which will enable the creation of "structural stability" and will attack the root causes of conflicts by, for example, promoting economic development, democracy, respect for human rights and viable political structures.[32]

One problem for the practical relevance of the EU in these new problem areas is posed by the levels of military and civilian resources currently available for crisis-management operations. Insufficient capacity in the defence sector and defence budgets that continue to stagnate or shrink seriously limit the capability of most EU states to go beyond autonomous decision making and actually take autonomous action. One important step towards making up the deficit was the resolution of Greece and Turkey's deadlock over the question of whether, and under what conditions, the EU can make use of NATO resources. Another is the growing awareness of the problem among European governments, which makes it conceivable that – even if more funds are not made available for procurement – at least the funds that are available may be used more efficiently.[33]

By requiring the Council and the Commission to pursue a mutually coherent policy in their various areas of responsibility (CFSP; external trade and development policy, respectively), the Treaty of Amsterdam also played an important role in ensuring the ability of the EU to act effectively. It also formally (i.e. contractually) brought together the intergovernmental and supranational dimensions of this policy area within a "unified institutional framework". The instrument of "Common Strategies" allows the European Council to define fundamental positions and policies within the EU on the basis of consensus. These can then be used as the basis for adopting "Common Positions" and pursuing "Joint Actions". While Council resolutions must be passed unanimously, a qualified majority suffices to pass measures needed for their execution or implementation. Although the Luxembourg compromise (1966) does allow a member state to use a veto in matters of vital national interest, abstaining can no longer delay the adoption or implementation of a resolution ("constructive abstention"). By making decision making more flexible, these measures could certainly have a positive effect on the EU's ability to take action. Similar prospects are also raised by the extension of the instrument of "enhanced co-operation" to the CFSP, as laid down in the Treaty of Nice (December 2001). However, the Treaty does not alter the requirement that consensus is reached for measures related to military and defence policy, i.e. the ESDP. Consequently, although a step has

32 Cf. European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM (2001) 211 final, Brussels, p. 10.

33 Cf. Christian Wernicke, Krisentruppe nimmt Gestalt an [Rapid Response Force Takes Shape], in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14-15 December 2002; Katia Vlachos-Dengler, Getting there: building strategic mobility into ESDP, Paris 2002, Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Papers 38/2002; François Heisbourg, European Defence: Making it work, Paris 2000, in: Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers 42/2000.

been taken towards greater flexibility, this is unlikely to have an effect on operational effectiveness in practice.[34]

The profile and the efficiency of the CFSP were improved by the creation under the Treaty of Amsterdam of the position of Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, who is simultaneously the High Representative for the CFSP. Although his responsibilities are formally limited to assisting the Council and he is by no means an "EU foreign minister", the first holder of the post, the former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has undoubtedly made a major contribution to the effectiveness of the CFSP since taking office in 1999. The Secretary-General is one third of the newly established Troika, alongside the holder of the rotating EU Presidency, and the External Relations Commissioner of the EU and also heads the new Strategic Planning and Early Warning Unit. Overall, the institutional basis of the CFSP has been reinforced, but without establishing a single foreign and security policy for the EU. The introduction of the ESDP involved the creation of a new committee structure (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, Military Staff, Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, etc.).[35]

The EC/EU has traditionally used economic and diplomatic means to carry out or support preventive crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction – acting either directly itself or indirectly via the Commission. This is certainly true of First Pillar activities, such as sanctions and aid programmes.[36] As early as 1993, in preparation for enlargement, the EU's then twelve member states created the Pact on Stability in Europe. This brought together the provisions of many interrelated international treaties – bilateral and multilateral – concerned with good relations between neighbouring states and including issues such as minorities and borders. Once more, only the CEE and Baltic states were initially invited to take part in the negotiations, while the other CSCE countries participated as observers to be admitted to the negotiations at a later date. The result was a comprehensive package of treaties, which the OSCE was handed responsibility for monitoring in 1995.[37]

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34 Cf. Elfriede Regelsberger, Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach „Nizza" – begrenzter Reformeifer und außervertragliche Dynamik [The Common Foreign and Security Policy after "Nice" – Limited Enthusiasm for Reform and Extra-Contractual Dynamism], in: integration 2/2001, pp. 156-166, here: pp. 159-161; Antonio Missiroli, CFSP, Defence and Flexibility, Paris 2000, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers 38/2000.

35 Cf. Jolyon Howorth, European Defence and the Changing Politics of the EU: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 4/2001, pp. 765-789, here: p. 770.

36 On the contribution made by the EU to the OSCE budget and to individual OSCE activities see: Günter Burghardt, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention as Tasks of the European Union and EU-OSCE Co-operation, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1999, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 421-428, here: pp. 426-428.

37 Cf. European Union, Pact on Stability in Europe, adopted on 20 March 1995 by the 52 States of the OSCE at the Concluding Conference on the Stability Pact in Paris; Florence Benoit-Rohmer/Hilde Hardemann, The Pact on Stability in Europe: A Joint Action of the

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, initiated by the EU at the 1999 Cologne Summit, follows the same pattern. Under its provisions, more than 40 states take part in three "Working Tables" (Democratization and Human Rights; Economic Reconstruction, Co-operation and Development; Security Issues). The Pact is an instrument for co-ordination and does not itself implement projects developed under its aegis.[38] Examples of civilian crisis management operations carried out by the EU include the administration of Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina) from 1993 to 1996, and the assumption of the tasks of the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) by the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003.[39] The EU's replacement of NATO as the body responsible for ensuring stability in Macedonia could pose the first real test for the Union's military components and structures. The EU replaced NATO on 31 March 2003.[40]

In summary, the EU's institutional development has been characterized, first, by an ongoing process of growth, which will see it expand to include as many as 25 member states by 2004. Second, there has been an enlargement of responsibilities in the policy area of "security policy" and the extension of specific functions in the problem area of military and civilian crisis management. Third, the issue of whether the necessary capacities for these activities exist remains problematic. Fourth, it is remarkable that, although this area of EU policy remains an intergovernmental matter, the new instruments and related decision-making procedures fundamentally enhance the Union's decision-making and operational capabilities, and include the powerful capabilities of the Commission.

The Institutional Development of the OSCE: Consolidation, Specialization and Marginalization

With the radical transformation of the international political system, the number of states participating in the CSCE/OSCE rose in stages during the first half of the 1990s (from 35) to 55. In contrast to NATO and the EU, the OSCE has since then not faced any further increase in numbers. The only ex-

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Twelve in the Framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in: Helsinki Monitor 4/1994, pp. 38-51.

38 Cf. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe – Strategic Success or Botched-up Bungle?, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2000, Baden-Baden 2001, pp. 163-177.

39 See on Mostar: Elfriede Regelsberger/Sven Arnswald, Europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik: Papiertiger oder Ordnungsfaktor? [European Foreign and Security Policy: Paper Tiger or Source of Stability], in: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed.), Europa an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert. Reform und Zukunft der Europäischen Union [Europe on the Threshold of the 21st Century. Reform and the Future of the European Union], Bonn 1998, pp. 261-303.

40 Cf. Christian Wernicke, EU-Truppe drängt auf den Balkan [EU Force Heads to the Balkans], in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 December 2002; NATO and the EU – In "Harmony" over Macedonia, in: NATO Notes 2/2003, pp. 2-3.

ception has been Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), whose participation in the CSCE was suspended in 1992, but which was rehabilitated and restored to active participation in 2000 following the fall of Slobodan Milosevic and the re-establishment of democracy. The OSCE therefore remains the European security organization with the widest coverage in terms of both participants and geographical reach: "Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok".

Embedded in a comprehensive concept of security, the CSCE/OSCE's traditional policy areas – politics and security (fundamental principles of relations between states; military confidence- and security-building measures); economic relations; and humanitarian matters and human rights issues – remained the Organization's domain following the end of the Cold War. The same is true of the general function of negotiating and setting international norms in these areas, which has been part of the Organization's portfolio since 1975. These have been joined by implementation and monitoring tasks, and there has been more differentiation of specific problem areas and functions: The promotion of democratization processes in OSCE States and the protection of national minorities, as well as work undertaken in the fields of conflict prevention and political crisis management, require on the operational level – above all, monitoring and improving compliance with norms, for instance through observer missions or the holding of seminars.

The institutions and structures of the OSCE and the instruments it uses to perform its new specific functions were largely in place by 1995.[41] Since then, participating States have mostly been content to consolidate the institutions and their operational activities. This has generally been a matter of making organizational changes in the light of practical experience, such as the latest restructuring of the Secretariat in Vienna and the appointment of a Co-ordinator for Economic and Environmental Activities. A new office was also created with the appointment of a Representative on Freedom of the Media, a financial reform process was initiated and a special Contingency Fund was established to enhance the Organization's ability to respond to crises.[42]

The Charter for European Security of 1999 instigated a further round of institutional fine-tuning: A Preparatory Committee was established under the Permanent Council in order to strengthen the political consultation process and increase internal transparency; with the establishment of Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) within participating States, a new instrument was created that will be at the disposal of the OSCE. To better "plan and deploy field operations, including those involving REACT resources", an Operation Centre with a small staff was established within the Conflict Prevention Centre. In addition, the position of Gender Officer was

41 Cf. Ingo Peters, From the CSCE to the OSCE – Institutional Quality and Political Meaning, in: Ingo Peters (ed.), New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions. Reforming the UN, NATO, EU and CSCE since 1989, Münster/New York 1996, pp. 85-122.

42 Cf. Secretary General Rationalizes Secretariat, in: OSCE Newsletter 11/1998, p. 9.

In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2003, Baden-Baden 2004, pp. 381-402.

created, to be based at the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw.[43]

At the operational level, the frequently arduous everyday work of the OSCE in conflict prevention and the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights remains largely unreported.[44] For example, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (frequently in co-operation with the Council of Europe) has been involved in training members of the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. International seminars have been held with the aim of improving participants' theoretical and practical knowledge of forms of democratic political behaviour. Fact-finding and monitoring missions serve to examine standards in political life and can be the basis for suggestions on how to eliminate deficits. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) plays a key role in pursuing these goals and receives considerable recognition. Long-term OSCE missions attempt to head off potential crisis situations and to eliminate deficits in the application of OSCE principles and norms. OSCE field operations in – currently – 17 countries employ some 4,000 people. The mandates of OSCE field missions range across concrete conflict-management efforts, the promotion of human and minority rights, democratization, and the monitoring of ceasefires and peacekeeping forces.[45]

The OSCE faced a new challenge in being given responsibilities related to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord (1995) for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The OSCE's tasks were in the area of post-conflict rehabilitation, covering a) holding negotiations on arms reduction and military confidence building, b) (together with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Council of Europe) monitoring and improving the human rights situation and c) organizing and supervising the presidential elections in 1996 and the local elections in 1997 (also jointly with other international organizations). The OSCE's operational workload was increased once again in the autumn of 1998 when, as part of the crisis management activities being carried out in Kosovo, it assumed responsibility for verifying adherence to UN Resolutions 1160 and 1199. The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was responsible for monitoring the ceasefire and troop movements, facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons, supervising elections and helping to form institutions of self-government and police forces and pro-

43 Cf. Charter for European Security, cited above (Note 2), paras 35, 37f., 42 and 43. On the Charter's origins and the compromises reflected in the text, see: Victor-Yves Ghebali, The Contribution of the Istanbul Document 1999 to European Security and Co-operation, in: OSCE Yearbook 2000, cited above (Note 2), pp. 289-305. On the Gender Officer and the Action Plan on Gender Issues see the OSCE's website: www.osce.org/secretariat/gender.

44 Cf. Peters, cited above (Note 7).

45 Cf. Annual Report 2001, cited above (Note 7), pp. 27-88; Berthold Meyer, Mit unendlicher Geduld für den Frieden. Zwischenbilanz der OSZE-Langzeitmissionen [With Inexhaustible Patience for Peace. Progress Report on OSCE Long Term Missions], in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 16-17/1998, pp. 23-30.

moting human rights and the building of democratic structures. [46] The KVM was withdrawn shortly before the outbreak of hostilities in March 1999 without ever having reached its full complement of personnel. After the Kosovo war, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) took a leading role in institution building, which involved police training, media development, the protection of human rights and the rule of law, democratization and elections. In this, it worked closely with the UN.[47]

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the areas in which the OSCE is engaged have taken on new significance with regard to the prevention of terrorism and international co-operation in anti-terrorism activities. The Plan of Action adopted in this respect comprises largely declarations of political intent and assigns the Permanent Council the role of forum for dialogue and clearinghouse. Agreement was also reached on developing plans for police-related OSCE activities which "at the request of participant states and with their agreement" concern for the most part the creation and co-ordination of training capabilities.[48]

In summary, the key elements of the OSCE's institutional development are the unchanging large number of participating States and the continuity of the broad concept of security as the basis for operational tasks. The few institutional reforms carried out since 1995 have been of limited impact. They are largely concerned with optimizing the Organization's operational capabilities in the following problem areas while also limiting the OSCE's activities to these areas: building civil society, conflict prevention and (non-military) crisis management, democratization, human and minority rights.

The Consequences of Parallel Institutional Development: Hierarchization, Flexibilization, Marginalization

The enlargement of NATO and the EU has significantly increased the degree of overlap among members/participants of Europe's various security organizations. This trend is set to grow with the forthcoming further enlargement of both organizations. Alongside the OSCE with its 55 participating States, we will then likely see a 25 member EU, a 28 member NATO, and a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of 46 states. As a consequence, the EU and NATO will increasingly join the OSCE in facing the "weakness in numbers" that exacerbates the general difficulties of collective action: With growing member numbers, it becomes increasingly difficult to achieve consensus in questions

46 Cf. Full Establishment of the KVM Expected by Mid-January, in: OSCE Newsletter 11/1998, pp. 1ff.
47 Cf. Annual Report 2001, cited above (Note 7), p. 41.
48 Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ninth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Bucharest, 3 and 4 December 2001, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2002, Baden-Baden 2003, pp. 391-417 (Decision No. 1, Combating Terrorism, pp. 393-402; Decision No. 9, Police-Related Activities, pp. 413-416).

of security policy, i.e. to remain capable of making decisions and taking action – especially important in crisis situations. The political response to these problems has been for each organization to carry out its own programme of institutional reform in the area of general functions, in other words, the internal creation of more flexible decision-making mechanisms. The OSCE had already agreed before 1995 to allow the application of exceptional rules (consensus minus one) for clearly defined special cases – mostly in the application of OSCE mechanisms[49] – in order to remain capable of effective decision making and action when faced with a state that violates OSCE norms and rules. NATO, the EAPC and the EU have gone even further down this road: NATO with the concept of the CJTF; the EAPC with its extremely flexible methods of negotiating and decision making; the CFSP/ESDP with different decision-making rules for adopting Common Strategies and Joint Actions, and the instrument of enhanced co-operation; and the ESDP again with the option of constructive abstention.

NATO and the EU have greatly expanded their competencies in a variety of problem areas and other fields of activity within the policy area of "security". NATO's responsibility in the problem area of military crisis management (non-article 5/out-of-area operations) and tasks relating to co-operative security has been significantly strengthened relative to its traditional role of collective defence. In accordance with the resolutions adopted in Cologne in June 1999 and at subsequent European Council meetings, the EU is creating a "military arm" for military crisis management. The EU's established practice of performing civilian crisis management via the provision of economic aid has also been expanded and formalized to encompass preventive conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation. In both NATO and the EU, these new general and specific functions have led to the creation and expansion of specialized institutional structures.

In the case of the OSCE, the increase in membership, the creation of more flexible decision-making processes, the assumption of new responsibilities and the creation of new military and civilian organs and instruments were completed in the mid-1990s. In contrast, NATO and the EU have largely carried out such institutional changes since then, while the OSCE has

49 The OSCE mechanisms in question are: the mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities, the human dimension mechanism, the mechanism for consultation and co-operation with regard to emergency situations and the Valetta mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes. For more details of the individual mechanisms see also: Ingo Peters, Normen- und Institutionenbildung der KSZE im Widerstreit politischer Interessen: Die Durchsetzung des Gewaltverzichts als Prüfstein für die KSZE [The CSCE's Work of Norm and Institution Building in the Midst of Conflicting Political Interests: The Achievement of Non-Violence as the Touchstone of CSCE Success], in: Bernard von Plate (ed.), Europa auf dem Wege zur kollektiven Sicherheit [Europe on the Road to Collective Security], Baden-Baden 1994, pp. 155-186; Heinz Vetschera, Die Rolle der KSZE als Einrichtung kooperativer Sicherheit im Rahmen des „*Interlocking institutions*"-Konzepts [The Role of the CSCE as a Co-operative Security Institution in the Framework of the "Interlocking Institutions" Model], in: ibid., pp. 95-154.

more or less stagnated in terms of institutional development, and its activities in this area have been restricted to consolidation.

What do these institutional developments within the various security organizations mean for inter-institutional co-operation?

It is no accident that the Istanbul Document's 1999 description of the OSCE's "key integrating role" in the co-operation of European security organizations is couched in tentative language.[50] So far at least, the key role envisaged for the OSCE has not been reflected in the political reality of the "interlocking network of European security institutions". In contrast to the OSCE's decision "not […] to create a hierarchy of organizations or a permanent division of labour among them",[51] a *de facto* hierarchy has emerged, with NATO in the dominant position, although, formally, it remains merely "first among equals".[52] The origins of this dominance are largely to be found in the area of military security policy with the central position of the USA and its military capacity. The right of "first refusal" in acute crises, which was reserved for NATO by the EU states at the Helsinki summit, amounts to a veto whose impact extends beyond the EU and NATO to Europe's other security organizations. The NATO member states have a blocking minority in the other security organizations and largely determine which organizations are given responsibility for collective security tasks in each case, as well as when and how they are carried out. The expansion of NATO's and the EU's competencies, structures and instruments, and the increased flexibility of their internal decision-making processes, are reducing the problems associated with taking collective action (entrapment and abandonment) by increasing the range of political options available, thereby reducing the influence of "unwilling" states and governments and making blocking tactics impossible. These reforms also increase external flexibility, since their newly created capabilities enable NATO and the EU to take action, such as sending a police

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50 Charter for European Security, cited above (Note 2), p. 429: "Recognizing the key integrating role that the OSCE *can* play, we offer the OSCE, when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster co-operation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths." (para. 12 section 2: emphasis added).

51 Ibid.; see also: ibid., p. 428: "Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence." (para. 8).

52 For a similar view, see. Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Europa und die Atlantische Gemeinschaft [Europe and the Atlantic Community], in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 1-2/1999, pp. 12-21; Werner Link, Die NATO im Geflecht internationaler Organisationen [NATO in the Network of International Organizations], in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 11/1999, pp. 9-18; Ingo Peters, Die NATO als „Primus inter Pares"? Die Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Sicherheitsinstitutionen [NATO as "First Among Equals"? The Evolution of European Security Institutions], in: Wolfgang Wagner et. al. (eds), Jahrbuch Internationale Politik 1997-1998, Munich 2000, pp. 124-135.

contingent, either unilaterally or within a broader multilateral framework such as the OSCE or the UN.[53]

At the operational level of European security-policy, hierarchization and flexibilization are evident in the concrete division of labour between the organizations. Here, the dominance of NATO and the EU is clearly evident, while the OSCE continues to toil at a wide range of thankless tasks that generally do not impact upon public awareness. The expansion of NATO and the EU in various policy areas, general functions and specific functions/problem areas means that even the "niche of co-operative security",[54] which was, until the mid-1990s largely the preserve of the OSCE, has been claimed and colonized by the other organizations. This is illustrated clearly, for example, by the new civilian crisis management capabilities established within NATO and the EU, or by a comparison of the OSCE and EAPC's agendas or work programmes. Thus, for instance, the EAPC rather then the OSCE is the forum preferred by NATO countries and the USA to address issues related to peacekeeping missions, as these require operational military capacities. This has happened despite the fact that the NATO states also explicitly delegated this function to the OSCE in the Helsinki Document of 1992.[55]

Contrary to the expectations of some states and governments in the early 1990s, the OSCE has not been expanded to become the central clearinghouse of European security. It has instead been forced into a niche of operational specialization focused on the promotion of democracy, human and minority rights and conflict management *excluding* military engagement and dependent in each case to a large extent on the resolutions of NATO and the EU: The OSCE is only granted responsibility when NATO and the EU (or, more accurately, their member states) so wish. Nevertheless, a new impetus for further institutional and operational development of the OSCE may come out of the decision of the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting at Porto to develop an OSCE strategy to counter threats to security and stability in the 21st century.[56]

By expanding their memberships, increasing the (internal) flexibility of decision making, and broadening their responsibilities to include co-operative security and civilian crisis management – areas where the OSCE has traditionally been active – NATO and the EU have undergone a functional "despecialization" or generalization, thereby becoming "OSCE-ified". With

53 Cf. Michal Olejarnik/Bonnie Landry, The EU and the OSCE – working together to prevent crisis and conflict; Javier Solana delivers key address to Permanent Council, in: OSCE Newsletter 2/2001, pp. 1-2.

54 Ingo Peters, Von der KSZE zur OSZE: Überleben in der Nische kooperativer Sicherheit [From the CSCE to the OSCE: Surviving in the Niche of Co-operative Security], in: Haftendorn/Keck, cited above (Note 9), pp. 57-100.

55 Cf. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, cited above (Note 21), paras 35, 38 and 42.

56 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Tenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Porto, 6 and 7 December 2002, see pp. 421-455 of this volume, especially: Decision No. 2, Development of an OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-first Century, pp. 443-445.

the EU's adoption of a military crisis management role and the creation of the appropriate organs and instruments, that organization can also be said to be undergoing NATO-ization – excluding, however, a collective defence component. These developments create the need for a higher degree of harmonization between the EU and NATO, as is evident in the transatlantic dispute over "duplication, decoupling, and discrimination".[57] Even the December 2002 agreement over the question of the EU's access to NATO resources requires close institutional co-operation and will likely mean additional co-ordination activities are required on an *ad hoc* basis with every major crisis.[58] The need for organizations to co-ordinate their activities is particularly high in the case of civilian crisis management, where the "OSCE-ification" of NATO and the EU has led to significant overlaps between the functions and instruments of all three organizations.

Measured against the dynamic development of NATO and the EU, the OSCE's progress appears retrograde: Having found its final institutional form some time ago, the OSCE has since stagnated to the extent that one can speak of a "forgotten transatlantic security organization"[59] which, while in absolute terms it still performs vital work in the niche of co-operative security, has been largely marginalized compared to the other major European security organizations. The institutions with the necessary capacities – NATO and the EU – dominate those with the task of mandating operational activities and which – in terms of policy and even international law – are formally dominant: *viz.* the OSCE and the UN.

However, the political importance of an organization depends not on its stage of institutional development or its formal competencies but rather on the willingness of the organization's member/participating States to make use of it for its intended function. For instance, the OSCE's various mechanisms and highly differentiated powers of conciliation and arbitration are impressive on paper, but, since they have been used very rarely if at all, they have remained politically insignificant. Even, NATO, despite its dominant position relative to the other organizations, is not unaffected by this discrepancy between supposed institutional powers and political reality. In view of the debate within NATO over the correct strategy for combating international terrorism, and the unilateral course pursued by the USA in relation to this crisis, even convinced NATO supporters see the Western Alliance – whose history could be seen as a series of internal conflicts and crises – as facing an unprecedented existential crisis.[60] At the same time, NATO's central role in the

57 Stanley R. Sloan, The United States and European Defence, Paris 2000, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 39, pp. 16f.

58 For some details of the agreements between NATO and the EU, see: NATO and the EU – In "Harmony" over Macedonia, cited above (Note 40), pp. 2-3.

59 Robert Barry, The OSCE: A Forgotten Transatlantic Security Organization?, BASIC Research Report 3/2002, London 2002.

60 Cf. Peter van Ham, Security and Culture, or, Why NATO Won't Last, in: Security Dialogue 4/2001, pp. 393-406; Helga Haftendorn, Das Ende der alten NATO [The End of the

handling of acute crisis situations is being eclipsed by more informal "institutions" – the Contact Group, the Quint, the Quad, etc. – which are acting as an informal "European security council" on an *ad hoc* basis.[61]

The informal pre-eminence of NATO and the EU and the central role played by informal structures in the "network of interlocking European security institutions" amount in practice to – at best – a "solution" to the problem of inter-institutional co-operation that is based on power. It is, however, a solution whose viability must be examined on a case-by-case basis, and one where – depending on the concrete conflict situation – "softer" forms of power than mere military force may also play a role, allowing those organizations which appear to have be sidelined also to make meaningful contributions to European security – assuming that their member/participating States make use of their capabilities for this purpose.

Old NATO], in: Internationale Politik 4/2002, pp. 49-54; Klaus Naumann, Crunch time for the Alliance, in: NATO Review 2/2002.

61 Cf. Catherine Gegout, The Quint: Acknowledging the Existence of a Big Four-US Directoire at the Heart of the European Union's Foreign Policy Decison-Making Process, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 2/2002, pp. 331-344; Helga Haftendorn, The "Quad": Dynamics of Institutional Change, in: Celeste A. Wallander/Helga Haftendorn/Robert O. Keohane (eds), Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space, Oxford 1999, pp. 162-194, here: p. 162; Vera Klauer, Bedingungen institutioneller Leistungsfähigkeit am Beispiel des Konfliktes im ehemaligen Jugoslawien [The Conditions of Institutional Performance Capabilities: The Example of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia], in: Haftendorn/Keck, cited above (Note 9), pp. 233-252, here: p. 245f.

An overview of European Security Organizations (international organizations only) Responsibilities according to mandate of member/participating States								
Organization Responsibility	UN+	OSCE	CoE	NATO+	EU	(Rump-) WEU	CBSS	CIS
Policy Areas								
Politics	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	X
Economics	X ECE	X Eco-nomic Forum			X		X	X
Security	X	X	X	X	X	(X)	*soft secu-rity*	X
General Functions								
Consultation/ Dialogue	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Negotiations/ Establishing Norms	X	X	X		X		X	
Implementation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Monitoring and Harmonization	X	X	X		X			
Problem Areas (Security Policy)	UN+	OSCE	CoE	NATO+	EU	(Rump-) WEU	CBSS	CIS
Public Administra-tion and Civil Soci-ety	X	X	X		X		X	
Democratization	X	X	X	X EAPC	X		X	
Human and Minor-ity Rights	X UN-HCR UN-CHR	X ODIHR	X				X	
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Manage-ment	X	X CPC		X EAPC PfP	X CFSP & ESVP			X
Peaceful Conflict Resolution	X	X						
Disarmament/ Arms Control	X	X FSC		X EAPC				X
Collective Defence				X		X (Art. 5)		

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