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Finland and the OSCE¹

The Significance of the OSCE for Finnish Foreign and Security Policy

For Finland, the Helsinki process has been, from its inception, a central point of reference and a fruitful source of inspiration for its foreign and security policy, both as a repository and guardian of concepts and values represented by the CSCE/OSCE and as a model and pattern for international relations. While its operative role has changed from the era of bipolar East-West confrontation to the age of transformation and unification in Europe, as Finnish policy has adapted to its environment as well, the CSCE/OSCE continues to have a special place in the Finnish elite strategies and public perceptions.²

A natural reason for the identity-related impact is the fact that the Finnish capital gave its name to the process, from the multilateral consultations in 1972-73 to the first Foreign Ministers' meeting in 1973 and the adoption of the Final Act of 1975, and again to the first regular post-Cold War Summit in 1992, and earned a permanent place in post-war history as a symbol of the core values common to all. In addition to its role as a symbol of diplomatic good offices, Helsinki is linked substantively to the human rights aspects, later the human dimension, which emerged as an essential and critical element of the process as an outcome of the Finnish initiative of 1969³ enlarging the idea from a mere security meeting to the *inclusive* conference on security *and co-operation* opened in 1972-1973.

There is also a political aspect to the Finnish view of the CSCE/OSCE. For a country that is, historically and geopolitically, a peripheral rather than mainstream actor, an institution that by its very nature binds together the whole of the European international system and provides an inclusive and equal forum for all states has both inherent value and practical significance.

1 Statements of fact and opinion are those of the author and do not imply endorsement by the Finnish government.

2 Cf. Finnish perspectives on the outcome of the Third Stage and Summit of the CSCE in Helsinki, in: Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1975, Helsinki 1975, pp. 32-65; materials from an international seminar, including a review of Finland's role in the process, and the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki, 1 August 1985, in: Kari Möttölä (Ed.), Ten Years After Helsinki, The Making of the European Security Regime, Boulder/London 1986; and assessments by Finnish and international experts of the role of the process twenty years later, in: Stability and Change, CSCE Helsinki Final Act 20th Anniversary Symposium, 1 August 1995, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs Foreign Policy Challenges 9/1996.

3 The Finnish memorandum of 5 May 1969, in: Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja 1969, Helsinki 1970, pp. 65-66.

During the Cold War, the Helsinki process was for Finland a facilitator of détente which eased the pressures of great-power confrontation on Finland's position as a neighbour to one of the two main players. The CSCE also offered a forum for legitimizing and employing a policy of neutrality, which was Finland's instrument for maximizing its freedom of action and pursuing its security interests in what was predominantly a bipolar system of power politics. In fact, the CSCE was the context in which the neutrals maximized their influence as mediators and actors in procedural and substantive issues of European security.⁴

As the CSCE, through the Paris Summit and the Paris Charter of 1990, became the "midwife" of the new Europe, it provided the framework in which Finland replaced its policy of neutrality with full and equal engagement in co-operative security. Once all the participating States adhered to common values and principles and set a unified Europe as their joint goal, there was no longer a great-power divide and, accordingly, no role for neutrality as a pattern of action. As new kinds of conflict arose in the post-Cold War Europe, Finland worked in concert with the other participating States towards their prevention, management and resolution. As long as the traditional neutrals could continue to offer good services, their role would not be based on a particular and permanent status but on their usefulness and impartiality within the circumstances of the conflict in question, often related to historical, nationality or ethnic issues.

While the neutral and non-aligned states, together with the Nordic caucus, were the reference group for Finland until the changes of 1989-91, membership in the European Union, with the co-ordination of a wide range of OSCE issues within its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has become the main channel for Finland's contribution to the work of the all-European institution since 1995, further consolidating its new role. For a small state, in particular in times of dynamic change, the main task for foreign and security policy is to acquire and assure a capability to act on behalf of national interests and in support of joint international values and goals. EU membership has given Finland new opportunities to influence change and stability in its security environment by fully taking part in decision-making in the core institution, pursuing and widening political and economic integration in Europe. At the same time, Finland supports the efforts to increase the authority and improve the capability of the OSCE, which stands for the common values and norms, the indivisibility of security and the sovereign equality of

4 Cf. Harto Hakovirta, *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality*, Oxford 1988; Janie Lee Leatherman, *Engaging East and West Beyond Bloc Divisions: Active Neutrality and the Dual Strategy of Finland and Sweden in the CSCE*, Ann Arbor, MI 1991.

states as indispensable elements of wider international co-operation and security in Europe.⁵

As the normative basis and institutional framework for the goal of the unification of Europe, the OSCE represents for Finland a security model and a form of practical co-operation that the country is working for in the fundamental national interest. Since the institutionalization of the CSCE and its conversion into a permanent organization as the OSCE, Finland has been involved in all aspects of OSCE work, in the continued debate on security arrangements as well as in the political security management and joint activities on the ground.

Finland's profile as a participating State of the OSCE combines the pursuit of national and regional security interests with a strong belief in the benefits of Europe-wide co-operation and unification through the OSCE process. Finland supports the comprehensive approach, whereby the OSCE, as an inclusive institution, and in co-operation with other security-related institutions and organizations, is used to promote democratic change and peaceful conflict resolution as pillars of a sustainable security order.

In military security, the CSCE/OSCE has a specific role for Finland, a formerly neutral country which has remained militarily non-allied while participating in European transformation and integration. During the Cold War, the CSCE emerged as the only forum where the neutrals were participating in negotiations related to the military aspects of security. As the OSCE has since consolidated its position as the sole framework for negotiating conventional arms control in Europe, it offers for Finland a vehicle for promoting openness and transparency in military affairs through the regime of confidence- and security-building measures and for advocating an orientation towards increasingly defensive doctrines and deployments through the arms reduction process.

In its dual role, the OSCE both *projects* common security for Europe and *affects* its evolution and realization. The significance of the OSCE for Finland's foreign and security policy can be similarly approached both from the political and practical angles. The security order for Europe for which the OSCE is a model and the practical security management for which the OSCE is an instrument, are both essential building blocks for Finnish foreign and security policy, which has been in transition since the last years of the Cold War and throughout the formation of the new Europe.

5 Cf. Security in a Changing World, Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy, Report by the Council of State to the Parliament, 6 June 1995, Helsinki 1995, pp. 58-62; The European Security Development and Finnish Defence, Report by the Council of State to the Parliament, 17 March 1997, Helsinki 1997, pp. 47-51.

The OSCE as a Security Model: The Relevance of Concepts and Principles for Finland's Status and Policy

The work on a Security Model launched at Budapest 1994 and 1995, further mandated at Lisbon 1996 and specified at Copenhagen 1997 as the task of developing "a comprehensive and substantive OSCE Document-Charter on European Security", brings out the political value of the OSCE and clarifies its character as a security-related institution. Finland has taken part actively in the Security Model/Charter process, which defines, upholds and consolidates concepts, rules and activities of fundamental significance for intra-state and inter-state relations.⁶

All the characteristics of the OSCE concept of common security - comprehensiveness, co-operation and indivisibility - have their concrete value for Finland.⁷

The idea of a *common* security space for the OSCE region - as opposed to a Europe of dividing lines - reflects the inclusiveness of the process and promotes the indivisibility of security. The *inclusiveness* of the OSCE is inherently valuable for a country situated in a geopolitically peripheral but sensitive area of Europe, as it brings all the actors into a common regime of peaceful change and conflict resolution. The OSCE retains for Finland unique characteristics as a forum of action, even though the danger of marginalization, which was a political concern for a neutral Finland during the bipolar era, no longer applies to a member of the European Union in the new Europe. Like-minded, the Nordic countries consult regularly on OSCE affairs as part of their intensified foreign and security policy co-operation, although their joint actions remain concentrated mainly on regional issues, where the new Europe has opened opportunities for reunifying the historic Baltic Sea region. Although its relative weight may have decreased for Finland, the OSCE continues to provide an indispensable forum for the pursuit of national security interests, in particular in the field of military security where some bloc-era structures are retained, while the well-established co-ordination of OSCE policies among the EU member states channels a widening spectrum of Finland's contributions to other fields.

The Union is a central actor in developing the OSCE as an institution and supporting its use in security management. Moreover, the OSCE has been a vehicle for promoting the Union's early enlargement policy in the form of the Stability Pact and the OSCE norms and principles continue to set behavioural

6 Cf. Kari Möttölä, The OSCE: Institutional and Functional Developments in an Evolving European Security Order, in: Michael Bothe/Natalino Ronzitti/Allan Rosas (Eds.), *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, The Hague/London/Boston 1997, p. 33.

7 Cf. Kari Möttölä, Security around the Baltic Rim: Concepts, Actors and Processes, in: Lars Hedegaard/Bjarne Lindström (Eds.), *The NEBI Yearbook 1998, North European and Baltic Sea Integration*, Berlin 1998, p. 392.

and reform criteria for countries in the pre-accession phase. Furthermore, the OSCE offers a set of normative and political resources for the Union's policies towards those countries of Eastern and South-eastern Europe that are not placed within the enlargement process.

As the security scene is undergoing deep and unpredictable change, the principle of *indivisibility* is an essential guideline for the participating States to take account of the commonly agreed rights of others and not to strengthen their own security at the expense of the legitimate interests of others. Spheres of interest and zones of influence, as historical patterns of great-power politics that have affected Finland's fate in the past, have been declared incompatible with the new philosophy of common security.⁸ While not a promise of a real security guarantee, the discussion launched by the Lisbon Document 1996 on a solidarity action and prompt consultation when the security of a participating State is threatened, and on an assistance mechanism in case of non-compliance with OSCE commitments by a participating State, can lead to the strengthening of the authority and capability of the OSCE as an institution responsible for international security.

Of particular significance for international as well as regional security is the impact of the OSCE on Russia's transition and engagement in a unifying Europe. The OSCE norms and principles have provided the framework for the adaptation of the Finnish-Russian neighbourly relationship to the new circumstances. Finland's relations with Russia are based on the guiding principles of the Final Act as registered in the 1992 agreement on the foundations of the relations between the two countries that replaced the treaty containing mutual security obligations which was adopted during the early years of the Cold War. Corresponding to the common and uniform pattern applied in Russia's new treaty arrangements with Central and Eastern European as well as Western European countries in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the bilateral security guarantees contained in the Finnish-Russian treaty are in the form of negative assurances - non-use of force and non-assistance to the aggressor - while the positive assurances of co-operation in international conflict situations refer to using the facilities offered by the UN and the OSCE. While the common border between Finland and Russia is determined by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 and both of the parties are signatories to the Final Act, the 1992 agreement reaffirms their undertakings with regard to the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity. While a public discussion has occasionally emerged in Finland on the issue of the return of the ceded territories, there is no intention on either side to activate the

8 Cf. CSCE Budapest Document 1994, Budapest, 6 December 1994, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Basic Documents, 1993-1995*, The Hague/London/Boston 1997, pp. 145-189, here: para. 7 of the Budapest Summit Declaration, p. 146.

provision on peaceful change contained in the Final Act.⁹ Maintaining that they did not correspond to Finland's status as a UN member and a participating State in the CSCE, Finland acted, upon the reunification of Germany in 1990, unilaterally to abolish the stipulations of the Paris Peace Treaty concerning Germany and limitations on Finnish armed forces that had become obsolete or were limiting Finland's sovereignty. That measure launched the adaptation of Finland's position to post-Cold War and post-Soviet circumstances in Europe.¹⁰

The northern European and Baltic Sea region, as a scene of national, regional and wider European policies, is affected by the adaptation and enlargement processes of the European Union and NATO. New members from the region are joining and both organizations are developing and implementing outreach, support and partnership arrangements. The changing integration and alliance situation has brought the principle of the freedom of choice in security policy into focus as one of the key normative and political developments in the OSCE security order. The right to choose or change security and defence arrangements has been codified in the CSCE/OSCE *acquis* since the Final Act (principle I) and elaborated, in a more concrete and detailed manner, in the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security contained in the Budapest Document of 1994. As a guarantee of the freedom of action and a ban against spheres of influence, the principle serves a vital Finnish interest in stabilizing Europe as a whole as well as the northern sub-region.

Although Finland has no intention of changing its basic security and defence policy, it has pursued an active dialogue with the principal actors on the implications of NATO enlargement and the evolving NATO-Russian relationship for Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region, stressing the need to respect the OSCE security principles related to equality and indivisibility.¹¹ A great-power overlay or other efforts to freeze the security solutions would turn the situation back to an era of tension and division. Of particular significance for regional stability is the recognition and respect of the freedom of

9 Cf. Agreement on the Foundations of Relations between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation, signed 20 January 1992, MFA Press Release No. 30, 20 January 1992; Jaakko Blomberg, Finland and Russia, in: Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1992, Helsinki 1992, pp. 15-18; Tuomas Forsberg, Settled and Remaining Border Issues around the Baltic Sea, in: The NEBI Yearbook 1998, cited above (Note 7), pp. 437-447.

10 Cf. Decision of the Government of Finland on stipulations of the Paris Peace Treaty concerning Germany and limiting the sovereignty of Finland, MFA Press Release No. 277, 21 September 1990.

11 Cf. Discussions between Finland and NATO of implications of NATO enlargement on European security, MFA Press Release No. 211, 29 May 1996; Finland, Sweden and NATO, article written jointly by Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen and her Swedish counterpart Lena Hjelm-Wallén, published on 15 March 1997 in the newspapers Helsingin Sanomat, Hufvudstadsbladet, Svenska Dagbladet and The International Herald Tribune, MFA Press Release.

choice of the three Baltic states in their aspirations towards integration with European and transatlantic political and military institutions.

The Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are in many ways heirs to, and beneficiaries of, the new Europe codified in the Paris Charter. The common goals of democracy and market economics have guided their path to the consolidation of independence and sovereignty as well as their political and economic transition towards full integration in Europe. OSCE instruments have been used to support their efforts to settle disputes with Russia that are connected with the vestiges of the Soviet era and to normalize relations with their neighbour. In the Russian-Baltic relations, OSCE norms of particular relevance for borders and minorities are being applied and advocated, as the unresolved border issues and the position of the stateless or non-citizen Russian-speaking people in Estonia and Latvia constitute potentially the most serious security problems in the Baltic Sea region.

The OSCE security model, with its uniformity of standards and indivisibility of security, offers an indispensable framework for *regionalism*, which is becoming a pattern of growing importance for security and co-operation in post-Cold War international relations. New security risks are experienced by states primarily as a local or regional matter and neighbours have to organize themselves to resolve common problems on site, with appropriate assistance by the wider community of the OSCE participating States. In addition to politico-military measures enhancing stability and confidence among states and governments, the safety of individuals calls for innovative measures in civic or societal security. As Finland's environs contain countries with differing affiliations and positions in the process of European integration and unification, the OSCE provides a source of principles and instruments applicable in regional security co-operation.

Neighbourly relations, cross-border interaction and multilateral (sub)regional arrangements are essential elements of Finnish policy, and their political and institutional linkage with the OSCE framework provides reassurance and stability for Finland as well as other countries involved. In addition to the normative role, whereby the common OSCE norms and principles provide legitimization, reassurance and direction to states and regions engaged in developing co-operation and settling disputes, the OSCE can make a concrete operative contribution in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in the regions. Moreover, the OSCE can act as a forum which facilitates mutual links among regional initiatives and institutions and offers a view to the totality of European co-operation and integration.¹²

12 Cf. Statement by Finland in the OSCE Seminar within the framework of the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-first Century "Regional Security and Co-operation", Vienna 2-4 June 1997, PC/491/97, 03.06.97.

The growing significance of regional co-operation is recognized in the OSCE Security Model process. The Baltic Sea region and the Barents region are among the most advanced and complex cases of institutionalized multilateral co-operation in a regional setting. They were presented and assessed - together with the Central European Initiative, the Central European Free Trade Agreement and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation - in an OSCE seminar organized as part of the work on the Security Model. The Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council are intergovernmental centres for what includes a wide array of sub-state, non-state and transnational networks in various walks of life. The Arctic Council, where the United States and Canada join the Nordic countries and Russia as members, is another element in the web of institutions close to Finnish interests as a northern country.¹³

The concept of *comprehensive* security which is closely affiliated with the CSCE/OSCE as a groundbreaking contribution to post-Cold War politics has been widely and keenly adopted in Finland. It has created the basis for broad consensus among elite and public opinion with regard to the adaptation of the national security policy line to the new situation and to the pursuit of new responsibilities and activities in the European arena. Security is viewed in analytical and operative terms as an arena of actions that aim at promoting transition and stability across the wide socio-economic spectrum and managing conflicts throughout their full cycle as well as protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state itself by a credible military defence, which includes a wider participation in international peace operations.¹⁴

The comprehensive concept of security has relevance for Finland from the perspective of both regional and wider international security. As the Baltic Sea region is an area of some of the widest gaps in socio-economic development in Europe, the support for political and economic transition is embedded in the Finnish view of the tasks and demands of co-operation in the vicinity. Moreover, uneven development creates risks of instability that require wide co-operation in early warning and conflict prevention. Confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and arms limitations retain their significance for the security and stability of the northern region as a whole. In the wider context, human rights and minority issues have increased their visibility and status in Finnish foreign policy, nationally and as a result of their prominent role in the CFSP of the European Union. In the politico-military

13 Cf. Summary document of the seminar cited above (Note 12), REF.PC/498/97, 6 June 1997.

14 Cf. Security in a Changing World, cited above (Note 5); Security in a Changing World, Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament, 19 October 1995, on the Government Report on Security Policy, UaVM 12/1995; The European Security Development and Finnish Defence, cited above (Note 5).

field, the Finnish decision-makers have in a short period of time adjusted Finland's political and military role to practical co-operation with NATO in peacekeeping and crisis management through active participation in the PfP and the Finnish contribution to IFOR/SFOR. Moreover, Finland has been an advocate of an effective role for the European Union and its closer relationship with the Western European Union in crisis management.¹⁵

The focus of the *co-operative* aspect of security is increasingly placed on multilateral institutions and their cumulative impact. Irrespective of the significance of the OSCE as a normative and institutional framework, it has become clear that the practical impact has to be sought through an inter-institutional order based on co-operation and co-ordination. As a host and facilitator, Finland was involved in the formulation of the key paragraph 24 in the Helsinki Summit Declaration of the Helsinki Document 1992 which introduced the concept of "mutually reinforcing institutions, each with its own area of action and responsibility".¹⁶ Finland stresses that the OSCE provides a unifying structure for the whole European, Eurasian and trans-Atlantic region, while integration continues to shape the international scene. Finland has a flexible and pragmatic stance towards co-operation between the European and trans-Atlantic institutions, while stressing efficiency and results as an indication of co-operative security in its true meaning. In the natural division of labour, and on the basis of comparative advantage, the OSCE has a primary role in conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation activities. Moreover, it is important for Finland's interests that the OSCE provides a framework for placing bilateral and regional initiatives in the inter-institutional order based on mutual reinforcement, comparative advantage and non-subordination.

The EU proposals on a Common Concept and a Platform for Co-operative Security outline principles and mechanisms for a productive relationship between security- and co-operation-related institutions. In national comments, Finland has devoted special attention and effort to supporting the development of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) into an effective and dynamic forum for a dialogue on security policy, including regional issues, and facilitating PfP activities. Finland has stressed the need for openness and interaction between the EAPC on one hand and NATO and the NATO-Russia Council on the other hand and worked, in close co-operation

15 Cf. The IGC and the security and defence dimension - towards an enhanced EU role in crisis management. Memorandum dated 25 April 1996 by Finland and Sweden, submitted to the other member states of the European Union.

16 CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993, pp. 701-777, para. 24, pp. 706-707; see also Kari Möttölä, *Prospects for Cooperative Security in Europe: The Role of the CSCE*, in: Michael R. Lucas (Ed.), *The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation*, Baden-Baden 1993, pp. 1-29.

with Sweden, to encourage Russia towards a fuller participation in the EAPC/PfP in the spirit of co-operative and indivisible security.¹⁷

Of particular interest to Finland is a more efficient co-operative relationship between the OSCE and the Council of Europe in the work for democratic security. While the two institutions are complementary in the sense that the Council of Europe has a legal and long-term approach and the OSCE is more political and flexible enough to take on short-term tasks, better co-ordination is needed in their activities, and opportunities exist for more co-operation on the ground. During its chairmanship of the Council of Europe in 1996-1997, Finland contributed to improved co-operation between the Council and the OSCE in the human rights aspects of rehabilitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to launching a closer dialogue between the two organizations on their respective monitoring mechanisms in the field of democracy-building and the protection of human rights. Finland also devotes special attention to the issue of co-operation between the OSCE and the Council of Europe in the work of the Committee of Wise Persons of the Council of Europe.¹⁸

Contributing to the Activities of the OSCE in Security Management

Since the early days of the institutionalization of the CSCE/OSCE, Finland has stressed the opportunity and responsibility offered by the common structures and institutions for the participating States, which need to make sure that they "do not lapse into disuse"¹⁹ as in so many earlier instances of international co-operation.

An indication of the practical value given to the OSCE by a participating State is the allocation of resources to its activities and organs. In 1996-1997, Finland sent altogether 17 seconded officers to OSCE missions and around 180 Finns participated in OSCE election observation missions. In early 1998, Finland fielded three members in the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, four in the Mission to Croatia, one to Estonia and one was to go to Ukraine. Moreover, Finland had nine officers in the EU/European Community Moni-

17 Cf. Statement by H.E. Martti Ahtisaari, President of the Republic of Finland, at the working session, Madrid Summit, 9 July 1997; The Dimensions of Finnish and Swedish Cooperation, speech by Director General Pertti Torstila at a seminar organized by Finland's National Defence Information Planning Commission on the theme of "The Security of Northern Europe in the 21st Century", Helsinki, 11 May 1998.

18 Cf. Statement by Ms Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, at a Press Conference marking the end of Finnish Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 6 May 1997; Committee of Wise Persons, Interim report to the Committee of Ministers (para 9), Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 28 April 1998; Statement by Ms Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, The OSCE Ministerial Council, Copenhagen, 18 December 1997.

19 H.E. Mr. Mauno Koivisto, President of Finland, in: Helsinki Summit 1992 of the Heads of State or Government of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Official Verbatim Records, 9 and 10 July 1992, CSCE/HS/VR.5.

toring Mission (ECMM) operation in Bosnia and Albania and two officers in the WEU's advisory police force in Albania and about 40 officers in the UN police operation in the region. In case the UN Civilian Police operation in Eastern Slavonia comes to an end, Finland is ready to consider participating in a similar OSCE-led operation. Finland's allocation of resources equals that of an average small EU member. In voluntary financial contributions, Finland has supported the elections in Bosnia and the fund earmarked for the recently admitted participating States. When the Central Asian and other CIS members were admitted to the OSCE in 1992, Finland was active in supporting the concept of assistance and contributed to the training of their as well as other new participating States' experts in CSCE affairs. Since hosting the 1992 Follow-up and Summit Meetings in Helsinki, Finland has not undertaken responsibilities of this kind. No offices of heads of permanent OSCE organs are currently occupied by Finnish citizens, but they are represented in prominent positions in the OSCE Secretariat and in the Secretariat of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

Support for Transition and Restructuring

There is a two-level approach to the role of the OSCE in security management in Europe, one related to promoting structural change and the other to coping with acute problems.

To close the social and economic gaps that appear as vestiges of the divided Europe and may threaten stability in all of Europe, solidarity and support are needed for transition countries and countries in conflict regions to achieve equal security and prosperity. While it was not expected that the CSCE/OSCE would have significant financial or other resources to assist states in their political and economic restructuring, it was vital that the principle of peace through change was adopted by the inclusive body immediately after the end of the Cold War, in Paris 1990 and Helsinki 1992.

Although the role of the CSCE/OSCE in economic co-operation decreased with the joint adoption of the market economy as the future system for all the participating States, it remains on the agenda as a reminder of the economic dimension of comprehensive security. The Economic Forum has played a useful role in the exchange of views and experiences on transition economies, and new themes like those concerning the security of energy supply as well as the relationship between energy and the environment are emerging. Finland concurs with the position of the EU that, in the interest of avoiding duplication, the OSCE need not have an operative role in economic affairs nor should any obligations be negotiated in its context. It is the international financial institutions and, above all, the European Union that have the re-

sponsibility and the resource base for economic support and technical assistance, which can also be promoted effectively in regional and bilateral contexts. Developing co-operation in economic development, energy and transportation as well as environmental protection in the northernmost regions of the OSCE space, including the Baltic Sea region, the Barents region and the circumpolar Arctic region, is the aim of the Finnish proposal launched in 1997 on a northern dimension for the policies of the European Union.²⁰

The OSCE has a greater role in the humanitarian aspects of transition, supporting the consolidation of political democracy and the respect for and implementation of human rights. The work is centred around the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the review and control mechanism of the commitments undertaken within the human dimension. Together with its EU partners, Finland supports the efforts to bring the ODIHR closer to the Permanent Council and focus its work on the key themes of democratization and election observation. The biennial implementation meetings should be made more effective and thematic special meetings might be considered in the interim.

Finland's substantive work on the human dimension takes place largely under EU co-ordination and is channelled through the common positions and statements. Recently Finland was responsible for the statement on behalf of the Union on Roma and Sinti. Although progress has taken place, the Union has criticized several Central and Eastern European countries for continuing discrimination against Roma and Sinti. The ODIHR Contact Point established by the decision of the Budapest Summit has performed liaison functions with representatives of the Roma and Sinti community and published and spread information on the situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE region. Key steps in the broader context are adherence by states to conventions relevant for national minorities and co-operation between the OSCE and the Council of Europe.²¹

Together with the other Nordic countries, Finland has advocated the idea of minimum humanitarian standards applicable in all situations, including internal conflict and strife that may fall into a grey zone between peace and traditional war. The Nordic efforts in the OSCE context are aimed mainly at supporting the efforts underway towards a United Nations resolution on the issue. The adequacy of human rights law in exceptional situations, involving non-state actors, has also become a matter of growing concern in the OSCE

20 Cf. Paavo Lipponen, The European Union needs a policy for the Northern Dimension, in: Lassi Heininen/Richard Langlais (Eds.), *Europe's Northern Dimension: the BEAR meets the south*, Rovaniemi 1997, pp. 29-35; Luxembourg European Council, 12 and 13 December, Presidency Conclusions (paras 67-68).

21 Cf. Statements by Finland on behalf of the European Union, OSCE Implementation Meeting 1997, Warsaw, 20 and 21 November 1997.

region which has witnessed a violent and destructive war in the former Yugoslavia between entities of a former state.

Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and post-Conflict Rehabilitation

Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the Baltic Sea Region

Finland has consistently supported Estonia as well as Latvia and Lithuania in the consolidation of their sovereignty, assisted them in their political and economic transition and backed their aspirations towards integration with the European Union. The OSCE and Council of Europe activities in the region, together with bilateral and multilateral support efforts, in particular by the Nordic countries, have kept the Baltic states covered by the common accountability and solidarity regime as well as linked with the network of international institutions and arrangements within the OSCE space.²²

The OSCE Missions to Estonia and Latvia have offered tools of direct relevance for Finland's security objectives in the nearby region. OSCE instruments of the human dimension have been applied in an early warning and conflict prevention mode. Starting with the understanding on the withdrawal of former Soviet/Russian troops from the territories of the Baltic states, negotiated with active Nordic mediation in the CSCE Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992 and contained in paragraph 15 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration, the CSCE/OSCE proved its usefulness in support of the consolidation of the newly regained sovereignty and independence of the Baltic states and their efforts in coping with the vestiges of the era of Soviet power and normalizing relations with Russia as a great-power neighbour, which itself was seeking a sustainable post-Soviet identity.

When the CSCE decided to establish long-term missions in Estonia (in 1992) and Latvia (in 1993) to deal with the relationships between the national and ethnic communities and monitor and support the countries' legislative and other efforts, Finland provided two of the first Heads of Mission to Estonia and also a Deputy Head to the Riga Mission. The work in Tallinn was not without its sensitivities, strains and difficulties. The OSCE Mission was involved, together with the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), in advising and encouraging the Estonian government in its efforts to adopt and readjust legislation on residence and citizenship and take it through *Riigikogu*. Russian-speaking persons enlisted support in their problems of adjustment from the Mission which was also engaged in organizing round-table dialogues between the communities. During the early years (1993-94), when the problems with community relations and the status of the

22 Cf. Möttölä, cited above (Note 7), pp. 363-404.

ethnic Russian non-citizens, particularly former military personnel, were mixed with the issue of the presence and delayed withdrawal of Russian troops, the OSCE Mission under its Finnish Head had to overcome unwarranted misperceptions and suspicions from more radical elements in both of the communities. Overall, the OSCE Mission succeeded in maintaining its impartiality and performing a function of preventive diplomacy and mediation, in particular in politically sensitive north-eastern Estonia.²³

Finland continues to see a special value in the role of the OSCE, which, in concrete and detailed ways through the recommendations of the HCNM, provides the standard for Estonia and Latvia in their continued reform and implementation in the field. The task of reducing the inordinate proportion of stateless persons through a determined process of naturalization, in accordance with their national laws and international standards, looms large for these countries, both of which are engaged in the accession process for EU membership. Both countries have introduced legislation granting citizenship to children born after 1991, while Latvia is also faced with the further task of eliminating the "windows" system - regulating the pace of citizenship applications through quotas - in the naturalization process. Finland works actively through the European Union, which remains engaged in Baltic issues,²⁴ noting that the most solid guarantor of the implementation of human rights and minorities standards will be EU membership for the Baltic states, which would also be in the ultimate interest of Russia.²⁵ The Commissioner on democratic institutions and national minorities of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, working in close co-operation with the HCNM of the OSCE, is another instrument in conflict prevention and transition support in the region and in Russian-Baltic relations. While the HCNM deals with the rights of minorities as groups, the CBSS Commissioner can take up individual cases. The OSCE norms and principles also constitute the basis for the resolution of the dispute over the border agreements between Estonia and Russia and Latvia and Russia, respectively, although no active mediation is under way. Finland, however, facilitated the establishment of the negotiation contact

23 Cf. Klaus Törnudd, *The Role of the CSCE Mission in Preventive Diplomacy - The Case of Estonia*, in: *The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy, The Experience of the CSCE*, Stockholm 1994, pp. 73-86; Timo Lahelma, *The Role of the CSCE Mission in Preventive Diplomacy - The Case of Estonia (August 1993 - June 1994)*, in: *ibid.*, pp. 87-99; The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention. An Introduction, The Hague 1997.

24 Cf. Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Russian Federation's proposals regarding security aspects, confidence-building measures and regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, Brussels, 15 December 1997, 13368/97 (Presse 394).

25 Cf. Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen on the Russian speaking non citizen population in Latvia, MFA Press Release No 171, 1 June 1998.

between Estonia and Russia on the border issue in summer 1997, and since then the parties have worked through direct bilateral negotiations.²⁶

Crisis Management in the post-Soviet Space

Another conflict management operation to which Finland has devoted particular diplomatic efforts is the mission undertaken by the OSCE towards settling the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Finland served as co-chairman of the Minsk Conference in 1995-1996 together with Russia, participating in mediation between the parties (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh) by its diplomatic representatives and experts in the Minsk Group as well as through a visit by the Finnish Foreign Minister to the region and meetings between the Finnish President and regional leaders.²⁷ Finnish military officers headed (from 1992 until June 1996) the OSCE working bodies (Interim Operational Planning Group and High Level Planning Group) planning an OSCE peacekeeping operation for Nagorno-Karabakh. Plans remain in place while being updated, as the diplomatic mediation effort goes on.

Finland's decision to make itself available for the demanding Minsk mission was connected, in addition to the general responsibility for sharing the burden as an OSCE participating State, with its interest in ensuring that conflicts in the space of the former Soviet Union (FSU) are resolved according to OSCE norms and principles. Russia's behaviour towards its neighbours is viewed widely as a test of its foreign and security policy orientation. If international institutions such as the OSCE can make a contribution to stability in the FSU space recognized and accepted by Russia as well as other parties to the dispute, it would further their engagement in the unification and integration process under way in Europe. Furthermore, the Minsk mission offered an opportunity to increase Finnish awareness and knowledge of Russian security interests in the south, which has emerged as a prolonged crisis region and a priority concern for the federal government in Moscow.

Although no breakthrough was achieved during Finland's co-chairmanship, progress was made in the consolidation of the Minsk process. This OSCE-run effort was confirmed as the sole forum for mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as it was to be no longer overshadowed by parallel

26 Estonian and Russian officials met in Helsinki in June 1997. Cf. Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen's statement on Finland's willingness to provide "good offices" for the parties, in: Demari, 15 May 1997.

27 Cf. Finland as a Mediator in the Karabakh Conflict, Report by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Ms Tarja Halonen to the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament on the activities of Finland as co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Conference, Helsinki, 11 February 1997; René Nyberg, Några reflektioner kring Finlands medling i Karabach-konflikten, in: Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift (The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, Proceedings and Journal) 4/1997, pp. 77-82; Terhi Hakala, The OSCE Minsk Process: A balance after five years, in: Helsinki Monitor 1/1998, pp. 5-14.

Russian unilateral efforts in the region. Furthermore, the functioning of the co-chairmanship was improved and good working relations were established between the two co-chairmen. While Finland continued to serve in the Minsk Group, the co-chairmanship was taken over after the Lisbon Summit by the United States and France together with Russia.²⁸

During the Nagorno-Karabakh mission, Finland, then a new member of the EU, strove to co-ordinate its activities closely with the other EU members in the group as well as keep the wider Union membership informed. The mission was an exercise of direct relevance for the Union which was constructing a closer working relationship with Russia not only on economic but also political issues within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). During the Chechen conflict, Finland supported actively the engagement of the OSCE on the ground that led to the establishment of the OSCE Assistance Group in spring 1995 and it has supported the OSCE mission during the conflict and in the rehabilitation phase. The Chechen conflict proved a difficult case for the Union which attempted to pressure Russia to respect its international commitments, in particular humanitarian international law and relevant provisions contained in the Code of Conduct, in an effort to contribute to a peaceful ending to the destructive conflict, while postponing the ratification of the PCA as a form of sanction. The OSCE involvement in the Chechen conflict offered to the Union the normative reference point for its policies and the operative target it could support in the dialogue with Russia, which proved to be a difficult but instructive test case in efforts to influence the complex Russian decision-making.²⁹

Arms Control and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

Finland's attitude towards arms control and military confidence- and security-building measures which have been discussed and developed in the OSCE framework is determined by its position as a small country with an indigenous national defence tailored to purely defensive tasks, and by its policy of military non-alliance and independent defence as well as by regional factors. While in certain issues Finland has specific interests to attend to, it benefits from the overall advancement of military build-down and transparency ushered in by the political changes in Europe and facilitated by co-operation in the OSCE framework.

28 Cf. Martti Ahtisaari, President of the Republic of Finland, Statement at the Lisbon Summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Lisbon, 2 December 1996, in: Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka, Tampere 1998, pp. 308-309.

29 Cf. Christer Pursiainen, Modelling Russia's Crisis Decision-Making: The Case of Chechnya, in: Finnish Institute of International Affairs Working Paper 1/1997.

Finland places emphasis on improving the applicability of the existing CSBMs of the Vienna Document 1994, such as the exchange of military information and the verification and compliance with the commitments, while the implementation record among the participating States remains uneven. Likewise, Finland has suggested that the commitments undertaken in the Code of Conduct be verified by the measures provided for in the Vienna Document (evaluation visits and inspections) and that the participating States should distribute information about their implementation measures such as training and publicity programmes.³⁰

The significance of the CSBM regime for Finland is likely to increase under changing circumstances, as the Vienna Document is being reviewed and the CFE Treaty is being adapted. Finland has expressed an interest in - and made technical preparations for - joining the Open Skies Treaty once the ratification process among the original parties is concluded and the Treaty opened for new accessions. The well-established CSBMs of the Vienna Document on military structures and activities implemented and complied with, together with the opportunity for short-notice surveillance flights offered by the Open Skies Treaty, would serve Finland's needs for openness in the immediate security environment, while the verification arrangements of the CFE Treaty would not bring significant new benefits. As a non-party, Finland cannot directly affect the outcome of the CFE adaptation, but the development of the CSBMs is becoming more closely linked with the future of the CFE arrangement, as both regimes address the same kinds of security concern - albeit from different angles - such as the transparency of changes in military dispositions or the consolidation of regional stability in the north-east and south-east.

NATO enlargement and defence restructuring in new or potential member countries, on the one hand, and the military reform in Russia, on the other hand, are developments that are being managed not only by CFE-related measures but also by improvements and new provisions in the Vienna Document. Earlier ideas about the harmonization of arms control commitments among the OSCE States, which in practice would have required the adoption of CFE-type limitations and verification across the board, have been followed by the idea of a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments. While Finland is opposed to the concept of harmonization, stressing that transparency measures must not run counter to legitimate defensive needs, it works together with the other participating States on developing the framework for arms control outlined in the 1996 Lisbon Document.

30 Cf. Statement by Finland on 23 September 1997, in: Follow-up Conference on the OSCE Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security, Vienna, 22-24 September 1997, Summary, FSC.GAL/15/97; cf. also statements in Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, Vienna, 2-4 March 1998.

The regional approach is another new aspect that is making the CSBM regime more relevant for Finnish security interests. As military security and stability in the post-division Europe are determined increasingly by developments in nearby areas, states have established regional and bilateral co-operative processes and arrangements, including CSBMs going beyond, and being complementary to, the Vienna Document 1994. Finland and Sweden have offered unilaterally, and on a reciprocal and bilateral basis, to their neighbours in the Baltic Sea region an extra quota of evaluation visits and inspections as part of a wider initiative dealing with politico-military aspects of security in the region. The initiative refers to the possibilities offered by the review of the Vienna Document for addressing security issues relevant for the Baltic Sea region, while stressing the indivisibility of security in the OSCE space and rejecting the idea of regionalization of security guarantees and responsibilities. The Finnish-Swedish initiative brings out the fact that there are other measures and arrangements in addition to the traditional military CSBMs that can enhance security and stability and promote confidence, such as co-operation among neighbours in the framework of the PFP and the EAPC and in the area of civic security and other responses to new transnational risks and challenges jointly by civilian and military authorities.³¹

Since the adoption in the early nineties of the Vienna Document in its present form, Finland had as of June 1998 made seven evaluation visits and six inspections and received eight evaluation visits and one inspection. In the Finnish defence structure, only the three air wings are categorized and notified as active formations subject to evaluation visits, while training centres are not active formations in peacetime. The present plans extending to 2008 foresee no change in the defence system which is based on the regeneration of wartime forces by mobilization from the reserves produced by conscription.

Finland has supported the CFE reporting practice introduced in the OSCE framework. From the beginning of the CFE negotiations, an information linkage was established with the Forum for Security Co-operation, which highlighted the need to take into account the security interests of non-participants as well. Openness continues with the CFE adaptation negotiations, and in practice the transparency has exceeded the formal requirements so that Finland can follow the negotiations closely.

Finland underscores the importance of the CFE Treaty, in particular the implementation of the flank limitations, to stability in its surrounding area. The issue of accession by Finland to the CFE Treaty may arise in the near future after a successful adaptation outcome has entered into force among the States Parties.

31 Cf. Non-paper by Finland and Sweden on Cooperative Security for the Baltic Sea Region, 17 April 1998, in: FSC.DEL/104/98/22.04.98; Torstila, cited above (Note 17).

Politically, Finland's position on the CFE issue is based on the OSCE principle of the right of every state to choose its defence and security arrangements and the obligation by all to take into account the security interests of others. Finland was not party to the negotiation of the original CFE Treaty or its later adaptations. Moreover, a key argument relates to the regional circumstances and the specific characteristics of the Finnish defence system in accordance with the OSCE principles. This guiding principle is contained in the provision whereby arms control regimes will take into account "the specific characteristics of the armed forces of individual participating States as well as already agreed commitments and obligations".³²

Militarily, safeguarding the integrity of the national defence system is paramount in the Finnish deliberations on the acceptance of any invitation to join the CFE. The requirements of a mobilization-based system preclude revealing mobilization plans or opening up weapons depots earmarked for war-time forces to the kind of intrusive verification that has been tailored for the CFE Treaty concluded between member countries of military alliances which have large active and standing armies with offensive capabilities and superior intelligence resources. Finland has no plans to join the CFE Treaty under the prevailing circumstances, but it gives strong support to the Treaty as a fundamental factor in military stability in Europe. Finland would have to assess the benefits of participation in the process if the Treaty were opened for further accessions, but the additional political benefits are not likely to overcome the military risks. For the same reason Finland has opposed the ideas of harmonizing arms control regimes in Europe, which in fact would mean the adoption of CFE standards by all the OSCE participating States. A cost-effective, purely defensive and inherently democratic defence system is likely to retain a relevant and legitimate position in the European security architecture.³³

32 Lisbon Document 1996, A Framework for Arms Control, para. 8, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1997, Baden-Baden 1998, p. 434.

33 Cf. The European Security Development and Finnish Defence, cited above (Note 5), p. 30; Statement by Mr. Pertti Torstila, Director General for Political Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, at the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, Vienna 18 June 1997; Military non-alliance. The development of military doctrine and changes in the defence structures. Reform or restructuring the armed forces, presentation by Lieutenant General Jussi Hautamäki at the Seminar on Defence Policies and Military Doctrines held in Vienna, FSC.MD.DEL/31/98, 27 January 1998; Evolution of the European Security Environment and Its Influence on Defence Policies and Military Doctrines, statement by Kari Möttölä, Special Adviser, MFA, in the same seminar, FSC.MD.DEL/ 26/98, 27 January 1998.

Conclusions: A Dynamic Relationship with the OSCE

Finland's activity in the OSCE reflects an inherently dynamic relationship. The overall European order of security and co-operation is changing, the role of the OSCE is under continuous debate among the participating States, and Finland's own adaptation to the integration and security environment is shaped by decisions where the OSCE has a variable role.

Finland is a small state with a strong interest and belief in international institutions. The usefulness of the political and functional dimensions of the OSCE for promoting Finnish foreign and security policy objectives is proved by Cold-War as well as post-Cold War history. At the same time, Finland's line of action is based on a set of priorities where an indigenous defence solution represents continuity, a close attention to regional stability is indispensable and membership of the European Union offers a main channel of influence. An active policy in the OSCE has relevance for all these core elements in the Finnish foreign and security policy line.

The role of the OSCE in European security arrangements is vital for Finland, which benefits from the inclusiveness and common norms upholding the indivisibility of security. In practical security management, the significance of the OSCE varies in the inter-institutional setting available for Finland, but it has a legitimate and functional place in the implementation of human rights policies and in the efforts to prevent and settle conflicts and reconstruct damaged areas and societies. The most tangible role the OSCE has for Finland's interests is in military security because of Finland's national security and defence solution.

EU membership has had a significant effect on Finnish policy towards the OSCE, not so much in substance, as Finland has joined a group of like-minded countries, but in practice because of the close co-ordination in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. A large part of the national profile is embedded in the joint contributions of the Union and the intra-Union debate and policy formation can only rarely be made public. While EU co-ordination offers a channel for reinforcing its aspirations and widening its efforts on behalf of the common security of the OSCE space, Finland can pursue specific interests in such issues as military security and regional stability by national measures or through Nordic and Nordic-Baltic co-operation.