

## Annex



## Vienna Document 1994

### of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

- (1) Representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia<sup>1</sup>, met in Vienna in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contained in the Concluding Documents of the Madrid, Vienna and Helsinki Follow-up Meetings of the CSCE. The delegation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia attended the meetings as an observer as from 1993.
- (2) The Negotiations were conducted from 1989 to 1994.
- (3) The participating States recalled that the aim of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general.
- (4) The participating States recognized that the mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures which are adopted in the present document and which are in accordance with the mandates of the Madrid<sup>2</sup>, Vienna and Helsinki Follow-up Meetings of the CSCE serve by their scope and nature and by their implementation to strengthen confidence and security among the participating States.
- (5) The participating States recalled the declaration on Refraining from

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<sup>1</sup> On 13 December 1992 the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials agreed to maintain in force its decision of 8 July 1992 to suspend the participation of Yugoslavia in the CSCE and review it as appropriate.

<sup>2</sup> The zone of application for CSBMs under the terms of the Madrid mandate is set out in Annex I.

- the Threat or Use of Force contained in paragraphs (9) to (27) of the Document of the Stockholm Conference and stressed its continuing validity as seen in the light of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe.
- (6) On 17 November 1990, the participating States adopted the Vienna Document 1990, which built upon and added to the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the Document of the Stockholm Conference 1986. On 4 March 1992, the participating States adopted the Vienna Document 1992, which built upon and added to the confidence- and security-building measures contained in the Vienna Document 1990.
  - (7) In fulfilment of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of November 1990 and the Programme for Immediate Action, set out in the Helsinki Document 1992, they continued the CSBM negotiations under the same mandate, and have adopted the present document which integrates a set of new confidence- and security-building measures with measures previously adopted.
  - (8) The participating States have adopted the following:

*I. Annual exchange of military information*

*Information on military forces*

- (9) The participating States will exchange annually information on their military forces concerning the military organization, manpower and major weapon and equipment systems, as specified below, in the zone of application for confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Participating States which have no military forces to be reported will so inform all other participating States.
- (10) The information will be provided in an agreed format to all other participating States not later than 15 December of each year. It will be valid as of 1 January of the following year and will include:
  - (10.1) 1. Information on the command organization of those military forces referred to under points 2 and 3 specifying the designation and subordination of all formations<sup>3</sup> and units<sup>4</sup> at each level of command down to and including brigade/regiment or

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<sup>3</sup> In this context, formations are armies, corps and divisions and their equivalents.

<sup>4</sup> In this context, units are brigades, regiments and their equivalents.

- equivalent level. The information will be designed in such a way as to distinguish units from formations.
- (10.1.1) Each participating State providing information on military forces will include a statement indicating the total number of units contained therein and the resultant annual evaluation quota as provided for in paragraph (107).
- (10.2) 2. For each formation and combat unit<sup>5</sup> of land forces down to and including brigade/regiment or equivalent level the information will indicate:
- (10.2.1) - the designation and subordination;
- (10.2.2) - whether it is active or non-active;<sup>6</sup>
- (10.2.3) - the normal peacetime location of its headquarters indicated by exact geographic terms and/or co-ordinates;
- (10.2.4) - the peacetime authorized personnel strength;
- (10.2.5) - the major organic weapon and equipment systems, specifying the numbers of each type of:
- (10.2.5.1) - battle tanks;
- (10.2.5.2) - helicopters;
- (10.2.5.3) - armoured combat vehicles (armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles);
- (10.2.5.4) - armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes;
- (10.2.5.5) - anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/integrally mounted on armoured vehicles;
- (10.2.5.6) - self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above);
- (10.2.5.7) - armoured vehicle launched bridges.
- (10.3.1) For planned increases in personnel strength above that reported under paragraph (10.2.4) for more than 21 days by more than 1,500 troops for each active combat unit and by more than 5,000 troops for each active formation, excluding personnel increases in the formation's subordinate formations and/or combat units subject to separate reporting under paragraph (10.2); as well as
- (10.3.2) for each non-active formation and non-active combat unit which is planned to be temporarily activated for routine military activities or for any other purpose with more than 2,000

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<sup>5</sup> In this context, combat units are infantry, armoured, mechanized, motorized rifle, artillery, combat engineer and army aviation units. Those combat units which are airmobile or airborne will also be included.

<sup>6</sup> In this context, non-active formations or combat units are those manned from zero to fifteen percent of their authorized combat strength. This term includes low strength formations and units.

- troops for more than 21 days
- (10.3.3) the following additional information will be provided in the annual exchange of military information:
- (10.3.3.1) - designation and subordination of the formation or combat unit;
- (10.3.3.2) - purpose of the increase or activation;
- (10.3.3.3) - for active formations and combat units the planned number of troops exceeding the personnel strength indicated under paragraph (10.2.4) or for non-active formations and combat units the number of troops involved during the period of activation;
- (10.3.3.4) - start and end dates of the envisaged increase in personnel strength or activation;
- (10.3.3.5) - planned location/area of activation;
- (10.3.3.6) - the numbers of each type of the major weapon and equipment systems as listed in paragraphs (10.2.5.1) to (10.2.5.7) which are planned to be used during the period of the personnel increase or activation.
- (10.3.4) - In cases where the information required under paragraphs (10.3.1) to (10.3.3.6) cannot be provided in the annual exchange of military information, or in cases of changes in the information already provided, the required information will be communicated at least 42 days prior to such a personnel increase or temporary activation taking effect or, in cases when the personnel increase or temporary activation is carried out without advance notice to the troops involved, at the latest at the time the increase or the activation has taken effect.
- (10.4) For each amphibious formation and amphibious combat unit<sup>7</sup> permanently located in the zone of application down to and including brigade/regiment or equivalent level, the information will include the items as set out above.
- (10.5) 3. For each air formation and air combat unit<sup>8</sup> of the air forces, air defence aviation and of naval aviation permanently based on land down to and including wing/air regiment or equivalent level the information will include:
- (10.5.1) - the designation and subordination;
- (10.5.2) - the normal peacetime location of the headquarters indicated by exact geographic terms and/or co-ordinates;
- (10.5.3) - the normal peacetime location of the unit indicated by the air base or military airfield on which the unit is based, specify-

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<sup>7</sup> Combat units as defined above.

<sup>8</sup> In this context, air combat units are units, the majority of whose organic aircraft are combat aircraft.

- ing:
- (10.5.3.1) - the designation or, if applicable, name of the air base or military airfield and
  - (10.5.3.2) - its location indicated by exact geographic terms and/or coordinates;
  - (10.5.4) - the peacetime authorized personnel strength<sup>9</sup>;
  - (10.5.5) - the numbers of each type of:
    - (10.5.5.1) - combat aircraft;
    - (10.5.5.2) - helicopters
- organic to the formation or unit.

*Data relating to major weapon and equipment systems*

- (11) The participating States will exchange data relating to their major weapon and equipment systems as specified in the provisions on Information on Military Forces within the zone of application for CSBMs.
  - (11.1) Data on existing weapon and equipment systems, if not already provided, will be provided once to all other participating States not later than 15 December 1995.
  - (11.2) Data on new types or versions of major weapon and equipment systems will be provided by each State when its deployment plans for the systems concerned are provided for the first time in accordance with paragraphs (13) and (14) below or, at the latest, when it deploys the systems concerned for the first time in the zone of application for CSBMs. If a participating State has already provided data on the same new type or version, other participating States may, if appropriate, certify the validity of those data as far as their system is concerned.
- (12) The following data will be provided for each type or version of major weapon and equipment systems:
  - (12.1) *Battle tanks*
    - (12.1.1) Type
    - (12.1.2) National Nomenclature/Name
    - (12.1.3) Main Gun Calibre
    - (12.1.4) Unladen Weight
    - (12.1.5) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
      - (12.1.5.1) Night Vision Capability      yes/no
      - (12.1.5.2) Additional Armour            yes/no
      - (12.1.5.3) Track Width                    cm

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<sup>9</sup> As an exception, this information need not be provided on air defence aviation units.

- (12.1.5.4) Floating Capabilities           yes/no
- (12.1.5.5) Snorkelling Equipment       yes/no
  
- (12.2)           *Armoured combat vehicles*
  
- (12.2.1)        Armoured Personnel Carriers
  
- (12.2.1.1)     Type
- (12.2.1.2)     National Nomenclature/Name
- (12.2.1.3)     Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any
- (12.2.1.4)     Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
- (12.2.1.4.1)   Night Vision Capability       yes/no
- (12.2.1.4.2)   Seating Capacity
- (12.2.1.4.3)   Floating Capability            yes/no
- (12.2.1.4.4)   Snorkelling Equipment        yes/no
  
- (12.2.2)       Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles
  
- (12.2.2.1)     Type
- (12.2.2.2)     National Nomenclature/Name
- (12.2.2.3)     Type and Calibre of Armaments
- (12.2.2.4)     Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
- (12.2.2.4.1)   Night Vision Capability       yes/no
- (12.2.2.4.2)   Additional Armour            yes/no
- (12.2.2.4.3)   Floating Capability            yes/no
- (12.2.2.4.4)   Snorkelling Equipment        yes/no
  
- (12.2.3)       Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles
  
- (12.2.3.1)     Type
- (12.2.3.2)     National Nomenclature/Name
- (12.2.3.3)     Main Gun Calibre
- (12.2.3.4)     Unladen Weight
- (12.2.3.5)     Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
- (12.2.3.5.1)   Night Vision Capability       yes/no
- (12.2.3.5.2)   Additional Armour            yes/no
- (12.2.3.5.3)   Floating Capability            yes/no
- (12.2.3.5.4)   Snorkelling Equipment        yes/no
- (12.3)         *Armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes*
  
- (12.3.1)       Armoured Personnel Carrier Look-Alikes
  
- (12.3.1.1)     Type



- (12.3.1.2) National Nomenclature/Name
- (12.3.1.3) Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any
  
- (12.3.2) Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle Look-Alikes
  - (12.3.2.1) Type
  - (12.3.2.2) National Nomenclature/Name
  - (12.3.2.3) Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any
  
- (12.4) *Anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/integrally mounted on armoured vehicles*
  - (12.4.1) Type
  - (12.4.2) National Nomenclature/Name
  
- (12.5) *Self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above)*
  - (12.5.1) Artillery pieces
    - (12.5.1.1) Type
    - (12.5.1.2) National Nomenclature/Name
    - (12.5.1.3) Calibre
  - (12.5.2) Mortars
    - (12.5.2.1) Type
    - (12.5.2.2) National Nomenclature/Name
    - (12.5.2.3) Calibre
  - (12.5.3) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
    - (12.5.3.1) Type
    - (12.5.3.2) National Nomenclature/Name
    - (12.5.3.3) Calibre

- (12.5.3.4) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
  - (12.5.3.4.1) Number of Tubes
  
- (12.6) *Armoured vehicle launched bridges*
  - (12.6.1) Type
  - (12.6.2) National Nomenclature/Name
  - (12.6.3) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
    - (12.6.3.1) Span of the Bridge                    \_m
    - (12.6.3.2) Carrying Capacity/Load Classification        \_metric tons
  
- (12.7) *Combat aircraft*
  - (12.7.1) Type
  - (12.7.2) National Nomenclature/Name
  - (12.7.3) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
    - (12.7.3.1) Type of Integrally Mounted Armaments, if any
  
- (12.8) *Helicopters*
  - (12.8.1) Type
  - (12.8.2) National Nomenclature/Name
  - (12.8.3) Data on new types or versions will, in addition, include:
    - (12.8.3.1) Primary Role (e.g. specialized attack, multi-purpose attack, combat support, transport)
    - (12.8.3.2) Type of Integrally Mounted Armaments, if any
  - (12.9) Each participating State will, at the time the data are presented, ensure that other participating States are provided with photographs presenting the right or left side, top and front views for each of the types of major weapon and equipment systems concerned.
  - (12.10) Photographs of armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes will include a view of such vehicles so as to show clearly their internal configuration illustrating the specific characteristic which distinguishes each particular vehicle as a look-alike.
  - (12.11) The photographs of each type will be accompanied by a note giving the type designation and national nomenclature for all models and versions of the type which the photographs represent. The photographs of a type will contain an annotation of the data for that type.

*Information on plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems*

- (13) The participating States will exchange annually information on their plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems as specified in the provisions on Information on Military Forces within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (14) The information will be provided in an agreed format to all other participating States not later than 15 December of each year. It will cover plans for the following year and will include:
- (14.1) - the type and name of the weapon/equipment systems to be deployed;
- (14.2) - the total number of each weapon/equipment system;
- (14.3) - whenever possible, the number of each weapon/equipment system planned to be allocated to each formation or unit;
- (14.4) - the extent to which the deployment will add to or replace existing weapon/equipment systems.

*Defence planning*<sup>10</sup>

*Exchange of information*

- (15) **General provisions**  
The participating States will exchange annually information as specified below in paragraphs (15.1) to (15.4), to provide transparency about each CSCE participating State's intentions in the medium to long term as regards size, structure, training and equipment of its armed forces, as well as defence policy, doctrines and budgets related thereto, based on their national practice and providing the background for a dialogue among the participating States. The information will be provided to all other participating States not later than two months after the military budget, referred to in paragraph (15.4.1), has been approved by the competent national authorities.
- (15.1) *Defence policy and doctrine*
- In a written statement participating States will address:
- (15.1.1) their defence policy, including military strategy/doctrine as well as changes occurring thereto;
- (15.1.2) their national procedures for defence planning, including the stages of defence planning, the institutions involved in the

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<sup>10</sup> The application of the measures relating to defence planning is not restricted by the zone of application for CSBMs as set out in Annex I.

- (15.1.3) decision-making process as well as changes occurring thereto; their current personnel policy and the most substantial changes in it.  
If the information under this point has remained the same, participating States may refer to the previously exchanged information.
- (15.2) *Force planning*
- In a written statement participating States will address in the form of a general description:
- (15.2.1) the size, structure, personnel, major weapon and equipment systems and deployment of their armed forces and the envisaged changes thereto. In view of the reorganization of the defence structure in a number of participating States, similar information will be provided on other forces, including paramilitary forces, on a voluntary basis and as appropriate. The scope and the status of the information on such forces will be reviewed after their status has been further defined, in the process of reorganization;
- (15.2.2) the training programmes for their armed forces and planned changes thereto in the forthcoming years;
- (15.2.3) the procurement of major equipment and major military construction programmes on the basis of the categories as set out in the United Nations Instrument mentioned in paragraph (15.3), either ongoing or starting in the forthcoming years, if planned, and the implications of such projects, accompanied by explanations, where appropriate;
- (15.2.4) the realization of the intentions previously reported under this paragraph.  
In order to facilitate the understanding of the information provided, the participating States are encouraged to use illustrative charts and maps, wherever applicable.

(15.3) *Information on previous expenditures*

Participating States will report their defence expenditures of the preceding fiscal year on the basis of the categories as set out in the United Nations "Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures" adopted on 12 December 1980.

They will provide, in addition, any appropriate clarification, if necessary, as to possible discrepancies between expenditures and previously reported budgets.

(15.4) *Information on budgets*

The written statement will be supplemented with the following information, where available:

(15.4.1) On the forthcoming fiscal year

(15.4.1.1) budget figures on the basis of the categories as set out in the United Nations Instrument mentioned in paragraph (15.3);

(15.4.1.2) status of budget figures.

The participating States will furthermore provide the following information in as far as available:

(15.4.2) On the two fiscal years following the forthcoming fiscal year

(15.4.2.1) the best estimates itemizing defence expenditures on the basis of the categories as set out in the United Nations Instrument mentioned in paragraph (15.3);

(15.4.2.2) status of these estimates.

(15.4.3) On the last two years of the forthcoming five fiscal years

(15.4.3.1) the best estimates specifying the total and figures for the following three main categories:

- operating costs,
- procurement and construction,
- research and development;

(15.4.3.2) status of these estimates.

(15.4.4) Explanatory data

(15.4.4.1) an indication of the year which has been used as the basis for any extrapolation;

(15.4.4.2) clarifications of the data as specified in paragraphs (15.3) and (15.4), especially with regard to inflation.

*Clarification, review and dialogue*

(15.5) *Request for clarification*

To increase transparency, each participating State may ask any other participating State for clarification of the information provided. Questions should be submitted within a period of two months following the receipt of a participating State's information. Participating States will make every effort to answer such questions fully and promptly. It should be understood that these exchanges are informational only. The questions and replies may be transmitted to all other participating States.

(15.6) *Annual discussion meetings*

Without prejudice to the possibility of having ad hoc discussions on the information and clarification provided, the participating States will hold each year a meeting for a focused and structured dialogue to discuss the issues relating to defence planning. The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting as foreseen in Chapter X of the Vienna Document 1994 could be used for the purpose. Such discussions may extend to the methodology of defence planning and the implications originating from the information provided.

(15.7) *Study visits*

To increase knowledge of national defence planning procedures and promote dialogue, each participating State may arrange study visits for representatives of other CSCE participating States to meet with officials at the institutions involved in defence planning and appropriate bodies such as government agencies (planning, finance, economy), ministry of defence, general staff and relevant parliamentary committees. Such exchanges could be organized within the framework of military contacts and co-operation.

*Possible additional information*

- (15.8) Participating States are encouraged to provide any other factual and documentary information relating to their defence planning. This may include:
  - (15.8.1) the list and, if possible, the texts of major publicly available documents, in any of the CSCE working languages, reflecting their defence policy, military strategies and doctrines;
  - (15.8.2) any other publicly available documentary reference material on their plans relating to paragraphs (15.1) and (15.2), e.g. military documents and/or "white papers".
- (15.9) This documentary information may be provided to the CPC Secretariat, which will distribute lists of received information and make it available upon request.

*II. Risk reduction*

*Mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities*

- (16) Participating States will, in accordance with the following provisions, consult and co-operate with each other about any unusual and unscheduled activities of their military forces outside their normal peacetime locations which are militarily significant, within the zone of application for CSBMs and about which a participating State expresses its security concern.
  - (16.1) The participating State which has concerns about such an activity may transmit a request for an explanation to another participating State where the activity is taking place.
    - (16.1.1) The request will state the cause, or causes, of the concern and, to the extent possible, the type and location, or area, of the activity.
    - (16.1.2) The reply will be transmitted within not more than 48 hours.
    - (16.1.3) The reply will give answers to questions raised, as well as any other relevant information which might help to clarify the activity giving rise to concern.
    - (16.1.4) The request and the reply will be transmitted to all other participating States without delay.
  - (16.2) The requesting State, after considering the reply provided, may then request a meeting to discuss the matter.
    - (16.2.1) The requesting State may ask for a meeting with the responding State.

- (16.2.1.1) Such a meeting will be convened within not more than 48 hours.
- (16.2.1.2) The request for such a meeting will be transmitted to all participating States without delay.
- (16.2.1.3) The responding State is entitled to ask other interested participating States, in particular those which might be involved in the activity, to participate in the meeting.
- (16.2.1.4) Such a meeting will be held at a venue to be mutually agreed upon by the requesting and the responding States. If there is no agreement, the meeting will be held at the Conflict Prevention Centre.
- (16.2.1.5) The requesting and responding States will, jointly or separately, transmit a report of the meeting to all other participating States without delay.
- (16.2.2) The requesting State may ask for a meeting of all participating States.
- (16.2.2.1) Such a meeting will be convened within not more than 48 hours.
- (16.2.2.2) The Permanent Committee will serve as the forum for such a meeting.
- (16.2.2.3) Participating States involved in the matter to be discussed undertake to be represented at such a meeting.
- (16.2.2.4) In the light of its assessment of the situation, the Permanent Committee will use all its competences to contribute to a solution.

*Co-operation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature*

- (17) Participating States will co-operate by reporting and clarifying hazardous incidents of a military nature within the zone of application for CSBMs in order to prevent possible misunderstandings and mitigate the effects on another participating State.
- (17.1) Each participating State will designate a point to contact in case of such hazardous incidents and will so inform all other participating States. A list of such points will be kept available at the Conflict Prevention Centre.
- (17.2) In the event of such a hazardous incident the participating State whose military forces are involved in the incident should provide the information available to other participating States in an expeditious manner. Any participating State affected by such an incident may also request clarification as appropriate. Such requests will receive a prompt response.



- (17.3) Matters relating to information about such hazardous incidents may be discussed by participating States at the Special Committee of the FSC, or at the annual implementation assessment meeting.
- (17.4) These provisions will not affect the rights and obligations of participating States under any international agreement concerning hazardous incidents, nor will they preclude additional methods of reporting and clarifying hazardous incidents.

*Voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities*

- (18) In order to help to dispel concerns about military activities in the zone of application for CSBMs, participating States are encouraged to invite other participating States to take part in visits to areas on the territory of the host State in which there may be cause for such concerns. Such invitations will be without prejudice to any action taken under paragraphs (16) to (16.2).
- (18.1) States invited to participate in such visits will include those which are understood to have concerns. At the time invitations are issued, the host State will communicate to all other participating States its intention to conduct the visit, indicating the reasons for the visit, the area to be visited, the States invited and the general arrangements to be adopted.
- (18.2) Arrangements for such visits, including the number of the representatives from other participating States to be invited, will be at the discretion of the host State, which will bear the in-country costs. However, the host State should take appropriate account of the need to ensure the effectiveness of the visit, the maximum amount of openness and transparency and the safety and security of the invited representatives. It should also take account, as far as practicable, of the wishes of visiting representatives as regards the itinerary of the visit. The host State and the States which provide visiting personnel may circulate joint or individual comments on the visit to all other participating States.

### III. Contacts

#### *Visits to air bases*

- (19) Each participating State with air combat units reported under paragraph (10) will arrange visits for representatives of all other participating States to one of its normal peacetime air bases<sup>11</sup> on which such units are located in order to provide the visitors with the opportunity to view activity at the air base, including preparations to carry out the functions of the air base, and to gain an impression of the approximate number of air sorties and type of missions being flown.
- (20) No participating State will be obliged to arrange more than one such visit in any five-year period. Prior indications given by participating States of forthcoming schedules for such visits for the subsequent year(s) may be discussed at the annual implementation assessment meetings.
- (21) As a rule, up to two visitors from each participating State will be invited.
- (22) When the air base to be visited is located on the territory of another participating State, the invitations will be issued by the participating State on whose territory the air base is located (host State). In such cases, the responsibilities as host delegated by this State to the participating State arranging the visit will be specified in the invitation.
- (23) The State arranging the visit will determine the programme for the visit in co-ordination with the host State, if appropriate. The visitors will follow the instructions issued by the State arranging the visit in accordance with the provisions set out in this document.
- (24) The modalities regarding visits to air bases will conform to the provisions in Annex II.
- (25) The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian visitors, including personnel accredited to the host State. Military visitors will normally wear their uniforms and insignia during the visit.
- (26) The visit to the air base will last for a minimum of 24 hours.

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<sup>11</sup> In this context, the term normal peacetime air base is understood to mean the normal peacetime location of the air combat unit indicated by the air base or military airfield on which the unit is based.

- (27) In the course of the visit, the visitors will be given a briefing on the purpose and functions of the air base and on its current activities, including appropriate information on the air force structure and operations so as to explain the specific role and subordination of the air base. The State arranging the visit will provide the visitors with the opportunity to view routine activities at the air base during the visit.
- (28) The visitors will have the opportunity to communicate with commanders and troops, including those of support/logistic units located at the air base. They will be provided with the opportunity to view all types of aircraft located at the air base.
- (29) At the close of the visit, the State arranging the visit will provide an opportunity for the visitors to meet together and also with State officials and senior air base personnel to discuss the course of the visit.

(30) *Programme of military contacts and co-operation*

*Military contacts*

- (30.1) To improve further their mutual relations in the interest of strengthening the process of confidence- and security-building, the participating States will, on a voluntary basis and as appropriate, promote and facilitate:
- (30.1.1) -exchanges and visits between members of the armed forces at all levels, especially those between junior officers and commanders;
- (30.1.2) -contacts between relevant military institutions, especially between military units;
- (30.1.3) -exchanges of visits of naval vessels and air force units;
- (30.1.4) -reservation of places in military academies and schools and on military training courses for members of the armed forces from the participating States;
- (30.1.5) -use of the language facilities of military training institutions for the foreign-language instruction of members of the armed forces from the participating States and the organization of language courses in military training institutions for military foreign-language instructors from the participating States;
- (30.1.6) -exchanges and contacts between academics and experts in military studies and related areas;
- (30.1.7) -participation and contribution by members of the armed forces of the participating States, as well as civil experts in security matters and defence policy, to academic conferences, seminars and symposia;

- (30.1.8) -issuing of joint academic publications on security and defence issues;
- (30.1.9) -sporting and cultural events between members of their armed forces.

*Military co-operation*

*Joint military exercises and training*

- (30.2) The participating States will conduct, on a voluntary basis and as appropriate, joint military training and exercises to work on tasks of mutual interest.

*Visits to military facilities, to military formations and observation of certain military activities*

- (30.3) In addition to the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 regarding visits to air bases, each participating State will arrange for representatives of all other participating States to visit one of its military facilities or military formations, or to observe military activities below thresholds specified in Chapter V. These events will provide the visitors or observers with the opportunity to view activity of that military facility, observe the training of that military formation or observe the conduct of that military activity.
- (30.4) Each participating State will make every effort to arrange one such visit or observation in any five-year period.
- (30.5) In order to ensure maximum efficiency and cost-effectiveness, the participating States may conduct such visits or observations in conjunction with, inter alia, other visits and contacts organized in accordance with provisions of the Vienna Document 1994.
- (30.6) The modalities regarding visits to air bases specified in paragraphs (19) - (29) of the Vienna Document 1994 will, mutatis mutandis, be applied to the visits to military facilities and to military formations.

*Observation visits*

- (30.7) Participating States conducting military activities subject to prior notification according to Chapter IV of the Vienna Document 1994, but at levels lower than those specified in Chapter V of the Vienna Document 1994, are encouraged to invite observers from other participating States, especially neighbouring States, to observe such military activities.
- (30.8) Arrangements for such visits will be at the discretion of the host State.

*Provision of experts*

- (30.9) The participating States express their willingness to provide to any other participating State available experts to be consulted on matters of defence and security.
- (30.10) For that purpose participating States will designate a point of contact and will inform all other participating States accordingly. A list of such points will be kept available at the Conflict Prevention Centre.
- (30.11) At the discretion of participating States, communications between them on this subject may be transmitted through the CSCE communications network.
- (30.12) The modalities regarding provision of experts will be agreed directly between the participating States concerned.

*Seminars on co-operation in the military field*

- (30.13) Subject to the approval of the appropriate CSCE bodies, the Conflict Prevention Centre will organize seminars on co-operation between the armed forces of the participating States.
- (30.14) The agenda of the seminars will concentrate primarily on CSCE-oriented tasks, including the participation of the armed forces in peacekeeping operations, in disaster and emergency relief, in refugee crises and in providing humanitarian assistance.

*Exchange of information on agreements on military contacts and co-operation*

- (30.15) The participating States will exchange information on agreements on programmes of military contacts and co-operation concluded with other participating States within the scope of these provisions.

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- (30.16) The participating States have decided that the Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation will be open to all CSCE participating States in respect of all their armed forces and territory. The implementation of this Programme will be assessed at annual implementation assessment meetings as foreseen in Chapter X.

*Demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems*

- (31) The first participating State which deploys with its military forces in the zone of application a new type of major weapon and equipment system as specified in the provisions on Information on Military Forces will arrange at the earliest opportunity, but not later than one year after deployment has started, a demonstration for representatives of all other participating States<sup>12</sup>, which may coincide with other events stipulated in this document.
- (32) When the demonstration is carried out on the territory of another participating State, the invitation will be issued by the participating State on whose territory the demonstration is carried out (host State). In such cases, the responsibilities as host delegated by this State to the participating State arranging the demonstration will be specified in the invitation.
- (33) The State arranging the demonstration will determine the programme for the demonstration in co-ordination with the host State, if appropriate. The visitors will follow the instructions issued by the State arranging the demonstration in accordance with the provisions set out in this document.
- (34) The modalities regarding demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems will conform to the provisions in Annex II.
- (35) The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian visitors, including personnel accredited to the host State. Military visitors will normally wear their uniforms and insignia during the visit.

*IV. Prior notification of certain military activities*

- (36) The participating States will give notification in writing in

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<sup>12</sup> This provision will not apply if another participating State has already arranged a demonstration of the same type of major weapon and equipment system.

accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX to all other participating States 42 days or more in advance of the start of notifiable<sup>13</sup> military activities in the zone of application for CSBMs.

- (37) Notification will be given by the participating State on whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place (host State) even if the forces of that State are not engaged in the activity or their strength is below the notifiable level. This will not relieve other participating States of their obligation to give notification, if their involvement in the planned military activity reaches the notifiable level.
- (38) Each of the following military activities in the field conducted as a single activity in the zone of application for CSBMs at or above the levels defined below will be notified:
- (38.1) The engagement of formations of land forces<sup>14</sup> of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components.
- (38.1.1) This military activity will be subject to notification whenever it involves at any time during the activity:
- at least 9,000 troops, including support troops, or
  - at least 250 battle tanks, or
  - at least 500 ACVs, as defined in paragraph (12.2), or
  - at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket-launchers (100 mm calibre and above)
- if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.
- (38.1.2) The participation of air forces of the participating States will be included in the notification if it is foreseen that in the course of the activity 200 or more sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters, will be flown.
- (38.2) The engagement of military forces in an amphibious landing<sup>15</sup>, heliborne landing or parachute assault in the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (38.2.1) These military activities will be subject to notification whenever any of them involves at least 3,000 troops.
- (38.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of

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<sup>13</sup> In this document, the term notifiable means subject to notification.

<sup>14</sup> In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile or heliborne forces and airborne forces.

<sup>15</sup> In this document, amphibious landing includes total troops launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on shore.

application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated.

- (38.3.1) The arrival or concentration of these forces will be subject to notification whenever it involves, at any time during the activity:
- at least 9,000 troops, including support troops, or
  - at least 250 battle tanks, or
  - at least 500 ACVs, as defined in paragraph (12.2), or
  - at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above)
- if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division.
- (38.3.2) Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed CSBMs when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (39) Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved are exceptions to the requirement for prior notification to be made 42 days in advance.
- (39.1) Notification of such activities, above the agreed thresholds, will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities.
- (40) Notification will be given in writing of each notifiable military activity in the following agreed form:
- (41) *A) General information*
- (41.1) The designation of the military activity;
  - (41.2) The general purpose of the military activity;
  - (41.3) The names of the States involved in the military activity;
  - (41.4) The level of command organizing and commanding the military activity;
  - (41.5) The start and end dates of the military activity.



- (42) *B) Information on different types of notifiable military activities*
- (42.1) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating State in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in combination with any possible air or naval components:
- (42.1.1) The total number of troops taking part in the military activity (i.e. ground troops, amphibious troops, airmobile or heliborne and airborne troops) and the number of troops participating for each State involved, if applicable;
- (42.1.2) The designation, subordination, number and type of formations and units participating for each State down to and including brigade/regiment or equivalent level;
- (42.1.3) The total number of battle tanks for each State;
- (42.1.4) The total number of armoured combat vehicles for each State and the total number of anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted on armoured vehicles;
- (42.1.5) The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre or above);
- (42.1.6) The total number of helicopters, by category;
- (42.1.7) Envisaged number of sorties by aircraft, excluding helicopters;
- (42.1.8) Purpose of air missions;
- (42.1.9) Categories of aircraft involved;
- (42.1.10) The level of command organizing and commanding the air force participation;
- (42.1.11) Naval ship-to-shore gunfire;
- (42.1.12) Indication of other naval ship-to-shore support;
- (42.1.13) The level of command organizing and commanding the naval force participation.
- (42.2) The engagement of military forces in an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault in the zone of application for CSBMs:
- (42.2.1) The total number of amphibious troops involved in notifiable amphibious landings, and/or the total number of troops involved in notifiable parachute assaults or heliborne landings;
- (42.2.2) In the case of a notifiable landing, the point or points of embarkation, if in the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (42.3) The engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated:

- (42.3.1) The total number of troops transferred;
  - (42.3.2) Number and type of formations participating in the transfer;
  - (42.3.3) The total number of battle tanks participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;
  - (42.3.4) The total number of armoured combat vehicles participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;
  - (42.3.5) The total number of artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above) participating in a notifiable arrival or concentration;
  - (42.3.6) Geographical co-ordinates for the points of arrival and for the points of concentration.
- (43) *C) The envisaged area in the zone of application for CSBMs and timeframe of the activity*
- (43.1) The area of the military activity delimited by geographic features together with geographic co-ordinates, as appropriate;
  - (43.2) Start and end dates of each phase of activity in the zone of application for CSBMs of participating formations (e.g., transfer, deployment, concentration of forces, active exercise, recovery);
  - (43.3) Tactical purpose of each phase and corresponding geographical area delimited by geographic co-ordinates; and
  - (43.4) Brief description of each phase.
- (44) *D) Other information*
- (44.1) Changes, if any, in relation to information provided in the annual calendar regarding the activity;
  - (44.2) Relationship of the activity to other notifiable activities.

#### *V. Observation of certain military activities*

- (45) The participating States will invite observers from all other participating States to the following notifiable military activities:
  - (45.1) -The engagement of formations of land forces<sup>16</sup> of the participating States in the same exercise activity conducted under a single operational command independently or in

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<sup>16</sup> In this context, the term land forces includes amphibious, airmobile or heliborne forces and airborne forces.

- combination with any possible air or naval components.
- (45.2) - The engagement of military forces in an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault in the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (45.3) - In the case of the engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for CSBMs to arrival points in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable activity or to be concentrated, the concentration of these forces. Forces which have been transferred into the zone will be subject to all provisions of agreed confidence- and security-building measures when they depart their arrival points to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (45.4) The above-mentioned activities will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged equals or exceeds 13,000 or where the number of battle tanks engaged equals or exceeds 300, or where the number of armoured combat vehicles engaged as defined in paragraph (12.2) equals or exceeds 500, or where the number of self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above) engaged equals or exceeds 250. In the case of an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault, the activity will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged equals or exceeds 3,500.
- (46) The host State will be the participating State on whose territory the notified activity will take place.
- (47) The host State may delegate responsibilities as host to another participating State or States engaged in the military activity on the territory of the host State, which will be the delegated State. In such cases, the host State will specify the allocation of responsibilities in its invitation to observe the activity.
- (48) Each participating State may send up to two observers to the military activity to be observed. The invited State may decide whether to send military and/or civilian observers, including personnel accredited to the host State. Military observers will normally wear their uniforms and insignia while performing their tasks.
- (49) The modalities regarding observation of certain military activities will conform to the provisions in Annex II.
- (50) The host or delegated State will determine a duration of observation which permits the observers to observe a notifiable military activity from the time that agreed thresholds for

- observation are met or exceeded until, for the last time during the activity, the thresholds for observation are no longer met.
- (51) The observers may make requests with regard to the observation programme. The host or delegated State will, if possible, accede to them.
- (52) The observers will be granted, during their mission, the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
- (53) The participating States will ensure that official personnel and troops taking part in an observed military activity, as well as other armed personnel located in the area of the military activity, are adequately informed regarding the presence, status and functions of observers.
- (54) The host or delegated State will not be required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations or defence sites.
- (55) In order to allow the observers to confirm that the notified activity is non-threatening in character and that it is carried out in conformity with the appropriate provisions of the notification, the host or delegated State will:
- (55.1) - at the commencement of the observation programme give a briefing on the purpose, the basic situation, the phases of the activity and possible changes as compared with the notification, and provide the observers with an observation programme containing a daily schedule;
- (55.2) - provide the observers with a map to a scale of one to not more than 250,000 depicting the area of the notified military activity and the initial tactical situation in this area. To depict the entire area of the notified military activity, smaller-scale maps may be additionally provided;
- (55.3) - provide the observers with appropriate observation equipment; in addition, the observers will be permitted to use their own binoculars, maps, photo and video cameras, dictaphones and hand-held passive night-vision devices. The above-mentioned equipment will be subject to examination and approval by the host or delegated State. It is understood that the host or delegated State may limit the use of certain equipment in restricted locations, installations or defence sites;
- (55.4) - be encouraged, whenever feasible and with due consideration for the security of the observers, to provide an aerial survey, preferably by helicopter, of the area of the military activity. If carried out, such a survey should provide the observers with the opportunity to observe from the air the disposition of

forces engaged in the activity in order to help them gain a general impression of its scope and scale. At least one observer from each participating State represented at the observation should be given the opportunity to participate in the survey. Helicopters and/or aircraft may be provided by the host State or by another participating State at the request of and in agreement with the host State;

- (55.5) - give the observers briefings, once daily at a minimum, with the help of maps on the various phases of the military activity and their development, and on the geographic location of the observers; in the case of a land force activity conducted in combination with air or naval components, briefings will be given by representatives of all forces involved;
- (55.6) - provide opportunities to observe directly forces of the State(s) engaged in the military activity so that the observers get an impression of the flow of the entire activity; to this end, the observers will be given the opportunity to observe combat and support units of all participating formations of a divisional or equivalent level and, whenever possible, to visit units below divisional or equivalent level and communicate with commanders and troops. Commanders and other senior personnel of the participating formations as well as of the visited units will inform the observers of the mission and disposition of their respective units;
- (55.7) - guide the observers in the area of the military activity; the observers will follow the instructions issued by the host or delegated State in accordance with the provisions set out in this document;
- (55.8) - provide the observers with opportunities for timely communication with their embassies or other official missions and consular posts; the host or delegated State is not obligated to cover the communication expenses of the observers;

- (55.9) - at the close of each observation, provide an opportunity for the observers to meet together and also with host State officials to discuss the course of the observed activity. Where States other than the host State have been engaged in the activity, military representatives of those States will also be invited to take part in this discussion.
- (56) The participating States need not invite observers to notifiable military activities which are carried out without advance notice to the troops involved unless these notifiable activities have a duration of more than 72 hours. The continuation of these activities beyond this time will be subject to observation while the agreed thresholds for observation are met or exceeded. The observation programme will follow as closely as practically possible all the provisions for observation set out in this document.
- (57) The participating States are encouraged to permit media representatives from all participating States to attend observed military activities in accordance with accreditation procedures set down by the host State. In such instances, media representatives from all participating States will be treated without discrimination and given equal access to those facets of the activity open to media representatives.
- (57.1) The presence of media representatives will not interfere with the observers carrying out their functions nor with the flow of the military activity.
- (58) The host or delegated State will provide the observers with transportation from a suitable location announced in the invitation to the area of the notified activity so that the observers are in position before the start of the observation programme. It will also provide the observers with appropriate means of transportation in the area of the military activity, and return the observers to another suitable location announced in the invitation at the conclusion of the observation programme.

#### *VI. Annual calendars*

- (59) Each participating State will exchange, with all other participating States, an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior notification,<sup>17</sup> within the zone of application for CSBMs, forecast for the subsequent calendar year. A participating State which is to host military activities subject to

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<sup>17</sup> As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.

prior notification conducted by any other participating State(s) will include these activities in its annual calendar. It will be transmitted every year in writing, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX, not later than 15 November for the following year.

- (60) If a participating State does not forecast any military activity subject to prior notification, it will so inform all other participating States in the same manner as prescribed for the exchange of annual calendars.
- (61) Each participating State will list the above-mentioned activities chronologically and will provide information on each activity in accordance with the following model:
- (61.1) - number of military activities to be reported;
  - (61.2) - activity number;
  - (61.2.1) - type of military activity and its designation;
  - (61.2.2) - general characteristics and purpose of the military activity;
  - (61.2.3) - States involved in the military activity;
  - (61.2.4) - area of the military activity, indicated by geographic features, where appropriate, and defined by geographic co-ordinates;
  - (61.2.5) - planned duration of the military activity, indicated by envisaged start and end dates;
  - (61.2.6) - envisaged total number of troops<sup>18</sup> engaged in the military activity;
  - (61.2.7) - envisaged total number of troops for each State involved, if applicable. For activities involving more than one State, the host State will provide such information;
  - (61.2.8) - types of armed forces involved in the military activity;
  - (61.2.9) - envisaged level of the military activity and designation of the direct operational command under which this military activity will take place;
  - (61.2.10) - number and type of divisions whose participation in the military activity is envisaged;
  - (61.2.11) - any additional information concerning, inter alia, components of armed forces which the participating State planning the military activity considers relevant.
- (62) Should changes regarding the military activities in the annual calendar prove necessary, they will be communicated to all other participating States no later than in the appropriate notification.

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<sup>18</sup> As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.

- (63) Should a participating State cancel a military activity included in its annual calendar or reduce it to a level below notification thresholds, that State will inform the other participating States immediately.
- (64) Information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in an annual calendar will be communicated to all participating States as soon as possible, in accordance with the model provided in the annual calendar.

*VII. Constraining provisions*

- (65) The following provisions will apply to military activities subject to prior notification:<sup>19</sup>
  - (65.1) No participating State will carry out within two calendar years more than one military activity subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks.
  - (65.2) No participating State will carry out within a calendar year more than six military activities subject to prior notification each one involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks, but not more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks.
    - (65.2.1) Of these six military activities, no participating State will carry out within a calendar year more than three military activities subject to prior notification, each one involving more than 25,000 troops or 400 battle tanks.
  - (65.3) No participating State will carry out simultaneously more than three military activities subject to prior notification each one involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks.
- (66) Each participating State will communicate, in writing, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX, to all other participating States, by 15 November each year, information concerning military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks, which it plans to carry out or host in the second subsequent calendar year. Such a communication will include preliminary information on the activity, as to its general purpose, timeframe and duration, area, size and States involved.
- (67) If a participating State does not forecast any such military activity, it will so inform all other participating States in the same manner as prescribed for the exchange of annual calendars.
- (68) No participating State will carry out a military activity subject

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<sup>19</sup> As defined in the provisions on Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities.



to prior notification involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks, unless it has been the object of a communication as defined above and unless it has been included in the annual calendar, not later than 15 November each year.

- (69) If military activities subject to prior notification are carried out in addition to those contained in the annual calendar, they should be as few as possible.

#### *VIII. Compliance and verification*

- (70) According to the Madrid mandate, the confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon "will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content".
- (71) The participating States recognize that national technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.

#### *Inspection*

- (72) In accordance with the provisions contained in this document each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs. The inspecting State may invite other participating States to participate in an inspection.
- (73) Any participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.
- (74) No participating State will be obliged to accept on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs more than three inspections per calendar year.
- (74.1) When a participating State has accepted three inspections in a calendar year, it will so inform all other participating States.
- (75) No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating State.
- (76) An inspection will not be counted if, due to force majeure, it cannot be carried out.
- (77) The participating State which has received such a request will reply in the affirmative to the request within the agreed period of time, subject to the provisions contained in paragraphs (74) and (75).
- (78) The participating State which requests an inspection will be permitted to designate for inspection on the territory of another State within the zone of application for CSBMs, a specific

area. Such an area will be referred to as the "specified area". The specified area will comprise terrain where notifiable military activities are conducted or where another participating State believes a notifiable military activity is taking place. The specified area will be defined and limited by the scope and scale of notifiable military activities but will not exceed that required for an army level military activity.

- (79) In the specified area the inspection team accompanied by the representatives of the receiving State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defence installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft. The number and extent of the restricted areas should be as limited as possible. Areas where notifiable military activities can take place will not be declared restricted areas, except for certain permanent or temporary military installations which, in territorial terms, should be as small as possible, and consequently those areas will not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable military activities. Restricted areas will not be employed in a way inconsistent with the agreed provisions on inspection.
- (80) Within the specified area, the forces of participating States other than the receiving State will also be subject to the inspection.
- (81) Inspection will be permitted on the ground, from the air, or both.
- (82) The representatives of the receiving State will accompany the inspection team, including when it is in land vehicles and an aircraft from the time of their first employment until the time they are no longer in use for the purposes of inspection.
- (83) In its request, the inspecting State will notify the receiving State of:
- (83.1) - the location of the specified area defined by geographical co-ordinates;
  - (83.2) - the preferred point(s) of entry for the inspection team;
  - (83.3) - mode of transport to and from the point(s) of entry and, if applicable, to and from the specified area;
  - (83.4) - where in the specified area the inspection will begin;

- (83.5) - whether the inspection will be conducted from the ground, from the air, or both simultaneously;
- (83.6) - whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter, or both;
- (83.7) - whether the inspection team will use land vehicles provided by the receiving State or, if mutually agreed, its own vehicles;
- (83.8) - other participating States participating in the inspection, if applicable;
- (83.9) - information for the issuance of diplomatic visas to inspectors entering the receiving State;
- (83.10) - the preferred CSCE working language(s) to be used during the inspection.
- (84) The reply to the request will be given in the shortest possible period of time, but within not more than twenty-four hours. Within thirty-six hours after the issuance of the request, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving State.
- (85) Any request for inspection as well as the reply thereto will be communicated to all participating States without delay.
- (86) The receiving State should designate the point(s) of entry as close as possible to the specified area. The receiving State will ensure that the inspection team will be able to reach the specified area without delay from the point(s) of entry. The receiving State will, in its reply, indicate which of the six official working languages will be used during the inspection.
- (87) All participating States will facilitate the passage of the inspection teams through their territory.
- (88) Within 48 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area, the inspection will be terminated.
- (89) There will be no more than four inspectors in an inspection team. The inspecting State may invite other participating States to participate in an inspection. The inspection team will be headed by a national of the inspecting State, which will have at least as many inspectors in the team as any invited State. The inspection team will be under the responsibility of the inspecting State, against whose quota the inspection is counted. While conducting the inspection, the inspection team may divide into two subteams.
- (90) The inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel will be granted during their mission the privileges and immunities in

accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

- (91) The participating States will ensure that troops, other armed personnel and officials in the specified area are adequately informed regarding the presence, status and functions of inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel. The receiving State will ensure that no action is taken by its representatives which could endanger inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel. In carrying out their duties, inspectors and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel will take into account safety concerns expressed by representatives of the receiving State.
- (92) The receiving State will provide the inspection team with appropriate board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the inspection, and, when necessary, medical care; however this does not exclude the use by the inspection team of its own tents and rations.
- (93) The inspection team will have use of its own maps and charts, photo and video cameras, binoculars, hand-held passive night vision devices and dictaphones. Upon arrival in the specified area the inspection team will show the equipment to the representatives of the receiving State. In addition, the receiving State may provide the inspection team with a map depicting the area specified for the inspection.
- (94) The inspection team will have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment of the receiving State for the purpose of communicating with the embassy or other official missions and consular posts of the inspecting State accredited to the receiving State.
- (95) The receiving State will provide the inspection team with access to appropriate telecommunications equipment for the purpose of continuous communication between the subteams.
- (96) Inspectors will be entitled to request and to receive briefings at agreed times by military representatives of the receiving State. At the inspectors' request, such briefings will be given by commanders of formations or units in the specified area. Suggestions of the receiving State as to the briefings will be taken into consideration.
- (97) The inspecting State will specify whether aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter or both. Aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement between the inspecting and receiving States. Aircraft will be chosen which provide the inspection team with a continuous view of the ground during the inspection.

- (98) After the flight plan, specifying, inter alia, the inspection team's choice of flight path, speed and altitude in the specified area, has been filed with the competent air traffic control authority the inspection aircraft will be permitted to enter the specified area without delay. Within the specified area, the inspection team will, at its request, be permitted to deviate from the approved flight plan to make specific observations provided such deviation is consistent with paragraph (79) as well as flight safety and air traffic requirements. Directions to the crew will be given through a representative of the receiving State on board the aircraft involved in the inspection.
- (99) One member of the inspection team will be permitted, if such a request is made, at any time to observe data on navigational equipment of the aircraft and to have access to maps and charts used by the flight crew for the purpose of determining the exact location of the aircraft during the inspection flight.
- (100) Aerial and ground inspectors may return to the specified area as often as desired within the 48-hour inspection period.
- (101) The receiving State will provide for inspection purposes land vehicles with cross-country capability. Whenever mutually agreed, taking into account the specific geography relating to the area to be inspected, the inspecting State will be permitted to use its own vehicles.
- (102) If land vehicles or aircraft are provided by the inspecting State, there will be one accompanying driver for each land vehicle, or accompanying aircraft crew.
- (103) The inspecting State will prepare a report of its inspection using a format to be agreed by the participating States and will provide a copy of that report to all participating States without delay.
- (104) The inspection expenses will be incurred by the receiving State except when the inspecting State uses its own aircraft and/or land vehicles. The inspecting State will be responsible for travel expenses to and from the point(s) of entry.

*Evaluation*

- (105) Information provided under the provisions on Information on Military Forces and on Information on Plans for the

Deployment of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems will be subject to evaluation.

- (106) Subject to the provisions below each participating State will provide the opportunity to visit active formations and units in their normal peacetime locations as specified in points 2 and 3 of the provisions on Information on Military Forces to allow the other participating States to evaluate the information provided.
- (106.1) Non-active formations and combat units temporarily activated will be made available for evaluation during the period of temporary activation and in the area/location of activation indicated under paragraph (10.3.3). In such cases the provisions for the evaluation of active formations and units will be applicable, *mutatis mutandis*. Evaluation visits conducted under this provision will count against the quotas established under paragraph (107).
- (107) Each participating State will be obliged to accept a quota of one evaluation visit per calendar year for every sixty units, or portion thereof, reported under paragraph (10). However, no participating State will be obliged to accept more than fifteen visits per calendar year. No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one fifth of its quota of visits from the same participating State; a participating State with a quota of less than five visits will not be obliged to accept more than one visit from the same participating State during a calendar year. No formation or unit may be visited more than twice during a calendar year and more than once by the same participating State during a calendar year.
- (107.1) A participating State will inform all other participating States when, if applicable, its quota is filled.
- (108) No participating State will be obliged to accept more than one visit at any given time on its territory.
- (109) If a participating State has formations or units stationed on the territory of other participating States (host States) in the zone of application for CSBMs, the maximum number of evaluation visits permitted to its forces in each of the States concerned will be proportional to the number of its units in each State. The application of this provision will not alter the number of visits this participating State (stationing State) will have to accept under paragraph (107).
- (110) Requests for such visits will be submitted giving five days notice.
- (111) The request will specify:
- (111.1) - the formation or unit to be visited;

- (111.2) - the proposed date of the visit;
- (111.3) - the preferred point(s) of entry as well as the date and estimated time of arrival for the evaluation team;
- (111.4) - the mode of transport to and from the point(s) of entry and, if applicable, to and from the formation or unit to be visited;
- (111.5) - the names and ranks of the members of the team and, if applicable, information for the issue of diplomatic visas;
- (111.6) - the preferred CSCE working language(s) to be used during the visit.
- (112) If a formation or unit of a participating State is stationed on the territory of another participating State, the request will be addressed to the host State and sent simultaneously to the stationing State.
- (113) The reply to the request will be given within 48 hours after the receipt of the request.
- (114) In the case of formations or units of a participating State stationed on the territory of another participating State, the reply will be given by the host State in consultation with the stationing State. After consultation between the host State and the stationing State, the host State will specify in its reply any of its responsibilities which it agrees to delegate to the stationing State.
- (115) The reply will indicate whether the formation or unit will be available for evaluation at the proposed date at its normal peacetime location.
- (116) Formations or units may be in their normal peacetime location but be unavailable for evaluation. Each participating State will be entitled in such cases not to accept a visit; the reasons for the non-acceptance and the number of days that the formation or unit will be unavailable for evaluation will be stated in the reply. Each participating State will be entitled to invoke this provision up to a total of five times for an aggregate of no more than 30 days per calendar year.
- (117) If the formation or unit is absent from its normal peacetime location, the reply will indicate the reasons for and the duration of its absence. The requested State may offer the possibility of a visit to the formation or unit outside its normal peacetime location. If the requested State does not offer this possibility, the requesting State will be able to visit the normal

- peacetime location of the formation or unit. The requesting State may however refrain in either case from the visit.
- (118) Visits will not be counted against the quotas of receiving States, if they are not carried out. Likewise, if visits are not carried out, due to force majeure, they will not be counted.
- (119) The reply will designate the point(s) of entry and indicate, if applicable, the time and place of assembly of the team. The point(s) of entry and, if applicable, the place of assembly will be designated as close as possible to the formation or unit to be visited. The receiving State will ensure that the team will be able to reach the formation or unit without delay. The receiving State will, in its reply, indicate which of the six official working languages will be used during the evaluation visit.
- (120) The request and the reply will be communicated to all participating States without delay.
- (121) Participating States will facilitate the passage of teams through their territory.
- (122) The team will have no more than two members. It may be accompanied by an interpreter as auxiliary personnel.
- (123) The members of the team and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel will be granted during their mission the privileges and immunities in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
- (124) The visit will take place in the course of a single working day and last up to 12 hours.
- (125) The visit will begin with a briefing by the officer commanding the formation or unit, or his deputy, in the headquarters of the formation or unit, concerning the personnel as well as the major weapon and equipment systems reported under paragraph (10).
- (125.1) In the case of a visit to a formation, the receiving State may provide the possibility to see personnel and major weapon and equipment systems reported under paragraph (10) for that formation, but not for any of its formations or units, in their normal locations.
- (125.2) In the case of a visit to a unit, the receiving State will provide the possibility to see the personnel and the major weapon and equipment systems of the unit reported under paragraph (10) in their normal locations.
- (126) Access will not have to be granted to sensitive points, facilities and equipment.
- (127) The team will be accompanied at all times by representatives of the receiving State.



- (128) The receiving State will provide the team with appropriate transportation during the visit to the formation or unit.
- (129) The evaluation team will have use of its own maps and charts, photo and video cameras, personal binoculars and dictaphones. Upon arrival at the location of the formation or unit being visited the evaluation team will show the equipment to the representatives of the receiving State.
- (130) The visit will not interfere with activities of the formation or unit.
- (131) The participating States will ensure that troops, other armed personnel and officials in the formation or unit are adequately informed regarding the presence, status and functions of members of teams and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel. Participating States will also ensure that no action is taken by their representatives which could endanger the members of teams and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel. In carrying out their duties, members of teams and, if applicable, auxiliary personnel will take into account safety concerns expressed by representatives of the receiving State.
- (132) Travel expenses to and from the point(s) of entry, including expenses for refuelling, maintenance and parking of aircraft and/or land vehicles of the visiting State, will be borne by the visiting State according to existing practices established under the CSBM inspection provisions.
- (132.1) Expenses for evaluation visits incurred beyond the point(s) of entry will be borne by the receiving State, except when the visiting State uses its own aircraft and/or land vehicles in accordance with paragraph (111.4).
- (132.2) The receiving State will provide appropriate board and, when necessary, lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the evaluation as well as any urgent medical care which may be required.
- (132.3) In the case of visits to formations or units of a participating State stationed on the territory of another participating State, the stationing State will bear the costs for the discharge of those responsibilities which have been delegated to it by the host State under the terms of paragraph (114).
- (133) The visiting State will prepare a report of its visit using a format to be agreed by the participating States which will be communicated to all participating States expeditiously.
- (134) The communications concerning compliance and verification will be transmitted preferably through the CSBM communications network.
- (135) Each participating State will be entitled to request and obtain

clarification from any other participating State concerning the application of agreed confidence- and security-building measures. The requested participating State will provide promptly relevant clarification to the requesting participating State unless otherwise specified in this document. Communications in this context will, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other participating States.

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- (136) The participating States are encouraged to undertake, including on the basis of separate agreements, in a bilateral, multilateral or regional context, measures to increase transparency and confidence. Illustrative examples could be as follows:
- (136.1) -to provide their neighbouring participating States with information on certain military activities carried out below the thresholds for notification and close to borders between them;
- (136.2) -to invite representatives from other, especially neighbouring participating States to observe exercises other than those subject to the provisions of this document.
- (137) The participating States are encouraged to provide information on such measures to the CPC, which will distribute lists of received information and make it available upon request.

#### *IX. Communications*

(138) *The CSCE communications network*

The participating States have established a network of direct communications between their capitals for the transmission of messages relating, inter alia, to agreed measures contained in this document. The network will complement the existing use of diplomatic channels. Participating States undertake to use the network flexibly, efficiently and in a cost-effective way in communications between States concerning agreed CSBMs and other CSCE-related matters.

(139) *Financial arrangements*

The cost-sharing arrangements are set out in documents CSCE/WV/Dec.2 and CSCE/WV/Dec.4.

(140) *Points of contact*

Each participating State will designate a point of contact capable of transmitting and receiving messages from other participating States on a 24-hour-a-day basis and will notify in advance any change in this designation.

(141) *Six CSCE languages*

Communications may be in any one of the six working languages of the CSCE. Without prejudicing the future continued use of all six working languages of the CSCE, according to established rules and practice as set out in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, the participating States will:

- (141.1) -in order to facilitate an efficient use of the communications network, give due consideration to practical needs of rapid transmission of their messages and of immediate understandability. A translation into another CSCE working language will be added where needed to meet that principle;
- (141.2) -indicate at least two CSCE working languages in which they would prefer to receive the message or its translation.

(142) *Use of the network*

Participating States will, whenever possible, use the Standard Operating Procedures (S.O.P.) and enforce user discipline to maximize the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the network.

- (142.1) Messages will always have headers as defined in the S.O.P.
- (142.2) Messages will, whenever possible, be transmitted in formats with headings in all six CSCE working languages. Such formats, agreed among the participating States with a view to making transmitted messages immediately understandable by reducing the language element to a minimum, are annexed to document CSCE/WV/Dec.4. The formats may be subject to agreed modifications as required.

- (142.3) Messages will be considered official communications of the sending State. If the content of a message is not related to an agreed measure, the receiving State has the right to reject it by so informing the other participating States.
- (142.4) Any narrative text, to the extent it is required in such formats, and messages that do not lend themselves to formatting will be transmitted in the CSCE working languages chosen by the transmitting State, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (141).
- (142.5) Each participating State has the right to ask for clarification of messages in case of doubt.
- (143) *Additional use of the network*
- Participating States may agree among themselves to use the network for other purposes.
- (144) *The Communications Group*
- A Communications Group will be established, composed of representatives of the participating States and chaired, on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office, by a representative of the Secretary General of the CSCE.
- (144.1) The group will address questions relating to rules of procedure, working methods, formats and any other measures to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the communications network, including issues relating to use of modern information technologies for data exchange.
- (144.2) The group will meet two times per year for at least one day. Additional meetings may be convened as necessary.
- (144.3) The Chairman of the Group will report to the appropriate CSCE committee about the proceedings of the Communications Group and, if appropriate, present drafts for decisions to be taken as prepared by the Group.

*X. Annual implementation assessment meeting*

- (145) The participating States will hold each year a meeting to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed CSBMs. Discussion may extend to:
- (145.1) -clarification of questions arising from such implementation;
- (145.2) -operation of agreed measures, including the use of additional equipment during inspections and evaluation visits;

- (145.3) - implications of all information originating from the implementation of any agreed measures for the process of confidence- and security-building in the framework of the CSCE.
- (146) Before the conclusion of each year's meeting the participating States will normally agree upon the agenda and dates for the subsequent year's meeting. Lack of agreement will not constitute sufficient reason to extend a meeting, unless otherwise agreed. Agenda and dates may, if necessary, be agreed between meetings.
- (147) The Special Committee of the Forum for Security Cooperation will hold such meetings. It will consider, as required, suggestions made during the AIAM aiming at the improvement of the implementation of CSBMs.  
Within one month after the AIAM, the Conflict Prevention Centre will circulate a survey of such suggestions.
- (147.1) One month prior to the meeting, the Conflict Prevention Centre will circulate a survey of exchanged annual information and ask participating States to confirm or to correct applicable data.
- (147.2) Any participating State may request assistance in implementing the provisions of this document from any other participating State.
- (147.3) Participating States which, for whatever reason, have not exchanged annual information according to this document will during the meeting explain the reasons why and provide an expected date for their full compliance with this commitment.

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- (148) The participating States will implement this set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures in order to promote security co-operation and to reduce the risk of military conflict.
- (149) In order to strengthen compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures and in addition to other relevant provisions of this document, the participating States will, as necessary, consider in appropriate CSCE bodies how to ensure full implementation of those measures.

- (150) The measures adopted in this document are politically binding and will come into force on 1 January 1995, unless specified otherwise.
- (151) The Secretary General of the CSCE is requested to transmit the present document to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Governments of the non-participating Mediterranean States, observer State, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
- (152) The text of this document will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.
- (153) The representatives of the participating States express their profound gratitude to the Government and people of Austria for the excellent arrangements they have made for the negotiations within the framework of the FSC and the warm hospitality they have extended to the delegations which participated in the negotiations.

Vienna, 28 November 1994

## Annex I

Under the terms of the Madrid mandate, the zone of application for CSBMs is defined as follows:

On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area<sup>20</sup> and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

Wherever the term "the zone of application for CSBMs" is used in this document, the above definition will apply. The following understanding will apply as well:

The commitments undertaken in letters to the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan on 29 January 1992 have the effect of extending the application of CSBMs in the Vienna Document 1992 to the territories of the above-mentioned States insofar as their territories were not covered already by the above.

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<sup>20</sup> In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.

## Annex II

The following provisions will apply in conformity with the events as set out in Chapters III and V:

- (1) **Invitations**  
Invitations will be extended in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX to all participating States 42 days or more in advance of the event. The invitations will include the following information as applicable:
  - (1.1) the type of event, e.g. visits to air bases, military facilities or military formations, a demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems or an observation of certain military activities;
  - (1.2) the location where the event will take place, including geographic co-ordinates in case of visits to air bases;
  - (1.3) State arranging the event and, if different, the host State;
  - (1.4) responsibilities delegated;
  - (1.5) whether the event is combined with other events;
  - (1.6) number of visitors or observers invited;
  - (1.7) date, time and place of assembly;
  - (1.8) planned duration of the event;
  - (1.9) anticipated date, time and place of departure at the end of the programme;
  - (1.10) arrangements for transportation;
  - (1.11) arrangements for board and lodging, including a point of contact for communications with visitors or observers;
  - (1.12) language(s) to be used during the programme;
  - (1.13) equipment to be issued by the State arranging the event;
  - (1.14) possible authorization by the host State and, if different, the State arranging the event, of the use of special equipment that the visitors or observers may bring with them;
  - (1.15) arrangements for special clothing to be issued;
  - (1.16) any other information including, if applicable, the designation/name of the air base, military facility or formation to be visited, the designation of the military activity to be observed and/or the type(s) of major weapon and equipment system(s) to be viewed.
- (2) **Replies**  
Replies, indicating whether or not the invitation is accepted, will be given in writing, in accordance with the provisions of



Chapter IX, not later than 21 days before the event and will include the following information:

- (2.1) reference to invitation;
  - (2.2) name and rank of visitors or observers;
  - (2.3) date and place of birth;
  - (2.4) passport information (number, date and place of issue, expiration date);
  - (2.5) travel arrangements, including airline name and flight number, if applicable, and time and place of arrival.  
If the invitation is not accepted in time, it will be assumed that no visitors or observers will be sent.
- (3) Financial aspects
- (3.1) The invited State will cover the travel expenses of its representative(s) to the place of assembly and from the place of departure, possibly the same as the place of assembly, as specified in the invitation;
  - (3.2) The State arranging the event will cover travel arrangements and expenses from the place of assembly and to the place of departure - possibly the same as the place of assembly - as well as appropriate civil or military board and lodging in a location suitable for carrying out the event.
- (4) Other provisions
- The participating State(s) will, in due co-operation with the visitors or observers, ensure that no action is taken which could be harmful to their safety.
- Furthermore, the State arranging the event will:
- (4.1) give equal treatment and offer equal opportunities to all visitors or observers to carry out their functions;
  - (4.2) restrict to the minimum necessary the time reserved for transfer and administrative activities during the event;
  - (4.3) provide any urgent medical care which may be required.

### **Annex III**

#### *Chairman's Statement*

It is understood that the implementation aspects of CSBMs in the case of contiguous areas of participating States specified in the understanding of Annex I which share frontiers with non-European non-participating States may be discussed at future Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings.

This statement will be an annex to the Vienna Document 1994 and will be published with it.

Vienna, 28 November 1994

#### **Annex IV**

##### *Chairman's Statement*

It is understood that the participating States will take into consideration practical problems which may arise at an initial stage in implementing CSBMs on the territories of newly independent States admitted to the CSCE. Those States will promptly inform all the participating States about such practical problems.

This statement will not constitute a precedent and will be subject to review in the light of the discussion at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

This statement will be an annex to the Vienna Document 1994 and will be published with it.

Vienna, 28 November 1994

#### **Annex V**

##### *Chairman's Statement*

In view of the task of the Conflict Prevention Centre to support the implementation of CSBMs assigned to it in the Charter of Paris the CPC should prepare, on a regular basis, a factual presentation of the information exchanged in accordance with this document between all participating States. At least initially, this should be done on the basis of existing resources.

This factual presentation should facilitate the analysis of this information by participating States and will not entail conclusions by the CPC.

This Chairman's Statement will be subject to review and may be amended, as appropriate, by the Special Committee of the FSC.

This statement will be an annex to the Vienna Document 1994 and will be published with it.

Vienna, 28 November 1994

## CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation

Budapest, 28 November 1994

The participating States, acting in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Programme for Immediate Action set out in the Helsinki Document 1992, have adopted the following measure:

### *Global Exchange of Military Information*

#### (1) *General Provisions*

The participating States of the CSCE will exchange annually information on major weapon and equipment systems and personnel in their conventional armed forces, on their territory as well as worldwide, as specified below. The global exchange of military information will be separate from other information exchange regimes and will not be subject to limitations, constraints or verification. This information will be provided not later than 30 April of each year and it will reflect the situation as of 1 January of that year.

#### (2) *Information on Command Structure and Personnel*

(2.1) Information will be provided for general or equivalent staff with regard to:

(2.1.1) location;

(2.1.2) peacetime authorized personnel strength.

(2.2) Information on the command organization of the forces referred to in paragraph (1) will be provided according to the provisions of paragraph (4.1), specifying for each formation:

(2.2.1) designation;

(2.2.2) first level of subordination;

(2.2.3) normal peacetime location of headquarters, specifying the exact geographic terms and/or co-ordinates.

(2.3) Information on personnel will be provided with regard to:

(2.3.1) peacetime authorized personnel strength for each formation or service according to the provisions of paragraph (4) of this document;

- (2.3.2) total authorized conscripts and total authorized professional officers/enlisted;
- (2.3.3) total officers/enlisted on active duty by rank;
- (2.3.4) total personnel in reserve status who have completed their initial military service or training and who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service or training since the last exchange of information;
- (2.3.5) total military personnel serving under the command of the United Nations or under a mandate of the CSCE.

(3) *Information on Holdings of Major Weapons and Equipment Systems*

Information on major weapon and equipment systems will be provided in the categories listed in paragraphs (3.1) to (3.9) with regard to total holdings and holdings according to the provisions of paragraph (4). This information excludes those major weapon and equipment systems undergoing testing or evaluation, provided that they have not yet entered into service.

- (3.1) Battle tanks
- (3.2) Armoured combat vehicles:
  - (3.2.1) armoured personnel carriers;
  - (3.2.2) armoured infantry fighting vehicles;
  - (3.2.3) heavy armament combat vehicles.
- (3.3) Armoured vehicle launched bridges
- (3.4) Anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/integrally mounted on armoured vehicles
- (3.5) Self-propelled and towed artillery:
  - (3.5.1) guns, howitzers and artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, 100 mm calibre or larger;
  - (3.5.2) mortars, 100 mm calibre or larger;
  - (3.5.3) multiple launch rocket systems, 100 mm calibre or larger.
- (3.6) Aircraft:
  - (3.6.1) combat aircraft, specifying total number of aircraft capable of operating from aircraft carriers;
  - (3.6.2) military transport aircraft;
  - (3.6.3) primary trainer aircraft.
- (3.7) Helicopters:
  - (3.7.1) attack helicopters;
  - (3.7.2) combat support helicopters;
  - (3.7.3) military transport helicopters.

- (3.8) Surface warships, greater than 400 tons fully loaded displacement
- (3.9) Submarines greater than 50 tons submerged

(4) *Levels of Disaggregation*

- (4.1) For the command organization, information in paragraph (2.2) will be provided according to the following levels of disaggregation:
  - for land forces down to division or equivalent or, if no such equivalent exists, the next higher level of command;
  - for other forces down to the level of army or equivalent or, if no such equivalent exists, down to the next lower level of command.
- (4.2) For all land forces stationed within the territory of the reporting State, the information in paragraphs (2.3.1) and (3) will be provided from the highest level down to and including the level of army or equivalent or, if no such equivalent exists, down to the next lower level of command.
- (4.3) For all other forces stationed within the territory of the reporting State, the information in paragraphs (2.3.1) and (3) will be disaggregated down to the level of service.
- (4.4) For all forces stationed beyond the territory of the reporting State, the information in paragraphs (2.3.1) and (3) will be disaggregated down to the level of service, specifying the numbers for each respective region in which such forces are stationed.

(5) *Technical Data and Photographs*

Each participating State will also provide the following information on each type or class of major weapon and equipment systems in the inventory of its armed forces for each category listed in paragraph (3):

- (5.1) Type;
- (5.2) National nomenclature/Name;
- (5.3) General descriptions of characteristics and capabilities.

This information will be provided together with relevant photographs.

If this information has not previously been reported to all other participating States, it will be exchanged once and amended as required in the next information exchange if new types or classes enter into service.

(6) *Weapon and Equipment Systems Newly Entered into Service*

Each participating State will provide to all other participating States the following information concerning its major weapon and equipment systems as specified in paragraph (3):

- (6.1) Total number of equipments by category entered into service in the previous calendar year through national production;
- (6.2) Total number of equipments by category entered into service in the previous calendar year through imports.

(7) *Clarification*

- (7.1) In addition to clarifications obtained at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM), each participating State may ask for clarification from any other participating State concerning the application of this measure. Communications in this context will, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other participating States.
- (7.2) Each participating State, on the basis of its national practice, will make available a glossary of terms, acronyms and abbreviations used in the implementation of this measure, and any other explanation it deems necessary for the better understanding of the information provided.

(8) *Communications*

- (8.1) The information will be provided in an agreed format.
- (8.2) Communications will be made in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX of the Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.
- (8.3) If information required under this measure has already been provided in another CSCE context, participating States may refer to the information under the respective format.

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The participating States have decided that the aforementioned measure is politically binding and will come into force on 1 January 1995.

*Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*

*The Secretary General*

**Annual Report 1995 on OSCE Activities**  
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## *I. Introduction*

The difficulties encountered in 1995 in dealing with both new and old conflicts highlighted the risk of the transition period being further extended. The general atmosphere was marked by uncertainties about the potential and role of the UN and regional and subregional organizations. While the demands and needs for international involvement further increased, the limits to the availability of international support and the reluctance of States and international organizations to extend their involvement indicated unresolved structural problems. Against this background and under the leadership of the Hungarian Chair, the OSCE increased its contribution to conflict prevention and resolution, began developing new approaches to military aspects of security and started the discussion on a Security Model for the 21st century.

In the reporting period (November 1994 to October 1995) it became apparent that the decisions of the Budapest Summit, as reflected in its acceptance of the name "Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe," had strengthened the OSCE structures and considerably increased its potential for political consultation and operational conflict management. Insisting on the implementation of basic OSCE commitments, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kovács was able to exercise the Chairman-in-Office's crucial lead function in initiating and managing OSCE support of efforts aimed at achieving peaceful solutions to the serious problems in Chechnya in the Russian Federation. With his rapidly increasing responsibility and workload, the Chairman-in-Office engaged the Troika (Hungary, Switzerland and Italy) at both the Ministerial and Permanent Representative level in Vienna. In the conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference, the dynamic joint chairmanship of the Russian Federation and Finland considerably improved the chances of negotiating a settlement; the High-Level Planning Group advanced the planning for a first OSCE peacekeeping operation for this area to a stage allowing early action once the necessary financial and personnel requirements are met and the political conditions are fulfilled by the parties.

As the prospects of a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina improved, the OSCE's involvement in the post-conflict phase became more specific. The OSCE's operational capacities will be challenged by the demands of support and monitoring before, during and following elections, as well as preparations for regional security arrangements and continued support for the function of ombudsmen in the federative structures. At the same time, the OSCE is also getting involved in Human Dimension support activities in Croatia.

The new and increasingly central role of the Permanent Council in Vienna provided the OSCE with a permanently available body of OSCE participating States, strengthening both the consultative and operational functions of the Organization. This helped also to provide political support for the tasks of the eight operative OSCE Missions and the OSCE Assistance Group to

Chechnya. Work relating to these specific tasks and to a broad spectrum of current issues, consultations with the High Commissioner on National Minorities, regular briefings of the Director of the ODIHR, and also the work on the Security Model, all contributed to developing a culture of political consultation, where the concerns of participating States are discussed and their security interests heard.

After a consensus was finally reached to admit the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a participating State of the OSCE, the number of fully participating States rose to 53. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is still excluded from participation in OSCE activities; the status of this country vis-à-vis the OSCE is unclear.

Encountering the obstacles to an early resolution of conflict once the threshold of violence has been crossed, the conflict prevention capabilities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the ODIHR were further expanded and strengthened.

Taking account of the increasingly crucial role of economic and environmental factors in the transition process of Central and Eastern European as well as Central Asian OSCE States, the OSCE continued its efforts to provide a clearer direction and a higher profile to its activities in the economic dimension, including environmental issues.

The Forum for Security Co-operation improved its internal structures so that its consultative as well as negotiating tasks could be more easily carried out.

While taking great care to maintain its basically unbureaucratic character, the OSCE continued to consolidate its administrative infrastructure. But with the steadily increasing volume of its operational activities, the Organization can only preserve its administrative flexibility if its participating States are ready to provide a greater number of qualified personnel on a seconded basis.

In 1996 the OSCE will have to cope with a number of foreseeable challenges: the deployment of a first multinational OSCE peacekeeping force; an important OSCE role in Bosnia and Herzegovina; early results in negotiating and implementing regional security measures for Southeastern Europe; and the development of an imaginative and realistic concept for the Security Model for the 21st century. Decision-making, operational management and the readiness to provide rapidly the necessary personnel and financial resources might well prove a real test of OSCE's political will and operational capabilities.

As this is the last annual report of the first Secretary General of the OSCE, I would like to add that the performance of the OSCE's rapidly increasing tasks will entail taking full advantage of the Secretary General's mandate in

support of the Chairman-in-Office, so as to involve him more actively in all aspects of the management of the OSCE.

## *II. Activities of the OSCE*

### *1. Political Consultations and Negotiations*

The Budapest Summit decisions, by streamlining the structure and to some extent defining the tasks of the Ministerial (MC), Senior (SC) and Permanent (PC) Councils, enhanced the OSCE's capacity for consultation, negotiation and decision-making. The role and competence of the PC were strengthened, with almost all OSCE States now represented in Vienna, the seat of the PC, by a permanent OSCE Delegation. ("OSCE Ambassadors" also represent their countries in the Joint Consultative Group of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and in the Open Skies Consultative Committee). The SC in Prague, meeting twice in 1995, attracted high-level participants from capitals and developed its function of assessing and guiding the work of the PC. The Forum for Security Co-operation agreed on a monthly rotating Chairmanship and better use of the "FSC Troika," providing clearer direction and greater continuity in this second permanent OSCE Vienna-based body.

### *2. Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management*

Preventive diplomacy and crisis management continued to be the main area of the OSCE's operative action. The increased authority of the CIO and greater involvement of the Troika facilitated OSCE action in the preparatory and implementation phases before and after adoption of consensus-based decisions by the Council. This helped narrow the traditional gap between early warning and early action, the most critical period in the initial phase of the crisis management process.

#### *2.1. Missions*

While the number of long-term missions remained unchanged compared with the preceding reporting period, the overall number of OSCE field operations has grown; the mandates of some missions were adjusted to meet political, military and humanitarian requirements in the field.

The carefully elaborated mandate of the OSCE Chechnya Assistance Group is a good example of the OSCE's - and OSCE States' - ability to adjust OSCE instruments to the specific circumstances of a given situation.

Great attention was given to fully exploiting the potential of the HCNM and the ODIHR in relation to the work of the Missions. Continuous efforts were made by the Missions, the CIO and the Secretariat to ensure close co-

ordination and co-operation between the Missions and other international organizations.

The annual meeting of all Heads of OSCE Mission (HOMs) and of other OSCE representatives was held in Vienna (20-22 June). The reports of the Heads of Mission showed the very broad spectrum of the Missions' mandates and the great variety of mandate-oriented activities. The reports also highlighted the importance of initiatives by the Heads of Mission and their teams for achieving progress. Addressing the problems presented by six-month rotation for Mission staff, the Heads of Mission pleaded for a greater continuity. Most Heads of Mission spoke in favour of more substantive support from OSCE institutions and more flexibility within the framework of their budgets so as to facilitate ad hoc measures such as round tables, seminars, etc.

The HOM's meeting also illustrated once again the extent to which the progress and success of a Mission depend on the quality of the HOM and his staff. It will be difficult to maintain the prevailing high standards if, more and more frequently, the choice of HOMs and Mission staff is limited to a single person.

For the first time, a Mission member lost his life in the performance of his duties. Mr. Antanas Nesavas from Lithuania was killed in Tbilisi in a fatal car accident.

As the work of a number of Missions is approaching the phase of conflict settlement, the OSCE is increasingly faced with a new question: What kind of "guarantees" can the OSCE provide for the implementation of a negotiated settlement by all concerned? While it is clear that the OSCE cannot give formal guarantees, it is also clear that the OSCE as such and OSCE States through the OSCE have at their disposal a fairly wide range of possibilities for fostering and "protecting" the implementation of peaceful settlements negotiated with OSCE involvement. This is another area where pragmatic development of OSCE instruments is needed.

Since its inception in April 1993, the Mission Support Section (MSS) of the CPC Department of the OSCE Secretariat has been responsible for daily support of OSCE field missions and other OSCE non-local activities. This includes logistics, procurement, transportation, inventory control, communications, personnel, insurance, and preparation of mission budgets, etc. As more missions are organized, deployed and/or expanded, the complexity and scope of the efforts of the MSS have also increased.

At the beginning of 1995, the MSS supported eight field missions. During the reporting period the Chechnya Assistance Group was added to the OSCE field operations, as well as three field offices of the Mission to Sarajevo, three field offices in Tajikistan, one in Moldova, the Skrunda Radar Station Representative, the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference, and the OSCE Liaison Office for Central Asia in Tashkent.

A total of 79 authorized seconded personnel are working in the field missions.

#### *2.1.1. Mission to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina*

The Mission continued to be non-operational. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has made the Mission's readmission conditional on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's status as a fully participating State of the OSCE.

This Mission's reporting has been partly replaced by reports from OSCE States, in particular, those of the OSCE Troika. Information thus submitted to an ad hoc working group is reported weekly to the PC. The discussions in the PC serve to remind the OSCE of its specific commitments vis-à-vis the continuing problems in those regions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which must not be excluded from the efforts to find negotiated solutions to conflicts in the territory of former Yugoslavia.

#### *2.1.2. Mission to Skopje*

The Spillover Monitoring Mission to Skopje has, within the framework of its mandate, shifted its priorities from monitoring the border situation to monitoring the internal situation, especially in the context of relations between the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the ethnic Albanian population and between different ethnic groups.

A major challenge for the Mission in 1995 was the February unrest in connection with attempts to establish a private Albanian university in Tetovo, which was regarded as illegal by The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia authorities. The Mission, with the support of the HCNM, was actively involved in defusing the situation.

Since the host State has been finally admitted as a participating State of the OSCE, the Mission's operation will be more straightforward.

#### *2.1.3. Mission to Georgia*

In 1995 the Mission intensified its activities in several areas of its broad mandate. It increased its efforts to foster and focus dialogue between Georgians and the authorities in the region of South Ossetia concerning a political solution to their conflict. In late 1994, after having drafted a status proposal for South Ossetia within Georgia, the Mission organized separate colloquia with officials from the Georgian and the South Ossetian sides to discuss the draft. The status proposal was finalized in December in the light of the comments received. Although there is still no agreement on the status question, the Mission's proposal helped to start the discussion of key issues that have to be addressed as part of a settlement process. In Georgia's

constitution, adopted on 29 August 1995, provisions on territorial structure have been left open, partly in order to leave room for negotiated solutions with the regions of South Ossetia (and Abkhazia).

On 1 March 1995 the Mission sponsored a round table discussion between leading Georgian and South Ossetian figures on the nature of the conflict and on possible ways of resolving it. There was agreement on the need to resolve the conflict by peaceful means only.

The Joint Control Commission (JCC), established to direct and control the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia, was revived in November 1994 with the participation of the OSCE Mission under a new mandate, giving it also the authority to deal with the political aspects of a settlement. However, a formal working group on political issues has not yet been established. After another six-month pause, the JCC met again in June 1995 in Moscow. The subsequent July meetings in Tbilisi and in Tskhinvali were significant in that they saw the first official visit by senior South Ossetian officials to Tbilisi since the beginning of the conflict in 1989. A joint declaration, agreed upon by the two sides, to move towards direct political talks on the future status of South Ossetia was a major achievement; a week later, however, South Ossetian representatives partially withdrew their delegation's approval of the declaration.

At the July session of the JCC, the Mission proposed a broader effort to foster economic reintegration of South Ossetia into the Georgian economy. The Mission continues to promote pragmatic co-operation between Georgian and South Ossetian officials on a local level.

The Mission has continued to monitor the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) in South Ossetia, as mandated in March 1994.

Despite repeated efforts, it has still not been possible to obtain the formal consent of the South Ossetian authorities for the opening of a branch office in Tskhinvali. In April the Permanent Council approved an increase in the authorized strength of the Mission by two officers to 19, once the branch office has been established.

Closely co-operating with the Tbilisi authorities and with their support, the Mission has significantly stepped up its activities to promote human rights and political reform in Georgia as a whole. To improve awareness of its goals and mandate, the Mission has opened a human rights and public relations office with easy access for the public. It has carried out visits to detention facilities and attended a trial of alleged political prisoners.

The Mission has been working with the staff of Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze to flesh out the latter's proposal to establish a regional human rights court for the CIS countries. Together with the ODIHR, and with considerable support from the EU and a number of international organizations, the Mission assisted the authorities in the preparation of the parliamentary and presidential elections at the beginning of November and co-ordinated their international monitoring.

The Mission has also increased its presence in Abkhazia for monitoring the human rights situation there.

#### *2.1.4. Mission to Moldova*

The reporting year was marked by increased efforts by the Moldovan Government and the authorities of the Trans-Dniester region to search for a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict.

The meeting between President Snegur and the leader of the Trans-Dniester area, Smirnov, on 7 June gave new impetus to the comprehensive settlement process agreed upon at the April 1994 leadership meeting. Both sides have instructed their teams of experts to develop specific wording and provisions of a law on a special status that would gain common acceptance. The expert groups had several meetings chaired by the Head of the OSCE Mission and the Russian President's Personal Representative.

At a further leadership meeting on 5 July, an agreement on the non-use of military force and economic pressure - a significant confidence-building measure - was signed by the two sides. The agreement, which represents a major step forward, was also signed by the mediators, i.e. the Head of the OSCE Mission and the Russian Representative. Under an innovative provision, the OSCE Secretariat has been designated as depository of the agreement.

In spring 1995, the Mission opened a permanent office in Tiraspol in support of its activities in the Trans-Dniester area. As a result, the Mission is now better placed to explain to the people in the area conditions for a successful settlement.

The Mission maintained its active involvement in the Joint Control Commission (JCC), although revised principles of co-operation between the JCC and the Mission have yet to be formally concluded.

Based on the Budapest decisions, the Permanent Council discussed at a number of meetings the assistance which the OSCE could offer in the implementation of the agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian troops

(former 14th Army) from Moldova that was reached a year ago. No decision could be taken as yet.

#### *2.1.5. Mission to Tajikistan*

The parliamentary elections in Tajikistan held on 26 February were not monitored by the OSCE, as the Government of Tajikistan had not taken into account OSCE recommendations regarding the electoral law and the conduct of the elections. While the Permanent Council regretted this fact, it welcomed the declared intention of the Tajik authorities to take the recommendations into account at a later stage.

Co-operation between the Mission and the Government of Tajikistan has since improved substantially, particularly in the field of human rights. A project for a national human rights institution with ombudsman functions was worked out in co-operation with the Mission and with expert input from the ODIHR.

In an effort to promote awareness of OSCE principles, the Mission has established a discussion group which regularly brings together on the Mission's premises figures from various walks of life in Tajikistan.

As the UNHCR wanted to withdraw from certain areas of Tajikistan, the Permanent Council requested the Mission to follow the human rights situation of returning refugees and internally displaced persons in these areas of Tajikistan with a view to facilitating their reintegration into Tajik society. The Mission has taken over from UNHCR three branch offices in the south of the country, initially for a six-month period, its authorized strength was temporarily increased by three members. The Mission has co-operated closely with UNHCR and UNMOT in preparation for this new task.

The Mission continued to follow the inter-Tajik talks under UN chairmanship. The agreement signed on 17 August by President Emomali Rakhmonov and the leader of the Tajik opposition, Said Abdullo Nuri, to hold non-stop negotiations with the aim of concluding a general agreement on establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan, has opened up new vistas in this process. But the agreement has yet to be implemented. Also, a series of security incidents in eastern Tajikistan and still worsening economic indicators underscore the complexity and difficulty of the overall situation.

#### *2.1.6. Mission to Ukraine*

From the outset the Mission has concentrated its work on the Crimean issue. The Mission had a specific role in the legislative and administrative disputes between the authorities of Kiev and Simferopol regarding the status of Crimea. At the initiative of the OSCE Mission and the HCNM, a Ukrainian Round Table was organized in Locarno, Switzerland in May in order to promote dialogue between the parties and discuss the future status of Crimea



as an autonomous part of Ukraine. The Round Table contributed considerably to improving joint discussions of the many outstanding problems.

In the second half of the year, the Mission focussed on issues related to the Crimean Tatars. A Round Table on this particular issue was organized by the Mission and the HCNM in September in Yalta. All participants welcomed this possibility for review of and informal discussions on the many outstanding problems.

#### *2.1.7. Mission to Sarajevo*

The purpose of the mission is to assist the Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who are organs of the constitution of the Federation. The Mission was launched in October 1994. Initially it supported the process of selecting the Ombudsmen from among the representatives of the three ethnic groups concerned. On 20 January 1995 the three Ombudmen (from the Moslem, Croat and Serb communities) were officially sworn in.

In order to extend the scope of their activities beyond Sarajevo, the Ombudsmen and the competent authorities of the Federation decided to establish branch offices in Zenica and Mostar. In March and April the Ombudsmen nominated their deputies for these branch offices, which became operational in May.

The blockade of Sarajevo in spring 1995 seriously hampered the Mission's operations in support of the Ombudsmen, as Mission members and the Ombudsmen were unable to move in or out of Sarajevo. By June 1995, the Ombudsmen had registered over 400 cases, with cases from outside Sarajevo representing more than 30 per cent of the total, thus testifying to the increased importance of the branch offices. The majority of complaints concerned property rights and other problems related to the refugee situation. There were increasingly frequent cases of unlawful imprisonment and various manifestations of "silent ethnic cleansing" that required attention.

In August, in the wake of military operations in Croatia and in Bihac, the Ombudsmen were asked to assist in coping with the new waves of refugees. To support the Ombudsmen's operations in this area an office was opened in Tuzla, and the Ombudsmen also established their presence in Velika Kladusa.

The Mission maintains close contacts with the authorities of the Federation, with UNPROFOR as well as other foreign missions in Sarajevo.

### *2.1.8. The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya*

After the outbreak of war-like fighting in Chechnya that put in jeopardy basic OSCE commitments, the Russian Federation accepted OSCE involvement in the efforts to find negotiated solutions.

Following reports by the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office and other OSCE officials from their visits to the area, the Permanent Council decided on 11 April 1995 to establish an Assistance Group. Its mandate is to promote respect for human rights, to help foster the development of democratic institutions and processes, and to promote a peaceful resolution of the crisis in accordance with OSCE principles and the constitution of the Russian Federation. The Group, initially consisting of a team of six diplomats, began its work in Grozny on 26 April.

A month later, direct talks between the parties involved in the crisis began at the premises of the Assistance Group and the Group chaired them. The talks included representatives of the Executive Authorities of the Russian Federation, of the Committee of National Accord, and of representatives of the rebel Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev. On 30 July an agreement to end hostilities was signed by Russian officials and representatives of Dudayev. The agreement provides for an immediate cessation of military hostilities, the liberation of all forcibly detained persons, the gradual withdrawal of troops, including the unconditional disarmament of illegal armed formations, and the cessation of military acts. A Special Observer Commission composed of representatives of all sides and of the OSCE was established to supervise the implementation of the agreement. As the implementation of the agreement met with serious difficulties, sporadic fighting and terrorist attacks on high-level Russian officials increased, the implementation and negotiating process was brought to a halt. In spite of a number of unfriendly acts from local Grozny authorities and a direct armed attack on the AG premises, the AG remained in Grozny, thus ensuring its availability at a particularly critical time.

### *2.1.9. Mission to Latvia*

The Mission closely followed events leading to the adoption of the Law on Non-Citizens approved in April 1995. The Mission considers this to be a balanced piece of legislation and emphasizes at every opportunity the importance of adequate implementation. It is therefore following the implementation process closely and has established contacts with the competent authority, the Naturalization Board. The Mission observes the naturalization process as a whole and makes on-site evaluations of the tests that are part of the naturalization procedure.

The Mission followed events relating to the retired military personnel of the Russian Federation remaining in Latvia in violation of bilateral agreements.

*2.1.10. The OSCE Representative to the Russian-Latvian Joint Commission on Military Pensioners*

The Permanent Council established, on 23 February 1995, an OSCE Representative and Alternate Representative to the Joint Commission on Military Pensioners. The OSCE Representative is tasked, inter alia, to consider, at the request of either party, questions relating to the application of the provisions of the Agreement on the Social Welfare of Retired Military Personnel of the Russian Federation and their Family Members Residing on the Territory of the Republic of Latvia. The OSCE Representative will consider jointly with Latvian and Russian representatives appeals on matters involving the rights of persons to whom the Agreement applies and participate in the adoption of recommendations and decisions on the basis of consensus.

In June 1995, representatives of the parties as well as the OSCE Representative reached an agreement on the modalities of the work of the Joint Commission. In particular, the OSCE Representative focused on problems related to the pensioners' rights to housing and work permits, investigated individual cases and prepared reports containing recommendations for the Latvian side.

*2.1.11. The OSCE Representative to the Joint Committee on the Skrunda Radar Station*

In accordance with the Agreement between Latvia and the Russian Federation of 30 April 1994 on the Legal Status of the Skrunda Radar Station During its Temporary Operation and Dismantling, the CSCE in June 1994 had welcomed requests by Latvia and the Russian Federation for CSCE assistance in implementing the Agreement. On 23 February 1995 the Permanent Council took a decision on the Terms of Reference for an OSCE Inspection Regime. At the request of the Permanent Council, the OSCE Representative and Alternate Representative were appointed by the Chairman-in Office on 6 April 1995. Two periodic and two extraordinary inspections may be scheduled for each year. The first periodic inspection was carried out from 28 to 30 August in a businesslike and co-operative manner. The inspection served its confidence building purpose.

*2.1.12. Mission to Estonia*

The Mission closely followed developments related to citizenship issues, including the adoption of the Citizenship Law, as well as amendments made to the Law on Aliens, which came into force in early July 1995. The Citizenship Law, which the Mission has considered acceptable in general terms, was adopted in January 1995. The Mission is following the implementation of this law, as well as matters connected with the Law on Aliens.

The Mission continued its work on issues related to language training for russophone inhabitants, and has emphasized its importance as a means of close connections between Russian speakers and their Estonian environment. In April the OSCE Mission organized a seminar in north-eastern Estonia aimed at improving understanding between various communities in Estonia and exploring how their integration could best be pursued.

*2.1.13. The OSCE Representative on the Estonian Government Commission on Military Pensioners*

The OSCE Representative on the Estonian Government Commission on Military Pensioners, who was appointed by the CIO, took up his office on 16 November 1994. The said Commission will make recommendations on the issuance of residence permits.

*2.2. The Conflict in the Area Dealt with by the Minsk Conference*

On 6 January, the CIO named Mr. Jan Eliason of Sweden and Mr. Valentin Lozinsky of Russia as co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference. The Co-chairmanship, agreed upon at the December 1994 Budapest Summit, established a single coordinated effort of the OSCE Minsk Group and the Russian Federation within the OSCE framework. On 21 April, Finland took over the Co-chairmanship from Sweden; the CIO appointed Mr. Heikki Talvitie as the new Finnish Co-chairman.

Heads of State or Government decided at the Budapest Summit to deploy a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force subject to an appropriate resolution from the UN Security Council following the conclusion of a political agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict. To plan the establishment, composition and operations of such a force, a High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) was set up in Vienna, replacing the Initial Operations Planning Group.

In July, the HLPG submitted to the CIO its Concept for the OSCE Multinational Peacekeeping Mission for the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.

In August, the CIO appointed Amb. Stanislaw Przygodzki of Poland as the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference. The Personal Representative's main task is to facilitate the achievement of a political settlement of the conflict through a

continued presence in the area, including assisting in efforts to promote the continuation of the ceasefire.

### 2.3. *Sanctions Coordinator and Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs)*

More than 200 customs officers and other experts continue their work in seven SAMs located in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Ukraine. The SAMs assist and advise the host countries in their implementation of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. SAMs operations are financed by the OSCE (except for personnel costs, which are borne by the sending States). Their mandate has been extended until 31 December 1995.

The operational headquarters of the SAMs, SAMCOMM, are located in Brussels. Financed and partly staffed by the EU, it has the function of facilitating the communications and co-ordination between the SAMs and the authorities of host countries, ensuring the follow-up of cases of suspected breaches of sanctions and bringing evaluation reports to the attention of the European Union, the OSCE Liaison Group and the UN Sanctions Committee. The OSCE/EU Sanctions Co-ordinator, co-located with SAMCOMM, is overseeing the entire operation, providing basic direction and co-ordination between all levels and participants involved in the enforcement of sanctions.

In February the Sanctions Coordinator visited Budapest and Tirana for talks with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and other representatives of the Government, National Bank and Danube Commission in Hungary; and with the Government and authorities in Albania, where ways for the better application of the Oil Pre-Verification System (OPVS) designed to curb oil smuggling into FRY, were discussed.

In May he visited New York for talks with U.N. officials and certain delegations. He also addressed the Security Council (Arria Procedure) and participated in the 123rd meeting of the Sanctions Committee on Yugoslavia.

In June he visited Valetta (Malta) and Nicosia (Cyprus) for talks with government officials and the Governor of the Central Bank. The discussion focused on the extension of the OPVS between Greece/Albania and Italy/Albania, also between Cyprus/Albania and Malta/Albania. In Cyprus, the issue of off-shore companies controlled by persons or entities in FRY was also discussed.

In June he visited Skopje (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) for talks with the President of the Republic, President of the Chamber of Commerce, and other government officials. The discussions focused on the

need to reduce the level of sanctions violations with regard to rail and truck traffic into and out of FRY.

From 17 to 23 October 1995 he visited New York for talks with U.N. officials. He participated in the 131st meeting of the Sanctions Committee on Yugoslavia and was received by the President of the Security Council.

During the same period the Sanctions Coordinator's Staff undertook a series of missions to New York, the Balkan countries and other OSCE member States for talks with regard to a better implementation of sanctions. SAMCOMM members also undertook a number of sanctions related missions.

#### *2.4. Other Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Activities*

In March a PC decision welcomed the *Pact on Stability in Europe* adopted on 21 March in Paris as a further step in enhancing stability in Europe. The decision reiterated that, in accordance with the Budapest Summit Declaration and the Budapest Decision on Strengthening the CSCE, the OSCE is the repository of the Pact and is entrusted with following its implementation. Further to the March PC decision, the 31st PC agreed on a practical follow-up to the Pact which specified steps the OSCE would take in its repository function. The upcoming Budapest Ministerial Council will be informed of the progress achieved and invited to endorse the general thrust of this work.

The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE entered into force on 5 December 1994 after the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification on 5 October 1994. The first meeting of the members of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was held on 29 May in Geneva. The agenda of the meeting included, inter alia, adoption of the rules of procedure for the first election of the Bureau and the first appointment of a registrar, election of the President of the Court, election of two conciliators as members of the Court and of two alternates, adoption of the rules of the Court, etc. Mr. Robert Badinter was elected the President of the Court and Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher his Deputy.

#### *3. The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)*

Tensions involving minorities today are a major cause of instability and violence in the OSCE area. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. Max van der Stoep, who has held this post since 1993, further intensified his efforts to defuse minority-related problems at an early stage.

3.1. In his report after his October 1994 visit to *Albania*, the HCNM formulated a number of recommendations concerning the situation of the Greek minority in the south of the country. These related, in particular, to education in the Greek language, increasing opportunities available to the Greek minority for employment in public service, ways of promoting dialogue and building trust between the authorities and members of ethnic minorities, and relations between the State and the Orthodox Church of Albania. During his visit to Tirana in July 1995, the HCNM focused on relations between Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. He also discussed the critical situation in Kosovo.

3.2. As in previous years, in 1995 the HCNM visited *Estonia*. He focused on the implementation of legislation relating to citizenship and aliens and on the question of language training and testing for persons seeking naturalization. The HCNM appealed to OSCE States to provide assistance for programmes in this field.

3.3. The HCNM paid several visits to *Hungary*, discussing the implementation of the law on national minorities and the situation of the Slovak minority in Hungary.

In 1993, the HCNM had recommended the establishment of a three-member team of experts to analyze the situation of the Hungarians in *Slovakia* and Slovaks in *Hungary* (see 3.10 below). During their fourth visit to Hungary, in June 1995, the experts were joined by the HCNM. They concentrated on the functioning of the local Slovak minority governments and the Slovak national self-governing body established earlier in the year. Issues discussed included the parliamentary representation of minorities, the establishment of a minority ombudsman, and education in the mother tongue.

3.4. In May 1995, the HCNM made his second visit to the Central Asian part of the OSCE area. In Almaty, *Kazakhstan*, he had extensive meetings both with leading state officials and with representatives of the Slavic and German communities in Kazakhstan. He paid particular attention to language and citizenship issues, as well as to ways of fostering dialogue between the authorities and ethnic minorities at national and local levels.

3.5. In May 1995 the HCNM visited Bishkek, *Kyrgyzstan*, for a two-day seminar on Interethnic Relations and Regional Co-operation organized by the HCNM in response to the interest expressed by the President of the Republic. The seminar focused on interethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan, and brought together government officials, representatives of Kyrgyzstan's ethnic

communities, representatives of the Governments of Kazakhstan, Russia and Tajikistan, and international experts on minority issues.

3.6. The HCNM continued to pay attention to developments in *Latvia*, in particular, to the implementation of the law on citizenship and a draft law on former USSR nationals (law on non-citizens), which took into account his comments. The HCNM also expressed his appreciation of the governmental draft programme for the setting up of a Human Rights Council authorized to give advice on human rights matters, receive individual complaints and engage in human rights education. Stressing the importance of training in the Latvian language, the HCNM appealed to OSCE States to provide assistance for programmes in this field.

3.7. The HCNM continued to take an active interest in the situation of the Albanian minority in the former Yugoslav Republic of *Macedonia*. During several visits to the country, he discussed ways of expanding educational opportunities at higher and secondary levels for young Albanians living in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and of improving their access to employment in the State administration. He suggested the creation of a Higher Educational Centre for Public Administration and Business. The HCNM, through interventions with officials at the highest levels and with leaders of the Albanian community, helped to defuse the tensions that had broken out after a group of Albanians started an Albanian University in Tetovo without governmental approval.

3.8. At the invitation of the Moldovan Government, the HCNM made his first visit to *Moldova* at the end of 1994. In Chisinau, he met with the President of the Republic and with leading government officials and parliamentarians. The HCNM visited the region inhabited by the Gagauz, an ethnically Turkic population of Christian faith, and examined the Law on Gagauz Autonomy then being debated by the Moldovan Parliament. He also visited the Trans-Dniester region in northeastern Moldova, which has a large Russian-speaking population.

3.9. The HCNM continued his involvement in *Romania*, paying special attention to legislation on minority education, and discussed the creation of an ombudsman. He recommended strong action to prevent discrimination against the Roma and to curb ethnic hostility and hatred.

3.10. The HCNM made a number of visits to *Slovakia*, dealing specifically with the situation of the Hungarian minority. In June 1995, he accompanied the team of experts on their fourth visit, during which they concentrated largely on education issues, including the Concept of the Ministry of Education for Education in the Ethnically Mixed Areas, the training of teachers for



state schools in those areas, and the creation of bilingual alternative education classes.

3.11. The HCNM made several visits to *Ukraine*, in the course of which the situation of the Crimean Tatars was discussed. Deported to Central Asia, the Tatars have recently been returning to Crimea in large numbers. However, they face serious problems in housing and education. The HCNM also dealt with the dispute between the Ukrainian Government and Parliament, on the one hand, and the Crimean Parliament, on the other, concerning the constitution adopted by the Crimean Parliament.

A three-member team of international experts on constitutional and economic matters visited Kiev and Simferopol on three fact-finding missions and submitted reports on their findings to the HCNM.

The HCNM and the Head of the OSCE Mission to Ukraine co-chaired a Round Table in Locarno, Switzerland. Comments and recommendations were subsequently sent to the Government of Ukraine with the request that they be passed on to the Ukrainian Parliament and to Crimea.

#### 4. *The Human Dimension*

##### 4.1. *Democratic Institutions Building*

During the reporting period the OSCE has been particularly active in providing assistance with democratic institution building.

The ODIHR assisted the OSCE mission to Sarajevo by arranging a training seminar for ombudsmen, bringing together ombudsmen of western and eastern Europe. A network of ombudsmen was established to provide the ombudsmen in Sarajevo with expertise. In Tajikistan the ODIHR advised the Tajik Government on an ombudsman office. Currently, the ODIHR is preparing a draft manual on national human rights institutions to assist OSCE participating States in the establishment of such institutions.

##### 4.2. *Election Monitoring*

The Budapest Summit tasked the ODIHR with the preparation of a framework for the co-ordination of election monitoring. After consultations with relevant international organizations, a draft framework was presented to the Permanent Council in May. The implementation of the framework was successfully tested in Armenia on a joint OSCE/United Nations operation for the observation of the July parliamentary elections.

*Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan (5 and 19 February 1995)*. The first democratic elections to the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan were monitored throughout the country by approximately 60 observers from OSCE States and NGOs. An ODIHR representative organized support activities for the

observers, including briefings, background materials, translation of laws and statistics, as well as liaising with the Kyrgyz authorities on a wide range of issues. The second round was monitored by a group of Swiss observers who shared their reports with the ODIHR. Observers had access to almost all polling sites and received all necessary information from polling officials. It was concluded that these elections could be considered as generally reflecting the will of the people.

*Parliamentary Elections in Estonia (5 March 1995).* These were the second parliamentary elections held in Estonia since it re-established its independence in September 1991. A group of 14 international observers from the participating States and NGOs, including one observer from a non-OSCE country monitored the elections. In general ODIHR considered these elections to have been conducted in accordance with the principles contained in the Electoral Law. There were some complaints from individuals that their applications for citizenship were being delayed, preventing them from voting and that some Estonian citizens were not included in the voting register. To prevent this from happening again ODIHR suggested that next time the registration of candidates should take place at an earlier stage of the electoral process.

*Local Referendum on the Inclusion of Certain Localities in Gagauzia, Republic of Moldova (5 March 1995).* The purpose of the referendum was to enable localities of Moldova having Gagauz population to decide whether they wished to be included in the autonomous territorial entity of Gagauzia. A group of twenty observers, including a Council of Europe delegation, monitored the referendum. ODIHR and the OSCE Mission to Moldova coordinated the activities of the observers. Some concerns were raised about the procedural integrity of the referendum. Results showed a strong vote in most localities in favour of inclusion in Gagauzia.

*Local Elections in Moldova (16 April 1995)* were the first local elections since Moldova proclaimed its independence in 1991. With the assistance of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the ODIHR established an office in Chisinau shortly before the elections. It was noted that, at all levels, the electoral authorities implemented the electoral law in a competent and dedicated manner. In general, the polling stations functioned in a satisfactory manner and elections were well organized.

*Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Belarus (14 and 18 May 1995)* were the first parliamentary elections held in the independent Republic of Belarus. Two ODIHR representatives co-ordinated the monitoring process. Delegations from several international organizations and parliamentary associations also observed the elections. The total number of accredited international observers was in excess of 200.

It was concluded that the electoral process fell short of the OSCE commitments with respect to political campaigning. Provisions dealing with secrecy of voting were not strictly enforced. Taking into account the deficiencies of

the electoral legislation, the voting itself was, despite some irregularities, conducted in a generally adequate manner.

The ODIHR made specific recommendations on the need to clarify the interpretation of certain provisions of the Election Law, and the fair allocation of broadcast time and newspaper space to political parties and candidates.

*Parliamentary Elections in Armenia (5 and 29 July 1995).* The election monitoring unit was established in early May and was the first joint OSCE/UN operation of election monitoring. The observers were drawn from 18 OSCE participating States and several non-governmental organizations.

The Armenian elections showed some encouraging signs in terms of democratic development. However there were a number of negative points. One political party was suspended prior to the elections, the composition of the Electoral Committees was unbalanced and changeable. The Law of Election was applied selectively and inconsistently. The secrecy of voting was not always strictly observed. Moreover, none of the court cases which were filed against the Central Electoral Committee had been resolved by the end of the elections. Nevertheless, the voting process itself went smoothly.

To improve the process in the future, it was recommended that the Central Electoral Committee should be a non-political body and the counting process should be made more transparent. Future election laws should also prohibit the presence of police or military persons in polling stations.

*Parliamentary Elections in Latvia (30 September and 1 October 1995).* These were the second democratic parliamentary elections to be held in the Republic of Latvia. The elections were observed by representatives of 11 OSCE States including a delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The electoral officials administering the polling stations showed a great level of professionalism.

There was still some concern on polling day concerning the guaranteed secret voting and the airing of political messages in the polling stations themselves. Concern arose over a part of the legislation governing the election to the Sixth Saeima which does not fully uphold the spirit of the OSCE commitments of the Copenhagen Document 1990. It contravenes Article 7.5 guaranteeing to "respect the rights of citizens to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations, without discrimination."

To ameliorate future elections, Latvia should develop a voting register. It was also felt that although the question of citizenship itself was not an issue, the fact that one third of the population was left out of the political life of the country remains a concern.

*Parliamentary Elections in Croatia (29 October 1995).* These were the first democratic elections to be held in Croatia. Observers came from 14 OSCE countries and several non-governmental organizations. Due to the late passage of the electoral legislation there was little time left for a meaningful political campaign. There was nevertheless a broad range of political parties

and candidates participating in the elections.

The recent displacement of a large number of Croatian citizens and the present political and social climate shortly after military operations raise concern about the ability to achieve universal and equal suffrage in an atmosphere conducive to strengthening democratic institutions. Concern remains also about the more fundamental questions of the extent of diaspora voting and how this was organised.

The absence of non-partisan domestic observers and the restrictive regulations governing party observers as well as delays in broadcasting opposition party campaigns by the State media were further points of criticism.

In the future, there should be more transparency towards amending the election legislation, the introduction of non-partisan observers and better, more equal access to the media. A general voter education programme might help to reduce the number of invalid ballots.

#### *4.3. Seminars, Symposia, Meetings*

During the reporting period the ODIHR organized and its experts participated in the following events:

##### *4.3.1 Rule of Law and Democratic Institution Building*

*Building Blocks for Civil Society: Freedom of Association and NGOs*, 4-7 April, Warsaw. The Seminar was attended by 286 participants, which is the highest number since CSCE seminars were initiated in 1992. One-half of the participants were representatives of 123 non-governmental organizations.

*International Seminar on the Constitution of Tajikistan*, 14-15 June, Dushanbe, for parliamentarians and jurists.

*Second Annual Warsaw Judicial Symposium*, 5-10 June, for lawyers from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and neighboring countries.

*Expert Seminar on the Changing Role of the Judiciary*, 29-30 May, Tbilisi, sponsored by the Supreme Court, Tbilisi, Georgia.

*Seminar on Tolerance*, 23-26 May, co-organized with the COE and UNESCO; Bucharest, Romania.

*Expert Seminar on the Changing Role of the Judiciary*, 3-4 April, Riga, sponsored by the Supreme Court, Riga, Latvia.

*OSCE Mission Seminar on Russian-Estonian Relations*, 6-8 April, Johvi, Estonia.

*Expert Consultation*, 15-20 January, organized by the President's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Constitutional Court, Moscow, Russian Federation;

*Expert Consultation*, 11-12 January, organized by the Supreme Court of Estonia and the OSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn and Tartu.

*Expert Consultation* organized by the Supreme Court and Parliament of Latvia, 10 January, Riga.

#### 4.3.2. *Media*

*Seminar on Print Media Management*, Chisinau, Moldova, 11-13 May 1995, co-organized with the Independent Journalism Center in Moldova.

*Seminar on Print Media Management*, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 11-13 September 1995, co-organized with UNESCO for the Central Asian States.

#### 4.3.3. *Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, 2-19 October, Warsaw*

The meeting examined implementation of the OSCE human dimension commitments as well as reviewed practical functioning of existing mechanisms and procedures for monitoring compliance with existing commitments. Several recommendations for the future human dimension activities for the OSCE were made in the course of discussion.

#### 4.4. *Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues*

The Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues (CPRSI) within the ODIHR was established by decision of the Budapest Summit.

After thorough consultation with the Office of the HCNM and several Romani associations, as well as with international organizations, in particular, the COE and the UNHCR, the following main objectives were identified for the activities of the Contact Point:

- focus on addressing discrimination and violence against Roma and Sinti;
- disseminate information on Roma and Sinti issues, including information on implementation of commitments pertaining to Roma and Sinti;

- encourage development of Roma and Sinti organizational capacity and assisting co-operation between Romani and Sinti associations and organizations.

Regular consultations on current activities of the CPRSI were organized on the occasion of OSCE seminars. A workshop on networking of contacts and co-operation with Romani and Sinti associations took place in October.

## 5. *Security Co-operation*

### 5.1. *New Measures in the Field of Arms Control and Confidence- and Security Building*

The Forum for Security Co-operation adopted in November/December 1994 the following documents:

- The Vienna Document 1994. It expands the provisions of the previous Vienna Documents on military information exchange and integrates in its framework measures previously adopted by the FSC in 1993, concerning
  - increased openness in defence planning and
  - a Programme for Military Contacts and Co-operation.
- The Document on the Global Exchange of Information, obligating participating States to exchange annually and without geographical limits information on major weapons and equipment systems and personnel in their conventional armed forces, as well as on the command structure of their forces.
- The Document on Principles Governing Non-Proliferation in the field of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and the transfer of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and their components and technology. Measures include, inter alia, support for the existing international agreements in these fields, and, more specifically, the obligation to incorporate the existing commitments in national legislation.

### 5.2. *The Code of Conduct*

A major document finalized during the reporting period is the *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*, adopted at the Budapest Summit. It is a comprehensive document relating to the military and defence policies of participating States both in times of peace and of war. It commits States subscribing to it, inter alia, to co-operate in the field of security, to

establish and maintain democratic control over their armed forces, and to ensure respect for existing international obligations.

### 5.3. *FSC Seminars*

The seminars offered an opportunity for brainstorming and discussing issues outside the framework of formal negotiations.

5.3.1. The Seminar on Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers (20-21 June). The Seminar offered an opportunity to exchange information and experience in various areas including export laws, control lists, licenses, enforcement practices and procedures, possibilities for better international co-operation in preventing undesirable or unauthorized transfers, increased transparency through international efforts, co-operation in the field of control agencies, and combating illegal conventional arms transfers. Follow-up action includes a questionnaire to be prepared by the CPC which will be circulated on an annual basis. The CPC will compile the information provided. The CPC will also receive national control lists and data of a designated national contact point and will make available on request the national control lists and a list of the contact points.

5.3.2. The Seminar on Regional Arms Control in the OSCE Area (10-12 July). Topics included the politico-military context for regional arms control, regional security, tailoring and applying arms control and CSBMs to regional concerns, regional security issues and further tasks of the FSC, and other regional issues.

5.3.3. A Seminar CSBMs and Arms Control: Application and Compliance, organized by the CPC, was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan (16-23 May). Its main objective was to strengthen the implementation of and compliance with arms control provisions in the OSCE framework. The Seminar aimed at providing officials from the Central Asian OSCE States who are responsible for compliance with arms control provisions in the participating States in the region with a better understanding of the CSBM and other arms control regimes in the OSCE framework.

### 5.4. *The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM), 12-14 April*

Delegations agreed the AIAM has become a flexible tool, a useful vehicle for the development of new techniques and measures.

The AIAM tried to determine whether agreed measures still correspond to reality or whether they should be changed. The meeting gave its attention to questions such as the validity, practical implementation and improvement of existing measures, as well as their further development.

Working Group A (WGA), a subsidiary body of the FSC, mandated with implementation and monitoring of measures adopted by the FSC that prepared the AIAM was also instructed by the FSC Decision to ensure its appropriate follow-up and to prepare FSC debates on implementation. Pursuant to that decision, WGA devoted its every fourth meeting entirely to implementation.

## 6. *Other Important Activities*

### 6.1. *Integration of Recently Admitted Participating States*

The Budapest Summit requested the ODIHR and the Secretary General to arrange further meetings and seminars relating to the Programme of Co-ordinated Support.

6.1.1. In addition to seminars arranged by the ODIHR and CPC, a Seminar on Rehabilitating the Environment (10-14 October) was organized by the Department of Chairman-in-Office Support in Tashkent/Urgench, Uzbekistan. The Seminar provided an OSCE framework for environment-related discussion among the participating States of Central Asia and fostered their contacts with the rest of the OSCE community and international organizations.

6.1.2. At the request of the CIO, the Secretary General visited Tajikistan from 7 to 9 January. He conducted a series of talks with the President, the Acting President of Parliament, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Justice. In his talks in Tajikistan the Secretary General focused on the need to improve the electoral law and process so as to bring them into line with OSCE standards and requirements.

6.1.3. Based on recommendations set in the Secretary General's report on his visit in 1994 to the OSCE participating States of Central Asia the Permanent Council decided on the establishment, for one year, of an OSCE Liaison Office for Central Asia. The Office became operational in July in Tashkent.

6.1.4. The Permanent Council established a Voluntary Fund for Fostering the Integration of Recently admitted Participating States.



## *6.2. The Economic Dimension*

The Third Meeting of the Economic Forum (7-9 June, Prague) considered various aspects of regional economic co-operation in the fields of trade, investment, infrastructure and, in particular, their relevance for security. A number of specific proposals on improved integration of the economic dimension into the work of the OSCE were made.

6.2.1. The role of tourism in promoting better understanding between different cultures was the subject of an OSCE seminar held in Bucharest (6-8 November) with the assistance of the Department of Chairman-in-Office Support. The seminar offered an opportunity to conduct an open and result-oriented dialogue on the main issues and prospects for the development of co-operation in this field.

6.2.2. The Government of Bulgaria hosted in Sofia an OSCE Seminar on the Role of Trans-European Infrastructure for Stability and Co-operation in the Black Sea Region (15-17 November) organized with the assistance of the Department of Chairman-in-Office Support. The seminar analysed the need for developing and upgrading transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure in the Black Sea Region with a view to contributing to an accelerated European integration process.

## *6.3. Press and Public Information*

Any institution in a civil society needs public support for its development. The Secretariat has undertaken a number of efforts to spread information about the OSCE, but the results have been very limited. Combined and indeed enhanced efforts on the part of the Chair, the OSCE States and the Secretariat as well as other OSCE institutions will be needed to make OSCE activities better known.

### *6.3.1. Press Relations*

The Secretariat (Department for Chairman-in-Office Support) has made an effort to improve access to and quality of information as well as to develop contacts with the press and the public. The Secretary General and OSCE officials have made more frequent public appearances and have improved their contacts with the media.

In order to inform the public of the work of OSCE Missions, journalists were invited to accompany the Secretary General on his visit to the OSCE Mission to Georgia in June.

### 6.3.2 *Publications Issued by the Institutions Increase Public Knowledge of the OSCE*

The DCIOS continued to publish the monthly OSCE Newsletter and distribute it to the OSCE States and about 1,000 outside subscribers.

The first issue of the OSCE Handbook prepared by the DCIOS provided comprehensive and factual information on the institutions, activities and mechanisms of the OSCE.

The Secretariat prepared a reference manual on CSCE/OSCE decisions and supported compilation projects conducted by private institutions.

As in previous years, the ODIHR has produced four issues of the OSCE ODIHR Bulletin.

On the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act the ODIHR published two books: Human Rights and the Judiciary - a Collection of Documents and OSCE Human Dimension Documents.

In addition to publishing the English version of the OSCE Human Dimension Documents in book form, the ODIHR co-ordinated the translation of several key OSCE Documents into non-OSCE languages (Latvian and Estonian). Projects are currently underway for translations into Tajik and Georgian.

In August the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues started producing a bi-monthly CPRSI Newsletter which, inter alia, lists the reports received by the ODIHR on the implementation of OSCE Commitments related to Roma.

The OSCE Secretariat has extended various forms of support and co-operation to other publications reporting on OSCE, in particular, the Helsinki Monitor.

6.3.3. A highlight of OSCE activities in 1995 were the events held to mark the *20th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act*.

In Vienna the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OSCE Secretary General jointly organized a ceremony with the participation of the Federal President of Austria on 30 June.

More than three hundred participants, representing governments of the OSCE States, parliaments, international organizations, research institutes and NGOs, attended in July the Seminar "Twenty Years of the Helsinki Act Towards a New Security Model" organized by the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a conference commemorating the Twentieth Anniversary of the Signing of the Final Act on 1 August. The conference took place in Helsinki and was attended by eminent persons who had played a key role at the beginning of the CSCE process.

On 8 September, an international Symposium entitled "20 Years After Helsinki: The OSCE and the European Security Policy in Transition", organized by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, was held in Hamburg, Germany. The event also served as an occasion for launching the OSCE Yearbook.

The upcoming Swiss Chairmanship marked the twentieth anniversary of the Final Act with a meeting held on 20 October in Geneva. Diplomats, scholars, journalists and NGOs discussed the OSCE contribution to the historic change in Europe in 1989 and also focused on the current and future role of the OSCE in confronting new challenges.

A Seminar on the OSCE: Assessment and Future Prospects, organized by the Prague-based Open-Media Research Institute, was held in Prague on 28 October, inaugurated by the CIO and attended by senior representatives from OSCE participating States, as well as academics.

6.3.4. A study from a Public Relations Agency "OSCE Communication Strategy" provided a basis for setting priorities for strengthening and improving the OSCE's press and public information effort.

### *III. The Parliamentary Assembly (PA)*

The 4th Annual Session of the PA was held in Ottawa, Canada, from 4 to 8 July 1995.

The Ottawa decision document contains three resolutions that track the three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act. The first resolution on Political Affairs and Security emphasizes, inter alia, strengthening the OSCE and the importance of the progress being made in OSCE activities in the Causasus and reiterates concern over the continuing military conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The resolution also calls on the OSCE to actively explore decision-making procedures based on an approximate consensus.

The Resolution on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment, underlines the importance of the role economic stabilization plays in the security dimension.

The Resolution on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions, states, inter alia, the need to establish an international criminal law and court covering war crimes.

In addition, the PA Standing Committee agreed to the setting up of an ad hoc Committee on a Code of Conduct on Democracy and Human Rights which PA President Swaelen will appoint at a later date.

Mr. Frank Swaelen was re-elected President of the Parliamentary Assembly by acclamation. Five Vice-Presidents were also elected for three-year terms: Steny Hoyer, an opposition leader in the U.S. Congress; Mrs. Helle Degn, former Minister and Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the

Danish Parliament; and Mr. Andras Barsony, Deputy Chairman of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian National Assembly. Mr. Erkin Khalilov, Speaker of the Uzbekistan Parliament, and Mr. Kazys Bobelis, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lithuanian Parliament, were both elected to one-year terms.

#### *IV. Relations with International Organizations and Institutions*

The ongoing inter-institutional dialogue on a political level was complemented by increased co-operation on specific topics like election monitoring, mission activities and humanitarian assistance.

Co-operation between the CSCE and the UN was again on the agenda of the forty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly that, on 11 November 1994, adopted a resolution on the co-operation between the UN and the CSCE.

While welcoming the increased co-operation between the two organizations, the resolution (49/20) requests the UN Secretary-General to explore with the CSCE Chairman-in-Office further improvements in this regard.

The resolution also "supports the activities of the CSCE to contribute to stability and the maintenance of peace within its area."

Most significantly, the resolution "encourages the participating States of the CSCE to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of disputes in the Conference area, through conflict prevention and crisis management by the Conference, including peacekeeping."

In April, a Representative of the CIO met UN Representatives in New York and discussed ways and means of possible UN assistance in the preparation of the OSCE peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In February, the CIO convened a meeting in Budapest to discuss co-operation and co-ordination in humanitarian causes with other international organizations. Attending the meeting were representatives from the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the United Nations Office in Geneva, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The OSCE was represented by Senior Officials from the Troika countries, the HCNM, the Director of the ODIHR and the Director of the CPC.

In Geneva Representatives of the CIO, the OSCE Troika, Directors of the ODIHR and the Conflict Prevention Centre had talks with the Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Committee of

Red Cross and the Council of Europe on operations for channelling humanitarian assistance to Chechnya.

In June, Heads of Mission met with Representatives of the Council of Europe, the ICRC and UNHCR, who gave presentations on the activities of their organizations in OSCE mission areas. This helped identify more specifically areas for practical co-operation in the field and contributed to a better understanding of the complementary elements of the respective mandates.

Close contacts and co-operation between the COE and OSCE continued. Two meetings between the respective Chairmen and the Secretary General were held and will be continued.

In October, the second high-level ("two+two") meeting between the OSCE and the COE was held in Prague. Attended by the CIO, the Secretary General, the HCNM, the Director of the ODIHR and the COE represented by the Czech Foreign Minister and COE Secretary General, the meeting focused on cooperation in former Yugoslavia, exchange of experiences in the field of compliance monitoring, cooperation in election monitoring, CBMS, information exchange, combating racism, aggressive nationalism, xenophobia, anti-semitism, situation of ethnic minorities in Europe, etc.

Working-level contacts and information exchange continued with the UN, UNDP, WEU, NATO, CBSS, CIS, etc.

#### *V. Relations with Non-Participating States (NPS)*

The OSCE continued its co-operation and interaction with the NPS Japan and Republic of Korea and also with the non-participating Mediterranean States (NPMS) Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia.

Pursuant to the Budapest decisions an informal open-ended contact group was established within the PC framework to enhance dialogue with NPMS.

In July, the Troika held ministerial-level consultations with NPMS Foreign Ministers or their Representatives. The participants stressed the global character and the indivisibility of security and agreed on the importance of a comprehensive approach to security and on the growing significance of non-military aspects of security. They stressed the interdependence between security in the OSCE and Mediterranean areas and the common interest of the OSCE and the Mediterranean States in resolving the crises there.

The NPMS suggested that the CIO submit proposals to the upcoming OSCE Ministerial Council in Budapest on the enhancement of the relationship and status of these States vis-à-vis the OSCE and the extension of its scope to Jordan and Mauritania.

The NPMS expressed their interest in the OSCE's experience and its rules and principles and also its structures and institutions with a view to benefiting from them in their future co-operation. The Troika invited high-level officials from these States for an information visit to the OSCE in Vienna.

In the context of fostering links with NPMS a seminar on the OSCE Experience in the Field of Confidence Building was held in Cairo, Egypt in September organized by the Department for Chairman-in-Office Support and the host Country. Attended by prominent experts, the seminar was an important landmark in OSCE-NPMS rapprochement and offered the NPMS an opportunity to draw upon relevant OSCE expertise.

In November, senior officials from these States attended a special briefing programme at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna.

#### *VI. Contacts with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)*

The Budapest Summit of 1994 requested the Secretary General to make a study of how participation of NGOs can be further enhanced. OSCE Participating States and over 600 NGOs were requested to submit their views and proposals.

Based on ideas generated during the exploratory phase, the Secretary General submitted in September the requested study containing a number of specific proposals aimed at enhancing NGO participation in OSCE activities and calling, inter alia, for full compliance by participating States with their commitments vis-à-vis NGO involvement in OSCE activities; holding annual Meetings to be arranged by the PC Chairman with NGO participation; organizing briefings for NGOs prior to major OSCE events; convening informal meetings with NGOs on specific topics in Vienna; and appointing a Vienna-based NGO Liaison Officer in the Secretariat.

Traditionally, the ODIHR has played a key role in liaising with NGOs.

In June, a training workshop was organised by the ODIHR in Vilnius, Lithuania on Capacity Building and Communication for NGO Leadership, the purpose of the workshop being to impart to human rights-oriented NGOs in the Baltics professional, organizational, communication and administrative skills, along with a basic understanding of the OSCE and the role played in it by NGOs. Further workshops of this nature are planned and the next training will possibly take place in Tbilisi. Skopje and Ljubljana are also prospective sites for workshops.

Continuing the process launched by the 1994 Stadtschlaining Seminar, the CPC assisted the Institute for Research and Security Studies (IRSS) by organizing the Seminar on Exchanging Knowledge and Conflict Management, which was part of an ongoing expert consultation co-ordinated by the CPC and the IRSS. The purpose of the seminar was to examine methods of com-

munication and information management with the aim of improving conflict management.

## *VII. Administration and Finance*

Activities in this area were aimed at further developing the administrative and financial structures and procedures of the OSCE with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of related support services for the benefit of OSCE operations. Special attention was given to the preparation of comprehensive Staff Regulations and Rules, as well as Financial Regulations.

### *1. Organizational and Personnel Matters*

A new office was established in Tashkent effective 1 July 1995. The staffing of the Prague Office was gradually reduced. The High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) was established in January.

The total number of OSCE staff continued to increase in 1995. Currently some 155 persons, including interpreters, translators and conference typists, are employed by the three OSCE institutions. Around 120 of these work at the Secretariat (114 in Vienna and 6 in Prague), 25 at the ODIHR in Warsaw and 10 at the Office of the High Commissioner in The Hague.

New Staff Regulations and Staff Rules were elaborated and presented to the Permanent Council in April.

A Provident Fund was established effective 1 July for staff whose security upon retirement is not provided through affiliation with the national social security system at their respective duty station.

An in-depth analysis and a job classification exercise covering all OSCE posts were carried out with the help of an external expert on the UN job classification system. Based on the results of this study, the Secretary General presented a report in September on the implementation of the OSCE salary structure, which had been adopted by the Permanent Committee on 21 July 1994.

A system for periodic evaluation of staff members' performance was established in April.

### *2. Financial Matters*

A unified budget for 1995 was initially adopted in November 1994 by the Committee of Senior Officials. This budget was revised during the first months of 1995 to take account of the outcome of the Budapest Summit and a revised budget was adopted by the Permanent Council on 6 April. This budget was again reviewed in July. Thus, the budget currently in force was adopted by the Permanent Council on 25 July and totals 321.4 million

Austrian Schillings, equivalent to some 30.6 million US Dollars.

The unified audited financial statements for 1994, including the report of the External Auditors, were submitted to the Permanent Council on 19 September. The Auditors attached to their report an unqualified audit opinion.

New Financial Regulations were elaborated and submitted to the Permanent Council in April.

A Voluntary Fund to Foster the Integration of Recently Admitted Participating States was created in March and a formalized administrative and financial procedure for the management of all voluntary contributions was established in August.



## Forms and Fora of Cooperation in the OSCE Area

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)  
NACC Observer  
Partnership for Peace (PfP)

European Union (EU)  
EU Association Agreement

Western European Union (WEU)  
Associate Member of the WEU  
Associate Partner of the WEU  
WEU Observer  
Eurocorps

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)  
Council of Europe  
European Free Trade Area (EFTA)  
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)

Group of Seven (G-7)  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)  
Baltic Defense Council  
Council of the Baltic Sea States  
Nordic Council  
Visegrád Group  
Black Sea Economic Cooperation



## The 55 OSCE Participating States - Facts and Figures\*

### 1. Albania

*Date of Accession:* June 1991

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %

*Area:* 28,748 km<sup>2</sup> (OSCE Ranking: 45)

*Population:* 3,389,000 (OSCE Ranking: 42)

*GNP per Capita:* 340 \$ (OSCE Ranking: 53)

*Armed Forces (Active):* 73,000 (OSCE Ranking: 21)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Council of Europe, Black Sea Economic Cooperation

### 2. Andorra

*Date of Accession:* April 1996

*Scale of Distribution:* was not fixed at time of printing

*Area:* 467.76 km<sup>2</sup> (50)

*Population:* 61,000 (51)

*GNP per Capita:* 21,150 \$ (13)

*Armed Forces:* None

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* Council of Europe

### 3. Armenia

*Date of Accession:* January 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.185 %

*Area:* 29,800 km<sup>2</sup> (44)

*Population:* 3,731,000 (39)

*GNP per Capita:* 660 \$ (49)

*Armed Forces:* 60,000 (25)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, CIS, Black Sea Economic Cooperation

### 4. Austria

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 2.05 %

*Area:* 83,858 km<sup>2</sup> (29)

*Population:* 7,862,000 (25)

*GNP per Capita:* 23,510 \$ (10)

*Armed Forces:* 55,750 (26)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, Partnership for Peace, NACC

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\* drawn up by Matthias Z. Karádi

Observer, Council of Europe, OECD, WEU Observer

### **5. Azerbaijan**

*Date of Accession:* January 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.185 %

*Area:* 86,600 km<sup>2</sup> (28)

*Population:* 7,384,000 (26)

*GNP per Capita:* 730 \$ (47)

*Armed Forces:* 86,700 (18)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, CIS, Black Sea Economic Cooperation

### **6. Belarus**

*Date of Accession:* January 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.7 %

*Area:* 207,595 km<sup>2</sup> (19)

*Population:* 10,188,000 (20)

*GNP per Capita:* 2,870 \$ (21)

*Armed Forces:* 98,400 (17)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace

### **7. Belgium**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 3.55 %

*Area:* 30,528 km<sup>2</sup> (43)

*Population:* 10,048,000 (21)

*GNP per Capita:* 21,650 \$ (12)

*Armed Forces:* 47,200 (28)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, WEU, Eurocorps, Council of Europe, OECD

### **8. Bosnia-Herzegovina**

*Date of Accession:* April 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %

*Area:* 51,129 km<sup>2</sup> (36)

*Population:* 3,776,000 (38)

*GNP per Capita:* less than 695 \$ (48)

*Armed Forces:* 132,000 (Muslim-Croat Federation) (13); 75,000 ("Serb Republic");

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* -

### **9. Bulgaria**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.55 %

*Area:* 110,994 km<sup>2</sup> (23)

*Population:* 8,887,000 (23)

*GNP per Capita:* 1,140 \$ (41)

*Armed Forces:* 101,900 (16)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, EU Association Agreement, Associate partner of the WEU, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Council of Europe

#### **10. Canada**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 5.45 %

*Area:* 9,958,319 km<sup>2</sup> (2)

*Population:* 27,782,000 (11)

*GNP per Capita:* 19,970 \$ (15)

*Armed Forces:* 70,500 (22)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NAFTA, G-7, OECD

#### **11. Croatia**

*Date of Accession:* March 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %

*Area:* 56,538 km<sup>2</sup> (35)

*Population:* 4,511,000 (34)

*GNP per Capita:* 1,900 \$ (37)

*Armed Forces:* 105,000 (15)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* Council of Europe

#### **12. Cyprus**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %

*Area:* 9,251 km<sup>2</sup> (48)

*Population:* 726,000 (47)

*GNP per Capita:* 10,380 \$ (22)

*Armed Forces:* 10,000 (39)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* Council of Europe

#### **13. Czech Republic\***

*Date of Accession:* January 1993

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.67 %

*Area:* 78,864 km<sup>2</sup> (30)

*Population:* 10,296,000 (18)

*GNP per Capita:* 2,710 \$ (31)

*Armed Forces:* 86,400 (19)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Associate partner of the WEU, EU Association Agreement, Council of Europe, Visegrád Group

\*After the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia became Participating States of the OSCE in January 1993.

#### **14. Denmark**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 2.05 %

*Area:* 43,094 km<sup>2</sup> (39)

*Population:* 5,165,000 (31)

*GNP per Capita:* 26,730 \$ (4)

*Armed Forces:* 33,100 (31)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Council of Europe, WEU Observer, Nordic Council, Council of the Baltic Sea States, OECD

#### **15. Estonia**

*Date of Accession:* September 1991

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %

*Area:* 45,227 km<sup>2</sup> (38)

*Population:* 1,552,000 (46)

*GNP per Capita:* 3,080 \$ (28)

*Armed Forces:* 3,500 (45)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, EU Association Agreement, Council of Europe, Associate partner of the WEU, Baltic Defense Council, Council of the Baltic Sea States

#### **16. Finland**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 2.05 %

*Area:* 338,139 km<sup>2</sup> (13)

*Population:* 5,058,000 (32)

*GNP per Capita:* 19,300 \$ (17)

*Armed Forces:* 31,100 (32)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, Partnership for Peace, NACC Observer, Nordic Council, EFTA, WEU Observer, Council of Europe, OECD, Council of the Baltic Sea States

### **17. France**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 9.0 %

*Area:* 543,965 km<sup>2</sup> (7)

*Population:* 57,472,000 (6)

*GNP per Capita:* 22,490 \$ (11)

*Armed Forces:* 409,000 (5)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, WEU, NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Eurocorps, G-7, Council of Europe, OECD

### **18. Georgia**

*Date of Accession:* March 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.185 %

*Area:* 69,700 km<sup>2</sup> (32)

*Population:* 5,446,000 (29)

*GNP per Capita:* 580 \$ (50)

*Armed Forces:* 9,000 (40)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Black Sea Economic Cooperation

### **19. Germany**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 9.0 %

*Area:* 356,854 km<sup>2</sup> (12)

*Population:* 81,338,093 (3)

*GNP per Capita:* 23,560 \$ (9)

*Armed Forces:* 339,900 (6)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, WEU, Eurocorps, G-7, Council of the Baltic Sea States, Council of Europe, OECD

### **20. Greece**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.7 %

*Area:* 131,957 km<sup>2</sup> (22)

*Population:* 10,365,000 (17)

*GNP per Capita:* 7,390 \$ (25)

*Armed Forces:* 171,300 (12)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, WEU, NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Council of Europe, OECD, Black Sea Economic Cooperation

### **21. The Holy See**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.15 %

*Area:* 0.44 km<sup>2</sup> (55)

*Population:* 802 (55)

*GNP per Capita:* not available

*Armed Forces:* None

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* -

### **22. Hungary**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.7 %

*Area:* 93,030 km<sup>2</sup> (26)

*Population:* 10,210,000 (19)

*GNP per Capita:* 3,350 \$ (27)

*Armed Forces:* 70,500 (23)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Associate partner of the WEU, EU Association Agreement, Council of Europe, Visegrád Group

### **23. Iceland**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %

*Area:* 103,000 km<sup>2</sup> (24)

*Population:* 263,000 (50)

*GNP per Capita:* 24,950 \$ (6)

*Armed Forces:* None

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Nordic Council, Associate member of the WEU, OECD, Council of Europe

### **24. Ireland**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.55 %

*Area:* 70,283 km<sup>2</sup> (31)

*Population:* 3,533,000 (41)

*GNP per Capita:* 13,000 \$ (21)

*Armed Forces:* 12,900 (35)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, WEU Observer, Council of Europe, OECD

### **25. Italy**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972



*Scale of Distribution:* 9.0 %  
*Area:* 301,302 km<sup>2</sup> (16)  
*Population:* 57,121,000 (7)  
*GNP per Capita:* 19,840 \$ (16)  
*Armed Forces:* 328,700 (7)  
*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, EU, WEU, G7, Council of Europe, OECD

## **26. Kazakhstan**

*Date of Accession:* January 1992  
*Scale of Distribution:* 0.55 %  
*Area:* 2,717,300 km<sup>2</sup> (4)  
*Population:* 16,952,000 (14)  
*GNP per Capita:* 1,560 \$ (38)  
*Armed Forces:* 40,000 (30)  
*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace

## **27. Kyrgyzstan**

*Date of Accession:* January 1992  
*Scale of Distribution:* 0.185 %  
*Area:* 198,500 km<sup>2</sup> (20)  
*Population:* 4,590,000 (33)  
*GNP per Capita:* 850 \$ (45)  
*Armed Forces:* 7,000 (43)  
*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace

## **28. Latvia**

*Date of Accession:* September 1991  
*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %  
*Area:* 64,589 km<sup>2</sup> (34)  
*Population:* 2,611,000 (43)  
*GNP per Capita:* 2,010 \$ (35)  
*Armed Forces:* 6,950 (44)  
*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, EU Association Agreement, Council of Europe, Associate partner of the WEU, Baltic Defense Council, Council of the Baltic Sea States

## **29. Liechtenstein**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972  
*Scale of Distribution:* 0.15 %

*Area:* 160 km<sup>2</sup> (52)

*Population:* 29,868 (52)

*GNP per Capita:* 30,270 \$ (3)

*Armed Forces:* None

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* Since 1923 Community of Law, Economy and Currency with Switzerland (Cf. Switzerland), Council of Europe

### **30. Lithuania**

*Date of Accession:* September 1991

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %

*Area:* 65,300 km<sup>2</sup> (33)

*Population:* 3,712,000 (40)

*GNP per Capita:* 1,320 \$ (40)

*Armed Forces:* 8,900 (41)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, EU Association Agreement, Baltic Defense Council, Associate partner of the WEU, Council of Europe, Council of the Baltic Sea States

### **31. Luxembourg**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.55 %

*Area:* 2,586 km<sup>2</sup> (49)

*Population:* 396,000 (48)

*GNP per Capita:* 37,320 \$ (1)

*Armed Forces:* 800 (49)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* NATO, NATO-Cooperation Council, WEU, EU, Eurocorps, Council of Europe, OECD

### **32. Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of**

*Date of Accession:* October 1995

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %

*Area:* 25,713 km<sup>2</sup> (46)

*Population:* 2,075,000 (44)

*GNP per Capita:* 820 \$ (46)

*Armed Forces:* 10,400 (38)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* Partnership for Peace, NACC Observer, Council of Europe

### **33. Malta**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.15 %

*Area:* 315.6 km<sup>2</sup> (51)

*Population:* 361,000 (49)

*GNP per Capita:* 7,970 \$ (24)

*Armed Forces:* 1,850 (48)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU Association Agreement, Council of Europe, Partnership for Peace, NACC Observer

### **34. Moldova**

*Date of Accession:* January 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %

*Area:* 33,700 km<sup>2</sup> (42)

*Population:* 4,408,000 (35)

*GNP per Capita:* 1,060 \$ (43)

*Armed Forces:* 11,850 (36)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Council of Europe

### **35. Monaco**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.15 %

*Area:* 1.95 km<sup>2</sup> (54)

*Population:* 29,876 (53)

*GNP per Capita:* not available

*Armed Forces:* None

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* -

### **36. Netherlands**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 3.55 %

*Area:* 41,864 km<sup>2</sup> (40)

*Population:* 15,280,000 (15)

*GNP per Capita:* 20,950 \$ (14)

*Armed Forces:* 74,400 (20)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, WEU, EU, OECD, Council of Europe, OECD

### **37. Norway**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 2.05 %

*Area:* 323,877 km<sup>2</sup> (14)

*Population:* 4,298,000 (36)

*GNP per Capita:* 25,970 \$ (5)

*Armed Forces:* 30,000 (33)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, EFTA, Associate member of the WEU, Council of Europe, OECD, Nordic Council, Council of the Baltic Sea States

### **38. Poland**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 1.4 %

*Area:* 312,685 km<sup>2</sup> (15)

*Population:* 38,303,000 (10)

*GNP per Capita:* 2,260 \$ (33)

*Armed Forces:* 278,600 (8)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* Visegrád Group, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Associate partner of the WEU, Council of Europe, EU Association Agreement, Council of the Baltic Sea States

### **39. Portugal**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.55 %

*Area:* 92,389 km<sup>2</sup> (27)

*Population:* 9,841,000 (22)

*GNP per Capita:* 9,130 \$ (23)

*Armed Forces:* 54,200 (27)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, WEU, OECD, Council of Europe

### **40. Romania**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.7 %

*Area:* 237,500 km<sup>2</sup> (18)

*Population:* 22,761,000 (12)

*GNP per Capita:* 1,140 \$ (42)

*Armed Forces:* 217,400 (10)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Associate partner of the WEU, EU Association Agreement, Council of Europe, Black Sea Economic Cooperation

### **41. Russian Federation\*\***

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 9.0 %

*Area:* 17,075,400 km<sup>2</sup> (1)

*Population:* 148,700,000 (2)  
*GNP per Capita:* 2,340 \$ (32)  
*Armed Forces:* 1,520,000 (2)  
*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Council of the Baltic Sea States, Council of Europe

\*\* Russia is the legal successor of the USSR in the OSCE

#### **42. San Marino**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972  
*Scale of Distribution:* 0.15 %  
*Area:* 60.57 km<sup>2</sup> (53)  
*Population:* 24,000 (54)  
*GNP per Capita:* 14,400 \$ (19)  
*Armed Forces:* None  
*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* Council of Europe

#### **43. Slovakia\*\*\***

*Date of Accession:* January 1993  
*Scale of Distribution:* 0.33 %  
*Area:* 49,035 km<sup>2</sup> (36)  
*Population:* 5,313,000 (30)  
*GNP per Capita:* 1,950 \$ (36)  
*Armed Forces:* 47,000 (29)  
*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, EU Association Agreement, Associate partner of the WEU, Visegrád Group, Council of Europe

\*\*\*After the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia became Participating States of the OSCE in January 1993.

#### **44. Slovenia**

*Date of Accession:* March 1992  
*Scale of Distribution:* 0.19 %  
*Area:* 20,254 km<sup>2</sup> (47)  
*Population:* 1,937,000 (45)  
*GNP per Capita:* 6,490 \$ (26)  
*Armed Forces:* 8,400 (42)  
*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* Partnership for Peace, NACC Observer, Council of Europe, EU Association Agreement, Associate partner of the WEU

#### **45. Spain**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 3.65 %

*Area:* 504,782 km<sup>2</sup> (8)

*Population:* 39,481,000 (9)

*GNP per Capita:* 13,590 \$ (20)

*Armed Forces:* 206,000 (11)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, EU, WEU, Eurocorps, OECD, Council of Europe

#### **46. Sweden**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 3.55 %

*Area:* 449,964 km<sup>2</sup> (10)

*Population:* 8,691,000 (24)

*GNP per Capita:* 24,740 \$ (7)

*Armed Forces:* 64,000 (24)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, WEU Observer, OECD, Partnership for Peace, NACC Observer, Council of Europe, Council of the Baltic Sea States, Nordic Council

#### **47. Switzerland**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 2.3 %

*Area:* 41,284 km<sup>2</sup> (41)

*Population:* 6,968,600 (27)

*GNP per Capita:* 35,760 \$ (2)

*Armed Forces:* 3,400 (46)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* OECD, Council of Europe

#### **48. Tajikistan**

*Date of Accession:* January 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.185 %

*Area:* 143,100 km<sup>2</sup> (21)

*Population:* 5,767,000 (28)

*GNP per Capita:* 470 \$ (52)

*Armed Forces:* 2,000 - 3,000 (47)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council

#### **49. Turkey**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 1.0 %

*Area:* 779,452 km<sup>2</sup> (5)

*Population:* 59,597,000 (4)

*GNP per Capita:* 2,970 \$ (29)

*Armed Forces:* 507,800 (3)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, OECD, Associate member of the WEU, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Council of Europe

#### **50. Turkmenistan**

*Date of Accession:* January 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.185 %

*Area:* 488,100 km<sup>2</sup> (9)

*Population:* 3,921,000 (37)

*GNP per Capita:* 1,390 \$ (39)

*Armed Forces:* 11,000 (37)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace

#### **51. Ukraine**

*Date of Accession:* January 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 1.75 %

*Area:* 603,700 km<sup>2</sup> (6)

*Population:* 51,551,000 (8)

*GNP per Capita:* 2,210 \$ (34)

*Armed Forces:* 452,500 (4)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Council of Europe

#### **52. United Kingdom**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 9.0 %

*Area:* 242,429 km<sup>2</sup> (17)

*Population:* 57,918,000 (5)

*GNP per Capita:* 18,060 \$ (18)

*Armed Forces:* 236,900 (9)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* EU, WEU, NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Council of Europe, Commonwealth, G-7, OECD

### **53. USA**

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 9.0 %

*Area:* 9,372,614 km<sup>2</sup> (3)

*Population:* 257,800,000 (1)

*GNP per Capita:* 24,740 \$ (8)

*Armed Forces:* 1,547,300 (1)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NAFTA, G-7, OECD

### **54. Uzbekistan**

*Date of Accession:* January 1992

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.55 %

*Area:* 447,400 km<sup>2</sup> (11)

*Population:* 21,860,000 (13)

*GNP per Capita:* 970 \$ (44)

*Armed Forces:* 25,000 (34)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* CIS, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace

### **55. Yugoslavia\*\*\*\***

*Date of Accession:* November 1972

*Scale of Distribution:* 0.55 %

*Area:* 102,173 km<sup>2</sup> (25)

*Population:* 10,566,000 (16)

*GNP per Capita:* 500 \$ (51)

*Armed Forces:* 126,500 (14)

*Memberships and Forms of Cooperation:* -

\*\*\*\* On 8 July 1992 the CSCE decided to suspend the participation of Yugoslavia in the CSCE.

*Sources:* Fischer Weltalmanach '96. Zahlen Daten Fakten, Frankfurt/M. 1995; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance



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## OSCE Chronology

1995

20/21 March	Final Conference on the Pact on Stability in Europe, Paris.
3/4 April	Expert Seminar on the Changing Role of the Judiciary, Riga.
4-7 April	Seminar on Building Blocks for Civil Society: Freedom of Association and NGOs, Warsaw.
6-8 April	OSCE Mission Seminar on Russian-Estonian Relations, Johvi (Estonia).
12-14 April	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, FSC, Vienna.
11-13 May	Seminar on Print Media Management, Chisinau (Moldova).
16-23 May	Seminar CSBMs and Arms Control, Almaty (Kazakhstan).
23-26 May	Seminar on Tolerance, Bucharest.
29 May	First Meeting of the Members of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Geneva.
29/30 May	Expert Seminar on the Changing Role of the Judiciary, Tbilisi.
5-10 June	Second Annual Judicial Symposium, Warsaw.
7-9 June	Meeting of the Economic Forum, Prague.
14/15 June	International Seminar on the Constitution of Tajikistan, Dushanbe.
20/21 June	Seminar on Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, Vienna.
30 June	Celebration on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, Vienna.
1 July	Opening of the OSCE Liaison Office in Central Asia in Tashkent (Uzbekistan).
4-8 July	Annual Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, Ottawa.
10-12 July	Seminar on Regional Arms Control in the OSCE Area, Vienna.
1 August	Conference commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act, Helsinki.
8 September	International Symposium of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH): "20 Years After Helsinki: The

11-13 September	OSCE and European Security Policy in Transition." Presentation of the OSCE Yearbook 1995, Hamburg. Seminar on Print Media Management, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan).
2-19 October	Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw.
10-14 October	Seminar on Rehabilitating the Environment, Tashkent (Uzbekistan).
26/27 October	Meeting of the Senior Council, Prague.
28 October	Seminar on the OSCE: Assessment and Future Prospects, Prague.
6-8 November	Seminar on the Role of Tourism in Promoting Better Understanding Between Different Cultures, Bucharest.
15-17 November	Seminar on the Role of Trans-European Infrastructure for Stability and Cooperation in the Black Sea Region, Sofia.
21 November	The OSCE obtains the overall charge to carry through the civil regulations implemented in the Dayton Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
28 Nov.-1 Dec.	Seminar on the Rule of Law, Warsaw.
7/8 December	Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Budapest.

*1996*

1 January	The Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti replaces the Hungarian Foreign Minister László Kovács as Chairman-in-Office (CiO).
10 January	Expert Consultation on the Rule of Law and Democratic Institution Building, Riga.
11/12 January	Expert Consultation on the Rule of Law and Democratic Institution Building, Tallinn and Tartu.
15-20 January	Expert Consultation on the Rule of Law and Democratic Institution Building, Moscow.
22-23 January	Economic Dimension Implementation Review Meeting, Geneva.
28/29 February	Seminar on Building Harmonious Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Newly Independent States, Almaty (Kazakhstan).
4-6 March	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, FSC, Vienna.
21/22 March	Meeting of the Senior Council, Prague.
27-29 March	Meeting of the Economic Forum of the OSCE, Prague.
16-19 April	Seminar on Constitutional, Legal and Administrative

24-26 April	Aspects of the Freedom of Religion, Warsaw. Seminar on Confidence Building and the Human Dimension, Dushanbe (Tajikistan).
6-10 May	Seminar on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Vienna.
3/4 June	Mediterranean Seminar on the OSCE as a Platform for Dialogue, Tel Aviv.
3-7 June	Seminar on Regional Security, Ashgabad (Turkmenistan).
10-12 June	Seminar on Drugs and Crime: New Challenges, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan).
14 June	Under the patronage of the OSCE an extensive "Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control" for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is signed.
15 June	Giancarlo Aragona takes up office as Secretary General of the OSCE for three years.
5-7 July	Annual Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, Stockholm.
9/10 July	Seminar on the Security Model for the 21st Century, Vienna.
25-27 September	Seminar on the Human Dimension, Warsaw.
2/3 December	OSCE Lisbon Summit Meeting.



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## Acronyms

CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI	Central European Initiative
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFE 1A	Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CiO	Chairman-in-Office
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (since 1 Jan. 1995 OSCE)
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials (since 1 Jan. 1995 Senior Council)
DAP	Democratic Assistance Programme (of the PA)
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
ECHR	European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms
ECMM	European Community Monitor Mission
ECU	European Currency Unit
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
G-7	Group of Seven (Canada, FRG, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, USA)
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFC	Informal Financial Committee
IFOR	Implementation Force
IHF	International Helsinki Federation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPTF	International Police Task Force
MPC	Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty

ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PA	Parliamentary Assembly
PC	Permanent Council
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy
SAM	Sanctions Assistance Mission
SAMCOMM	Sanctions Assistance Missions Communication Centre
SC	Senior Council
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the CIS
TLE	Treaty Limited Equipment (CFE-Treaty)
UN/UNO	United Nations/United Nations Organization
UNCHR	United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights
UNDCP	United Nations Drug Control Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTS	United Nations Treaty Series
VD 90, 92, 94	Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (1990, 1992, 1994)
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

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