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## The Work on a Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century

### *Background*

More than twenty years have passed since the signing of the CSCE Final Act. Europe has changed fundamentally during this time. The division into two blocs and the confrontation between two antagonistic systems have been overcome since the end of the Cold War. The bitter ideological struggles of yesterday belong to the past. In the Charter of Paris (1990) the CSCE States committed themselves to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, market economies, social justice, and a responsible attitude toward the environment. Since that time they have been emphasizing that they belong to a new community of values.

Unhappily, the spread of freedom and democracy has been accompanied by new conflicts and the resurgence of forgotten tensions. Against a background of economic and social instability, local wars, violations of fundamental freedoms and human rights, aggressive nationalism and conflicts between ethnic groups have developed.<sup>1</sup> The international community was as little prepared for these new challenges as were the international organizations. All of them are being called upon to adapt themselves as quickly as possible to the new situation, find convincing answers to the new challenges and think about how security in Europe, now and in the future, can best be assured.

Against the background of new security risks and instabilities and also in view of the eastward enlargement of NATO, which it opposes, Russia in the fall of 1994 proposed that a fundamental discussion on the goals, methods and instruments of long-term European security cooperation be undertaken. This proposal was refined on the fringes of the Budapest Review Conference in informal consultations between Russia, the United States and the EU and was put into the draft of the final document. The OSCE "Discussion on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century" is intended to help gain respect for the fundamental values of living together in Europe, to meet the new challenges through joint efforts, and to re-examine all existing structures with a view to improving the way they work together.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. CSCE Budapest Document 1994, Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era, in: Helsinki Monitor 1/1995, pp. 79-106, here: p. 79.

*Mandate, Dimensions and Modalities of the Discussion*

At their Summit Meeting in Budapest (5-6 December 1994) the Heads of State or Government decided to begin a broadly based and comprehensive discussion on all aspects of security in the 21st century. The mandate makes clear that this discussion does not limit the inherent right of each individual participating State to be free to choose or change its own security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. With regard to procedure, it was decided to take into account the ongoing discussions on this topic in the participating States, to hold a seminar on this subject in Vienna in fall 1995 and to put it on the agenda of the Ministerial Council meeting scheduled for December 1995 in Budapest. The Budapest decisions say nothing about the institutional implementation of the discussions. The Chairman-in-Office was requested to present a progress report to the next Ministerial Council. The initial results of the discussion were to be presented by the Chairman-in-Office at the Summit Meeting in Lisbon.<sup>2</sup>

At the Fifth Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Budapest (7-8 December 1995) the objectives of the discussion were more precisely defined, guidelines were adopted, and it was decided how the work was to be organized. The Council decided to move the discussion into a more clearly operational phase. The listing of risks and challenges, already begun, was to be continued. The Foreign Ministers set forth the following substantive guidelines: promoting the observance of OSCE principles and commitments; further developing the OSCE and effectively using its instruments; promoting cooperative approaches and responses to challenges and risks; sustaining a comprehensive view of security; the concept of cooperation between complementary and mutually reinforcing security organizations; further developing coordination and cooperation between the OSCE and the UN; and promoting a transparent and democratic development of trans-Atlantic and regional organizations.

With regard to procedure, it was decided to set up a Security Model Committee which would meet under the auspices of the Permanent Council. The decision stipulated that the Security Model should remain on the agenda of the Senior Council, that additional seminars on the subject should be arranged, and that representatives of non-governmental organizations and academics should participate in the discussion.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, Chapter VII, p. 95.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Decisions of the Fifth Meeting of the Council of Ministers, 7-8 December 1995, Budapest.

### *Objectives*

At the Budapest meeting of the Ministerial Council the objectives for the discussion of a Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century were also defined more precisely. Above all, the discussion was to aim at making full use of the OSCE's unique capabilities and inclusive nature for the development of a common security space. The common security space is to be based on a comprehensive and cooperative idea of security as well as on the principle of its indivisibility. This space is to be free of dividing lines, spheres of influence and zones of unequal security. The countries and organizations are to work together in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way, building a genuine partnership. They will not strengthen their own security at the expense of the security of other States. They emphasize their common responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region.<sup>4</sup>

### *Significance and Extent of the Discussion; Coordination with Other Security Organizations*

The mandate makes clear that the discussion takes place institutionally in the OSCE but extends far beyond that organization. This raises the question why the discussion is being held in the OSCE. What is its relationship to current debates in other security organizations? What influence does it have on developments in other security organizations?

Because of its large circle of participants and the comprehensiveness of its security concept, the OSCE obviously appeared to be a suitable forum. The OSCE offers the broadest dialogue network in Europe. It is only in the OSCE that all 55 States in the region between Vancouver and Vladivostok participate. The proviso that the discussion was to be comprehensive, i.e. that it was to go beyond politico-military security, also seemed to predestine the OSCE as the forum. From 1975 on, in fact, the CSCE had committed itself to a broad concept of security which, in addition to politico-military aspects, was to include guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic development, cooperation in technology, social justice and a responsible attitude toward the environment.

Although the discussion goes beyond the bounds of the OSCE, the OSCE has no power to instruct other security organizations. Hierarchical relationships are ruled out, but improving cooperation and coordination between the various security organizations is one of the objectives. Representatives of the other security organizations are invited to take part in the work on the Security Model. The EU, NATO, the WEU, the CIS and other security organiza-

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

tions refer to this work in their political statements. They are also invited to participate in seminars on the Security Model and to contribute to them. Coordination between the organizations takes place horizontally, through the governments of the participating States. The 16 NATO countries, for example, use their internal consultations to ensure that their proposals and contributions are in the enlightened self-interest of the Alliance. The 15 EU members hold regular coordination meetings to clarify their positions. Their ideas are then presented in joint EU papers.

*The Course of the Discussion from December 1994 until June 1996*

At the beginning of 1995 the Hungarian OSCE Chairmanship faced the difficult task of getting the discussion started, giving it a structure and guiding it. Discussions began at the first session of the Senior Council at the end of March 1995.<sup>5</sup> Thereafter, an ad hoc working group was set up at the ambassadorial level which on average met fortnightly. The discussions on the Security Model were once again on the agenda of the Senior Council at the end of October 1995.<sup>6</sup> On 18 and 19 September a seminar was held in Vienna on the Security Model which was open to other organizations, NGOs and scholarly experts.<sup>7</sup>

The work program adopted by participating States in early 1995 provided for a three-stage procedure. First, the underlying principles of the Security Model were to be discussed and worked out; then the risks and challenges in the OSCE region were to be identified and a kind of inventory established. In a third step, joint responses and instruments for dealing with these risks and meeting the challenges were to be worked out.

The main work for 1995 consisted in identifying risks and challenges to security. A broad range of risks was covered, mostly in a very general way. A paper presented by France, acting as the EU's Presidency, provided a working basis for the discussions. It distinguished between various factors of instability - political, military as well as economic, social and environmental - and listed just two dozen individual risks.<sup>8</sup> It quickly became clear that perceptions of security varied considerably, depending on geographic situation and degree of involvement in security organizations. Thus it was important that as many States as possible participate in the discussions and report on their own subjective concerns about security.

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<sup>5</sup> Journal No. 2, First Meeting of the Senior Council, 31 March 1995.

<sup>6</sup> Journal No. 2, Third Meeting of the Senior Council, 27 October 1995.

<sup>7</sup> Summary, REF.PC/568/95, 5 October 1995.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Preliminary Contribution by the European Union to the Security Model, REF.PC/272/95, 14 June 1995.

On the basis of the EU paper and other contributions, the Hungarian Chairmanship developed a new version of the risks and challenges, which has been repeatedly updated.<sup>9</sup> The introduction to this document states that security in the OSCE area must be understood as indivisible and comprehensive. Developments of the most different nature - political, military, human rights, economic, social, environmental - can jeopardize security in the OSCE area. Moreover, many risks are interrelated and can have consequences in other fields of security.

At the same time, it was noted that security risks are unevenly distributed in the OSCE area. Certain regions and sub-regions are confronted with different problems, some of which are highly specific. Nevertheless, the postulate about the indivisibility of security requires that all security risks be taken seriously by the OSCE States and by the OSCE as a whole and that common responses be sought for them.<sup>10</sup>

Excerpts from this list of risks show clearly how broad the approach and the consideration of new risks and dangers are:

- striving for power and attempts to create zones of influence;
- increased inclination to use force internally and externally to settle conflicts;
- unresolved territorial claims and conflicts over borders;
- separatist movements that appeal to the right to self-determination of peoples;
- terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and other forms of organized crime;
- unstable democratic structures and fragility of the rule of law;
- violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- discrimination against ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic minorities;
- economic deprivation and disparities between countries and regions;
- the application of economic pressure (e.g. cutting off supplies of raw materials or routes of transport) for political purposes;
- disintegration, fragmentation and polarization of societies;
- uncontrolled migratory flows and the hardships suffered by refugees;
- massive destruction of the environment;
- irresponsible over-use of natural resources;
- insufficient safety standards in industrial production.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Risks and Challenges to Security in the OSCE Area, REF.PC/418/95, 24 August 1995; REV.1, 15 September 1995; REV.2, 4 December 1995.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

In addition, the ad hoc working group drafted a decision of the Ministerial Council on the Security Model. As the Hungarian Chairman observed in his report on the course of the discussion, the year 1995 was mainly devoted to conceptual exploration and to working out organizational aspects of the discussion.<sup>12</sup>

The Swiss Chairman-in-Office told the Permanent Council on 11 January 1996 in Vienna that the main purpose of working out a security model should be to promote pan-European security cooperation and to prevent the development of dividing lines in European security policy. At the same time, he invited all participating States to present concrete proposals as soon as possible.

On 19 January 1996 the newly created Security Model Committee met for the first time. At the ensuing sessions the participating States devoted special attention to questions of conflict prevention, including early warning and preventive diplomacy, as well as crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The basis for these discussions was an inventory of existing OSCE instruments and mechanisms which had been prepared by the Secretariat along with a discussion paper from the Swiss Chairmanship which, using an exhaustive catalogue of issues, attempted to define the role and the possible range of actions of the OSCE and other security organizations in different stages of the whole conflict cycle.<sup>13</sup> Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic enlivened the discussion at the beginning of March with a proposal on cooperation between the international security organizations. This was the first proposal that had been formally submitted.<sup>14</sup>

The Security Model was a prominent subject at the 4th meeting of the Senior Council in Prague (21-22 March 1996). Russia and Italy/EU presented their ideas. At the 4th Economic Forum which followed, likewise in Prague (27-29 March 1996), a closer look was taken at the relationship between economic and politico-military security. Various delegations contributed to the economic aspects of the discussion on the Security Model.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. Security Model Progress Report, REF.MC/14/95, 1 December 1995.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. PC/117/96, 14 February 1996; Add.1, 11 March 1996.

<sup>14</sup> The OSCE Role in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, REF.PC/169/96, 1 March 1996.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Fourth Meeting of the Economic Forum, Summary, REF.SC/115/96/Rev.1, 16 April 1996.

### *Current Proposals*

#### *The Proposal of Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic of 1 March 1996*

Despite its sweeping title - The OSCE Role in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation - this proposal is in essence limited to principles of cooperation between security organizations. In a first part, the role of individual organizations (OSCE, NATO and its fora for cooperation, NACC and Partnership for Peace, the EU and WEU, and the Council of Europe) is defined. The proposal concludes that all of the institutions mentioned will have to adjust themselves to the new challenges and requirements.<sup>16</sup> Using initial experiences in the implementation of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia as a point of departure, concrete recommendations are made:

- consultation and cooperation among various European and trans-Atlantic organizations in the field of conflict prevention should observe the following principles: practicability, equality of all organizations, flexibility, mutual support, transparency, complementarity and the concept of comprehensive security;
- consultations between the institutions should be conducted on three levels: on occasion and on the margins of routine meetings of a given organization; meetings organized according to a firm schedule and on a rotational basis; ad hoc meetings aimed at specific goals.<sup>17</sup>

#### *The Proposal of Italy/European Union of 17 April 1996*

This is a comprehensive and broadly-based proposal. The document is the result of internal consultations among the EU countries. It identifies a series of subjects that should be covered in a document on a security model but offers few proposals to guide the search for solutions. Individual EU countries have been asked to prepare more detailed papers on different aspects of the subject in the name of the EU.

Divided into 43 parts, the document undertakes an analysis of the existing institutionalized security cooperation in Europe. On the basis of this analysis, possible improvements and enhancements of efficiency are suggested. Even though it goes beyond the parameters of the OSCE, the document clearly puts the OSCE as an institution in the foreground. It poses three main questions: What contribution can the OSCE make to security in Europe? What is to be the role of other organizations which are crucial to Europe's

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<sup>16</sup> REF.PC/169/96, 1 March 1996.  
<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

security, and how should they work together? And, finally, what institutional and organizational conclusions need to be drawn from this for the OSCE?

The first chapter explains that the OSCE's mission is to promote the development of a common security space for Europe free of dividing lines and to contribute to the emergence of a real "culture of cooperation". To reach these goals the OSCE should work out a new, politically binding "Platform for Cooperative Security". This Platform - a combination of statutes, "corporate identity" and a concrete work program - is not meant to supplant existing OSCE commitments but to continue them in an appropriate way in a new situation. With regard to substance, new guidelines might *inter alia* contain the following elements:

- Enhancing the implementation of OSCE commitments and considering possible action in cases of non-implementation;
- clarifying the role of the OSCE in the field of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping;
- developing OSCE principles for the participation in peacekeeping operations;
- better integration of military aspects as well as of the human and economic dimensions into the OSCE's preventive diplomacy;
- effective implementation of the CFE Treaty and the adoption of new arms control measures within the OSCE area at OSCE-wide and regional level;
- democratic control upon armed forces and sufficiency of military capabilities;
- measures for improved implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and for closing any substantial gaps;
- definition of scope/content of post-conflict rehabilitation by the OSCE and of its interaction with other international organizations;
- measures to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights as the foundations of society (education, consciousness-building, inclusion of NGOs).

In the chapter on mutually reinforcing and supporting institutions the EU first introduces itself as a participant in European security cooperation: "As the main pole of integration, stability and prosperity in Europe, the EU provides an important contribution to the security environment."<sup>18</sup> Mentioned as instruments of its security-building efforts are its third party relations, its bilateral agreements, the Pact on Stability, its technical and financial assistance programs and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

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<sup>18</sup> REF.PC/252/96, Para. 20.



Moving on to cooperation between the institutions, the EU proposal sets forth general principles to govern such cooperation. The concept of mutually reinforcing security organizations is the cornerstone of this cooperation. Other important principles mentioned are:

- the non-hierarchical cooperation among all organizations in the OSCE area, bearing in mind the special responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations;
- working out of principles for further transparent and democratic development of the security organizations;
- enhancement of the OSCE's effectiveness in preventive diplomacy through joint action and diplomatic support from other institutions;
- regular or ad hoc meetings of Secretary-Generals, exchange of liaison officers, etc.;
- reaffirming/operationalizing the primary responsibility of the OSCE ("OSCE first") for early warning/conflict prevention/crisis management. Should OSCE efforts fail, presentation of the dispute to the UN Security Council on a consensus basis, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the directly affected states;<sup>19</sup>
- operational and financial arrangements between the OSCE and other European and trans-Atlantic institutions.

The concluding chapter pursues the question of how the OSCE's political effectiveness and operational capabilities can be improved. A number of proposals have been made with a view to the OSCE Summit in Lisbon:

- the OSCE should develop a better overview of existing decisions and structures;
- the functioning of the OSCE's leadership should be strengthened by a more extensive use of Personal Representatives and the role of the Secretary General should be strengthened;
- it should be clarified whether and, if so, in what form the Senior Council can play a useful role;
- the operative functions of the ODIHR should be strengthened and its cooperation with the Council of Europe improved;
- the effectiveness and the operational capabilities of the OSCE Missions should continue to be improved;

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<sup>19</sup> This is a new version of an idea put forward in the summer of 1994 by Germany and the Netherlands ("Kinkel-Kooijmans Proposal") which was presented as a proposal of the EU countries and Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden to the Budapest Review Conference. CSCE/BC/WG1/2, 16 November 1994.

- over the long term it might be useful to consolidate the OSCE Institutions (Vienna, Prague, Warsaw) in one place;
- the public relations work of the OSCE should be further improved.

### *The Russian Proposals*

The Russian memorandum of 21 March 1996 is strongly focused on institutional issues. It contains many concrete proposals which are not, however, worked out in full detail. Some elements of it must be regarded as extremely ambitious and could hardly be implemented over the short term.

The development of a common and comprehensive security model is described as a matter of priority. Russia calls on the OSCE States to work out a concept with specific content so as to have a substantial document for the Summit Meeting in Lisbon. The objective is an extensive political declaration setting forth the fundamental principles of a future European security system along with a classification and assessment of the risks, with a view to developing collective responses.

This document should include concrete guidelines. What is being proposed is a European Security Charter. A Charter would make it possible to put relations on a treaty basis and to create for the OSCE region a security system binding under international law. Such a system would offer security guarantees to countries not members of alliances; it would reorganize cooperation between the existing European and Euro-Atlantic organizations on the basis of coordination and a clear division of responsibilities. There is also a suggestion that "a Security Council for Europe (or the OSCE Executive Committee) which would have appropriate powers"<sup>20</sup> might be established.

In addition, there is a proposal that a code of conduct on economic, social and environmental aspects of security be developed, that new commitments be undertaken in the field of human rights, and that cooperation in the fight against terrorism be intensified. With regard to politico-military security, it is suggested that a new concept be worked out for arms control not based on bloc thinking. Finally, the document proposes strengthening the legal foundations of the OSCE and making substantial improvements in OSCE institutions and mechanisms.

As for follow-up actions, Russia suggests that a European conference to be called "Europe of the 21st Century" be organized for 1997/98. There, all OSCE States and existing multilateral institutions would come together to decide on an improved division of labor between the institutions.<sup>21</sup>

The Russian proposal called "An Outline Structure of an Economic Component of a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the

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<sup>20</sup> REF.SC/11/96, 21 March 1996, 2c.  
<sup>21</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 3.

21st Century", dated 24 May 1996, introduces a dazzling variety of elements culled from the field of economics (social security, elimination of discriminatory trade and economic practices, regional economic cooperation, infrastructure, protection of the environment, preventing the proliferation of technologies for mass destruction, conversion issues, fighting crime and corruption) which are of importance for a security model.

Among other things there is a proposal to define crisis indicators of an economic and social kind and, together with the OECD, the IMF, and the ECE/UN, to set up an economic and social early-warning system that would permit the OSCE to take the necessary steps at an early stage. In order to identify those economic circumstances which are relevant to security, the OSCE, along with competent economic organizations, should develop a mechanism for coordination, cooperation and division of responsibilities.<sup>22</sup>

#### *The Ukraine's Proposal of 28 May 1996*

This rather long paper argues the case for stronger cooperation between the security organizations on the basis of equality, coordination, transparency and comparative advantage. The concept of mutually reinforcing security organizations ought to be implemented more effectively. Exchange of information, the division of responsibilities and coordination should all be improved. The role and the effectiveness of the OSCE should be defined more clearly and strengthened. Compliance with norms and principles should be improved. When these principles are violated there should be concerted action which, when necessary, should include coercive measures. In such cases, the OSCE should turn to the UN Security Council. Such a decision should be based on the principle "consensus minus the violator". The Ukraine favors strengthening the economic dimension of the OSCE. It specifically welcomes measures for economic confidence-building and an economic and environmental code of conduct.

Two Ukrainian proposals deserve special mention. One suggests that security guarantees be given to countries not members of military alliances, if those countries so desire. Depending on the individual case, such guarantees would be provided by one or more European or trans-Atlantic organizations, if they agreed to do so. Secondly, the Ukraine proposes the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone for Central Eastern Europe in order to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons in new NATO member countries as part of NATO enlargement. This point is of particular importance for the Ukraine as it has either scrapped the nuclear weapons it inherited from the USSR or

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. REF.PC/329/96, 24 May 1996.

given them to Russia under international control and has joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.<sup>23</sup>

#### *Work Leading up to the Lisbon Summit*

Discussion on the Security Model will continue after the summer break. New and more concrete proposals are expected beginning in September. At the beginning of October 1996 an intensifying seminar on the Security Model will be held in Vienna. It is also expected that recommendations by a working group of independent experts on the Security Model will be published in the fall.<sup>24</sup> The Review Meeting in Vienna (4-22 November 1996) and particularly the Preparatory Meeting before the Lisbon Summit (25 November - 1 December 1996) will give the discussion important new thrust. The Chairman-in-Office has made clear that he expects substantial results at Lisbon. He has called on the participating States repeatedly to make appropriate contributions. A political declaration may be adopted in Lisbon. It would probably contain a risk analysis and, in addition, might lay down new principles of security cooperation as well as arrange for organizational and institutional measures. There could be a procedural decision to govern the further work on the Security Model.

#### *Evaluation and Prospects*

Just one and a half years after the discussion began, we are still in an initial phase. Following the first stage of cataloguing risks and challenges, the participating States are displaying some reticence when it comes to drawing operational conclusions and proposing concrete steps.

This is partly because the drawing up of a Security Model for the 21st Century is a conceptually demanding and politically delicate task. The draft proposals have to satisfy 55 countries with varying needs, interests and ideas. They must be innovative and add something to security. But at the same time it is clear that the participating States attach great importance to their sovereignty and want no limitation of their rights. The security organizations, too, insist on their established autonomy; they show a willingness to cooperate

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<sup>23</sup> REF.PC/339/96.

<sup>24</sup> At the initiative of Dr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Director of SIPRI, the Independent Working Group of security experts was set up to make a contribution to the model discussion from the vantage point of security specialists. With the support of the governments of Hungary, Sweden, Russia and Switzerland, three experts meetings were held (Budapest, 1-3 December 1995; Moscow, 12-13 April 1996; Geneva, 23-24 May 1996). The report and recommendations of the Working Group are to be presented to the OSCE in September 1996.

but are determined not to be dictated to. Thus the work on a Security Model is turning into a difficult balancing act between what is substantively desirable and what is politically doable.

But the reticence of the participating States is also a result of the political situation in the last half of the nineties. It reflects the imponderable factors affecting the actors on the European security stage in this eventful time of transition. In the face of important events - e.g. the results of the Russian presidential elections, the consequences of the pacification process in Bosnia, the eastward enlargement of NATO - neither countries nor organizations want to commit themselves prematurely to new principles, responses and institutions. Despite the non-committal character of the proposals it is heartening to see that the discussion has come to be taken seriously by all participants, states as well as other security organizations. The proposals aimed at improving cooperation between the international organizations and at enhancing the effectiveness of the OSCE are interesting. They are also of a practical kind and could be implemented. But it is questionable whether such improvements in details do justice to the lofty notion of a "Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century".

The discussions held so far have begun a learning process. Our views on a "Security Model" are clearer today than they were a year and a half ago. We know what the Security Model cannot be: a ponderous new collective security structure with rigid and binding allocation of tasks which claims exclusive responsibility for security in Europe and, from a position at the top of the hierarchy, dictates to other institutions what they must do. We have some indications of what this discussion might accomplish. It offers a way of adapting security cooperation steadily and flexibly to new challenges and for working out certain common values, procedures and instruments on a voluntary basis.

There is another lesson we had to learn: differing and sometimes opposed perceptions of security and security interests exist in reality. It would be naive to think that this discussion could simply do away with such differences. A continuing dialogue can, however, make a country's concerns about security and its interests in this regard more understandable to the other states. Open discussion promotes transparency and creates better understanding of a state's motives. Such a dialogue is a confidence-building measure. It can mean that significant changes in the security scene are understood rightly and do not provide a pretext for negative counter-measures.

Still another important lesson is that the discussion of a Security Model can only be carried on at a common pace and together with all other security organizations. The OSCE has no monopoly in this field. Nor does it have the authority to impose its rules on other organizations. Only a coordinated, transparent and cooperative approach by the OSCE, together with other inter-

ested organizations, will ensure that what emerges from these discussions will pass the test of everyday relevance and practicability. What should be avoided under all circumstances, in our opinion, is a model document that exhausts itself in flights of rhetoric and arouses high public expectations on which it cannot make good. "Paper tigers" of this kind damage the credibility of organizations and discredit the principle of security cooperation.

Taking these complexities into consideration, it is becoming clearer and clearer that the discussion of a Security Model is a long-term undertaking which will extend far beyond the Lisbon Summit. What is important is not so much the grandiose idea of a "Security Model" but rather the unspectacular but determined pursuit of a European security agenda which is in the interest of all countries and organizations.