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A Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: A New Role for the OSCE

A Changing World

In a recently published book, Zbigniew Brzezinski notes that this is the first time that problems of human survival have begun to overshadow more traditional international conflicts.¹ While this is true, however, I would add that domestic problems and conflicts also overshadow traditional wars and conflicts between states.

The international security environment has changed radically in the past twenty-five years. Yet the core profiles of multilateral international security institutions have remained the same.

The changes that have reshaped the world are fundamental in nature. Confrontational blocs and the associated dichotomy expressed geopolitically as the partition between East and West have disappeared. The line of division between the blocs that ran through the centre of Europe, symbolized by the Berlin Wall, no longer exists. As a result of the overcoming of this partition, the probability of an outbreak of a nuclear war has diminished. Non-military and human aspects of security – humanitarian, economic, ecological, civilizational, and cultural – have gained in significance. Neither Washington nor Moscow – which once governed the bipolar world – can be considered a centre of political, ideological, economic, or military domination. There are no longer any hegemonies in the world who are able to decide about global or regional security. The Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian OSCE region is confronted both with democratization within states and the diffusion of power among them.

The catalogue of changes is much longer. Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new generation of Europeans and Americans has entered adulthood. For this generation, the bipolar world is a thing of the distant past. People who do not remember the Cold War, not to mention World War II, are now in their mid-twenties and thirties.

It is worth bearing all these facts in mind – for one, because from this perspective we can better understand the place, role, and significance of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), signed in 1975. The Conference initiated the process of peacefully overcoming Europe's division.

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1 Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, New York 2012, p. 1.

It was a different world then. A different Europe. The world was static, organized around protecting and preserving the status quo. There were many reasons why the process of overcoming the division was a peaceful one, the most important being that the one-party totalitarian system in Central and Eastern Europe had exhausted its internal driving forces. The system was brought down by domestic factors – the social forces symbolized by the many million-strong *Solidarność* movement in Poland and the policies of glasnost and perestroika initiated in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev. The principles and standards negotiated in the process initiated in Helsinki and the institutions agreed upon in the CSCE Final Act also contributed in a significant way to the peaceful transformation of the system.

The Static Balance of Power

Historically, fundamental change in the system of international security resulted, as a rule, from great wars: The victors imposed their rules on the losers. This happened after the Napoleonic Wars, when, at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, on the initiative of Austria's Chancellor Klemens von Metternich and the British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh, the foundation was laid for the "Concert of Europe" and the Holy Alliance, which together ensured Europe's stability for several generations to come. The same thing happened at the Congress of Berlin (1878) after the end of the Balkan Wars and the unification of Germany, and after World War I, when the victorious powers dictated the conditions of a new political and legal order in the Treaty of Versailles (1919). Finally, this is what occurred after the defeat of the Third Reich, when the anti-Hitler coalition set the rules and standards for a new legal and political order in Europe.

The system that developed as a result of the decisions of the great powers in Yalta and Potsdam rested not only on the principles and standards adopted in the 1945 UN Charter, but also on the territorial and political changes that had taken place in Europe. In this system, peace and stability were to be ensured through the preservation of the territorial and political status quo in Europe and respect for the principle of the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The system agreed on at Yalta and Potsdam was static, based on mutual "deterrence", where the relatively high level of stability was guaranteed by the high risk of nuclear war.

A new political philosophy expressed in NATO's "Harmel Report" (1967) spelled the beginning of the end of the system. The key idea of the report boiled down to initiating a policy of *détente* in relations with the Eastern bloc without compromising the security of the democratic world. The first conceptual framework for a new policy of *détente* that would not forsake *deterrence* was spelled out in Egon Bahr's address in a Protestant church in

Tutting (1963). Bahr's guiding idea was of "change through rapprochement" (*"Wandel durch Annäherung"*). He postulated gradual, evolutionary change, based on rapprochement, as opposed to radical and violent change with the use or threat of force.

The Beginning of Peaceful Change

I have briefly recalled these familiar facts to help us realize that even during the Cold War period, when the system of security between East and West was essentially based on ideological and military confrontation and maintaining the status quo, conditions were slowly maturing to allow peaceful change of the international system. The signing of the Helsinki Final Act was an important stage in this process of change. The document was signed by the leaders of 33 European states as well as the United States and Canada. Subsequent landmarks in this process were the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990); the adoption of a new mandate and new institutions at the second CSCE Summit in Helsinki (1992); and, finally, reformulating the process initiated in Helsinki, the creation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in Budapest in 1994, which came into effect on 1 January 1995. Today, the Organization encompasses not just 35 but 57 countries in Europe, North America, and Asia.

While the main task of the CSCE process in the 1970s and 1980s was to provide peoples living under communist rule with an "umbrella" so that they could enjoy individual rights and political freedoms, for more than 20 years after the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, other tasks became a priority.

Initially, these consisted of the limitation, reduction, and elimination on a grand scale of almost 70,000 systems of conventional arms (under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe/CFE and the adapted CFE Treaty) and the development of new Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).

The next stage was the institutionalization of various forms and means of managing crises, preventing conflict, eliminating tensions, and identifying political solutions to crisis situations.

One effort to effectively respond to the new challenges and threats was the decision taken 20 years ago to establish the office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Many other institutions were also created under the auspices of the OSCE, including the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw, the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM), and the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). Many OSCE missions that no longer exist have played an important role as well. There are also institutions that have played no role, and could be

described as “aborted efforts” – dead from the start – although formally they still exist. A pointed example is the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, whose creation 20 years ago was welcomed with great hopes and expectations by some countries (Switzerland and France). Their expectations have not been realized. It would be naïve to think that the establishment of an institution can by itself solve any problems. Institutions should follow problems and not the other way around.

Institutionalized Ineffectiveness

There is a widespread belief today that the existing multilateral security institutions are not living up to our hopes and expectations. As a result, we are witnessing the gradual marginalization of some of these institutions. They continue to exist by virtue of inertia, but the states that created them and are represented in them attach increasingly less importance to their activities.

This leads to the question: What are the sources and causes of this “institutionalized ineffectiveness”? On the one hand, we have an abundance, a kind of inflation of different types of institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area. This applies, in particular, to countries that are members of NATO and the European Union, as well as the Council of Europe and the OSCE. This leads to competition among the institutions, which is a natural phenomenon. Despite various verbal assurances that they would work together – to be cooperative rather than competitive and interlocking rather than “interlocking” – in practice we are seeing institutions duplicating each other, competing, shifting responsibility, and sometimes crossing each other’s paths. Calls for a “division of labour” yield no effective results. Such a state of affairs does not enhance the authority of the institutionalized multilateral security order.

Yet I would look for the causes of states losing interest in the work of the organizations they are members of not so much in procedures, structures, and organizational matters, but rather in profound changes in political reality – in radically changed threats and risks that represent a new challenge for the international community.

The causes of such new risks and threats are internal – not external. The weakness of the present system is rooted in the processes taking place within countries rather than in relations between them. Meanwhile, we are increasingly dealing with reversion to the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs”. In the case of gross violations of human rights and, in particular, the rights of persons belonging to minority groups, international public opinion expects effective intervention, rather than passivity and “non-interference”. Yet, some countries continue to invoke the principle of non-interference in their internal matters, which, in their minds, fall under the discretionary

power of the state. Such an approach illustrates a contradiction that lawyers call *contradictio in adjecto*.

Countries in the Euro-Atlantic area have recognized the catalogue of European values agreed upon in the OSCE constitutional documents as their common foundation, but they have stuck to their own specific interpretations of these principles and values. Some of them give precedent to and place a decisive importance on the principles of sovereign equality of states and non-interference. They forget that the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, which constitutes the most important part of the Helsinki Final Act, clearly states that all ten principles “are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others”.² What does this mean in practice?

Had all the principles been fully applied in the sphere of domestic policy by the 57 states in the OSCE area, there would have been no crises and conflicts. Disputes and collisions of interest would have been resolved pursuant to agreed international commitments – legal, political, and moral. Although these commitments are international (having been undertaken in bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental treaties concluded under international law or in multilateral acts and declarations of a political and moral nature), they essentially concern the domestic sphere.

All the principles, standards, and procedures adopted by the OSCE, the UN, the Council of Europe, and many other intergovernmental institutions create a code of conduct for states in their external relations, and identify methods and rules for the conduct of states within their borders vis-à-vis their own citizens. In other words, a qualitatively new factor that determines the security of both states and individuals has emerged: States are now obliged to respect international commitments at home and their own legal norms in relations between the state and individuals or groups of citizens who declare their affiliation with ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other minority groups. These standards must be routinely respected. States cannot hide behind the shield that the rights of individuals and minority groups fall under the category of internal affairs. The validity and obligatory nature of norms today make these countries accountable before the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe.

Invoking the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs merely in order to justify dodging accountability and the responsibility of states cannot be effective. A key change in the legal and political order of this new world is that both states, on the one hand, and individuals and minority groups, on the

2 Final Act of Helsinki, Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, in: Arie Bloed (ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993*, Dordrecht 1993, pp. 141-217, here: p. 149.

other, are subjects of international law and other legal and political commitments. As a result, they enjoy certain international rights and freedoms.

Security in a Time of Change

The international security system in this transitional period is characterized by uncertainty, instability, and vagueness – hence the political unpredictability. In the new circumstances, the old foundations of the security system (e.g. mutual deterrence) have lost their former strength and validity, while new foundations have not been fully formed or universally recognized. Deterrence was a response to the confrontational nature of the former security system, which was based on the lack of trust and a balance of power between two opposing blocs. Once the military confrontation of the Cold War had eased, it became apparent that deterrence no longer corresponded fully to the needs and requirements of the new security order. Nevertheless, the strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of NATO adopted by the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010 stated that: “Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.”³ This is understandable given that the NATO leaders, in the same document, reconfirmed their determination “to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens”.⁴ They also committed themselves to preventing crises, managing conflicts, and stabilizing post-conflict situations. The Lisbon Summit offered NATO’s partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and – last but not least – committed NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. NATO leaders kept the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership.

Under the new circumstances, where the *interdependence* of states, rather than military blocs, nuclear balance, and a lack of mutual trust, is the basis of a new security system, let us think about what needs to be done to restore vitality and effectiveness to multilateral institutions and security structures. How can they be turned into an instrument of conflict prevention and adapted to the new demands and tasks facing the Euro-Atlantic security system in the second decade of the 21st century?

It is not enough to merely propose to correct or improve existing institutions, but rather it will be necessary to reflect upon the very idea underlying the system. This applies to all international security structures without exception. Under the auspices of the US Council on Foreign Relations, the

3 NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon*, 19 November 2010, para. 17, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm.

4 Ibid., Preface.

European Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and, on the initiative of the UN, NATO, the European Union, the OSCE, and many other international organizations, various reports and specific suggestions have been published over the years by former politicians and experts. They contain specific suggestions and proposals addressed to the leaders of states and heads of multilateral institutions.

Renewing Atlantic Partnership

Ten years ago, a report by an independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations, co-chaired by Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Summers, concluded with a thought that is still topical today and has been repeated in different forms in many other documents. Its authors postulate that: “Europe and America have far more to gain as allies than as neutrals or adversaries. We are confident that with enlightened leadership, governments and citizens on both sides of the Atlantic will grasp and act upon that reality”.⁵ The concept of a transatlantic free trade zone, as suggested by Angela Merkel seven years ago, was recently embraced by President Barack Obama. On 20 March 2013, Radosław Sikorski, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared in Sejm: “We should create a transatlantic free trade area agreement [...]”⁶ This may signal the beginning of a US-EU common market. The significance of such a solution would be hard to overestimate.

The civil societies of Europe, North America, and Central Asia want to see results rather than mere verbal declarations, resolutions, and new institutions. States in the Euro-Atlantic region are today generally led by highly qualified, well-educated, and experienced administrators, but leadership requires more than just effective administration. Today, nations and public opinion in the Euro-Atlantic area need leaders who will not only identify problems and make the right diagnoses, but also have the courage to outline visions and methods of realizing them. Today, politicians know what should be done and how to go about doing it. Yet, they lack the courage to carry out much needed policies, paralysed by the fear of losing the next election.

It is generally believed that there are three criteria for good political leadership: the ability to diagnose a situation, to identify means of solving problems, and to win support of the political community. Leadership is not only manifested in the ability to formulate a strategy and a long-term vision, but also requires courage, determination, and perseverance in the implementation of policy. In practice, politicians are often hostages to history: They

5 Council on Foreign Relations, *Renewing the Atlantic Partnership. Report of an Independent Task Force*, Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers, Co-Chairs, Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director, New York 2004, p. 28.

6 *Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Goals of Polish Foreign Policy in 2013*, p. 12 available at: <http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/b67d71b2-1537-4637-91d4-531b0e71c023>.

know what should be done, but on a day-to-day basis are motivated by the logic of the past. Meanwhile, signals coming from academic communities are at times so abstract, idealistic, and general as to limit their applicability.

All the many ideas presented by groups of eminent experts can be reduced to the proposal to develop a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum. In seeking such a solution, it is necessary to respect a number of premises.

First, we need to realize that the international security environment in 2013 is not uniform and homogenous; it is not subordinated to the same rules of conduct throughout the Euro-Atlantic area of the OSCE – from San Francisco and Vancouver to Vladivostok and Kamchatka. Countries situated in this area have different traditions, political cultures, and mentalities; they are driven by different interests and have different expectations of multilateral security institutions.

Second, the risks, threats, and challenges for countries in this region are also different: the United States, the NATO member states, and the European Union understand them differently than do Russia and the other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO began to regard Russia not as an adversary, but rather as a partner in co-operation, while in Russia the traditional image of the West, especially of the United States, as the eternal enemy and rival is making a comeback. Universal principles and values are contrasted with the concept of traditional Russian national standards and principles.

Such an approach is not generally shared by Russian foreign-policy experts. Such views, stemming from old geopolitical doctrines and a perception of the international system as a platform where national interests clash, leading to a kind of return to the 19th century Concert of Europe, are not the only ones now present in Russia. And these alternative opinions are more in tune with the demands of our time.

The new *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, signed into law on 12 February 2013 by President Vladimir Putin, emphasizes Russia's civilizational links with the West and gives priority to relations with countries from the Euro-Atlantic area. It stresses that Russia is "committed to universal democratic values, including human rights and freedoms",⁷ noting that "the only reliable insurance against possible shocks is compliance with universal principles of equal and indivisible security in respect of the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian and Asia-Pacific regions".⁸ The concept introduces a new element – it emphasizes the need to adopt common values as grounds for co-operation in the framework of a new security system based on "a common moral denominator, which major world religions have always shared".⁹

7 *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013* (unofficial translation), at: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

Third, an anachronistic mindset – thinking about the new world order in terms of alliances and counter-alliances (e.g. NATO and the EU vs. the Eurasian Economic Community and the CSTO) – is evidence that the signs of the times have been wrongly interpreted.

A Polycentric World

Now is the time to look at the world with different eyes. An attempt was made at the NATO-Russia Council Summit in Lisbon (20 November 2010), where a common catalogue of challenges, risks, and threats was jointly drawn up. This list shows that, even though US-Russian disputes tend to focus on missile defence and other arms-control issues, the key challenges facing Russia and the West are not military in nature. Russia does not create the West's problems, nor is the West the source of Russia's major challenges. The threats and dangers of destabilization that both face are domestic in origin. Russia's main challenges are to build a state based on the rule of law, modernization, demography, the fight against corruption and the reallocation of resources from the sale of energy (gas and oil) to shape a new and more competitive economy. For the West, the key challenges are effective EU integration, fiscal reform, counteracting the effects of the financial crisis in the long term, and overhauling transatlantic relations.

In other words, although the military aspects of Euro-Atlantic relations are no longer as significant as they used to be, disputes – motivated by inertia and the logic of the past – mostly concern the military sphere. The main military threats are located outside the Euro-Atlantic area – in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Korean peninsula, and Africa. Contrary to common wisdom, it is not geopolitics and emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil that pose a challenge to the entire Euro-Atlantic area, but rapidly accelerating change in a world where there are no longer clear centres of power. Instead of searching for a new system based on the concept of polarity, it is necessary to understand that the essence of global security has undergone a qualitative shift and is now based on interdependence and the polycentric diffusion of power. Attempts to return to the status quo ante are illusory. Thinking in terms of blocs and “concerts of powers” – a world divided between two superpowers that would govern their spheres of influence – is anachronistic.

On the agenda is the need to negotiate a new set of rules and principles that will form the foundation of Euro-Atlantic security. This means, in practice, that there is a need to redefine existing rules and formulate new ones for the twenty-first century. This system should reconcile the various distributed centers of power on the basis of tolerance and interdependence. The Euro-

Atlantic community needs to work out a formula that combines “political diversity and pluralism”.¹⁰

One of the manifestations of such a political philosophy was the concept of a multipolar world that was supposed to replace the bipolar world of the Cold War era.

Let’s start with the terminology: There can be only two poles – a plus and a minus. Multipolarity is not a concept known to physics – the science from which the political notion of bipolarity was borrowed. A polycentric world, elements of which are found in real life, can be imagined. However, it is not polycentrism around which political thinking about the new security system is organized today.

Interdependence

The principle around which the new system of security in the Euro-Atlantic area is organized is *interdependence*. Today’s world knows no hegemonies capable of imposing their arbitrary will on the rest of the world. What we see happening today is the negotiation – in varying configurations – of solutions that take into account the pluralistic nature of a new international security system. How effective the problem solving is depends on the accuracy of the diagnosis and the recommended methods of counteracting conflicts and crises.

An important but underestimated element of the functioning and effectiveness of the new system is timing. In the practice of a pluralistic system of security, it is the speed with which decisions are made that often determines the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the method of resolving problems: “Balancing speed with patience, and choosing correctly, will be the measure of effective strategy.”¹¹

In a bipolar system, every local and regional conflict could have escalated into a global conflict if it had violated the interests of one of the main adversaries. Meanwhile, in the polycentric system now taking shape, the prevailing tendency is for local and regional conflicts not to get out of control and for their territorially limited nature not to destabilize the global situation.

The New Nature of Conflicts

The nature of armed conflicts has changed significantly. For many centuries, inter-state armed conflicts had decisive importance for international security.

10 Charles A. Kupchan: *No One’s World. The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*, New York 2012, p. 205.

11 John Chipman, The age of “fast power”, in: *Security Times* (a special edition of the Atlantic Times produced for the Munich Security Conference 2013), February 2013.

However, in the first decade of the 21st century, we witnessed 69 armed conflicts within states and only three between states. There were also 221 non-state conflicts during this period, and 127 actors were involved in unilateral violence. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a total of over 400 large-scale acts of organized violence took place in 2001-2010.¹²

The civilian population is the main victim of such conflicts. This fact confronts the international community with challenges of a completely new type.

Europe's role in resolving these problems has changed significantly. States in the immediate neighbourhood now play a bigger role in restoring peace in places where local and regional conflicts erupt. They are interested in extinguishing hotbeds of tension that could escalate into inter-state conflicts. As a result, regional security structures are gaining in importance.

There is an urgent need to work out a formula for Euro-Atlantic security that will be viable in the future. The new system needs to give priority to political, social, diplomatic, legal, financial, economic, cultural, and intellectual activity. Military aspects of security will fade into the background. Nonetheless, developing new types of confidence- and security-building measures will continue to have fundamental significance. Today, the main source of instability and insecurity of states in the Euro-Atlantic area is not so much armaments and preparations for aggression, as was the case in the past, but rather the lack of trust and confidence between states.

What Has to Be Done?

A new security concept could and should provide an answer to the deficit of confidence according to a formula that the states concerned need to work out together. Outstanding personalities can make a contribution in this respect. Eminent political figures, intellectuals, and experts not involved in current disputes can offer decision-makers fresh and innovative ideas. Recently a number of brilliant reports and papers have appeared. One of them, disseminated in April 2013 by the co-chairs of the working group established by the European Leadership Network (Des Browne), the Munich Security Conference (Wolfgang Ischinger), the Russian International Affairs Council (Igor Ivanov) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (Sam Nunn) raised the fundamental question: What are the obstacles and what has to be done to improve security for all peoples in the Euro-Atlantic region and in the world?

They answer this question as follows: "The most significant obstacle in the way of achieving this goal remains a lack of trust, fuelled by historical animosities and present uncertainties in the European and global security

12 Cf. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (ed.), *SIPRI Yearbook 2012*, Oxford 2012, p. 65.

landscape. This corrosive lack of trust undermines political and military co-operation, increases bilateral and multilateral tensions, and threatens to derail hopes for improving the lives of people across the region.”¹³

This document was preceded a year earlier by the report *Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security Community*, which was published by the Carnegie Endowment.¹⁴ It is the result of the work of a commission called the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), which brought together – under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment – over 20 former politicians, researchers, and experts. The work of the EASI Commission was headed by Igor Ivanov, former Foreign Minister of Russia; Wolfgang Ischinger, former Secretary of State in the German Federal Foreign Office; and Sam Nunn, former Chairman of the US Senate Armed Services Committee. The document addresses the following aims:

- to transform and demilitarize strategic relations between the United States/NATO and Russia;
- to achieve historical reconciliation where old and present enmities prevent normal relations and co-operation.

In the report’s words: “In a world of new communications technologies, global information space, and populations demanding their voice, effective security can only be built by making better use of underutilized institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the untapped potential of civil society (churches, academic and scientific institutions, and nongovernmental organizations).”¹⁵

As the three co-chairs of the EASI Commission noted in a joint statement: “Rather than drafting new treaties, creating new institutions or expanding existing alliances, the commission sought to create new pathways to a more inclusive and effective Euro-Atlantic community, focusing on the military, human and economic dimensions of security.”¹⁶

The time is ripe to think about a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum within the OSCE that would provide a foundation for building a new strategy through dialogue and practical steps. The goals of such a forum would be to understand and address various threat perceptions, to decrease risks of con-

13 Des Browne/Wolfgang Ischinger/Igor Ivanov/Sam Nunn, *Co-Chairs’ Summary, Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region*, Report Prepared for Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Publics, s.l. 2013, p. 2, at: https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/BMS_Summary_Report_FINAL.pdf. For the full report, see: Des Browne/Wolfgang Ischinger/Igor Ivanov/Sam Nunn, *Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region*, 2013, at: https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/BMS_Long_Report_FINAL.pdf.

14 Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, *Toward a Euro-Atlantic Security Community*, Moscow/Brussels/Washington, DC, 2012, at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/03/toward-euro-atlantic-security-community/9d3j>.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

16 Wolfgang Ischinger/Igor Ivanov/Sam Nunn, Euro-Atlantic Goals, in: *International Herald Tribune*, 31 January 2012, at: <http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=46989>.

flict, and to increase security, co-operation, transparency, defence, and stability for all the nations in the Euro-Atlantic region. A new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum could be established both to implement many specific steps and to promote sustained dialogue on building mutual security. The adoption of a suitable mandate for this task within the OSCE is a matter for the Organization's political leaders.

Six recommendations formulated by the experts from Europe, Russia, and the United States can be summarized in the following conclusions:

First of all, the proposed Euro-Atlantic Security Forum would mean that the new dialogue concerning the construction of mutual security would focus on the central issues. It would also have to consider not only what the countries of the region share but also what divides them.

Second, the mandate of the dialogue would be specified by the OSCE's political leaders.

Third, the new dialogue about building mutual security would build on basic principles shared by the participants.

Fourth, the dialogue would support future concrete steps. These would not necessarily require the signing of new treaties binding the countries in international law, but would encourage it if useful and proper.

Fifth, for the process to be effective, common priorities must be specified.

Sixth, setting up a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum would facilitate the implementation of many concrete steps for building mutual security in the region as suggested by the authors of the 2013 report on *Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region*, and for implementing the guidelines established within the forum. In the view of the authors, the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region is predestined to play a role in shaping the new global security system for many reasons: "Although much of the global security discussion today revolves around Asia, there remains an urgent need for a new strategy for building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region – an area that includes six of the world's 10 largest economies, four of the five declared nuclear-weapon states, and more than 95 percent of global nuclear inventories. Today, the common interests of nations in the Euro-Atlantic region are more aligned than at any point since the end of World War II. It would be a tragic mistake, however, to assume that the window for developing a new strategy for building mutual security will remain open forever. We must seize the opportunity and move now."¹⁷

Following this approach to setting up a Euro-Atlantic Security Forum would not create yet another institution on top of the dysfunctional structures that already exist, but would instead contribute to reviving the existing bodies and organs of the OSCE. The starting point would be the Platform for Co-

17 Browne/Ischinger/Ivanov/Nunn, *Co-Chairs' Summary*, cited above (Note 13), p. 2.

operative Security and a new mandate agreed by the leaders at the OSCE's jubilee summit in Helsinki in 2015.

We have to think about security for the next generation, which will be confronted by both processes of integration as well as fragmentation between and within states. As one observer has noted, "the politics of identity is to differ with others rather than find common ground".¹⁸ Instead of a hierarchical world governed by hegemonic powers, we are entering into the era of a poly-centric security system, where new players and non-state actors will challenge the traditional security order.

To sum up – a thought of a general nature: The future is not determined by any historical necessity. Nations and states, international communities, and individual people make choices every day. These choices determine the future. As the French thinker Thérèse Delpech, who died in 2012, and whose strategic deliberations about the world's future are well worth remembering, wrote: "It would be a mistake to claim that nothing enables us to imagine the future: we usually go in the direction our thinking takes us."¹⁹

I have tried to present my thoughts on what should be done to prevent events from developing out of control. It is up to us, the nations of Europe and their leaders, to make the right decisions. One thing is certain, however: Decisions that are made now will determine our common future as well as the future of European nations and the entire Euro-Atlantic region.

18 National Intelligence Council (US), *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, s.l., December 2012, p. 4.

19 Thérèse Delpech: *Savage Century: Back to Barbarism*, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 83.