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The OSCE and Security-Sector Reform

Since the mid-1990s, “human security” has become an increasingly popular campaign slogan in development co-operation.¹ According to the Human Development Report 1994 published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), human security ought to guarantee economic, food, health, environmental and personal security, the security of ethnic and traditional communities and political freedoms.² Since the end of the 1990s, there has also been much talk of “security-sector reform” as a political instrument that can guarantee human security. In this context, some organizations have concentrated on security-relevant actors and institutions in the narrow sense while others have established a connection with the socio-economic causes of insecurity. This broadening of the concept of security reflects a change in security thinking – away from the traditional focus on the military defence of state interests and territory towards questions of the social foundations of security, threats posed by non-state actors and the interests of those affected by insecurity.

The OSCE and some of its individual missions have taken an enormous number of specific measures that, in the broadest sense, can be classified as matters of security-sector reform. Whether this re-orientation will offer the OSCE a new *raison d'être* depends on whether the causes of “human insecurity” are understood, addressees and priorities determined clearly and sustainable capacities built up.³ The present contribution examines whether the OSCE – alongside its traditional functions as the guardian of democracy, human and minority rights and freedom of the media and as a forum for confidence building – makes an effective contribution to security-sector reform. I will argue that, in this area, the OSCE, lacking an explicit mandate, has taken ambitious but insufficiently co-ordinated measures, which are only partially guided by needs-assessment analysis and often driven instead by institutional ambitions. Moreover, there have up to now been no mechanisms for evaluating their effectiveness.

1 I would like to thank Lena Andersson, Shay Duffy, Jörn Grävingholt, Christian Haupt, Kate Joseph, Hans Odenthal and Heinz Vetschera for providing information on individual aspects of OSCE work in the area of security-sector reform. I assume full responsibility for all opinions expressed in this article.

2 Cf. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994, pp. 24-25, at: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/pdf/hdr_1994_ch2.pdf.

3 Cf. Roland Paris, Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, in: International Security 3/2001, pp. 87-102.

The Concept of Security-Sector Reform

The debate around security-sector reform is based on ideal conceptions of legitimate, fair, effective, efficient, sustainable, transparent, democratically controlled and human-rights-oriented security-sector institutions. The intention is to make these a reality by offering consulting services, supporting capacity building and, occasionally, via direct implementation. Security-sector reform tends to include any and all efforts to promote the physical, social, material and environmental security and integrity of human beings in instable and/or developing societies by providing governmental and non-governmental security agencies with a legal basis, professionalizing and democratizing them and changing the prevailing “culture of security” within a society. The concept of security-sector reform is based on the assumption that the domestic security of a society, that is, the capability of the state to create internal order, is a central prerequisite for democratization and sustainable economic development and that an inadequately regulated security sector reinforces the deeper causes of conflict. Typical manifestations of insecurity within a society include organized crime and illegal paramilitary organizations, trafficking in drugs and weapons, the unregulated possession of firearms, terrorism and violent extremism and the abuse of power by state security apparatuses. Indeed, for those affected, state institutions, including the military and the police, are often one of the main sources of insecurity. Concrete plans for security-sector reform apply primarily to the military, police, intelligence services, judiciary, criminal-prosecution and parliaments or other public bodies with a supervisory function.⁴ In the course of co-operation on development issues between international organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, the United Nations, the EU and the OSCE and national development agencies – in particular those of the UK and Germany – the claim is often implicitly made that security-sector reform is intended to and is capable of making a contribution to conflict prevention and conflict management and especially to state building.

Possible measures range from (a) strengthening civilian and democratic participation and control (“the primacy of the civil”) through (b) redeploying military (material, economic and human) resources for civilian ends (“conversion”, “demilitarization” and control of military spending) to (c) reforming military and police institutions to perform specific tasks (“professionalization”, “capacity building”), (d) developing an independent judiciary and a humane penal system (“rule of law”) and (e) undertaking security analyses and creating policy models. In fact, external contributions to security-sector reform have been made where international agreements adopted following the cessation of armed conflict have provided a corresponding mandate (Bos-

4 Cf. Dylan Hendrickson, A Review of the Security-sector reform, The Conflict, Security and Development Group of the Department for International Development (DfID), Working Paper, Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London, London 1999, p. 29.

nia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia), where a ceasefire has put an end to collectively organized and/or large-scale armed conflict (for example, in Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Northern Ireland) or where support has been provided to local initiatives and donor countries have devoted themselves exclusively to administrative reforms.⁵ In “failed states”, in the conflict-escalation phase and during actual combat, international organizations and/or national agencies have, by contrast, made no contributions to security-sector reform worth mentioning.

Publications on security-sector reform read like a compilation of normative concepts on the tasks of the three branches of government in providing internal security.⁶ However, debates on security-sector reform are lacking an adequate understanding of the types of conflict, country-specific conditions and exigencies and the conflict phases in which external reform impulses could become effective. The concept furthermore fails to take into account the external security environment and the relationship of external assistance to local responsibility. In a critical review of the situation undertaken in 1999, the British Department for International Development (DFID) came to the conclusion that the impulse for reform in the security sector must come from the recipient countries themselves and that assistance should only be granted if a legitimate government is in control of the security forces.⁷ The diversity of international organizations and/or national agencies active in the area of security-sector reform often leads to competition, mistrust and the withholding of information. This is especially true of relations between civilian organizations and military actors such as NATO and individual NATO states in areas relating to military matters. The discrepancy between wide-ranging aspirations and actual capabilities leads most often to demands for better co-ordination, coherence and priority setting, the adequate provision of resources and the clear allocation of competencies and responsibilities.⁸

The experiences of international aid organizations have been used on several occasions to develop minimum criteria for security-sector reform. The key aspects of reform have in this way been identified as, *first*, to analyse the priority needs of the recipient countries, *second*, to identify local capacities and influential actors, *third*, to define the necessary skills, goals, scope and duration of international engagements and, *fourth*, to agree on the division of tasks with other organizations. International projects need to be based

5 Cf. Saferworld/International Alert/Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security-sector reform. Broadening the Debate, Occasional SSR Paper No. 1, The Hague 2002.

6 Cf. Hans-Georg Ehrhart/Albrecht Schnabel/Monica Blagescu, Towards More Effective Assistance in Security-sector reform, Policy Brief, Hamburger Informationen zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik 34/2002, Hamburg 2002.

7 Cf. Hendrickson, cited above (Note 4), p. 9.

8 Cf. Hans-Joachim Gießmann, Reform des Sicherheitssektors [Security-sector reform], Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung [Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development] (unpublished manuscript), at: http://www.bmz.de/infotek/fachinformationen/spezial/spezial056/spezial056_13a.html.

on clearly defined criteria for success that can serve to ensure accountability. Criteria that could be applied include a reduction in serious crime, an improvement in the human-rights situation, a decrease in corruption among the judiciary and police and the creation and/or maintenance of local capacities.⁹ If needs, capacity and success assessments are not carried out, security-sector reform projects will serve only the institutional interests of donor organizations, will waste resources, and – in the worst case – will create the appearance of reform where no actual reform has taken place.

A Mandate for the OSCE?

Searching the OSCE Website for “security-sector reform” did not yield a single hit. While the Organization’s missions have very precise mandates in the areas of democratization, human rights and conflict prevention (with corresponding leadership and monitoring functions being performed by the OSCE’S Vienna-based bodies), this is only partly true in the area of security-sector reform. An OSCE mandate for security reform can be indirectly derived from the Organization’s “human dimension”, in particular from the commitment of the participating States to guarantee legislative transparency, the independence of the judiciary and fair legal proceedings¹⁰ and from the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which was adopted at the 1994 OSCE Summit Meeting in Budapest and calls for effective and constitutional control over the military, paramilitaries and other security forces.¹¹ The Forum for Security Co-operation and the Conflict Prevention Centre are responsible for compliance with the Code of Conduct.¹² Since 1999, a series of additional documents that legitimate OSCE measures have been adopted. The Charter for European Security, adopted in November 1999 at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, contains the “Platform for Co-operative Security”, assigning the OSCE a co-ordinating role for regional initiatives.¹³ In addition, in November 2000, the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation

9 Cf. Saferworld/International Alert/Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, cited above (Note 5).

10 Cf. among others, The 1998 OSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues, Warsaw, 26 October-November 1998, report prepared by the staff of the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, at: <http://www.csce.gov/pdf/FEb1999Warsaw.pdf>.

11 CSCE, Budapest Document 1994, Budapest, 6 December 1994, in: Arie Bloed (ed.), The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995, The Hague/London/Boston 1997, pp. 145-189, Chapter IV: Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, pp. 161-167.

12 Cf. e.g. OSCE Features: The role of security forces in democratic societies, at: http://www.osce.org/features/show_feature.php?id=92#featbm1.

13 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 1999, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2000, Baden-Baden 2001, pp. 425-443, Operational Document – the Platform for Co-operative Security, pp. 441-443.

adopted the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons.¹⁴ The OSCE Charter on Combating and Preventing Terrorism was adopted in December 2002.¹⁵ The Bishkek Programme of Action, adopted in December 2001, foresees close co-operation among the Central Asian states in combating terrorism.¹⁶ Finally, mention must also be made of the Comprehensive Programme for Training, Exchange and Co-operation to Address Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe¹⁷, which is being pursued in conjunction with the EU Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.

Concrete OSCE Activities

The OSCE's work on security-sector reform is performed, above all, by the Rule of Law Unit within the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). In 2003, ODIHR pursued a programme to curb trafficking in human beings in the OSCE area, which focused on strengthening the field missions. Further ODIHR activities include support for the reform of penal systems in Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro and the establishment of independent ombudsman institutions for human rights in these countries. Support is also being provided for police reform in Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. Prison reforms, ombudspersons and co-operation between the police and non-governmental organizations are also being promoted in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus. The training of prison personnel and the employees of law-enforcement agencies is being supported in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Since December 2002, the OSCE has also assumed responsibility for the start-up financing of the office of the ombudsman for human rights in Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan, although an ombudsman institution has been established, it remains without power. In the case of Kazakhstan, a corresponding draft law has been blocked.

Seminars on environmental security conducted by the OSCE in Central Asia can also be counted as security-sector reform in the broadest sense. At

14 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Forum for Security Co-operation, OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2001, Baden-Baden 2002, pp. 503-519.

15 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Tenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Porto, 6 and 7 December 2002, printed in this volume, pp. 421-455, therein: OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, pp. 425-428.

16 UNODCCP/OSCE, Summary Report, Bishkek International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia. Strengthening Comprehensive Efforts to Counter Terrorism, Bishkek, 13-14 December 2001, at: <http://www.osce.org/events/bishkek2001/documents/Bishkekreport.pdf>

17 Comprehensive Programme for Training, Exchange and Co-operation to Address Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe, in: Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Task Force on Trafficking on Human Beings, Multiyear Anti-trafficking Action Plan for South Eastern Europe, 16 March 2001, pp. 49-54, at: <http://www.stabilitypact.org/trafficking/atap-2001.doc>.

the end of 2002 and in the spring of 2003, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine organized training seminars with a human-rights focus for judges, public prosecutors and criminal investigation department (CID) officers as well as a conference on the "Conversion of Former Military Sites in Ukraine". In addition, the OSCE has launched an awareness-raising and monitoring programme against torture for all OSCE participating States and a training programme for lawyers and parliamentarians in Chechnya. Finally, the Forum for Security Co-operation – alongside its traditional involvement in confidence-building measures and military aspects of security – is increasingly concerned with small-arms proliferation and (mostly by holding seminars) the democratic control of the armed forces.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (since July 1999) is the Organization's largest field mission with 450 international members (and 1,100 local staff). As an integral part of the UNMIK administration, it is responsible for police training, judicial and civil administration, the organization of elections, the protection of human rights and the promotion of freedom of the media. The Kosovo Police Service School, which is run by the OSCE, must, in particular, be adjudged a success – not least in comparison to the KFOR-controlled Kosovo Protection Corps. The activities of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the security sector are related to the implementation of Articles II and IV of Annex I-B of the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), the Vienna Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (1996) and the Florence Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (1996). Following completion of most of these initial tasks, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina's Department for Security Co-operation has concentrated on the planning and financial oversight of the defence budget, regulations for weapons exports, support for demining projects and developing institutional capacities in formulating a pan-Bosnian security policy. Problems in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina include the lack of political leadership from Vienna, the duplication (until 2002) of security-policy capacities with the High Representative for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords and frequently inadequate co-ordination between the Department of Security Co-operation of the OSCE Mission and the SFOR Mission.

Beyond the OSCE's broad-scope Missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, several of the Organization's offices in CIS countries have started to function as conference organizers and "agents" for legal advisors, both of which may be considered aspects of "human security". In 2002, the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre organized expert meetings in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia on the implementation of OSCE principles in the armed forces, the police and the intelligence services. The OSCE Centre in Bishkek, for its part, arranged seminars on "human security" for students in Central Asia. In 2001, OSCE experts also advised Central Asian governments and militaries on democratic control of the armed forces.

Following 11 September 2001, combating terrorism became a priority for the OSCE in Central Asia in particular. In December 2001, the OSCE and the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP)¹⁸ organized a joint conference on this topic in Bishkek. In early June 2003, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the UNDP also organized a meeting of parliamentarians in Almaty on the topic of “The Trans-Asian Dimension of the OSCE: A Vital Security Link”, which was devoted to the topics of combating terrorism, environmental security and establishing democratic institutions. Since early 2003, the OSCE has been involved in training experts at the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Emergencies in Tajikistan in the removal of the approximately 16,000 mines laid during the civil war.

The OSCE’s concentration on police and law enforcement in the Central Asian states and the countries of the Caucasus is highly justified: The area has been largely untouched by reform, and political instrumentalization, abuse of authority, corruption and involvement with organized crime are widespread.¹⁹ The OSCE’s influence on security-sector reform in Central Asia can, however, only be assessed as moderate. This is largely because the OSCE’s aim of promoting democracy and the rule of law in the security sector contradicts the emphasis that Central Asian regimes have placed on policies to promote stability. Institutional reforms initiated by the OSCE in Central Asia have proved unsuccessful when they have involved exposing the methods of authoritarian rule.²⁰ For their part, the governments of Central Asia are primarily interested in the OSCE’s operational support in strengthening border controls and combating terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking.²¹ However, where technical assistance of this kind is not linked to a reform agenda, it can contribute to the reinforcement of undemocratic standards of behaviour. The OSCE is faced with the problem that governments in Central Asia may use the “war against terrorism” as a pretext to curtail human rights and fundamental freedoms. Observers of UNDP projects have also expressed their fear that the reform agenda could be subordinated to the “war against terrorism”.²²

18 Since 1 October 2002, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC.

19 Cf. International Crisis Group, Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, Asia Report No. 42, Osh/Brussels, 10 December 2002.

20 Cf. Marie-Carin von Gumpfenberg, Die Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Stabilisierendes Moment in Zentralasien? [The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. A Stabilizing Factor in Central Asia?], SWP-Studie S 33, Berlin, October 2002, p. 11.

21 Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

22 Cf. Dylan Hendrickson/Andrzej Karkoszka, The Challenges of Security-sector reform, SIPRI Yearbook 2002, Oxford et al. 2002, Chapter 4.

Other International Organizations

The UNDP has the highest profile of all international organizations active in the security sector. In national action plans signed with governments, non-governmental organizations and increasingly also with private enterprises, the UNDP has supported demining, demobilization and reintegration programmes and police reform – the latter in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mozambique and Somalia, in particular. However, according to one observer, the UNDP's debates on strengthening state capacities have failed to systematically assess success and failure.²³ Since the autumn of 2002, however, criteria catalogues have been developed within the UNDP to which project funding will in future be aligned.²⁴ In the programmes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, budgetary discipline has always played a fundamental role and there is therefore considerable interest in the reduction of military expenditures. As well as projects in Africa, the World Bank finances demobilization programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Romania. Recently, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD has also been addressing the control of the military sector by parliaments, the judiciary and civil society as a matter for development co-operation. Finally, the EU Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe declared security-sector reform as one of its tasks in the autumn of 2001. Concrete results brought forth by this have, up to now, primarily consisted of a regional plan to limit small-arms proliferation and an initiative to fight organized crime. In areas relevant to security, the OSCE co-operates, above all, with the UNODC, the Council of Europe, NATO (mainly in the Balkans) and – in the area of small arms proliferation and combating terrorism – increasingly also with partners outside the OSCE, among them the OSCE's Mediterranean partners for co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia), the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Conclusions

The expectations that flourished at the start of the 1990s that the OSCE could become the dominant pan-European co-operative security organization collided with diverging national interests, the importance attributed to military resources, NATO's new lease of life and the OSCE's own internal power asymmetries. However, the OSCE still has a number of fundamental "comparative advantages". It is the only international organization with an unbroad-

23 Cf. Hendrickson, cited above (Note 4), p. 36.

24 Cf. UNDP, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), Justice and Security-sector reform. BCPR's Programmatic Approach, November 2002; Nicole Ball, Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP, 9 October 2002.

ken history of dealing with security-sector reform in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. In contrast to NATO, the OSCE does not concentrate on modernizing military capacities in formerly socialist countries, but on the domestic preconditions necessary for human security. Furthermore, the commitments undertaken by recipient countries have more force if they – unlike the activities of non-governmental organizations – are adopted by high-ranking government representatives within the OSCE. The activities of the OSCE are not limited to intergovernmental co-operation; it also engages with non-governmental organizations. Where a UN mandated territory has been established following the end of armed conflict, the OSCE – alongside other organizations – has enjoyed quasi-governmental authority. Of course, conditions are particularly favourable for this in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Finally, the OSCE has a good reputation and a motivated, young and multinational staff that does not suffer from ministerial bureaucracies or military hierarchies and can take action comparatively independently of party- or power-political influences.

However, potential advantages are jeopardized by the OSCE's internal institutional mechanisms. In many respects, the OSCE imitates EU incrementalism. In failing to clearly delineate which fields it is active in, the OSCE may lose its comparative advantage. By expanding its activities, the OSCE runs the risk of duplicating the work of other international organizations. The OSCE is in danger of drowning in a sea of hastily initiated projects based on no easily discernible long-term strategy. The credibility of OSCE missions, particularly in the CIS area, suffers from the high turnover of field-office staff, wasteful "info tourism", gaps in long-term project financing together with floods of unconnected subprojects and short-term contracts that systematically devalue accumulated knowledge. Apparently OSCE field missions feel under chronic pressure to take action before they have had a chance to gain an adequate understanding of the problems they face or to clarify which long-term commitments the OSCE is prepared to fulfil.

Projects are too often generated internally, "from above" and then "sold" to the recipient country without needs assessment by independent experts or the recipient government. In 2002, the Portuguese Chair of the OSCE therefore explicitly undertook the task of overcoming paternalism towards recipients, specifically in Central Asia.²⁵ Analytical and operations-driven needs-assessment studies are rarely performed before measures are decided on – although note should be taken of the exemplary preliminary study carried out on police reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.²⁶ Although a considerable proportion of OSCE projects in the CIS countries are financed

25 Cf. OSCE, The Secretary General, OSCE Partnerships for Security and Co-operation. Annual Report on Interaction between Organizations and Institutions in the OSCE Area, Vienna 2003, p. 60.

26 Richard Monk, Study on Policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, OSCE Mission to the FRY, Belgrade 2001.

by the EU, there is no way of the public to observe how tenders for project proposals are granted nor are there transparent criteria for project approval.

Within the OSCE, there is a lack of co-ordination between departments that deal with security-sector reform. The Strategic Police Matters Unit works for the most part alone. According to insiders, co-ordination between it and the Forum for Security Co-operation is almost nonexistent. ODIHR, which offers security-relevant advice from a human-rights angle to groups such as border troops, comes closest to remaining focused on operations-oriented project assistance. Nevertheless, it is still in danger of spreading itself too thin. The OSCE treats its databases on national practices in implementing OSCE principles as if it were top secret. The Organization thus fails to adequately fulfil its own requirements for transparency and accountability. Moreover, the mandates of some missions and field offices are so general that virtually anything held up as a good deed can be justified. This deficit in coherency is, of course, not unique to the OSCE – German development co-operation has, for example, been given a similar assessment.²⁷

Because of the woolliness of the OSCE's mandate on security-sector reform, the difficulty in influencing governments that are not interested in reform and a shortage of expertise and financial incentives, the role of the OSCE will in most cases remain restricted to the dissemination of normative concepts, the provision of expert knowledge, the exchange of information among participating States, long-term monitoring and the provision of support and co-ordination assistance for national initiatives. The biggest influence the OSCE is likely to have on domestic security policies is its contribution to building trust in a country and increasing its attractiveness for inward investment.

Eliminating these deficits in the Organization's functioning will most likely entail fulfilling several conditions. These include the need for the Chairman-in-Office and his Personal Representatives to set clear priorities (combined with longer periods in office); public transparency and accountability on the costs and benefits of OSCE projects; the introduction of a requirement for open competitive bidding for larger project proposals; specifically defined mandates rather than self-mandating by national OSCE offices; clearer differentiation between short-term and long-term projects; the co-ordination of OSCE, UNDP and OECD guidelines for funding security-related projects; a personnel policy based on attracting and maintaining quality staff;

27 Cf. Reform des Sicherheitssektors in Entwicklungsländern. Eine Dokumentation der Fachtagung des BMZ und der GTZ [Security-sector reform in Developing Countries. A Report on the Expert Meeting of the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ) and the GTZ (a German corporation active in international development)], 2 May 2001, Gustav-Stresemann-Institut, Bonn; Tobias Debiel/Volker Matthes, Krisenprävention: Was wurde erreicht? [Crisis Prevention: What Has Been Achieved?], in: AFB-Texte 2/2000; Tobias Debiel/Martina Fischer, Krisenprävention in einer gewaltträchtigen Welt. Was kann europäische und deutsche Entwicklungspolitik leisten? [Crisis Prevention in a Violent World. What Can European and German Development Policy Achieve?], in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 12/2001, pp. 14-23.

and, finally, providing the Parliamentary Assembly with supervisory powers. The first positive steps in this direction have already been taken. They include the annual “high-level Tripartite meetings” between the OSCE, the United Nations and the Council of Europe; the strengthening of operational units within the OSCE Secretariat; the formal exchange of information between the OSCE and the UNDP which has taken place since the end of 2001; the improvements in project co-ordination with the EU that have been made since 2002; and the creation of contact points for subregional organizations.