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## The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace launched the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) in Brussels, Moscow, and Washington, DC, in December 2009. Chaired by Wolfgang Ischinger, Igor Ivanov, and Sam Nunn, with prominent members drawn from across North America, Europe, and Russia, EASI is an independent, high-level Commission, whose task is to lay the “intellectual framework” for a strengthened European security order.<sup>1</sup> Over the life of the Commission, EASI will examine the weaknesses in existing security arrangements and weigh the challenges posed to them by both unresolved problems from the past and an array of new threats. At the conclusion of its work, the Commission will release a comprehensive report with recommendations for institutional adjustments and new approaches intended to transform the Euro-Atlantic region into a genuine common security space. As the Commission Co-Chairs wrote in a jointly-authored op-ed, “The aim must be a community of nations where all generally agree on the security threats that they confront, believe cooperation is crucial in coping with them and work seriously to overcome the obstacles to it.”<sup>2</sup>

The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative rests on the assumption that Europe cannot be secure if Russia remains alienated from key aspects of Europe’s security architecture. In the twenty years since the end of Communism, the West and Russia have not succeeded in building a “mutually beneficial and durable security relationship”.<sup>3</sup> Instead of a “community of nations” committed to indivisible security, Europe is in danger of seeing new lines divide the continent with the prospect of less security and increased tension for all. Worse, a new security “grey zone” has emerged, with countries like Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia a part of no durable security treaty and instead caught between duelling systems. Past and present approaches to rebuilding European security have not succeeded in resolving these key issues or the attendant tensions over the role of the West in general, and the United States in particular, in the former Soviet space. These unanswered questions continue to generate friction and threaten long-term stability.

Further, the existing organizations charged with maintaining Euro-Atlantic security are struggling to meet the new threats posed by a changed

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1 A video webcast of the *Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative Launch* is available at: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1505>.

2 Wolfgang Ischinger/Igor Ivanov/Sam Nunn, *Toward a Stronger European Security*, in: *The Moscow Times*, 8 December 2009, at: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=24277>.

3 Sam Nunn in *Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative Launch*, cited above (Note 1).

security context.<sup>4</sup> NATO and the OSCE, the two most prominent regional security structures, were both created to manage the confrontation between the Soviet Union and a US-led Western alliance. They were not designed to deal with cyber-attacks, human trafficking, and the potentially catastrophic security implications of global warming, to say nothing of extensive “out of area” military exercises at a time when much of Europe is increasingly “averse to military force and the risks that go with it” and dramatically reducing military budgets as part of austerity measures instituted in response to the global financial crisis.<sup>5</sup>

Confronting these problems will require bold, creative thinking that transcends current preoccupations, addresses in a coherent and comprehensive fashion the security agenda facing the Euro-Atlantic region, and offers institutional answers better able to meet the challenge. EASI’s talented membership should make that possible. The Commission is comprised of business, academic, and former government leaders drawn from across the Euro-Atlantic region. Its members have demonstrated innovative and inventive thinking in many areas of concern to this undertaking in the course of distinguished public service careers.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, it is crucial to the spirit of the Commission that its members set aside the national narratives of the countries from which they come and take advantage of this opportunity “to meld diverse perspectives in ways that create greater collective wisdom”.<sup>7</sup>

The Commission will operate under the leadership of its three co-chairs and a director, Professor Robert Legvold. While independent of governments, international institutions, and its sponsor, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, it benefits from the Endowment’s considerable resources. As the first genuinely global think tank, the Carnegie Endowment has active indigenous public policy organizations in all three areas – in Moscow, Brussels, and Washington (as well as Beijing and Beirut). Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, and Ambassador James Collins, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program within Carnegie, provide critical support to the project. In keeping with its trilateral character, the project receives funding from all three regions. EASI is made possible by funding from the Robert

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4 Cf. David J. Kramer/Daniel P. Fata, *The Wrong Answer: Why the Medvedev Proposal is a Non-Starter*, in: The German Marshall Fund of the United States (ed.), *A New European Order?* Brussels Forum Paper Series, March 2010, pp. 19-32, here: p. 20, at: [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/Brussels\\_Forum\\_March\\_2010\\_Legvold\\_Kramer-Fata.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/Brussels_Forum_March_2010_Legvold_Kramer-Fata.pdf).

5 Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Remarks on the Future of European Security*, L’Ecole Militaire, Paris, France, 29 January 2010, at: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/136273.htm>; Dan DeLuce, *Gates Not Happy With Europe’s “Demilitarization”*, in: *DefenseNews*, 23 February 2010, at: <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4511240&c=POL&s=TOP>; cf. also Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, *Lack of defence spending may cripple European ambitions*, in: *The Guardian*, 28 November 2010, at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/nov/28/defence-spending-cuts-european-ambition>.

6 For a full list of Commission members, see: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/special/misc/easi>.

7 Robert Legvold in *Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative Launch*, cited above (Note 1).

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At the Commission's initial meeting in Munich in February 2010, members emphasized the need to approach the Euro-Atlantic security agenda comprehensively. The notion that European security should be conceived broadly has, of course, long marked the official consensus. Within the OSCE, the concept begins with the traditional political-military dimension, and then adds economic and environmental security, and the "human dimension" of security. These categories, however, have grown ever more complex as conflicts over energy, cyber-threats, trafficking in illicit materials, and climate change complicate the European (and global) security context.<sup>8</sup> Further, these new areas represent only the threats that are already known, not those that may emerge in the future. European security architecture needs procedures to respond to known threats and the ability to respond to new threats as they emerge. For this reason, EASI will operate with a broad definition of security.

From the start, however, the Commission has recognized the importance of Europe's existing institutions, and has no intention of approaching the challenge by seeking to reinvent Europe's security architecture. Rather the task is to identify shortcomings in these institutions and the relationships among them and to suggest improvements and additions. That said, EASI members do see significant weaknesses in the status quo. These begin with the frequently noted lack of co-ordination among key institutions – the EU with NATO, the OSCE with NATO, and so on.<sup>9</sup> In addition, the existing institutions often fall short for the simple reason that they are twentieth-century entities grappling with twenty-first century problems.<sup>10</sup> In examining existing institutions and organizations, therefore, the Commission will keep an open mind about possible remedies, including those that would adapt and expand existing institutions as well as, where needed, create new ones.<sup>11</sup>

Following its first meeting, the EASI Commission divided into four working groups. Each focused on a critical dimension of the Commission's agenda and was tasked with developing insights and recommendations intended to deepen the deliberations of the full Commission. The first group, Strategic Values and Political Framework, dealt primarily with the underlying conceptual and psychological barriers that have impeded past efforts to erect a durable European security architecture. The second group, Political-Military Security, looked at questions of hard security, including the impact of NATO's new Strategic Concept on Euro-Atlantic security, the prospect of

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8 Cf. Clinton, cited above (Note 5).

9 Cf. Robert Legvold, *Include Russia and its Neighbors: How to Move toward a Common Security Space*, in: *A New European Order?* Cited above (Note 4), pp. 3-17.

10 Cf. Clinton, cited above (Note 5).

11 Cf. Ischinger and Nunn in: *Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative Launch*, cited above (Note 1).

pursuing a joint missile defence system (discussed in more detail below), and how to integrate Europe's new "grey zones" into a common European security space. The third group explored economic security, examining issues ranging from the instability of global financial regulatory institutions to energy security, the Arctic, and immigration. Finally, the fourth group considered new and non-traditional challenges, with particular emphasis on cyber-security, illicit trade, and managing the international nuclear fuel cycle. Following their individual meetings, each group drafted a report that was distributed to the wider Commission. The Commission discussed these reports at the second meeting of the full Commission, held at the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center in October 2010. The recommendations of these working groups will help inform EASI's final report.

EASI has also taken a forward stance on the question of a joint missile defence system with the United States, Russia, and Europe. As the three Commission Co-Chairs argued in the *International Herald Tribune*: "No other initiative has more near-term potential to ease the NATO-Russian relationship out of its petulant, impacted state, while giving a positive jolt to the revived but tentative and unfocused interest in an improved and more inclusive European security system, than missile-defense cooperation."<sup>12</sup> To further this effort, EASI will convene a working group on missile defence, chaired by two Commission members and including both Commissioners and outside experts. What distinguishes the EASI project from similar parallel groups is the focus on the political rather than the technical hurdles. While building a joint missile defence system is technically difficult, it is EASI's contention that the project remains moribund primarily because of a terminal lack of political will in all three capitals. The EASI Working Group on Missile Defence, therefore, will focus its efforts on addressing the political and bureaucratic obstacles that will have to be overcome if, for example, the auspicious agreements reached at the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon are to bear fruit.

EASI's long-term goal is to set the region on the path towards creating a genuine Euro-Atlantic security community. In a statement released in advance of the 2010 NATO summit and the OSCE Summit in Astana, the Commission explained: "By a Euro-Atlantic security community we mean an inclusive, undivided security space free of opposing blocs and gray areas. Within this space disputes would be expected to be resolved exclusively by diplomatic, legal or other non-violent means, without recourse to military force or the threat of its use."<sup>13</sup> Euro-Atlantic states are a crucial stabilizing influence in "an increasingly fragmented and stressed international order,"

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12 Sam Nunn/Igor Ivanov/Wolfgang Ischinger, All Together Now: Missile Defense, in: *International Herald Tribune*, 21 July 2010, at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/opinion/22iht-edischinger.html>.

13 Sam Nunn/Wolfgang Ischinger/Igor Ivanov/Robert Levgold, *Why Euro-Atlantic Unity Matters to World Order*, 9 November 2010, at: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41902>.

and have the unique ability to confront global challenges as a region.<sup>14</sup> Before it can fill that role, however, the region must overcome the internal tensions that continue to plague relations. Doing so will require not only political will and attention from all three capitals, but also increased opportunities to operate together towards shared objectives. As a starting point, EASI will focus on building collaborative efforts to support managing the international nuclear fuel cycle, co-operation on the responsible exploitation of Arctic resources, and beginning military-to-military dialogues about decision-making and warning times for tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, in addition to the push for a joint missile defence system.

Throughout its efforts, EASI maintains a continuous dialogue with other organizations also engaged in rethinking European security, as well as with senior NATO, EU, and OSCE officials, parliamentarians, and key governments. EASI, we well realize, is not operating in a vacuum. In the months preceding the December 2009 EASI launch, the OSCE began the Corfu Process. Since EASI began, NATO has debated and adopted a new Strategic Concept for the first time since 1999. In addition to these two prominent official processes, several organizations have undertaken studies and held conferences dealing with aspects of Europe's security future.<sup>15</sup> By remaining in close contact with key organizations and governments, EASI, in addition to producing a final report, will also offer interim recommendations on specific issues. The hope is that this continuous exchange of ideas between official undertakings such as the Corfu Process and independent initiatives like EASI will advance progress in both realms.

Finally, the leadership of EASI is fully cognizant of the obstacles to improving the Euro-Atlantic security order. They begin with the difficulty in achieving a mutually acceptable security agenda. General agreement exists that existing institutions have failed to meet the new and pressing challenges threatening the Euro-Atlantic space.<sup>16</sup> There is less agreement, however, on what precisely these new threats are and their relative priority.<sup>17</sup> Although the vital interests of the great powers – preventing nuclear proliferation, com-

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14 Ibid.

15 See, for example, *Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths*, EastWest Institute, New York, June 2009; *Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century: Do New Threats Require New Approaches? – a hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, United States Congress, 17 March 2010; *Towards a New European Security Architecture? – Institute for International Strategic Studies in partnership with the Valdai International Discussion Club and the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy*, London, 8-9 December 2009, at: <http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/conferences/conferences-2009/towards-a-new-european-security-architecture>; and The International Institute of Strategic Studies/Institute for Contemporary Development, *Towards a NATO–Russia Strategic Concept: Ending Cold War Legacies; Facing New Threats Together*, London and Moscow, October 2010, at: <http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/publications/towards-a-nato-russia-strategic-concept>.

16 Cf. *Discussion at meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative*, Munich, 7-8 February 2010.

17 Cf. Legvold, cited above (Note 9), p. 7.

bating terrorism and extremism – clearly overlap, their governments “have different threat perceptions, assign them a different order of priority, and favor different approaches”.<sup>18</sup> The reasons for these disparities range from historical distrust to differing geographic advantages and vulnerabilities, and each cause demands a different response. The net effect of these disparities, however, leaves the states of the Euro-Atlantic region a community unable to unite around a single action plan.

More importantly, these problems do not arise only around secondary issues. There is also disagreement over the nature and relative priority of what most in principle agree are the major issues. For example, compared with Western nations, Russia emphasizes hard security over the human dimension, and sees the latter as more an issue of, for example, the flow of narcotics than defending human rights.<sup>19</sup> This mismatch in priorities not only makes forming a common agenda hard, but also highlights the importance of arriving at an understanding of the purpose revised European security architecture is to serve before setting about designing that architecture. As one scholar noted, “the problem here is less the institutionalization than the creation of a common position”.<sup>20</sup> The failure so far to achieve a workable agreement on the critical elements constituting European security and the priorities among them thus represents both an obstacle to the Commission’s work and a challenge to be overcome.

These are not small challenges. Ultimately, however, if the Commission succeeds in dealing with many of the underlying issues that have caused the current impasse, and offers a coherent set of recommendations for addressing them, and the new challenges facing the larger Euro-Atlantic region, it will have seized a historic opportunity. Many voices concur that Europe is at a crossroads, that key stakeholders from North America to Russia and the states in between see as again imminent the great unanswered questions governing the region’s future: What is Russia’s place in the European order? What kind of relationship do Europe, the United States, and Russia want to have? What does Euro-Atlantic security mean twenty years after the end of the Cold War? If EASI can help to answer these questions and contribute to creative ways of producing a Euro-Atlantic order in which security is, indeed, “indivisible and equal” it will have more than fulfilled its purpose.

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18 Nunn in *Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative Launch*, cited above (Note 1); Cf., also Legvold, cited above (Note 9), p. 7.

19 Cf. Legvold, cited above (Note 9), p. 7.

20 Andrei Zagorski, *The Russian Proposal for a Treaty on European Security: From the Medvedev Initiative to the Corfu Process*, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2009*, Baden-Baden 2010, pp. 43-59, here: p. 55.