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The Quartet of European Institutions and Its Prospects

The OSCE regards itself as the most *comprehensive* European organization and it is frequently so described. This characterization is applied in two ways: on the one hand, with reference to the group of participants and, on the other, in regard to the content of its security concept.

Owing to changed international conditions, the other three large European security organizations - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU) - have enlarged their membership or the number of candidates for membership and have expanded or deepened their fields of responsibilities.[1] How does this quantitative and qualitative enlargement of organizations occur and what does it mean for the OSCE? What might be accomplished by the growth and possible (at least partial) pulling together of the quartet of European institutions?

Quantitative and Qualitative Growth

Two things can be seen immediately when one looks at NATO, the Council of Europe and the EU: they are supposed to or they want to get bigger, and they are supposed to or want to assume more responsibilities; the "be supposed to" emerges from the ranks of the member states, the "want to" comes more from the Secretariats. By way of justification, both sources point to the fact that countries that have so far stood aside or been kept at a distance are now applying for membership and that some problems call for an international approach. Thus the institutionalization of Europe appears to be intensifying in a variety of forms.[2]

There are also contrary tendencies of various kinds such as exclusions, separations, rapprochement and membership with reservations, which is often referred to in very general terms as "renationalization". Moreover, an enlarged organization is not necessarily able to retain the substantial depth it has already attained and for the short term deepening is sacrificed to enlargement.

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1 "Expanded" refers to the assumption of new responsibilities; "deepened" stands for the growth of competences related to responsibilities already taken on. This distinction can also be described in terms of "horizontal" vs. "vertical" expansion as was done, for example, by Ingo Peters, The Relations of the OSCE to Other International Organizations, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1995/1996, Baden-Baden 1997, pp. 385-399, here: p. 386.

2 With regard to the concept and various aspects of institutionalization, mainly relating to Europe, see: Thomas König/Elmar Rieger/Hermann Schmitt (Eds.), Europäische Institutionenpolitik [European Institutional Policy], Frankfurt/New York 1997.

But substantial changes may also be needed before enlargement to make sure that the organization will continue, after enlargement, to function as it has done in the past. Experience shows that increasing the number of members is not without influence on the way in which an organization carries out its responsibilities and attains its goals. What seemed possible for the six-member EEC, for example, may prove to be unattainable for an EU with 20 or even 25 members. It is not just that the candidates for membership have to adapt themselves to what an organization has accomplished; the organization itself, or its original members, must also give up some things they are accustomed to and get used to the behaviour of those who have recently joined.[3]

When it comes to acquiring new members, some organizations have a greater need than others to catch up. This depends on the existing number of members and on the conditions for admission in each case. For example, the Council of Europe has since 1990 rapidly increased its membership from 23 to 40 and at the same time eased the conditions for admission. The EU, too, has taken on three new members since 1990, is examining six more as well as a possible five others and at the same time is taking a look at its own capacity for further admissions. NATO has so far stayed at its 1990 level but has made an initial decision to accept three more candidates and is examining the structural possibilities for continued enlargement. Since 1990 the OSCE has also increased the number of its participating States, at least formally, from 35 to 55, although mainly as a result of the division of a number of its existing participating States. All European states belong to it. Thus every country participates in at least one of the large organizations - i.e. the OSCE; of the 55 OSCE participating States 24 are members of one additional large organization, seven belong to two others and eleven to three (and, hence, are represented in all four).

For a variety of reasons there are definitional limits and, at least for the time being, also narrow political limits to the growth of all organizations and, conversely, to the international institutionalization of the states. The largest potential EU enlargement would include Poland, to the east, Bulgaria, to the south-east (and thus no members of the Commonwealth of Independent States/CIS), and Cyprus, to the south (but apparently not Turkey). The Council of Europe has a broader concept of Europe which includes Russia, Ukraine and Turkey (but not Georgia, Armenia or Azerbaijan). The potential limits to NATO membership are less clear, especially because it - as well as the OSCE - does not define itself as an exclusively "European" organization. The participating States of the latter, as an organization of the "northern hemisphere"[4], are found on the territory "between Vancouver and Vladivo-

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3 Empirically informative on this is: Lykke Friis, And then they were 15: The EU-EFTA-Enlargement Negotiations, in: Cooperation and Conflict 1/1998, pp. 84f.
4 Thus Willy Wimmer, Member of the German *Bundestag* and Vice President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, in his plenary speech at Stockholm, 1996.

stok" and include three Trans-caucasian, five Central Asian and two North American states.

In assuming new responsibilities the organizations were guided by the changed circumstances; they repackaged those responsibilities, giving attention to matters that had been neglected in the past or ones that had recently come to the fore, and in the process were able to strengthen their competences. This came about with the co-operation of the members, partly as a result of the organization's own urge for self-preservation, partly owing to the expansionist tendency common to all bureaucracies and partly from the force of circumstances. It was inevitable - indeed, it was sometimes the result of deliberate action - that responsibilities were taken on which factually belonged to another organization; and some did not even shrink from expanding into a field where others were already active. But there are limits even to this "competency-imperialism", for a variety of reasons. One is that the field of activity being claimed is simply too far removed from the purposes and competence of the organization. Another emerges from the attitudes of both members - reservations to protect their own sovereignty, for example - and non-members - say, in relation to their strategic interests.

When institutionalization meets its limits, either in the form of programmatic or procedural deepening or through growth of membership, it makes sense to think in terms of co-operation, networks and interconnectedness between the organizations as an appropriate form of future action. This provides room for creative political action of a more extensive and important kind than could be either sought or found through the further enlargement of each existing institution.

One structural problem in carrying out the concept of close institutional co-operation is that eleven of the OSCE participating States belong to all of the organizations while 13 of them (are able to) participate in only one - the OSCE. The result is that the European organizations are unevenly fitted out with competences, resources and personnel - depending on the interests of their members. Moreover, the Secretariats incline more to jealousy, competition and domination than to division of labour and co-operation. This results in redundancy, overlapping and lack of clarity and, as a consequence, in misspent funds.[5]

Co-operation and Networking

In the period after 1945, the relationship to existing international institutions, especially the United Nations, has traditionally had a bearing even on the founding act of an international organization. Thus the North Atlantic Treaty

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5   For a critical summary of this situation see Peters, cited above (Note 1), pp. 397ff.

of 1948 refers to the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty establishing the EEC (1957) mentions obligations that the member states have undertaken in other international agreements.[6] Those are, of course, no more than declarations that serve to provide legitimation for their own actions, which are perforce of limited scope.

The Final Act of Helsinki of 1975 goes farther because it does not limit itself in general terms to the principles of the United Nations but wishes to take advantage of other organizations, especially the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, for co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment.[7]

A European organization's relationship to the United Nations, as compared with other organizations, can influence its legal status, its political effectiveness and its reputation. From the very beginning, the CSCE/OSCE sought successfully to establish close formal and material relations with the United Nations, something which finds clear expression in the declaration of 1992 aimed at making it a "regional arrangement" of the United Nations in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.[8] In this matter and, hence, in its relations with the other European organizations, the question of the CSCE/OSCE's legal status has always had a precarious significance.[9]

Only after 1990, an inter-institutional relationship based on *mutual* recognition, co-ordination and, particularly important, division of labour is a possibility - owing above all to the disappearance of the Eastern European "counter-organizations" such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). And so the Charter of Paris, after listing a number of economic and environmental organizations, including the European Community, states: "In order to pursue our objectives, we stress the necessity for effective co-ordination of the activities of these organizations and emphasize the need to find methods for all our States to take part in these activities."[10]

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6   Cf. Preamble, Arts. 1 and 5, North Atlantic Treaty; Art. 37(5) EEC Treaty.
7   Cf. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993, pp. 141-217, here: pp. 156-157; on relations between the OSCE and the United Nations, see Ralf Roloff, Die OSZE und das Verhältnis zu den Vereinten Nationen - Im Wechsel von Kooperation, Konkurrenz und Subsidiarität [The OSCE and its Relationship to the United Nations - Between Co-operation, Competition and Subsidiarity], in: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg [Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg]/IFSH (Ed.), OSZE-Jahrbuch [OSCE Yearbook] 1995, Baden-Baden 1995, pp. 375-383.
8   See Roloff, cited above (Note 7).
9   On this see Marcus Wenig, The Status of the OSCE under International Law - Current Status and Outlook, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1997, Baden-Baden 1998, pp. 367-383, esp. pp. 375-383.
10   Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 November 1990, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 7), pp. 537-566, here: p. 546.

Since that time, the participating States have on various occasions declared their intention to tie the existing organizations together in a network of "interlocking institutions" in which each would find its place according to its "comparative advantage". Thus the communiqué of the 1991 North Atlantic Council meeting in Copenhagen states with regard to Central and Eastern Europe: "Our common security can best be safeguarded through the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the Alliance (i.e. NATO - author's note), the process of European integration (i.e. the EU - author's note) and the CSCE are key elements."[11]

Since the Prague meeting of the CSCE Council in 1992, relevant CSCE/OSCE documents have devoted a special section to relations with international organizations; thus they spoke in Prague of the necessity of "full co-ordination" between the CSCE on the one hand and the Council of Europe, North Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union (*inter alia*) on the other; later, the Helsinki Document of 1992, referring to the Prague meeting, spoke of an "information exchange" and the document of the Stockholm Council Meeting mentioned "improved co-operation and close contacts".[12] This referred primarily and explicitly, but not exclusively, to the United Nations and its organs. The 1993 Council meeting in Rome decided to establish organized forms for consultation and the co-ordination of activities with other "European and Transatlantic institutions".[13]

These declarations of intent have long since been followed by the contacts called for with the Council of Europe and NATO. Since 1993 the Secretary General of the OSCE has been reporting on them with growing frequency.[14]

These contacts take place at various levels and in a variety of fields. A simple form is the participation by representatives of other organizations in OSCE meetings and, conversely, the attendance of OSCE representatives, particularly the Secretary General, in meetings of the others. Especially worthy of mention are the so-called "2+2 meetings" between the Chairmen and the Sec-

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11 Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June 1991, in: NATO's Sixteen Nations 4/1991, pp. 73-74, here: p. 73.

12 Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council, 30-31 January 1992, Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 7), pp. 830-838, here: p. 837; CSCE Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, in: ibid., pp. 701-777, here: p. 731; Stockholm Meeting of the CSCE Council, Stockholm, 15 December 1992, in: ibid., pp. 845-899, here: p. 860.

13 CSCE Fourth Meeting of the Council, Rome, 30 November - 1 December 1993, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995, The Hague/London/Boston 1997, pp. 192-214, here: p. 206.

14 Cf. Annual Reports of the Secretary General: Annual Report 1993, in: Bloed (Ed.), cited above (Note 13), pp. 2-20, here: pp. 17-18; Annual Report 1994, in: ibid., pp. 21-52, here: pp. 47-49; Annual Report 1995, in: ibid., pp. 53-86, here: pp. 82-84, and in: OSCE Yearbook 1995/1996, cited above (Note 1), pp. 483-516, here: pp. 512-513; and Annual Report of The OSCE Secretary General 1996, in: OSCE Yearbook 1997, cited above (Note 9), pp. 447-482, here: pp. 477-478.

retaries General of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, which have become a firm component of their mutual relations. There are relations at the "working level" and operational co-operation "in the field", i.e. at the locations of OSCE missions, has finally been achieved. The many forms and situations of co-operation that have been developed can be categorized as information, as informal, *ad hoc* and formal consultation, as co-ordination, and as operative co-operation in the fields of general security policy and its human and economic dimensions.[15]

A special security policy role for the OSCE in its relationship with the United Nations - and thus implicitly with respect to its status vis-à-vis the other European organizations - was to be governed by a form of subsidiarity which, formulated as "OSCE first", was proposed in a joint initiative of the German and Netherlands Foreign Ministers in 1994, the year of the Budapest Summit (Kinkel-Koojmans initiative).

The two Foreign Ministers had had their proposals presented to the Permanent Council in May 1994 under the motto "on the path to collective security in the CSCE area" and "strengthening the operational capacities of the CSCE". The purpose was to make it possible to apply the collective security system of the United Nations more effectively. Henceforth the OSCE was to be the first to deal with tensions and disputes arising in Europe; only if its efforts were unsuccessful should the UN Security Council become involved. At the same time, the OSCE's decision-making ability was to be strengthened through introduction of the majority rule for procedural and administrative decisions and of the principle of "consensus-minus-n" with regard to certain decisions on conflict management.

In view of the current status of international law, the introduction of mechanisms for regional collective security was not, in principle, a matter of dispute. The provisions of Chapter VIII, Art. 52, Para. 2 of the UN Charter give the members of regional organizations the authority to make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes through the appropriate arrangements before referring them to the Security Council. What was controversial, however, was a provision stating that the possible involvement of the Security Council along these lines would, first, have to be preceded by an evaluation of the situation and appropriate proposals and, second, that it could be decided upon without the agreement of the countries involved in the conflict. When it became clear that consensus was unobtainable, the Chairman-in-Office, following adoption of the Budapest Document, declared that this matter would be turned over to the Permanent Council for further handling; once adopted, the arrangements would be considered an integral part

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15   For more detail on a large number of cases, see Peters, cited above (Note 1), pp. 391-397.

of the Budapest Decisions. But a further effort on the part of the Chairman of the Permanent Council in the first quarter of 1995 met with no success.

The debate on a Security Charter and the so-called Platform for Co-operative Security it would contain has given a new character to the issue of mutual relations, since it is now a question of joint formalization, especially as between all four organizations.

At the Budapest Summit in 1994 the Heads of State or Government decided to start a " discussion on a model of common and comprehensive security" in the coming two years. This decision contained a variety of recommendations on the conduct of the discussion and stipulated that its results be presented by the Chairman-in-Office to the Lisbon Summit in 1996. At that Summit, the Heads of State or Government then adopted a 12-point "Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-first Century". The result of further discussions was to emerge as a Charter on European Security.

For the purposes of these consultations, the delegates could take encouragement from references in a series of NATO documents, e.g. the Madrid Declaration of the NATO Summit on 8-9 July 1997 which states, among other things: "We reaffirm our commitment to further strengthening of the OSCE as a regional organisation according to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and as a primary instrument for preventing conflict, enhancing co-operative security and advancing democracy and human rights. The OSCE, as the most inclusive, European-wide security organisation, plays an essential role in securing peace, stability and security in Europe. The principles and commitments adopted by the OSCE provide a foundation for the development of a comprehensive and co-operative European security architecture. Our goal is to create in Europe, through the widest possible co-operation among OSCE states, a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of particular states."[16]

At their OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in December 1997 in Copenhagen, the Foreign Ministers provided detailed instructions tasking the Permanent Council of the OSCE in Vienna with continuing discussions on "Guidelines on an OSCE Document-Charter" and the Platform to be contained in it.

In addition to this currently pursued paramount project in the field of pan-European security and institutional policy, the government of the Netherlands undertook an intermediate step with its initiative for an alliance between the OSCE and the Council of Europe on human rights and democracy,

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16 Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 8 July 1997, in: NATO review 4/1997, Documentation, pp. 1-4, here: point 21, p. 3.

which suggested a new approach.[17] This lavish undertaking was risky and in the end probably failed to meet the expectations of its initiators. Nevertheless, it was useful because it focused the attention of all on the weaknesses of institutional policy, because it shook the participants out of their indolent attitudes, and because it demonstrated the possibilities and limits of such cooperation while at the same time opening a debate on the subject.[18]

Fitting into a "Common House"

For various reasons there is a risk that the institutionalization of Europe that has so far been achieved will end up as an "abandoned building". Further expansion of the existing organizations is meeting with resistance.

One way out of the impasse in institutional enlargement might be a direct tying together of the European institutions and their restructuring, on the principle of division of labour, and thus fitting them into a "Common House". If in a spirit of resignation one wanted to make fun of past efforts to create "interlocking institutions" on the basis of "comparative advantages" by describing them as stubborn actors running in circles, then the aftermath - to pursue the same image - might be called the squaring of that circle, i.e. the designing of a *single* institution to replace the four or, to put it another way, the institutionalization of the institutions themselves. However, the experiment set forth here does not exist in a vacuum and is not meant to portray a utopia inappropriate to the times. On the contrary, it takes up the current work of the OSCE which, since the Copenhagen Ministerial Council, has been heavily preoccupied with work on the so-called "Platform for Co-operative Security" as part of the Security Charter. This phase of formulating a workable Platform for Co-operative Security, which is to be decided at the next OSCE Summit Meeting of Heads of State or Government, is taken to be the point of departure for a three stage process as set forth in the remainder of this paper.

The Stage of the Platform as a Common Basis

The available drafts already give an idea of what the Platform can deliver. Even if what is ultimately achieved falls short of more adventurous proposals, these drafts provide a glimpse of an institutional combination which many of those involved consider feasible even today.

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17   See: Address by Hans van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 26 March 1998, pp. 4-6.

18   Cf. Discussion Paper for the 5 June OSCE-Council of Europe Seminar "Alliance for Human Rights and Democracy" in The Hague, incl. Summary of the Seminar.

Viewed soberly, the Platform is nothing more than the formal recognition by the other organizations of principles which have already been put forward by OSCE organs and their representatives and of various forms of co-operation already being practised in certain fields. In addition, the Platform points to the necessity of reforms in the relationships between the organizations and hence to their further development.

Among the principles mentioned here are statements about the OSCE area as a common security space and about the predominant position of the OSCE in view of its being the only trans-Atlantic and pan-European organization. Given equal emphasis is the need for mutually reinforcing co-operation on an equal basis between the OSCE and the other security-oriented organizations, including the requirement for framework agreements on co-ordinated approaches in reacting to particular crises. The following are cited as premisses of the Platform: (1) no organization can effectively meet the many different security challenges of the future alone; the common security space can only be achieved by intensive co-operation between the organizations; (2) political and operational coherence is needed between the various organs that deal with security issues, especially with regard to their reactions to existing crises and working out reactions to new risks and challenges; (3) co-ordinated action is necessary to avoid duplication and to ensure the efficient use of available resources; (4) the OSCE provides a particularly suitable and flexible framework for inter-institutional co-operation owing to its comprehensive membership and its norms.

Agreement on these guidelines was reached at the Ministerial Council in Copenhagen. Now the agreement of the other organizations must be obtained. A further step will be to extend the Platform beyond its politico-military origin in order to make possible co-operation with those institutions which are also involved in promoting comprehensive security. All participating States at Copenhagen stated their willingness to work in the organizations of which they are members to gain acceptance of the Platform for Co-operative Security.

Agreement was also reached on certain steps of a practical kind: regular contacts and meetings within an established framework for dialogue; greater transparency and more practical co-operation, including the appointment of contact persons and establishment of points of contact; and reciprocal attendance at appropriate meetings. Comparative advantages should be identified and synergies promoted so as to encourage complementarity and avoid unnecessary competition between the organizations.

The Stage of Transformation of the Individual Institutions

Europe's further institutionalization through the linking of institutions should then proceed in two stages. The four large organizations would incorporate the Platform in a framework agreement that would be valid for a limited period of time and then be replaced by a common statute. The framework agreement would obligate the organizations (and thus their members) to redistribute responsibilities and to open their ranks for other states that want to join.

If new foundations and different forms of consultation, co-ordination and co-operation between the four large organizations are to be established it will be necessary to think in terms of reforming their areas of responsibility, methods of work and membership practices. There are, above all, two important problem areas that must be attacked. First, the often criticized duplication and overlapping of responsibilities and competences must be recorded and reduced. Second, the membership practices of the organizations must be made compatible with each other.

Before the organizations can be further linked together in the following stage they must first be delinked so as to ensure that their existing functions can be carried out smoothly. The proliferating network of security institutions (agreements, treaties and organizations), which ties countries together in a variety of ways, should be thinned out with a view to strengthening its effectiveness and then put in a clearer relationship with one of the four organizations. One example of such a procedure would be the transfer of the Pact on Stability, along with the many bi- and multilateral treaties associated with it, to the OSCE.

Among the oft-stated convictions of Western politicians is the assertion that no one wants to have a new partition of the continent and that security is indivisible. The division of the continent into a "great Europe" and a "little Europe" has become obsolete. For that reason, every country that is a member of one organization ought to be regarded as a candidate for membership in the others if it is not already represented there.

Separation and exclusion do not eliminate the sources of conflict, even if they do remove them for a time from the field of vision of the few privileged countries. Rather, they make it easier to ignore existing conflicts and they create new ones. If this kind of situation, which only serves to evoke the destructive forces of nationalism and chauvinism, is to be avoided on the European continent, then this stage will call for both pragmatic *and* creative solutions.

As the various countries have only a limited number of experts in security and foreign policy and in view of the large number of *ad hoc* parliamentary bodies such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, that of the Council

of Europe, the Assembly of the Western European Union, the North Atlantic Assembly, the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS, and the Plenary Assembly of the Nordic Council (leaving aside the permanent and privileged European Parliament), the question arises whether a linkage of these parliamentary bodies would not enhance the quality and effectiveness of international parliamentary activity. One could imagine one Parliamentary Assembly that would have committees for the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union/WEU, NATO, etc. Hence it is up to the Parliamentarians to take the first steps into the Common (High) House!

Towards European Confederation

In the third stage, now following, the framework agreement would be transformed into a charter governing a UN regional organization and into a constitution for a confederation of European states.

The European governments have already set out on the path to a Common House as a kind of "clearing-house"; without stumbling and without fear of contradiction they should pursue this path to its attainable end, to that level of "finality" which has always been invoked in the European movement. The "Common European House" would, after all, already have four chambers *in statu nascendi*: one having to do with security policy generally, constituted by the participating States of the OSCE; one concerned with economic and social policy constituted by the EU members; one preoccupied with law and culture, constituted by the members of the Council of Europe; and one specialized in military security policy, constituted by the members of NATO and the WEU.

The European states are thus represented in a number of "chambers" or "assemblies". Initially there will continue to be for some of them organs of an inclusive and exclusive nature, full membership, associate membership, observer and advisory status. But with the course of time the formal parity of the European states will become established; at the same time the status of the North American countries can be transformed into an associative relationship. In this connection, the principle should apply that joint institutions with the United States and Canada would also include Russia, Ukraine and the other CIS countries. Conversely, if Russia, Ukraine and others were excluded from European institutions, then the United States and Canada should be excluded as well.

The common roof should institutionalize the close co-operation needed for a policy of comprehensive security. This would mark a beginning on the way to a pan-European confederation. It could have a synergistic effect if the states "put together what belongs together".

Just how rapidly and how far this development goes will of course always depend on the insight, courage and will of the 55 governments, especially of those which are striving, for the most part unsuccessfully, to achieve a Common Foreign and Security Policy within the European Union and ought to do this within the OSCE framework and not in competition with the OSCE.

If the European countries succeed in developing their system of co-ordination and co-operation, by way of the continental/regional clearing-house, into a regional organization of the United Nations in the form of a confederation, they will have prepared themselves in exemplary fashion for a leadership role in a co-operative, global policy.

The concept of pan-European linkage represents the attempt to achieve a normative hegemony based on development of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In the pan-European context and from the standpoint of a cost-benefit analysis, it offers the best prospect for a European institutional policy.