

## Anhang



# Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community

*From Vision to Reality*

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*Purpose of the Report*

In late 2011, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany, France, Poland and the Russian Federation asked the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Russian Foreign Ministry (MGIMO) to organize a series of workshops in order to advance the discussion on the future character of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community and to present a report with recommendations to the participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna. With their initiative, the Ministers took up the idea of establishing a network of academic institutions, a proposal made by OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier during his inaugural speech to the Permanent Council on 4 July 2011.

The purpose of this report is to contribute to a critical and illuminating debate on the conceptualization of a security community. We are fully aware that, as we present this report, Europe in particular is going through a fundamental economic and political crisis. However, we believe that the very fact of this crisis makes the objective of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community and the benefits it offers all the more urgent and necessary.

This report builds on four workshops held in Berlin, Warsaw, Paris and Moscow from March through July 2012. The workshops were attended by a total of about 300 participants and guests from 40 countries and four international organizations. The working group established by the four institutes benefitted from additional meetings with officials in each of the four capitals.

The institutes have also greatly profited from co-operation with the Foreign Ministries of the four countries, including their Permanent Delegations to the OSCE, and from the assistance given by the Irish OSCE Chairmanship. Outstanding contributions were made at the workshops and in discussions by Minister Guido Westerwelle, former Ministers Igor Ivanov and Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Deputy Minister Bogusław Winid, Deputy Minister Alexander Grushko, and former State Secretary Wolfgang Ischinger. The discussions at all workshops were most informal and deeply enriching. The participants and guests at the workshops deserve a special acknowledgement for this. Any shortcomings in this report are the sole responsibility of its authors.

### *Executive Summary*

The vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, as advanced by the 2010 Astana OSCE Summit meeting, is particularly important against the background of the strategic uncertainty the OSCE area faces now and in the future. The global shift in the balance of economic power, the refocusing of international politics towards the Pacific, the crisis of the Euro zone and the uncertainty regarding the future of the European Union and of Russia make the appeal of this vision less plausible than it was twenty-two years ago when the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was adopted.

Against this background, the emergence of a genuine security community throughout the OSCE area cannot be taken for granted. However, the acknowledgement of the challenges ahead only emphasizes the importance of the vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community offered by the OSCE Heads of State or Government. It reminds us that the OSCE participating States can benefit more from coming closer together via increasing convergence in all areas than they can from drifting further apart.

The strategic uncertainties within the OSCE, manifested in political and institutional divergence among the participating States, have increased over the past decade. All participating States appear to share the expectation that developing a security community should make war among its members impossible, regardless of whether they are members of alliances or not. However, states have different views on what needs to be done to achieve this goal. Whereas some concentrate on the traditional politico-military ‘hard security’ issues, others emphasize the primary importance of developing a viable community of values.

If developing a security community is conceptualized as a process rather than as a single act, these two approaches need not be seen as mutually exclusive, but can rather be followed in parallel. A security community cannot be successful if the security or normative concerns of individual states are not appropriately addressed. Nor can it be reduced to inter-state relations or ‘hard security’ issues. A security community can only grow through the active involvement and engagement of the societies at all levels.

Building a security community in the OSCE area cannot be delegated to the OSCE alone. States benefit from the existence of a dense network of European, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian institutions. Despite problems in specific relations, all OSCE participating States work together in multiple institutional settings, whether as full members or associate partners. Building a security community will thus involve a number of different institutional formats. At the same time, being the single most inclusive organization in this area, with a comprehensive mandate, the OSCE has an important role to play in this process.

Starting from its current agenda, the OSCE participating States can contribute to building a security community in the OSCE area by:

1. Preserving the existing arms control *acquis*, further pursuing conventional arms control and substantially modernizing confidence- and security-building measures.
2. Making concerted efforts to solve protracted conflicts, and, as a matter of urgency, to prevent any increase of tensions.
3. Assessing the effects that the situation in Afghanistan may have on the OSCE area after 2014 and appropriately adjusting relevant activities.
4. Promoting long-term reconciliation processes throughout the OSCE area.
5. Further developing the OSCE transnational threats agenda, concentrating on cyber security, countering terrorism, and combating illicit drug trafficking.
6. Developing its own initiatives for dialogue and promoting the implementation of relevant international instruments in the economic and environmental dimension throughout the OSCE area.
7. Improving the effectiveness of the OSCE's human dimension work by monitoring the compliance of all OSCE participating States in an equal manner and by streamlining the human dimension events cycle.
8. Providing a platform for enhancing understanding between states and Muslim communities and engaging with the new political and societal forces of the Arab Spring.
9. Developing an OSCE network of academic institutions to facilitate open debate and communication on the relevant issues on the OSCE agenda.
10. Making better use of the institutional richness in the OSCE area through more effective co-operation, particularly with the organizations in the Eastern part of the OSCE space.

### *I. The Vision of a Security Community*

At their 2010 Astana Summit meeting, the Heads of State or Government of the 56 OSCE participating States committed themselves

“to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals.”

The Astana Commemorative Declaration further elaborates on the concept of “comprehensive, co-operative, equal and indivisible security, which relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and links economic and environmental co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations”. It further develops a vision of a security community which “should be aimed at meeting the challenges of the 21st century”, is “based on full adherence to common OSCE norms, principles and commitments across all three dimensions”, and should “unite all OSCE participating States across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, free of dividing lines, conflicts, spheres of influence and zones with different levels of security”.

With this far-reaching vision, the Astana Commemorative Declaration advanced what the Heads of State or Government had endeavoured to achieve twenty years earlier in the 1990 Charter of Paris:

“The era of confrontation and division in Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation. [...] Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries.”

A security community is a bold vision that can only materialize if states and societies actively pursue this goal. However, the majority of political elites and the broader public have not taken any notice of it. Furthermore, individual states often define the concept of a security community in quite different – even contradictory – terms. Whereas some states believe that the way towards a security community must begin by addressing ‘hard security’ issues, others point out that a genuine security community presupposes the existence of a community of values. Any viable process towards building a security community in the OSCE area will have to reconcile these different approaches.

This report proceeds on the basis of the understanding that a security community stands for a community of states and societies whose values,

social orders and identities converge to such a degree that war among them becomes unthinkable. A security community means stable and lasting peace among states and within societies where there are no longer zones of different security, regardless of whether individual states belong to alliances or not. Disputes are resolved by peaceful means only. The notion of a security community is not limited to relations between states, but includes all sectors and levels of societies that are interconnected by multiple channels of free communication and free movement. It also allows for more effective common responses to shared threats and challenges.

A security community cannot be created by a single founding act, but is rather the result of a long-term process that allows the overcoming of the legacies of the past, the creation of mutual trust, an increase in convergence, and the development of common identities and institutions. A security community is not an alliance directed against any outside state or alliance.

The process towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community extends beyond the OSCE. However, as the most comprehensive and inclusive international organization in its region, the OSCE has to play an important role as a ‘security community-building institution’.

## 2. *Arguments in Favour of a Security Community of the OSCE Participating States*

While individual OSCE participating States may have different visions of a security community and see different rationales for engaging in security-community building, there is solid common ground for the pursuit of this goal.

### *Shared Identity of Europeanness*

All OSCE participating States share an identity of Europeanness, a common history and culture, which builds on a centuries-old heritage of economic exchange and political and cultural communication.

### *Safeguarding Common Principles and Values*

A Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community would safeguard and consolidate our joint principles and values. Starting with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the OSCE participating States committed themselves to a comprehensive *acquis* of shared values and commitments, which they confirmed at the Astana Summit meeting in the context of declaring their support for a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. This common *acquis*, and the shared OSCE institutions, have brought them together and kept them together even in most difficult periods of the OSCE’s history. Although much of the *acquis* remains to be fully implemented, it has continuously contributed to developing and strengthening a sense of a common normative space.

#### *Addressing Transnational Threats and Challenges*

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the OSCE participating States share new threats and challenges which are transnational and often global in nature. Some of them, such as global warming, climate change, cyber security, transnational terrorism and drug trafficking challenge the very foundations of states and societies in the OSCE area. Finding appropriate responses to transnational threats has emerged as an important area of convergence among the OSCE participating States.

#### *Utilizing Economic Complementarity for the Challenge of Modernization*

In a world that is expected to be home to eight billion people by 2025, and which is increasingly shaped by emerging powers, all OSCE participating States have a great deal to gain by strengthening and expanding economic, technological and scientific co-operation with each other, particularly in view of the high level of interdependence and complementarity of their economies. The conjunction in the OSCE area of a wealth of energy and mineral resources, highly developed knowledge-based industries and services, advanced technological development and the capacity for innovation, as well as accumulated human capital, allows the participating States to jointly meet the mounting challenges of competition and modernization in the globalized world.

#### *Setting Global Standards*

With its technological lead, strong institutions and high standards of governance, rule of law and comprehensive transparency, a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community could provide a model for a norm- and rule-based international order.

### *3. Developments in the OSCE Space*

Building a security community in the OSCE area does not start from scratch. Over the past two decades, the process of increasing convergence within the OSCE area has significantly advanced in many areas, although it has been accompanied by repeated setbacks.

#### *The Threat of a Major War – A Feature of the Past*

The greatest achievement of the last two decades is that a major war in Europe between states and alliances – the ever-present threat during the era of East-West confrontation – has become inconceivable. Although differences between states persist, there are no more antagonistic or major ideological divides within the OSCE space. However, the 2008 Georgian-Russian conflict and earlier conflicts have clearly demonstrated that the use of force on a smaller scale is still possible within the OSCE area.

### *Trends towards Convergence*

Almost all OSCE participating States are now market economies, even if their forms vary considerably. The economies within the OSCE space are highly interconnected, and states and societies are aware of this growing interdependence. The ongoing economic and financial crisis has made it evident that the welfare of each society depends on the welfare of all the others.

There has been a remarkable process of normative convergence throughout the OSCE area over the past two decades, even though it has been uneven in terms of implementation. All OSCE participating States have declared their adherence to the same values and norms, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy based on political pluralism and the rule of law. In the Astana Commemorative Declaration, they reaffirmed “categorically and irrevocably that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned”.

Further convergence is resulting from the membership of an increasing number of states in or their co-operation with other international organizations in the OSCE area. Almost all participating States are members of or observers in the Council of Europe. Most of them have become members in the World Trade Organization. And many states that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU) have developed partnership relations of varying degrees of intensity with them.

As far as transnational threats are concerned, there is increasing co-operation among a wide range of organizations. The density of bilateral co-operation between businesses and civil society organizations, as well as of cultural and human contacts in general has increased dramatically. All participating States now share a common information space that allows for a freer flow of information across their borders.

### *Newly Emerging Areas of Divergence*

More recently, however, new lines of divergence have formed between the OSCE participating States. They are pursuing contradictory agendas and disagree on an increasing number of issues. The culture of compromise is in decline. The implementation of the agreed norms and commitments is uneven. The predominance of the security dilemma results in zero-sum games and deep mutual mistrust – many states still share the perception that optimizing one's own security is only possible at the price of less security for others. Despite the declared commitment to indivisible and co-operative security, there are different levels of security within the OSCE space. Already achieved levels of co-operative security are being eroded. Many areas, such as energy, natural resources and migration, have been excessively politicized.

Recent efforts to turn things around, such as the OSCE's Corfu Process, have failed to produce conclusive results.

*Lack of Proper Communication*

Existing differences and contradictions are exacerbated by different underlying patterns of understanding and interpretation. The dominant perception in the West is that the lack of democracy and human rights abuses in post-Soviet states lead to non-co-operative foreign policy. From the Eastern perspective, the Western democracy discourse is seen as part of the traditional pursuit of geopolitics and a remnant of Cold War rhetoric and thinking. Discussions are often of a tactical nature. Open dialogue over strategic interests and objectives does not take place. The result is mutual frustration and the recurring confirmation of mutual mistrust.

*The Effects of the Financial and Economic Crisis*

The overall situation has been further exacerbated by the effects of the current economic and financial crisis. Individual countries and groups of countries tend to turn inwards, are absorbed by addressing their own pressing problems and are less inclined to invest in joint projects, shared institutions and a common future. The crisis has once again highlighted substantial differences in terms of economic output, productivity, the capacity for innovation, employment and welfare as well as of the levels of stateness in the OSCE area. A failure to sincerely address those fundamental challenges and to develop a more sustainable economic model would represent a serious stumbling block for a genuine security community in the OSCE area. On the other hand, working more closely together in identifying appropriate responses to the current crisis would inevitably boost the process of security community-building.

*The Crisis of Institutions*

Almost all international organizations in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space are facing complex challenges. Overcoming the current financial and economic crisis poses an unprecedented challenge to the European Union. The current alternatives are deeper integration or increasing fragmentation. Overcoming the crisis will take time and energy and will have implications for the EU's external engagement.

NATO, for its part, is reassessing its post-Afghanistan role in the context of severe constraints on military spending. The model of consecutive enlargements seems to be exhausted, at least for the time being. The NATO-Russia-Council has failed to play a role in crisis management in the OSCE space.

The OSCE is strongly affected by increasing divergence among its participating States and by the lack of political will for pan-European co-operation. As the most comprehensive and inclusive regional institution, it is,

at the same time, the weakest of the major Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian international organizations. A number of governments have significantly decreased their investments in the OSCE.

The political divergence over the last decade has led to some initial indications of an emerging institutional divide. Russia and other countries in the new East have increasingly invested in different institutions, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Customs Union, which are facing their own challenges as well.

Against this background, security community-building would require that the OSCE participating States increasingly invest in interconnecting the existing institutions in a more co-operative and efficient way.

#### *Unfinished Integration Processes*

Although integration within the OSCE space has advanced significantly since the early 1990s, it has remained unfinished. Russia and the West are no longer enemies, but they have not yet become genuine partners. There has not been much progress in shaping a new treaty on the strategic partnership between the European Union and the Russian Federation. NATO-Russia relations have remained fragile and do not live up to the 2010 Lisbon Summit promise to open “a new stage of co-operation towards a true strategic partnership”. The progress achieved to date has not been sufficiently translated into resolving existing problems and conflicts.

Turkey is facing comparable integration deficits. Prospects for EU accession are uncertain and negotiations with the EU Commission have, so far, yielded only little progress. At the same time, Turkey is taking on a new role as a regional power.

#### *No Solutions for Conflicts*

The protracted conflicts have not been solved mainly because of unilateral strategies used by the parties to these conflicts and their lack of political will to find compromises. Lack of initiative and leadership plus vested interests in the continuation and instrumentalization of these conflicts have allowed many regressive steps and prevented any major breakthrough. The use of force in sub-regional conflicts is no longer taboo. Despite the efforts of the Minsk Group, a potential war over Nagorno-Karabakh is a possibility that could entail a significant danger of escalation, particularly in case of the inclusion of relevant regional powers. While conflicts in the South Caucasus, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe have not been fully resolved, new ones are looming. There is a risk of a possible spillover of conflicts from the regions adjacent to the OSCE area.

#### *Stagnation in Arms Control*

Since 1990, Europe has made historical progress in reducing its armed forces. Arms control has been one of the drivers of political rapprochement and co-

operation. However, in recent years, arms control has degenerated from an instrument of co-operative security into a bone of contention. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), once hailed as the ‘cornerstone of European security’, is no longer functioning properly. Discussions aiming to unlock the situation have ended in stalemate. Success in modernizing the Vienna Document has been quite limited. The functioning of the Open Skies Treaty is hampered by disputes between individual states. The situation has been further complicated by the emergence of new issues, subjects of concern raised by various participating States, which have not yet been addressed in a proper way, such as missile defence deployments or tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Nevertheless, the level of military transparency has remained comparatively high.

*Challenges for the Observance of Human Dimension Commitments*

Respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law, which, according to the 1999 OSCE Charter for European Security, “is at the core of the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of security”, is continuously confronted with old and new challenges. The process of democratization has been slower, less consistent and more contradictory than originally expected. A number of autocratic regimes persist in the OSCE area and have consolidated their rule. Key ingredients of democratic governance, such as the rule of law and freedom of the media are increasingly challenged throughout the OSCE area. Human rights are often abused in the context of combating terrorism. The defence of human dignity remains a fundamental challenge throughout the OSCE space. Progress in the human dimension is an indispensable element for increasing convergence among the OSCE participating States and thus for the growth of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

*Progress Insufficiently Translated into Joint Action*

The current situation in the OSCE space is ambiguous. Advances towards greater convergence are paralleled by divergences preventing joint action. The main divergence is political and concerns a lack of cohesive policy approaches to many issues in various fields. This opens up space for parochial vested interests to create vicious cycles of old problems, old behaviour and new mistrust. Positive change requires continuous and energetic engagement by both political leaderships and societies. The building of a security community would help to narrow and close old and new gaps and the divergences currently dividing the OSCE participating States by promoting greater cohesion and convergence.

4. *The Way towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: Guiding Principles of a Strategy*

Drafting a detailed strategy for developing a security community in the OSCE area goes beyond the scope of this report. We will therefore focus here on some guidelines that can direct the process towards building a security community.

*First:* Economic interdependence, even if it is strong, does not lead automatically to peace and stability. Asymmetric interdependence can even produce conflicts. One therefore cannot rely on economic factors alone. Rather, states and societies must take political action. Peace is not the result of benign conditions alone. Whoever wants peace has to *make* peace through direct, focused and sustained action.

*Second:* Progress towards a security community is achieved through increasing convergence and overcoming divergence among the OSCE participating States and their societies with respect to reducing existing security concerns and broadening shared interests, values and identities as the basis for lasting peaceful behaviour. Pursuing the objective of a security community therefore requires enhancing the whole OSCE *acquis* in all its dimensions and a qualitatively better implementation of these commitments.

*Third:* Shaping the process towards a security community is more important than striving for quick fixes. A security community is not established by a single founding act. The task is not to fix the *status quo*, but rather to manage the process of ongoing change and gradually direct it towards a security community.

*Fourth:* It is essential to address as many issues as possible in parallel. Substantive results should be accompanied by efforts towards reconciliation and the reduction of mistrust among and within states and communities. Agreements of all kinds in as many sectors as possible – regimes, politically binding agreements, legally binding treaties etc. – add up over time to an ever denser network of mutual ties and commitments that enhance trust and make wars and violent conflicts practically impossible. This is reflected by the fact that no one – governments and peoples alike – any longer expects organized acts of violence by another state or any relevant societal group. If this state of affairs is established and assured over a longer period, one can speak of a security community.

*Fifth:* There should be a balance between items of the old agenda inherited from the Cold War and a new agenda related to forthcoming challenges and opportunities, including transnational threats. Neither of these agendas can be neglected. Rather, they should be dealt with in parallel. Elements of the new agenda including reconciliation, which deals with a legacy issue in a novel way, should increase in importance.

*Sixth:* It is important to address both potential game changers, such as developing co-operative missile defence, and relatively non-controversial

issues. Focusing on game changers alone runs the risk of their turning into spoilers where no political breakthrough can be achieved. In the same way, it is important to pursue, in a balanced way, long-term objectives, such as reconciliation, and short-term goals that can yield results relatively quickly. Early successes of any kind – even small ones – are essential, because the existing mistrust can only be reduced by deeds, not by mere declarations.

*Seventh:* It is imperative to depoliticize controversial issues – in general and in all individual issue areas. The degree of de-politicization achieved can be seen as a sign of success on the way towards a security community.

*Eighth:* We need a change in thinking. So-called ‘soft issues’ such as reconciliation, the rule of law including international law, people-to-people-contacts, expert communities and business co-operation might prove more important, in the long term, than so-called ‘hard security’ issues. This is the case because the main task ahead is changing ways of thinking, values and identities. This is even true for ‘hard security’ issues such as arms control, where the creation of transparency and trust and the establishment of firm bonds of co-operation are more important than setting balances and limiting military items.

*Ninth:* Embarking on a path towards a security community requires the active engagement of the political leaderships. At the same time, broad societal participation and ownership are essential if the process is to become robust and sustainable. This goes far beyond the traditional notion of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and includes business leaders, representatives of trade unions, religious communities, expert communities and many others. It means fostering the gradual evolution of a new culture of peaceful conflict regulation.

*Tenth:* As the most comprehensive and inclusive international organization in its area of application and as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), the OSCE has played and can continue to play an important role as a ‘security community-building institution’. Moving ahead towards a security community would require the positive involvement and co-operation of the EU, NATO, the CSTO, the Customs Union, the OSCE and other organizations. For this reason, the OSCE should strengthen its co-operation with the UN institutions, with the regional and sub-regional organizations in its area, and with its Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation.

##### 5. *What the OSCE Can Contribute to Building a Security Community*

By improving their co-operation in all areas of the OSCE’s activities – in the security, economic and environmental and human dimensions – the participating States can show political will and send a strong message that they

want to advance towards a security community. They can engage in a few selected topics and projects that are significant and visible.

### 5.1 *Re-engaging in the Security Dimension*

The long-term objective in the security dimension is the gradual demilitarization and de-securitization of interstate, and, where necessary, intrastate relations up to the point where the use of organized force is no longer thinkable. This requires a common understanding of military security, functioning arms control and military co-operation, as well as the resolution of protracted violent conflicts and the prevention of new ones, reconciliation among former adversaries and jointly addressing transnational threats and challenges.

#### 5.1.1. *Developing Arms Control, CSBMs and Military Co-operation*

The erosion of the conventional arms control regime in Europe, and specifically of the CFE Treaty, poses a challenge to the OSCE region. Sharply divergent perceptions of ‘hard security’ issues make concerted action to salvage arms control a matter of urgent need, but at the same time harder to achieve. The further pursuit of arms control remains an essential tool for building a co-operative and indivisible security space and thereby paving the way towards a security community. To prevent further deterioration, participating States should:

- a) Abstain from steps which could jeopardize the remaining arms control regimes in Europe.
- b) Exercise restraint in conventional armed forces deployments, since any substantial build-up not commensurate with national security requirements could exacerbate existing concerns.

If, however, the stalemate over CFE is overcome, new opportunities for addressing the current security concerns of the participating States could open, particularly since the dramatically changed security landscape in Europe has made many CFE provisions obsolete. The following guidelines could be helpful for participating States in pursuing a renewed arms control dialogue:

- c) Consider the option of extending conventional arms control to new weapons categories and complex military capabilities.
- d) Consider making new weapons categories the subject of monitoring rather than of limitations.
- e) Pursue an arms control dialogue where all concerns expressed would be heard and discussed without taboos.
- f) Fully engage defence establishments in the arms control dialogue.

The OSCE has a particular role to play in improving transparency and predictability by further developing confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). This task is all the more important as the armed forces of the participating States undergo profound reductions and modernization processes.

The negotiation of a substantial Vienna Document (VD) modernization is just beginning. Participating States advocate different views with respect to which particular measures should be developed. They also differ on the issue of whether the current level of intrusiveness of the CSBMs is sufficient or whether it should be stepped up.

The main objective should be to provide for an improved baseline agreement while encouraging individual states to engage in more specific arrangements wherever appropriate. In particular, the participating States should be encouraged to provide extensive advance information about military exercises and be ready to address concerns raised by other participating States, to conclude further bilateral and regional CSBM agreements, or to practice tailored CSBMs voluntarily and unilaterally. At the same time, CSBMs, although important, should not be treated as a substitute for arms control mechanisms.

The OSCE's role in arms control and confidence- and security-building measures could be advanced through:

- g) Resuming consultations with the goal of adopting a mandate for negotiations on a modern conventional arms control agreement.
- h) Intensifying efforts to overcome the difficulties with the Treaty on Open Skies.
- i) Conducting joint threat assessments and discussing appropriate joint responses in conjunction with national military and defence doctrines.
- j) Encouraging military co-operation, including through joint training and exercises for crisis management.

#### *5.1.2. Taking Responsibility for Protracted Conflicts*

The protracted conflicts remain an issue of growing concern to the OSCE participating States. No genuine security community can be developed if the use of force is not ruled out. Protracted conflicts represent the context in which the fundamental principle of non-use of force is most likely to be broken. For about two decades, states have been striving to settle these conflicts, but have been unable to do so because of divergent views among the parties to the conflicts and other states involved. As long as the protracted conflicts are not solved, any discussion on a security community will lack substance.

Improving the effectiveness of the OSCE early warning, conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation was a major issue during the 2010 Corfu Process and has continued to be so in the subsequent discus-

sions. Despite the progress achieved, the participating States take different views regarding which particular measures will enable the OSCE to most effectively address the challenges posed by a possible violent escalation of the protracted conflicts.

While this divergence blocks substantial progress, there is room for the OSCE to improve its performance in preventing any escalation of violence in the OSCE area. Building on the 2012 Report by the Secretary General on the progress made and possible options on the way forward with respect to the 2011 Vilnius Ministerial Council decision on the conflict cycle, the OSCE should concentrate on early warning and early action. Continued attention should be paid to innovative approaches, such as developing a conflict mediation capacity within the OSCE. The Chairmanship, in close co-operation with the Secretariat, should seek to fully utilize available tools to take appropriate action to prevent and/or to stop any escalation of violence.

### *5.1.3. Supporting Stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan*

For years, the OSCE has been fostering stability in Central Asia. Based on the mandate of the 2007 Madrid Ministerial Council meeting, which reflected the concern that the situation in Afghanistan could affect security in the OSCE area, the OSCE has also engaged in addressing relevant challenges. This has concerned, in particular, supporting measures for securing the borders between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan, intensifying the involvement of Afghan counterparts in OSCE activities related to border security and management, policing and combating drug trafficking at educational and training facilities in Central Asia and in the rest of the OSCE area, and co-ordinating its activities with the United Nations and other relevant regional and international organizations.

Now, as the anticipated deadline for the termination of the engagement of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by the end of 2014 approaches and the international community considers strategies to ensure stability after the government of Afghanistan has taken full responsibility for the security of the country, the OSCE participating States are urged to examine whether and what adjustments need to be made in the OSCE's efforts to address the challenges of a new security environment in Afghanistan. The OSCE should:

- a) Engage in intense consultations with the relevant participating States and Partners for Co-operation, particularly with the Central Asian States and with Afghanistan, in order to assess the need for adjusting current activities within the Madrid mandate.
- b) Become engaged in broader international consultations, on the basis of the OSCE Platform for Co-operative Security, particularly with the United Nations, NATO, the EU and the CSTO, as well as with the relevant Partners for Co-operation, in order to co-ordinate further

- activities, realize synergies and avoid unnecessary duplication of international efforts after 2014.
- c) The forthcoming Dublin Ministerial Council meeting should mandate the OSCE Secretariat to undertake an examination of the OSCE's engagement subject to proper discussion within the Permanent Council and a review by a Ministerial Council meeting no later than in 2014.

#### *5.1.4 Encouraging Reconciliation as Means of Conflict Resolution and Rapprochement*

Reconciliation is crucial for overcoming deficits of trust in the OSCE area and finding solutions to protracted conflicts, territorial disputes and inter-ethnic, inter-religious and other tensions in various parts of Europe. While an important dimension of reconciliation consists of governmental activities, sustainable reconciliation can only be achieved through a lasting change of perceptions by the relevant societies. Reaching a basic level of mutual understanding of common history including the causes and dynamics of past conflicts remains an indispensable part of this process. Reconciliation is usually a long-term process. It cannot be seen as a tool of quick-fix crisis management.

While there is no universal template for pursuing reconciliation, the OSCE can promote reconciliation processes in significant international, transnational, inter-ethnic or other contexts. Such efforts aimed at restoring mutual respect can pave the way towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

Many OSCE activities over the last several years have focused on promoting and encouraging reconciliation, not least with respect to the protracted conflicts. The importance of these efforts should be further highlighted through concrete OSCE actions. This can be done by adjusting the priorities of OSCE institutions, or by formulating specific tasks for the Organization. The significance of reconciliation should also be reflected in the communication strategy of the OSCE. Moreover, the OSCE can focus particularly on the following objectives:

- a) Identifying best practices from historical cases (France and Germany, Northern Ireland, Poland and Germany) and some of the current processes (South-Eastern Europe, Poland and Russia).
- b) Identifying 'reconciliation stakeholders' at the levels of regions and states, and in civil societies, the media and business circles.
- c) Supporting the parties concerned in identifying and overcoming specific 'choke points' in the process of reconciliation.
- d) Standing ready to provide, upon request, a tailored set of proposals for reconciliation activities in particular conflict areas or contexts.

Specific tasks for the OSCE could include:

- e) Conducting a series of seminars on the subject of ‘The Link between Reconciliation, Conflict Resolution and Security in Europe: Experiences and Needs’.
- f) Producing reports to summarize past reconciliation efforts (including failed ones).
- g) Producing a ‘Handbook of Best Practices in Reconciliation’ using the aforementioned reconciliation reports.
- h) Preparing and making available to interested parties a database of experts with experience in reconciliation processes.
- i) Exploring possibilities for reconciliation efforts created by technological advances and new modes of social interaction and networking.
- j) Devising a programme, funded by voluntary contributions, to encourage reconciliation efforts by civil societies, focusing on student exchanges, the establishment of cross-border cultural and sporting events, the funding of cross-cultural media projects, and support for regional cross-border trade fairs.

#### *5.1.5 Addressing Transnational Threats and Challenges*

For years, numerous reports by the UN, other international organizations or various NGOs have been raising the alarm about transnational threats and challenges as key concerns for international peace and stability. Among the most critical threats are the interrelated issues of trafficking in drugs, human beings and small arms and light weapons, organized crime, corruption and money laundering. Terrorism benefits greatly from these phenomena, which are rooted in economic asymmetries and social divisions, bad governance and weak or failing statehood. Climate change is also a major crisis multiplier.

Across the OSCE area, states are confronted with various forms of terrorism. States differ in their threat assessments, definitions of terrorism, interests and goals. They also differ in the ways and means they attempt to prevent and combat terrorism: Some states follow a comprehensive approach and are more focused on the processes leading to terrorism; others concentrate on searching for the motives of terrorism. In addition, combating terrorism requires a sensitive balance between the security of the state and the observance of human rights.

Cyber security is receiving increasing attention. This complex and fast-moving subject is particularly difficult to grasp from both a technological and a political point of view.

Regardless of existing differences in approaches, the last decade has shown that the OSCE participating States have found it easier to agree on joint actions to combat transnational threats than on many other issues. With its comprehensive and inclusive approach, the Organization is well equipped

to address this kind of issues. However, the OSCE is not the only international organization doing so. To identify its appropriate contribution to addressing transnational threats, the OSCE should enhance its interaction with other international organizations such as the UN, the EU, NATO and the CSTO and take advantage of its ties with civil societies and its Partner States.

The OSCE should further develop the agenda it has been working on in recent years – that is anti-terrorism, cyber security, anti-drugs activities, and the related field of police issues. Practical contributions could include:

- a) Conducting a transparency-building seminar on ‘Military Doctrines and Cyberspace: The Problem of Definitions’.
- b) Launching an OSCE cyber dialogue framework on ‘Joint Risk and Needs Assessments and Interstate Communication in Cases of Cyber Incidents’.
- c) Conducting a series of seminars on ‘Aligning National Cyber Defence Systems of Critical Infrastructures to the Most Advanced International Standards’.
- d) Adopting an OSCE document on cyber security confidence-building measures.
- e) Adopting a consolidated OSCE framework for the fight against terrorism.
- f) Conducting regional seminars with civil society representatives on ‘The OSCE Experience with Preventing Radicalization and the Problem of Identification, De-radicalization and Reintegration of (Former) Terrorist Supporters’.
- g) Conducting a seminar on ‘Experiences in Countering the Spread of Mafia Organizations’.
- h) Elaborating a ‘Handbook for Business Practitioners on Lessons Learned in Fighting Drug-Related Crime’, including the international trade in chemical precursors.
- i) Developing joint activities with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).

## 5.2 *Engaging in the Economic and Environmental Dimension*

The long-term objective in the economic and environmental dimension is a gradual process towards a converging, economically and socially prosperous region that ensures environmental sustainability. A security community will be rooted in a progressive convergence of economic policies and will increasingly interconnect the national economies between Vancouver and Vladivostok. This implies the advancement of democratic institutions, the rule of law and economic freedom. The most visible expression of this would be the creation of a free-trade and free-travel zone for the whole OSCE space.

Moving towards a security community that relies on economic freedom implies free competition. It does not rule out the possibility of conflicting interests among the various economic players. Conflicting interests are an integral part of a security community. What is essential is that disputes be resolved by peaceful means alone and that there be a strict renunciation of the use of force. This poses particular challenges with respect to political communication, joint legal and other regulatory arrangements and commercial arbitration procedures or, in other words, good economic governance at all levels.

In the *economic area*, the OSCE should focus on issues that are relevant for improving the political atmosphere among the participating States. It can neither replace specialized organizations nor interfere in the internal affairs of participating States or regional organizations. The OSCE should, however, contribute to raising awareness and developing common understanding and a gradual consensus on issues that are both controversial and symbolic, such as energy security, water management, and obstacles to economic freedom such as restricted labour migration, visa-regimes and market barriers.

In the *area of environmental protection*, the OSCE should continue to concentrate on issues that link environmental protection and sustainable development to public participation and interstate co-operation. The Organization should also discuss sensitive issues such as access to natural resources in cross-border or sub-regional contexts. It should engage in mediation in cases of disputed trans-boundary matters such as cross-border watercourses and aquifers.

The OSCE should continue its efforts to assist the participating States in implementing relevant international regulatory frameworks, particularly the 1991 UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context and the 1998 UNECE Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.

### 5.3 *Engaging in the Human Dimension*

Greater convergence of norms and identities is essential for creating the long-term conditions for a security community. This requires a better and more balanced implementation of the whole OSCE *acquis* in its human dimension (HD), more assistance with implementation, addressing new questions and challenges and elaborating related commitments, as well as initiating people-to-people programmes between different sub-regions and different strata of the populations.

### *5.3.1 Improving the Effectiveness of the OSCE's HD Events Cycle*

Two statements in the 2005 report ‘Common Purpose: Towards a More Effective OSCE’ by the ‘Panel of Eminent Persons’ can serve as guidance for further strengthening the process of reviewing the implementation of the OSCE’s human dimension commitments:

“Monitoring of the implementation of human dimension standards is a particularly challenging and, in many situations, highly sensitive task. To encourage equal treatment and improve transparency, OSCE monitoring should be done in an unbiased and more standardized way.”

“If a Human Dimension Committee is established [...], the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) can be reduced to a maximum of five days.”

Monitoring the individual states’ compliance with their human dimension commitments is the basis for the subsequent implementation discussion among states and civil society actors. The objective is to monitor the compliance of all OSCE participating States, without exception, in a transparent and less politicized manner, and to connect the review process with a subsequent decision-making process in a more effective way. The following proposals might serve these objectives:

- a) The OSCE’s process of reviewing the implementation of its HD commitments should combine the activities of the HDIM and the Human Dimension Committee (HDC) in an integrated manner.
- b) To facilitate this, and to create a common base of reference, a questionnaire-based state reporting system could be introduced. This would help the HDC to prepare the HDIMs, which, in turn, would provide feedback for further consideration by the HDC.
- c) As the HDIM currently takes place in September/October, the time is frequently too short to consider its recommendations at the subsequent MC meetings. Consequently, in order to facilitate the decision-making process, the HDIM should be convened in the first half of the year.
- d) If the review process were to be improved by taking these proposed steps, shortening the duration of the HDIM should be considered without changing its comprehensive agenda and the participation of NGOs.

### *5.3.2 Opening Dialogue with Muslim Communities*

The participants of the IDEAS project have discussed the issue of the OSCE’s role in fostering a dialogue between the participating States and their Muslim communities. It was argued by some participants that the OSCE has

no significant role to play, while other participants supported a dialogue-facilitator role for the organization. Based on the latter interpretation, it can be argued that in some regions within the OSCE space, political Islam is questioning the established norms and regulations of the secular state and the separation of the state and religious institutions. These problems are often aggravated by social hardship, bad governance, intolerance and discrimination. In other regions, they are frequently related to the broader issues of migration from Islam-dominated regions and the integration policies of particular states. Outside the OSCE area, the uncertain evolution of the Arab Spring shows the new dimension and urgency of these issues.

While debates with and about Muslim communities are taking place in a number of states, they usually lack a wider context. This is the point where the OSCE can bring together all those who are interested in the preservation of stability, including secular and reformist Islamic forces. Even though the issue affects different states in different ways, the OSCE could address the dilemma of mistrust between secular policymakers and political Islam. Likewise, the OSCE could initiate discussions on the commonalities and discrepancies between secular and Islamic concepts of state and nation building, democracy, rule of law, human rights, women's rights and gender equality, and education.

Building on its experience and activities related to good governance, education, and specifically fighting intolerance and discrimination, the OSCE can serve as a useful facilitator by:

- a) Launching a discussion on societal confidence-building between secular governments, civil-society representatives and Islamic parties, movements and dignitaries. The goal is to overcome misunderstandings, to identify and avert sources of escalation and to prevent possible radicalization processes.
- b) Initiating discussions to explore the relationship between Muslim communities and secular states in different OSCE sub-regions. Such discussions should particularly highlight positive historical and present-day experiences with the integration of Muslim communities, and involve the OSCE Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation.
- c) Launching a discussion on lessons-learned in preventing radicalization with key stakeholders and opinion-shapers from Muslim communities and representatives of political Islam and integrating them into the day-to-day activities of the OSCE in areas including conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
- d) Conducting a roundtable with the OSCE's Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation to enhance understanding of the ongoing processes of the Arab Spring and to engage with new political and societal forces.

#### *5.4. Creating an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions*

The OSCE has always been open to input from and communication with civil society actors. Transnational civic networks can foster communication and identity-building, and by so doing, contribute to creating the conditions for a security community. They can help to advance the discussion on a security community within and beyond the OSCE.

An OSCE network of academic institutions was first proposed by the OSCE Secretary General, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier. Such a network can:

- a) Give advice, expertise and assistance to the OSCE and its participating States.
- b) Organize the academic debate on a security community.
- c) Serve as a platform for discussion of crucial issues, particularly in the context of the Irish Chairmanship's "Helsinki + 40" initiative.

The creation of an OSCE network of academic institutions can build on a number of existing elements, such as the "OSCE Security Days", which were held for the first time in June 2012 and included a large number of academic and think tank experts; the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) and the Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS).

These existing elements can be further developed, building on the three key criteria of innovation, inclusiveness and continuity.

- d) If the "OSCE Security Days" were held regularly, they could serve as a platform for exchanging ideas between the members of the network and the OSCE participating States.
- e) In order to focus discussions, an annually changing key theme could be defined following consultations between the network and OSCE institutions. In addition, the Chairmanship or the Secretariat could ask the network for expertise on specific issues.
- f) Discussions in Vienna might be complemented by local or sub-regional activities including those of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. These discussions could be brought together under the banner of the "OSCE Security Days".
- g) The four IDEAS institutes stand ready to participate in establishing such an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions.

#### *5.5 Arranging Institutional Issues*

The OSCE area is characterized by a particularly high density of regional and sub-regional international organizations. In spite of some overlaps and paral-

lism, this institutional richness represents an important building-block for the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

As a consequence, the OSCE space is not in need of new organizations. Rather, the present and future task is to improve and streamline co-operation among the existing organizations. This should also include the emerging organizations in the Eastern part of the OSCE area such as the CSTO, the Customs Union, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The objective should be full-scale co-operation among all organizations. In this way, an ever denser network of organizations could emerge, with each organization advancing the process towards a security community according to its own characteristics and capacities. To achieve inter-institutional progress, the OSCE could observe two guidelines:

- a) The potential of the emerging organizations in the Eastern part of the OSCE space should be acknowledged and they should be integrated into co-operation networks.
- b) Institutionalized co-operation bodies such as the NATO-Russia Council should be able to operate effectively under all conditions.

## 6. *A Call for the OSCE*

The most important comparative advantages of the OSCE are its geographic, political and substantial comprehensiveness and inclusiveness. No other international organization stretches over three continents with 56 states and integrates such a broad array of issues relating to internal and external security. Preserving this feature at a time when divergent tendencies prevail in many areas is no small success. However, the other side of this achievement is that such an organization necessarily embraces all kinds of conflicts, tensions and contradictions among its participants. This is precisely the task the OSCE has to address.

The OSCE is primarily a reflection of the state of the relations among its 56 participating States. The more divergent the positions of its participating States, the harder it is for the OSCE to act. Conversely, the better the relations among the states, the more the OSCE is able to act in a decisive and high-profile manner. As a consequence, the Organization, particularly in politically difficult times, is more an arena for holding states together and engaging them in dialogue, and less a strong player. In terms of its ability to take action, the OSCE is a rather weak organization. In terms of its ability to continue and safeguard the political process, it is not weak at all. It is therefore no surprise that the OSCE has had difficulties in becoming more active against the background of the current political conditions.

That the OSCE is still functioning demonstrates a high level of institutional perseverance on the part of the Organization and its participating

States. The permanent security dialogue in Vienna represents a collective philosophy and practice that distinguishes Europe fundamentally from all other continents. Although the OSCE's human dimension has been a bone of contention for more than a decade, its daily operations, such as conducting human dimension events or election observation missions, do function. And although there is a deadlock in arms control, the participating States nonetheless want to maintain the OSCE's arms control *acquis*. This high degree of institutional steadiness equips the OSCE to pass through the extended period of transition that we are currently experiencing.

Paradoxically, the OSCE's relative weakness offers advantages: It is because it is not the decisive game-changer that it enjoys the freedom to serve as a laboratory and test field for innovative ideas – the best example is the discussion of a security community. Thus, the OSCE's opportunity lies in encouraging new thinking and in testing innovative ideas in a broad communication process with civil society actors, other international organizations and Partner States. Its opportunity lies in starting political projects that strengthen convergence among states and societies and thus clear the way towards a security community.



## Kooperationsformen und -foren im OSZE-Bereich

Gruppe der Acht (G8)  
Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (OECD)

Europarat

Nordatlantikvertrags-Organisation (NATO)  
Euro-Atlantischer Partnerschaftsrat (EAPR)  
Partnerschaft für den Frieden (PfP)  
NATO-Russland-Rat  
NATO-Ukraine-Charta/NATO-Ukraine-Kommission  
NATO-Partner rund um den Globus

Europäische Union (EU)  
EU-Bewerberländer  
EU-Assoziierungsabkommen  
Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsabkommen (SAA)

Westeuropäische Union (WEU)<sup>1</sup>

Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten (GUS)

Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer Ministerrat  
Euro-arktischer Barentsrat  
Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter  
Nordischer Rat  
Rat der Ostseestaaten (CBSS)

Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa  
Stabilitätspakt-für-Südosteuropa-Beobachter  
Mitteleuropäisches Freihandelsabkommen (CEFTA)  
Zentraleuropäische Initiative (ZEI)

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<sup>1</sup> Die Westeuropäische Union (WEU) wurde am 30. Juni 2011 offiziell aufgelöst. Die in Artikel V des WEU-Vertrags festgelegte Beistandsverpflichtung wurde in Artikel 42 Absatz 7 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union übernommen, der die Verpflichtung zur Hilfe und Unterstützung im Falle eines bewaffneten Angriffs enthält. Vgl. Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty – Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, Brüssel, 31. März 2010, unter: [http://www.weu.int/Declaration\\_E.pdf](http://www.weu.int/Declaration_E.pdf).

Südosteuropäische Kooperationsinitiative (SECI)  
Kooperationsprozess in Südosteuropa (SEECP)  
Schwarzmeer-Wirtschaftskooperation (BSEC)

Nordamerikanisches Freihandelsabkommen (NAFTA)  
Zollunion von Belarus, Kasachstan und Russland

Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit (OVKS)

Schanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit (SOZ)  
SOZ-Beobachter  
SOZ-Dialogpartner

*Quellen:*

OECD: [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)

Europarat: [www.coe.int](http://www.coe.int)

NATO: [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int)

EU: [europa.eu](http://europa.eu)

WEU: [www.weu.int](http://www.weu.int)

GUS: [www.cis.minsk.by](http://www.cis.minsk.by)

Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer Ministerrat: [www.baltasam.org](http://www.baltasam.org)

Euro-arktischer Barentsrat: [www.beac.st](http://www.beac.st)

Nordischer Rat: [www.norden.org](http://www.norden.org)

CBSS: [www.cbss.org](http://www.cbss.org)

Stabilitäts pakte für Südosteuropa: [www.stabilitypact.org](http://www.stabilitypact.org)

CEFTA: [www.stabilitypact.org/wt2/TradeCEFTA2006.asp](http://www.stabilitypact.org/wt2/TradeCEFTA2006.asp)

ZEI: [www.ceinet.org](http://www.ceinet.org)

SECI: [www.secicenter.org](http://www.secicenter.org)

BSEC: [www.bsec-organization.org](http://www.bsec-organization.org)

NAFTA: [www.nafta-sec-alena.org](http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org)

OVKS: [www.odkb-csto.org](http://www.odkb-csto.org)

SOZ: [www.sectsco.org](http://www.sectsco.org)

## Die 57 OSZE-Teilnehmerstaaten – Daten, Fakten, Kooperationsformen<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Albanien

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1991

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (OSZE-Rang: 40)<sup>2</sup>

*Fläche:* 28.748 km<sup>2</sup> (OSZE-Rang: 46)<sup>3</sup>

*Bevölkerung:* 3.002.859 (OSZE-Rang: 42)<sup>4</sup>

*BIP pro Kopf in internationaler Dollar nach PPP:* 7.800

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2 Prozent (OSZE-Rang: 29)<sup>6</sup>

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 14.245 (OSZE-Rang: 36)<sup>7</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), NATO (2009), EAPR, SAA (2006), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1996), SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

### 2. Andorra

*Beitrittsdatum:* April 1996

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (40)

*Fläche:* 468 km<sup>2</sup> (52)

*Bevölkerung:* 85.082 (53)

*BIP pro Kopf in internationaler Dollar nach PPP:* 37.200

*BIP-Wachstum:* -1,8 Prozent (53)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1994).

### 3. Armenien

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,05 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 29.743 km<sup>2</sup> (45)

*Bevölkerung:* 2.970.495 (43)

*BIP pro Kopf in internationaler Dollar nach PPP:* 5.500

*BIP-Wachstum:* 4,4 Prozent (15)

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1 Bearbeitet von Jochen Rasch.

2 Von 57 Ländern.

3 Von 57 Ländern.

4 Von 57 Ländern.

5 Internationaler Dollar ist der Wertausdruck der PPP. Als PPP (Purchasing Power Parity/Kaufkraftparität) wird die Anzahl der Einheiten einer Landeswährung bezeichnet, die benötigt wird, um eine identische Menge an Waren und Dienstleistungen auf dem einheimischen Markt zu kaufen, für die in den Vereinigten Staaten ein US-Dollar aufzuwenden wäre. Vgl. The World Bank, World Development Report 2002, Washington, D.C., 2002. Aufgrund der Unvergleichbarkeit der Daten aus verschiedenen Jahren unternehmen wir hier kein Ranking.

6 Von 53 Ländern.

7 Von 55 Ländern.

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 48.834 (18)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2001), EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), BSEC, OVKS.

#### **4. Aserbaidschan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,05 Prozent (49)  
*Fläche:* 86.600 km<sup>2</sup> (28)  
*Bevölkerung:* 9.493.600 (22)<sup>8</sup>  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 10.300  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 0,1 Prozent (49)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 66.940 (15)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2001), EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), BSEC.

#### **5. Belarus**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,28 Prozent (30)  
*Fläche:* 207.600 km<sup>2</sup> (20)  
*Bevölkerung:* 9.643.566 (21)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 15.200  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 5,3 Prozent (13)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 72.940 (13)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1995), GUS (1991), ZEI (1996), Zollunion von Belarus, Kasachstan und Russland, OVKS, SOZ-Dialogpartner.

#### **6. Belgien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 3,24 Prozent (10)  
*Fläche:* 30.528 km<sup>2</sup> (44)  
*Bevölkerung:* 10.438.353 (18)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 38.200  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,9 Prozent (30)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 34.336 (21)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

#### **7. Bosnien und Herzegowina**

*Beitrittsdatum:* April 1992  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (40)

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<sup>8</sup> Das Staatliche Statistische Komitee der Republik Aserbaidschan gibt die Bevölkerung für 2012 mit 9.235.100 Personen an. Die letzte Volkszählung fand 2009 statt. Vgl. unter: [http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demoqgraphic/en/AP\\_1.xls](http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demoqgraphic/en/AP_1.xls).

*Fläche:* 51.197 km<sup>2</sup> (37)

*Bevölkerung:* 3.879.296 (38)<sup>9</sup>

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 8.200

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,7 Prozent (33)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 10.577 (40)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2002), EAPR, PfP

(2006), SAA (2008),<sup>10</sup> Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1992),

SECI, SEECP.

## **8. Bulgarien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,55 Prozent (26)

*Fläche:* 110.879 km<sup>2</sup> (24)

*Bevölkerung:* 7.037.935 (28)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 13.800

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,7 Prozent (33)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 31.315 (22)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1992), NATO (2004),

EAPR, EU (2007), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1996), SECI,

SEECP, BSEC.

## **9. Dänemark**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 2,1 Prozent (14)

*Fläche:* 43.094 km<sup>2</sup> (40)

*Bevölkerung:* 5.543.453 (29)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 37.600

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,1 Prozent (41)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 18.628 (33)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949),

NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1973), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat

(1952), CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **10. Deutschland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 9,35 Prozent (2)

*Fläche:* 357.022 km<sup>2</sup> (13)

*Bevölkerung:* 81.305.856 (3)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 38.400

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,1 Prozent (20)

<sup>9</sup> Für 2013 plant das Bundesamt für Statistik die erste Volkszählung seit 1991. Ein Pilotzensus lief bereits im Oktober 2012. Vgl. unter: <http://www.fzs.bund.de/Eng/population.htm>.

<sup>10</sup> Das Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsabkommen ist bereits ratifiziert, aber noch nicht in Kraft getreten.

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 251.465 (4)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G8 (1975), OECD (1961),  
Europarat (1950), NATO (1955), EAPR, EU (1958), Euro-arktischer-  
Barentsrat-Beobachter, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **11. Estland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* September 1991  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (33)  
*Fläche:* 45.228 km<sup>2</sup> (39)  
*Bevölkerung:* 1.274.709 (47)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 20.600  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 7,6 Prozent (5)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 5.750 (46)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (2010), Europarat (1993),  
NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2004), Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer  
Ministerrat, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **12. Finnland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 1,85 Prozent (16)  
*Fläche:* 338.145 km<sup>2</sup> (14)  
*Bevölkerung:* 5.262.930 (32)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 36.700  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,9 Prozent (24)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 22.100 (29)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1969), Europarat (1989),  
EAPR, PFP (1994), EU (1995), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat  
(1955), CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **13. Frankreich**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 9,35 Prozent (2)  
*Fläche:* 643.801 km<sup>2</sup> (7)  
*Bevölkerung:* 65.630.692 (5)  
*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 35.600  
*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,7 Prozent (33)  
*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 238.591 (5)  
*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G8 (1975), OECD (1961),  
Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), Euro-arktischer-  
Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **14. Georgien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* März 1992  
*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,05 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 69.700 km<sup>2</sup> (33)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.570.934 (36)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 5.600

*BIP-Wachstum:* 7 Prozent (8)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 20.655 (31)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1999), EAPR, PfP (1994), BSEC.

## **15. Griechenland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,98 Prozent (19)

*Fläche:* 131.957 km<sup>2</sup> (23)

*Bevölkerung:* 10.767.827 (17)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 26.600

*BIP-Wachstum:* -6,9 Prozent (54)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 145.647 (8)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1952), EAPR, EU (1981), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

## **16. Großbritannien und Nordirland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 9,35 Prozent (2)

*Fläche:* 243.610 km<sup>2</sup> (18)

*Bevölkerung:* 63.047.162 (6)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 36.600

*BIP-Wachstum:* 0,7 Prozent (44)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 174.030 (7)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G8 (1975), OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1973), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **17. Heiliger Stuhl**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (40)

*Fläche:* 0,44 km<sup>2</sup> (57)

*Bevölkerung:* 836 (57)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* k.A.

*BIP-Wachstum:* k.A.

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 110 (52)<sup>11</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* keine.

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<sup>11</sup> Sollstärke 110 Schweizer Gardisten, vgl. unter: [http://www.vatican.va/roman\\_curia/swiss\\_guard/500\\_swiss/documents/rc\\_gsp\\_20060121\\_informazioni\\_it.html](http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/swiss_guard/500_swiss/documents/rc_gsp_20060121_informazioni_it.html).

## **18. Irland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,75 Prozent (21)

*Fläche:* 70.273 km<sup>2</sup> (32)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.722.028 (34)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 40.100

*BIP-Wachstum:* 0,7 Prozent (44)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 9.650 (42)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949),

EAPR, PfP (1999), EU (1973), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **19. Island**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (33)

*Fläche:* 103.000 km<sup>2</sup> (25)

*Bevölkerung:* 313.183 (52)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 38.500

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,1 Prozent (20)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1950),

NATO (1949), EAPR, EU-Bewerberland, Euro-arktischer Barentsrat,

Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1995).

## **20. Italien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 9,35 Prozent (2)

*Fläche:* 301.340 km<sup>2</sup> (17)

*Bevölkerung:* 61.261.254 (7)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 30.900

*BIP-Wachstum:* 0,4 Prozent (48)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 184.532 (6)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G8 (1975), OECD (1962),

Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), Euro-arktischer-

Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1989).

## **21. Kanada**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 5,53 Prozent (7)

*Fläche:* 9.984.670 km<sup>2</sup> (2)

*Bevölkerung:* 34.300.083 (11)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 41.100

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,5 Prozent (25)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 65.700 (16)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G8 (1976), OECD (1961), NATO (1949), EAPR, Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, NAFTA.

## **22. Kasachstan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,36 Prozent (28)

*Fläche:* 2.724.900 km<sup>2</sup> (4)

*Bevölkerung:* 17.522.010 (14)<sup>12</sup>

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 13.200

*BIP-Wachstum:* 7,5 Prozent (6)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 49.000 (17)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), Zollunion von Belarus, Kasachstan und Russland, OVKS, SOZ.

## **23. Kirgisistan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,05 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 199.951 km<sup>2</sup> (21)

*Bevölkerung:* 5.496.737 (30)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 2.400

*BIP-Wachstum:* 5,7 Prozent (11)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 10.900 (38)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), OVKS, SOZ.

## **24. Kroatien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* März 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (33)

*Fläche:* 56.594 km<sup>2</sup> (36)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.480.043 (37)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 18.400

*BIP-Wachstum:* 0 Prozent (50)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 18.600 (34)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1996), NATO (2009), EAPR, EU-Bewerberland,<sup>13</sup> Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1992), SECI, SEECP.

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12 Das Amt für Statistik der Republik Kasachstan gibt die Bevölkerung zum 1. Oktober 2012 mit 16.856.000 Personen an. Die letzte Volkszählung fand 2009 statt. Vgl. unter: <http://www.eng.stat.kz/Pages/default.aspx>

13 Kroatien tritt der EU am 1. Juli 2013 bei.

## **25. Lettland**

*Beitrittsdatum:* September 1991

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (33)

*Fläche:* 64.589 km<sup>2</sup> (35)

*Bevölkerung:* 2.191.580 (44)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 15.900

*BIP-Wachstum:* 5,5 Prozent (12)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 4.600 (48)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), NATO (2004),

EAPR, EU (2004), Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer Ministerrat, CBSS

(1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **26. Liechtenstein**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (40)

*Fläche:* 160 km<sup>2</sup> (54)

*Bevölkerung:* 36.713 (54)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 89.400<sup>14</sup>

*BIP-Wachstum:* -0,5 Prozent<sup>15</sup>

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine<sup>16</sup>

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1978), EU-

Assoziierungsabkommen (1995), seit 1923 Rechts-, Wirtschafts- und

Währungsunion mit der Schweiz.

## **27. Litauen**

*Beitrittsdatum:* September 1991

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (33)

*Fläche:* 65.300 km<sup>2</sup> (34)

*Bevölkerung:* 3.525.761 (40)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 19.100

*BIP-Wachstum:* 5,9 Prozent (10)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 10.640 (39)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1993), NATO (2004),

EAPR, EU (2004), Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer Ministerrat, CBSS

(1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **28. Luxemburg**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,47 Prozent (27)

*Fläche:* 2.586 km<sup>2</sup> (51)

*Bevölkerung:* 509.074 (50)

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14 2009 (geschätzt).

15 2009 (geschätzt).

16 Das Militär wurde 1868 aufgelöst. Vgl. unter: <http://www.liechtenstein.li/index.php?id=60>.

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 81.100

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1 Prozent (42)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 900 (51)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **29. Malta**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (40)

*Fläche:* 316 km<sup>2</sup> (53)

*Bevölkerung:* 409.836 (51)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 25.800

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,1 Prozent (28)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 1.954 (50)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1965), EAPR, PfP (1995/2008<sup>17</sup>), EU (2004), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

## **30. Ehemalige jugoslawische Republik Mazedonien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Oktober 1995

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (40)

*Fläche:* 25.713 km<sup>2</sup> (47)

*Bevölkerung:* 2.082.370 (45)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 10.500

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3 Prozent (23)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 8.000 (44)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1995), EU-Bewerberland, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1993), SECI, SEECP.

## **31. Moldau**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,05 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 33.851 km<sup>2</sup> (43)

*Bevölkerung:* 3.656.843 (39)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 3.400

*BIP-Wachstum:* 6,4 Prozent (9)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 5.354 (47)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1996), SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

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<sup>17</sup> Malta trat dem PfP-Programm im April 1995 bei, setzte seine Mitgliedschaft jedoch im Oktober 1996 aus. Malta hat sich dem PfP-Programm 2008 wieder angeschlossen. Vgl. unter: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0403e.html>.

### **32. Monaco**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (40)

*Fläche:* 2,00 km<sup>2</sup> (56)

*Bevölkerung:* 30.510 (56)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 63.400<sup>18</sup>

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,5 Prozent (25)<sup>19</sup>

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2004).

### **33. Mongolei**

*Beitrittsdatum:* November 2012

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0 Prozent (57)

*Fläche:* 1.564.116 km<sup>2</sup> (5)

*Bevölkerung:* 3.179.997 (41)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 4.800

*BIP-Wachstum:* 17,5 Prozent (1)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 10.000 (41)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* NATO-Partner rund um den Globus, SOZ-Beobachter

### **34. Montenegro**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 2006

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,05 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 13.812 km<sup>2</sup> (49)

*Bevölkerung:* 657.394 (49)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 11.700

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,5 Prozent (25)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 2.984 (49)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2007), EAPR, PfP (2006), EU-Bewerberland, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (2006), SECI, SEECP.

### **35. Niederlande**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 4,36 Prozent (9)

*Fläche:* 41.543 km<sup>2</sup> (41)

*Bevölkerung:* 16.730.632 (15)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 42.700

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,3 Prozent (40)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 37.368 (20)

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18 2009 (geschätzt).

19 2010 (geschätzt).

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **36. Norwegen**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 2,05 Prozent (15)

*Fläche:* 323.802 km<sup>2</sup> (15)

*Bevölkerung:* 4.707.270 (35)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 54.200

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,7 Prozent (33)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 24.450 (27)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU-Assoziierungsabkommen (1996), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **37. Österreich**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 2,51 Prozent (13)

*Fläche:* 83.871 km<sup>2</sup> (29)

*Bevölkerung:* 8.219.743 (24)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 42.400

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,1 Prozent (20)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 25.758 (24)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1956), EAPR, PFP (1995), EU (1995), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1989).

### **38. Polen**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 1,35 Prozent (17)

*Fläche:* 312.685 km<sup>2</sup> (16)

*Bevölkerung:* 38.415.284 (10)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 20.600

*BIP-Wachstum:* 4,4 Prozent (15)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 100.000 (11)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1996), Europarat (1991), NATO (1999), EAPR, EU (2004), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1991).

### **39. Portugal**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,98 Prozent (19)

*Fläche:* 92.090 km<sup>2</sup> (27)

*Bevölkerung:* 10.781.459 (16)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 23.700

*BIP-Wachstum:* -1,5 Prozent (52)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 42.634 (19)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1976), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1986), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

#### **40. Rumänien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,6 Prozent (23)

*Fläche:* 238.391 km<sup>2</sup> (19)

*Bevölkerung:* 21.848.504 (13)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 12.600

*BIP-Wachstum:* 2,5 Prozent (25)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 73.900 (12)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2007), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1996), SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

#### **41. Russische Föderation**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 6 Prozent (6)

*Fläche:* 17.098.242 km<sup>2</sup> (1)

*Bevölkerung:* 142.517.670 (2)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 17.000

*BIP-Wachstum:* 4,3 Prozent (17)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 956.000 (2)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G8 (1998), Europarat (1996), EAPR, PfP (1994), NATO-Russland-Rat (2002), GUS (1991), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, BSEC, Zollunion von Belarus, Kasachstan und Russland, OVKS, SOZ.

#### **42. San Marino**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,125 Prozent (40)

*Fläche:* 61 km<sup>2</sup> (55)

*Bevölkerung:* 32.140 (55)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 36.200<sup>20</sup>

*BIP-Wachstum:* 0,8 Prozent (43)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* keine

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1988).

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20 2009.

### **43. Schweden**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 3,24 Prozent (10)

*Fläche:* 450.295 km<sup>2</sup> (11)

*Bevölkerung:* 9.103.788 (23)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 40.900

*BIP-Wachstum:* 4 Prozent (18)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 20.363 (32)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (1995), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1992), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **44. Schweiz**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 2,81 Prozent (12)

*Fläche:* 41.277 km<sup>2</sup> (42)

*Bevölkerung:* 7.925.517 (25)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 43.900

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,9 Prozent (30)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 25.287 (26)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1963), EAPR, PfP (1996), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen (per Referendum abgelehnt), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

### **45. Serbien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* November 2000<sup>21</sup>

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,14 Prozent (39)

*Fläche:* 77.474 km<sup>2</sup> (31)

*Bevölkerung:* 7.276.604 (27)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 10.800

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,8 Prozent (32)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 28.184 (23)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (2003), EAPR, PfP (2006), EU-Bewerberland, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, CEFTA, ZEI (1989/2000), SECI, SEECP, BSEC.

### **46. Slowakische Republik**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1993

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,28 Prozent (30)

*Fläche:* 49.035 km<sup>2</sup> (38)

*Bevölkerung:* 5.483.088 (31)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 23.600

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<sup>21</sup> Die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien war vom 7. Juli 1992 bis zum 10. November 2000 von der Mitarbeit in der OSZE suspendiert.

*BIP-Wachstum:* 3,3 Prozent (19)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 15.799 (35)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (2000), Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2004), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1990/1993).

#### **47. Slowenien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* März 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,22 Prozent (32)

*Fläche:* 20.273 km<sup>2</sup> (48)

*Bevölkerung:* 1.996.617 (46)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 29.000

*BIP-Wachstum:* -0,2 Prozent (51)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 7.600 (45)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (2010), Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2004), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1992), SECI, SEECP.

#### **48. Spanien**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 4,58 Prozent (8)

*Fläche:* 505.370 km<sup>2</sup> (9)

*Bevölkerung:* 47.042.984 (8)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 31.000

*BIP-Wachstum:* 0,7 Prozent (44)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 143.006 (9)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1977), NATO (1982), EAPR, EU (1986), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

#### **49. Tadschikistan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,05 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 143.100 km<sup>2</sup> (22)

*Bevölkerung:* 7.768.385 (26)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 2.100

*BIP-Wachstum:* 7,4 Prozent (7)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 8.800 (43)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (2002), GUS (1991), OVKS, SOZ.

#### **50. Tschechische Republik**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1993

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,57 Prozent (25)

*Fläche:* 78.867 km<sup>2</sup> (30)

*Bevölkerung:* 10.177.300 (19)

*BIP pro Kopf in internationaler Dollar nach PPP:* 27.400

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,7 Prozent (33)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 25.421 (25)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1995), Europarat (1993), NATO (1999), EAPR, EU (2004), Stabilitätsabkommen für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1990/1993).

## **51. Türkei**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 1,01 Prozent (18)

*Fläche:* 783.562 km<sup>2</sup> (6)

*Bevölkerung:* 79.749.461 (4)

*BIP pro Kopf in internationaler Dollar nach PPP:* 14.700

*BIP-Wachstum:* 8,5 Prozent (3)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 510.600 (3)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1952), EAPR, EU-Bewerberland, Stabilitätsabkommen für Südosteuropa, SECI, SEECP, BSEC, SOZ-Dialogpartner.

## **52. Turkmenistan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,05 Prozent (49)

*Fläche:* 488.100 km<sup>2</sup> (10)

*Bevölkerung:* 5.054.828 (33)

*BIP pro Kopf in internationaler Dollar nach PPP:* 7.900

*BIP-Wachstum:* 14,7 Prozent (2)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 22.000 (30)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991).

## **53. Ukraine**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,68 Prozent (22)

*Fläche:* 603.550 km<sup>2</sup> (8)

*Bevölkerung:* 44.854.065 (9)

*BIP pro Kopf in internationaler Dollar nach PPP:* 7.300

*BIP-Wachstum:* 5,2 Prozent (14)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 129.925 (10)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1994), NATO-Ukraine-Charta/NATO-Ukraine-Kommission (1997), GUS (1991),<sup>22</sup> Stabilitätsabkommen für Südosteuropa Beobachter, ZEI (1996), BSEC.

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<sup>22</sup> Obwohl die Ukraine einer der Gründungsstaaten der GUS ist, hat sie die GUS-Charta nie ratifiziert.

#### **54. Ungarn**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,6 Prozent (23)

*Fläche:* 93.028 km<sup>2</sup> (26)

*Bevölkerung:* 9.958.453 (20)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 19.800

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,7 Prozent (33)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 22.587 (28)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* OECD (1996), Europarat (1990),

NATO (1999), EAPR, EU (2004), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1989), SECI.

#### **55. USA**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 11,5 Prozent (1)

*Fläche:* 9.826.675 km<sup>2</sup> (3)

*Bevölkerung:* 313.847.465 (1)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 49.000

*BIP-Wachstum:* 1,7 Prozent (33)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 1.569.417 (1)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* G8 (1975), OECD (1961), NATO (1949), EAPR, Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, NAFTA.

#### **56. Usbekistan**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Januar 1992

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,35 Prozent (29)

*Fläche:* 447.400 km<sup>2</sup> (12)

*Bevölkerung:* 28.394.180 (12)

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 3.300

*BIP-Wachstum:* 8,3 Prozent (4)

*Streitkräfte (aktive):* 67.000 (14)

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), OVKS, SOZ.

#### **57. Zypern**

*Beitrittsdatum:* Juni 1973

*Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:* 0,19 Prozent (33)

*Fläche:* 9.251 km<sup>2</sup> (50)<sup>23</sup>

*Bevölkerung:* 1.138.071 (48)<sup>24</sup>

*BIP pro Kopf in international Dollar nach PPP:* 29.400

*BIP-Wachstum:* 0,5 Prozent (47)

<sup>23</sup> Griechischer Teil: 5.896 km<sup>2</sup>, türkischer Teil: 3.355 km<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> Griechischer und türkischer Teil zusammen.

*Streitkräfte (aktive): 12.000 (37)<sup>25</sup>*

*Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen:* Europarat (1961), EU (2004), Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.

*Quellen:*

Beitrittsdatum:

<http://web.archive.org/web/20100826040207/http://www.osce.org/about/13131.html>

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:

*OSZE, Beschluss des Ständigen Rates, PC.DEC/1027 Annex, 22. Dezember 2010.* <http://www.osce.org/de/pc/92800>

Fläche:

[https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/rawdata\\_2147.txt](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/rawdata_2147.txt)

Bevölkerung:

*(Schätzungen für Juli 2012)* [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/rawdata\\_2119.txt](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/rawdata_2119.txt)

BIP pro Kopf in *International Dollar* nach PPP:

*(soweit nicht anders angegeben Schätzungen für 2011)*  
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html>

BIP-Wachstum:

*(soweit nicht anders angegeben Schätzungen für 2011)*  
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2003rank.html>

Streitkräfte (aktive):

*International Institute for Strategic Studies (Hrsg.), The Military Balance 2012, London 2012*

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25 Türkischer Teil: 5.000.



## OSZE – Tagungen, Treffen und Termine 2011/2012

### 2011

- 7.-9. September OSZE-Büro in Eriwan/Armenian Civil Service Council/EU-Projekt „Sigma“/UNDP: Internationale Konferenz zur Verwaltungsreform, Eriwan
12. September OSZE-Vorsitz/Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte (BDIMR): hochrangiges Treffen zum Thema „Verhütung von hassmotivierten Übergriffen auf Verbrechen an Christen und die Reaktion darauf“, Rom
- 14.-16. September Büro des Koordinators für Wirtschafts- und Umweltaktivitäten der OSZE: 19. Wirtschafts- und Umweltforum zur Förderung gemeinsamer Aktionen und der Zusammenarbeit im OSZE-Raum bei der Entwicklung nachhaltiger Energie- und Verkehrssysteme, Prag
- 21.-23. September OSZE-Zentrum in Aschgabat/Büro der OSZE-Beauftragten für Medienfreiheit: Ausbildungsseminar für Regierungssprecher und Vertreter von Pressestellen, Aschgabat
26. September BDIMR: Implementierungstreffen zur menschlichen Dimension, Warschau
- 3.-4. Oktober OSZE-Sekretariat, Büro der Sonderbeauftragten und Koordinatorin zur Bekämpfung des Menschenhandels: Expertenseminar zum Einsatz von Systemen zur Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche im Kampf gegen den Menschenhandel, Wien
- 4.-5. Oktober OSZE-Sekretariat/Gruppe Terrorismusbekämpfung (ATU)/Innenministerium der Republik Kirgisistan: Workshop zu den Instrumenten bürgernaher Polizeiarbeit zur Bekämpfung von gewalttätigem Extremismus und Radikalisierung, die zu Terrorismus führen, Bischkek
- 7.-10. Oktober Herbsttagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE, Dubrovnik
- 10.-11. Oktober OSZE-Sekretariat, Abteilung Externe Zusammenarbeit: Mittelmeerkonferenz der OSZE 2011, Budva
- 13.-14. Oktober OSZE-Beauftragte für Medienfreiheit: Erste Medienkonferenz für Südosteuropa, Sarajewo
- 20.-21. Oktober OSZE-Beauftragte für Medienfreiheit: Achte Medienkonferenz für den Südkaukasus zu „Medienpluralismus und Regulierung des Internet“, Tiflis
- 27.-28. Oktober OSZE-Sekretariat, Abteilung Genderfragen: Konferenz über die Resolution 1325 des VN-Sicherheitsrats „Von

	der Theorie zu größtmöglicher Sicherheit in der OSZE“, Sarajewo
28. Oktober	OSZE-Vorsitz/BDIMR: Treffen zum Thema „Bekämpfung von Intoleranz und Diskriminierung gegenüber Muslimen im öffentlichen Diskurs“, Wien
31.Oktober-4. November	BDIMR: Schulungskurs zu Ermittlungsmethoden in Fällen von Terrorismus im Einklang mit den internationalen Menschenrechtsstandards, Pristina und Skopje
10.-11. November	BDIMR: Zusätzliches Treffen zur menschlichen Dimension zum Thema Verhütung von Rassismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Hassverbrechen durch Erziehungs- und Bewusstseinsbildungsinitiativen, Wien
4.-5. Dezember	BDIMR: Zivilgesellschaftliche Konferenz der Mittelmeerpartnerländer der OSZE, Vilnius
6.-7. Dezember	Litauischer OSZE-Vorsitz: 18. OSZE-Ministerratstreffen, Vilnius
9. Dezember	OSZE-Sekretariat, ATU und Gruppe Strategische Polizeiangelegenheiten (SPMU), in Zusammenarbeit mit der türkischen Polizeiakademie: Panel zur Rolle bürgernaher Polizeiarbeit bei der Verhütung von gewalttätigem Extremismus und Radikalisierung, die zu Terrorismus führen, Antalya
12. Dezember	BDIMR: Expertenrunde über die Verhütung einer terroristische Radikalisierung von Frauen, Wien
12.-13. Dezember	Büro des Koordinators für Wirtschafts- und Umweltaktivitäten der OSZE/Binnenverkehrsausschuss der VN-Wirtschaftskommission für Europa (UNECE): Diskussionsforum zur Sicherheit des Binnenverkehrs, Runder Tisch von OSZE und UNECE, Wien

## 2012

1. Januar	Irland übernimmt den OSZE-Vorsitz von Litauen. Eamon Gilmore, Irlands Vizeministerpräsident und Außen- und Handelsminister, wird Amtierender Vorsitzender der OSZE
26.-27. Januar	BDIMR/ATU/SPMU: Expertenrunde zur Verhütung von Terrorismus und zur Bekämpfung von gewalttätigem Extremismus und Radikalisierung, die zu Terrorismus führen: ein Ansatz der bürgernahen Polizeiarbeit, Warschau

6.-7. Februar	OSZE-Vorsitz/Büro des Koordinators für Wirtschafts- und Umweltaktivitäten der OSZE: Erstes Vorbereitungstreffen für das 20. Wirtschafts- und Umweltforum über Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung von Geldwäsche und Terrorismusfinanzierung, Wien
13.-14. Februar	OSZE/Außenministerium Thailands: OSZE/Thailand-Konferenz zum Thema „Stärkung der Sicherheit durch regionale Zusammenarbeit“, Chiang Mai
14. Februar	BDIMR: Expertentreffen zur Praxis der Datensammlung zu Hassverbrechen in der OSZE-Region, Warschau
23.-24. Februar	Wintertagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE, Wien
12.-13. März	Sekretariat, Abteilung Genderfragen: Expertenrunde zur Rolle und Befähigung von Frauen bei der Bekämpfung von gewalttätigem Extremismus und Radikalisierung, die zu Terrorismus führen, Wien
16. März	OSZE-Sekretariat, Abteilung Grenzüberschreitende Bedrohungen (TNTD)/BDIMR: Start eines Online-Forums über die Verhütung von Terrorismus und die Bekämpfung von gewalttätigem Extremismus und Radikalisierung, die zu Terrorismus führen können: ein Ansatz der bürgernahen Polizeiarbeit
26.-28. März	Büro des OSZE-Beauftragten für Medienfreiheit/Albany Associates: Master-Kurs zur Rundfunkregulierung, Istanbul
27.-28. März	BDIMR: Treffen einer Expertengruppe zum Thema „Menschenrechtsschutz bei der Rückkehr von Menschenhandelsopfern“, Warschau
27.-31. März	BDMIR/OSZE-Stabsakademie für Grenzmanagement (BMSC): Schulung für Grenzschutzbeamte zum Menschenrechtsschutz bei der Terrorismusbekämpfung, Dushanbe
3.-4. April	BDIMR: Treffen zum Thema „Zugang zu den Gerichten und zu wirksamen Rechtsbehelfen für Menschenhandelsopfer: die Einrichtung eines Anwälte-Netzwerks“, Warschau
18.-19. April	BDIMR: Runder Tisch für Vertreter der Zivilgesellschaft zur Datensammlung über Hassverbrechen und zur Bekämpfung von Intoleranz, Wien
19. April	BDIMR/Georgisches Parlament: Konferenz über Normen parlamentarischer Ethik und Verhaltenskodizes, Tiflis

- 19.-20. April BDIMR: Zusätzliches Treffen zur menschlichen Dimension zum Thema Sport als Medium für die Bekämpfung von Rassismus, Intoleranz und Diskriminierung in der Gesellschaft, Wien
- 23.-24. April OSZE-Vorsitz/Büro des Koordinators für Wirtschafts- und Umweltaktivitäten der OSZE: Zweites Vorbereitungstreffen für das 20. OSZE Wirtschafts- und Umweltforum zur Förderung guter Regierungsführung und Bekämpfung von Korruption zur Unterstützung der sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklung, Dublin
- 8.-10. Mai Der Persönliche Beauftragte des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE für Anhang 1B Artikel IV des Friedensabkommens von Dayton: Achte Überprüfungskonferenz des Artikels IV im Anhang 1B des Friedensabkommens von Dayton, Rom
- 10.-11. Mai OSZE/Büro der Vereinten Nationen für Drogen- und Verbrechensbekämpfung (UNODC): Konferenz zu Verbesserungen der Implementierung internationaler Verträge gegen den Einsatz von Sprengstoffen zu terroristischen Zwecken, Wien
- 12.-14. Mai Wirtschaftskonferenz der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE, Batumi
- 14.-16. Mai BDIMR: Seminar zur menschlichen Dimension über den rechtsstaatlichen Rahmen bei der Bekämpfung des Menschenhandels, Warschau
- 21.-25. Mai OSZE-Sekretariat, ATU: Erstes Online-Forum zur Benutzung des Internets durch Terroristen
24. Mai BDIMR/European Network of Independent Living: Workshop zur Bekämpfung von Hassverbrechen an Menschen mit Behinderungen, Dublin
- 5.-6. Juni OSZE-Konfliktverhütungszentrum (KVZ)/Büro der VN für Abrüstungsfragen (UNODA): Workshop zur Umsetzung der Resolution 1540 des VN-Sicherheitsrats, Vilnius
- 18.-19. Juni OSZE-Vorsitz: Dubliner Konferenz über Internetfreiheit, Dublin
- 18.-20. Juni OSZE-KVZ in Zusammenarbeit mit Lettland sowie mit Deutschland und der Schweiz als Geberländer: Seminar zum Verhaltenskodex zu politisch-militärischen Aspekten der Sicherheit für die Ostseeregion, Riga
- 24.-25. Juni OSZE: OSZE Security Days 2012, Wien
- 26.-27. Juni BDIMR: Seminar über die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft bei der Bekämpfung von Hassverbrechen an Christen, Rom

26.-28. Juni	OSZE: Jährliche Sicherheitsüberprüfungskonferenz, Wien
3.-4. Juli	BDIMR: Zweites Expertentreffen zur Überwachung und Sammlung von Daten zu Hassverbrechen, Warschau
5.-6. Juli	OSZE, Büro der OSZE-Beauftragten für Medienfreiheit: Zentralasiatische Medienkonferenz „Von altbekannten Online-Medien – bewährte Praktiken und Perspektiven“, Aschgabat
5.-6. Juli	BDIMR: Die Verfolgung von Hassverbrechen. Meinungsaustausch und erster Schulungskurs, Warschau
5.-9. Juli	21. Jahrestagung der Parlamentarische Versammlung der OSZE, Monaco
11. Juli	Forum für Sicherheitskooperation (FSK): Erste jährliche Diskussion über die Umsetzung des OSZE-Verhaltenskodex zu politisch-militärischen Aspekten der Sicherheit, Wien
12.-13. Juli	OSZE-Vorsitz/BDIMR: Zusätzliches Treffen zur menschlichen Dimension über demokratische Wahlen und Wahlbeobachtung, Wien
20.-25. Juli	Büro des Koordinators für Wirtschafts- und Umweltaktivitäten der OSZE/OSZE-BMSC/Binnenverkehrsausschuss der UNECE: Regionales Schulungsseminar zu bewährten Praktiken an Grenzübergängen, Duschanbe
26.-27. Juli	OSZE-Sekretariat, ATU/Antiterrorismuszentrum des kirgisischen Staatskomitees für nationale Sicherheit: Treffen von Experten von Antiterrorismuszentren, Bischkek



*Ute Runge*

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## Abkürzungsverzeichnis

ACMF	Advisory Committee on Management and Finance/Beratender Ausschuss für Verwaltung und Finanzen
AEI	Allianz für Europäische Integration
AEMR	Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte
AHB	Ausschuss Hoher Beamter
ANA	Afghan National Army/Afghanische Nationalarmee
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces/Nationale Sicherheitskräfte Afghanistans
AIAM/JTBD	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting/Jährliches Treffen zur Beurteilung der Durchführung
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations/Verband Südostasiatischer Nationen
ASRC	Annual Security Review Conference/Jährliche Sicherheitsüberprüfungskonferenz
ASSR	Autonome Sozialistische Sowjetrepublik
ATU	Action against Terrorism Unit/Gruppe Terrorismusbekämpfung
AU	African Union/Afrikanische Union
BDIMR	Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte
BfV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
BiH	Bosna i Hercegovina/Bosnien und Herzegowina
BIP	Bruttoinlandsprodukt
BKA	Bundeskriminalamt
BMI	Bundesinnenministerium
BMSC	Border Management Staff College/Stabsakademie für Grenzmanagement
BRICS	Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China, Südafrika
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation/Schwarzmeer-Wirtschaftskooperation
CACO	Central Asian Cooperation Organization/Zentralasiatische Organisation für Zusammenarbeit
CAPTF	Combined Air Power Transition Force
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States/Rat der Ostseestaaten
CCIIR	Centre for Civil Integration and Inter-Ethnic Relations
CDC	Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement/Mitteleuropäisches Freihandelsabkommen
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CERD	Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination/Ausschuss für die Beseitigung der Rassendiskriminierung

CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia/Konferenz über Interaktion und vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen in Asien
CIPDD	Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
COMISAF	Commander of the International Security Assistance Force
CORE	Centre for OSCE Research/Zentrum für OSZE-Forschung
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
CSTO/OVKS	Collective Security Treaty Organization/Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DK	Demokratikus Koalíció/Demokratische Koalition
EAD	Europäischer Auswärtiger Dienst
EAPR	Euro-Atlantischer Partnerschaftsrat
EASI	Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative/Euro-atlantische Sicherheitsinitiative
EBWE	Europäische Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung
ECMI	European Centre for Minority Issues/Europäisches Zentrum für Minderheitenfragen
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council/Wirtschafts- und Sozialrat der Vereinten Nationen
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States/Westafrikanische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
ECRI	European Commission against Racism and Intolerance/Europäische Kommission gegen Rassismus und Intoleranz
EdRo	Jedinaja Rossija/Einiges Russland
EGMR	Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte
EG TEX	Ermittlergruppe Terrorismus/Extremismus
EMRK	Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention/Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy/Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik
ENVSEC	Environment and Security Initiative/Umwelt- und Sicherheitsinitiative
ESVP	Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik
EU	Europäische Union
EUA	European University Association
EUFOR	European Union Force
EULEX	EU-Rechtsstaatlichkeitsmission
EUMM	European Monitoring Mission/EU-Beobachtermission
EUPM	EU-Polizeimission
EUSB	EU-Sonderbeauftragter
EUV	Vertrag über die Europäische Union

FCNM	Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities/Rahmenübereinkommen zum Schutz nationaler Minderheiten
Fidesz-MPSZ	Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Szövetség/Bund Junger Demokraten – Ungarischer Bürgerbund
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
FRS	Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique/Stiftung für Strategische Forschung
FSB	Federalnaja Sluschnba Besopasnosti Rossiskoj Federazii/Sicherheitsdienst der Russischen Föderation
FSK	Forum für Sicherheitskooperation
G8	Gruppe der Acht
G20	Gruppe der Zwanzig
GASP	Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
GUAM	Georgien, Ukraine, Aserbaidschan, Moldau (Organisation für Demokratie und Wirtschaftsentwicklung)
GUS	Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten
GYLA	Georgian Young Lawyers Association
HDZ BiH	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine/Kroatische Demokratische Union in Bosnien und Herzegowina
HKNM	Hoher Kommissar für nationale Minderheiten
IBU	Islamische Bewegung Usbekistans
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination/Internationales Übereinkommen zur Beseitigung jeder Form von Rassendiskriminierung
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICTY/IStGHJ	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia/Internationaler Strafgerichtshof für das ehemalige Jugoslawien
IDEAS	Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGH	Internationaler Gerichtshof
IKRK	Internationales Komitee vom Roten Kreuz
IKT	Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien
ILO	International Labour Organization/Internationale Arbeitsorganisation
IMEMO	Institute of World Economy and International Relations/Institut für Weltwirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen
IOM	International Organization for Migration/Internationale Organisation für Migration
IPbpR	Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte
IPI	International Peace Institute

IPTF	International Police Task Force/Internationale Polizeieinsatztruppe
IRMA	Integrated Resource Management System
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force/Internationale Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe
IStGHJ/ICTY	Internationaler Strafgerichtshof für das ehemalige Jugoslawien/International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IWF	Internationaler Währungsfonds
Jobbik	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom/Bewegung für ein beseres Ungarn
JTBD/AIAM	Jährliches Treffen zur Beurteilung der Durchführung/Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting
KazISS	Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies/Kasachisches Institut für strategische Studien beim Präsidenten der Republik Kasachstan
KDNP	Keresztyén demokrata Néppárt/Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KKP/PPP	Kaufkraftparität/Purchasing Power Parity
KP	Kommunistische Partei
KPRF	Kommunistitscheskaja Partija Rossiskoi Federazii/Kommunistische Partei der Russischen Föderation
KSE-Vertrag	Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa
KSZE	Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (seit 1995 OSZE)
KVZ	Konfliktverhütungszentrum
LAS	League of Arab States/Arabische Liga
LDP	Liberalno-Demokratska Partija/Liberaldemokratische Partei Serbiens
LDPR	Liberalno-Demokratischeskaja Partija Rossii/Liberal- Demokratische Partei Russlands
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LMP	Lehet Más a Politika/Politik kann anders sein
MAD	Amt für den militärischen Abschirmdienst
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MANU	Mazedonischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste
MDF	Magyar Demokrata Fórum/Ungarisches Demokratisches Forum
MEP	Member of the European Parliament/Mitglied des Europäischen Parlaments

MGIMO	
Universitet	Moskovski gosudarstvennyj institut meždunarodnych otnošeni MID Rossii (universitet)/Moskauer Staatliches In- stitut für Internationale Beziehungen des russischen Außen- ministeriums (Universität)
MSZP	Magyar Szocialista Párt/Ungarische Sozialistische Partei
NAC	North Atlantic Council/Nordatlantikrat
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAKR	Nordatlantischer Kooperationsrat
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization /Nordatlantikvertrags- Organisation
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations/nichtstaatliche Organisa- tionen
NPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
NSU	Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan/NATO-Ausbil- dungsmission Afghanistan
OAS	Organization of American States/Organisation Amerikani- scher Staaten
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Ent- wicklung
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHR	Office of the High Representative/Büro des Hohen Reprä- sentanten
OIC/OIZ	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation/Organisation für Isla- mische Zusammenarbeit
OMiK	OSCE Mission in Kosovo/OSZE-Mission im Kosovo
OMON	Otryad Mobilnyi Osobogo Naznacheniya/Mobile Einheit besonderer Bestimmung
OPCAT	Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment/Fa- kultativprotokoll zum Übereinkommen gegen Folter und andere grausame, unmenschliche oder erniedrigende Be- handlung oder Strafe
OSI	Open Society Institute
OSZE	Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa
ovi	Objectively Verifiable Indicators
OVKS/CSTO	Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit/Col- lective Security Treaty Organization
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe/Parla- mentarische Versammlung des Europarats
PAQ	Project Appraisal Questionnaire

PCU	Project Co-ordination Unit
PfP	Partnership for Peace/Partnerschaft für den Frieden
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy
PIC	Peace Implementation Council
PISM	Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych/Polnisches Institut für Internationale Angelegenheiten
PLC	Project Life Cycle
PMC	Project Management Cycle
PMD	Project Management Database
PPP/KKP	Purchasing Power Parity/Kaufkraftparität
PV	Parlamentarische Versammlung
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion
REC	Regional Environment Centre for Central and Eastern Europe/Regionales Umweltzentrum für Mittel- und Osteuropa
RECCA V	Fifth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference for Afghanistan/Fünftes Treffen der Konferenz über regionale wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit für Afghanistan
RGW	Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe
RSFSR	Russische Sozialistische Föderative Sowjetrepublik
SAA	Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsabkommen
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons/Kleinwaffen und leichte Waffen
SBB BiH	Savez za bolju budućnost Bosne i Hercegovine/Bund für eine bessere Zukunft Bosnien und Herzegowinas
SBiH	Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu/Partei für Bosnien und Herzegowina
SCO/SOZ	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation/Schanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit
SDA	Stranka Demokratske Akcije/Partei der demokratischen Aktion (Bosnien und Herzegowina)
SDP	Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i Hercegovine/Sozialdemokratische Partei von Bosnien und Herzegowina
SDPK	Sozialdemokratische Partei Kirgisistans
SDS	Srpska Demokratska Stranka/Serbische Demokratische Partei (Bosnien und Herzegowina)
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SECI	Southeast European Cooperative Initiative/Südosteuropäische Kooperationsinitiative
SEECP	South-East European Cooperation Process/Kooperationsprozess in Südosteuropa

SEE University/ SEEU	The South East European University/Südosteuropa-Universität
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SLfV	Sächsisches Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz
SNSD	Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata/Allianz der Unabhängigen Sozialdemokraten (Bosnien und Herzegowina)
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies
SOZ/SCO	Schanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit/Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit/Gruppe Strategische Polizeiangelegenheiten
SR	Sprawedliwaja Rossija/Gerechtes Russland
SSR	Sozialistische Sowjetrepublik
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty/Vertrag zur Verringerung strategischer Waffen
SZDSZ	Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége/Bund Freier Demokraten
TANDIS	Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System
TLfV	Thüringer Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz
TLKA	Thüringer Landeskriminalamt
TNTs	Transnational Threats/grenzüberschreitende Bedrohungen
TYP	Transition Year Programme/Übergangsjahrprogramm
UCLA	University of California, Los Angeles
UdSSR	Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations/Vereinigung Europäischer Fußballverbände
UN/UNO/VN	United Nations/United Nations Organization/Vereinte Nationen
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCHR/ UNOHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UP	Universität Pristina
USAID	United States Agency for International Development/US-Behörde für internationale Entwicklung
UT	Universität Tetovo
VBM	Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen
VSBM	Vertrauens- und sicherheitsbildende Maßnahmen
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WD	Wiener Dokument
WEU	Westeuropäische Union
WITS	Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
WTO	World Trade Organization/Welthandelsorganisation
ZEI	Zentraleuropäische Initiative

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