

Elisa Perry

The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative

The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), launched by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2009, completed its work in early 2012. The Initiative was structured as an independent, high-level Commission, whose task lay in creating the intellectual foundation for a strengthened Euro-Atlantic security order. As previously described in this publication,¹ the Commission was co-chaired by former German Deputy Foreign Minister Wolfgang Ischinger, former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and former United States Senator Sam Nunn, and directed by Robert Legvold, Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Columbia University. The 26-member Commission included prominent members drawn from across North America, Europe, and Russia. Over the past two years, EASI has assessed the weaknesses in existing Euro-Atlantic security arrangements and considered the challenges posed to them by both unresolved problems from the past and an array of new threats. Upon conclusion of its work, the Commission released a final report with recommendations for new approaches and institutional adjustments intended to transform the region into a genuine Euro-Atlantic security community.

The substantive recommendations of the Commission are classified in three dimensions: military security, human security, and economic security. Within each of these dimensions, the Commission identifies specific areas in which improvement in Euro-Atlantic relations is needed. In the dimension of military security, the EASI Commission concludes that a political dialogue is necessary to increase stability and reduce hard security tensions, and proposes an agreement on missile defence. In the realm of human security, Commissioners are calling for a strategy to improve historical reconciliation and initiate resolutions for protracted conflicts. On the subject of economic security, the Commission proposes two areas through which Euro-Atlantic co-operation will impact and contribute to the overall security of the region: natural gas and the Arctic.²

In addition to the substantive recommendations produced by the final report, some significant essential truths about Euro-Atlantic security emerged from EASI's work. The first was the recognition that mistrust among the regional players – particularly between Russia and the West – still exists twenty years after the end of the Cold War and must be overcome. The sec-

1 Rachel S. Salzman, The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2010*, Baden-Baden 2011, pp. 85-90.

2 Cf. Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security Community, Final Report*, Washington, DC/Moscow 2012, at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/03/toward-euro-atlantic-security-community/9d3j>.

ond was that the ability of high-ranking former policy-makers, diplomats, generals, and business leaders from across the region to come together and achieve consensus on key issues demonstrates the communal potential of the region. The third was that while there is no magic solution for improving Euro-Atlantic relations, focusing on practical problems and actively working together constitutes the soundest foundation for a process leading to the larger goal of an inclusive security community. These themes, interwoven throughout the Commission's work, must now become the basis for enhanced efforts towards building a Euro-Atlantic security community.

EASI's Work in Its Second Year

As a means of shoring up the Initiative's efforts in its first year – which were documented in the above-mentioned contribution to the OSCE Yearbook 2010 – and focusing attention on the most significant threats to a Euro-Atlantic security community, EASI commissioned five working groups to delve more deeply into specific topics related to the region in its second year. The Working Group on Missile Defense (WGMD) was established at the Commission's October 2010 meeting. At the February 2011 EASI meeting in Munich, the Commission established four additional working groups. Two of these are of similar size and stature to the WGMD: the Working Group on Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts (WGRPC) and the Working Group on Energy (WGE). Two smaller working groups were also formed to supplement these efforts: the Working Group on Turkey (WGT) and the Working Group on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (WGNSNW). Commissioners chose these topics because they concluded that progress on these issues would contribute significantly to the development of a true and lasting Euro-Atlantic security community. Working groups were made up of both EASI Commissioners and outside experts, unless otherwise stated below.

The WGMD comprised former senior government officials, academics, and technical experts from North America, Europe, and Russia. In addition to three working group meetings in the spring of 2011, participants met with missile defence experts in relevant governments and multinational organizations. Over the course of their work, the WGMD agreed on a concept for missile defence co-operation and the principles that should underlie it, and designed a prospective architecture demonstrating its practicality. The working group's final paper, including this detailed architecture, represents a carefully constructed consensus among all the group's members. The WGMD paper recommends, for example, putting together a team to work on co-operation challenges; initiating real-time data exchange between NATO and Russia; creating joint (operational) co-operation centres; and conducting tabletop exercises, discussions, and war-gaming exercises to increase missile

defence capabilities and augment ongoing co-operation among relevant actors.³

The WGRPC held several meetings over the spring and summer of 2011 in a number of salient locations, including Vienna, Riga, and Moscow. Over the course of its deliberations and in meetings with governmental officials, the WGRPC determined that the persistence of several serious conflicts and entrenched historical disputes hampers the social, political, and economic development of the region and creates insecure conditions which could lead to broader conflict and further societal degradation. Traditional diplomatic efforts to address these conflicts have proved ineffective. In light of this, the WGRPC recommends an ambitious new initiative to mobilize civil society and knit together a sense of common destiny for the region. Recommendations include calling for the active development of new tools and processes to promote reconciliation across the region and between particular states and peoples where long-lasting hostility and mistrust prevent any forward movement towards peace. The initiative would make full use of the institutional strengths and capacities of the OSCE, which is the only organization whose members include all the countries of the region and whose mandate directly relates to reconciliation and protracted conflicts. These efforts would be made in conjunction with the exploitation of new and diverse means of communication, including social media.⁴

The WGE held three meetings during the spring and summer of 2011. The group, which included former policy-makers as well as industry and academic experts, concentrated its work on the significant issues of natural gas and the Arctic. The working group discussion on natural gas centred on the economic tensions in the EU-Russia gas relationship, which, despite having eased in recent years, remain a significant potential impediment to the establishment of a genuine Euro-Atlantic community. This working group also met with key officials and experts in both the public and private sectors. The working group's final recommendations on natural gas include co-operation to improve energy efficiency and the establishment of a regional centre for energy innovation. The WGE offers several recommendations for co-operation in the Arctic, one of the best examples of the intersection of energy, environmental, and security issues. Members of the WGE emphasize that managing the Arctic by establishing modes of co-operation in the region, also among the littoral Arctic states, can be a potential building block for creating a Euro-Atlantic security community.⁵

3 Cf. Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Missile Defense: Toward a New Paradigm*, Paper of the EASI Working Group on Missile Defense, Washington, DC/Moscow 2012, at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/03/missile-defense-toward-new-paradigm/9cvz>.

4 Cf. Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Historical Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts*, Paper of the EASI Working Group on Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts, Washington, DC/Moscow 2012, at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/03/historical-reconciliation-and-protracted-conflicts/9cwb>.

5 Cf. Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Energy as a Building Block in Creating a Euro-Atlantic Security Community*, Paper of the EASI Working Group on Energy, Washington,

Two smaller working groups also served the Commission: the Working Group on Turkey and the Working Group on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. While the recommendations of these working groups are much more narrowly focused than the three larger working groups above, each brought focused contributions to the Commission's work.

The WGT held three meetings in 2011. The aims of this group were to define the Turkish dimension of Euro-Atlantic security and to discuss the challenges and opportunities Turkey poses to and for the creation of a Euro-Atlantic security community. Its conclusions include upgrading the dialogue between Turkey and the EU to increase co-ordination and collaboration on common security concerns; making maximum use of Turkey's proven role in assisting in the resolution of conflicts; and increasing Turkey's participation in securing and stabilizing the greater Euro-Atlantic region.⁶

The WGNSNW met twice in the spring of 2011. This working group comprised eleven distinguished experts who were recruited from outside of the Commission's membership. Over the course of its two meetings, the WGNSNW drafted a paper which helps policy-makers to focus on the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons and consider alternative approaches to its various dimensions. Recommendations were centred on increasing strategic co-operation, reducing the role of these weapons, and enhancing the transparency of their numbers and deployment. The paper was shared with officials in Europe, the United States, and Russia, but was presented as the product of a group convened under EASI auspices rather than as a paper from the EASI Commission.⁷

Outcome of the EASI Working Groups' Papers

When the Commission met in the autumn of 2011 in Kyiv, the working groups' papers were presented to Commissioners, reviewed, and debated. The Commission discussed the possible inclusion of each of the working groups' recommendations in the EASI final report and how best to structure the final recommendations for maximum impact. It concluded that certain elements of each paper would be integrated into the EASI final report. The draft of the final report was completed and reviewed at EASI's fifth and final meeting in Moscow in December 2011.

DC/Moscow 2012, at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/03/energy-as-building-block-in-creating-euro-atlantic-security-community/9cvy>.

6 Cf. Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Addressing the Turkish Dimension in Creating a Euro-Atlantic Security Community*, Paper of the EASI Working Group on Turkey, Washington, DC/Moscow 2012, at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/03/addressing-turkish-dimension-in-creating-euro-atlantic-security-community/9cwi>.

7 Cf. Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Addressing Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces*, Paper of the Working Group on Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Washington, DC/Moscow 2012, at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/03/addressing-nonstrategic-nuclear-forces/9cw1>.

In Moscow, the Commission spent considerable time deliberating over and finalizing the report, bearing in mind their declaration in EASI's 2010 vision statement: "[...] failing such a transformation, the Euro-Atlantic states and their organizations will settle for suboptimal and too often utterly inadequate responses to the twenty-first century's security challenges [...]."⁸ By the end of their meeting, a final draft was completed which synthesized the Commission's work of the previous two years and highlighted EASI's recommendations for building a strong Euro-Atlantic security community. The Commission also decided that, along with EASI's final report, the five working group papers would be published and distributed at the Munich Security Conference in February 2012.

Mistrust

Again, certain important themes on the subject of a Euro-Atlantic security community emerged throughout the period of the Initiative's existence. The issue of mistrust continued to come up during the Commission's meetings and its final deliberations. The Commission's final report attempts to highlight methods of overcoming the lack of trust among states whose conflicts had supposedly ended at the close of the Cold War twenty years before.

EASI's work on missile defence, for example, demonstrates the significance of establishing trust between the United States and Russia. As the Commission notes: "Achieving a genuinely collaborative approach to missile defense matters not only in addressing a threat, but in removing the misgivings blocking progress toward a common security space."⁹ Furthermore, the system is intended to be open to any actor willing to embrace the nuclear non-proliferation regime and eschew the development of medium- and intermediate-range missiles.¹⁰

Similarly, the paper by the WGRPC looks at tangible ways to overcome mistrust. Among their concrete recommendations is the fostering of a robust civil society to establish inter-societal links, an increase in dialogue between and among societies, and a diminution of opposition through confidence-building measures. The WGRPC calls for increased reliance on pre-existing institutions, such as the OSCE, to facilitate these efforts. As Commissioner Adam Daniel Rotfeld writes, "(EASI) also suggests taking Nelson Mandela's example and creating a Group of Elders which would reinvigorate the OSCE process of resolving protracted conflicts between Kishinev and Tiraspol in

8 Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Why Euro-Atlantic Matters to World Order*, Washington, DC, 2010, at: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/09/why-euro-atlantic-unity-matters-to-world-order/5gn>.

9 Ibid.

10 Cf. Sam Nunn/Igor Ivanov/Wolfgang Ischinger, All Together Now: Missile Defense, in *The New York Times*, 21 July 2010, at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/opinion/22iht-edischinger.html>.

Moldova and between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh”.¹¹ These substantive recommendations demonstrate the importance of establishing co-operative and transparent measures to improve trust among all regional actors.

Co-operation

The Commission’s discussion of the missile defence paper also shows the practicality of a diverse group of officials working together, leaving their national affiliations at the door, and finding common ground on a difficult issue. During an era of cutbacks in defence budgets, the Commission argues that attempting to build missile defences separately would be prohibitively expensive, making the burden-sharing achieved through co-operation all the more essential. The EASI co-chairs wrote in their July 2010 op-ed on missile defence in *The New York Times*: “Were North America, Europe and Russia to make defense of the entire Euro-Atlantic region against potential ballistic missile attack a joint priority, they would – apart from addressing a concrete problem – in a single stroke undermine much of the threat analysis that sets Russia against NATO, and prove that trilateral cooperation on a key security issue is possible.”¹²

The significance of high-ranking individuals working together to recommend a path for overcoming obstacles to Euro-Atlantic co-operation was evident in the Commission’s discussion of the WGT’s paper. The paper outlines both Turkey’s emerging role on the diplomatic stage, as well as its fraught relationship with the European Union. The Commission – which included participants from both Turkey and European Union countries – concludes that the two entities need one another, and should work to minimize existing mistrust and animosity in order to secure the advantages of greater foreign policy co-ordination, particularly in the Arab Middle East and the troubled Caucasus.¹³

Process

The EASI co-chairs stressed the importance of process in their op-ed in *The New York Times* on 31 January, 2012, noting that “The ‘Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative’ set out to identify the practical steps needed to secure the region’s future.”¹⁴ The final goal of a fully developed Euro-Atlantic security

11 Adam Daniel Rotfeld, NATO 2020: In Search of a Security Community, in *Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, No. 1/2012.

12 Nunn/Ivanov/Ischinger, cited above (Note 10).

13 Cf. Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Addressing the Turkish Dimension in Creating a Euro-Atlantic Security Community*, cited above (Note 6).

14 Wolfgang Ischinger/Igor Ivanov/Sam Nunn, Euro-Atlantic Goals, in: *The New York Times*, 31 January 2012, at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/opinion/euro-atlantic-goals.html>.

community, therefore, is not the first or only measure of success. Progress on the path to such a community constitutes an early and equally important goal.

For example, the consensus among the WGE participants is that the economic relationship established between the European Union and Russia with regard to natural gas needs to be depoliticized by mitigating the effect of the two sides' conflicting concepts of a continental natural gas market. With this in mind, the Commission suggests several mechanisms for progressing towards this goal, including a Euro-Atlantic Centre for Energy Innovation and Efficiency along the lines of a similar, although more narrowly focused centre recommended by the 2000-2010 EU-Russia Energy Dialogue Report.¹⁵

The Commission's discussions on historical reconciliation and protracted conflict also demonstrate the value of progressive co-operation. Commissioners acknowledge that successful efforts at reconciliation were historically different throughout the region and between and among states. The WGRPC paper notes that each of the protracted conflicts in the post-Soviet space "reflects above all the basic failure of the Euro-Atlantic countries to address adequately ongoing centrifugal forces and the security needs of states and sub-state groups in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse".¹⁶ Achieving progress on any of the conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, or Transdniestria would strengthen a unifying Euro-Atlantic narrative, stressing the common future of the region.¹⁷

EASI's Final Report

The EASI final report was completed in late January and hard copies were distributed on a close-hold basis to senior officials in relevant national governments and multinational organizations. Commissioners made a specific push to distribute copies personally to their own national leaders, many of whom had been kept informed about EASI activities on an ongoing basis since the start of the project.

This final report was presented and promoted publicly at the 48th annual Munich Security Conference in February 2012. The Munich Security Conference counts many former Euro-Atlantic officials, as well as current officials from all of the Euro-Atlantic countries and multinational organizations, among its participants and speakers. The EASI pack distributed to conference participants and officials in the run-up to the Munich Security Conference also included published versions of the five working group papers.

15 Cf. Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Energy as a Building Block in Creating a Euro-Atlantic Security Community*, cited above (Note 5).

16 Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Historical Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts*, Paper of the EASI Working Group on Reconciliation and Protracted Conflicts, cited above (Note 4), p. 7.

17 Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

The report was rolled out primarily during the Munich Security Conference's Saturday sessions (4 February 2012), in which participants focused on the security of the region. The session opened on Saturday morning with an introduction by EASI Co-Chair and Conference Chair Wolfgang Ischinger, who then introduced EASI Co-Chairs Sam Nunn and Igor Ivanov. In his remarks, Nunn discussed the significance of creating new pathways to a more inclusive and effective Euro-Atlantic community, stressing the need for the regional actors to work together actively on issues such as missile defence and increased warning and decision time.¹⁸ Ivanov spoke of the EASI process and how it brought together a diverse and experienced group of stakeholders, a feat that other, similar initiatives failed to achieve.¹⁹

Following the co-chairs' presentation, top US, Russian, and European officials presented statements on the subject of "Building a Euro-Atlantic Security Community". Governmental reception of the Commission's work at the Conference was positive, as demonstrated by the comments of current officials on the contents of its final report. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted: "The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative [...] holds great promise for us all if we heed the words that it contains."²⁰ Guido Westerwelle, the German Foreign Minister, observed: "The proposals put forward in the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative show the right way forward."²¹

In addition to accepting the substantive recommendations of the Commission's work, more detailed participant comments serve to highlight acknowledgement of the important lessons gleaned from the Initiative. On mistrust, Westerwelle observed that participating in multilateral forums is "the only way to nurture trust".²² The Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Anders Fogh Rasmussen, commented on the significance of the co-operation achieved by Commission members as follows: "I particularly welcome the fact that the report is the result of the joint efforts by senior political and military leaders from Russia, Europe, and the United States. The fact that you managed to reach consensus on such difficult issues is an inspiration to us all. It shows how much we can accomplish together, if we are committed to cooperation."²³ Commenting more specifically

18 Cf. Samuel A. Nunn, *Speech at the 48th Munich Security Conference*, Munich, Germany, 4 February 2012, <http://www.securityconference.de/Samuel-A-Nunn.824+M52087573ab0.0.html>.

19 Cf. Igor Ivanov, *Speech at the 48th Munich Security Conference*, Munich, Germany, 4 February 2012, <http://www.securityconference.de/Prof-Igor-S-Ivanov.826+M52087573ab0.0.html>.

20 Hillary R. Clinton, *Speech at the 48th Munich Security Conference*, Munich, Germany, 4 February 2012, <http://www.securityconference.de/Hillary-R-Clinton.827+M52087573ab0.0.html>.

21 Guido Westerwelle, *Speech at the 48th Munich Security Conference*, Munich, Germany, 4 February 2012, <http://www.securityconference.de/Dr-Guido-Westerwelle.825+M52087573ab0.0.html>.

22 Ibid.

23 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, *Speech at the 48th Munich Security Conference*, Munich, Germany, 4 February 2012, <http://www.securityconference.de/Anders-Fogh-Rasmussen.829+M52087573ab0.0.html>.

on the process, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commented that “the devil is in the details”, but “[I] read the report and I think that it is a welcome sight that people discuss ways to move toward a common space.”²⁴

Conclusion

Since the release of the report, efforts to continue the Commission’s work and build a Euro-Atlantic security community have gone beyond rhetoric. The Russian International Affairs Council, for example, led by EASI Co-Chair Igor Ivanov, held a conference on 23 March 2012 that was dedicated to the concept. On specific security matters, EASI has had an influence with government actors, as demonstrated by public comments made in Washington, Moscow, and Brussels, for example, on missile defence.²⁵

The Carnegie Endowment plans to actively continue the work of the EASI Commission by buttressing the efforts of other organizations and bringing interested parties – NGOs, businesses, multinational organizations, and others – together to work on both the specific goals identified in the EASI final report and working group papers, and also by identifying new opportunities for co-operation. Such activities will require a long-term, sustained effort that will involve engaging a multitude of actors. This effort will be underpinned by the development of a new intellectual framework – a new Atlanticism. In practical terms, this will require building up a network of ready partners, including the OSCE, to dedicate resources to a shared relationship based on co-ordinated research, activity, and outreach. These efforts were launched in April 2012, with conferences held in Brussels, Vienna, and Warsaw to reach out to the European and Russian think tank community. Plans are ongoing for continuing outreach efforts, next in Washington, DC

Policy-makers have welcomed EASI’s efforts, as many of those who are intimately involved in foreign policy recognize the significance of embracing the creation of an integral, undivided Euro-Atlantic security community. There have been challenges, however. Constructive efforts by these policy-makers have not necessarily been forthcoming. Arousing and maintaining the interest of the press has been difficult. Finding a broad public audience for this effort has proved a challenge. There are of course many topics – the Arab Spring, the euro crisis, and national domestic concerns, for example – which

24 Sergei V. Lavrov, *Speech at the 48th Munich Security Conference*, Munich, Germany, 4 February 2012, <http://www.securityconference.de/Sergey-V-Lavrov.832+M52087573ab0.0.html>.

25 For further public comments by officials on Euro-Atlantic security co-operation and missile defence, see: Dmitri Medvedev, *Speech at the Russian International Affairs Council Conference Euro-Atlantic Security Community: Myth or Reality?*, Moscow, 23 March 2012, at: <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/3582>; Ellen Tauscher, Special Envoy for Missile Defense and Strategic Stability, *Press Conference on Missile Defense*, Moscow, 3 May 2012, at: http://photos.state.gov/libraries/russia/231771/PDFs/missile_defense_briefing_in_moscow-may-3-2012.pdf.

have steered attention away from this work over the past two years and will continue to do so in the future. Executing EASI's vision will therefore require sustained determination and a refocusing of attention by numerous engaged stakeholders in order to bring a Euro-Atlantic security community to fruition.