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Co-operation, Rivalry or Insignificance? Five Scenarios for the Future of Relations between the OSCE and the EU

Since 1990, we have been witnessing the “OSCE-fication” of European security architecture.¹ Paradoxically, this has occurred at the expense of the OSCE rather than benefiting it. However, while the OSCE, by assuming operative tasks in, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo, has raised its profile considerably, demonstrating thereby its value and effectiveness, this demonstration of success could nevertheless not be converted into greater political support from the participating States. In fact, at the beginning of this 21st century, the Organization is being threatened with marginalization. On the one hand, it appears to be true that the substance of participating States’ OSCE policy, which, according to Ingo Peters, consists of the leftovers from their EU, NATO and UN policies, is becoming increasingly meagre.² On the other, the OSCE is suffering due to the simultaneous enlargement of both NATO and the EU: These institutions have not only been growing geographically, but have taken on functions that originally belonged to the OSCE (for example, democratic control of the armed forces, police-related activities and the building of democratic institutions).³

Against this background, it is unclear what role the OSCE will play in the future. The present contribution is an attempt to clarify this by introducing five scenarios for the development of European security architecture between now and 2020 and examining their consequences for the OSCE. In the following, we first briefly address the basic principles of scenario building, we then introduce the five scenarios and analyse the consequences resulting from each. In doing so, we concentrate on the spectrum of risk emerging from these scenarios, the willingness of the states to co-operate within the framework of international organizations and the tasks of the OSCE.

1 Cf. Emanuel Adler, *Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE’s security community-building model*, in: Emanuel Adler/Michael Barnett (eds), *Security Communities*, Cambridge 1998, pp. 119-160.

2 Cf. Ingo Peters, *Von der KSZE zur OSZE: Überleben in der Nische kooperativer Sicherheit* [From the CSCE to the OSCE: Survival in the Niche of Co-operative Security], in: Helga Haftendorn/Otto Keck (eds), *Kooperation jenseits von Hegemonie und Bedrohung. Sicherheitsinstitutionen in den internationalen Beziehungen* [Co-operation without Hegemony or Threats. Security Institutions in International Relations], Baden-Baden 1997, pp. 57-100, here: p. 99.

3 A similar view is found in Reinhard Bettzuege, *The OSCE of the 21st century – A Departure for New Horizons?*, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2002, Baden-Baden 2003*, pp. 39-45, here: pp. 42f.

Relations between the OSCE and the EU are our central concern.⁴ This is the outcome of three considerations. *First*, the spectrum of tasks in EU foreign and security policy is becoming increasingly similar to that of the OSCE. Consequently, the two organizations and their members must inevitably deal with questions of the division of labour, co-operation and institutional rivalry. *Second*, through its enlargement to the East, the EU is advancing towards potential crisis regions in which the OSCE is already active today.⁵ However, the resulting stabilization function, which the OSCE could perform for the EU, can *third*, only bear fruit if the EU and its members develop a clear understanding of their relationship to the OSCE. In this regard, Javier Solana recently emphasized the “natural-born partnership” between the two organizations, promising that intensified relations following EU enlargement would enable a stronger partnership whose potential has only just started to be realized.⁶

The Basic Principles of Scenario Building

The scenario technique is an approach for dealing with the unpredictability of future developments. Scenarios illustrate possible futures and the developments that may lead to them. They are created by identifying key factors in a particular area and analysing interdependencies between these factors to arrive at alternative descriptions of the future. They thus differ from prognoses, which merely project developments into the future on the basis of current trends.⁷

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- 4 On this see Günter Burghardt, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention as Tasks of the European Union and EU-OSCE Co-operation, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1999, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 421-428; Marc Otte, ESDP and Multilateral Security Organizations: Working with NATO, the UN, and the OSCE, in: Esther Brimmer (ed.), The EU's Search for a Strategic Role: ESDP and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, D.C., 2002, pp. 35-56; Adam Daniel Rotfeld, For a New Partnership in the New Century: The Relationship between the OSCE, NATO and the EU, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1999, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 377-390; Monika Wohlfeld, Developing Ways of Cooperation and Mutual Reinforcement between the EU and the OSCE, in: Frida Blom, EU Civilian Crisis Management Capability, Conference Report, Stockholm 2001, pp. 30-32, at: <http://www.Svenska-freds.se/sakerhetspolitik/eufakta>.
 - 5 Cf. Oliver P. Richmond, Emerging Concepts of Security in the European Order: Implications for “Zones of Conflict” at the Fringes of the EU, in: European Security 1/2000, pp. 41-67.
 - 6 Cf. Javier Solana, The European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: The Shape of Future Cooperation, Address to the Permanent Council of the OSCE, Vienna, 25 September 2002, at: http://www.osce.org/press_rell/documents/2002-503-ec_solana-speech.pdf.
 - 7 Cf. Hans Georg Graf, Globale Szenarien – Megatrends im weltweiten Kräftespiel [Global Scenarios – Megatrends in Global Dynamics], Zurich 2000; Ute von Reibnitz, Szenariotechnik. Instrumente für die unternehmerische und persönliche Erfolgsplanung [Scenario Technique. Instruments for Entrepreneurial and Personal Performance Planning], Wiesbaden 1991.

The following five scenarios were developed based on a good three dozen influential factors. These comprise, first, various vital parameters for European security, such as the role of European security organizations and the conduct of important states (including the USA, Russia and Turkey) and non-state actors (such as non-governmental organizations). A second group of factors encompasses EU-specific features, such as the Union's geographic scope, European special-interest regions, the EU's institutional evolution, co-operation with non-EU states and organizations and the development of military and non-military tasks. In addition, long-term developments relevant to security policy have been taken into consideration. These consist of elements such as cross-border co-operation on armaments, the difference in rates of force modernization and transformation in the USA and Europe and the resulting consequences for interoperability, demographic changes and their effect on recruitment models for the armed forces as well as the shift in political priorities from security to health, social and education policy.

Scenario 1: Trilateral Co-operation and the Triumph of Multilateralism

The central characteristics of this scenario are the clear commitment of the relevant states to multilateralism and to its active implementation. This underlying attitude strengthens international institutions. The essential prerequisite for this is close co-operation between the USA, the EU and Russia. These three major players join forces to guarantee global stability and prosperity by amalgamating NATO and the OSCE to create the *Northern Hemisphere Alliance* (NHA). The United Nations profits from the fruitful co-operation of nations within the NHA. It is reformed extensively so that it may conduct its global tasks efficiently and effectively. As an important forum for co-ordination between the members of the NHA and other countries and regional organizations, the UN contributes to strengthening global co-operation through regional multilateralism.

International relations are characterized by stability. Through the NHA and the UN, the USA, the EU and Russia are capable of having a preventive effect on conflict and largely impeding the emergence of war. In addition, the active role of non-governmental actors contributes to the strengthening of conflict prevention efforts. Non-governmental actors can play a particularly effective part in moderating the behaviour of parties before the outbreak of actual hostilities. They also provide the international community with important early-warning information.

There is a relatively high degree of political integration within the EU. While the Council of Ministers dominates, the Commission and the European Parliament have extensive powers of co-decision. In the Council, decisions on Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) are made by a qualified majority, and decisions on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are

made by a selective majority, i.e. different majorities are needed for different issues. The EU is represented on all international bodies by a permanent President of the Council. Geographically, the Union includes the Baltic states, Malta and Cyprus and has a total of 35 member states. It maintains close economic relations in the Mediterranean region, in particular with Turkey, Israel, Egypt and Algeria. Moreover, the EU attaches a great deal of importance to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thanks to effective trilateral co-operation, substantial political progress is being achieved in these regions.

In the area of security policy, the EU understands itself as a force for peace that maintains a balance between non-military and military capacities and is politically and militarily integrated in the Northern Hemisphere Alliance. Militarily, it has a force of 200,000 troops at its disposal, which can be deployed globally for humanitarian tasks and rescue missions, crisis management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as for defence. It also assists civilian authorities within the EU (for example, with emergency aid and border-protection tasks). The EU pools resources to perform security-related tasks in the civilian sector in the areas of institutional reconstruction, police forces, the rule of law and civil administration. Activities in these areas are funded by the Union's own security budget. The EU also co-operates closely with the UN on development policy.

Consequences

The strong multilateral framework produces a highly stable international environment, in particular by strengthening the preventive component. International organizations play the central role in this, most impressively illustrated by the creation of the NHA.⁸ Through the fusion of NATO and the OSCE, the NHA is able to make use of a comprehensive spectrum of instruments for crisis prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. Furthermore, seamless co-operation with the EU opens up the possibility of systematically incorporating economic elements into prevention and peacebuilding, enabling the successful realization of the vision of an integrated peace policy.

The NHA will presumably continue to perform the tasks currently undertaken by the OSCE. The strong emphasis on multilateralism strengthens the rule-oriented aspect of international politics, thereby changing the importance of confidence building and peaceful conflict settlement. In view of the fundamentally co-operative character of relations in the NHA's transatlantic core region, such measures are likely to decline in importance there. In other regions of the NHA such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, and in dealings with non-NHA states and other regional organizations, they will

8 On this concept, see also Martti Ahtisaari, *The United States, the European Union, and Russia: Essential partners for the 21st Century*, East-West Institute Policy Brief, April 2002.

continue to be important. The value of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding will increase. Because the primary actors enjoy the necessary mutual trust and share the same interests, they can co-operate successfully. Through this, institutional rivalries are reduced, while combined planning and joint missions strengthen the operational effectiveness of international organizations.

Scenario 2: Pax Americana and the Fragile Unipolar World Order

In this scenario, US supremacy is decisive. As a hegemonic power enjoying solid economic growth and comprehensive military capabilities, the USA dominates the international scene. Washington follows a policy of “velvet-glove unilateralism”, that is, its foreign policy takes international and regional organizations into consideration only so long as they serve US interests. Washington relies on a fully developed global network of bilateral relations and alliances for specific situations. In Europe, the UK, Spain, Italy and Turkey count as the closest US allies. The strategic partnership with Moscow supports Russian economic reform (including admission to the WTO), ensures that Washington has access to Russian energy sources and serves to counterbalance China.

Relations between the USA and the EU states are strained as regards security matters. The USA’s great military strength, the increase in its defence budget and progress in military technology allows it to conduct wars from a distance and reduces its dependency on third states (for example, for military bases). US unilateralism is provoking criticism worldwide and resulting in terrorist attacks against US establishments, to which Washington responds with pre-emptive strikes. This conduct puts the Europeans to a real test and impairs the ability of the EU to take action. Although the Europeans criticize the USA, the Union is too weak to form an effective counterweight.

The 60,000-man EU rapid-reaction force can only be deployed to perform humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping tasks. The EU thus remains dependent on NATO, which, through the transformation of the US armed forces is, however, being converted into a global intervention force. The USA is the only power capable of carrying out robust military operations. In contrast, the EU has a civilian police pool and the EU, the UN and the OSCE are amalgamating their experts databases. This makes it easier to prepare and implement joint missions, whose effectiveness, however, is hampered by a lack of agreement with Washington – for example, on the question of how to proceed in the Middle East.

After a delay, the EU admits the ten current accession candidates. The second pillar of the EU remains organized on an intergovernmental basis and is dominated by the Council of Ministers. The Council makes decisions with a qualified majority on issues relating to the CFSP. Questions of a military

nature, however, must still be decided unanimously. The President of the Council, elected by EU members, is responsible for foreign policy and represents the EU before the UN, though not before NATO. While this artificial division weakens EU security policy, it does correspond with the wishes of most EU members, as they see both NATO and the maintenance of good bilateral relations with Washington as guarantees of security and stability.

Consequences

Compared to the first scenario, the potential for international action in the scenario "*Pax Americana*" is considerably limited. The dominance of the USA and its tendency to take unilateral action not only lead to transatlantic differences of opinion, thereby impairing co-operation, but US unilateralism also increases – in particular – asymmetric risks, which threaten Washington and its allies equally. The lack of agreement between the leading states paralyzes international organizations. In addition, as the Iraq war in the spring of 2003 made clear, there is the danger of such organizations being instrumentalized by the USA to implement its own goals, or by other states aiming to oppose Washington.

In this scenario, the classical OSCE domain of confidence and security building will only retain the importance it had up to now if the USA agrees to engage in at least a minimal dialogue with other states. Peaceful settlement of disputes loses its importance as an OSCE task because the US hegemon has the role of maintaining order. Preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding could, however, gain importance where these activities contribute to implementing specific interests of the hegemon and/or legitimizing its conduct through a multilateral body. One thinks, in particular, of Central Asia, where Washington could employ the OSCE to stabilize and balance the interests of regional powers. In this scenario, peacekeeping operations are organized by "coalitions of the willing", leaving no room for the OSCE.

Scenario 3: Euro-power and the Triumph of Balanced Security

In this scenario, the EU becomes a leading international political, economic and military power, which supports multilateralism and rule orientation. Other important state actors are the USA, Russia and China. Apart from occasional tensions, for example on economic issues, relations between these actors are characterized by co-operation. Transatlantic differences that prevail at the start of the period under consideration are settled during its second half following substantial and visible successes for the ESDP (military operations in the Balkans and in Africa).

The EU engages in active co-operation with the UN and the OSCE, for example, by running a joint mission to Central Asia. The UN concentrates on

conflict prevention and development assistance while the OSCE commitment to the democratization process contributes decisively to the region's political development. NATO declines in importance from the position it currently enjoys. This is because, for one, the initial differences between the transatlantic partners have a negative effect on NATO's ability to act. In addition, the Alliance's enlargement makes decision making more difficult. At the same time, successful EU prevention work in co-operation with the UN, the OSCE and non-governmental actors makes a major contribution to stopping conflicts from escalating into violent hostilities and finding peaceful resolutions.

Institutionally, the EU is developing into a supranational community with its own Constitution. The complicated three-pillar construction has been abolished. The EU has a Commissioner for Foreign and Security Affairs, who represents the Union and heads the newly established Council for Foreign and Security Affairs, responsible for the CFSP and the ESDP. The European Parliament elects an EU President with a largely symbolic role and the Commission President has become the "European Head of Government". The Commission is the central institution, and in all bodies, decisions are made through a simple or qualified majority.

In addition to today's accession candidates, the Union has expanded geographically to include Norway and Iceland, all the states of the Balkans and Turkey. Moreover, the EU, Russia and Ukraine have formed a "Trilateral Security Council" and the EU has Common Strategies for the Middle East and North Africa. To do justice to its increased global responsibility, the EU defines itself as a force for peace with a balanced range of civilian and military capabilities at its disposal. In the area of civilian security policy, the focus is on comprehensive prevention and on the deployment of economic instruments for sanctions and reconstruction. The 300,000-strong intervention force is under the control of the EU Council for Foreign and Security Affairs, is fully integrated and assists civilian authorities within the EU upon request – as well as performing Petersberg tasks and defence operations. The EU headquarters is responsible for planning and conducting civilian and military operations. The Union's capabilities are completed by a procurement agency and, thanks to the participation of Great Britain and France, access to nuclear weapons.

Consequences

In this scenario, the EU guarantees security. Co-operative relations between Brussels and Moscow and the fact of Turkey's EU membership are of decisive importance in addressing the smouldering conflicts in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. As expected, the EU is committed to a rule-oriented international politics – one that strengthens multilateral bodies.

Moreover, it has all the necessary political, economic, civilian and military means to be active and successful throughout the entire conflict cycle.

The consequences for the OSCE can be evaluated in various ways. The pessimistic point of view has it that the EU is like a sponge “sucking the OSCE dry” of the tasks it has performed up to now. From this perspective, the relationship between the OSCE and the EU represents a zero-sum game that Brussels wins and Vienna loses.⁹ In contrast, we hold a considerably more optimistic view, which is based on, among other things, Javier Solana’s speech cited at the beginning of this contribution. It is our opinion that the EU will not act like a “Machiavellian wolf in sheep’s clothing”, but that through co-operation with the OSCE, it will make use of the OSCE’s core competencies to achieve specific prevention and stabilization goals.¹⁰ This is true, above all, for regions such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, which have become strategically more important for Brussels since the beginning of Eastward enlargement.¹¹ In dealing with these regions, the significance of OSCE activities in the areas of confidence and security building, preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding is increasing. This is particularly true of the activities of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT), which supplement and complete the civilian aspects of ESDP. In view of the EU’s preference for rule orientation, the peaceful settlement of disputes will lose importance as a “reserve instrument”. As peacekeeping operations will presumably be conducted by the EU, the OSCE will not be active in this area either.

Scenario 4: Resurgent National Sovereignty and Europe at a Standstill

A long-lasting global economic crisis, the near-catastrophic failure of an EU military operation in the Balkans (and the loss of credibility associated with this) and fundamental tensions within the EU bring the integration process to a standstill. These developments lead to a general weakening of the international order. Support for international organizations dwindles to mere lip service as both the will and the means for common international action are lacking. The isolationist behaviour of the United States is particularly problematic. Terrorist attacks lead to increased feelings of vulnerability and re-

9 For example, Kurt P. Tudyka, *Auswirkungen der ESVP auf die OSZE: Stärkung oder Schwächung* [The Effects of the ESDP on the OSCE: Do They Strengthen or Weaken It?], in: Hans-Georg Ehrhart (ed.), *Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Positionen, Perzeptionen, Probleme, Perspektiven* [The European Security and Defence Policy. Positions, Perceptions, Problems, Prospects], Baden-Baden 2002, pp. 295-303.

10 A similar position is taken by: Jolyon Howorth, *European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge*, Paris 2000; Hans-Georg Ehrhart, *What model for CFSP?*, Paris 2002.

11 In dealing with these regions, the EU’s planning remains deficient. See also: S. Neil MacFarlane, *Caucasus and Central Asia: Towards a Non-Strategy*, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Occasional Paper No. 38, August 2002.

duce the USA's willingness to take risks or fulfil a leadership role. Emerging problems in Southeast Asia and the economic crisis in South America draw Washington's attention to these regions. Other states attempt to use this situation to strengthen their regional position.

The EU is weak. The European Council annuls the Growth and Stability Pact and allows an increase in the level of new debt to combat the economic crisis and to improve the military capabilities of the European armed forces. In addition, the Council decides to postpone the Union's Eastward enlargement, provoking protest in the candidate countries, increasing their distance from Brussels and contributing to the strengthening of right-wing nationalist movements. The postponement of the accession of the current candidates puts a stop to any further enlargement. Against this background, the failure of the EU military operation in the Balkans is only prevented by the intervention of US troops at the urging of the new NATO members. This causes lasting damage to the credibility of the EU as a crisis manager. In the second decade of the 21st century, the EU countries have just as much trouble agreeing on a US proposal for the stabilization of Latin America through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Consequently, the USA deems it necessary to proceed unilaterally.

As a result of this, the EU's leading states take control of the Union's foreign and security policy. France, the UK, Germany and Italy form the new G4 Directorate. They set out to reduce the power of the Commission and the European Parliament while strengthening the Council of Ministers and to replace majority decisions with unanimity. Under these circumstances, the CFSP reverts back to the earliest days of European Political Co-operation (EPC) with member states using the Council of Ministers as an informal and non-binding setting for exchanging information and co-ordinating policy. Security- and defence-policy issues are discussed in the G6, which includes Spain and Poland. Military tasks thus no longer belong to the EU's sphere of competence, but are to be implemented through the G6 and/or *ad hoc* alliances.

Consequences

"Resurgent national sovereignty" increases insecurity in international relations as the lack of international order restores a situation that resembles the classic prisoner's dilemma. Although the risk spectrum will probably not change substantially compared to today, the effects will be felt far more strongly. This is primarily due to the long-lasting global economic crisis, which doubly limits the potential for political action: On the one hand, politics has fewer resources at its disposal, on the other, decreasing resources must initially be deployed in those political fields that contribute to mitigating the effects of the global economic crisis (such as unemployment) at the national level. The foreign and security policy of states thus becomes funda-

mentally more reactive, which increases the potential for smouldering conflicts to endanger stability.

The OSCE, like all other international organizations, loses significance in this scenario. The importance of rule-oriented international politics decreases, as does the peaceful settlement of disputes. This is also true of preventive diplomacy, which is rendered irrelevant due to the lack of international agreement. Placing foreign and security policy in the hands of the G6 will lead to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations being carried out – at best – by *ad hoc* alliances; it will almost certainly leave no role for the OSCE. Thus, in this scenario, the only area in which OSCE will be able to gain importance is in confidence and security building, namely by reassuming the role it had during the Cold War as a platform for dialogue.

Scenario 5: The Unstable Periphery and “Fortress Europe”

The instability on the European periphery is a consequence of underdevelopment, demographic pressure, economic mismanagement and ethnic or religious tensions, including the effects of fundamentalism. These forces lead to the outbreak of various conflicts in North Africa, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Lacking political support and resources, international organizations remain ineffective. The loss of confidence in the UN resulting from cases of corruption and gross mismanagement turns into a distrust of international institutions in general. The OSCE participating States put conflict-prevention measures on ice and freeze their funding.

Washington is not concerned with the conflicts on Europe’s periphery, but concentrates on the Asia-Pacific area. Major disagreements between non-EU states and EU/NATO members lead to the reciprocal use of blocking tactics. This destroys the very core of the transatlantic partnership. NATO is only of use to the USA inasmuch as it contributes to defending Washington’s interests in the Pacific. Russia is in a difficult position as it must simultaneously address serious domestic and economic problems as well as the political hot spots near its borders (Ukraine, Moldova, South Caucasus, Central Asia). However, Moscow is able to capitalize politically on its energy reserves. Russia and the USA give each other mutual assurances that they will not intervene in the other’s sphere of interest.

In Europe, pressure arising from migration, especially from the Mediterranean region, is increasing. Governments have not found adequate ways to overcome this problem. Ethnic and religious minorities form well-organized interest groups, but are badly integrated into society. Within the EU, the danger of social instability as a consequence of riots and terrorist attacks are thus growing. Because the EU states are not in a position to combat the root causes they limit themselves to intensifying border and immigration controls. “Fortress Europe” becomes a reality.

In this environment, EU integration is limited. After the accession of the current candidate countries, the enlargement process comes to a standstill. The second pillar is still organized intergovernmentally and the Council of Ministers dominates. Decisions on ESDP are reached unanimously. In contrast, a qualified majority is sufficient for CFSP issues. However, the strengthened ability to act, which should result from this in theory, is undermined by the fact that EU does not present a single face to the world. This suboptimal solution reveals the desire of EU members to shape their own individual foreign policies.

The fear of ordinary citizens, the growing strength of the political right and terrorist attacks in Europe turn European integration towards the creation of a “security state” that threatens fundamental civil liberties. The EU’s economic instruments and non-military crisis mechanism remain ineffective due to the lack of preventive action to stabilize the periphery. In contrast, through the establishment of a European police headquarters and police academy, the powers of the police are strengthened at the European level. By the same token, Europe enhances its military capabilities. The EU has its own defence budget and has a 200,000-man intervention troop at its disposal, which is not only being deployed for the Petersberg tasks, but also to combat terrorism and guarantee domestic security.

Consequences

The “unstable periphery” is the most risky scenario. The causes are in this case of mixed inter- and intra-state origin (proliferation, migration, terrorism, for example), giving the risk spectrum both symmetrical and asymmetrical features. Combating risk is complicated by the fact that transatlantic co-operation has come to a standstill and confidence in international organizations has dwindled away. Only the EU can profit from the consequences of this scenario, inasmuch as the conflicts spilling over into Europe cause “integration through fear” and strengthen the range of security tasks – primarily defined as police and military matters – carried out by the Union.

For the OSCE, the consequences are without exception negative. While the Organization will continue to exist, the new stress laid on military and police security means it is hardly ever utilized. In this scenario, in particular, preventive measures could be effective in addressing the causes of conflict. However, there is no consensus for this. This is also the case for the other areas of the OSCE’s work. The only exception is confidence and security building, where the OSCE remains useful as a mediator. The high level of escalation, however, limits the effect of diplomatic measures considerably so that – in contrast to the “resurgent national sovereignty” scenario – the OSCE does not have any increased importance in this area.

Outlook

These five scenarios (see also Table pp. 416-417) illustrate the spectrum of possible futures for the OSCE. This ranges from insignificance or the withdrawal to niche functions in the scenarios “unstable periphery” and “resurgent national sovereignty”, the danger of instrumentalization in “*Pax Americana*” through systematic co-operation with the EU in the case of “Euro-power”, to transformation into the Northern Hemisphere Alliance, which successfully assumes the role of the regional arrangement foreseen in the Charter of the United Nations, in the “trilateral co-operation” scenario.

The events surrounding the Iraq war may lead one to dismiss the two scenarios that are most favourable to the OSCE, “trilateral co-operation” and “Euro-power”, as over-ambitious – even hopelessly so. To this negative assessment we reply that the key to realizing these two versions of the future is held by the actors: International politics is not structurally predetermined, but can be actively shaped and changed.¹² The USA and Europe have a special responsibility for this. The scenarios make clear that the way the USA pursues its foreign policy determines the character of international relations in a fundamental manner. The Europeans, for their part, can influence Washington if they can reach agreement on their aims and the means they should use to achieve them. Expanding and consolidating European foreign, security and defence policy is the best way to avoid the scenarios associated with negative consequences. At the same time, strengthening the EU’s civilian and military capabilities creates the basis for achieving both positive scenarios. It is crucial for relations between the OSCE and the EU that this is done in a way that builds on the OSCE’s strengths.

Both organizations are committed to the ideal of co-operative and multilateral foreign and security policy. In expanding the ESDP, therefore, it does not seem very sensible to strengthen its civilian components at the expense of the OSCE by, for example, encouraging the EU to expand into the areas of media freedom, the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities or the return of refugees.¹³ It makes far more sense to design and implement cross-organizational conflict-prevention and post-conflict-rehabilitation processes that combine the EU’s efforts to establish a “union of freedom, security and justice”¹⁴ with the OSCE’s endeavours to strengthen democracy “at the roots”. To this end, *first*, the OSCE’s various instruments should, for maximum effectiveness, be systematically integrated into the EU’s country-specific programmes. In this connection, the OSCE Annual Security Review Conferences adopted in Porto could be used for joint planning and evaluation

12 Cf. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics, in: *International Organization* 1/1992, pp. 391-425.

13 Reinhardt Rummel argues for this in: *Wie zivil ist die ESDP?* [How Civilian is ESDP?], SWP-Aktuell, March 2003, p. 4, at: www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=115.

14 Decisions of the Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999.

of missions and other field activities.¹⁵ *Second*, the amalgamation of civilian-experts databases and the establishment of civilian resource pools, as suggested in the scenarios, should be carried out. *Third*, the EU must be prepared to deal with those regions that are brought closer to it by in the course of enlargement. For this reason, we recommend the development of Common Strategies for the Caucasus and Central Asia. With its unique international expertise in both these regions, the OSCE – and, in particular, its presence in the field – should be an integral part of these strategies.

15 Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Tenth Ministerial Council, Porto, 6 and 7 December 2002, reprinted in this volume, pp. 421-455; here: Decision No. 3, Annual Security Review Conference, pp. 445-447.

The Five Scenarios and Their Consequences for the OSCE

	Trilateral Co-operation	Pax Americana
Driving Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USA supports multilateralism • Russia is internationally active, Western-oriented and co-operative • Successful EU reforms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USA pursues "velvet-glove unilateralism" through bilateral relations and <i>ad hoc</i> alliances • Transatlantic differences
Key Features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong multilateralism • USA, EU and Russia co-operate in the Northern Hemisphere Alliance (NHA) • UN plays central role, effective co-operation with NGOs • EU enlargement by current candidates plus Bulgaria, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, remaining Balkan states; economic agreements with other Mediterranean states • EU has 200,000-man force for Petersberg tasks, defence and aid missions. Civilian aspects of ESDP include creation of resource pool for reconstruction, police, judiciary and public sector reform 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USA dominates international relations, unilateralism increases risks • NATO becomes a globally active, flexibly deployable intervention force • EU enlargement delayed, limited to current candidates • Artificial division between CFSP and ESDP: EU develops non-military crisis management capabilities, but these remain ineffective. Military engagement lags behind expectations, actions restricted to the lower level Petersberg tasks
Consequences for the OSCE		
<i>Confidence/ Security Building</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Same significance as today, but carried out by the NHA rather than the OSCE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Same significance as today
<i>Peaceful Settlement of Disputes</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less significant than today (US hegemon is the guarantor of order)
<i>Preventive Diplomacy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More important than today, but carried out by NHA rather than the OSCE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More important than today, but danger of instrumentalization
<i>Peacekeeping Operations</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not an OSCE task (conducted by "coalitions of the willing")
<i>Peacebuilding</i>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More important than today, but danger of instrumentalization

Euro-power	Resurgent National Sovereignty	Unstable Periphery
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO less capable of taking action • ESDP successes strengthen European self-confidence • EU Constitutional Convention leads to institutional breakthrough 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global economic crisis • US troops relocated from Europe to the Pacific • ESDP failure in the Balkans • Tensions within the EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global economic crisis • Transatlantic relation fundamentally damaged • “Integration through fear”
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transatlantic differences settled by substantial progress of ESDP • Good Russian-EU relations • Successful ESDP operations • Accession of the current candidates to the EU plus Bulgaria, Croatia, Norway, Iceland, the remaining Balkan states and Turkey • EU strengthens conflict-prevention capabilities. European army (300,000 strong) controlled by EU Foreign and Security Council and used for Petersberg tasks, aid missions and defence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US feeling of vulnerability leads to selective international engagement • Chinese-American differences on supremacy in the Pacific • Economic problems and drug-related crime threaten the stability of the Americas • EU enlargement delayed and restricted to current candidates • CFSP reverts back to the beginnings of EPC • Security and defence are no longer EU tasks but are carried out by the G6 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of confidence in international organizations • Serious economic and political problems in Russia • EU states cannot overcome the problems of migration flows and trafficking in human beings. • EU enlargement limited to the current candidates • Civilian component of ESDP is for the most part ineffective. Military component (200,000-strong force for Petersberg tasks, defence, combating terrorism and EU-internal aid missions) and police are strengthened
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More significant than today, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More significant than today, especially in areas of former CSCE activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Same significance as today
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Same significance as today 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less important than today 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International measures ineffective so that these tasks completely lose importance and/or are not implemented internationally at all
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More significant than today, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less important than today 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not an OSCE task (carried out by the EU) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not an OSCE task (if solved internationally, then <i>ad hoc</i>) 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More significant than today, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not an OSCE task (if solved internationally, then <i>ad hoc</i>) 	