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The Vienna Review Conference and the Lisbon Summit of 2 and 3 December 1996

The Vienna Experiment

In recent years the OSCE has undergone rapid and profound change with regard to its responsibilities and methods of operation. The necessary adaptation of its structures and forms of organization has not entirely kept up with this development. This also applies to Review Conferences and Summit Meetings, as could be seen recently in Lisbon.

With the adoption of a system of shared values (Charter of Paris) by all OSCE States in 1990 and the creation of permanent bodies in the years thereafter it is no longer appropriate to hold extensive review meetings lasting for several months. One important earlier function - putting public pressure on certain countries and naming names in the process - has for the most part been abandoned, even though the US Congress may still have lively memories of Max Kampelmann's "public shaming" strategy in the eighties. Reviewing respect for OSCE principles and the observance of its norms continues to be necessary but it is better now to do it on a continuing basis in the permanent bodies or by subject (confidence-building measures, human dimension) in focused meetings. And the OSCE structures that with more (Helsinki 1992) or less (Budapest 1994) success were at the centre of attention in review meetings have, in the view of many OSCE States, reformed themselves adequately and do not need repeated reviews. The minority of countries favouring more reform, Germany among them, cannot ignore that fact.

Under these circumstances, the ten weeks' duration of the Budapest Review Conference (10 October to 4 December 1994) became an old story which the Permanent Council, with its Decision No. 114 of 25 April 1996, cut short by providing for a Review Conference of only three weeks (4-22 November) in Vienna and a one-week preparatory meeting in Lisbon (25 November - 1 December) for the Summit. The more important decision not to make the results of the Review Conference part of the Summit document, as had been done in the past, was made later and informally. Instead, they are only summarized as a Report of the Chairman-in-Office² and, owing to their limited relevance, hardly played a role at Lisbon. Indeed, the Vienna event was not so much a review meeting as one to prepare the Summit, in which capacity it did good work.

1 The author is Head of the OSCE Department in the Foreign Office. The article presents his personal views.

2 Ref. S/91/96 of 29 November 1996.

The judgement on the Vienna experiment within the EU was later unanimous. It was seen as hardly successful but no obvious alternative seemed to offer itself. The United States, too, was dissatisfied with the hybrid character of the Vienna Conference. The Review Conference itself continues to be in need of review.

Summit "Light"

Only a very distant or superficial observer could reach a quick conclusion about an OSCE Summit Meeting. Every serious effort at judgement meets with great obstacles: the variety of actors, the complexity of the subjects, the relative nature of the standards. For most of the Heads of Government who take part, Summit Meetings are obligatory exercises more than political opportunities to be used. It is understandable that for them the bilateral encounters on the margins are often more interesting than the goings on at the Conference itself. Diplomats have spent weeks or months preparing the event down to the last details - details that remain hidden from all the others and are a matter of indifference to them. They are generally too close to events to categorize them and form a judgement. In the age of the media the journalists ultimately prevail. In their press centres, far from the scene of the action, they depend on the crumbs they can pick up at press conferences and in interviews with politicians or background talks with diplomats. It is even more difficult, finally, for scholars and publicists who must try, after the fact, to suck what analytical honey they can out of dry conference documents.

Despite these difficulties we will risk a judgement on Lisbon right here at the beginning. It was a Summit "light" - with both the positive and negative associations that this fashionable term has. For the first time the most important participants were missing from an OSCE Summit. The absence of President Yeltsin, due to illness, meant that the US President, Clinton - whose presence in Budapest had already been a struggle to arrange - also stayed away. Not only was there less time to prepare this Summit but important countries showed little interest in intensive co-ordination between capitals during the weeks and months before Lisbon. This and the decision not to include the results of the Review Conference resulted in a shorter and pithier Summit Document, but one which also had comparatively less substance. By way of compensation, Lisbon had nothing of the dismal heaviness of Budapest where Yeltsin grumblingly had spoken about the "Cold Peace", Izetbegovic about the failure of the international community and the mortally ill Mitterrand about his legacy. In warm and sunny Lisbon, the Heads of State and the diplomats gave the international public the impression that the OSCE, strengthened by its successes in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Chechnya, was able, in a situation that was still not

without its difficult side, to put on a Summit with modest but useful results. This success was a harder piece of work than the result alone suggests.

The Political Context of Lisbon

That the situation was not without its difficulties resulted from the fact that only a few days after Lisbon the NATO Council was to make its definitive decision to hold a Summit in Madrid in July 1997 at which the first round of NATO enlargement to include Central and Eastern European countries would be settled. Related to this were issues about the European security order: among them the agreement on relations between NATO and Russia, the relationship between NATO and Ukraine, a strategy for dealing with the countries that had no prospect of NATO membership in 1997 or later, the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, the future of the OSCE and the relationship of various security organizations to each other.

German diplomacy, with the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister in the lead, had worked at all levels throughout 1996 to achieve an agreement with Russia on these issues, the goal being a strategic partnership and the conclusion of a NATO-Russia Charter. The German side proposed, *inter alia*, a consultation mechanism for NATO and Russia, a body consisting of 17 members in which Russia would not be just a guest (that would have corresponded to the 16 + 1 formula) but an equal partner. Initial resistance from certain quarters had to be overcome, as had been the case with the NATO-Russia Charter which Foreign Minister Kinkel had earlier proposed in 1995. Even before Lisbon, Russia was absolutely interested in the creation of a consultation mechanism and also in an agreement on relations between itself and NATO, but until Lisbon it insisted on the condition that agreement on these matters would have to precede the decision on NATO enlargement. NATO, on the other hand, wanted to develop the security partnership in parallel to the opening up of NATO. This disagreement was without doubt the most important single issue before the Lisbon Summit.

In contrast to Budapest in 1994, when the Summit had been overshadowed by the dramatic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lisbon was not particularly burdened by regional conflicts. There were, however, two things at that time which played a role in preparations and also at the Summit itself. One was the events in Belarus, where President Lukashenko had *de facto* emasculated the legislative and judicial branches of government and thus abrogated the democratic separation of powers; the other was the wave of demonstrations in Belgrade against Milosevic in the aftermath of his manipulation of the local elections in Serbia. Both of these situations led to confrontation in Lisbon between Russia and a number of Western countries. A United States proposal for an extraordinary session in Lisbon of the Permanent Council of the OSCE to discuss

the situation in Belarus was firmly rejected by Russia. As an alternative, actions by the Chairman-in-Office, Cotti (Switzerland), or his Troika colleague, Petersen (Denmark), were considered and then rejected as too risky. Owing to the NATO issue things were already difficult enough and the feeling was that the Summit ought not to be further complicated by regional problems. Finally, as a compromise, the OSCE Secretary General, Aragona, was sent to Minsk and subsequently presented a written report. The United States tabled a number of critical proposals on the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for inclusion in the Summit Declaration which, owing to Russian resistance, were included in that document only in very watered-down form.

Thus the Western countries, with a view to the NATO Council and the NATO Summit, still to be decided on, were interested in a good atmosphere in Lisbon. As far as substance was concerned, however, they were only to a limited degree - which varied from one country to another - prepared to make concessions for that purpose. On the other hand, both NATO aspirants and countries on the territory of the former Soviet Union feared that the NATO countries would make too many concessions to Russia with regard to the organization of European security and to arms control and were, for that reason, cautious.

The Most Important Results: A Start on the Security Charter and CFE Adaptation

In Budapest, Russia had reacted to NATO's basic decisions of 1994 on creating the Partnership for Peace and on NATO enlargement by producing its own proposal for working out a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st Century. That made it possible, particularly at home, to counter the impression that the European security order was being created almost entirely by the dynamism emerging from NATO. The Russian proposal led in 1995 to a confusing and not particularly fruitful discussion of theory which was then guided into more practical channels by the 1995 meeting of Foreign Ministers in Budapest. At the fourth and, so far, last meeting of the OSCE Senior Council on 21-22 March 1996 Russia presented a memorandum which made the discussion at once concrete and controversial. It proposed, among other things, the adoption of a European Security Charter as a fundamental document comparable in its political significance to the Helsinki Final Act; the creation of a security system in the OSCE area on the basis of a treaty, including bilateral security guarantees; the establishment of an OSCE Security Council; and the holding of a pan-European security conference in 1997/98. The memorandum triggered a critical response. The conference project, which Russia had never explained in detail, disappeared almost immediately from the discussion. In summer of 1996 the Chairman-in-Office suggested in an informal paper the

creation of an "advisory committee" to support his office in the preparation and carrying out of decisions. The fact that permanent and non-permanent members were foreseen made the idea look like a modification of a Security Council. With this courageous step, Switzerland was taking account of experience that it had garnered during its period of chairmanship and whose effect was to formalize the situation that already existed informally in Vienna. Although that would have given other countries the opportunity, in the course of rotation, to exercise enhanced influence, a large majority of OSCE States rejected this idea emphatically as a violation of the consensus principle prevailing in the OSCE. The potential members of the committee - with the exception of Great Britain, which opposed the idea more from behind the scenes than on the stage - had no comment. At an appearance before the Permanent Council, Foreign Minister Kinkel favoured examining the proposal but at the Review Conference it was hardly given further mention. During the Summit itself Chancellor Vranitzky was the only Head of Government to comment on the Swiss proposal - surprisingly, in almost entirely favourable terms.

The third Russian suggestion - to provide the OSCE with a basis in law (that is how, in a simplified way, it was perceived) - has been controversial for years. Two factors made the discussion of it at Lisbon even more complicated. One is that Russia tied the offer of bilateral or multilateral security guarantees to countries that were neither named nor defined. No doubt the reference was to countries seeking to join NATO which, for their part, viewed the Russian proposal as nothing more than a disruptive manoeuvre. Another factor is that the proponents of a legal status are divided up into several factions. While one group of countries wants the OSCE as an institution to have such a status others, Germany among them, argue for creating a legal foundation for OSCE operations undertaken by the Organization in its capacity as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. This refers, first and foremost, to peacekeeping measures. The efforts of both of these groups³ met with determined resistance from those OSCE States that oppose legal status in any form.

Thus the only remaining proposal from the Russian memorandum with any chance - and a slim one at that - of being adopted in Lisbon was the one for a Security Charter. Russia itself contributed nothing of substance apart from the word "Charter" and the prescription that it was to be a fundamental document on the European security order in the nature of the Helsinki Final Act, whose principles were to be adapted to the current situation. A speech by Primakov in September 1996 to the Permanent Council in Vienna left the impression that what Russia was mainly concerned about in the aftermath of the Chechnya war

3 A third form, giving legal status or partial legal status to OSCE principles and commitments, played no role either in advance of Lisbon or at the Summit. Initial stages of this approach can be seen nationally in some OSCE States and also in bilateral treaties.

was the security of its own borders and its territorial integrity. Despite this basically defensive attitude the lack of clarity in the Charter proposal aroused suspicion in a number of OSCE States. The Baltic and Scandinavian states, in particular, along with some Central and Eastern European ones, obviously feared that the Security Charter was designed to give Russia a voice in European affairs. The negative position of the United States and Great Britain did not change even when Russia, in advance of the Lisbon Summit, made clear that the nature of the Charter - whether legal or political - did not need to be decided until later. On the other hand, the French President, Chirac, meeting with Yeltsin in April 1996, came out in favour of a pan-European peace order on a treaty basis and with the OSCE as its foundation ("socle"). Germany, too, made clear before and at Lisbon that it was open to the idea of the Charter. Thus the whole Security Model discussion of the previous two years boiled down in Lisbon to the question of whether or not the Summit Document would at least hold open the prospect of a Security Charter. It was only after a dramatic sharpening of the negotiations towards the end of the preparatory meeting, chiefly caused by the Baltic states, that with a moderating influence from the American side and with German efforts to achieve balance, the following highly conditional statement on the Security Model was retained at the end of the eleventh paragraph of the Lisbon Declaration: "Drawing on this work (i.e. the working programme on the Security Model, H.H.), remaining committed to the Helsinki Final Act and recalling the Charter of Paris, we will consider developing a Charter on European Security which can serve the needs of our peoples in the new century." The second key question at the Lisbon Summit was whether the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe would be able to agree on a negotiating mandate for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty. As this is not strictly an OSCE matter but one that concerns the CFE Treaty we will only touch on it briefly here. In the Final Document of the CFE Review Conference of 31 May 1996 the States Parties to the CFE Treaty had given themselves the goal of adapting the CFE Treaty as far as necessary to the changing European security landscape. Now the extent and modalities of this adaptation had to be laid out. The existing bi-polar group structure had been overtaken by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and it quickly became clear that its replacement by a new multi-polar treaty structure would be at the centre of future CFE adaptation negotiations. The States Parties to the CFE Treaty states regarded it as particularly important, in the future as in the past, to prevent concentrations of military forces everywhere in Europe. The main issue for the Russians was to exclude in advance any transfer of allied forces to the territory of future NATO members and to durably limit the overall strength of NATO (sufficiency rule). The Western countries, on the other hand, although they sought to meet Russian concerns about the opening up of NATO, wanted to do this without depriving new mem-

bers of full participation in alliance guarantees and without limiting the process of opening to a small number of countries. The agreement on extent and modalities of the adaptation negotiations finally succeeded when all States Parties to the Treaty obligated themselves to exercise restraint with regard to any changes in the size or deployments of their forces while the CFE adaptation negotiations are going on. This also deprived of force another central Russian demand according to which the weapons holdings of the CFE States Parties were to be frozen at the level of 16 November 1995 (the official end of the CFE reduction phase). That requirement would have been particularly disadvantageous for the NATO states which have already reduced their force strength well beyond the requirements of the CFE Treaty. The document on this matter was made an Appendix to the Lisbon Summit Document. Thus the success in Lisbon followed on the conclusion of the flank agreement of 31 May 1996 which succeeded in solving a serious problem of implementation. In this connection, a group of countries called GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) with similar interests was formed and, presenting proposals and positions of their own, made themselves quite visible in the Security Model discussions in Lisbon.

A few days after Lisbon, at the meeting of the NATO Cooperation Council on 11 December 1996 in Brussels, Primakov explained his country's decision to enter into negotiations on the formalization of its relations with NATO by pointing to the successful course of the Lisbon Summit, emphasizing the agreement on the CFE adaptation negotiations and the characterization of the OSCE in Lisbon as a "key organization".

Federal Minister Kinkel described the most important results of Lisbon as a beginning and a setting of the course for the most important security decisions of 1997. The "signal of Lisbon", he said, had confirmed the equal integration of all OSCE States in the European security order and the opportunity for countries such as Russia and Ukraine to participate. There should be neither new dividing lines in the OSCE region nor grey areas with differing levels of security.

It is important to point out that this success of Lisbon was by no means to be taken for granted. It required the disciplined, collective efforts of large, medium-sized and small powers with very different security needs and interests, as the example of the GUAM countries shows, to do justice to the OSCE postulate about common and indivisible security. The politically-minded European public does not always show sufficient understanding or appreciation for this often repeated accomplishment. In neighbouring regions and ones more distant - in the Mediterranean area, for example and in the ASEAN community of states - the European model is regarded as a distant goal worth emulating.

Additional Results

The general Summit Declaration takes account of German proposals for the further development of OSCE principles on refugee problems and for the appointment of an OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. The participating States undertook to refrain from any kind of ethnic cleansing and to facilitate the return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons without discrimination and in accordance with the relevant international standards.

The Summit adopted an initiative for the appointment of a Representative on Freedom of the Media which was introduced by Minister Kinkel and Delegate Duve in Vienna on 3 October 1996. The Permanent Council has been asked to work out a mandate for this new OSCE institution by the time of the Copenhagen Ministerial Council in December 1997. The underlying thought on the German side is that the Representative will watch over the media situation in the OSCE area and serve as an office to receive complaints and intervene when freedom of opinion and of the press are violated. He will need to pay particular attention to freedom of the media in connection with elections.

The Summit Declaration acknowledges the contribution made by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The OSCE States undertake to meet all financial and personnel requirements of the Mission so that it can fulfil its mandate. The Permanent Council had already extended that mandate for an additional year on 21 November, particularly at American request. The United States did not want this important operational decision to be dependent on the vagaries of a Summit Meeting, especially in view of the fact that Russia, in particular, had let its dissatisfaction with the size and direction of the Mission be known in advance. The Mission will continue its activities in connection with democratization, monitoring of human rights and arms control agreements, and it will have to supervise the local elections which after a number of postponements have now been set for September 1997. The Republika Srpska finally gave its agreement, after a lengthy delay, shortly before the Summit. The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation had given their approval some time before. On the margins of the Summit it was decided that the retired Ambassador Ellerkmann would become Deputy to the American Head of Mission, Frowick.

The Summit Declaration also deals with a number of regional conflicts in the OSCE area. Georgia and Moldova, on one side, and Russia on the other spent a long time behind the scenes struggling intensely but soundlessly over the formulations to be used. Georgia managed to get its sovereignty and territorial integrity reaffirmed and a clear criticism of the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia included. In payment for that it had to accept the direct mention of Russia as a mediator along with the United Nations and the OSCE. Rus-

sian stubbornness on this point is a good illustration of the division of roles that it seeks in the multi-lateral settlement of conflicts on its periphery. Moldova was able to put its own wishes across. The Lisbon text criticizes the fact that the Moldo-Russian Agreement of 21 October 1994 on the withdrawal of Russian troops has not yet been carried out and it expresses the expectation that there will be an "early, orderly and complete withdrawal of the Russian troops". The bitter struggle over texts of this kind is not perceived even by most of the diplomats at the Summit, let alone the general public. And yet these texts are of the utmost importance for the bilateral relationship between the affected states. A final decision about them usually has to await the arrival of the Foreign Ministers or Heads of Government at the Conference. And so it was in both of these cases. There was another dispute, however, that was carried on completely in the public spotlight. Until the very last moment the fate of the Summit Declaration - and hence a good part of the entire Summit's effect - depended on the struggle between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The efforts to reach agreement were carried on at the highest level. Among others, Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin participated. Armenia was the only country that resisted until the very end a passage proposed by the Minsk Group of the OSCE on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which for the first time embodied the principles of territorial integrity for Armenia and Azerbaijan and the right of self-determination with the greatest possible degree of autonomy and security for Nagorno-Karabakh. For its part, Azerbaijan threatened to refuse its agreement to the entire Summit Declaration if it did not contain this passage. The Swiss Chairman-in-Office, Cotti, found a courageous and innovative way out. He made a statement which included the disputed passage word for word and which, in the form of an annex, became part of the Summit Declaration. People referred to it as a "Summit Declaration with consensus minus one". It is not untypical for the OSCE to include as an annex in the final printed version of the Summit Document a declaration by Armenia which was not talked about at the Summit. Nevertheless, Lisbon was a dramatic diplomatic defeat for Armenia. Azerbaijan, in yielding, was the more clever side which, for the first time, had its claim to territorial integrity certified by the OSCE. During the weeks before the Summit, President Aliyev had personally worked for this result by writing a series of letters to leading Heads of State or Government, including Chancellor Kohl. The success of Azerbaijan was attributable, first and foremost, to an obvious change of course on the part of the US. The struggle between the US and France over the appointment of a new Co-chairman of the Minsk

Group, which was not decided at the Summit, may well have played an important part in this.⁴

The Summit adopted as an independent document a "Declaration on the Security Model" which in large sections is drawn from the Code of Conduct passed in Budapest in 1994. Here, too, there were hard struggles over simple repetitions. Still, over and above the section of text on the Security Charter, which has already been discussed in detail, there are a number of new thoughts which will preoccupy the OSCE in the coming years. Under Number Four the concept of "empowerment", used by the American civil rights movement, is introduced for the first time into the OSCE. Much was left open because the United States failed to provide a precise explanation of the term's purpose and Russia was only willing to accept its appearance one time in the text. Under Number Five a general principle of accountability for OSCE States towards each other and towards their own citizens - something which hitherto had applied only to the human dimension - was included at Germany's request. Number Six is based on preliminary work by France and Poland. The commitment to act in solidarity in carrying out OSCE principles, particularly in cases where these principles have been violated, is meant to enhance the OSCE's effectiveness and thereby strengthen the security of those countries that belong to no alliance.

It was only with the greatest of difficulty that Number Ten was able to state that European security requires the greatest possible measure of "co-operation and co-ordination" between security organizations and that the OSCE is particularly well suited to promote them (owing to its comprehensive group of participants, its traditionally broad concept of security and its formal flexibility). A number of countries dragged their feet here, mainly because in the notion of "co-ordination" they thought they heard echoes of Russian ideas about putting the OSCE above other organizations - ideas that had been developed before Budapest and then allowed to lapse. In fact, the formulations finally accepted at Lisbon came from a US paper which, for its part, had taken some of its ideas from the European Union. Starting with a British-French basic idea, the EU had worked out before Lisbon a "Platform for Co-operative Security" which contained: a) rules for transparency, voluntary membership and the conduct of security organizations; b) mechanisms for their co-operation; and c) principles for peacekeeping measures in the OSCE area. This EU paper failed owing to the refusal of the United States to accept annexes for the Declaration on a Security Model. It is thus only in the work programme laid out in Number Eleven that this Platform is mentioned. The option of a collective appeal to the UN Security Council by the OSCE which had been adopted in 1994 in Budapest (Kinkel-Kooijmans Initiative) was further defined in Lisbon to mean that measures in

4 The Swiss Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, on 31 December 1996, the last day of his term, named France as Co-chairman along with Russia. After Azerbaijan refused to accept this solution his Danish successor, Petersen, appointed the US as third Co-chairman.

accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter (coercive measures) are to be undertaken. At Lisbon it again proved impossible, in the face of resistance from Russia and other countries, to adopt the important provision, already foreseen in Budapest, that this appeal could be made without the agreement of the parties to the conflict.

For the sake of completeness it should be mentioned that the OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation, before the Summit, adopted two documents included in the Annex: "A Framework for Arms Control" and "Development of the Agenda of the Forum for Security Co-operation". They strengthen the basis of OSCE arms control and provide options for arms control policy to contribute to the solution of regional and internal conflicts.

The View from the Summit

The question marks associated with Summit Meetings have, if anything, become more numerous as a result of Lisbon. The biannual rhythm of the meetings that was established indirectly in the Charter of Paris in 1990 (through biannual review meetings) was already called into question at Budapest in 1994. The next Summit was to make a decision on the matter. But the Lisbon Summit ended without any decision having been made on future frequency or on the place or time for the next Summit. Even the EU has not been able to reach a consensus on the only applicant for this honour, Istanbul. No explanation was offered. With regard to frequency, some countries want in future to hold Summits "only in case of need" and at a single location (Vienna?). A single location would certainly save money but it would reduce the political publicity value of the Summits. The political engagement and interest that Summit hosts have in the success of "their" event should not be underestimated. There are others who want to reduce the frequency to every three or four years. Whereas this may seem plausible *ad hoc* Summit Meetings are difficult to conceive of in practice. Quite apart from the difficulty of finding on short notice an acceptable date for all Heads of State or Government, it is unlikely that any consensus could be reached on the need for such a meeting. Although for substantive reasons crisis situations might appear to be appropriate occasions, they would scarcely serve because the countries in crisis would want to prevent the convening of a "tribunal". Summits called on an *ad hoc* basis could at best be arranged by those who wanted to participate, after abandoning the consensus principle, but they would no longer be universal. The comprehensiveness of participation in the OSCE, to which every country in its area belongs (even the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has not been expelled but only suspended), is one of the advantages the OSCE enjoys in comparison with other organizations, and it would be impaired by the above-mentioned arrangement. NATO has recently held Summit Meet-

ings every three years (1991, 1994, 1997). The Council of Europe will hold a second Summit in 1997, following the initial one in 1993 in Vienna. The political standing of organizations and the public perception of them depend on such events to a considerable degree. However, the political content of OSCE Summit Meetings has diminished significantly following the end of the East-West conflict and the establishment of permanent OSCE bodies that meet regularly and make decisions. Under these changed circumstances Summits no longer energize diplomatic creative power as they once did. And yet this effect should still not be underestimated. All participating States are under pressure to work out a political result appropriate to the occasion. Even if this does not always work, the states should not relieve themselves of this pressure.

The modern OSCE is mainly an instrument for crisis management. In this sense the appointment of a Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office in the person of Felipe Gonzalez, which happened less than three weeks after Lisbon, was perhaps a better indicator of the future than the Lisbon Summit itself had been. (In a very short time Gonzalez carried out a mission to Belgrade, resulting in recommendations which led to a correction of the Serbian local elections.) The imitation of this successful example through Franz Vranitzky's appointment for Albania at the beginning of March 1997 shows the potential of this innovation. But the balance of political forces may already be different at the next Summit. The OSCE would be well advised not to wear its instruments out through excessive or inappropriate use. But neither should it put them aside or give them up entirely.