Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia  
*Dr. Aaron Rhodes*, Executive Director, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights  
*Klaus Schumann*, Director General, Council of Europe Secretariat  
*Ambassador Peter Semneby*, former Head of the OSCE Mission to Croatia  
*Ms. Daniele Smadja*, Director Multilateral Relations and Human Rights, Directorate General for External Relations, European Commission  
*Ambassador Christian Strohal*, Director, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

*Marcin Swiecicki*, Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities

*Ambassador Margit Waestfelt*, Head of the Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE and Chairman of the Informal Group of Friends on Improving the Functioning and Effectiveness of the OSCE Field Operations.

*Dr. Monika Wohlfeld*, Deputy Director, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre

*Dr. Andrei Zagorski*, Moscow State Institute for Foreign Affairs

*Dr. Wolfgang Zellner*, Acting Head, Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), Hamburg

*The Panel would also like to thank:*

*H.E. Karel De Gucht*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium

*H.E. Dr. Daniel Rotfeld*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland

*H.E. Dr. Dimitrij Rupel*, Chairman-in-Office and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia

*H.E. Ján Kubiš*, Secretary General of the OSCE

*H.E. Daan Everts*, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the OSCE

*H.E. Mette Kongslem*, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Norway to the OSCE

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All individuals, Institutions, Missions and Governments of participating States that have briefed or assisted Panel Members during this process.

## Annex II: The Panel's Mandate

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Ministerial Council

Sofia 2004

MC.DEC/16/04

7 December 2004

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MC(12) Journal No. 2, Agenda item 8

*Decision No. 16/04*

*Establishment of a Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE*

The Ministerial Council,

Determined to enhance the OSCE's capacity to address the challenges of the twenty-first century as one of the pillars of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture,

Recognizing that the thirtieth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, the fifteenth anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the tenth anniversary of the OSCE provide with a unique opportunity to reflect on the role of the Organization in a transforming Europe,

Realizing that there is a need to improve the Organization's functioning as well as its capabilities for collective action, without diminishing its strengths and flexibility,

Mindful of the need to proceed further with this work in 2005 by taking broad and forward-looking approach to strengthening the overall capacity of the OSCE:

*I.*

1. Decides to establish a Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE, in order to give new impetus to political dialogue and provide strategic vision for the Organization in the twenty-first century;
2. Further decides that the Panel will review the effectiveness of the Organization, its bodies and structures and provide an assessment in view of the challenges ahead. The Panel will make recommendations on measures in order to meet these challenges effectively;
3. Tasks the Chairman-in-Office to appoint the members of the Panel after consultations with all participating States. The composition of the Panel, which shall have up to seven eminent persons with knowledge of the OSCE, will take into account the diversity of the OSCE community, including from participating States hosting field presences. Members of the Panel will have their costs covered by extrabudgetary contributions. Secretariat support shall be provided by the OSCE Secretariat through existing resources. The Chairman-in-Office shall act as Focal Point for the Panel during its work. The Panel shall present its report with recommendations no later than the end of June 2005 to the participating States through the Chairman-in-Office. Specially convened High Level OSCE Consultations will be held as a follow-up. The Permanent Council shall take a decision on the organizational modalities and the timetable of such a specially convened High Level OSCE Consultation by the end of July 2005;
4. The Consultations will examine the report of the Panel as well as other possible contributions, and will forward their conclusions and recommendations through the Permanent Council to the Ministerial Council meeting in 2005 for appropriate action.

*II.*

The Ministerial Council further tasks the Permanent Council, through the Working Group on Reform and the Informal Group of Friends of the Chair on Improving the Functioning and Effectiveness of OSCE Field Operations, to continue consideration of issues pertaining to improving the functioning of the Organization.

The Chairpersons of the Groups will be available for consultations with the Panel of Eminent Persons when necessary.





## Report: Colloquium on “The Future of the OSCE”\*

*A Joint Project of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Swiss Institute for World Affairs*

*Washington, 5-6 June 2005*

### *Executive Summary*

The OSCE is facing serious difficulties as well as challenges to its purpose and political relevancy. Participants and contributors to the Colloquium unanimously agreed that the OSCE is still a valuable and relevant international organization that should continue to play a critical role in promoting stability and security in Europe. The political commitments made in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris as well as in other CSCE/OSCE documents are of great value. They should be preserved and upheld by the participating States.

It was also agreed that the crisis of the OSCE is first and foremost political. The structural reform in and by itself will not solve the political problems that only participating States can address. The governments of the 55 OSCE states should reconfirm their commitment to a useful, credible and professional OSCE that serves the interest of all. They should also commit themselves, at the highest political levels, to the full implementation of all of their OSCE commitments and to future improvements in the structures and procedures of the Organization.

It was also agreed that:

1. The strengthening of OSCE activities in the field of security, economy and environment should not be done at the expense of the human dimension or to the detriment of basic OSCE values and principles. The security dimension should be expanded by further elaborating the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security and increasing the role of the Forum for Security Co-operation.
2. Election observation is one of the most politically relevant and visible aspects of the Organization. The independence of these missions must

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\* This report has been agreed by President of the OSCE PA, Congressman Alcee L. Hastings, and the Swiss Foundation Chairman, Ambassador Edouard Brunner. It has been drafted by Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Spencer Oliver, Secretary General of the OSCE PA who served as co-Rapporteurs during the Colloquium. They were assisted by Nicolas Kaczorowski, Deputy to Ambassador Stoudmann and Tina Schön from the International Secretariat of the OSCE PA. The Report is a synopsis of views expressed at the Colloquium as seen by the Rapporteurs, and it also takes into consideration opinions expressed in the written contributions which were submitted to the project. The Report has been reviewed by the participants at the Colloquium who agree with the content [...].

be protected and efforts should focus on expanding electoral standards without weakening existing commitments. It is recommended that ODIHR and the OSCE PA increase their co-operation in order to maintain and ensure the independence of the OSCE election observation that has been recently eroded. Finally, election assessments could be expanded further in Western democracies. Double standards in electoral observations should be avoided.

3. The role of the OSCE Secretary General should be strengthened in the political, budgetary and administrative spheres. The Secretary General, as well as and in consultation with the Chairman-in-Office, should be able to speak for the Organization and to make policy pronouncements as well as appropriate criticisms when OSCE commitments are not observed.
4. The OSCE should improve its ability to make timely decisions through adjusting its decision-making procedure. The consensus rules could be modified for decisions related to personnel, budget and administration.
5. Transparency and accountability can be improved by requiring that a country which blocks or holds up consensus must do so openly and be prepared to defend such position publicly.
6. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly could approve the budget and confirm the Secretary General once nominated, by an absolute or weighted majority vote and after appropriate consultations.
7. The budget must be adopted in a timely fashion and be commensurate to OSCE political objectives. A multi-year financial plan should be established in order to pursue longer term strategies.
8. Structural reform is needed to improve the functioning of the Organization: 1) Enhancing the analytical capabilities of the Secretariat by the creation of an Analysis and Prospective Unit; 2) Building permanent lessons learned capabilities by setting up a best Practices Unit; and 3) developing a truly operational civilian rapid reaction capability to intervene at time of crisis.
9. Professional standards should be raised in all OSCE structures. In order to attract and retain performing staff, fixed term limits on duration of service should be eliminated. At the same time, reliance on seconded personnel should be reduced. However, when seconded personnel are assigned, Governments should ensure that such assignment is for a substantial period of time – at least one or two years.
10. The OSCE needs to increase its network capabilities and reinforce its strategic co-operation with the EU, NATO, and the UN by opening liaison offices in Brussels and New York City.
11. The OSCE could export its comprehensive security concept, expertise such as election observation and assistance and share its values and experience beyond the OSCE area.

### *Addressing the Political Challenges First*

At a time when the OSCE's purposefulness and political relevance are challenged and put into question, the participants in the colloquium unanimously agreed that with its unique composition and comprehensive security concept as well as its crisis prevention and management capacities, the OSCE still has the potential and has a relevant role to play in a Europe facing new security challenges. In recent years, the OSCE has encountered serious problems and has entered into a critical situation that requires high-level attention by the participating States.

The problems are first and foremost of a political nature and should find political responses at the outset. *Structural reforms are certainly needed, but the essential problem lies elsewhere. Putting the emphasis on these can only blur the issue and confuse the priorities. Only then does it make sense to proceed with structural reforms. If participating States decide to support the OSCE in its objectives, they need to commit resilience, will and resources in politically revitalizing the Organization before they undertake the structural reform.* The OSCE's ability to reform will ultimately depend on how much participating States are committed to and interested in the Organization's potential.

The OSCE today is in a complex situation. With successive EU and NATO enlargements, there is a tendency at the political level to devote less attention to the OSCE which has increasingly disappeared from public view. In many countries, the OSCE is rarely placed high on political agendas in Capitals. The fact that the OSCE Ministerial Council Meetings are attended at an increasingly lower political level is a sign of this diminishing political interest. These elements all point to the reduced political relevance of the OSCE. Political issues relevant to its mandate and geographical areas are barely addressed seriously any more at the Permanent Council.

The culture of informal discussions and consultations, which once was necessary to build up consensus and formal decisions has been eroded. Broad consultations should be carried out on current political issues. The EU countries in the OSCE arduously negotiate issues among themselves before they disclose their common position to non-EU countries. Once a compromise in the EU has been found, there is very little scope for negotiations, which contributes to the shrinking importance of the OSCE as a political platform. Therefore, rebalancing the decision-making process and making it more transparent and inclusive is a necessity.

### *Rebalance the OSCE Multidimensional Approach*

The three dimensions of the OSCE have constituted the early and innovative recognition of the inseparable link between security, development and democracy that ensures stability. The OSCE comprehensive security concept is

still current and very relevant for addressing the challenges of the XXI century. *The expansion of security related activities should not be done to the detriment of the importance of the human dimension. Within the security dimension, actions should be taken to increase the role of the Forum for Security Co-operation, to involve the OSCE in security sector governance, by inter alia elaborating the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security.*

#### *Maintain the OSCE Lead on Electoral Activities*

Election observation is recognized as the remaining most politically relevant and visible activity of the OSCE. This must remain so and the OSCE should not relinquish its leading comparative advantage in this field. The involvement of the Parliamentary Assembly is critical to maintain the visibility and independence of OSCE election observation. *Agreement was found on the need to complement the existing election standards and to continue to improve election observation, which should in no way result in a watered-down version of existing standards. As previously indicated, it is recommended that ODIHR and the OSCE PA increase their co-operation in order to maintain and ensure the independence of the OSCE election observation that has been recently eroded. Finally, election assessments could be expanded further in Western democracies. Double standards in electoral observations should be avoided.*

#### *Democratization of the OSCE*

##### *Strengthening the Role of the OSCE Secretary General*

It has been agreed that the present status quo is not sustainable and it would be in the interest of the Organization and the Chairman-in-Office itself to benefit from a strengthened role of the Secretary General. There is no contradiction or conflict of interest between a reinforced role for the Secretary General and the overall responsibilities of the Chairmanship. A Chairman-in-Office rotating annually means ever changing directions, lack of political continuity and difficulty to define long-term, coherent and sustainable priorities. The aims and role of the OSCE Secretary General should:

1. Ensure better political continuity from one Chairmanship to another;
2. Define long-term priorities, thus improving the OSCE credibility;
3. Serve as the focal point for the Organization;
4. Increasing his/her decision making power in personnel and administrative issues;
5. Speak for the Organization and making political pronouncements;
6. Take political initiatives;

7. Propose priorities for resource allocation (financial, human and administrative) and other activities in particular present a multi-year financial plan; and
8. Ensure that budget is adopted in a timely fashion and human and financial means be commensurate to the political objectives of the Organization. A slight increase in the OSCE budget will greatly boost its effectiveness.

*Permanent Council Procedures: Transparency and Accountability in the Decision-making*

Achieving consensus within the OSCE has become increasingly difficult. Protracted negotiations on relatively minor issues have hampered the effectiveness of the Organization and have, at times, led to paralysis. *It is recognized that the consensus rule for decisions related to budget, personnel appointments and general administrative issues should be modified.*

Furthermore, the decision-making process has to become more transparent. *A country should only be able to block the consensus openly and publicly. Debates should be more open and transparent and not limited to issues where a consensus exists but should extend to contentious matters where consensus is lacking. Informal consultations and generally better information sharing are critical to improve accountability, transparency and visibility of the Organization.*

*Strengthened Role of the OSCE PA*

*The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly remains an essential player because it is by essence more independent and can take political initiative. The PA should be more closely associated to the OSCE decision shaping and making processes as is the case for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The OSCE PA should approve the budget of the OSCE and confirm the OSCE Secretary General after the nomination.* This would ensure the independence and legitimacy of the OSCE Secretary General, and reinforce his/her position.

*Furthermore, in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management, the OSCE PA should take more political initiative such as organizing "fact finding missions", facilitating negotiations. These initiatives could be public or confidential assimilated to silent diplomacy and carried out alone or in co-operation with other parliamentary actors (European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe). Such initiatives would substantially increase the political credibility and visibility of the Organization.*

### *Institutional Reform*

#### *Structural Adjustments*

To regain political credibility, the OSCE has to act as an effective crisis management and conflict prevention/resolution body. The OSCE needs effective early warning and an ability to carry out swift follow-up action.

*To this end, three concrete measures are recommended:*

1. *Enhancing the analytical capabilities in the Secretariat by the creation of an Analysis and Prospective Unit.* It will process and analyze the wealth of information that the OSCE collects in the field and through its network of institutions and missions. This instrument would be essential to set up credible early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms.
2. *Establishing a Best Practices Unit in the Secretariat will provide the OSCE with a permanent lessons learned capability.* This unit will *inter alia* formulate recommendations aiming at improving the functioning, effectiveness and work of field missions. It will also analyse working methods of other organizations and will seek to adapt and apply them to the OSCE, when and where appropriate. And,
3. *Developing a civilian rapid reaction capability that could be deployed in time of crisis to supplement the work of field missions.* These teams would provide the OSCE with the opportunity to react swiftly to an unfolding crisis, assess the situation and the needs, and make policy recommendations to the OSCE executive bodies for future actions. These civilian experts could be recruited on an ad hoc basis.

#### *Increased Co-operation with other International Organizations*

The OSCE should further develop its network capabilities which are currently too dependent on personal individual contacts. *Permanent channels of communications must be opened and strategic co-operation with the EU, NATO and the UN must be established through the creation of liaison offices in Brussels and New York City.* Carefully selected liaison personnel would have a multiplier effect on networking, working contacts, and on guaranteeing prime access to strategic thinking and planned operations from other organizations. This would improve the OSCE's ability to respond adequately and swiftly.

#### *OSCE Field Presences*

The OSCE field presences offer significant comparative advantages. However, current weaknesses and grievances from the field, institutions and participating States indicate:

1. deficient recruitment procedures;
2. in some cases, insufficient professionalism;
3. a lack of adequate human and financial resources; and
4. a too often lack of clear political guidance and of coherent priorities.

Consequently, it is recommended that:

- i) clear political guidance be regularly updated and reviewed;
- ii) interaction and support from the Chairmanship, the Secretariat and field missions be revisited with the aim of improving the political and administrative functioning of missions;
- iii) micromanagement from Vienna be avoided; and
- iv) geographic and substantive priorities established for field missions be periodically reviewed.

### *Professionalism*

The OSCE counts good professionals. The problem is that the Organization is not able to retain them or attract experienced senior staff due to restrictive staff rules that limit the maximum duration of employment to seven years. These rules have become counter productive. The OSCE loses not only experience and know-how, but it also lacks the continuity needed for the successful implementation of programs on the ground. The OSCE competes directly with other career-based international organizations e.g. the European Commission, the UN, NATO and Council of Europe, for experienced trained staff. Addressing this problem is essential to improve the quality and credibility of the work of OSCE. The OSCE needs to keep efficient employees for as long as desirable in order not to lose experience, institutional memory and valuable networks. *To that effect, the OSCE employment rules should be revised. This can be done by eliminating maximum time limits while maintaining fixed term contracts subject to periodical, in-depth review of performance. Such system would allow full flexibility as well as preserve the best OSCE professional staff.*

Despite its financial advantages, the secondment system has shown its inherent weaknesses, such as the uneven quality of the recruited staff and the lack of transparency in the recruitment process. The Organization has little control over who is recruited through this system, and the quality control is less effective than for contracted personnel. Secondment is a factor that contributes to diminished effectiveness and credibility of the Organization. However, secondment in its current form and under specific circumstances is still useful since it confers flexibility to quickly deploy large scale and temporary missions such as military observers, but it should not be used to fill the Organization's core positions that require continuity. It is *recommended to re-*

*view the OSCE secondment system, using for instance the UN system, whereby employees have a contractual relationship with the Organization.*

Additional recommendations include: 1) *reducing reliance on seconded personnel in core positions in the field*; 2) *requesting participating States to second personnel for no less than one year at a time*; 3) *empowering regional experts, and 4) pursuing efforts on training*. There is an urgent need to reform the OSCE recruitment policy in order to enhance the level of continuity among the staff in the field and within institutions, and to guarantee highest possible professional standards.

#### *Expanding Out-of-Area Activities*

On the one hand, the OSCE specific expertise such as election observation and assistance could be used out-of-area directly or indirectly where it can contribute positively to the stabilization of an area. On the other hand, the OSCE should consider exporting its model of comprehensive and co-operative security to partner countries and beyond (Middle East, Africa, etc). There is a growing interest in the Organization from areas outside the OSCE. This opportunity should be seized to share OSCE values and experience. The OSCE should stand ready to provide assistance with regard to crisis in other areas. *This "out-of-area" policy could be endorsed at the next Ministerial Council. If approved, appropriate resources should be allocated to credibly implement this policy.*

#### *Increased Visibility*

The OSCE is not attractive for the media and will never be, unless it regains political credibility and is perceived as a relevant security actor. Therefore the issue of visibility is very much limited to the further political role of the Organization and cannot be fixed technically.

It is recommended to improve co-ordination and cross fertilization between the various media units in the Organization, in particular between the Chairmanship and the Secretariat.



## Managing Change in Europe

### *Evaluating the OSCE and Its Future Role: Competencies, Capabilities, and Missions*

*Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), Hamburg\**

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\* This report was written by Dr. Wolfgang Zellner, Acting Head of CORE (Hamburg), in consultation with Ambassador Alyson Bailes, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Prof. Victor-Yves Ghebali, Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), Prof. Terrence Hopmann, The Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (Providence, RI, USA), Dr. Andrei Zagorski, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), and experts at the Centre for OSCE Research, Hamburg. CORE Working Paper 13, Hamburg 2005.

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### *Executive Summary*

The past and present contribution of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to peace and stability, progress and change in the larger Europe is far greater than generally acknowledged. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later the OSCE, has provided Europe with an inclusive framework for dialogue and co-operation, established basic elements of a pan-European space of democracy and the rule of law, and given essential assistance to its participating States in resolving conflicts, establishing structures of good governance, and implementing common commitments.

Despite its great merits, the OSCE is currently in the middle of a double adaptation crisis. This can either serve as a starting point for the participating States to redefine the Organization's functions and tasks, or will leave the OSCE severely reduced in relevance.

The first cause of the crisis is the Organization's need to adapt to new challenges and tasks. During the 1990s, intra- and inter-state conflicts were the number-one priority. Consequently, the OSCE developed unmatched competencies in conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. Today, however, the key focus of international security has shifted to transnational threats and risks, and the Organization has to develop new strategies and working instruments accordingly, such as thematic missions.

The second cause of the crisis is the OSCE's need to respond to the changing political constellation in Europe. EU and NATO enlargements have fundamentally altered the continent's political geography. Russian aspirations to consolidate its influence in the post-Soviet space have remained largely unsuccessful, and have been shaken by the developments in Georgia, Ukraine, and in Kyrgyzstan. This has profoundly influenced political relations between participating States and the place they give the OSCE among the European security organizations.

Together, these two developments have created the need for OSCE reform.

Strategic change has led to controversies within the OSCE, primarily between Russia, the USA, and the EU states. Russia wants to avoid sudden changes of regime in the post-Soviet space and perceives the USA and EU states as unfairly using the OSCE to bring about such change. Russia also perceives Western influence in the post-Soviet space to be growing at its expense. Consequently, the Russian Federation and Western states have come to disagree on regional issues, on the human dimension in general, election monitoring in particular, and on the further institutional development of the Organization. These opposing views have led to a stalemate, which up until now has blocked the necessary reform of the OSCE.

The essential precondition that must be met to break this stalemate and to start to address OSCE reform is for all parties to recognize that change in Europe will continue and that managing change and containing the dangers of change are both necessary and possible. Once the participating States accept that this is a strategic task they must share and not a tactical contest between them, they will be able to begin to elaborate how the OSCE can contribute to this long-term challenge.

Provided that this basic common understanding can be achieved, the OSCE can not only continue to provide a stabilizing framework for security relations between states and state groupings in its geographical space, but can help focus their efforts on substantive tasks of even wider relevance. Two priorities should be:

- *Addressing transnational threats and risks.* This fairly new yet critical task aims to address issues such as the root causes of terrorism; trafficking in human beings, drugs, and weapons; and illegal migration flows. It seeks to do so by means of a concept of peace-building that aims both at strengthening state capacities and at developing transnational coalitions of civil-society actors. To address this increasingly important challenge, the OSCE and its participating States should create new working instruments, such as thematic missions.
- *Assistance in resolving "frozen conflicts" and preventing new ones.* Although this task is by no means new, it is both timely and urgent. While accelerated change can exacerbate the negative effects of unresolved frozen conflicts, the chances for their resolution should increase as the general level of conflict and tension in the OSCE space falls and the common need to combat transnational threats is recognized. The OSCE and its participating States should therefore develop new initiatives to contribute to the resolution of the frozen conflicts in Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. It is also essential that the Organization maintains and strengthens conflict prevention activities in places such as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Central Asia, and the South Caucasus, and peace-building work in war-torn societies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Tajikistan.

In redefining the OSCE's future, it is essential that States do not give up, compromise, or water down OSCE principles, norms, and commitments in any of its dimensions. Even if this might offer political short-term gains, it would be the beginning of the end of the OSCE as a values-driven organization.

If the participating States can reach a consensus on the Organization's future functions, they should adapt its working structures accordingly. Here, the essential task consists in strengthening the OSCE's continuity, coordination, and co-operation functions by upgrading the competencies of the Secretary General and streamlining the structures of the Secretariat.

The OSCE stands at a crossroads. It addressed the "Challenges of Change" in Helsinki in 1992, in Porto in 2002 it identified the task of "Responding to Change". Now it has to adapt its policies and instruments once more to the long-term task of managing change in Europe. If its participating States cannot agree on a meaningful reform agenda, the Organization's relevance will be seriously undermined and it can expect to be reduced to a kind of stand-by existence, having lost most of its operational activities. This minimal option represents a clear regression. It would threaten security and stability in Europe, and would reflect the participating States' inability to make full and sincere use of multilateral options to meet their common challenges.

However, if the participating States succeed in agreeing on a meaningful reform agenda, the OSCE will have a future. It will not have a dominant role in the dynamically changing pattern of European organizations, and may indeed become a more limited and specialized actor. But its specialized contribution will be a vital one of providing a stable pan-European security framework while addressing specific threats and risks on the basis of a comprehensive *acquis* of common values, norms, and shared commitments and drawing on its expertise and operational capacities. This optimal option represents the best possible future available to the OSCE.

## 1. Introduction

The OSCE's past and present contribution to peace and stability, progress and change in the larger Europe is far greater than generally acknowledged. The CSCE/OSCE has provided Europe with an inclusive framework for dialogue and co-operation, established basic elements of a pan-European space of democracy and the rule of law, and given essential assistance to its participating States in preventing violence, resolving conflicts, establishing structures of good governance, and implementing common commitments.

The question we have to consider at the current juncture is whether the Organization's role can be maintained in the future or whether it will shrink or change in functional terms.

The relevance of international organizations and their very existence depend on the changing threats and risks their member states are exposed to, and on how states decide to make use of international organizations to meet these challenges. To clarify possible options for the OSCE's future role, therefore, it is necessary to determine which tasks and functions the Organization can carry out in a substantially changed strategic environment and amidst the changing interests of its key participating States.

Following an introduction to the OSCE's historical development and the current crisis, this report will

- examine the impact of the changed strategic environment on the interests of key participating States in utilizing the OSCE;
- analyse the changed nature of threats and risks societies and states face on the global level as well as specifically within the OSCE area;
- analyse the current status of the OSCE's fields of activity and institutional structures, and make recommendations on how they can be adapted to meet the challenges ahead.

The report closes by sketching two possible options for the future of the OSCE: a minimal option where the Organization is reduced to a bare minimum and a best possible future where optimal use is made of the Organization's potential.

## 2. *The Historical Development of the OSCE and Its Current Crisis*

Bridging contradictions between Europe's various political regions and providing them with a broad framework for dialogue and co-operation has always been the core mission of the CSCE/OSCE. In fulfilling this role, the Conference/Organization has performed four basic functions with varying degrees of intensity at different times:

- A *normative function* to establish commonly agreed principles, norms, and rules for international and domestic (state) behaviour, including a role as a normative mediator.
- An *international-security function* aimed at maintaining stability and security between states in Europe by means of normative commitments, dialogue, and co-operation in areas such as arms-control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).
- A *conflict-management function*, directed at the domestic situation in individual states as well as inter-state relations, comprising early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, and post-conflict rehabilitation.
- Finally, following the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe, a security-related *good-governance-assistance function* aimed at provid-

ing the transition states with support in implementing good governance as they progress towards democracy, the rule of law, and market economies.

With its 30 years of history, the OSCE is a relatively young institution. Nevertheless, one can distinguish three distinct phases of its development.

*CSCE I: Management of Confrontation during the Cold War*

The Cold War situation was characterized by two politico-military blocs separated by a clear dividing line. The CSCE was an essential instrument for the leaders on both sides. It enabled them to manage this confrontational situation and to overcome it, at least in part, by entering into what has been called “antagonistic co-operation”. In doing so, they were actively supported by a group of dedicated neutral and non-aligned states, for which the CSCE provided a welcome security forum. The CSCE’s basic approach consisted in establishing a framework for continuous dialogue and elaborating a comprehensive set of security-related principles and commitments, enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, followed by discussions and other practical steps for their implementation. The CSCE’s dominant functions at that time concerned norm-setting and security-building. The basic method of bridging the gap between divergent interests was to assemble “package deals” that balanced and integrated the needs of different parties. Although the CSCE’s primary function during this period consisted in managing the status quo, its evolving normative *acquis* has proved to be a major agent of peaceful change in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.

*CSCE/OSCE II: Conflict Management until the Late 1990s*

The transformation of Central and Eastern Europe brought the East-West confrontation to an end. Clear-cut spheres of influence began to dissolve. For the Central European states, which reoriented themselves towards the West, the primary question was how quickly integration would occur and in what form. Russia, on the other hand, after a brief period of enthusiasm, was pre-occupied with trying to reconsolidate its influence in the former Soviet space within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

During this period, the CSCE reinvented itself for the first time. The primary challenges, particularly during the early years of this phase, were to prevent violent conflict from breaking out in various transition countries and to contribute to ending hostilities where they could not be prevented from starting. With its 1990 Charter of Paris, the 1992 Helsinki Document “The Challenges of Change”, and the 1994 Budapest Decision “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era”, the CSCE, more rapidly than any other international organization, created an extensive toolbox of instruments for conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. The centrality of the human dimension for the CSCE’s norms was underlined in the 1990

Copenhagen and 1991 Moscow Documents. The CSCE built up operational capabilities, deployed them in the field, and, in the process, transformed itself from a conference into an organization. In the early 1990s, arms-control measures and CSBMs under the aegis of the CSCE helped to manage the parcelling out of the military legacy of the Soviet Union among its successor states. During this period, while all four CSCE functions remained effective, their character and relevance changed. And although important new normative commitments were created at the start of the 1990s, particularly in the field of human and minority rights, but also regarding the use of military power, the main focus of the normative function later shifted to socialization and implementation. The OSCE's classical international-security function gradually declined in importance. Its conflict-management function, however, gained prominence reflecting qualitatively improved inter-state relations, on the one hand, and a series of emerging limited conflicts primarily within states, on the other. The Organization's good-governance-assistance function was first established during this period; it has continuously grown in importance by addressing the root causes of instability and insecurity, namely poor governance by weak and overstretched states.

### *OSCE III: Adaptation Crisis since the Late 1990s*

The character of the dominant threats and risks affecting the OSCE area has changed once again. Although inter-state conflict and intra-state violence – in the form of inter-ethnic, regional, or separatist conflicts – remain important problems, transnational threats and risks have increasingly become the dominant challenge. While all international actors have started to address these issues, the development of long-term strategies is still in its early stages.

This change in the nature of the challenges facing Europe and European organizations parallels strategic changes on the global level. Intra-European conflicts are no longer at the top of the global security agenda. The focus of attention has shifted to regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. Within Europe, the enlargements of the EU and NATO and the unsuccessful attempts by Russia to reintegrate the post-Soviet space have left spheres of influence poorly defined, and have created the perception by many in the Russian Federation that their country is isolated or even encircled by unfriendly regimes. This has resulted in unresolved conflicts of interests between Russia and Western states.

Consequently, the OSCE finds itself in the midst of a double adaptation crisis. On the one hand, it has to address a new category of threats and risks, on the other, its participating States struggle with disputes among themselves. While the Organization runs close to twenty field operations, it is unable to agree on common policies in many areas. At three of the last five Ministerial Meetings, the participating States were not able to agree on a concluding statement. The situation has escalated to become an open crisis that increasingly endangers the Organization's practical work. The current Chairman-in-

Office, Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel, expressed this point forcibly in *The Washington Post* on 7 March 2005: "I sense a hardening of attitudes on all sides, and I hear rhetoric uncomfortably reminiscent of the Cold War. If the impasse continues, the OSCE's credibility and its survival will be in jeopardy."

However, for the OSCE, a crisis has always also been an opportunity to adapt to new realities. The 2004 Sofia Ministerial Meeting established a Panel of Eminent Persons to "provide strategic vision for the Organization in the twenty-first century". The report of the panel, which was submitted at the end of June 2005, is to be followed by high-level consultations in the autumn of this year that will set the scene for negotiations on the future role of the OSCE.

### 3. *Strategic Change and Evolving State Interests*

Both the European and the global strategic environments have profoundly changed during the last fifteen years. This has substantially altered the interests of participating States and will play a major role in deciding the future relevance of the OSCE.

#### 3.1 *Adapting to a New Political Environment*

While strategic change is far more comprehensive than can be analysed here, the following three trends specifically influence the OSCE's future function and tasks: the decreasing frequency and intensity of intra-European violent conflicts alongside the increase in transnational threats to the security of both states and individual citizens, EU enlargement and functional change, and the largely unsuccessful attempts of Russia to consolidate its influence in the CIS region.

*First*, the number and intensity of intra-European violent conflicts are clearly decreasing. While this is good news and reflects success in resolving or at least containing these conflicts, it also means that an international organization dealing exclusively with European security, such as the OSCE, will decline in importance unless it succeeds in redefining its tasks according to new needs. The decreasing intensity of intra-European violent conflicts gives States and international organizations more room to find answers to the still unresolved conflicts in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the South Caucasus, and to prevent new ones in Central Asia and other parts of the continent. At the same time, regions adjacent to the OSCE area, in particular the Middle East, harbour (potentially) violent conflicts that could impact on the OSCE region, and the OSCE should pay more attention to these threats by extending its outreach activities.



*Second*, the enlargement of the EU and its adoption of new functions have fundamentally influenced the political geography and the institutional division of labour in Europe. While the most recent enlargement of the EU already included smaller parts of the former Soviet space in the form of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, larger ones are eager to follow. In the framework of its neighbourhood policy, the EU has increased its interests in countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. The EU played a visible role in the management of democratic change in Ukraine in 2004. It has deepened its relations with Russia by adopting, at the EU-Russia Summit on 10 May 2005, a single package of four "Road Maps" for the long-term creation of a Common Economic Space; a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; a Common Space of External Security; and a Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the EU has accepted competencies and developed instruments across the whole spectrum of civilian and military conflict prevention and crisis management. Both EU and NATO have taken on a global crisis intervention role.

*Third*, the Russian Federation has remained largely unsuccessful in consolidating its influence in the CIS region. Against this background, Russia has perceived recent developments in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan as a threat, and has seen the OSCE as one of the agents of change. Consequently, many in the Russian Federation believe that Russia is being isolated or even encircled by potentially hostile states. A further problem is Russia's failure to settle the Chechen conflict, which is also associated with a serious danger of horizontal escalation to other parts of the (North) Caucasus and beyond.

Each of these three trends has the potential to severely impact on the future role of the OSCE. If its participating States cannot agree on a new function and new tasks for the Organization, its current status will be increasingly undermined and its relevance called seriously into question. In order to achieve a better understanding of the chances of such an agreement being reached, it is necessary to take a closer look at the OSCE-related interests of three key actors: the Russian Federation, the United States, and the European Union.

### 3.2 *The Interests of Key Participating States and Groups of States*

The OSCE is an inter-governmental organization made up of participating States. The balance of states' interests decisively influences the Organization's future role. While all participating States' interests and activities are important for the OSCE, this paper limits its analysis to the interests of three key players: the Russian Federation, the USA, and the EU.

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1 Available at: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/russia/summit\\_05\\_05/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/index.htm) (June 2005).

### *3.2.1 Loss of Ownership: The Russian Federation*

Over the last fifteen years, Russia's positive interests in the CSCE/OSCE have continuously decreased while disincentives to engage with the Organization, its goals and activities have tended to grow, especially during the past five years. In the early 1990s, Russia continued to follow the Soviet course of taking a strong interest in the CSCE. By the 1994 Budapest Summit, Russia's prime objective consisted in transforming the Organization into a UN-type umbrella security organization on a legal basis and with binding competencies. The revamped Organization would have included a sort of Security Council (Executive Committee) that would have replaced or at least taken precedence over NATO. This approach failed because Western states preferred to enlarge their own (security) organizations rather than to create a new one. The 1999 Kosovo war was a key experience for Russian policy-makers and a turning point in their relations with the OSCE. The Organization not only proved unable to resolve the crisis, but, from the Russian perspective, was actually used by NATO to start a war, while Russia was unable to exert any influence over the course of events.

Another longstanding Russian interest in the OSCE was its advocacy on behalf of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Moscow was disappointed with the closure of the OSCE Missions to Estonia and Latvia at the end of 2001, and vehemently opposed this action.

Russia does have a serious interest in European arms control. While Moscow's interest in the ratification of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is based more on political than military considerations, its interest in potentially destabilizing developments not covered by arms-control treaties, such as new NATO bases close to Russia or long-range weapons, is a reflection of genuine security concerns. This interest is manifested in Russia's call for a seminar on military doctrines. Russian interest in economic and environmental matters continues, but is essentially marginal.

The Russian Federation is broadly interested in the OSCE taking on a role in addressing transnational threats. Anti-terrorism is not a new issue for Moscow, which has regularly warned of terrorism and extremism in the Caucasus since the early 1990s. Russia has also feared the rise of religious fundamentalism in Central Asia. The 2001 Bucharest Ministerial Meeting was salvaged by the agreement of participating States on anti-terrorism issues. Since the Ministerial, Russian representatives have consistently referred to the OSCE's anti-terrorism efforts as the Organization's top priority. However, in its own dealings with terrorism, Russia primarily follows a unilateral military approach, which is showing itself ineffective in addressing the root causes of terrorism. While the OSCE focuses on longer-term conditions, Russia targets more immediate threats – Chechnya being the most extreme ex-

ample of counter-terrorism activities being narrowly focussed on military instruments.

While Russia has a certain interest in the OSCE playing a role in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria, it was seriously disappointed by the OSCE's rejection in late 2003 of the Kozak Memorandum, a Russian initiative outside the agreed negotiation format that aimed to resolve the conflict.

During the last five years, Russia's waning positive interest in the OSCE has been increasingly combined with a distinctly negative attitude. The leadership of the Russian Federation is frightened by unexpected changes in its perceived sphere of interest, and it sees the OSCE as one of the agents of change. Russian reactions include continued attacks on the validity of OSCE election-monitoring and other human-dimension activities. Moscow's more general complaint is that certain participating States use the OSCE to intervene in the domestic affairs of others. The latter points figured as key items in the Moscow Declaration and the Astana Appeal signed by a number of CIS states in 2004. With these two documents, the Russian Federation has questioned the principle contained in the 1991 Moscow Document that "commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned". Instead, Russia appears to be returning to its old argument of non-intervention based on Principle Six of the Helsinki Final Act, which most participating States consider to have been merely interpreted by the 1991 Moscow Document. Another example of Russia's selective use of OSCE commitments is its violation of the commitment not to deploy troops in foreign countries without the consent of the host state – as Russia did in Georgia and continues to do so in Moldova.

All things considered, the current balance of Russian interests in the OSCE is negative. While some limited positive interests remain, they are clearly outweighed by negatives. Consequently, the Russian Federation has widely lost its sense of ownership in the Organization. Whether this will change depends on three questions: The first is whether Russia will see advantages in accepting an OSCE role in managing change and containing the dangers of change in countries neighbouring Russia, namely in Belarus, in Central Asia, and possibly even within the Russian Federation itself. The second question is whether the participating States will agree to give more weight to the OSCE's security dimension in general, and to the question of addressing transnational threats in particular. The third question is whether Russia may use its new special relationships with NATO and the EU to address what it perceives as these organizations' intrusions upon its interests rather than using the OSCE for this purpose.

### 3.2.2 Focus on Democratic Change: The United States

The US position on the OSCE is framed by its current attitude of unilateralism and distrust toward international institutions. In this regard, however, the OSCE is relatively weak and non-constraining, and the US has in the past frequently used it to pursue specific policy goals. At the same time, however, US security concerns are now increasingly focussed on conflicts outside Europe. Consequently, when the US does substantially engage with international organizations, it prefers to deal at a more global level (UN, G8). And where Europe is concerned, Washington's chosen instruments are NATO and the EU. While the US Mission to the OSCE remains active and committed, it has little influence on senior Washington decision-makers. However, the US still regards the OSCE as a means for decision-making on a number of issues in which it has an interest.

US interest in arms control is limited. Arms-control instruments are generally suspected of being ineffective at best and of limiting the operational room for manoeuvre of US armed forces at worst. There is however some indication that progress concerning the ratification and entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty cannot be ruled out, *first*, because this is an issue below the level of strategic US interests, and *second*, because the recent Georgian-Russian agreement on the withdrawal of Russian armed forces removes one of the most important obstacles to ratification.

Washington's interest in the OSCE's economic and environmental dimension has been limited since it became clear not only that the forum is unsuited for addressing major economic issues, but also that the EU is not prepared to let it do so. Conflict resolution under the *aegis* of the OSCE is still seen as a US interest, although this depends on Russian co-operation. Consequently, the main interest of the US in the OSCE concerns human-dimension issues: election monitoring, freedom of religion or belief, and the fight against intolerance, discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. The most important issue of concern for the USA where the OSCE plays a key role is democratization and democratic change in countries such as Georgia and Ukraine. Washington would like to encourage equivalent developments in Belarus and other countries of the region as well.

While there is a clear US interest in the OSCE's anti-terrorism efforts, there is also a certain ambiguity between its more unilateral and operational short-term approach and the OSCE's focus on the root causes of terrorism and the upholding of human-rights standards when pursuing counter-terrorism activities. There is clear and active US support for arms-control measures related to anti-terrorism such as export controls on Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and the destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition.

To sum up, the main focus of US interest in the OSCE's human-dimension efforts is precisely what upsets the Russian Federation and some other

CIS states most. As a result, the most contentious question for the US and Russia might not be what positive steps the OSCE could take in the future, but what it might refrain from doing in this one area – the area that is perceived by the US (and others) as democratization, and by Russia as destabilization. Although Russian interest in arms control has so far not been required by the US, progress could be achieved if the US were to merely make some small changes in its position on this issue. With regard to the OSCE's anti-terrorism efforts, the two states are closer here than in other areas. What remains to be seen is whether this area of agreement can be broadened to give the OSCE a more comprehensive role in addressing transnational threats and risks.

### *3.2.3 Closeness to OSCE Philosophy: The European Union*

In recent years, the EU has been preoccupied with its own enlargement and institutional development, with transnational and non-European security challenges, and with trans-Atlantic disagreements related to the latter. To the extent that it focuses on traditional security issues within Europe, it deals with the following issues: *First*, on the basis of the Stabilization and Association Process, the EU has taken on a long-term commitment for stability and prosperity in the Western Balkans. There is close co-operation between the EU and the OSCE in Croatia, FYROM, and Kosovo. *Second*, in the framework of its new neighbourhood policy, the EU shows considerably more interest in countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. *Third*, to strengthen bilateral relations with Russia, road maps for the four "Common Spaces" were adopted at the EU-Russia Summit in May 2005. In addition, the EU can mobilize incomparably larger resources devoted to the stabilization of its neighbourhood than can any other international organization or state.

The institutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP) has led to the development of autonomous EU capacities for (civilian) crisis prevention and conflict resolution, areas that are also core competencies of the OSCE and in which it had hitherto enjoyed a kind of monopoly. Although this development is necessary and strengthens overall European capacities for crisis management, it makes it urgent to rethink the co-operation between the EU (Commission and Council Secretariat) and the OSCE in more concrete terms. In doing this, it should be borne in mind that the EU's capacity and political will to act autonomously in the Caucasus and Central Asia are still limited and will remain so in the next few years. While it is too early to assess the consequences of the failed ratification of the European Union's constitution, it is evident that the EU will be in need of more co-operation with other international organizations including the OSCE to implement its stability-related policies, in particular its neighbourhood policy.

In terms of concrete activities, the EU's most prominent interest certainly concerns the OSCE's human dimension; the European Commission funds a considerable number of projects set up by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Central Asia. The EU shares with other countries a sympathy for an enhanced OSCE role in addressing transnational threats. With regard to the EU's key concern of securing its borders, the OSCE can contribute related activities, not only in regions directly neighbouring the EU, but also in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Although the EU is more interested in arms control than the USA, it has not yet managed to elaborate its own arms-control strategy on the core issues (conventional arms, CSBMs, but also small arms and light weapons) that the OSCE deals with. The EU tends to block the OSCE from dealing with economic and environmental issues, which are seen as an EU core competency.

Including its associated and candidate countries, the EU accounts for more than 30 of the OSCE's 55 participating States and provides some 70 per cent of the Organization's budget and personnel. By this token, the EU is a key player in the OSCE. Another factor that might play an even more important role can be formulated as follows: Although EU member states differ widely in their foreign policy traditions, the Union as such, by virtue of its own history and development, shares many characteristics with the OSCE. In particular, both pursue a multilateral, comprehensive, and co-operative policy approach based primarily on non-military means. This aspect is underlined by the activities of a range of smaller EU member states sympathetic to the OSCE. Making better use of the closeness of the EU's basic philosophy to that of the OSCE – the concrete impact of which is still hampered by the slow pace of EU decision-making and its scattered competencies – is one of the greatest challenges that the four successive OSCE Chairmanships held by EU member states (Slovenia, Belgium, Spain, and Finland) will be facing in the years 2005-2008.

### *3.3 Balancing State Interests: Defining the Future of the OSCE*

It seems fair to start from the assumption that no participating State is ready to dissolve the OSCE, although very few states will be striving to restore it to its predominant position among European security organizations. The challenge facing the participating States will therefore be to find the OSCE's proper level between these two extremes and to define its functions and tasks accordingly. The relationships between the interests of the various states and groups of states and the potential for compromises are highly complex: There might be agreement among the states on certain goals they want to achieve, and on other outcomes they wish to avoid; there may also be both common and conflicting interests within certain working fields, and asymmetric constellations of interests among several of the OSCE's dimensions. Thus, the results of the participating States' negotiations on the future of the Organiza-

tion – which might well develop into a longer process rather than being achieved in a single step – might take on the form of complex “package deals” in the tradition of the early CSCE.

#### *Interests in Addressing New Threats and Risks*

If anything accords with the interests of all the key actors within the OSCE, it is the desire to address the broad range of new transnational threats and risks that either directly (terrorism, organized crime, trafficking), or indirectly (e.g. demographic developments, migration, economic disparities) undermine European stability. While all the major players agree on the high priority of these issues, there is less accord on concrete strategies and actions. However, there exists at least a common starting point for the joint development of a suitable strategy.

#### *Interests in Arms Control and Conflict Resolution*

Contrary to widespread assumptions, it might not be impossible to find some common ground in the field of arms control. It should not be too difficult to agree on the long-standing Russian demand to hold a seminar on military doctrines. This would be the right place to define the need for further steps, such as a new generation of CSBMs directed at new destabilizing tendencies, or the rethinking of sub-regional CSBMs. Even with regard to the most contentious issue of the ratification and entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, a breakthrough would seem possible if progress can be made on Moldova following the Georgian-Russian agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Georgia. Altogether, these points could create a certain, admittedly modest, dynamic in European arms control, which would improve the general political climate and contribute to a better balance among the OSCE's dimensions.

Although there is currently no decisive movement concerning the resolution of the frozen conflicts, progress in at least one of these cases cannot be excluded. On behalf of the Co-chairs of the Minsk Group, a number of OSCE participating States sent a fact-finding mission to the occupied areas of Nagorno-Karabakh in spring 2005. Negotiation activity facilitated by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group has been stepped up, high-level bilateral discussions seem to be proving constructive. A breakthrough in Nagorno-Karabakh would represent a significant success for the OSCE and could even lead to some form of low-key OSCE peacekeeping and other rehabilitation work.

Although many uncertainties remain, the first dimension offers several opportunities to the participating States to recover common ground. The key problem thus seems to be disagreement over the human dimension.

#### *Interests in the Human Dimension*

The core problem in agreeing on a viable package deal on the future role of the OSCE lies in the human dimension, whose norms have been intimately

linked to issues of European security since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Given their own performance in the implementation of human-dimension commitments, it is unlikely that the Russian Federation and its supporters within the CIS will overcome their aversion to this dimension. Consequently, from the Russian perspective, the question is not how much more can be achieved here, but how far activities can be reduced.

This places the developed democracies in a rather difficult situation, particularly with regard to the emerging positive prospects in the first dimension. The key question concerns which compromises the developed democracies can agree to and which they cannot. They will certainly not weaken the OSCE human-dimension *acquis* and its implementation. What is open for debate, however, is the question of whether there should be more human-dimension activities in Western countries. To achieve this, it would be necessary to create a general human-dimension monitoring instrument that covers all states without exception. It would also be necessary to create some political, not legal, consultation mechanism to deal with complaints made by states over reports issued by OSCE election observation missions. Furthermore, it is also vital to debate the relation between democratization and stability, which is a key issue in the larger context of managing change. It seems that any approach that neglects one side of this balance is mistaken. Nonetheless, even if the developed democracies show flexibility, the prospects of consensus in the human dimension remain uncertain.

#### *Package Deals for the Management of Change*

It can be assumed that a certain amount of common ground in the first dimension will be found. The critical question, however, is whether this will be sufficient to persuade the Russian Federation to accept human-dimension issues being stressed robustly enough to satisfy the EU, US, and other developed democracies. Another question is whether agreement on some elements designed to strengthen the institutional effectiveness of the OSCE – e.g. the role of the Secretary General or new forms of field operations – can contribute to an overall climate of compromise. All in all, it is unclear whether the potential agreements that may be reached will be broad enough to give the Organization an effective and worthwhile role. A related question is whether the high-level consultations scheduled for September 2005 will be a one-off occurrence or a starting point for a continued process of consultation and negotiation.

Considered more generally, the crucial question is whether the participating States can agree on the relevance of an inclusive and flexible organization for the management of change and for containing the dangers of change. A more specific question is whether the EU and Russia can agree on the desirability of the OSCE to serve as an instrument to cushion possible tensions between them beyond their bilateral relations. A related issue is whether the USA will continue to appreciate the value of the OSCE as an-



other forum for trans-Atlantic co-operation besides NATO, which is currently facing its own crisis of adaptation. These broader deliberations will contribute considerably to answering the question of whether the participating States will be able to reach some compromise on the future role of the OSCE.

#### 4. *Addressing Transnational Threats and Risks*

The OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-first Century, adopted at the 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Meeting, acknowledges that threats of a politico-military nature are still a matter of concern for participating States and that addressing violent inter-state and intra-state conflicts remains a key task for the Organization. However, the document also states that: "Threats to security and stability in the OSCE region are today more likely to arise as negative, destabilizing consequences of developments that cut across the politico-military, economic and environmental and human dimensions, than from any major armed conflict."<sup>2</sup>

Consequently, this chapter discusses the most prominent features of transnational threats and risks, and the OSCE's comparative advantages and disadvantages in addressing them. This is the most salient challenge the Organization is currently facing. Its more traditional and better-known priorities, which remain valid, are dealt with in Chapter 5.

##### 4.1 *Characterizing Transnational Threats and Risks*

Transnational threats and risks can be considered the dark side of the process of globalization that has become one of the most basic features of the system of international relations. Globalization, driven by a new scientific and technological revolution, increases the interdependence of states and societies, results in a new global division of labour, and increases the opportunities for co-operation leading to higher overall efficiency. Globalization also reduces the abilities of states and even international organizations to act, while enhancing the power of transnational actors, be they business groups, NGOs, criminal networks, or terrorist groups. Global competition creates winners and losers, leading to sharp asymmetries between different regions, countries, and social groups in economic, social, military, and ideological or spiritual terms. This asymmetric interdependence across the whole spectrum of human life provides the background for transnational threats and risks.

The category of transnational threats subsumes a wide range of phenomena, from terrorism to organized crime and trafficking in drugs, weapons, and human beings. Expanding the category to include phenomena that have a

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2 OSCE, Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Maastricht, 1 and 2 December 2003, OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, p. 1.

less direct relation to security makes it possible to add economic factors such as corruption, poverty, and high unemployment as well as environmental degradation, demographic change, widespread degradation of health, and practices of discrimination and intolerance. As diverse as these threats may be, they have some features in common.

*Characteristics of Transnational Threats and Risks*

*Transnational threats are complex and of multi-dimensional and long-term nature.* Trafficking in weapons, for example, concerns the security, economic, and human dimensions. While most transnational threats are of a non-military character, they can profoundly affect the security of states, social groups, and individuals. However, some of them, such as terrorism, have a distinct military dimension with terrorists applying asymmetric methods of unconventional warfare.

*Transnational threats are multiply interlinked.* Drug trafficking is one of the most important sources of funding for terrorism; terrorism utilizes the structures of organized crime, which again foster all kinds of trafficking. Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists represent the worst nightmare that can be imagined. But even the spread of small arms and light weapons has stimulated violence in the OSCE region, as for example in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001. Political extremism, intolerance, and discrimination can prepare the ground for terrorism.

*Transnational threats represent a global phenomenon by their very nature.* Threats originating from outside a specific region affect security and stability within other regions. This aspect is all the more important as the OSCE area is adjacent to regions of violent conflict, particularly the Middle East.

*Actors associated with transnational threats* are usually non-state entities. They frequently do not have a public face and are far more difficult to address than nation states. As for transnational risks such as demographic developments or environmental degradation, “actors” can only be associated with the failure of competent state agencies to act.

*Transnational threats do not emerge out of a vacuum.* Weak and overstretched states provide the most important breeding ground for transnational threats, either in the form of criminal and/or extremist actors that cannot be marginalized and may even be supported by corrupt officials, or in the shape of economic, ecological, or social-dysfunctional developments that cannot be contained by governments. However, both organized crime and the support structures of terrorism have also proven their ability to survive in highly developed states.

*Violent conflict breeds transnational threats.* Relevant in this context are those internationally unrecognized pseudo-states that have been established in the cases of frozen conflicts, where the “state” is essentially little more than an instrument for the unlimited enrichment of those in power.

These states have often become “black holes” in which criminal groups and terrorists may operate with relative impunity.

*Transnational threats affect states and population groups* in both developed and less developed regions. In terms of their threat potential, they represent some of the real hard-security issues of our time.

Because transnational threats reflect basic features of the process of globalization, they represent a category of problems that cannot be simply solved, but at best contained. Even at this more modest level, no state or international organization can claim to have viable answers. While most activities concentrate on (necessary) operational short-term approaches, long-term strategies to address the root causes of transnational threats are still widely neglected.

*Functional Prerequisites of a Long-Term Approach to Transnational Threats*

*First*, transnational threats and risks can only be effectively addressed by means of a cross-dimensional and long-term approach. What is easy to analyse, is extremely difficult to do. Working structures of states and international organizations are heavily compartmentalized and oriented toward short-term success. In addition, properly addressing transnational threats requires thorough analytical preparation and long planning horizons.

*Second*, transnational threats and risks must be addressed with a global approach. Consequently, the UN is the necessary lead agency and should make proper use of regional arrangements, such as the OSCE, and other international and transnational actors.

*Third*, a proper balance between short-term (operational and tactical) and long-term (strategic) approaches to address the structural root causes of transnational threats has to be found. This must include a division of labour between organizations oriented more toward the first group of tasks and those working more in the second area. Long-term approaches naturally entail a need to engage in long-term commitments and planning.

*Fourth*, addressing transnational threats requires the (re)strengthening of weak state structures *and* civil-society actors. While the report of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of 2 December 2004<sup>3</sup> rightly focuses on the strengthening of state capacity and international co-operation, it widely neglects the role of transnational civil-society actors. However, if it is true that globalization means a loss of both states’ and international organizations’ ability to act, success in addressing transnational threats can only be achieved by building a new type of coalition between state, international, and (trans)national civil-society actors. Malign transnational actors can only be successfully managed by engaging benign transnational actors.

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3 United Nations, General Assembly, A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004 (A/59/565).

*Fifth*, all this means that the new category of transnational threats cannot be addressed effectively using only the working instruments that have been developed for other types of challenges. Consequently, the existing working structures of both state institutions and international organizations have to be adapted and new ones need to be created with the main focus on creating opportunities for coalitions with civil-society actors.

#### *4.2 The OSCE's Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages*

Analysing the OSCE's comparative advantages and disadvantages in addressing transnational threats and risks means both inquiring where comparative advantages are not sufficiently exploited and looking for ways to compensate for disadvantages as far as possible.

##### *Specific Comparative Advantages of the OSCE*

*First*, the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security with its focus on soft security issues represents an essential comparative advantage. Complex issues require a complex response – one which looks at a range of root causes and comprehensive solutions. However, much of this advantage is negated by the institutional division between the three OSCE dimensions and the difficulties of co-ordination among them that make it more difficult to address multidimensional threats by means of cross-dimensional approaches.

*Second*, the OSCE's political and geographical inclusiveness represents another important comparative advantage. It makes a great difference whether an international organization deals with a certain country or region from within, based on mutual assistance, or from without, possibly based on a system of conditionality. However, this great advantage is undermined by the overly narrow methods of consultation that characterize the Organization's day-to-day political work and fall short of the ideal of inclusiveness. In addition, participating States must solve their current political disputes to profit fully from the principle of inclusiveness.

*Third*, one of the greatest comparative advantages of the OSCE is its vast field experience collected over more than a decade, together with its flexible system of deploying, managing, and closing field operations. Most field operations, and particularly the larger ones, are still predominantly oriented towards tasks related to intra-state and inter-state conflicts, including post-conflict rehabilitation. While these tried-and-tested forms of field operations remain necessary, new forms of mission addressing transnational threats, such as "thematic missions", should be created, building on the OSCE's extensive field experience.

*Fourth*, the inclusion of civil-society actors in its activities constitutes another important comparative advantage of the OSCE, particularly in view of the need to build up broad coalitions to address transnational threats. This openness to civil partners is most fully developed in the human and environ-

mental dimensions as well as in the work of the field operations. If other fields of activity follow this approach, the inclusion of civil-society actors could develop into one of the decisive strengths of the OSCE.

*Specific Comparative Disadvantages of the OSCE*

*First*, the OSCE is a regional and not a global actor and, in addition, lacks the means for effective global outreach. In view of the global character of transnational threats and the need for global approaches, this constitutes an undeniable comparative disadvantage that can only be partially overcome by the OSCE acting alone. One way to overcome this is to make greater use of the capacity of the OSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and to support the UN in addressing specific transnational threats, as has already been done in the field of counter-terrorism. Other possibilities include enhancing outreach and co-operation activities with the Mediterranean and Asian Partners.

*Second*, the OSCE does not have any authority or mechanism to adopt legally binding measures that can be implemented within states against non-state actors. However, the fact that OSCE commitments are politically but not legally binding makes it easier for the participating States to accept them.

*Third*, the shortage of resources, and particularly the lack of long-term resource commitments, probably constitutes the OSCE's most serious comparative disadvantage. In many areas, this means that OSCE activities are little more than symbolic and all too rarely produce concrete results. The lack of financial commitments extending over a number of years makes long-term planning nearly impossible.

*Fourth*, and closely related to the third point, the lack of mechanisms for making use of lessons-learned, and the shortage of analytical and planning capacities constitutes a significant comparative disadvantage, particularly in view of the longer-term planning and implementation horizons necessary for addressing transnational threats.

In sum, the OSCE has a significant stock of comparative advantages that can be further developed to enable it to effectively address transnational threats on a long-term basis together with (trans)national and international partners. To achieve this aim and to compensate for its disadvantages, three crucial conditions have to be met:

- The participating States must commit themselves to engaging the OSCE in addressing transnational threats on a long-term basis.
- The participating States should provide the resources and, in particular, the long-term resources necessary to implement these commitments.
- On this basis, they should establish lessons-learned mechanisms and long-term analysis and planning capacities in the Secretariat, including a capability to provide support to OSCE field operations.

From the point of view of the security of the participating States and their populations, there is a clear need to address transnational threats on a more sustainable and long-term basis. The OSCE can make a substantial contribution to this. It is up to the participating States to decide whether they will entrust the Organization with this task.

## 5. *Adapting the OSCE's Competencies, Capabilities, and Missions to the Challenges Ahead*

This chapter analyses the Organization's fields of activity, its structures, procedures, and working instruments, and its co-operative relations, with the aim of defining strengths and weaknesses and areas where reform is necessary.

### 5.1 *Fields of Activity*

Although the division into three dimensions is not fully commensurate with the challenges ahead, this chapter follows this structure, which underpins the entire institutional outlook of the OSCE. However, the new cross-dimensional area of transnational threats and risks is treated first, followed by the politico-military dimension and conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

#### 5.1.1 *Addressing the Cross-Dimensional Challenge of Transnational Threats and Risks*

The OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century refines the analysis of transnational threats and risks and formulates general answers and recommendations. However, the Strategy does not descend to the operational level. More detailed plans and operational capacities are distributed, quite unevenly, among the OSCE's various fields of activity. The spectrum ranges from well developed fields, such as police matters, via less developed areas, such as trafficking (in human beings), to areas where little more has been done than to identify issues of concern, as in the case of migration.

In the field of police matters, an area that is crucial for addressing many transnational threats, the OSCE possesses a functioning Strategic Police Matters Unit, and considerable project experience from Kosovo, Southern Serbia, Croatia, FYROM, Kyrgyzstan, and, most recently, Armenia. With this combination of strategy, capacities, and experience, the Organization has crossed the critical threshold that divides rhetoric from practical impact. As a result, the OSCE's police-related work has become a benchmark for other fields of activity. A regional border security and management project has been started in the Western Balkans; work on an OSCE Border Security and

Management Concept is underway; and a small working group has been established in the Secretariat. The Action against Terrorism Unit in the Secretariat has successfully started work on supporting states with the ratification of the twelve UN anti-terrorism conventions, and in the areas of travel-document security and container security. Capacity-building and interoperability are important aspects of all these efforts, especially in regions such as Central Asia and the South Caucasus, where resources have not been sufficient to implement these goals adequately.

In the area of anti-trafficking, the OSCE adopted solid documents in Vienna in 2000 and in Maastricht in 2003. With the establishment of the Action Plan against Trafficking in Human Beings, a Special Representative on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings has been appointed, supported by an Assistance Unit in the OSCE Secretariat. In addition, a small Anti-Trafficking Unit exists within ODIHR, and the 11<sup>th</sup> OSCE Economic Forum has tasked the Office of the Economic and Environmental Coordinator to address these issues. However, the OSCE's work on trafficking still remains at the level of political rhetoric with only a few exceptions, such as seminars and awareness-raising campaigns, most of which are organized by OSCE field operations. The essential reason for this is the lack of personnel and budgetary resources. The establishment of a Thematic Mission on Trafficking in Human Beings in close co-operation with the EU and other regional and sub-regional organizations as well as civil-society actors would provide a clear signal that the OSCE is ready to make a serious effort to tackle transnational threats and to test new forms of field operations to this end.

Although some missions work across the whole spectrum of security-related capacity-building, the OSCE has no comprehensive concept for addressing transnational threats and risks that would identify clear priorities. Because such a concept necessarily builds on a comprehensive approach to security, the OSCE is well positioned to elaborate it. Conversely, the lack of such a concept threatens to undermine one of the OSCE's greatest comparative advantages, precisely its comprehensive approach to security, which cannot become fully effective so long as different issues are dealt with in isolation. The elaboration of a concept for addressing transnational threats and risks is thus one of the most urgent tasks the OSCE faces. This concept should include at the very least the OSCE's activities on anti-terrorism, policing, border security and management, and anti-trafficking.

The adoption of such a strategy would have important consequences for the OSCE's work: It would strengthen the need for closer co-operation with regional and sub-regional organizations; it would underline the necessity of formulating cross-dimensional strategies and adapting working structures and instruments to this end; and it would highlight the need for enhanced analytical and lessons-learned capacities within the Organization.

### 5.1.2 *Revitalizing Arms Control*

Arms control has not become obsolete. The CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document 1999, and other instruments provide Europe with a unique arms-control regime that is of continuing relevance. However, if it is not adapted to the evolving strategic environment, this regime will lose significance. During the last few years, the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) has been predominantly devoted to implementation issues. The most recent adaptation of the Vienna Document took place in 1999, and it did not take into account today's destabilizing tendencies brought about by mobile warfare, long-range capabilities, and pre-emptive military doctrines. A seminar on military doctrines – as recently suggested by the Russian Federation – would therefore be a timely event and one that would build on the tradition of the CSCE, which convened such seminars in 1990 and 1991. Such an event could be the starting point for the definition of a new generation of CSBMs to address threats not yet covered.

Although the CFE Treaty does not belong to the OSCE agenda, it is of critical importance for the OSCE arms-control regime. The Adapted CFE (ACFE) Treaty, signed at the 1999 Istanbul Summit, has not yet entered into force due to the fact that NATO states consider the implementation of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit commitments (withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova) in their entirety to be a precondition for ratification. The Russian Federation, while acknowledging the commitments it made in Istanbul, views them as not having any implications for the ACFE ratification process. Russia and the NATO states should facilitate a solution to the ratification problem. The recent agreement on the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia suggests that a solution could be within reach. NATO states could then start the ratification process in recognition of Russia's agreement with Georgia while withholding final ratification until an agreement is also made on the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Moldova. The entry into force of the ACFE Treaty would open it to the accession of new states parties, including the new NATO states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose accession is a longstanding desire of Russia. At the same time, the entry into force of the ACFE Treaty could open the door to the harmonization of existing European arms-control commitments.

One instrument that has already proved its worth and still has considerable potential to exploit is the elaboration of sub-regional arms-control measures and CSBMs – e.g. in the Black Sea or Baltic Sea – in co-operation with sub-regional organizations. The same is even more true of sub-regional arms control as an element of conflict resolution – on the model of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although there is an urgent need for arms-control arrangements to contribute to the potential political settlement of the conflicts in Transdnestria, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, there has been little discussion



of this issue up to now, the arms-control concept for the case of Transdnistria elaborated by the OSCE Mission to Moldova notwithstanding.

In 2001 the OSCE adopted a Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and in 2003 one on export controls on Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) as part of the effort to prevent these dangerous weapons from reaching the hands of terrorists. It has also undertaken initiatives in several regions to provide services for the destruction of dangerous surplus weapons. While all these efforts point in the right direction, they should be more closely linked to a more general plan to address transnational threats and risks. Furthermore, many of the recommendations contained in these documents and decisions have remained at the level of rhetoric and have not been fully implemented. While a comprehensive system of controls on small arms may be difficult to achieve, an effort to control the smuggling of light weapons across national borders should become part of a comprehensive effort at reducing the flow of illicit traffic across borders. Similarly, OSCE efforts in the destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition should be implemented in close co-operation with NATO.

### *5.1.3 Resolving "Frozen Conflicts" and Preventing New Ones*

Facilitating the resolution of frozen conflicts and carrying out tasks in the areas of post-conflict rehabilitation and conflict prevention remain priorities for the OSCE. Left unresolved, these conflicts will continue to serve as breeding grounds for malign transnational actors, who poison the European political atmosphere as a whole, and the danger of renewed escalation will be present.

Consequently, the OSCE should promote new initiatives aimed at facilitating the resolution of the conflicts in South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transdnistria in accordance with its mandates. So far, neither the OSCE nor any other international organization has been successful in assisting in the resolution of these conflicts. What the OSCE has done is to contribute to keeping them frozen and escalation processes under control. This is particularly true for 2004, where it was largely due to the OSCE's quiet-but-firm on-site diplomacy that escalation was prevented in South Ossetia and Moldova. While the key factor is whether the parties concerned, including the Russian Federation, which is an important stakeholder, can agree on a solution, the OSCE can do more to broker solutions.

In order to resolve the frozen conflicts by means of compromises that include Russia, increasing levels of high-level involvement are necessary. The OSCE should co-ordinate its efforts with the EU, and should take advantage of the fact that EU states will hold the OSCE Chairmanship from 2005 to 2008. Sub-regional arms control and economic issues, both of whose importance are frequently underestimated, could play a significant role in resolving these conflicts. Although the OSCE has not yet carried out any full-

fledged peacekeeping tasks (although the Kosovo Verification Mission and the Mission to Georgia contained peacekeeping functions), the assumption of a peacekeeping role should not be excluded as an option for the cases mentioned above. The OSCE could either provide a mandate for third-party peacekeeping, or could implement low-key forms of peacekeeping itself in a framework of more comprehensive, multifunctional field operations.

The OSCE currently still spends around two-thirds of its resources on its large Balkan missions. This will fundamentally change during the next decade, as the EU substantially upgrades its commitment to these regions and the countries in question hopefully reach higher levels of stability. Although the OSCE should remain active in post-conflict rehabilitation in the region for as long as it is needed, it should also be prepared to shift its long-term focus more to the (South) Caucasus, to Central Asia, and to pan-European issues.

Conflict prevention via OSCE field operations and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) will remain an important OSCE task. The High Commissioner, who has already dealt with the cases of Estonia, Greece, Latvia, and Turkey, should pay more attention to minority-related conflicts in Western countries where necessary. Turkey should be encouraged to make use of the High Commissioner to ease tensions related to its Kurdish minority, as has been proposed by the EU.

#### *5.1.4 Integrating the Economic and Environmental Dimension into the OSCE's Tasks*

The OSCE is neither an economic organization nor a major donor. Accordingly, the main deficiency of the OSCE's economic and environmental dimension (EED) activities is its lack of strategic vision and resources. Its activities are only tenuously integrated into the Organization's current and future strategic tasks and challenges. The mandate of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (CEEAA) is weak and his office understaffed. There is some co-operation with environmental groups, but almost no interaction with key economic actors.

The OSCE Strategy Document for the EED, adopted in Maastricht in 2003, includes some updating of the basic Bonn Document on EED of 1990. Nonetheless, more consideration of the economic dimension of early warning, conflict resolution, and post-conflict rehabilitation is necessary. Other institutions with more resources will inevitably have to take the lead in the implementation of general economic-development projects, but the special role of the OSCE can be to advise implementers on how their projects should be targeted to alleviate the underlying causes of violent conflict.

To date, the links between the OSCE's EED activities and other working fields have been weak. This is particularly true of conflict resolution, where there is a shortage of both analyses of the economic root causes of

conflicts and models of how economic tools can be used for early warning and conflict resolution. The same is true with regard to post-conflict rehabilitation and long-term peace-building. Since economic issues can be key factors in a conflict, looking at the political economy should be part of the solution. The CEEA should develop plans for using economic instruments to facilitate the resolution of the conflicts in Transdniestria, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, and models for the economic revitalization of these regions. In general, the CEEA should use its expertise to help international financial and donor organizations to build up a proper understanding of the economic dimension of (violent) conflict.

There has also been insufficient consideration of long-term economic developments relevant to security and stability in Europe such as energy security, transnational migration, and freedom of movement. The CEEA should identify specific transnational risks in the EED, as well as the economic and environmental dimensions of other transnational challenges, and integrate them in an overall concept. The CEEA should also be involved more closely in OSCE planning and policy-making, stressing the aspects of anti-corruption, transparency, good governance, and other economic rights, including tighter co-operation with business and other private sector experts.

#### *5.1.5 Resolving the Dispute over the Human Dimension*

Human-dimension issues have become the OSCE's most important field of activity and the area where the Organization's worldwide profile is highest. Foremost among the OSCE's human-dimension activities are election monitoring and assistance, where the OSCE is Europe's leading creator of standards and, in many respects, its key implementing agent. Other important areas of activities concern democratic governance, the rule of law, rights of persons belonging to (national) minorities, media development, gender equality, and freedom of movement. Despite many examples of successful activities within the human dimension, the criticisms levelled by the Russian Federation and other CIS states concentrate on the human dimension. A first conclusion that can be drawn from this is that, in order to solve the crisis of the OSCE, it will not be enough merely to better "balance the three dimensions", or to launch more politico-military and economic and environmental activities. If the kernel of the disagreement concerns the human dimension, a discussion aiming at a new common understanding must also start there. The solution to this problem should certainly not be to dismantle the OSCE's capacity (via ODIHR) to assist with and monitor the compliance of participating States with their commitments under the 1990 Copenhagen Document and other relevant norms of the OSCE *acquis*. At the same time, certain modalities for implementing these norms may be improved.

One dispute concerns the mechanisms the OSCE uses to monitor compliance with its human-dimension commitments. Major differences exist

among the participating States with respect to the observance of human rights, electoral standards, and other human-dimension commitments. This in itself constitutes a severe problem in terms of the coherence of the OSCE and the ability of its participating States to co-operate. However, the situation is not improved by the fact that the OSCE's human-dimension monitoring instruments focus largely on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This focus, which may appear logical at first sight, has proved politically counter-productive, by making it possible for Russia and other CIS countries to complain of double standards. It is therefore necessary to create a general human-dimension monitoring instrument that covers all participating States without exception. This kind of monitoring should be based on questionnaires to be answered by each state. The states' replies could then be presented and discussed at the OSCE's annual Human Dimension Implementation Meetings. A more parsimonious and at the same time more co-operative option would be to use the proposed annual human rights reports of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as the basis of discussion, provided the UN follows this suggestion.<sup>4</sup>

The 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Meeting tasked the Permanent Council with considering the need for additional election-related commitments, supplementing those of the 1990 Copenhagen Document. The relevance of this question is increased by the fact that election procedures and techniques vary widely among participating States, including established democracies; and the validity of elections in Western countries (such as the USA) has also been questioned in relation to certain (in this case electronic) voting techniques. It might therefore be fruitful to consider additional commitments related to new election methods and their specific monitoring needs. However, this must not lead to lower standards, to a "Copenhagen minus", but rather to an enhanced "Copenhagen plus".

The reports of OSCE election observation missions are at times disputed between the state concerned and the OSCE election observation mission. It would be desirable to have a political consultation mechanism to clarify these kinds of disputes. This does not mean that states should be given a right to influence the substance of the reports, which should remain the sole responsibility of the election observation missions. The coherence of election monitoring by different international organizations/bodies could be strengthened by introducing standardized training measures for observers from the OSCE, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the CIS, and other interested international organizations.

As the OSCE increasingly focuses on transnational threats, it needs to include the human-rights aspects of these issues. There is a legitimate concern in particular about excessive counter-terrorism and border-security measures being implemented at the expense of human-rights considerations. More generally, the OSCE should also address the more general issues of the

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4 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 75.

human rights of refugees and asylum seekers, as well as the question of freedom of movement and visa regimes.

The OSCE and the Council of Europe (CoE), which share a number of fundamental values and have widely overlapping spheres of competence and member states, should co-operate more closely. There is also a remarkable potential for synergy between the CoE's strong Secretariat and the OSCE's strong field operations. The Declaration on Co-operation between the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation from 17 May 2005, which proposes various measures including joint meetings and activities, and the establishment of a Co-ordination Group, is a good starting point.

## 5.2 Structures, Procedures, and Instruments

### 5.2.1 Achieving more Inclusive Consultations

The OSCE's function as a forum for dialogue and consultation has declined in recent years for several reasons. *First*, compared to the situation in 1990, participating States – transition states in particular – now have access to a broader range of multilateral and bilateral forums in which they are able to discuss specific questions. *Second*, conflicts within the OSCE have meant that many discussions have been unproductive, as reflected in the increasingly formal character of debates in the Permanent Council and elsewhere. *Third*, consultations in preparation for OSCE decisions are frequently the preserve of an exclusive group. As it is virtually impossible to hold meaningful consultations among 55 states, consultations are generally conducted between the Chairperson, the USA, the EU, the Russian Federation and the country concerned.<sup>5</sup> This *modus* of consultations does not live up to the ideal of inclusiveness and discourages many states from genuinely participating in the OSCE's working process. A return to more inclusive consultation and decision-making is key to regaining a wider sense of ownership. This issue could be addressed by further developing the currently rather *ad hoc* structure of the PC's informal working groups into a more organized system that reflects the Organization's main areas of activity. This would enable states to participate in precisely those areas where they are most interested.

What has also become clear is that there is too little dialogue and consultation between the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly (PA). As a consequence, the OSCE does not fully exploit the considerable potential possessed by its parliamentary dimension to be a further point of contact with its participating States. The Chairman-in-Office (CiO) should therefore explore

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5 Even the Netherlands, an EU and NATO member State, once complained that it had been sidelined in the decision-making process (cf. PC.JOUR/313, 7 December 2000, Annex, Statement by the Delegation of the Netherlands).

ways to engage the PA and its members more closely in the work of the OSCE.

A further critical matter is the possibility of convening an OSCE Summit Meeting, the last one having been held in Istanbul in 1999. The next OSCE Summit should adopt a reform agenda for the Organization, provided that the participating States have succeeded in finding sufficient common ground in the preparatory stage.

#### *5.2.2 Strengthening the Role of the Secretary General*

For structural reasons, OSCE institutions and field operations suffer from a general lack of political leadership and co-ordination. In organizational terms, the OSCE can be described as having a highly diversified and geographically dispersed structure with weak central institutions. This organizational system is not the result of any master plan, but rather the consequence of the way the OSCE has developed as an organization in reaction to numerous urgent crises, and a reflection of the individual interests of its participating States. Such a diffuse organization calls for a huge input of leadership and co-ordination to achieve effectiveness.

The Chairman-in-Office, whose mandate includes a leadership function, can only perform this task to a limited degree for three reasons. *First*, the annually rotating Chairmanship lacks continuity by definition. *Second*, the Chairmanship does not have the capacities needed to perform effectively in a guidance role, especially when the post is filled by smaller countries with limited resources. *Third*, the autonomous or semi-autonomous character of OSCE institutions and the separate and autonomous mandates given to OSCE field operations mean that it would be difficult to gain acceptance for enhanced centralized powers. The Secretary General (SG) as “chief administrative officer” does not have the mandate to give political guidance, although the decision on the gradual extension of the SG’s competencies adopted in 2004 in Sofia is a step in the right direction. In other words, there is no OSCE institution that could effectively guide, co-ordinate and control. As a result, OSCE institutions and field operations enjoy considerable autonomy and largely depend on the personal qualities of the Heads of Missions.

One specific problem concerns co-ordination between OSCE institutions and, in particular, between its dimensions. Not only are the different dimensions associated with different institutions, but in some areas, such as trafficking in human beings, operational capabilities are also shared between the Secretariat, ODIHR, and the Chairmanship. A system of this kind may have been adequate for the task of generating *ad hoc* activities to meet immediate and localized needs. The challenges of addressing transnational threats, however, demand more durable organizational structures. The organizational challenge the OSCE is facing thus consists in reforming its system of co-ordination and operational guidance.

As the leadership problems of the OSCE are the result of historical developments and political interests, they cannot be simply solved via organizational means. However, the OSCE's system of internal management can be substantially improved by redefining the division of labour between the Chairmanship and the Secretary General in a way that strengthens the latter:

- The Chairman should concentrate on political consultations and the preparation of the decision-making process among the participating States, on top-level co-operation with international partner organizations, and on providing political guidance.
- The Secretary General should be vested with overall executive responsibility, including operational leadership and the co-ordination of institutions and field operations. More tasks should be delegated to the Secretary General.

It should be stressed that the division of competencies between the Chairmanship and the Secretary General is not a zero-sum game. The CiO has an interest in the SG being provided with sufficient competencies and resources to fulfil his or her tasks, thereby freeing the Chairmanship from some of its more mundane activities and allowing more time for its core work.

### *5.2.3 Giving the OSCE Secretariat a Leadership Function*

To adapt the Secretariat's structure to future needs, including those of the strengthened Secretary General, the following objectives should be pursued: *First*, the Secretariat should be provided with further organizational elements necessary for it to fulfil its expanded operational leadership role with regard to both institutions and issues. *Second*, experiences gained and lessons learned have to be fed back into the development of operational doctrines, procedures, and mandates. *Third*, the current structures of departments must be streamlined.

The OSCE should thus consolidate the structures of the Secretariat along the following lines:

- The Office of the Secretary General should be strengthened by the addition of a Political Unit, responsible for political planning, and an Analytical Unit. The Analytical Unit should include regional, conflict-management, and issue-oriented expertise, and should be tasked with running a lessons-learned and evaluation process independently from the more strictly operational departments.
- All functions concerning the support of field operations, apart from mission staffing –which should remain with the Department for Human Resources – should be united in a Department for Field Operations.
- The most important issue-oriented working units should be combined in a Department for Security-Building. These are the Strategic Police

Matters Unit, the Action against Terrorism Unit, and all working units dealing with border security, weapons transfers, and trafficking in human beings.

In order to provide inter-institutional and cross-dimensional co-ordination, the Secretary General should introduce Competence Teams in specific areas, e.g. anti-trafficking, policing, etc. They should include representatives of all relevant institutions as well as the OSCE's field operations, and liaise with external experts, think tanks, and NGOs. Competence Teams should meet regularly to co-ordinate policy. They should be chaired by the Secretary General or a representative of the SG, and supported for research and planning purposes by the Analytical Unit.

The institutional weakness of the OSCE is further aggravated by the fact that it lacks a convention on privileges and immunities. To better protect staff working in the field and to solve contractual problems, the participating States should adopt such a convention.

#### *5.2.4 Reforming OSCE Field Operations*

The OSCE's field operations are one of its greatest assets and constitute its most important comparative advantage. It is important to note that there is no standard format for field operations. The first type of field operations to be deployed (from 1992) were missions focused on early warning, early action, and conflict resolution. The large Balkan missions oriented towards specific post-conflict rehabilitation tasks, which have been deployed since 1995, represent the second type. The third type are the small OSCE Offices and Centres that have been established in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe since 1995 to deal with a range of more or less well defined stability risks and potential sources of conflict.

The problems of operating OSCE Field operations are as diverse as the missions themselves. In the following, we will concentrate on problems of country missions, introduce an example of a possible future thematic mission, and deal with the staffing of missions with seconded personnel.

##### *Country-Specific Field Operations*

*Co-operation with the host state and co-ordination among missions.* Two key aspects of country-specific field operations that need to be addressed are the modalities of co-operation with the host state, and operational guidance of and horizontal co-ordination among field operations and institutions.

*The lack of co-operation between host states and missions* is one of the most sensitive points of criticism raised against OSCE field operations. Heads of Mission, Centre, or Office should be aware that OSCE field operations are based on co-operation and that this must be reflected in a mission's day-to-day activities. The host state should thus be consulted regarding major



projects as well as the appointment of Heads of Mission, Centre, or Office. Field operations should engage more local staff, including professional staff.

*Operational leadership and horizontal co-ordination.* The Secretary General should be given overall responsibility for operational leadership of field missions and the co-ordination of issue-oriented activities. The Department for Field Operations and the Competence Teams should play an important role in enabling this. Joint activities between the field operations and the High Commissioner, ODIHR, and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (FOM) must respect the autonomy of the various mandates.

*An Example of a Thematic Mission: The OSCE Mission on Trafficking in Human Beings*

To address specific transnational challenges, new formats of field operations should be established alongside those that have a proven track record. Concepts that have been discussed include “Thematic Missions”. The example of a hypothetical OSCE Mission on Trafficking in Human Beings discussed here shall serve to illustrate this new concept.

The tasks of the OSCE Mission on Trafficking in Human Beings would consist in implementing a series of interconnected projects in countries of origin, transition, and destination that aim to help victims, create links with civil society and state actors in different countries, raise awareness in societies and governments, and assist governments and local administrations in taking key legislative and administrative action.

The thinking behind this kind of mission is based on two premises: first, that transnational threats can only be successfully countered by mobilizing broad coalitions of benign (trans)national actors, and second, that the OSCE should take on the role of a “force multiplier” by bringing these actors together and facilitating contacts and co-operation with other actors at state and international level. Accordingly, the primary partners of the OSCE Mission on Trafficking would be official contact persons and NGO networks in the target countries, whose activities would be co-ordinated, funded *via* and guided by the mission’s head office within the Secretariat’s Department for Field Operations. In contrast to traditional OSCE field operations, there would be no permanent OSCE offices staffed with international personnel in the targeted countries, but mission contact points would be established and staffed by the NGO networks themselves. The head office in Vienna would undertake the following tasks to safeguard the coherence of the mission’s work:

- Performing comprehensive needs analysis as a basis for selecting target countries and mission partners.
- Drafting an overall plan of action and discussing with the governments of the target countries and the mission partners how best to adapt it to local needs.

- Assisting governments in fulfilling commitments on trafficking they have undertaken in the OSCE and other contexts.
- Assisting NGOs in pressuring and monitoring governments and in playing an operational role in combating trafficking in human beings.
- Providing (full or partial) funding for local, regional, and countrywide activities carried out by the mission partners in the target countries.
- Closely following activities and providing support in the form of e.g., expert advice and rapidly deployable capacities.
- Liaising between NGO networks and local administrations, governments, and international organizations including OSCE decision-making bodies and institutions with a view to exploiting possible synergies.
- Organizing the exchange of information, skills, and best practices between NGO networks and state actors in the different countries.
- Evaluating the progress of the mission's work and reporting to OSCE bodies.

It is evident that a mission of this kind cannot operate with a six-month mandate, but rather needs one of at least two years.

*Mission Staffing: Developing the Secondment System*

The *secondment system* has great merits. Without personnel seconded by the participating States, the OSCE could have never been as successful as it has been over the years in staffing field operations rapidly and flexibly to address urgent challenges. It is therefore vital that the secondment system be retained. On the other hand, the disadvantages of the system for poorer states that cannot afford to second staff cannot be overlooked. For this reason, moderate reform is desirable in this area. A voluntary fund, comparable to the ODIHR funds for elections observation missions, should therefore be established to pay staff from countries that cannot afford to second. The existing selection criteria should be maintained in the secondment process.

As the CORE report *Working in OSCE Field Missions* has shown, there are still serious flaws in the implementation of the secondment system. According to this study, only 52 per cent of new mission members were given a proper briefing upon arrival at their duty stations, and only around 30 per cent of new mission members experienced an effective handover procedure.<sup>6</sup> These flaws are mainly due to the briefness of six-month secondments. The minimum working period of seconded staff should therefore be lengthened to at least one year. At the same time, more local professional staff should be engaged in field operations to strengthen local capacities.

For *contracted staff* in the professional category, there is a maximum employment term of ten years. This rule, intended to underline the fact that the OSCE is not an organization where one can permanently pursue a career,

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6 Cf. Annette Legutke, *Working in OSCE Field Missions*, Hamburg 2003 (Centre for OSCE Research), pp. 21-22.

constantly damages the Organization by excising its institutional memory and dismissing its most experienced staff members. Consequently, this rule should be dropped.

### 5.3 *Deepening Co-operation with Mediterranean and Asian Partners and with International and Non-Governmental Organizations*

*Mediterranean Partners and Partners in Asia.* OSCE participating States encourage their Mediterranean and Asian Partners to voluntarily implement OSCE principles and commitments. They frequently invite them to participate as observers in PC and FSC meetings (Maastricht 2003). Communication is maintained at all kinds of OSCE events – from Summits and Ministerials to seminars and workshops. Seminars focussing specifically on issues relating to partner states have become regular events. Two Contact Groups also exist whose task is to maintain dedicated regional lines of dialogue with the two groups of Partners. Discussions on the voluntary implementation of OSCE commitments and the further transfer of OSCE expertise should be concretized according to the political needs of partner states. Because of its heterogeneity, the OSCE can better serve as a model for co-operation outside Europe than the EU, which is, at least in part, a supranational organization. It would boost the OSCE's visibility if it could present its partners with a brief charter document summarizing its *acquis*.

*The outreach activities of the OSCE* are closely related to its co-operation with Mediterranean and Asian Partners. A further working group sounds out possible areas where outreach activities could allow the OSCE to share the benefits of its experience with its Partners. The Election Support Team sent to Afghanistan in the autumn of 2004 is one of the first examples of an OSCE outreach activity. As security challenges become increasingly global in character and security within the OSCE space is significantly affected by developments outside, the Organization should expand its outreach activities to partners and other interested states outside of Europe. Outreach activities should cover all the OSCE's spheres of competence, such as election assistance, policing, and border control. If the participating States want to support these activities, they will have to upgrade the Organization's outreach capacity, which is extremely limited at the moment. The OSCE should be willing to lend its advice and support to other regions of the globe that seek to develop or strengthen regional security organizations and could draw on the OSCE's experience.

*Co-operation with international organizations.* While the Platform for Co-operative Security adopted at the 1999 Istanbul Summit describes a model of co-operation with other international organizations, reality rarely conforms to such programmatic decisions. While there are regular high-level meetings between the OSCE and a number of relevant international organizations, and while, as a rule, good co-operative relations exist in the field,

staff-to-staff meetings at headquarter level are all too rare, and cross-representation is almost non-existent. All too often, attempts to co-ordinate the activities of different organizations come too late. The OSCE should therefore systematically strengthen co-ordination and co-operation with relevant international and sub-regional organizations:

- The OSCE should make more systematic use of its capacity as a regional arrangement of the UN and should support the UN in the regional implementation of global initiatives, as it has already done in the field of anti-terrorism. Consultations with the UN should cover regional issues, peace-building structures, peacekeeping, transnational threats, relevant aspects of economic and human development in the OSCE area, and lessons-learned mechanisms.
- The OSCE should open discussions with the EU on better co-ordination and co-operation, which should also cover those areas where the two organizations are in competition. This dialogue should take into account that there are issues (e.g. arms control, election monitoring, rights of persons belonging to national minorities) as well as regions (South Caucasus, Central Asia) where the EU needs to co-operate with the OSCE.
- In view of their substantial overlap in terms of issues and members, and the possible synergies between strong OSCE field operations and the strong Secretariat of the Council of Europe, the OSCE should strive to lead the Co-ordination Group with the Council of Europe to concrete results.

*Co-operation with non-governmental organizations.* Co-operation with NGOs is mainly focused on human-dimension issues, and insufficient advantage is taken of opportunities for co-operation in other fields and with other civic-society entities, including the world of research and education. Co-operation with NGOs should be expanded, and their access to OSCE meetings should be facilitated. This is of particular importance in view of the need to create broad transnational coalitions for addressing transnational threats.

#### 6. *Visions of the OSCE's Future*

The presentation of the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons will be followed by high-level consultations in autumn of 2005. Whether these consultations will be a one-off occurrence or whether they can serve as a starting point for a longer negotiation process, is an open question. Currently, there is no way of foreseeing how much common ground the participating States will find. The range of choices the OSCE has for development is therefore sum-

marized here in terms of the two extremes on a continuum of options: a minimal and an optimal option.

### 6.1 *Minimal Option: The OSCE as a Stand-by Organization*

The minimal option assumes that the participating States fail to reach an agreement on the OSCE's changed functions and tasks and cannot bridge their political differences. Nonetheless, they agree that the OSCE ought not be dissolved formally in order to maintain some of its basic political functions.

This would result in a substantial decrease of the Organization's relevance, which would be reflected in the downsizing of its operational activities and its field operations in particular. The loss of operational capacity would be accompanied by a further *de facto* erosion of the normative *acquis*. While some states would continue to respect OSCE commitments, others would prefer a selective approach to them. The *acquis* would, however, not be formally revoked.

The OSCE would most probably not be dissolved in a formal sense. The Organization's decision-making bodies, at least the Permanent Council and a smaller Secretariat, would remain. In this scenario, the operational range of the OSCE's institutions – ODIHR, the HCNM, and the FOM – would be sharply reduced.

Such a development would not necessarily occur all at once, for example, with the simultaneous non-extension of several mission mandates, but could also take the form of a gradual process of decline, which might even be hidden behind a superficial progress on some measures to improve the OSCE's organizational effectiveness.

The minimal option would preserve the OSCE as a kind of stand-by organization, which could be revitalized to deal with future contingencies. This would be better than nothing, but security and stability in Europe would be severely damaged unless other actors take over the OSCE's tasks. The minimal option would represent a clear regression from what has already been achieved, both in normative and operational terms. At the same time, it would reflect the states' inability to agree on relevant multilateral approaches to the challenges ahead.

### 6.2 *Optimal Option: A New Consensus on the OSCE's Future*

The optimal option starts from the assumption that the participating States can agree on a new, politically substantial, and problem-oriented consensus on the future functions and tasks of the Organization. Such a consensus would start with the political acknowledgement that management of change in Europe is necessary and that the OSCE is the right organization to contribute to this task.

Such a consensus would almost certainly not provide the OSCE with a role as an overarching European security organization, brokering relations between major powers. However, it would define a specific role for the OSCE as an organization specializing in addressing certain categories of threats. The OSCE as a specialized organization based on comprehensive values, norms, and commitments – an organization positioned somewhere below the level of overall responsibility for European security, but helping to guide and harmonize as well as complement other institutions' work – is the optimal scenario.

The operational capabilities of the OSCE, in particular its field operations, and the related support structures would be reorganized according to changed needs. The OSCE institutions would continue to function. The OSCE's normative *acquis* would be maintained; attempts to use it in a selective way would be contained.

Such an outcome may not emerge in the immediate future, that is, after a brief round of high-level consultations, but could also be the result of a longer process that starts with agreements on institutional matters. Furthermore, even if the optimal option is achieved, it would still be desirable for the OSCE to prove its usefulness beyond its area by extending its outreach activities.

The key to achieving this second option, or something close to it, lies in finding a new political consensus on the functions of the Organization, and no amount of organizational engineering can substitute for this. Whether any such agreement is reached will reveal the participating States' ability to address today's and tomorrow's challenges in a truly multilateral and co-operative way.

## 7. *Recommendations*

The following recommendations aim at adapting the function and tasks of the OSCE to changed needs and building a consensus among participating States on the Organization's new role.

### *Key Recommendations:*

1. Do not give up, compromise, or water down OSCE principles, norms, and commitments. Even if this might offer short-term political gains, it would be the beginning of the end of the OSCE as a values-driven organization.
2. Make the issue of addressing transnational threats and risks a priority for the OSCE and elaborate an operational cross-dimensional concept, building on the Organization's experiences and capacities in police matters, border management, anti-trafficking, and counter-terrorism.

3. Establish new initiatives to contribute to the resolution of the “frozen conflicts” in Transdnistria, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh by making more use of high-level involvement, closer co-operation with the EU and other international organizations, and by supporting concepts for arms control and economic revitalization.
4. Convene an OSCE Summit Meeting to decide on the Organization’s reform agenda – as soon as the participating States have developed sufficient common ground.

*Recommendations on Fields of Activity:*

*Politico-Military Dimension:*

5. Reopen the discussion on current threat perceptions of the participating States with an OSCE seminar on military doctrines as a starting point for the elaboration of a new generation of regional and sub-regional Confidence and Security-Building Measures.
6. Bring the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (ACFE) Treaty into force by honouring progress made by the Russian Federation in fulfilling its Istanbul commitment with progress in the ratification process. After the entry into force of the ACFE Treaty, admit new states parties.
7. Elaborate arms-control concepts to support possible political settlements of the conflicts in Transdnistria, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
8. Operationalize and implement OSCE efforts to reduce the illicit flows of small arms and light weapons across national borders throughout the region.

*Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management:*

9. Start preparation of multi-functional field operations, which will be needed after the resolution of “frozen conflicts”, including arms-control, border-security, policing, and peacekeeping elements.
10. Make better use of the capabilities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities to assist in the resolution of ethno-political conflicts in all participating States, including Western ones.

*Economic and Environmental Issues:*

11. Include the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities in the elaboration of a cross-dimensional approach to addressing transnational threats and risks, with the specific task of integrating the economic and environmental aspects of these challenges to regional security.

12. Elaborate plans for using economic instruments to contribute to the resolution of the conflicts in Transdniestria, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Elaborate concepts for the economic revitalization of war-torn regions and discuss them with international financial organizations and other relevant donor organizations.

*Human-Dimension Issues:*

13. Create a general human-dimension monitoring instrument that covers all participating States without exception. Base monitoring on a questionnaire to be answered by states, or on the annual human rights report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and discuss states' replies at the OSCE's annual Human Dimension Implementation Meetings.
14. Amend the commitments of the 1990 Copenhagen Document relating to elections and election-monitoring. Establish a mechanism of political consultations to clarify disputes between the state concerned and the OSCE election observation mission.

*Recommendations on Structures, Procedures, and Instruments:*

*Structures for Dialogue and Consultation:*

15. Develop a system of informal working groups mirroring the working structures of the OSCE to enhance the inclusiveness of consultations and to give the participating States more opportunities to become involved in issues that particularly interest them.
16. Upgrade the framework for dialogue and consultation between the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the decision-making and operational bodies of the OSCE.

*Secretary General and Secretariat:*

17. Introduce a clear division of labour between the Chairmanship and the Secretary General that enlarges the competencies of the latter:
  - The Chairman should concentrate on political consultations and the preparation of the decision-making process among the participating States, on top-level co-operation with international partner organizations, and on providing political guidance.
  - The position of Secretary General should be strengthened by being vested with overall executive responsibility, including operational leadership and co-ordination of institutions and field operations. More tasks should be delegated to the Secretary General.



18. Provide the Secretariat with all the means it needs to fulfil an expanded operational leadership role with regard to both institutions and issues:
  - Strengthen the Office of the Secretary General by adding a Political Unit, responsible for policy planning, and an Analytical Unit, tasked with lessons-learned, evaluation, and analysis functions.
  - Unite all functions related to the support of field operations in a Department for Field Operations, apart from mission-staffing which should remain with the Department for Human Resources.
  - Unite the most important issue-oriented working units, such as counter-terrorism, police matters, border management, local arms control, and anti-trafficking in a Department for Security-Building.
19. Create Competence Teams as an instrument for the Secretary General to provide inter-institutional and cross-dimensional co-ordination within specific fields.
20. Adopt a convention on privileges and immunities for the practical purposes of better protecting staff in the field and solving contractual problems.

*Field Operations:*

21. Develop thematic missions directed at specific cross-border and regional challenges rather than specific states. Establish a Mission on Trafficking in Human Beings as a prototype for a future generation of thematic OSCE field operations.
22. Open a voluntary fund for seconding suitable personnel from countries that are underrepresented in the OSCE because they cannot afford to second staff; also extend the minimum working period for seconded staff to at least one year. Drop the rule on a maximum term of employment for professional staff.

*Co-operation with International and Non-Governmental Organizations:*

23. Make better use of the capacity of the OSCE as a regional arrangement of the UN; consult with the UN on regional issues, peacekeeping, transnational threats, peace-building structures, and lessons-learned mechanisms; and support the UN in the regional implementation of global initiatives.
24. Establish co-ordination groups with other international organizations on the model of the group set up jointly with the Council of Europe, and improve co-operation, for instance by holding regular staff-to-staff meetings and introducing cross representation both at headquarters and field-operations level.

25. Take better advantage of deepening co-operation with non-governmental organizations in all of the OSCE's dimensions, and include them as actors in broad transnational coalitions addressing new threats and risks.

*Outreach:*

26. Increase the impact of the OSCE beyond its area of application by offering the Organization's *acquis* and experiences as a model for other regions, by strengthening co-operation with the Asian and Mediterranean partner states, and by implementing more outreach activities.

## Kooperationsformen und -foren im OSZE-Bereich

Gruppe der Acht (G-8)

Organisation für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (OECD)

Europarat (EuR)

Nordatlantikvertrags-Organisation (NATO)

Euro-Atlantischer Partnerschaftsrat (EAPR)

EAPR-Beobachter

Partnerschaft für den Frieden (PfP)

NATO-Russland-Rat

NATO-Ukraine-Charta/NATO-Ukraine-Kommission

Europäische Union (EU)

EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen

EU-Bewerberländer

EU-Assoziierungsabkommen

Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozess (SAP)

Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsabkommen (SAA)

Westeuropäische Union (WEU)

Assoziierte WEU-Mitglieder<sup>1</sup>

Assoziierte WEU-Partner

WEU-Beobachter<sup>2</sup>

Eurokorps

Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten (GUS)

Baltischer Rat

Euro-arktischer Barentsrat

Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter

Nordischer Rat

Rat der Ostseestaaten (CBSS)

Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa

Stabilitätspakt-für-Südosteuropa-Beobachter

Mitteuropäisches Freihandelsabkommen (CEFTA)

Zentraleuropäische Initiative (ZEI)

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1 In der Praxis der WEU wird kein Unterschied zwischen Assoziierten und Vollmitgliedern gemacht.

2 Der Beobachterstatus beschränkt sich auf Informationsaustausch und Präsenzen in Sitzungen im Einzelfall und auf Einladung.

Südosteuropäische Kooperationsinitiative (SECI)  
Kooperationsprozess in Südosteuropa (SEECP)  
SEECP-Beobachter  
Schwarzmeer-Kooperationspakt (BSEC)

Nordamerikanisches Freihandelsabkommen (NAFTA)

*Quellen:*

OECD: [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)  
Europarat: [www.coe.int](http://www.coe.int)  
NATO: [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)  
EU: [europa.eu.int](http://europa.eu.int)  
WEU: [www.w eu.int](http://www.w eu.int)  
Baltischer Rat: [www.baltasam.org](http://www.baltasam.org)  
Euro-arktischer Barentsrat: [www.beac.st](http://www.beac.st)  
Nordischer Rat: [www.norden.org](http://www.norden.org)  
CBSS: [www.cbss.st](http://www.cbss.st)  
Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa: [www.stabilitypact.org](http://www.stabilitypact.org)  
CEFTA: [www.cefta.org](http://www.cefta.org)  
ZEI: [www.ceinet.org](http://www.ceinet.org)  
SECI: [www.secicenter.org](http://www.secicenter.org)  
BSEC: [www.bsec.gov.tr](http://www.bsec.gov.tr)  
NAFTA: [www.nafta-sec-alena.org](http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org)

## Die 55 OSZE-Teilnehmerstaaten – Daten, Fakten, Kooperationsformen<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Albanien

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1991

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (OSZE-Rang: 32)<sup>2</sup>

*Fläche:* 28.748 km<sup>2</sup> (OSZE-Rang: 45)<sup>3</sup>

*Bevölkerung:* 3.563.112 (OSZE-Rang: 41)<sup>4</sup>

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP<sup>5</sup>:* 4.900 (OSZE- Rang: 46)<sup>6</sup>

*BIP-Wachstum:* 5,6 Prozent (OSZE-Rang: 20)<sup>7</sup>

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 21.500 (OSZE-Rang: 32)<sup>8</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1994), SAP, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1995), SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

### 2. Andorra

*Beitrittsdatum:* April 1996

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (43)

*Fläche:* 468 km<sup>2</sup> (50)

*Bevölkerung:* 70.549 (51)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 26.800 (20)<sup>9</sup>

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2 Prozent (44)<sup>10</sup>

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1994).

### 3. Armenien

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,11 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 29.800 km<sup>2</sup> (44)

*Bevölkerung:* 2.982.904 (42)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 4.600 (47)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 9 Prozent (7)

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1 Bearbeitet von Jochen Rasch.

2 Von 55 Ländern.

3 Von 55 Ländern.

4 Von 55 Ländern.

5 Internationaler Dollar ist der Wertausdruck der PPP. Als PPP (Purchasing Power Parity/ Kaufkraftparität) wird die Anzahl der Einheiten einer Landeswährung bezeichnet, die benötigt wird, um eine identische Menge an Waren und Dienstleistungen auf dem einheimischen Markt zu kaufen, für die in den Vereinigten Staaten ein US-Dollar aufzuwenden wäre. Vgl. The World Bank, World Development Report 2002, Washington, D.C., 2002.

6 Von 48 Ländern.

7 Von Ländern.

8 Von 54 Ländern.

9 2003 geschätzt

10 2003 geschätzt

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 44.874 (23)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2001), EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), BSEC.

#### **4. Aserbaidshan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,11 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 86.600 km<sup>2</sup> (28)

*Bevölkerung:* 7.911.974 (25)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 3.800 (48)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 9,8 Prozent (4)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 66.490 (15)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2001), EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), BSEC.

#### **5. Belarus**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,51 Prozent (28)

*Fläche:* 207.600 km<sup>2</sup> (19)

*Bevölkerung:* 10.300.483 (20)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 6.800 (42)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 6,4 Prozent (17)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 72.940 (14)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1995), GUS (1991), ZEI (1995).

#### **6. Belgien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 3,55 Prozent (10)

*Fläche:* 30.528 km<sup>2</sup> (43)

*Bevölkerung:* 10.364.388 (19)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 30.600 (11)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,6 Prozent (38)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 40.800 (24)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), WEU (1954), Eurokorps (1993), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

#### **7. Bosnien und Herzegowina**

*Beitrittsdatum:* April 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)

*Fläche:* 51.129 km<sup>2</sup> (36)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.430.494 (38)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 6.500 (43)

*BIP-Wachstum*: 5 Prozent (25)

*Streitkräfte (aktive)*: 24.600 (35)<sup>11</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen*: Europarat (2002), SAP, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1992), SECI, SEECP.

## **8. Bulgarien**

*Beitrittsdatum*: Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE*: 0,55 Prozent (26)

*Fläche*: 110.910 km<sup>2</sup> (23)

*Bevölkerung*: 7.450.349 (27)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP*: 8.200 (37)

*BIP-Wachstum*: 5,3 Prozent (22)

*Streitkräfte (aktive)*: 51.000 (21)<sup>12</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen*: Europarat (1992), NATO (2004), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen (1999), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen (1993), Assoziierter WEU-Partner (1994), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1995), SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

## **9. Dänemark**

*Beitrittsdatum*: Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE*: 2,05 Prozent (15)

*Fläche*: 43.094 km<sup>2</sup> (39)

*Bevölkerung*: 5.432.335 (29)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP*: 32.200 (6)

*BIP-Wachstum*: 2,1 Prozent (42)

*Streitkräfte (aktive)*: 21.180 (31)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen*: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1973), WEU-Beobachter (1992), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **10. Deutschland**

*Beitrittsdatum*: Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE*: 9,1 Prozent (1)

*Fläche*: 357.021 km<sup>2</sup> (12)

*Bevölkerung*: 82.431.390 (3)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP*: 28.700 (15)

*BIP-Wachstum*: 1,7 Prozent (48)

*Streitkräfte (aktive)*: 284.500 (5)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen*: G-8 (1975), OECD (1961), Europarat (1950), NATO (1955), EAPR, EU (1958), WEU (1954),

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11 Der OSZE-Rang bezieht sich auf die muslimisch-kroatische Föderation (16.400) und die Republika Srpska (8.200) zusammen.

12 Ohne circa 10.000 Baulruppen.

Eurokorps (1992), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **11. Estland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* September 1991

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)

*Fläche:* 45.226 km<sup>2</sup> (38)

*Bevölkerung:* 1.332.893 (46)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 14.300 (31)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 6 Prozent (18)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 4.980 (44)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (2004), Assoziierter WEU-Partner (1994), Baltischer Rat, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **12. Finnland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 2,05 Prozent (15)

*Fläche:* 338.145 km<sup>2</sup> (13)

*Bevölkerung:* 5.223.442 (31)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 29.000 (14)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3 Prozent (37)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 27.000 (29)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1969), Europarat (1989), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (1995), WEU-Beobachter (1995), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **13. Frankreich**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 9,1 Prozent (1)

*Fläche:* 547.030 km<sup>2</sup> (7)

*Bevölkerung:* 60.656.178 (5)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 28.700 (15)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,1 Prozent (42)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 259.050 (6)<sup>13</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G-8 (1975), OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), WEU (1954), Eurokorps (1992), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

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13 8.600 Service de santé nicht aufgeführt.



#### **14. Georgien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* März 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,11 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 69.700 km<sup>2</sup> (32)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.677.401 (34)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 3.100 (49)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 9,5 Prozent (5)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 17.770 (36)<sup>14</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1999), EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1993), BSEC.

#### **15. Griechenland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,85 Prozent (20)

*Fläche:* 131.940 km<sup>2</sup> (22)

*Bevölkerung:* 10.668.354 (17)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 21.300 (23)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,7 Prozent (30)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 170.800 (9)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1952), EAPR, EU (1981), WEU (1995), Stabilitätspakt für Südost-europa, SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

#### **16. Großbritannien und Nordirland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 9,1 Prozent (1)

*Fläche:* 244.820 km<sup>2</sup> (17)

*Bevölkerung:* 60.441.457 (6)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 29.600 (12)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,2 Prozent (35)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 207.630 (7)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G-8 (1975), OECD (1961), Euro-parat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1973), WEU (1954), Euro-arkti-scher-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

#### **17. Heiliger Stuhl**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (43)

*Fläche:* 0 km<sup>2</sup> (55)

*Bevölkerung:* 932 (55)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* k.A.

*BIP-Wachstum:* k.A.

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14    Geschätzt.

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 110 (49)<sup>15</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* keine.

## **18. Irland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,65 Prozent (25)

*Fläche:* 70.280 km<sup>2</sup> (31)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.015.676 (39)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 31.900 (7)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 5,1 Prozent (24)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 10.460 (40)<sup>16</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), EAPR, PfP (1999), EU (1973), WEU-Beobachter (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **19. Island**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)

*Fläche:* 103.000 km<sup>2</sup> (24)

*Bevölkerung:* 296.737 (50)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 31.900 (7)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,8 Prozent (46)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1950), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU-Assoziierungsabkommen (1996), Assoziiertes WEU-Mitglied (1992), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1995).

## **20. Italien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 9,1 Prozent (1)

*Fläche:* 301.230 km<sup>2</sup> (16)

*Bevölkerung:* 58.103.033 (7)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 27.700 (18)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,3 Prozent (49)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 194.000 (8)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G-8 (1975), OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), WEU (1954), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1989).

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15 Sollstärke 100-110 Schweizer Gardisten, [http://www.vatican.va/news\\_services/press/documentazione/documents/sp\\_ss\\_scv/informazione\\_generale/guardia-svizzera\\_it.html](http://www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/sp_ss_scv/informazione_generale/guardia-svizzera_it.html).

16 Geschätzt.

## **21. Kanada**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 5,45 Prozent (7)

*Fläche:* 9.984.670 km<sup>2</sup> (2)

*Bevölkerung:* 32.805.041 (11)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 31.500 (9)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,4 Prozent (40)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 52.300 (20)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G-8 (1976), OECD (1961), NATO (1949), EAPR, Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, NAFTA.

## **22. Kasachstan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,42 Prozent (29)

*Fläche:* 2.717.300 km<sup>2</sup> (4)

*Bevölkerung:* 15.185.844 (15)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 7.800 (38)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 9,1 Prozent (6)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 65.800 (16)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991).

## **23. Kirgisistan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,11 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 198.500 km<sup>2</sup> (20)

*Bevölkerung:* 5.146.281 (32)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 1.700 (53)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 6 Prozent (18)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 12.500 (39)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991).

## **24. Kroatien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* März 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)

*Fläche:* 56.542 km<sup>2</sup> (35)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.495.904 (36)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 11.200 (35)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,7 Prozent (30)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 20.800 (34)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1996), EAPR, PfP (2000), EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen (2004), SAA (2001), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1992), SECI, SEECP.

## **25. Lettland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* September 1991

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)

*Fläche:* 64.589 km<sup>2</sup> (34)

*Bevölkerung:* 2.290.237 (43)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 11.500 (34)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 7,6 Prozent (10)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 4.880 (45)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), NATO (2004), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (2004), Assoziierter WEU-Partner (1994), Baltischer Rat, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **26. Liechtenstein**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (43)

*Fläche:* 160 km<sup>2</sup> (52)

*Bevölkerung:* 33.717 (52)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 25.000 (21)<sup>17</sup>

*BIP-Wachstum:* 11 Prozent (2)<sup>18</sup>

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine<sup>19</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1978), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen (1995), seit 1923 Rechts-, Wirtschafts-, und Währungs-gemeinschaft mit der Schweiz.

## **27. Litauen**

*Beitrittsdatum:* September 1991

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)

*Fläche:* 65.200 km<sup>2</sup> (33)

*Bevölkerung:* 3.596.617 (40)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 12.500 (32)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 6,6 Prozent (15)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 13.510 (38)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (2004), Assoziierter WEU-Partner (1994), Baltischer Rat, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **28. Luxemburg**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,55 Prozent (26)

*Fläche:* 2.586 km<sup>2</sup> (49)

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<sup>17</sup> 1999 geschätzt

<sup>18</sup> 1999 geschätzt

<sup>19</sup> 1868 wurde das Militär aufgelöst, <http://www.liechtenstein.li/pdf-fl-multimedia-information-liechtenstein-bildschirm.pdf>.

*Bevölkerung:* 468.571 (48)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 58.900 (1)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,3 Prozent (41)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 900 (48)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), WEU (1954), Eurokorps (1996), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **29. Malta**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (43)  
*Fläche:* 316 km<sup>2</sup> (51)  
*Bevölkerung:* 398.534 (49)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 18.200 (26)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 1 Prozent (53)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 2.140 (47)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1965), EU (2004).

### **30. Mazedonien, Ehemalige Jugoslawische Republik**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Oktober 1995  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)  
*Fläche:* 25.333 km<sup>2</sup> (46)  
*Bevölkerung:* 2.045.262 (44)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 7.100 (41)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,3 Prozent (49)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 10.890 (37)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1995), SAP, SAA (2001), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1993), SECI, SEECP.

### **31. Moldau**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,11 Prozent (49)  
*Fläche:* 33.843 km<sup>2</sup> (42)  
*Bevölkerung:* 4.455.421 (37)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 1.900 (51)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 6,8 Prozent (13)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 6.809 (41)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1996), SECI, BSEC.

### **32. Monaco**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (43)

*Fläche:* 1,95 km<sup>2</sup> (54)

*Bevölkerung:* 32.409 (53)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 27.000 (19)<sup>20</sup>

*BIP-Wachstum:* 0,9 Prozent (54)<sup>21</sup>

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2004), gehört über Sonderabkommen mit Frankreich dem Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsraum an.

### **33. Niederlande**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 3,8 Prozent (9)

*Fläche:* 41.526 km<sup>2</sup> (40)

*Bevölkerung:* 16.407.491 (14)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 29.500 (13)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,2 Prozent (51)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 53.130 (19)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), WEU (1954), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **34. Norwegen**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 2,25 Prozent (14)

*Fläche:* 324.220 km<sup>2</sup> (14)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.593.041 (35)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 40.000 (3)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,3 Prozent (34)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 26.600 (30)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU-Assoziierungsabkommen (1996), Assoziiertes WEU-Mitglied (1992), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **35. Österreich**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 2,3 Prozent (13)

*Fläche:* 83.870 km<sup>2</sup> (29)

*Bevölkerung:* 8.184.691 (24)

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20 2000 geschätzt

21 2000 geschätzt

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 31.300 (10)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,9 Prozent (45)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 35.000 (25)<sup>22</sup>  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1956), EAPR, PfP (1995), EU (1995), WEU-Beobachter (1995), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1989).

### **36. Polen**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 1,4 Prozent (17)  
*Fläche:* 312.685 km<sup>2</sup> (15)  
*Bevölkerung:* 38.557.984 (10)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 12.000 (33)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 5,6 Prozent (20)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 141.500 (10)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1996), Europarat (1991), NATO (1999), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (2004), Assoziiertes WEU-Mitglied (1992), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1991).

### **37. Portugal**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,85 Prozent (20)  
*Fläche:* 92.391 km<sup>2</sup> (27)  
*Bevölkerung:* 10.566.212 (18)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 17.900 (27)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,1 Prozent (52)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 44.900 (22)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1976), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1986), WEU (1990), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **38. Rumänien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,7 Prozent (22)  
*Fläche:* 237.500 km<sup>2</sup> (18)  
*Bevölkerung:* 22.329.977 (13)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 7.700 (39)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 8,1 Prozent (9)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 97.200 (12)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen (1999), EU-Assoziierungsab-

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22 Circaangabe.

kommen (1993), Assoziierter WEU-Partner (1994), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1995), SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

### **39. Russische Föderation**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 9 Prozent (5)

*Fläche:* 17.075.200 km<sup>2</sup> (1)

*Bevölkerung:* 143.420.309 (2)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 9.800 (36)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 6,7 Prozent (14)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 1.212.700 (2)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G-8 (1998), Europarat (1996), EAPR, PfP (1994), NATO-Russland-Rat (2002), GUS (1991), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, BSEC.

### **40. San Marino**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (43)

*Fläche:* 61 km<sup>2</sup> (53)

*Bevölkerung:* 28.880 (54)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 34.600 (4)<sup>23</sup>

*BIP-Wachstum:* 7,5 Prozent (11)<sup>24</sup>

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1988).

### **41. Schweden**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 3,55 Prozent (10)

*Fläche:* 449.964 km<sup>2</sup> (10)

*Bevölkerung:* 9.001.774 (23)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 28.400 (17)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,6 Prozent (33)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 27.600 (28)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (1995), WEU-Beobachter (1995), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **42. Schweiz**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 2,45 Prozent (12)

*Fläche:* 41.290 km<sup>2</sup> (41)

*Bevölkerung:* 7.489.370 (26)

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23 2001 geschätzt

24 2001 geschätzt



*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 33.800 (5)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,8 Prozent (46)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 4.000 (46)<sup>25</sup>  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1963), EAPR, PfP (1996), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen (per Referendum abgelehnt), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

#### **43. Serbien und Montenegro**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)  
*Fläche:* 102.350 km<sup>2</sup> (25)  
*Bevölkerung:* 10.829.175 (16)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 2.400 (50)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 6,5 Prozent (16)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 65.300 (13)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2003), SAP, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1989/2000), SECI, SEECF.

#### **44. Slowakische Republik**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1993  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,33 Prozent (31)  
*Fläche:* 48.845 km<sup>2</sup> (37)  
*Bevölkerung:* 5.431.363 (30)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 14.500 (30)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 5,3 Prozent (22)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 20.195 (32)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (2000), Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (2004), Assoziierter WEU-Partner (1994), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1990/1993).

#### **45. Slowenien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* März 1992  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)  
*Fläche:* 20.273 km<sup>2</sup> (47)  
*Bevölkerung:* 2.011.070 (45)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 19.600 (25)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,9 Prozent (28)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 6.550 (42)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (2004), Assoziierter WEU-Partner (1994), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1992), SECI.

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25 Zusätzlich 24.000 Rekruten, die zweimal jährlich für jeweils 15 Wochen eingezogen wurden.

#### **46. Spanien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 4 Prozent (8)

*Fläche:* 504.782 km<sup>2</sup> (8)

*Bevölkerung:* 40.341.462 (9)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 23.300 (22)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,6 Prozent (38)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 150.700 (11)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1977), NATO (1982), EAPR, EU (1986), WEU (1990), Eurokorps (1994), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

#### **47. Tadschikistan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,11 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 143.100 km<sup>2</sup> (21)

*Bevölkerung:* 7.163.506 (28)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 1.100 (54)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 10,5 Prozent (3)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 7.600 (43)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (2002), GUS (1991).

#### **48. Tschechische Republik**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1993

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,67 Prozent (24)

*Fläche:* 78.866 km<sup>2</sup> (30)

*Bevölkerung:* 10.241.138 (21)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 16.800 (28)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,7 Prozent (30)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 45.000 (17)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1995), Europarat (1993), NATO (1999), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (2004), Assoziiertes WEU-Mitglied (1999), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1990/1993).

#### **49. Türkei**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 1 Prozent (18)

*Fläche:* 780.580 km<sup>2</sup> (5)

*Bevölkerung:* 69.660.559 (4)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 7.400 (40)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 8,2 Prozent (8)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 514.850 (3)<sup>26</sup>

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26    Geschätzt, wird abgebaut.

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1952), EAPR, EU-Bewerber (1987), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen (1964), Assoziiertes WEU-Mitglied (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

## **50. Turkmenistan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,11 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 488.100 km<sup>2</sup> (9)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.952.081 (33)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 5.700 (45)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 7,5 Prozent (11)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 26.000 (27)<sup>27</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991).

## **51. Ukraine**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,95 Prozent (19)

*Fläche:* 603.700 km<sup>2</sup> (6)

*Bevölkerung:* 46.996.765 (8)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 6.300 (44)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 12 Prozent (1)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 272.500 (4)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1994), NATO-Ukraine-Charta (1997), GUS (1991), ZEI (1995), BSEC.

## **52. Ungarn**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,7 Prozent (22)

*Fläche:* 93.030 km<sup>2</sup> (26)

*Bevölkerung:* 10.006.835 (22)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 14.900 (29)

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,9 Prozent (28)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 32.300 (26)<sup>28</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1996), Europarat (1990), NATO (1999), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (2004), Assoziiertes WEU-Mitglied (1999), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1989), SECI.

## **53. USA**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 9 Prozent (5)

*Fläche:* 9.631.418 km<sup>2</sup> (3)

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27    Geschätzt.

28    Geschätzt.

*Bevölkerung:* 295.734.134 (1)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 40.100 (2)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 4,4 Prozent (26)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 1.433.600 (1)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G-8 (1975), OECD (1961), NATO (1949), EAPR, Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, NAFTA.

#### **54. Usbekistan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,41 Prozent (30)  
*Fläche:* 447.400 km<sup>2</sup> (11)  
*Bevölkerung:* 26.851.195 (12)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 1.800 (52)  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 4,4 Prozent (26)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 55.000 (18)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991).

#### **55. Zypern**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (32)  
*Fläche:* 9.250 km<sup>2</sup> (48)<sup>29</sup>  
*Bevölkerung:* 780.133 (47)<sup>30</sup>  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 20.300  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,2 Prozent (35)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* griechischer Teil: 10.000, türkischer Teil: 5.000  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1961), EU (2004), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

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Beitrittsdatum:

[http://www.osce.org/general/participating\\_states/](http://www.osce.org/general/participating_states/)

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:

*OSZE Beschluss 468 des Ständigen Rates (PC.DEC/468)*

<http://www.osce.org/docs/german/pc/2002/decisions/pcgd468.pdf>

Fläche:

*CIA World Factbook 2005*

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2147rank.txt>

Bevölkerung:

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29 Griechischer Teil: 5.895 km<sup>2</sup>, türkischer Teil: 3.355 km<sup>2</sup>.

30 Griechischer und türkischer Teil Zyperns zusammen.

*CIA World Factbook 2005*

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2119rank.txt>

(Schätzungen für Juli 2005)

BIP pro Kopf in Dollar nach PPP:

*CIA World Factbook 2005*

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2004rank.txt> (soweit nicht anders angegeben Schätzungen für 2004 bezogen auf die Bevölkerung am 1. Juli desselben Jahres.)

BIP-Wachstum:

*CIA World Factbook 2005*

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Streitkräfte (aktive):

*International Institute for Strategic Studies (Hrsg.), The Military Balance 2004-2005, London 2004*



## OSZE – Tagungen, Treffen, Termine 2004/2005

### 2004

26. August	OSZE-Seminar zum Thema „Bekämpfung des Menschenhandels“, Baku.
27.-28. August	Konferenz über Medienfreiheit im Internet, Amsterdam.
7.-9. September	Expertenkonferenz zur Grenzverwaltung und -sicherheit, Wien.
13.-14. September	OSZE-Konferenz zum Thema „Toleranz und Bekämpfung von Rassismus, Fremdenhass und Diskriminierung“, Brüssel.
17. September	Besuch des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE Solomon Passy in Russland.
19. September	OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Parlamentswahlen in Kasachstan.
23.-24. September	Konferenz zum Thema „Gewährleistung des Menschenrechtsschutzes in den Bestimmungsländern: Unterbindung des Menschenhandels“, Helsinki.
29. September-2. Oktober	Herbsttreffen der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE mit dem Themenschwerpunkt Menschhandel, Rhodos.
2. Oktober	OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Kommunalwahlen in Bosnien und Herzegowina.
4.-15. Oktober	Neuntes OSZE/BDIMR-Implementierungstreffen zu Fragen der menschlichen Dimension, Warschau.
9. Oktober	OSZE/BDIMR entsenden ein Wahlunterstützungsteam zu den Präsidentschaftswahlen nach Afghanistan.
17. Oktober	OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Parlamentswahlen in Belarus.
18.-21. Oktober	Reise des OSZE-Beauftragten für Medienfreiheit Miklós Haraszti nach Moldau.
25.-26. Oktober	Die OSZE-Mission in Georgien und der Medienbeauftragte der OSZE veranstalten die erste Medienkonferenz im Südkaukasus, Tiflis.
28. Oktober	Der Medienbeauftragte der OSZE und der Europarat veranstalten einen runden Tisch zum Thema Medienfreiheit, Baku.

- 31. Oktober OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Ukraine.
- 2. November OSZE/BDIMR-Beobachtung der Präsidentschaftswahlen in den USA.
- 4.-5. November Zusätzliches Treffen zur menschlichen Dimension zum Thema „Binnenvertriebene in der OSZE-Region“, Wien.
- 7. November OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung des Referendums in der ehemaligen jugoslawischen Republik Mazedonien.
- 8.-9. November Erstes Vorbereitungstreffen für das 13. Wirtschaftsforum über „Demographische Trends, Migration und die Integration von Angehörigen nationaler Minderheiten“, Triest.
- 18.-19. November Mittelmeerseminar zum Thema „Bedrohung der Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert“, Sharm-el-Sheikh.
- 21. November OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der zweiten Runde der Präsidentschaftswahlen in der Ukraine.
- 6. Dezember Der VN-Sonderberichterstatter zur Förderung und zum Schutz der Meinungsfreiheit, der Sonderberichterstatter der OAS für Fragen der freien Meinungsäußerung und der Medienbeauftragte der OSZE unterzeichnen eine gemeinsame Erklärung über den Zugang zu Informationen, London.
- 6.-7. Dezember Zwölftes Treffen des OSZE-Ministerrats, Sofia.
- 13.-15. Dezember Besuch des Hohen Kommissars für nationale Minderheiten (HKNM) in Turkmenistan
- 26. Dezember Eingeschränkte OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Parlamentswahlen in Usbekistan.
- 26. Dezember OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Wiederholung der zweiten Runde der Präsidentschaftswahl in der Ukraine.

## 2005

- 1. Januar Slowenien übernimmt den OSZE-Vorsitz von Bulgarien. Amtierender Vorsitzender wird der slowenische Außenminister Dimitrij Rupel.
- 5. Januar Besuch des Amtierenden OSZE-Vorsitzenden in der Ukraine.
- 10. Januar Besuch des amtierenden OSZE-Vorsitzenden im Kosovo.
- 14. Januar Treffen der OSZE-Troika, Wien.
- 18. Januar Jährliches hochrangiges Dreiertreffen zwischen den Vereinten Nationen, dem Europarat und der OSZE.
- 24.-25. Januar Besuch des OSZE-Beauftragten für Medienfreiheit in Serbien-Montenegro.



24.-25. Januar	Zweites Vorbereitungstreffen für das 13. OSZE-Wirtschaftsforum zum Thema „Wirtschafts-, Umwelt-, Sicherheits- und menschliche Aspekte der Migration“, Almaty.
26. Januar	Der Amtierende Vorsitzende der OSZE besucht das NATO-Hauptquartier, Brüssel.
31. Januar-6. Februar	Eine Erkundungsmission der Minsker Gruppe der OSZE besucht die sieben besetzten Regionen Aserbaidschans.
1. Februar	Besuch des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE in Russland.
7. Februar	Besuch des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE in Serbien.
9.-11. Februar	Besuch des OSZE-Beauftragten für Medienfreiheit in Belarus.
14.-16. Februar	Erste Überprüfungskonferenz des Vertrags über den offenen Himmel, Wien.
15.-16. Februar	Besuch des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE in Kasachstan und Usbekistan.
17. Februar	Erstes Treffen des Weisenrats zur Stärkung der Wirksamkeit der OSZE, Brdo.
23. Februar	14. hochrangiges Treffen zwischen OSZE und Europarat, Straßburg.
24.-25. Februar	Viertes Wintertreffen der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE, Wien.
27. Februar	OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Parlamentswahlen in Tadschikistan.
27. Februar	OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Parlamentswahlen in Kirgisistan.
28. Februar	Expertentreffen zum Thema „Unterstützung und Schutz für die Opfer des Menschenhandels“, Wien.
4.-5. März	Besuch des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE in Serbien und Montenegro.
6. März	OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Parlamentswahlen in Moldau.
6.-9. März	Besuch des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE in den USA.
8.-9. März	15. jährliches Treffen zur Beurteilung der Durchführung des Wiener Dokuments, Wien.
10.-11. März	Drittes Vorbereitungstreffen für das 13. OSZE-Wirtschaftsforum zum Thema „Integration von Angehörigen nationaler Minderheiten“, Kiew.
13. März	OSZE/BDMIR-Beobachtung der Kommunalwahlen in der ehemaligen jugoslawischen Republik Mazedonien.

14. März	Besuch des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE in Moldau.
18. März	Konferenz des Bündnisses gegen den Menschenhandel zum Thema „Handel mit Kindern“, Wien.
25. März	Besuch des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE im Kosovo.
31. März – 2. April	Der Amtierende Vorsitzende der OSZE besucht Armenien, Aserbaidshan und Georgien.
21.-22. April	Zusätzliches Treffen zur menschlichen Dimension über die Anforderungen an Wahltechnologien und -verfahren, Wien.
25.-26. April	OSZE-Korea-Konferenz zum Thema „Neue Sicherheitsbedrohungen und neue Sicherheitsparadigmen“, Seoul.
28. April	OSZE-Konferenz über Gewalt gegen Frauen, Paris.
2. Mai – 11. Juli	Wahlbeobachtungsmission der Präsidentschaftswahl in Kirgisistan.
12.-14. Mai	Vierte subregionale Konferenz der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE zum Thema „Der hohe Norden: Umwelt, Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit“, Tromsø.
13. Mai – 4. Juli	Wahlbeobachtung der Parlamentswahlen in Albanien
23.-27. Mai	13. Treffen des Wirtschaftsforums zum Thema „Demographische Trends, Migration und die Integration von Angehörigen nationaler Minderheiten“, Prag.
26. Mai	Internationale Konferenz zum Thema Menschenhandel, Belgrad.
30. Mai	Der HKNM besucht Turkmenistan.
8.-9. Juni	OSZE-Konferenz zum Thema „Antisemitismus und weitere Formen der Intoleranz“, Córdoba.
17.-18. Juni	Dritte Internet-Konferenz des OSZE-Medienbeauftragten über Medienfreiheit im Internet, Amsterdam.
21.-22. Juni	Dritte Jährliche Sicherheitsüberprüfungskonferenz, Wien.
1.-5. Juli	14. Jahrestagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung, Washington D.C.
14.-15. Juli	Zusätzliches Treffen zur menschlichen Dimension zum Thema „Menschenrechte und der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus“, Wien.

*Ute Runge*

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## Abkürzungsverzeichnis

ACAC	Albanian Coalition Against Corruption
ACEEEO	Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials/Vereinigung der mittel- und osteuropäischen Wahlorganisationen
AIAM	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (VSBM)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations/Verband südostasiatischer Staaten
ATAU	Anti-Trafficking Assistance Unit/Sondergruppe zur Bekämpfung des Menschenhandels
ATU	Action against Terrorism Unit/Antiterrorgruppe (OSZE-Sekretariat)
AU	African Union/Afrikanische Union
BDIMR/ ODIHR	Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte/ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
BOMCA	Border Management Programme for Central Asia/Programm zur Grenzverwaltung in Zentralasien (EU)
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Co-operation/Schwarzmeer-Kooperationspakt
CACO	Central Asian Cooperation Organization
CAEC	Central Asian Economic Community
CAEU	Central Asian Economic Union
CALO	Central Asian Liaison Office/OSZE-Verbindungsbüro in Zentralasien
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation/Gemeinschaftshilfeprogramm für Wiederaufbau, Entwicklung und Stabilisierung (EU)
CAREC	Central Asian Regional Environment Centre (TACIS)
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States/Rat der Ostseestaaten
CEC	Central Elections Commission/Zentrale Wahlkommission
CEEA	Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities/Koordinator für ökonomische und ökologische Aktivitäten der OSZE
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI/ZEI	Central European Initiative/Zentraleuropäische Initiative
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia/Konferenz über Interaktion und vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen in Asien
COPI	Citizen Outreach and Participation Initiative (Bosnien und Herzegowina)

CORE	Centre for OSCE Research/Zentrum für OSZE Forschung
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization/Organisation des kollektiven Sicherheitsvertrages
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Committee/Ausschuss für Terrorismusbekämpfung (VN-Sicherheitsrat)
EAPR	Euro-Atlantischer Partnerschaftsrat
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
ECRI	European Commission against Racism and Intolerance/Europäische Kommission gegen Rassismus und Intoleranz (Europarat)
EED	Economic and Environmental Dimension/Wirtschafts- und Umweltdimension
EGMR	Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte
EHU	European Humanities University/Europäische Humanistische Universität (Belarus)
EMRK	Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten (Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention)
ENVSEC	Environment and Security Initiative/Umwelt- und Sicherheitsinitiative
ESVP	Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik
EU	Europäische Union
EU BAM	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine/EU-Grenzmission Moldau/Ukraine
EUMC	European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia/Europäische Stelle zur Beobachtung von Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
FOM	Representative on Freedom of the Media/Beauftragter für Medienfreiheit
FSK	Forum für Sicherheitskooperation
G8-Staaten	Gruppe der Acht (Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Italien, Japan, Kanada, Russland, USA)
GASP	Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (EU)
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
GUAM-Staaten	Georgien, Ukraine, Aserbaidshan, Moldau
GUS	Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten
HKNM	Hoher Kommissar für nationale Minderheiten
IAEA/IAEO	International Atomic Energy Agency/Internationale Atom-Energie-Organisation
IBU	Islamische Bewegung Usbekistans
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization

ICTY/IStGJ	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia/ Internationaler Strafgerichtshof für das ehemalige Jugoslawien
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IGH	Internationaler Gerichtshof
IHF	International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights
IISEPS	Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (Belarus)
IKRK	Internationales Komitee vom Roten Kreuz
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF/IWF	International Monetary Fund/Internationaler Währungsfonds
Interforza	Italian Interforce Police Liaison Office in Albania
IOM	Internationale Organisation für Migration
IPBPR	Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte
IRMA	Integrated Resource Management/Integriertes Ressourcen- management
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
IStGJ/ICTY	Internationaler Strafgerichtshof für das ehemalige Jugosla- wien/International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo- slavia
IWF/IMF	Internationaler Währungsfonds/International Monetary Fund
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Besopasnosti/Komitee für Staats- sicherheit
KPdSU	Kommunistische Partei der Sowjetunion
KSE	Vertrag über Konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa
KSZE	Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (seit 1. Januar 1995 OSZE)
KVAE	Stockholmer Konferenz über Vertrauens- und Sicherheitsbildende Maßnahmen und Abrüstung in Europa
KVZ	Konfliktverhütungszentrum
LSI	Levizja Socialiste per Integrim/Sozialistische Bewegung für Integration (Albanien)
LTOs	Long-Term Observers/Langzeitwahlbeobachter
MANPADS	Man-portable air defence systems/tragbare Luftabwehr- systeme
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions/Konferenz über bei- derseitige und ausgewogene Truppenverminderungen in Mitteleuropa
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Nordatlantikvertrags- Organisation

NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations/nichtstaatliche Organisationen
NNCSDC	National Network of Civil Society Development Centres (Albania)
NPT/NVV	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty/Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen
NRMs	National referral mechanisms/Zuweisungsmechanismen
OAS	Organization of American States/Organisation Amerikanischer Staaten
OAU/AU	Organization of African Unity/African Union/Organisation für Afrikanische Einheit/Afrikanische Union
OCEEA	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities/Büro des Koordinators für ökonomische und ökologische Aktivitäten der OSZE
ODIHR/ BDIMR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights/Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Organisation für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit
OHCHR	Office of the (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHR	Office of the High Representative/Büro des Hohen Repräsentanten
OIC/OIK	Organization of the Islamic Conference/Organisation der Islamischen Konferenz
OSZE	Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PAMECA	Police Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania/EG-Mission zur Unterstützung der Polizei in Albanien
PCC	Project Co-ordination Cell/Gruppe Projektkoordination (im Konfliktverhütungszentrum)
PfP	Partnership for Peace/Partnerschaft für den Frieden (NATO)
PKK	Arbeiterpartei Kurdistans
PLIP	Property Law Implementation Plan/Plan zur Umsetzung des Eigentumsgesetzes (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
PMSC/AHG	Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping/Politisch-Militärischer Lenkungsausschuss/Ad-hoc-Gruppe für Zusammenarbeit bei der Friedenserhaltung (NATO)
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team (Afghanistan)
PV	Parlamentarische Versammlung (OSZE)
RATS	Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (SCO)
RSFSR	Russische Sozialistische Föderative Sowjetrepublik



SAA	Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsabkommen (EU)
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons/Kleinwaffen und leichte Waffen
SAP	Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozess (EU)
SCO	Shanghai Co-operation Organization/Shanghai-Kooperationsorganisation
SECI	Southeast European Co-operative Initiative/Südosteuropäische Kooperationsinitiative
SEECF	South Eastern European Co-operation Process/Kooperationsprozess in Südosteuropa
SNV	Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers/Niederländische Entwicklungshilfeorganisation
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies (London)
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit/Gruppe „Strategische Polizeiangelegenheiten“ (OSCE-Sekretariat)
SSR	Sozialistische Sowjetrepublik
STOs	Short-Term Observers/Kurzzeitwahlbeobachter
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the CIS (EU)
TRACECA	Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia/Transportkorridor Europa-Kaukasus-Asien
UÇK	Ushtria Çlirimtarë e Kosovës/Kosovo-Befreiungsarmee
UK	United Kingdom/Vereinigtes Königreich
UN/UNO/VN	United Nations/United Nations Organization/Vereinte Nationen
UNCERD	United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCHR/ UNOHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (vormals UNODCCP)
UNODCCP	United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (seit 1. Oktober 2002 UNODC)

UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USA	United States of America/Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VBM	Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen
VSBM	Vertrauens- und sicherheitsbildenden Maßnahmen
VICS	Verification and Implementation Coordination Section/ NATO-Referat für konventionelle Rüstungskontrolle und Verifikationskoordinierung
VN	Vereinte Nationen
WTO/WHO	World Trade Organization/Welthandelsorganisation
YES	Young Entrepreneurs Scheme/Programm „Seminare für Jungunternehmer“ (Georgien)

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