

Anhang

Back to Diplomacy

Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project

November 2015

Foreword

In its Interim Report the Panel of Eminent Persons set out some practical lessons for the OSCE from the crisis in and around Ukraine. This Final Report takes the same starting point but addresses the crisis of European security in a more comprehensive way.

The Panel's discussions were frank and intense. They dealt with serious national security issues, touching the very core of state sovereignty. It is not easy to convey in the report itself both the frankness, the professionalism, and the good humour of these exchanges, nor the moments of tension and of fundamental disagreement.

Our disagreements were numerous, and challenging to overcome. For many, if not for most members of the Panel, the final version represents a compromise which does not adequately reflect the many ambitious proposals submitted. One member of the Panel, Sergey Karaganov, who contributed to the ideas in the report as well as making vigorous interventions in our discussions, has felt obliged to write a letter of disagreement. This is attached to the report. Another member of the Panel, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, was able to participate only in the first Panel meeting. This is why he felt it was too presumptuous on his part to share full credit for the Report with the other panelists. But he sent us a letter supporting the Report and its findings. This letter is attached to this report as well.

Even if our discussions were sometimes heated, they were framed by a shared sense of the dangers and the lack of security of Europe today. This is far from the settled, co-operative order that we imagined twenty-five years ago. We began with an attempt to understand how the current crisis developed, and what errors and missteps may have been made on the way. We quickly found that there was no agreed view, no common analysis. This lack of agreement is reflected in the three different narratives included in the Report (with longer versions in the Annex). No member of the Panel would endorse all three of these narratives – which are often in opposition to each other; and, in the case of the long versions, most do not accept any of them as an accurate or adequate way of describing their perspective on what happened. The point, however, is not historical accuracy but to illustrate how much our appreciation of the recent past diverges. These diametrically opposed narratives are a fact that, for the moment, we have to live with. While

it should not prevent us from working together, it ought to help us realize how difficult that is.

For governments and other institutions, as well as for the OSCE as a whole, it might be worth considering a research project on these different narratives, on our common history, bringing together scholars from different countries, and aiming to set out more systematically our divergent views of the past, and how and why they developed.

The Report does not propose new principles or new institutions. We have many agreed principles though we do not always respect them; and we have common institutions though sometimes we seem determined to prevent them from working.

Instead we propose a return to diplomacy; a robust diplomatic process designed to replace mutual recrimination with rebuilding trust: not military activity, not propaganda, not rhetoric – but a process that explores our common problems carefully, confidentially and systematically. If we can understand them as common problems we will already be making progress. The process will be based on the Helsinki principles, notably that of equal sovereignty; those undertaking it must also be prepared to discuss the situations of particular countries in concrete terms. The aim should be to resolve the open questions, in particular relating to those who, for want of a better term, we have called the countries in-between. This should be accompanied by work in the economic and human dimension, and by confidence-building measures in the military field.

But above all we need confidence re-building in the political field - that is to say, diplomacy. The process will need stamina and patience. If successful, it should conclude with a summit meeting. The Finnish initiative which led to the Helsinki Final Act forty years ago was a courageous step, and we need such courageous steps again – today more than ever.

It would not make sense to discuss architecture while the house is burning: such discussions can begin seriously only when the Minsk agreements have been implemented. This remains the most urgent diplomatic task of all.

The Panel's Interim Report should also be followed up. Security in Europe needs co-operation and that is possible only if we have effective common instruments. The modest proposals of the Interim Report are designed to give the OSCE the means for stronger co-operation and so for stronger security.

I thank the OSCE Troika for proposing this Panel, and those participating States who have supported its work through written contributions, or enabled it through funding and other forms of co-operation. I am also grateful to the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions for their input to our discussion. It has been an experience of mutual education for all of us – and for this as well as for the time, work and energy committed I am grateful to all the members of the Panel.

Finally, the Final Report as well as the Interim Report could not have been developed and agreed without the drafting and editing skills of Robert Cooper and the members of his team, Walter Kemp, Adrian Oroz and Wolfgang Zellner. Last not least, the Panel is grateful to Ambassador Fred Tanner and to Juraj Nosal, who made sure we remained in close touch with the OSCE in Vienna, and worked very hard to organize and co-ordinate the Panel's work in an effective manner.

Amb. Wolfgang Ischinger

Chairperson of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project

Introduction

European security is in crisis. The Panel of Eminent Persons was established to reflect on how Europe could reconsolidate its security as a common project. It was asked to prepare for a renewed dialogue, taking account of the damage done by the crisis in and around Ukraine, and to examine ways of relaunching the idea of co-operative security. (The Panel's mandate is set out in full at Annex 3.)

The Panel's Interim Report looked at the lessons to be learned from the Ukraine crisis for the OSCE as an institution: this is important since it is the institution that embodies the idea of common and co-operative security in Europe. This Report looks at the broader issues of security in Europe.

The Panel was unanimous on the grave dangers of the present situation. Europe is not divided as it was when the Helsinki Final Act was signed forty years ago; but the situation in Europe is more uncertain and precarious. The annexation of Crimea by force is an action unprecedented in post-war Europe. Economic relations as well as security issues have become sources of instability. There is no commonly accepted status quo. It is urgent to reduce the risks of the present situation and to put security and co-operation on a more stable basis. This would enable participating States to work together more effectively in many areas, including to tackle the common threat of terrorism.

This crisis can be resolved only through a robust process of active diplomacy. A return to negotiation will be difficult but we must seek agreements that will carry sufficient conviction to make them sustainable. The Report's recommendations suggest how such a process might be organized and what its objectives should be. This should be complemented by an open intellectual and political dialogue, including civil society.

This must be done in a way that reaffirms the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. It is true that important Helsinki principles have been violated in most damaging ways. That does not invalidate the principles. Traffic

laws are violated every day but we still need them for an orderly traffic system. The Helsinki principles remain the only basis for a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space in which people and nations can live in peace.

The Paths to the Crisis

The present crisis in European security did not come out of a blue sky. It grew out of the actions and perceptions of the different parties over the last twenty-five years. Their differing interpretations are both a symptom and a cause of the crisis in European security. At the very least they point to a serious failure of communication.

In the course of frank and open discussions, members of the Panel set out different interpretations of events in Europe since 1990 and different views on the causes of the breakdown of trust. To reflect this and the different perspectives on the origins of the current crisis, the report presents different narratives of the events. Some Panel members remain in fundamental disagreement about each others' narratives; nevertheless, the articulation of these views has enabled a better understanding of each others' perspective.

There is no such thing as a single narrative, in the West, in Russia or in the states in-between, those that became independent with the dissolution of the Soviet Union but have not joined Western institutions. What follows is an attempt to outline the main themes from three different standpoints. (At the request of some Panel members, a longer version of the narratives is at Annex 1.)

The View from the West

The end of the Cold War brought the liberation of Central and Eastern European countries from Soviet dominion. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, which came about through the determination of its constituent republics to become independent states, extended this liberation to the countries that had been incorporated in the Soviet and Russian empires. This was not a victory of the West but a victory for freedom and democracy, and was recorded as such in the Charter of Paris.

This was an opportunity for the creation of a Europe that was whole and free, democratic and at peace. For newly-liberated countries, that meant joining the Western institutions – both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) – and transforming their economic and political systems. A strategic partnership with Russia that would include co-operation with, if not necessarily integration in, these Western institutions was intended to bring stability and co-operation to Europe. This process resulted in the successful enlargements of NATO and the EU in the 1990s and 2000s – enlargements that Russia accepted. Enlargement became

increasingly controversial when membership questions arose for the former Soviet republics, with Russia increasingly opposed, the West divided and beset with enlargement fatigue, and some of the countries seeking membership often poorly governed.

The process of creating a Europe whole, free, and at peace was challenged by the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the conflicts that emerged in the wake of the Soviet breakup. The West was unprepared for the crisis in the Balkans and failed to prevent or resolve the conflict initially. Addressing this crisis brought the West into conflict with Russia. The first crisis between Russia and the West over Bosnia was overcome through inclusion in the diplomatic process; but this did not succeed in the case of Kosovo nor with conflicts in former Soviet republics.

When democratic revolutions took place in some countries that had been part of the Soviet Union, conflict between the West and Russia (which feared the “colour revolutions” would spread, including to Moscow) grew. Profound disagreements arose over Georgia in 2008 and open confrontation in the case of Ukraine from 2013. Whatever concerns Russia may have had about Ukraine, including Crimea, it made no attempt to resolve them peacefully. The strengthening authoritarian rule in Russia, which distanced itself from the values of the Charter of Paris, contributed to these developments.

The crisis of today has come about because Russia decided to give up any pretence of wanting to co-operate with, let alone integrate in, the West. Instead, it decided to resort to force by annexing Crimea and intervening in other parts of Ukraine. With this it seems to have abandoned the basic principles of international order: sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-use of force.

The View from Moscow

The main dynamic after the Cold War was the expansion of Western institutions at the expense of Russia. The West never tried to address security with Russia, only without it, or against it. NATO’s expansion was an increasing threat to Russia’s national security. The EU’s expansion took over Russia’s markets; and as new member states joined Schengen, the area of visa-free travel available to Russian citizens was reduced. In each case, as compensation, Russia was offered a junior partnership: the NATO-Russia Council was sugar coating for the bitter pill of enlargement; the EU’s idea of partnership was that Russia should adopt the EU’s rules.

The idea of NATO as a benign, defensive alliance ended with its bombing of Serbia – a traditional partner of Russia. This was a breach both of international law and of the Helsinki principles. The West involved Russia in the negotiations that preceded this, but when no agreement was reached, acted unilaterally. This was followed by another open breach of international law in the US-led invasion of Iraq. This used military power for regime

change. Having created turmoil in the Middle East, the West has continued to pursue regime change there, supporting the popular movements of the “Arab Spring”, and using force, as in Libya.

The West gave active support to the colour revolutions in Europe. Abrogating the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty destroyed one of the pillars of cooperative security in Europe. Russia made its views known on all these subjects but no one listened. Instead a negative propaganda campaign was launched against Russia in 2013 and Western leaders boycotted the Sochi Olympics.

All these elements came together first in Georgia and then in Ukraine, the promise of NATO membership at the Summit in Bucharest – a serious threat to Russian security – without even a pretence of consultation; then the attempt by the EU to increase its economic space at the expense of Russia; and finally, Western support for the Maidan regime change movement. Russia responded in the only language that gets Western attention.

The View from States in-between

These states do not share either of the above narratives fully. Some of these states (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) saw their independence as an opportunity for integration into Western institutions, as the Baltic States and Central and Eastern European States had. These three states are going through a transition, with more or less democratic elections and functioning civil societies. But they continue to see Russia as a threat to their security, willing to use all means, including force, to prevent them establishing themselves as successful and independent states with autonomy in foreign policy.

Other states in the same region have accepted Russia’s political and security pre-eminence, or have decided not to align with either the West or Russia, as an alternative route to maintaining security and independence.

In summary, at the end of twenty-five years, there are three broad perspectives:

The West: The central problem is not the rules but that Russia breaks them; it continues to behave as if its security can be assured only by dominating its neighbours.

Russia: Instead of creating a common security system there was a Western takeover. Russia was given the Versailles treatment and has responded accordingly.

States in-between: Many of these states wish to integrate with the West; these and others see themselves at risk as Russia develops a more aggressive policy in the region.

The Crisis and Its Dangers

The Panel's views on the past diverge but it is unanimous in seeing today's situation as the most dangerous for several decades. The scene has been set by acts of military force; diplomacy has been ineffective so far, or is used as cover for military action. Changing borders by force breaches the most fundamental principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

In the past many countries have misjudged the implications of their actions and have miscalculated the reactions of others. If they were to do so in the new circumstances this could lead to an even more dangerous confrontation.

Europe today is far from the co-operative order imagined in the early 1990s when, in the Charter of Paris, its leaders declared an end to "the era of confrontation and division" and the arrival of "a new era of democracy peace and unity in Europe". As the narratives above show, historical memories and habits are not overcome without a positive and sustained effort. The new era was a hope rather than a reality and it is naive to think of returning to something that was never realized. Europe's situation now is one of mutual distrust.

Today we are faced with dangerous and threatening behaviour, disinformation, the threat and use of force, leading to a poisoned atmosphere. Instead of confidence-building measures we have forward deployment of troops and equipment, military exercises designed to intimidate, if not to prepare for aggression, deliberate close encounters between naval vessels and pointless risk-taking by military aircraft. These actions risk adding to the civilian deaths in Ukraine, including those killed in the shooting down of flight MH17.

The success of the Helsinki process in the 1970s was to contain confrontation in a structure of dialogue and rules. These were reinforced by transparency- and confidence-building measures, opening the perspective of security through co-operation.

Underpinning the Helsinki Final Act and the structured confrontation of the 1970s was a willingness to accept the territorial status quo in Europe. The Finnish diplomatic note offering to host preparatory talks for a European Conference came less than a year after the Soviet tanks arrived in Prague. Meanwhile negotiations for German-Polish and German-Soviet treaties were underway, and talks were beginning for an agreement on Berlin – all central to a territorial settlement.

These agreements and the Helsinki Accords did not solve all the problems of the Cold War – particularly for peoples living under foreign domination – but they reduced the risks of conflict and enabled increased exchanges across East-West dividing lines. Within the limits set by the Cold War the territorial principles of Helsinki, inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity, were generally well-observed.

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the territorial settlement of the 1970s. This had consisted of two blocs whose members were either in NATO or the Warsaw Pact, plus non-alliance countries with a well-defined neutral status. After 1990 Europe found itself instead with a large number of countries whose security status was undefined. Many of these states have joined NATO and the EU since then, leaving a small number whose external military and economic relations are contested. Not by accident some of them are trapped in so-called frozen conflicts.

This uncertainty means that there is no recognized status quo, and that those who want to end the uncertainty can be perceived as challenging the status quo.

Recommendations

It is urgent to set in motion a robust political and diplomatic process to overcome the present crisis. The vision of a “common European home” may be more remote today than it appeared two decades ago, but we still occupy a common space and need to find ways of living together in it.

Avoiding Accidents

As a first and most urgent step the Panel stresses the need for more effective measures to reduce the risk of military accidents or incidents. Existing bilateral agreements, including the recent US-Russia Air Safety Protocol on Syria or the US-China agreement provide possible models. The steps proposed should not be seen as a return to normality. They represent rather a better means of communication in abnormal times.

- The Panel recommends the reactivation of the NATO-Russia Council, inter alia to agree on rules to improve operational safety and emergency communications in the air and at sea.
- A resumption of military-to-military contacts to discuss such matters is also desirable, including in the OSCE framework.

A New Start for Ukraine

It is essential to complete the implementation of the Minsk agreements, including the restoration of full control of its border to the Government of Ukraine. This will provide not a solution to the crisis, but a breathing space: this should be used to work on a wider framework in which the achievements of the Minsk agreements can be embedded and consolidated.

Meanwhile the illegal annexation of Crimea has substantially eroded the idea of co-operative security in Europe. Until this is addressed it is difficult to imagine a return to European security as a common project.

The fulfilment of the Minsk agreements will not be the end of a process but the starting point for the development of a sustainable political, military and economic settlement of the crisis in and around Ukraine.

- The Panel recommends reinforcing the operations and capabilities of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) so that, as well as monitoring, it can contribute to building peace.
- The Panel also recommends the creation of a Ukraine Contact Group that would bring together the Normandy Group and the signatories of the Budapest Memorandum to help deal with political and security issues arising in the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Towards a Summit Meeting

As soon as the Minsk commitments are in place on the ground, the Panel recommends that the OSCE Chairmanship, supported by the OSCE Troika, and in communication with the Ukraine Contact Group, launch a diplomatic process to rebuild the foundation of European security. Its ultimate aim should be to re-establish security on a co-operative basis, within the framework of the OSCE principles. The questions at issue are of a nature and urgency that requires the involvement of Heads of State or Government; this is why the process should conclude with a Summit meeting.

That cannot be prejudged; the diplomatic work undertaken in the meantime should be organized in that spirit, and should have the active political support of Heads of State or Government. It will be for successive Chairmanships, starting with Germany in 2016, to organize the work – through consultations bilaterally or in small groups, or through structured working groups, regularly informing the OSCE Permanent Council of developments. This process should be reinforced by open intellectual debate and honest political dialogue.

Key Agenda Items for this Process:

I. Security status

The core need is to deal with the problem of those countries whose security status is contested. This problem is all the more pressing as Russia's declarations and actions suggest it believes that it is entitled to limit the independence of certain states. This contradicts the fundamental right of sovereign states to choose their own security arrangements. Any country has the sovereign right to apply for membership of NATO. At the same time the applicant

country and NATO collectively as well as their neighbouring states have a collective responsibility to work together to strengthen the security of Europe as a whole where legitimate security interests of everyone are protected.

The task of diplomacy is to find a solution that strengthens the security of all European countries and of Europe as a whole and which, for the countries most concerned, provides reassurance about their future.

A proper examination of ways to resolve these problems might include elements such as: a Treaty on European security; alliance membership; military co-operation outside the alliance framework; permanent or time-limited neutrality; neutrality but with military links to NATO; security guarantees; understandings on what neutrality means in the present context. Decisions on specific security arrangements however remain solely for the country concerned and, in the case of alliance membership, with the members of the alliance.

Agreements in this area should be reinforced by:

- Updating the OSCE 2011 Vienna Document to adjust the thresholds for notification and inspection of military exercises, to raise quotas for inspections, to review categories for information exchange and revise the definition of 'unusual military activities'.
- Consideration should also be given to updating the Open Skies Treaty.
- A new set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) addressing snap exercises and exercises close to borders.
- Limitations on deployment of forces and equipment close to borders.
- Increased military-to-military contacts, e.g. on shared challenges and new doctrines like cyber security, new technology (like unmanned aerial vehicles and automated weapons systems), and transnational threats like terrorism and organized crime.
- Reinforcement of the NATO-Russia Council, for example by more meetings at Defence and/or Foreign Minister level, resumed military co-operation.
- Eventually, the elaboration of a new and comprehensive conventional arms control regime based on, but not limited to, the concepts of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

II. Unresolved conflicts

The second bundle of issues to be disentangled are those around the question of the protracted conflicts. The objective here is to settle the status of disputed territories, i.e. those subject to so-called frozen conflicts or military occupation, on the basis of the Helsinki principles. If a diplomatic process can succeed in following-up Minsk implementation by creating a more solid

framework for co-operative security, it must be possible also to find solutions to problems which have poisoned relations between states and blighted the lives of ordinary people.

The Panel recommends that, in the context of the wider effort for a territorial/security settlement, an intensive attempt should be made to agree a set of procedures to resolve these situations. This might include:

- Interim measures aimed at normalizing the lives of people in or near the territories concerned. This could include stepping up economic measures and promoting cross-boundary/border trade and contacts.
- A process for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees in a safe, dignified and voluntary way.
- Exploration of security regimes. These might involve, inter alia: i) all sides to the conflict, regardless of their status, pledging the non-use of force and non-resumption of hostilities; ii) withdrawal of all armed forces from the conflict regions; and iii) internationalization of the security regimes and/or peace operations in these regions under OSCE or UN auspices.
- The OSCE should do its best to allow freedom of local as well as international movement across the dividing lines, whether in and out of occupied or annexed territories.
- Greater efforts to identify and reflect the wishes and needs of the peoples in the affected regions, including displaced persons. Taking into account national constitutions, ways should be found to establish conditions for a fair test of opinion. This should include examination of the method of testing opinion, the formulation of questions, the monitoring of any ballots, and the issue of participation in these.
- In return for the fulfilment of these conditions, all OSCE participating States would agree to recognize the results of the process.

III. The Human Dimension

The problem in the human dimension is primarily one of implementation. It has been an important factor in the conflict in and around Ukraine. Giving the human dimension its proper place is also a part of the solution.

The greater openness of our societies, including through new technology, is a welcome development. It has however also brought complaints about intervention in domestic affairs. Accusations include support from foreign governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for political parties or movements promoting political change and the instrumentalization of minority rights by “kin states” or other outside powers as an excuse for intervention.

The Panel recommends:

- The OSCE Chairmanship with support of the OSCE Troika should use every means possible to establish a better human dimension implementation review process, for example along the lines of the UN and Council of Europe practice.
- As a matter of urgency, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) should be given access to the Crimean Peninsula. This would be an important step in rebuilding confidence.
- The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media should carry out an assessment on propaganda, demonization and misinformation in the OSCE area and make recommendations on how to address this without damaging freedom of media.
- The HCNM should be invited to develop ideas on how the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life might be applied to the unresolved conflicts.
- The OSCE Chairmanship should consider/commission studies on whether meaningful confidence-building measures could be devised to reassure OSCE participating States on the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.

IV. Economic Connectivity

Trade and investment in the OSCE area have grown dramatically in the post-Cold War period; this is positive but it has also brought increased vulnerability. Some of the deterioration of relations in the last ten years has been expressed in disagreements on trade questions. Rules are well-established but are not always followed.

The Panel recommends that the OSCE Chairmanship/Troika establish an expert group to:

- Consider what could or should be done about the use of trade regulations as a political weapon.
- Look at the question of economic connectivity between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, giving special attention to the position of the states in-between, including Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
- Consider, in consultation with the World Trade Organization (WTO), whether it might be possible and useful to create a quick and light process for resolving trade disputes within the OSCE area.
- Consider the creation of an international committee of relevant stakeholders (including from outside the OSCE area) to promote economic development in Ukraine.

- Make proposals for a forum to bring together governments, companies and other relevant organizations from the entire Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space, including China, to discuss opportunities for and obstacles to the development of better business relations between Europe, North America and Asia.

V. External Co-operation

The OSCE area is not an island. Crises in the adjacent regions impact Europe, through the spread of instability, spill-over of violent extremism and flows of refugees. The Panel invites the OSCE Chairmanship to:

- Enhance contacts with Partners for Co-operation to seek concrete solutions for specific instances of these problems.
- Work with regional organizations, i.e. in Asia and the Middle East, to exchange views on the OSCE's experience in promoting regional co-operation. Use the OSCE as a platform for dialogue among all organizations with an interest in Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security, like Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), NATO and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO).
- Consider creating within the OSCE framework a working group to explore ways of more effectively countering violent extremism in the OSCE area.

If the process proposed by the Panel were to succeed, this would greatly improve the prospects for the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region. This in turn would open the way to a wider co-operation and dialogue with other partners in Asia and other regions in all three OSCE dimensions.

Letter of Disagreement

I believe that the effort of the Panel has been honest, earnest and constructive. I appreciate the great effort of our rapporteurs and our chairman – Wolfgang Ischinger. And the text is a step forward in understanding what went wrong in Europe. I advise everybody to read attentively the long narratives in the Annex I.

I agree with some of the assessments and proposals and appreciate that a number of my ideas were taken into consideration.

However, to my regret, I cannot support the text as it is for both intellectual and political reasons. I do not want to pepper it with two dozen footnotes, which would make it unreadable, would be a show of disrespect to the

hard work of our rapporteurs and put myself into a position of a “useful dissident”.

The paper is basically an old Western one in substance, in logic and in recommendations (though I agree with some of them).

The text is still largely directed towards the past, aimed at a restoration of the status quo ante plus or minus. But the situation in and around Europe has changed and will be changing dramatically. Alas, many statements and recommendations are unrealistic or even counterproductive.

The text also is not aimed at prevention of a new structural military-political confrontation, which would be much more dangerous than in last decades of the Cold War. Its main emphasis is on making such a confrontation “safer”.

But I reiterate my support for the positive elements in the text. And believe that it should be used as a point of departure for future open and frank intellectual and political deliberations accompanied by serious diplomacy, which could lead Europe out of its present failure in order to pave the way for a future-oriented common, effective, fair and thus stable European/Eurasian system of co-operation, co-development and security. We should not be bound to repeat mistakes of the past.

I call for continuation of a systemic and open dialogue, like we had in our panel. And I thank my fellow “wizards” for their efforts and for the friendly atmosphere during our debates.

Sergey A. Karaganov

Letter to the Panel

Dear Ambassador Ischinger,

Dear Members of the Panel,

I would like to sincerely thank Ambassador Ischinger, the distinguished members of our Panel and all those experts who were involved in its work for the extraordinary efforts that were unprecedented in its scale and complexity. I pay tribute to Ambassador Ischinger for having reconciled different views from the West, Moscow and the States in-between expressed during the Panel deliberations.

As for Kazakhstan’s perspective, we seek to build with all our partners an indivisible Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic security community rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals as the Astana Commemorative Declaration affirmed in 2010. That is why this work is extremely essential and could be continued in this format or another one.

As I have not been directly involved in the meetings of the Panel where you spent a lot of time hammering out the Report and as the sitting Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan I felt to be too

presumptuous to share co-authorship of the final draft of the Report as one of those who were part of the team par excellence.

Meanwhile, I strongly believe that this Report is a major step forward in international efforts to bring about a common solution to one of the most acute and difficult issues on the international agenda.

Please, accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev

Annex 1: The Long Narratives

The View from the West

The Cold War ended with the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. Numerous European states as well as countries that had been incorporated into the Soviet empire were liberated from Soviet dominion. These states and their tens of millions of citizens now had the freedom to determine their own future, including their alliance memberships. This was not a victory of the West but a victory for freedom and democracy, and was recorded as such in the Charter of Paris in 1990.

In Paris, the Soviet Union and other states from the Euro-Atlantic space came together to welcome a “new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity” in Europe. “Europe whole and free”, the Charter said, “is calling for a new beginning”.

The West had prevailed in a clash of systems and ideas, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness; instead it made an effort to support and stabilize the complicated transition as the Soviet Union disintegrated. It hoped that Russia too would become a successful democracy and a prosperous economy and would play a part in stabilizing Europe.

The end of the Cold War made possible the creation of a Europe that was whole and free, democratic and at peace. Key to this was the willingness of the countries themselves to take the hard decisions to enable their transformation. Their wish to reaffirm their Western and European identity meant that they wanted to join Western institutions, including NATO and the EU. This gave the West an opportunity to help both in their transition and in supporting stability in Europe.

The enlargement of NATO and the EU did not follow a Western plan to encircle Russia. It came about because large majorities in many of the newly-independent states wanted to return to the democratic family. On the other side the legacy of history meant that many NATO countries felt an obligation to help these states fulfill their legitimate aspirations.

To complement this the West aimed to build a strategic partnership with Russia that would include close co-operation with, if not integration in, these

Western institutions. With this in mind, the West proposed the NATO-Russia Founding Act and later the NATO-Russia Council. NATO's first round of enlargement in 1999 was realized after intensive discussions, including with Russia. Russia has also benefitted from the improved security environment enlargement created: inclusion in NATO meant that the states in Central and Eastern Europe did not have to seek solely national ways of providing for their defense.

EU policy also was to take relations with Russia forward in parallel with those of its other neighbours. The 1999 Common Strategy on Russia preceded the EU's decision on enlargement; the "four common spaces" initiative was in parallel with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); and negotiations for the new bilateral agreement with Russia started before the Eastern Partnership – which was designed to take co-operation beyond the level of co-operation with ENP countries.

The claim that the EU took over Russia's markets is unfounded. When Russia adopted free market policies the idea of captive markets became a thing of the past. If Russia lost market share this was a result of the normal operation of open international markets. Russia's reluctance to modernize its economy may also have played a part.

To further deepen the partnership, Russia was also invited to join the G7. It was questionable whether Russia was ready for membership of a club of major economies who were also democracies. But the West wanted Russia to succeed and believed that in due course it would meet the normal standards for membership.

The process of rebuilding Europe was challenged by the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the conflicts that emerged in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Addressing the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the unresolved territorial and ethnic disputes in former Soviet countries brought the West into conflict with Russia. In Bosnia, this conflict was overcome through an intensive diplomatic process that included Russia. In the cases of Kosovo and in the unresolved conflicts in former Soviet countries, including in Georgia and Moldova, it was not possible to overcome deep-seated differences.

In Kosovo, the West tried to address the issue in partnership with Russia, seeking a political solution. When this failed and the signs of impending violence against Kosovars and refugee flows grew, the Western countries decided they could not again risk to wait for mass atrocities, as they had done in Bosnia, before they acted. On the question of Kosovo's status, many diplomatic avenues were pursued. Only after eight years, when it had proved impossible to find a solution acceptable to all parties, did Kosovo declare itself independent (accepting initial limitations on its sovereignty). Most countries of the West decided to recognize it as an independent state, and the majority of the international community has since joined them.

In the cases of the unresolved conflicts in post-Soviet states, the international community had recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. But for more than two decades Russia has now worked to support separatists in these countries, significantly weakening the states concerned.

When popular protests occurred in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) conflict between Russia and the West grew. These so-called colour revolutions were the result of legitimately popular movements, protesting against fraudulent elections and corrupt elites; they led to peaceful transitions of power. But Moscow was increasingly afraid that such changes could spread to Russia, as well as jeopardize its supposed interests in its "near abroad".

The question of further enlargement of NATO was hotly debated by the Alliance's member states; they considered the concerns expressed by Russia about its security, yet in 2004 NATO was enlarged again on the demand and insistence of the candidate countries. The new members included former republics of the USSR as well as other Central and Eastern European states. This was consistent with their sovereign right to choose their own alliances.

At the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the requests of Georgia and Ukraine for Membership Action Plans were rejected. NATO instead decided that Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO but did not say how or when.

In August 2008, following a series of provocations and escalating exchanges of fire Georgia fell into what, in retrospect, looks like a Russian trap and moved against a town in South Ossetia (this region of Georgia, like neighbouring Abkhazia, had been under control of Russian-backed separatists since the early 1990s). The Georgian army was overwhelmed by a larger Russian force.

After the end of the fighting, in violation of a cease-fire agreement and international law, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and kept its troops in these regions. Many interpreted these actions as a pre-emptive Russian move against Georgian membership of NATO.

Even so, in early 2009, as one of its first acts the Obama administration pressed the "reset" button with Russia. A period of increased co-operation culminated in the NATO Lisbon summit in 2010, which renewed NATO-Russia relations including an envisaged joint missile defence system, and the New START Treaty (which entered into force in early 2012).

However, from 2012, mostly due to domestic reasons after Putin's re-election as president, the Russian government chose a more antagonistic course. Russia was growing more authoritarian internally and more assertive in its foreign policy. The West grew increasingly concerned about a Russian leadership that restricted personal freedoms and human rights at home. The countries close to Russia's border, in particular, warned that this authoritarian

turn would shape Moscow's foreign policy as well. It certainly did in Ukraine.

After months of negotiations and preparations, Ukrainian President Yanukovich had agreed to sign a limited EU Association Agreement at the EU Summit in Vilnius in November of 2013. After being called to Moscow the night before, he reneged on the agreement, which led to mass protests on the Maidan, which the President attempted to contain by violent means.

In February of 2014, several European foreign ministers agreed to witness a compromise agreement, which they hoped would end the crisis. Instead of seeing this pact through, Yanukovich left the country. The ensuing constitutional crisis was resolved by the parliament's election of an acting president and by well-organized and monitored elections first for a new president, then for parliament.

The Russian description of these events as a coup d'état is entirely inaccurate; equally wrong, as the election results proved, were Russian allegations of a takeover by the extreme right. The rhetoric employed by Russia, depicting Ukraine's youth and reformers as Nazis and murderers, is crude and hate-mongering language, an unacceptable return to the worst practices of a bygone era.

Nothing in the events in Ukraine can justify Russia's seizure by force of Crimea, in breach of international law, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and many other agreements. The claim that this was an act of self-determination would be more convincing if Russian forces had not been involved, if the procedures had complied with the Ukrainian constitution and if the referendum had taken place following an open debate and with proper international monitoring. Unlike Kosovo, which Russia cites as a precedent, this declaration of independence did not follow a decade of diplomatic negotiation and deliberation within the international community.

Nor is there any justification at all for Russia's armed intervention in eastern Ukraine, a further breach of basic principles of international law. This conflict has been sustained by Russian arms and by Russian forces.

Russia made no attempt at all to resolve the issues it may have had about Ukraine, including Crimea, peacefully or legally. It also dealt a blow to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions, violating the security guarantees Ukraine received in the Budapest Memorandum for giving up its nuclear weapons. As a result of Russia's intervention, other countries may think twice before trusting a similar guarantee in the future.

Russia's policies in Ukraine follow the pattern of its relations with other former Soviet republics, where it has fostered (and then frozen) ethnic conflicts. Putin's stated conviction that Russia has the right to act to protect Russian-speakers – no matter where they are – potentially sows the seeds of future interventions to protect Russian "kin". It also violates numerous agreements Russia has signed, as well as the UN Charter.

Russia has decided to give up on any pretense of co-operating with, let alone integrating in, the West. It also has abandoned any pretense of playing by the rules, including respect for the political independence of sovereign states and the principle of not using force to change borders. As a result, Russia's definition of its security today means insecurity for its neighbours.

Due to its own choices, Russia today is a very different country from the 1990s and the early 2000s. Instead of focusing on domestic modernization, Russia is pursuing a revisionist and unpredictable foreign policy, manufacturing and actively seeking conflicts abroad to control the fate of its neighbours.

The View from Moscow

Starting with the negotiations on German unification, the West systematically took advantage of Russia's weakness. The West never acted in the spirit of the Charter of Paris, in which the indivisibility of security was a key concept. The West never tried to address security with Russia, only without it, or against it. The United States instead seized the opportunity to dominate international affairs especially in Europe.

The "common European home" failed because the West was unwilling to build new, open security architecture – and to fulfil its promises. The West talked of co-operation and expected co-operation from Moscow, but believed in Russia's perennial aggressiveness or/and weakness.

From the Russian side a crucial contribution was made to eliminate the material legacy of the era of confrontation. Russia had withdrawn its troops and armaments from Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and later from the Baltic countries, fully implemented the CFE Treaty by cutting thousands of conventional armaments and equipment pieces, signed and ratified the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty.

Under the slogan of promoting democratic values eastwards the West continued to expand its institutions at the expense of Russian security interests. It was the main dynamic after the Cold War. Consecutive waves of NATO's expansion reduced Russia's security. The EU's expansion took over Russia's markets, and as new member states joined Schengen the area of visa free travel for Russian citizens was reduced. In each case, as compensation, Russia was offered a formal junior partnership: the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council were sugar coating for the bitter pill of enlargement; the EU's idea of partnership is that Russia should adopt its rules.

NATO enlargement was pursued in spite of dozens of assurances to the contrary. For example, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner said in May 1990, "the very fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees." But they did and do deploy troops all over this area.

NATO's 78-day bombing campaign against, what was left from Yugoslavia – Serbia, a small defenceless country, for something that it had not yet done, was an atrocity. The West involved Russia in the negotiations, but when there was no agreement it acted unilaterally. The intervention was an open and blatant breach of international and humanitarian law and the first breach of the Helsinki principles in post-war Europe – unfortunately not the last. Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence was another illustration of the hollowness of the "partnership" between the West and Russia. It was a subversion of international law and the OSCE principles. Russia sat at the table, but, in the end, the West made the decisions, and made them against Russian interests and Helsinki principles. Kosovo's separation from Serbia took place without a referendum.

In the first years of the 2000s, the international legal order and global stability were further undermined by the United States with few protests from Europe. Russia was also frequently lectured on democracy and the rule of law, while the U.S. was running secret prisons and torturing prisoners. The U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 was not only another blatant violation of international law but has been one of the causes of the continuing turmoil in the Middle East.

The West has meanwhile continued to pursue regime change there, supporting the popular movements of the "Arab Spring", with catastrophic results especially in Syria, and occasionally using force, as in Libya.

The unresolved conflicts in the former Soviet Union – the so-called "frozen conflicts" – did not emerge after 1992 because of Russian involvement, but because large parts of the population in those areas wanted to stay with Russia, against the interest of the elites. When the conflicts started, Russia had to intervene to stop the bloodshed. Since then Russia has played a stabilizing role in the region, preventing the outbreak of major wars. Russian actions in Moldova/Transnistria, and Tajikistan are among the rare examples of effective peacekeeping.

Before the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, the West did not even pretend to consult Russia, although the promise of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine was, as President Putin later said, "a direct threat" to Russian security. The war provoked by Georgia later in the year demonstrated the foolishness of the Bucharest decision.

Writing in 2008, former President Mikhail Gorbachev summed up Russia's view: "Russia has long been told to simply accept the facts. Here's the independence of Kosovo for you. Here's the abrogation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and the American decision to place missile defences in neighbouring countries. Here's the unending expansion of NATO. All of these moves have been set against the backdrop of sweet talk about partnership. Why would anyone put up with such a charade?"

In spite of this on-going charade, Russia played its part in the "reset", taking the initiative to prepare a new European Security Treaty, the objective

of which was to make the principle of the indivisibility of security legally binding. Russia also proposed creation of a common economic and humanitarian space from Vladivostok to Lisbon. All initiatives came to nothing. Russia's willingness to co-operate on Libya was exploited by the West, again for its agenda of regime change, ending in profound destabilization, civil war and refugee flow.

The West continued to pursue a "Versailles policy in velvet gloves", constantly enlarging its sphere of interest and control.

Russia made its views known on all these subjects but no one listened. Instead a negative propaganda campaign was launched against Russia especially in 2012-2013 and Western leaders boycotted the Sochi Olympics. Moscow came to the conclusion that the West was starting a new containment policy. Russia had to pre-empt this and had to teach its partners to respect its vital interests.

All the elements came together in Ukraine: first the promise of NATO membership at the NATO Summit in Bucharest – a threat to Russia, then the attempt by the EU to increase its own economic space at the expense of Russia, and finally the open Western support for the Maidan regime change movement.

The EU's neighbourhood policies and its Eastern Partnership had created a situation in which several of Russia's closest neighbours were faced with an artificial choice: either they were with the West, or against it. Only in such an atmosphere of polarization and forced choices could the events that led to the coup d'état against President Yanukovich unfold.

Russia repeatedly expressed understanding for those protestors in Kyiv who demonstrated against corruption, bad government, and poverty. But those who forced the elected president of Ukraine to flee had a different agenda: they wanted to seize power and resorted to terror and murder. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites were behind this coup. And it was openly supported by Western officials.

Russia responded in the only language that gets Western attention.

People all over Ukraine realized what was happening. The people of Crimea overwhelmingly favoured its reunification with Russia in a referendum. Russia, unlike the West in many cases, did not use force in Crimea, only assured that others would not use it. Eastern Ukrainians also made it clear they would not accept the power grab of the new government in Kyiv. Russia is not a party to the conflict, but it has sympathies for the goals of the self-defence forces. The sanctions against Russia are unjustified and counter-productive and another blatant violation of international law as they were imposed without a decision of the UN Security Council.

Russia tried many times to prevent Western expansion but was not listened to. Positive alternatives were ignored and ridiculed. Europe has failed to capitalize on the chance offered by the end of the Cold War – to build a sustainable and fair security and co-operation system.

Western interventions in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, the rupture of Kosovo, poor performance in Afghanistan, and open support for the Arab Spring have damaged the most important principles of international security and stability – namely state sovereignty and non-interference into internal affairs. It is the West's actions which are threats to international peace and security. The West has irresponsibly destabilized the international system: stable political orders are upended and replaced with nothing but chaos. Russia has not only lost trust in the West's words, but respect for the West's competence.

The View from the States in-between: A Perspective from Tbilisi

The states between Russia and the West share common historic features, but do not always have the same outlook on current affairs, security issues and even the future. Countries like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have chosen a clear pro-Western policy stance. They are more democratic, have better governance systems and are inclined to join the EU and/or NATO. To them, this is a matter of principle, international law, and people's choice and cannot be negotiated, or changed, as long as the populations and governments of the three countries have made their decisions.

Other countries, like Armenia and Belarus, have made it clear that they do not wish to join Western institutions and that good relations with Russia are their priority. Azerbaijan has chosen a middle position, balancing the West and Russia, pursuing a rather independent foreign-policy course. These positions too need to be respected, even if they are not so much a conscious choice, as a necessity of circumstance.

For these "states in-between", the end of the Cold War was not the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century, as Putin later argued, but the best thing that could happen to the former Soviet states. They regained their independence after the decades of Soviet domination. Russia has never adjusted to the idea of the demise of the Soviet Union and throughout the last two decades has attempted to reconstruct the lost empire, first through the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), then creating the CSTO and finally launching the idea of the Eurasian Economic Union.

As Russia and Western states engaged in the formation of the post-USSR European security order, former Soviet states engaged in debilitating domestic conflicts, civil wars and ethnic conflicts. As a result the governments were forcefully changed in Azerbaijan and Georgia; and in almost every post-Soviet state the politicians from the Soviet past returned to dominate local politics. The new generation of politicians only came to politics in the beginning of the 2000s as the colour revolutions swept post-Soviet space. The Rose Revolution dramatically changed Georgia as the new pro-Western Government eradicated corruption, implemented painful but necessary economic reforms, strengthened the state structures and increased its independence from Moscow. Its pro-Western foreign policy eventually antagonized

Russia, who became the biggest opponent of such democratic transitions and new methods of governance. This clash can be observed throughout the last decade with Moscow supporting old type of governance systems, with rampant corruption and inefficient bureaucracies. Today's confrontation between Ukraine and Moscow, according to one narrative, is the continuation of the Georgia vs. Russia clash, in which Moscow opposes any type of modernization, growing independence and Western integration of its neighbours.

All post-Soviet countries which are pursuing Western integration are ridden with the conflicts. Occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, breakaway Transnistria, war-torn Donbas and annexed Crimea hold back Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in their goals of modernization and Western integration. These conflicts are a result of historical and modern processes, local and international events, but most importantly, of Moscow's interference. Many erupted in the beginning of the 1990s as the Soviet Union fell apart. Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a bloody war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Moldova and Georgia became engulfed in domestic conflicts, inspired and supported by Moscow. As a result Tbilisi lost de facto control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Chisinau lost control of Transnistria. The Russian military presence in these conflict regions and its full support of the breakaway authorities essentially decided the outcome of the conflicts. Russia then used these conflicts to drag Georgia and other states into the CIS.

The role of Russia was never positive in conflict resolution. The West at that time did not consider the resolution of these conflicts a priority, mainly because it was busy with other conflicts – in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Therefore, Russia was given the status of a mediator in these conflicts and all peacekeeping operations and negotiating formats were centered around Moscow. As a result conflicts became frozen for the next decade, with the potential for explosion, as the states whose territorial integrity was violated were unable to accept the status quo.

The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 was a logical embodiment of the destructive role that Russia played in the Georgian conflicts. Russia invaded Georgia as a result of a trap it had set up in the first place. Russian troops invaded Georgia directly as Tbilisi engaged in an attack on Tskhinvali, preceded by days of attacks on Georgian villages by South Ossetian irregular forces. The intervention by Russia was a response to the active pro-NATO and pro-EU policy of Georgia. After the April 2008 Bucharest decision that stated that "Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO", Russia resorted to the use of force to stop the enlargement process. Moreover, Russia occupied the two territories of Georgia and declared them independent states. This was a new paradigm that no one was ready for. At least, Russia could not be called neutral any more: it became a clear party to the conflict.

But it is not just NATO that Russia is concerned about. It is also the EU and its possible enlargement. In short, any Western "encroachment" is problematic for Moscow, even though it is in the vital security interests of neigh-

bouring states to integrate into Western structures. Russian statements denouncing the EU's Eastern Partnership did not go unnoticed. Nor did its hostile actions. In 2014, Victor Yanukovich, the pro-Russian President of Ukraine decided not to proceed with the Association Agreement with the EU, taking a decision similar to that of his Armenian colleague a few months earlier. As a result the Euromaidan revolution took place and the government was replaced through peaceful protests in Ukraine. Russia intervened openly in the process, discarding the Helsinki principles and directly violating international law. Moscow supported the ousted government, dubbed the new government a military junta, annexed Crimea and launched a military offensive in Donbas. Ukraine resisted and the conflict has dragged on, as the foundations of European security were shattered.

As a result of these two major developments in 2008 and 2014 nobody should have any illusion about Russia's true motivations in its immediate neighbourhood. The biggest threat to the security and well-being of its neighbours is Moscow's aggressive policy and its inability to accept independent neighbours. Therefore, as long as Russia is viewed in the West as a part of the solution, and not the problem, these problems will persist and the security of Russia's neighbours will be further undermined.

Some of Russia's neighbours accept Russia as a dominant partner which has a serious stake in their economy and provides security through the CSTO and the presence of its military bases. The big question is whether such Russian presence limits the independence of these countries in the foreign policy choices. Armenia and Belarus, Russia's two main partners in the Eastern Partnership, accept a strategic partnership with Moscow, but also try to diversify their economic, trade, and security policies. The West often does not understand that for these states foreign policy choices are about survival and power maximization, and they are therefore unable to resist strong Russian pressure. Trade embargoes, the threat of sanctions and politically motivated trade-related decisions have been felt throughout Russia's neighbourhood, from Riga to Tbilisi.

Many states in this group believe that the EU and NATO have not always used their instruments vis-à-vis them prudently. EU and NATO policies have been those of words and not of deeds. The membership perspective of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO is blocked by reluctant partners, who are unwilling to risk Russia's anger if these states become members of NATO. For this reason not even Membership Action Plans are given to Georgia and Moldova. When in need, neither Georgia, nor Ukraine received military assistance. With such ambiguous policies, the role and credibility of NATO in Armenia, Azerbaijan or Belarus is very limited and support for membership is split in Ukraine. Georgia remains the only country with high support for NATO membership. The biggest problem seems to be that NATO members are unwilling and unready to discuss the options: how could Georgia and Ukraine join, and what could be done to accommodate Russia's interests if

these countries became members. Therefore the discussion is postponed from Summit to Summit, as Russia becomes stronger and more assertive.

A similar lack of credibility applies to the EU. All Eastern Partnership states have declared their willingness to develop closer relations with the EU. But the EU's strategy towards this region has not been that of enlargement, based on conditionality, but rather a slow socialization, without the promise of membership benefits. Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements and Visa Liberalization Action Plans are the three serious instruments that contribute significantly to the reforms of the Eastern Partnership countries. But short of the promise of membership, the reforms are likely to be successful only to the certain point. This demotivates some countries in the neighbourhood from pursuing active Europeanization, especially since the process is linked to high standards of human rights protection. The EU is often criticized by some states in the Eastern Partnership for being too vocal on the issue of human rights and democracy, but not having anything to offer to these states in return.

Existing security institutions and regimes in Europe are no longer efficient. The OSCE is ineffective because of Russia's veto power; the EU and NATO are inaccessible. All agreed security regimes, like CFE, are now effectively defunct. The Adapted CFE Treaty agreed in Istanbul in 1999 was a cornerstone for arms control in the OSCE area. Because of insistence of the US and NATO, Russia agreed to withdraw its military installations from the neighbouring states. Georgia and Moldova requested Russia to withdraw the forces, while Armenia wanted to maintain the military presence. Nevertheless, Russia never fully withdrew, particularly from the conflict regions. This led to the crisis of the OSCE, the unwillingness of Western states to ratify the Treaty, then Russia's decision to declare a moratorium on the treaty implementation, and finally the death of CFE.

The OSCE was an organization that these "states in-between" hoped to benefit from. Indeed, as a forum for exchanging information, the OSCE is valuable, but its role has become insignificant in the last decade, with the exception of the SMM in Ukraine. Therefore, the states between Russia and the West believe that they need to be better represented in the security discussions between the West and Russia.

Finally, there is an overwhelming mood of concern among Russia's neighbours who also border the EU and NATO. They are always concerned that if something major happens in the global arena, like the "reset policy" or conflicts in Syria or Afghanistan, an informal deal will be "struck" between Russia and the West about the "fate" of Russia's near abroad. This cannot be tolerated. It should be a matter of principle for Western Europe and the United States, not to abandon Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in their quest to integrate into the EU and NATO. As the Baltic states and Central and Eastern European countries managed to slip away from Russia's grip, these countries hope to do so, too.

Annex 2

Panel Members

Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany), Chairperson primus inter pares of the Panel
Ambassador Ischinger is currently the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference. Before this appointment, he served as Ambassador to the United Kingdom (2006-2008) and the United States (2001-2006), and as Deputy Foreign Minister of Germany (1998-2001). In 2007, he represented the European Union in the Troika negotiations on the future of Kosovo. In 2014, he served as the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, promoting national dialogue in the Ukrainian crisis. He is a member of both the Trilateral Commission and the European Council on Foreign Relations, and serves on many non-profit boards, including SIPRI.

Dora Bakoyannis (Greece)

Dora Bakoyannis is a Member of the Greek Parliament. She was Minister of Foreign Affairs (2006-2009) and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in 2009. Previously, she served as the first female Mayor of Athens (2003-2006) and was appointed Minister for Culture (1992) and Under-Secretary of State (1990). In 2009, Dora Bakoyannis was named as the first female foreign associate of the French Academy of Human and Political Sciences, and as Honorary Senator of the European Academy of Sciences and Art. Prior to her political career, she worked for the Department of European Economic Community Affairs at the Ministry of Economic Co-ordination.

Tahsin Burcuoğlu (Turkey)

Ambassador Burcuoğlu currently serves as the First Deputy Secretary General of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. During his distinguished career in the Turkish foreign service, he held number of important positions, including policy planner and Ambassador to Bulgaria, Greece and France. He also served as Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council and headed the Turkish National Security Council's Secretariat.

Ivo H. Daalder (United States of America)

Dr. Daalder is the President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Before this appointment he served as the Ambassador to the NATO (2009-2013) and a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution (1998-2009), specializing in American foreign policy, European security and transatlantic relations, and national security affairs. Prior to joining Brookings, he was an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy and Director of Research at its Center for International and Security Studies. He also served on the National Security Council staff as Director for European Affairs (1995-1997).

Oleksandr Chalyi (Ukraine)

Ambassador Chalyi is currently the President of Grant Thornton. He served as a Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Ukraine (2006-2008), State Secretary for European integration issues (2001-2004), and first Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (1998-2001). He was Ambassador of Ukraine to Romania (1995-1998) and to the Council of Europe (2001), settling urgent issues in Ukrainian foreign policy. Amb. Chalyi has over 35 years of experience in diplomatic and state service, legal and advisory practices. He has received a number of national and international awards.

Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia)

Prof. Vike-Freiberga has served as President of Latvia (1999-2007). She was appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as Special Envoy on UN reform in 2005. She was Vice Chair of the European Council's Reflection Group on the long term Future of Europe, and she chaired the High-level group on freedom and pluralism of media in the EU in 2011-12. Currently she is President of the Club de Madrid and Co-chair of the Board of Trustees of the Nizami Ganjavi International Centre. Prior to entering politics, she pursued a professorial career at the Department of Psychology of the University of Montreal (1965-1998).

Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France)

Jean-Marie Guéhenno is the President and the CEO of International Crisis Group. He chaired a commission to review the French defense and national security white paper established by President François Hollande. In 2012, he was appointed Deputy Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the Arab League for Syria. He has also served as UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (2000-2008). As a former French diplomat, he held the position of Chairman of the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (1998-2000), served as Director of the French Policy Planning Staff and as Ambassador to the Western European Union.

Barbara Haering (Switzerland)

Dr. Haering is the Director of the private think tank econcept Inc. She was a member of the Swiss Parliament from 1990 to 2007. In this capacity, she chaired the Committee on Science, Education and Culture and the Defense Committee, and was Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. She is Co-Chair of the European Research and Innovation Area Board. She also chairs the Board of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Public Administration in Lausanne and presides over the Foundation Council of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining.

Sergi Kapanadze (Georgia)

Dr. Kapanadze is the Director of the think tank Georgia's Reforms Associates, Dean of the School of Governance at Caucasus University and Associate Professor of International Relations at the Tbilisi State University. He was

Deputy Foreign Minister (2011-2012) and Director of the Department of International Organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (2008-2011), where he had served in various positions since 2005. In 2006, he was Senior Advisor in the Analytical Group of the Administration of the President of Georgia. He also worked as Policy Analyst at the International Security Department of the National Security Council of Georgia (2004-2005).

Sergey A. Karaganov (Russian Federation)

Prof. Karaganov is Dean of the School of International Economics and Foreign Affairs of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. He is author of numerous publications on economics, foreign policy, arms control, national security strategy, and Russia's foreign and military policy. His previous positions include: Member of the Presidential Council (1993-1998), Adviser to the Deputy Chief of Staff of Presidential Executive Office (2001-2007), Member of the Academic Council of the MFA of Russia (since 1991), and Member of the Academic and Advisory Council, Russian Security Council (since 1993).

Malcolm Rifkind (United Kingdom)

Sir Malcolm Rifkind is a former Member of Parliament (1974-1997, 2005-2015). He served in various roles as a Cabinet Minister under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major, including as Foreign Secretary (1995-1997), Secretary of State for Defence (1992-1995), Secretary of State for Transport (1990-1992), and Secretary of State for Scotland (1986-1990). In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland)

Prof. Rotfeld currently serves as Professor at Warsaw University. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland (2005) and Secretary of State (2003-2004). He established the Warsaw Reflection Group on the United Nations Reform and the Transformation of the Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions. Previously he served as Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1991-2002) and as a project leader on Building a Cooperative Security System in and for Europe at SIPRI (1989-1991). He was Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office to develop the political settlement of the conflict in Transdnistria in 1992. Since 2008 he has been co-chairing the Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters.

Teija Tiilikainen (Finland)

Dr. Tiilikainen is the Director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. She served as State Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2007-2008). She has extensive experience in foreign policy issues, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and the European security policy system. She has held research positions at the University of Turku,

Åbo Akademi University, the Finnish National Defence College, and the University of Helsinki. She has published widely.

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (Kazakhstan)

Dr. Tokayev is currently Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. He was Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN to this Conference (2011-2013). He served as Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2007-2011) during which he was elected Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (2008). He has also served as Secretary of State (2002-2003), Prime Minister of Kazakhstan (1999-2002), and Minister for Foreign Affairs (1994-1999, 2002-2007).

Ivo Visković (Serbia)

Prof. Visković currently serves as Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade. He was Serbian Ambassador to Germany (2009-2013) and Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro in Slovenia (2001-2004). In 2007, he became a member of the Council for Foreign Policy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Forum for International Relations. Prior to this, he lectured at the University of Belgrade in the Faculty of Political Sciences from 1979, where he was the Head of the Department of International Studies (2000-2009).

Panel Meetings

8 February 2015: Munich, Germany

First working session of the Panel

26–27 March 2015: Vienna, Austria

Consultations on the Interim Report

29–30 April 2015: Kyiv, Ukraine

Consultations on the Interim Report

5 May 2015: Geneva, Switzerland

Second working session of the Panel

17–18 June 2015: Vienna, Austria

Third working session of the Panel

14–15 September 2015: Brussels, Belgium

Fourth working session of the Panel

2 October 2015: Belgrade, Serbia

Fifth working session of the Panel

Panel Support

Drafting/Editorial Team

- Sir Robert Cooper, European Council on Foreign Affairs, London School of Economics and Political Science
- Dr. Walter Kemp, International Peace Institute
- Mr. Adrian Oroz, Munich Security Conference Foundation

Research

- Dr. Wolfgang Zellner, IFSH Centre for OSCE Research

Vienna-based Support Team/Liaison

- Amb. Friedrich Tanner, Senior Adviser to the Secretary General, OSCE Secretariat
- Mr. Juraj Nosál, Project Administrative Assistant, OSCE Secretariat
- Ms. Anna Kabanen, Intern, OSCE Secretariat

Munich Security Conference Foundation

- Mr. Tim Gürtler, Director for Programs and Operations
- Ms. Sara-Sumie Yang, Head of the Chairman's Office

Annex 3: Panel Mandate

Purpose and Role of the Panel

The consensus on European security as a common project, as reflected in the Charter of Paris on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act, has gradually eroded over the past years. The implementation of commitments has been uneven and the resulting decrease of trust has weakened several cornerstones of cooperative security. This crisis of European security has been aggravated by the crisis in and around Ukraine. In addition to continuing efforts to restore peace to Ukraine, it is time to start addressing the broader crisis of European security too.

The Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project - hereafter called 'the Panel' - is designed to provide advice on how to (re-)consolidate European security as a common project.

In particular, the Panel will

- Prepare the basis for an inclusive and constructive security dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions, taking into consideration the recent crisis in and around Ukraine in its broader

- perspective as well as other situations in the OSCE area where participating States consider their security to be threatened;
- Reflect on how to re-build trust to enhance peace and security in Europe on the grounds of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and on how to ensure effective adherence to the Helsinki Principles Guiding Relations between participating States;
 - Examine perceived threats in the OSCE area and explore common responses;
 - Explore possibilities to reconfirm, refine, reinvigorate and complement elements of co-operative security;
 - Analyse the particular role of the OSCE in this context, as well as its role in preventing and resolving crises in the OSCE area, including in Ukraine.

Launched in the context of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel in December 2014 after consultations with OSCE participating States, the Panel is commissioned by the former Swiss Chairmanship, in close co-operation with the Serbian Chairmanship 2015 and the German Chairmanship 2016.

Membership

The Panel is composed of 15 eminent personalities from all OSCE regions, headed by a Chairperson primus inter pares. The Panel will gather personalities with long-standing practical expertise in European security in all its dimensions and include policymakers as well as representatives of think tanks. Members of the Panel serve in their individual capacity.

Outputs

The Panel shall produce two reports:

1. An Interim Report, in particular on lessons learned for the OSCE from its engagement in Ukraine.
2. A Final Report on the broader issues of security in Europe and the OSCE area at large, as outlined above.

Both reports should contain recommendations on action points for policy makers, including for the OSCE Ministerial Council and participating States.

Working Methods

General guidance will be provided by the OSCE Troika 2015.

The Panel will seek input from participating States, the OSCE Institutions, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, multilateral actors concerned with

European security issues, civil society, think tanks, and other relevant actors through hearings, commissioning of papers, and other forms of activities.

The Panel and individual members will be provided opportunities to engage with high-level representatives of participating States (for example in the form of side events at multilateral conferences and other international events).

The Panel will be assisted by a support unit which will provide operational and logistical support in convening meetings as well as substantive support in drafting the reports. The OSCE Secretariat will provide additional operational and logistical support, as needed. The OSCE network of think tanks and academic institutions should be engaged as a contributor for research- and input-papers.

The Panel will address in parallel the different issues outlined above, irrespective of the more specific focus of the Interim Report.

Timeframe

- Presentation of the Panel and constitutive meeting (January/February 2015)
- Interim Report (June 2015)
- Final Report (November/December 2015): presentation at the Ministerial Council in Belgrade
- Follow-up (2016)
- Further outreach events at multilateral conferences;
- Presentation of the report at, inter alia, WEF, Munich Security Conference, in the margins of UNGA;
- Discussion of the report in the appropriate OSCE fora.

Financing

The Panel will be financed through voluntary contributions.

Kooperationsformen und -foren im OSZE-Bereich

Gruppe der Sieben (G7)

Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (OECD)

Europarat

Nordatlantikvertrags-Organisation (NATO)

Euro-Atlantischer Partnerschaftsrat (EAPR)

Partnerschaft für den Frieden (PfP)

NATO-Russland-Rat

NATO-Ukraine-Charta/NATO-Ukraine-Kommission

Globale Partner der NATO

Europäische Union (EU)

EU-Bewerberländer

EU-Assoziierungsabkommen

Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsabkommen (SAA)

Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten (GUS)

Eurasische Wirtschaftsunion (EAWU)

Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit (OVKS)

Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer Ministerrat

Euro-arktischer Barentsrat

Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter

Nordischer Rat

Rat der Ostseestaaten (CBSS)

Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa

Kooperationsprozess in Südosteuropa (SEECP)

Mitteeuropäisches Freihandelsabkommen (CEFTA)

Zentraleuropäische Initiative (ZEI)

Schwarzmeer-Wirtschaftskooperation (BSEC)

Nordamerikanisches Freihandelsabkommen (NAFTA)

Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit (SOZ)

SOZ-Beobachter

SOZ-Dialogpartner

Quellen:

OECD: www.oecd.org

Europarat: www.coe.int

NATO: www.nato.int

EU: europa.eu

GUS: www.cis.minsk.by

EAWU: www.eaeunion.org

OVKS: www.odkb-csto.org

Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer Ministerrat: www.baltasam.org

Euro-arktischer Barentsrat: www.beac.st

Nordischer Rat: www.norden.org

CBSS: www.cbss.org

Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa: www.rcc.int

CEFTA: www.cefta.int

ZEI: www.ceinet.org

BSEC: www.bsec-organization.org

NAFTA: www.naftanow.org

SOZ: www.sectesco.org

Die 57 OSZE-Teilnehmerstaaten – Daten, Fakten, Kooperationsformen¹

1. Albanien

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1991

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,125 Prozent (OSZE-Rang: 40)²

Fläche: 28.748 km² (OSZE-Rang: 46)³

Bevölkerung: 3.029.278 (OSZE-Rang: 41)⁴

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 4.619

BIP-Wachstum: 1,9 Prozent (OSZE-Rang: 27)⁵

Streitkräfte (aktive): 8.000 (OSZE-Rang: 43)⁶

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1995), NATO (2009), EAPR, EU-Bewerberland, SAA (2006), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, CEFTA, ZEI (1996), BSEC.

2. Andorra

Beitrittsdatum: April 1996

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,125 Prozent (40)

Fläche: 468 km² (52)

Bevölkerung: 85.580 (53)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 42.806⁷

BIP-Wachstum: -0,1 Prozent⁸

Streitkräfte (aktive): keine

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1994).

3. Armenien

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,05 Prozent (49)

Fläche: 29.743 km² (45)

Bevölkerung: 3.056.382 (40)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 3.620

BIP-Wachstum: 3,4 Prozent (12)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 44.800 (17)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (2001), EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), EAWU, OVKS, BSEC, SOZ-Dialogpartner.

1 Bearbeitet von Jochen Rasch.

2 Von 57 Ländern.

3 Von 57 Ländern.

4 Von 57 Ländern.

5 Von 49 Ländern.

6 Von 49 Ländern.

7 2013.

8 2013.

4. Aserbaidshan

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,05 Prozent (49)

Fläche: 86.600 km² (28)

Bevölkerung: 9.780.780 (22)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 7.884

BIP-Wachstum: 2,0 Prozent (25)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 66.950 (13)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (2001), EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), BSEC, SOZ-Dialogpartner.

5. Belarus

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,28 Prozent (30)

Fläche: 207.600 km² (20)

Bevölkerung: 9.589.689 (23)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 8.040

BIP-Wachstum: 1,6 Prozent (31)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 48.000 (15)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: EAPR, PfP (1995), GUS (1991), EAWU, OVKS, ZEI (1996), SOZ-Beobachter.

6. Belgien

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 3,24 Prozent (10)

Fläche: 30.528 km² (44)

Bevölkerung: 11.323.973 (16)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 47.517

BIP-Wachstum: 1,1 Prozent (36)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 30.700 (22)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958).

7. Bosnien und Herzegowina

Beitrittsdatum: April 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,125 Prozent (40)

Fläche: 51.197 km² (37)

Bevölkerung: 3.867.055 (38)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 4.805

BIP-Wachstum: 1,2 Prozent (35)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 10.500 (39)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (2002), EAPR, PfP (2006), SAA (2008), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, CEFTA, ZEI (1992).

8. Bulgarien

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,55 Prozent (26)

Fläche: 110.879 km² (24)

Bevölkerung: 7.186.893 (27)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 7.713

BIP-Wachstum: 1,7 Prozent (30)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 31.300 (21)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1992), NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2007), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, ZEI (1996), BSEC.

9. Dänemark

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 2,1 Prozent (14)

Fläche: 43.094 km² (40)

Bevölkerung: 5.581.503 (30)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 60.634

BIP-Wachstum: 1,1 Prozent (36)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 17.200 (32)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1973), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1992), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

10. Deutschland

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 9,35 Prozent (2)

Fläche: 357.022 km² (13)

Bevölkerung: 80.854.408 (3)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 47.627

BIP-Wachstum: 1,6 Prozent (31)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 181.550 (5)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: G7 (1975), OECD (1961), Europarat (1950), NATO (1955), EAPR, EU (1958), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, CBSS (1992), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

11. Estland

Beitrittsdatum: September 1991

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,19 Prozent (33)

Fläche: 45.228 km² (39)

Bevölkerung: 1.265.420 (47)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 19.720

BIP-Wachstum: 2,1 Prozent (24)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 5.750 (46)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (2010), Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2004), Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer Ministerrat, CBSS (1992).

12. Finnland

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 1,85 Prozent (16)

Fläche: 338.145 km² (14)

Bevölkerung: 5.476.922 (31)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 49.541

BIP-Wachstum: -0,1 Prozent (44)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 22.200 (27)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1969), Europarat (1989), EAPR, Pfp (1994), EU (1995), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1955), CBSS (1992), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

13. Frankreich

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 9,35 Prozent (2)

Fläche: 643.801 km² (7)

Bevölkerung: 66.553.766 (5)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 42.733

BIP-Wachstum: 0,2 Prozent (43)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 215.000 (4)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: G7 (1975), OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

14. Georgien

Beitrittsdatum: März 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,05 Prozent (49)

Fläche: 69.700 km² (33)

Bevölkerung: 4.931.226 (35)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 3.670

BIP-Wachstum: 4,8 Prozent (5)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 20.650 (31)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1999), EAPR, Pfp (1994), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen, BSEC.

15. Griechenland

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,98 Prozent (19)

Fläche: 131.957 km² (23)

Bevölkerung: 10.775.643 (18)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 21.683
BIP-Wachstum: 0,8 Prozent (40)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 144.950 (8)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1952), EAPR, EU (1981), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, BSEC.

16. Großbritannien und Nordirland

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973
Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 9,35 Prozent (2)
Fläche: 243.610 km² (18)
Bevölkerung: 64.088.222 (6)
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 45.603
BIP-Wachstum: 2,6 Prozent (16)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 159.150 (7)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: G7 (1975), OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1973), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

17. Heiliger Stuhl

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973
Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,125 Prozent (40)
Fläche: 0,44 km² (57)
Bevölkerung: 842 (57)⁹
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: k.A.
BIP-Wachstum: k.A.
Streitkräfte (aktive): 110 (52)¹⁰
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: keine.

18. Irland

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973
Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,75 Prozent (21)
Fläche: 70.273 km² (32)
Bevölkerung: 4.892.305 (36)
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 53.314
BIP-Wachstum: 4,8 Prozent (5)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 9.350 (41)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), EAPR, PfP (1999), EU (1973), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

9 2014 geschätzt.

10 Sollstärke 110 Schweizer Gardisten, siehe unter: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/swiss_guard/500_swiss/documents/rc_gsp_20060121_informazioni_it.html.

19. Island

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,19 Prozent (33)

Fläche: 103.000 km² (25)

Bevölkerung: 331.918 (52)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 52.111

BIP-Wachstum: 1,9 Prozent (27)

Streitkräfte (aktive): keine

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1950), NATO (1949), EAPR, Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1995).

20. Italien

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 9,35 Prozent (2)

Fläche: 301.340 km² (17)

Bevölkerung: 61.855.120 (7)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 34.960

BIP-Wachstum: -0,4 Prozent (45)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 176.000 (6)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: G7 (1975), OECD (1962), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1989).

21. Kanada

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 5,53 Prozent (7)

Fläche: 9.984.670 km² (2)

Bevölkerung: 35.099.836 (11)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 50.271

BIP-Wachstum: 2,5 Prozent (18)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 66.000 (14)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: G7 (1976), OECD (1961), NATO (1949), EAPR, Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, NAFTA.

22. Kasachstan

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,36 Prozent (28)

Fläche: 2.724.900 km² (4)

Bevölkerung: 18.157.122 (14)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 12.276

BIP-Wachstum: 4,3 Prozent (8)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 39.000 (18)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), EAWU, OVKS, SOZ.

23. Kirgisistan

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,05 Prozent (49)

Fläche: 199.951 km² (21)

Bevölkerung: 5.664.939 (29)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 1.269

BIP-Wachstum: 3,6 Prozent (10)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 10.900 (38)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), EAWU, OVKS, SOZ.

24. Kroatien

Beitrittsdatum: März 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,19 Prozent (33)

Fläche: 56.594 km² (36)

Bevölkerung: 4.464.844 (37)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 13.507

BIP-Wachstum: -0,4 Prozent (45)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 16.550 (33)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1996), NATO (2009), EAPR, EU (2013), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, ZEI (1992).

25. Lettland

Beitrittsdatum: September 1991

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,19 Prozent (33)

Fläche: 64.589 km² (35)

Bevölkerung: 1.986.705 (45)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 16.038

BIP-Wachstum: 2,4 Prozent (19)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 5.310 (48)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1995), NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2004), Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer Ministerrat, CBSS (1992), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

26. Liechtenstein

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,125 Prozent (40)

Fläche: 160 km² (54)

Bevölkerung: 37.624 (54)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 149.160¹¹

BIP-Wachstum: k.A.

Streitkräfte (aktive): keine¹²

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1978), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen.

27. Litauen

Beitrittsdatum: September 1991

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,19 Prozent (33)

Fläche: 65.300 km² (34)

Bevölkerung: 2.884.433 (43)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 16.445

BIP-Wachstum: 2,9 Prozent (14)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 10.950 (37)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2004), Baltische Versammlung/Baltischer Ministerrat, CBSS (1992).

28. Luxemburg

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,47 Prozent (27)

Fläche: 2.586 km² (51)

Bevölkerung: 570.252 (50)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 110.664¹³

BIP-Wachstum: 2,0 Prozent¹⁴

Streitkräfte (aktive): 900 (51)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958).

29. Malta

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,125 Prozent (40)

Fläche: 316 km² (53)

Bevölkerung: 413.965 (51)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 22.776¹⁵

BIP-Wachstum: 2,9 Prozent¹⁶

Streitkräfte (aktive): 1.950 (50)

11 2012.

12 1868 wurde das Militär aufgelöst, siehe unter: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140401170303/http://www.liechtenstein.li/index.php?id=60>.

13 2013.

14 2013.

15 2013.

16 2013.

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1965), EAPR, PfP (1995/2008¹⁷), EU (2004).

30. Ehemalige jugoslawische Republik Mazedonien

Beitrittsdatum: Oktober 1995

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,125 Prozent (40)

Fläche: 25.713 km² (47)

Bevölkerung: 2.096.015 (44)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 5.456

BIP-Wachstum: 3,8 Prozent (9)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 8.000 (43)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1995), EU-Bewerberland, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, CEFTA, ZEI (1993).

31. Moldau

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,05 Prozent (49)

Fläche: 33.851 km² (43)

Bevölkerung: 3.546.847 (39)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 2.234

BIP-Wachstum: 4,6 Prozent (7)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 5.350 (47)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen, GUS (1991), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, CEFTA, ZEI (1996), BSEC.

32. Monaco

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,125 Prozent (40)

Fläche: 2,00 km² (56)

Bevölkerung: 30.535 (56)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 163.351¹⁸

BIP-Wachstum: k.A.

Streitkräfte (aktive): keine

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (2004).

33. Mongolei

Beitrittsdatum: November 2012

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,05 Prozent (49)

17 Malta trat dem PfP-Programm im April 1995 bei, suspendierte seine Mitgliedschaft jedoch im Oktober 1996. Malta hat sich dem PfP-Programm 2008 wieder angeschlossen, siehe unter: <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0403e.html>.

18 2011.

Fläche: 1.564.116 km² (5)
Bevölkerung: 2.992.908 (42)
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 4.129
BIP-Wachstum: 7,8 Prozent (3)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 10.000 (40)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: globaler Partner der NATO, SOZ-Beobachter.

34. Montenegro

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 2006
Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,05 Prozent (49)
Fläche: 13.812 km² (49)
Bevölkerung: 647.073 (49)
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 7.371
BIP-Wachstum: 1,5 Prozent (33)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 2.080 (49)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (2007), EAPR, PfP (2006), EU-Bewerberland, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, CEFTA, ZEI (2006).

35. Niederlande

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973
Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 4,36 Prozent (9)
Fläche: 41.543 km² (41)
Bevölkerung: 16.947.904 (15)
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 51.590
BIP-Wachstum: 0,9 Prozent (38)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 37.400 (19)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1958), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter.

36. Norwegen

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973
Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 2,05 Prozent (15)
Fläche: 323.802 km² (15)
Bevölkerung: 5.207.689 (34)
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 97.363
BIP-Wachstum: 2,2 Prozent (23)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 25.800 (25)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU-Assoziierungsabkommen, Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1992), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

37. Österreich

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 2,51 Prozent (13)

Fläche: 83.871 km² (29)

Bevölkerung: 8.665.550 (24)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 51.127

BIP-Wachstum: 0,3 Prozent (42)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 22.500 (26)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1956), EAPR, PfP (1995), EU (1995), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1989).

38. Polen

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 1,35 Prozent (17)

Fläche: 312.685 km² (16)

Bevölkerung: 38.562.189 (10)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 14.423

BIP-Wachstum: 3,4 Prozent (12)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 99.300 (11)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1996), Europarat (1991), NATO (1999), EAPR, EU (2004), Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, CBSS (1992), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1991).

39. Portugal

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,98 Prozent (19)

Fläche: 92.090 km² (27)

Bevölkerung: 10.825.309 (17)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 22.081

BIP-Wachstum: 0,9 Prozent (38)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 34.600 (20)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1976), NATO (1949), EAPR, EU (1986).

40. Rumänien

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,6 Prozent (23)

Fläche: 238.391 km² (19)

Bevölkerung: 21.666.350 (13)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 9.997

BIP-Wachstum: 1,8 Prozent (29)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 71.400 (12)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1993), NATO (2004),

EAPR, EU (2007), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECF, ZEI (1996), BSEC.

41. Russische Föderation

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 6 Prozent (6)

Fläche: 17.098.242 km² (1)

Bevölkerung: 142.423.773 (2)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 12.736

BIP-Wachstum: 0,6 Prozent (41)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 771.000 (2)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1996), EAPR, PfP (1994), NATO-Russland-Rat (2002)¹⁹, GUS (1991), EAWU, OVKS, Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, CBSS (1992), BSEC, SOZ.

42. San Marino

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,125 Prozent (40)

Fläche: 61 km² (55)

Bevölkerung: 33.020 (55)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: k.A.

BIP-Wachstum: k.A.

Streitkräfte (aktive): keine

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1988).

43. Schweden

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 3,24 Prozent (10)

Fläche: 450.295 km² (11)

Bevölkerung: 9.801.616 (21)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 58.887

BIP-Wachstum: 2,3 Prozent (22)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 15.300 (35)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), EAPR, PfP (1994), EU (1995), Euro-arktischer Barentsrat, Nordischer Rat (1952), CBSS (1992), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

44. Schweiz

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 2,81 Prozent (12)

Fläche: 41.277 km² (42)

Bevölkerung: 8.121.830 (26)

19 Im April 2014 suspendierte die NATO die gesamte praktische Zusammenarbeit mit Russland, einschließlich des NATO-Russland-Rates.

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 84.733²⁰
BIP-Wachstum: 1,9 Prozent²¹
Streitkräfte (aktive): 21.250 (29)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1963), EAPR, PfP (1996), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

45. Serbien

Beitrittsdatum: November 2000²²
Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,14 Prozent (39)
Fläche: 77.474 km² (31)
Bevölkerung: 7.176.794 (28)²³
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 6.153
BIP-Wachstum: -1,8 Prozent (47)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 28.150 (23)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (2003), EAPR, PfP (2006), EU-Bewerberland, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, CEFTA, ZEI (1989/2000), BSEC.

46. Slowakische Republik

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1993
Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,28 Prozent (30)
Fläche: 49.035 km² (38)
Bevölkerung: 5.445.027 (32)
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 18.417
BIP-Wachstum: 2,4 Prozent (19)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 15.850 (34)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (2000), Europarat (1993), NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2004), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1990/1993).

47. Slowenien

Beitrittsdatum: März 1992
Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,22 Prozent (32)
Fläche: 20.273 km² (48)
Bevölkerung: 1.983.412 (46)
BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 23.963
BIP-Wachstum: 2,6 Prozent (16)
Streitkräfte (aktive): 7.600 (45)
Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (2010), Europarat (1993),

20 2013.

21 2013.

22 Die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien war vom 7. Juli 1992 bis zum 10. November 2000 von der Mitarbeit in der OSZE suspendiert.

23 Diese Angabe nimmt die Bevölkerung des Kosovo aus.

NATO (2004), EAPR, EU (2004), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, ZEI (1992).

48. Spanien

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 4,58 Prozent (8)

Fläche: 505.370 km² (9)

Bevölkerung: 48.146.134 (8)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 30.262

BIP-Wachstum: 1,4 Prozent (34)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 133.250 (9)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1977), NATO (1982), EAPR, EU (1986), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa.

49. Tadschikistan

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,05 Prozent (49)

Fläche: 144.100 km² (22)

Bevölkerung: 8.191.958 (25)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 1.114

BIP-Wachstum: 6,7 Prozent (4)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 8.800 (42)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: EAPR, PfP (2002), GUS (1991), OVKS, SOZ.

50. Tschechische Republik

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1993

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,57 Prozent (25)

Fläche: 78.867 km² (30)

Bevölkerung: 10.644.842 (19)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 19.554

BIP-Wachstum: 2,0 Prozent (25)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 21.000 (30)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1995), Europarat (1993), NATO (1999), EAPR, EU (2004), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1990/1993).

51. Türkei

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 1,01 Prozent (18)

Fläche: 783.562 km² (6)

Bevölkerung: 79.414.269 (4)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 10.530

BIP-Wachstum: 2,9 Prozent (14)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 510.600 (3)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1961), Europarat (1949), NATO (1952), EAPR, EU-Bewerberland, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, SEECP, BSEC, SOZ-Dialogpartner.

52. Turkmenistan

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,05 Prozent (49)

Fläche: 488.100 km² (10)

Bevölkerung: 5.231.422 (33)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 9.032

BIP-Wachstum: 10,3 Prozent (1)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 22.000 (28)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991).

53. Ukraine

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,68 Prozent (22)

Fläche: 603.550 km² (8)²⁴

Bevölkerung: 44.429.471 (9)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 3.082

BIP-Wachstum: -6,8 Prozent (49)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 121.500 (10)²⁵

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1995), EAPR, PfP (1994), NATO-Ukraine-Charta/NATO-Ukraine-Kommission (1997), EU-Assoziierungsabkommen²⁶, GUS (1991), ZEI (1996), BSEC.

54. Ungarn

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,6 Prozent (23)

Fläche: 93.028 km² (26)

Bevölkerung: 9.897.541 (20)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 13.903

BIP-Wachstum: 3,6 Prozent (10)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 26.500 (24)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: OECD (1996), Europarat (1990),

24 Die ukrainische Regierung hat seit März 2014 keine Kontrolle mehr über die Krim und seit April/Mai 2014 keine Kontrolle mehr über die von Rebellen kontrollierten Gebiete.

25 Ohne Berücksichtigung der unklaren Situation aufgrund des aktuellen Konflikts.

26 Das Europäische Parlament und die ukrainische *Werchowna Rada* haben das Assoziierungsabkommen gleichzeitig am 16. September 2014 ratifiziert. Es findet vorläufig Anwendung, bis alle EU-Mitgliedstaaten es ratifiziert haben. In den Niederlanden wird am 6. April 2016 ein nicht bindendes Referendum mit lediglich aufschiebender Wirkung durchgeführt. Auf der Grundlage eines Übereinkommens zwischen Russland und der Ukraine wurde die Anwendung des Abschnitts über den Handel bis zum 31. Dezember 2015 ausgesetzt.

NATO (1999), EAPR, EU (2004), Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, ZEI (1989).

55. USA

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 11,5 Prozent (1)

Fläche: 9.833.517 km² (3)

Bevölkerung: 321.368.864 (1)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 54.629

BIP-Wachstum: 2,4 Prozent (19)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 1.433.150 (1)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: G7 (1975), OECD (1961), NATO (1949), EAPR, Euro-arktischer-Barentsrat-Beobachter, Kooperationsrat für Südosteuropa, NAFTA.

56. Usbekistan

Beitrittsdatum: Januar 1992

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,35 Prozent (29)

Fläche: 447.400 km² (12)

Bevölkerung: 29.199.942 (12)

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 2.038

BIP-Wachstum: 8,1 Prozent (2)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 48.000 (15)

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: EAPR, PfP (1994), GUS (1991), SOZ.

57. Zypern

Beitrittsdatum: Juni 1973

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE: 0,19 Prozent (33)

Fläche: 9.251 km² (50)²⁷

Bevölkerung: 1.189.197 (48)²⁸

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar: 27.194

BIP-Wachstum: -2,3 Prozent (48)

Streitkräfte (aktive): 12.000 (36)²⁹

Mitgliedschaften und Kooperationsformen: Europarat (1961), EU (2004).

27 Griechischer Teil: 5.896 km², türkischer Teil: 3.355 km².

28 Griechischer und türkischer Teil zusammen.

29 Türkischer Teil: 3.500.

Quellen:

Beitrittsdatum:

<http://web.archive.org/web/20100826040207/http://www.osce.org/about/13131.html> und <http://www.osce.org/de/mc/97738> (Mongolei)

Kostenbeteiligung an der OSZE:

OSZE, Beschluss des Ständigen Rates, PC.DEC/1072, 7. Februar 2013.
<http://www.osce.org/pc/99508>

Fläche:

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/print_2147.html

Bevölkerung:

(Schätzungen für Juli 2015) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/print_2119.html

BIP pro Kopf in gegenwärtigen US-Dollar:

(soweit nicht anders angegeben Angaben für 2014)
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries>

BIP-Wachstum:

(soweit nicht anders angegeben Angaben für 2014)
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries>

Streitkräfte (aktive):

International Institute for Strategic Studies (Hrsg.), The Military Balance 2015, London 2015

OSZE – Tagungen, Treffen und Termine 2014/2015

2014

- 23.-24. Juli Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte (BDIMR): Schulung zum Thema Hassverbrechen für Angehörige der Strafverfolgungsbehörden – Ausbildung der Ausbilder, Warschau
- 10.-12. September OSZE-Vorsitz/Büro des Koordinators für Wirtschafts- und Umweltaktivitäten der OSZE (OCEEA): Schluss-sitzung des 22. OSZE-Wirtschafts- und Umweltfo-rums zum Thema „Umweltherausforderungen im Hin-blick auf die Förderung von Kooperation und Sicher-heit im OSZE-Raum“, Prag
- 16.-17. Septem-ber OSZE/UNODC unter der Schirmherrschaft der Regie- rung von Malta und mit Unterstützung von Liechten- stein, Spanien und der Schweiz: Workshop über die Verhütung von und Reaktion auf Entführungen und Geiselnahmen durch terroristische Gruppen, Valletta
18. September OSZE-Sekretariat/Italienische EU-Präsidentschaft/ OSZE-Vorsitz/Italienisches Außenministerium/Insti- tute of International Affairs of Rome: Workshop „To- wards Helsinki +40: The OSCE, the Global Mediter- ranean and the Future of Co-operative Security“, Rom
19. September OSZE-Beauftragte für Medienfreiheit: Zweites Exper- tentreffen über „*Open Journalism*“, Wien
22. September - 3. Oktober BDIMR: Implementierungstreffen zur menschlichen Dimension 2014, Warschau
- 25.-26. Septem-ber Parlamentarische Versammlung (PV) der OSZE: Ers- tes Seminar zum Helsinki+40-Projekt der OSZE-PV zum Thema „Der Helsinki+40-Prozess: Aussichten für eine Stärkung der OSZE“, Moskau
26. September OSZE-Beauftragte für Medienfreiheit: Drittes Treffen mit Vertretern von Medienorganisationen aus der Russischen Föderation und der Ukraine, Wien
1. Oktober OSZE, Abteilung Kommunikation und Medienbezie- hungen/Graduate Institute Geneva: Die OSZE und die Sicherheit in einer neuen Welt, Genf
2. Oktober Hohe Kommissarin der OSZE für nationale Minder- heiten (HKNM): Die in Kirgisistan ansässige NGO Spravedlivost erhält den Max van der Stoel Award 2014, Den Haag

3. Oktober Herbsttagung der OSZE-PV: „Neue Herausforderungen für die Sicherheit: Die Rolle der Parlamente“, Genf
- 7.-27. Oktober OSZE-Projektkoordinator in der Ukraine: Die OSZE unterstützt Wähleraufklärungskampagne im Vorfeld der vorgezogenen Parlamentswahlen, Ukraine
10. Oktober OSZE-Konfliktverhütungszentrum (KVZ)/Group of Friends on Mediation and Crisis Management Initiative (CMI): Hochrangige Konferenz zur Mediation im OSZE-Gebiet, Wien
- 21.-22. Oktober OSZE-Sekretariat, Abteilung Grenzüberschreitende Bedrohungen (TNTD)/Global Counterterrorism Forum: Workshop „Advancing Women’s Roles in Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism“, Wien
- 27.-28. Oktober OSZE-Sekretariat: Mittelmeerkonferenz über den illegalen Handel mit Kleinwaffen und leichten Waffen und die Terrorismusbekämpfung in der Mittelmeerregion, Neum
- 30.-31. Oktober BDIMR: Zusätzliches Treffen zur menschlichen Dimension: Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten in Wirtschaftskrisen, Wien
3. November OSZE, Abteilung Kommunikation und Medienbeziehungen: OSZE-Café „Democracy Rising“, Straßburg
4. November Büro der OSZE-Sonderbeauftragten und Koordinatorin für die Bekämpfung des Menschenhandels: Konferenz über „Ethische Fragen bei der Verhütung und Bekämpfung des Menschenhandels“, Wien
7. November OSZE-Vorsitz/TNTD: Konferenz über vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen (VBM) der OSZE zur Verminderung der Risiken bei der Anwendung von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien: Förderung der Implementierung, Unterstützung von Verhandlungen, Wien
- 10.-11. November OSZE-Medienbeauftragte: 11. OSZE-Südkaucasus-Medienkonferenz: Öffentlich-rechtliche Rundfunkanstalten im Digitalzeitalter, Tiflis
- 12.-13. November Auswärtiges Amt/OSZE-Vorsitz/BDIMR: 10. Jahrestag der Berliner OSZE-Konferenz gegen Antisemitismus: Hochrangige Festveranstaltung und Forum für die Zivilgesellschaft, Berlin
- 13.-14. November BDIMR: Zweites OSZE/BDIMR-Jugendforum 2014, Warschau

18. November OSZE-PV: Zweites Seminar zum Helsinki+40-Projekt der OSZE-PV zum Thema „Der Helsinki+40-Prozess: Implikationen für die transatlantischen Beziehungen“, Washington, D.C.
- 4.-5. Dezember OSZE-Vorsitz: 21. Treffen des OSZE-Ministerrats, Basel
11. Dezember OSZE-Medienbeauftragte: Viertes Treffen mit Vertretern von Medienorganisationen aus der Russischen Föderation und der Ukraine, Wien
18. Dezember OSZE-Medienbeauftragte: Diskussion über das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung für Toleranz und Nichtdiskriminierung, Wien

2015

1. Januar Serbien übernimmt den OSZE-Vorsitz von der Schweiz; Serbiens Außenminister Ivica Dačić wird Amtierender Vorsitzender der OSZE
- 26.-27. Januar OSZE-Vorsitz/OCEEA: 1. Vorbereitungstreffen des 23. OSZE-Wirtschafts- und Umweltforums zum Thema „Wasser-Governance im OSZE-Gebiet – Erhöhung von Sicherheit und Stabilität durch Kooperation“, Wien
- 18.-20. Februar Wintertagung der OSZE-PV, Wien
25. Februar OSZE-Medienbeauftragte: Fünftes Treffen mit Vertretern von Medienorganisationen aus der Russischen Föderation und der Ukraine, Wien
27. Februar OSZE: Nach Paris – Die Medienfreiheit und die Bekämpfung von gewalttätigem Extremismus und Radikalisierung, Wien
- 9.-10. März BDIMR: Regionaler Runder Tisch zur Lösung von Konflikten bei Wahlen in Osteuropa und im Südkaukasus; Zugang zur Justiz und wirksamer Rechtsschutz, Warschau
11. März OSZE-PV: Drittes Seminar zum Helsinki+40-Projekt der OSZE-PV zum Thema „Die Rolle der OSZE bei der (Re-)Konsolidierung der europäischen Sicherheit“, Stockholm
17. März OSZE-Generalsekretär/Wilson Centre: Security Days: Aktuelle Herausforderungen für die euroatlantische Sicherheit – Strategien für die Zusammenarbeit und gemeinsame Lösungen, Washington, D.C.

- 16.-17. April OSZE-Vorsitz/BDIMR: Zusätzliches Treffen zur menschlichen Dimension: Das Recht auf friedliche Versammlung und Vereinigungsfreiheit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Vereinigungsfreiheit, Wien
21. April CTBTO/IAEO/OSZE/UNIDO/UNODC: Hochrangige Podiumsdiskussion zum Thema „The Use of Evaluation in Evidence-Based Policy Making ,Accountability and Learning: the Need for Results and Impact“, Wien
21. April OSZE-KVZ/OSZE-Vorsitz/OSZE-Mission in Serbien: OSZE-weite Konferenz über Sicherheitssektorgovernance und -reform, Belgrad
23. April OSZE-Medienbeauftragte: Sechstes Treffen mit Vertretern von Medienorganisationen aus der Russischen Föderation und der Ukraine, Wien
27. April OSZE-PV: Viertes Seminar zum Helsinki+40-Projekt der OSZE-PV zum Thema „Die fehlende Rechtspersönlichkeit der OSZE – Herausforderungen in Krisensituationen“, Kopenhagen
- 29.-30. April OSZE/Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict/International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance/United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies/Organisation Amerikanischer Staaten: Die Stärkung der Zusammenarbeit für Frieden und Sicherheit auf dem Weg zu Demokratie und Entwicklung, Wien
6. Mai OSZE-Forum für Sicherheitskooperation (FSK): Sicherheitsdialog über „Konventionelle Rüstungskontrolle und vertrauens- und sicherheitsbildende Maßnahmen (VSBM): Stand und Perspektiven“, Wien
- 11.-13. Mai OSZE-Vorsitz/OCEEA: 2. Vorbereitungstreffen des 23. OSZE-Wirtschafts- und Umweltforums, Belgrad
13. Mai European Council on Foreign Relations/Institute of International Affairs (IAI) in Zusammenarbeit mit der OSZE und der Compagnia di San Paolo: Workshop „Ein multilateraler Ansatz für regierungsfreie Räume: Libyen und darüber hinaus“, London
18. Mai BDIMR: Konferenz zur Verstärkung der Bemühungen zur Verhütung und Bekämpfung von Intoleranz gegenüber und Diskriminierung von Christen mit dem Schwerpunkt Hassdelikte, Ausgrenzung, Marginalisierung und Entrechtung, Wien

- 27.-28. Mai OSZE-PV: Fünftes Seminar zum Helsinki+40-Projekt der OSZE-PV zum Thema „Bekräftigung der Stärken, Vergegenwärtigung der Aussichten“, Belgrad
- 28.-29. Mai OSZE-OCEEA/EBWE/UNCITRAL: Regionalseminar zur Stärkung der Vorschriften für öffentliche Beschaffungen, Wien
28. Mai OSZE-Stabsakademie für Grenzmanagement: Afghanistan – Zentralasiatische Perspektiven regionaler Sicherheit, Duschanbe
- 1.-2. Juni Asienkonferenz der OSZE 2015, Seoul
- 1.-3. Juni OSZE-Vorsitz/BDIMR: Seminar der menschlichen Dimension zur Rolle Nationaler Menschenrechtsinstitutionen (NMRI) bei der Förderung und beim Schutz der Menschenrechte im OSZE-Gebiet, Warschau
- 8.-10. Juni Republik Belarus (Vorsitz): Dritte Überprüfungs-konferenz des Vertragsüber den Offenen Himmel, Wien
- 11.-12. Juni OSZE-Vergleichs- und Schiedsgerichtshof/OSZE-Sekretariat: Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der globalisierten Welt von heute, Wien
- 23.-25. Juni OSZE: Jährliche Sicherheitsüberprüfungskonferenz, Wien
25. Juni OSZE-Medienbeauftragte: Twitter-Chat über digitale Bedrohungen und Online-Missbrauch von Journalistinnen, Wien
30. Juni – 1. Juli OSZE-Vorsitz/TNTD/Gruppe Terrorismusbekämpfung (ATU): Expertenkonferenz zur Terrorismusbekämpfung zum Thema „Bekämpfung der Anstiftung und der Rekrutierung ausländischer terroristischer Kämpfer“, Wien
- 2.-3. Juli OSZE-Vorsitz/BDIMR: Zweites Zusätzliches Treffen zur menschlichen Dimension zum Thema „Religions- und Glaubensfreiheit – Förderung von gegenseitigem Respekt und gegenseitigem Verständnis“, Wien
5. Juli OSZE-PV: Ergebnisse des Helsinki+40-Projekts der OSZE-PV, Helsinki
- 5.-9. Juli OSZE-PV: 24. Jahrestagung, Helsinki
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Abkürzungsverzeichnis

ACMF	Advisory Committee on Management and Finance/Berater der Ausschuss für Verwaltung und Finanzen
AG	Arbeitsgruppe
AIAM/JTBD	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting/Jährliches Treffen zur Beurteilung der Durchführung
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces/Nationale Sicherheitskräfte Afghanistans
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations/Verband Südostasiatischer Nationen
ASRC	Annual Security Review Conference/Jährliche Sicherheitsüberprüfungskonferenz
ATO	Anti-Terrorist Operation
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty/Vertrag über den Waffenhandel
ATU	Action against Terrorism Unit/Gruppe Terrorismusbekämpfung
BDIMR/ ODIHR	Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte/ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
BIP	Bruttoinlandsprodukt
BISS	Baltic Institute of Social Sciences
BMO	Border Monitoring Operation/Grenzüberwachungseinsatz
BMSC	Border Management Staff College/Stabsakademie für Grenzmanagement
BRICS-Staaten	Brasilien, Russland, Indien, China und Südafrika
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation/ Schwarzmeer-Wirtschaftskooperation
BSMC	Border Security and Management Concept/Konzept für Grenzsicherung und -management
BSMU	Border Security and Management Unit/Referat Grenzsicherung und Grenzmanagement
CACO	Central Asian Cooperation Organization/Zentralasiatische Organisation für Zusammenarbeit
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States/Rat der Ostseestaaten
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement/Mitteuropäisches Freihandelsabkommen
CERD	Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination/Ausschuss für die Beseitigung der Rassendiskriminierung
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia/Konferenz über Interaktion und vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen in Asien
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative

CoCom	Coordinating Committee for East West Trade Policy/Koordinationsausschuss für Ost-West-Handel
CORE	Centre for OSCE Research/Zentrum für OSZE-Forschung
CPC/KVZ	Conflict Prevention Centre/Konfliktverhütungszentrum
CPC/OS	Operations Service of the Conflict Prevention Centre
CPRSI	Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues/Kontaktstelle für Fragen der Roma und Sinti
CRRC	Caucasus Research Resource Centre
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations/Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen
CST/VKS	Collective Security Treaty/Vertrag über kollektive Sicherheit
CSTO/OVKS	Collective Security Treaty Organization/Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization/Organisation des Vertrags über das umfassende Verbot von Nuklearversuchen
DDR	Deutsche Demokratische Republik
DF/DVP	Dansk Folkeparti/Dänische Volkspartei
DNFBP	Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions/Bestimmte Nicht-Finanz-Unternehmen und -Berufsgruppen
DVR	Donezker Volksrepublik (selbsternannt)
EAD	Europäischer Auswärtiger Dienst
EAPR	Euro-Atlantischer Partnerschaftsrat
EASO	European Asylum Support Office/Europäisches Unterstützungsbüro für Asylfragen
EAWU	Eurasische Wirtschaftsunion
EBWE	Europäische Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung
ECRI	European Commission against Racism and Intolerance/Europäische Kommission gegen Rassismus und Intoleranz
EG	Europäische Gemeinschaft
EGMR	Europäischer Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte
ELN	European Leadership Network
EMRK	Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention/Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten
ENP	Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik
ESVP	Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik
EU	Europäische Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
Eurojust	European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit/Einheit für justizielle Zusammenarbeit der Europäischen Union
Europol	European Police Office/Europäisches Polizeiamt
FATF	Financial Action Task Force/Arbeitsgruppe Finanzielle Maßnahmen gegen die Geldwäsche

FAZ	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
FN	Front National/Nationale Front
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
FRA	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights/Agentur der Europäischen Union für Grundrechte
Frontex	Europäische Agentur für die operative Zusammenarbeit an den Außengrenzen der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union
FSK	Forum für Sicherheitskooperation
G7	Gruppe der Sieben
G20	Gruppe der Zwanzig
GASP	Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GPS	Global Positioning System/Globales Positionsbestimmungssystem
GT	Georgischer Traum
GUS	Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten
HDI	Human Development Index
HDIM	Human Dimension Implementation Meeting/Implementierungstreffen der menschlichen Dimension
HKNM	Hoher Kommissar für nationale Minderheiten
HLPG	High-Level Planning Group/Hochrangige Planungsgruppe
HQ	Headquarters
HRAM	Human Rights Assessment Mission
IAEA/IAEO	International Atomic Energy Agency/Internationale Atomenergie-Organisation
IAI	Institute of International Affairs
IBU	Islamische Bewegung Usbekistans
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization/Internationale Zivilluftfahrtorganisation
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination/Internationales Übereinkommen zur Beseitigung jeder Form von Rassendiskriminierung
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons/Binnenvertriebene
IEOM	International Election Observation Mission/Internationale Wahlbeobachtermission
IGH	Internationaler Gerichtshof
IJU	Islamic Jihad Union/Islamische Dschihad-Union
IKRK	Internationales Komitee vom Roten Kreuz
ILO	International Labour Organization/Internationale Arbeitsorganisation

IMCA	Islamic Movement of Central Asia/Islamische Bewegung Zentralasiens
IOM	International Organization for Migration/Internationale Organisation für Migration
IPbpR	Internationaler Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte
IPI	International Peace Institute
IS	Islamischer Staat
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force/Internationale Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe
JaK	Jund al-Khilafah/Soldaten des Kalifats
JCCC	Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination/Gemeinsames Zentrum für Kontrolle und Koordination
KaPO	Kaitsepolitseiamet/Sicherheitspolizeiamt
KSE	Konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa
KSE-Vertrag	Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa
KSZE	Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa
KVAE	Konferenz über Vertrauens- und Sicherheitsbildende Maßnahmen und Abrüstung in Europa
KVZ/CPC	Konfliktverhütungszentrum/Conflict Prevention Centre
LAS	Liga der Arabischen Staaten/Arabische Liga
LVR	Lugansker Volksrepublik (selbsternannt)
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air Defence Systems/tragbare Luftabwehrsysteme
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions/Beiderseitige und ausgewogene Truppenreduzierungen
MGIMO	Moskovski gosudarstvennyj institut meždunarodnych otnošeni MID Rossii (universitet)/Moskauer Staatliches Institut für Internationale Beziehungen des russischen Außenministeriums (Universität)
MOAS	Migrant Offshore Aid Station
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement/Nordamerikanisches Freihandelsabkommen
NAKR	Nordatlantischer Kooperationsrat
NAP	National Action Plan/Nationaler Aktionsplan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization//Nordatlantikvertrags-Organisation
NEOS	Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations/nichtstaatliche Organisationen/Nichtregierungsorganisationen
NIMFOGO	Nezavisimyi institut po monitoringu formirovanija graždanskogo obščestva/Unabhängiges Institut zum Monitoring der Gestaltung der Zivilgesellschaft
NIMRI	Nationale Menschenrechtsinstitutionen

N+N-Staaten	Neutrale und nichtpaktgebundene (blockfreie) Staaten
NPT/NVV	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty/Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen
NRR	NATO-Russland-Rat
NVV/NPT	Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen/Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAS	Organization of American States/Organisation Amerikanischer Staaten
OCEEA	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities/Büro des Koordinators für Wirtschafts- und Umweltaktivitäten der OSZE
ODIHR/ BDIMR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights/Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
ÖP	Östliche Partnerschaft
OGRV/OGRS	Operativnaja gruppa rossiskich voisk/Operative Gruppe der russischen Streitkräfte
OH	Offener Himmel
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIZ	Organisation für Islamische Zusammenarbeit
OSZE	Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa
OVKS/CSTO	Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit/Collective Security Treaty Organization
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe/Parlamentarische Versammlung des Europarats
PEP	Panel of Eminent Persons/Weisenrat
PfP	Partnership for Peace/Partnerschaft für den Frieden
PISM	Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych/Polnisches Institut für Internationale Angelegenheiten
PIW	Partei der Islamischen Wiedergeburt
PIWT	Partei der Islamischen Wiedergeburt Tadschikistans
PKD	Public Key Directory
PV	Parlamentarische Versammlung
PVV	Partij voor de Vrijheid/Partei für die Freiheit
RATS	Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
RCC	Regional Cooperation Council
RFOM	Representative on Freedom of the Media/Beauftragter für die Freiheit der Medien
RGW	Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe
RSFSR	Russische Sozialistische Föderative Sowjetrepublik
RSM	Resolute Support Mission

SAA	Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsabkommen
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty/Gespräche zur Begrenzung strategischer Rüstung
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons/Kleinwaffen und leichte Waffen
SAP	Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozess
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SART	Search and Rescue Training
SCHR	Swiss Centre of Expertise in Human Rights
SCO/SOZ	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation/Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit
SD	Sverigedemokraterna/Schwedendemokraten
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SEEC	South-East European Cooperation Process/Kooperationsprozess in Südosteuropa
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SKDS	Tirgus un sabiedriskās domas pētījumu centrs/Zentrum für Markt- und Meinungsforschung
SKMR	Schweizerisches Kompetenzzentrum für Menschenrechte
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission/Sonderbeobachtermission
SOZ/SCO	Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit/Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit/Gruppe Strategische Polizeiangelegenheiten
SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty/Vertrag zur Verringerung strategischer Waffen
StGB	Strafgesetzbuch
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
TAHCLE	Training Against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement
TAP	Training Assistance Programme
TCG	Trilateral Contact Group
TISP	Transitional Institutional Support Programme
TNTD	Transnational Threats Department/Abteilung Grenzüberschreitende Bedrohungen
UdSSR	Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UN/UNO/VN	United Nations/United Nations Organization/Vereinte Nationen
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNCITRAL	United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCHR/ UNOHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPoA	United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
UNROCA	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Ukrainische Sozialistische Sowjetrepublik
VB	Vlaams Belang/Flämische Interessen
VBM	Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen
VKS/CST	Vertrag über kollektive Sicherheit/Collective Security Treaty
VNB	Vereinte Nationale Bewegung
VSBM	Vertrauens- und sicherheitsbildende Maßnahmen
VTO	Vereinigte Tadschikische Opposition
WD	Wiener Dokument
WEF	World Economic Forum
WEU	Western European Union
WHO	World Health Organization/Weltgesundheitsorganisation
WTO	World Trade Organization/Welthandelsorganisation
WVO	Warschauer Vertragsorganisation
ZEI	Zentraleuropäische Initiative

Autorenverzeichnis

- Reem Ahmed*, Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH); Hamburg
- Prof. Dr. David Aprasidze*, Staatliche Ilia-Universität; Tiflis
- Natascha Cerny Ehtesham*, Projekt-Koordinatorin, humanrights.ch; Bern
- Jennifer Croft*, Senior Adviser bei der Hohen Kommissarin der OSZE für nationale Minderheiten (HKNM); Den Haag
- Jean P. Froehly*, Leiter des Büros des Direktors/Politischer Berater, OSZE-Büro für demokratische Institutionen und Menschenrechte (BDIMR); Warschau
- Prof. Dr. David J. Galbreath*, Direktor des Centre for War and Technology, Defence Studies, Universität Bath; Bath
- Dr. Samuel Goda*, Leiter des Programms Internationale Sicherheit, Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA); Assistant Professor an der Fakultät für Internationale Beziehungen, Wirtschaftsuniversität Bratislava; Bratislava
- Prof. Dr. Laurent Goetschel*, Direktor der Schweizerischen Friedensstiftung (swisspeace) und Professor für Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Basel; Basel
- Dr. Omar Grech*, Koordinator des Human Dimension Programme, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC), Universität Malta; Malta
- Dr. Paul Holtom*, Stellvertretender Direktor des Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Universität Coventry; Coventry
- Prof. Dr. P. Terrence Hopmann*, Prof. of International Relations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Prof. emer. of Political Science, Brown University; Washington, D.C.
- Dr. Thomas Kunze*, Regionalbeauftragter der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung für Zentralasien; Taschkent
- Maxime Lefebvre*, ehemaliger Botschafter Frankreichs bei der OSZE (2013-2015); Paris
- Dr. Michail Logvinov*, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung an der Technischen Universität Dresden; Dresden
- Rory McCorley*, Lt. Col., Stellvertretender Leiter des Grenzüberwachungseinsatzes der OSZE-Mission in Georgien (2004-2005); Programme Manager Training Assistance Programme (2005-2006); Glasson, Westmeath
- Dr. Ghaffor J. Mirzoev*, Leiter der Abteilung Religionsphilosophie, Institut für Philosophie, Politikwissenschaft und Rechtswissenschaft, Akademie der Wissenschaften der Republik Tadschikistan; Duschanbe
- Prof. i.R. Dr. Reinhold Mokrosch*, Institut für Evangelische Theologie, Universität Osnabrück; Osnabrück

- Dr. Reinhard Mutz*, ehemaliger Amtierender Direktor des Instituts für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH); Hamburg
- Dr. Claus Neukirch*, Stellvertretender Direktor des Konfliktverhütungszentrums für die Unterstützung von Einsätzen, OSZE-Sekretariat; Wien
- Jenny Nordman*, unabhängige Wissenschaftlerin, arbeitet zu Fragen europäischer Politik; Stockholm
- Dr. Daniela PISOIU*, Wissenschaftliche Referentin am Österreichischen Institut für Internationale Politik (OIIP); Fellow am Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH); Wien/Hamburg
- Matthew Rojansky*, Direktor des Kennan Institute am Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Washington, D.C.
- Ursel Schlichting*, Wissenschaftliche Referentin am Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH); Hamburg
- Dr. Hans-Joachim Schmidt*, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Projektleiter, Programmbereich Sicherheits- und Weltpolitik von Staaten, Leibniz-Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung; Frankfurt
- Dr. Arne C. Seifert*, Botschafter a.D., Zentralasienberater am Zentrum für OSZE-Forschung (CORE)/Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH); Berlin/Hamburg
- Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier*, Bundesminister des Auswärtigen, amtierender Vorsitzender der OSZE 2016; Berlin
- György Szabó*, Botschafter, OSZE-Projekt Koordinator in Usbekistan; Taschkent
- Heidi Tagliavini*, Botschafterin a.D., von Juni 2014 bis Juni 2015 Sonderbeauftragte des Amtierenden Vorsitzenden der OSZE für den Konflikt in der Ostukraine; Bern
- Fred Tanner*, Botschafter, Erster Berater im Büro des OSZE-Generalsekretärs, OSZE-Projektleiter des Weisenrats zur europäischen Sicherheit als gemeinsames Projekt; 2005-2013 Direktor des Genfer Zentrums für Sicherheitspolitik; Wien
- Dr. Mikhail Troitskiy*, Moskauer Staatsinstitut für internationale Beziehungen (MGIMO-Universität); Referent am Institut für USA- und Kanadastudien an der Russischen Akademie der Wissenschaften; Moskau
- Dr. Monika Wohlfeld*, Inhaberin des deutschen Lehrstuhls für Friedensforschung und Konfliktprävention, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC), Universität Malta; Malta
- Lamberto Zannier*, Botschafter, Generalsekretär der OSZE; Wien