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Georgia and the OSCE

The attitude of Georgia towards the OSCE is determined, on the one hand, by the main activities generated by OSCE structures and institutions. On the other, it is defined by the possibility of utilizing OSCE capabilities in the interests of my country in resolving the most acute problems that Georgia is facing. This is nothing new and extraordinary, as the attitude of all states towards different international organizations is the same - that they are pragmatic and rational. But our attitude towards the OSCE is somewhat special, taking into consideration that the most acute problems of Georgia - restoration of violated territorial integrity, return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons, resolution of "frozen" ethno-political conflicts, facilitation of the extremely painful process of developing democratic institutions, "Georgian" aspects of the CFE Treaty adaptation, etc. - are the primary subjects of OSCE "specialization". It is impossible for countries that recently regained independence after quite a long period of time to solve these problems without maximum involvement of the international community and international organizations. My country looks at the UN and the OSCE from this point of view. We were guided by these very principles when we became a member of the then CSCE in 1992.

It was the then CSCE Council of Ministers that admitted Georgia as a participating State on 24 March 1992. According to the terms of admission a CSCE Rapporteur Mission, led by former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens, visited Georgia. The Mission's mandate was to "report to the participating States on progress in the Republic of Georgia toward full implementation of CSCE commitments and provide assistance toward that objective".¹

The situation in the country deteriorated seriously during the period immediately after the visit of the fact-finding mission, leading to a decision of the 17th Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) taken on 6 November 1992 to establish a long-term CSCE Mission to Georgia. The Mission started to work in December 1992. According to the modalities of the Mission, as approved by the 18th CSO in December 1992, the objective of the Mission was "to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia which are aimed at reaching peaceful political settlement".² In practice, the Mission concen-

1 Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council, 24 March 1992, Annex 2, in: CSCE First Additional Meeting of the Council, Helsinki 1992, p. 17.

2 For the decision see CSCE, Eighteenth Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials, Stockholm 1992, Journal No. 1, Annex 1; wording of the modalities of the Mission to Georgia: CSCE Permanent Committee, Journal No. 14, 29 March 1994, Annex 1.

trated on the conflict in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. It has helped to facilitate a dialogue between the authorities in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali.

We do not have the leeway here to analyse in detail the OSCE's activities in Georgia since its admission. That would be a subject of special research. Instead we shall limit ourselves to a more general description of our attitudes and co-operation with the OSCE.

Human Dimension

The main sphere of the OSCE's interests and activities in Georgia is human rights and the building of democratic institutions.

The human dimension is at the core of the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are direct and legitimate concern for all participating States, Georgia among them.

Although Georgia faced great challenges after the restoration of its independence, positive tendencies in the field of human rights and democratic institutions are obvious today. And the Mission's work was of great help here. A new Constitution of Georgia has been adopted, under which the protection of human rights and rights of national minorities as embodied in international law is guaranteed. The building of democratic institutions and establishment of civil control mechanisms over the armed forces continue on an intensive basis. The OSCE Mission played a clearly positive role in monitoring and assessing the results of all elections held in recent years in Georgia. The Mission contributed significantly to the development of a legal framework and improvement in the work of law-enforcement bodies. With active assistance and participation of the OSCE Mission, the institution of an Ombudsman was established.

Despite a certain amount of progress in the development of democratic institutions, Georgia is plagued with many problems, but the most painful among them is the problem of refugees. Ethnic cleansing and forced expulsion of the Georgian population from the Abkhazian region of Georgia is a characteristic tendency and a part of the phenomenon known as "aggressive nationalism" with its worst and most extreme manifestation: "aggressive separatism". It does not respond either to moral or to legal categories and tends to ignore fundamental principles of international law.

About 300,000 refugees and displaced persons from Abkhazia are now scattered all over Georgia.

We strongly believe that the OSCE must be more outspoken and clear on this matter. These 300,000 displaced people have become refugees in their own homeland. For the world today, caught up in the flames of numerous ethnic

conflicts, 300,000 may not be much of a figure, but for the tiny country of Georgia, it is a real tragedy. It has been witness to the helplessness of the weak and not too vigorous peace efforts of the international community which has eroded people's confidence in the effectiveness of international mechanisms and could precipitate a disastrous outbreak of uncontrolled actions.

It is very difficult to explain to our refugees why the suffering of Kosovar refugees is a humanitarian disaster and tragedy, while their own tragedy, which has been going on for six years, is almost completely ignored by the international community. Having said this, we do not underestimate the problems faced by Kosovar refugees. Quite the contrary. In view of the rapidly growing flow of refugees and displaced persons in the OSCE region, we deem it important to undertake concerted and decisive measures to eliminate these flagrant and mass violations of human rights.

In this regard, we hope that the OSCE and all its institutions, all its participating States, will not only reconfirm once and for all the declarations that national, ethnic, racial or religious cleansing - whether committed in time of peace or in time of war - is a crime under international law, which they are undertaking to prevent and reacting to adequately. Furthermore the OSCE should intervene vigorously with all its resources to achieve a real solution to this problem.

In the field of human rights, Georgia's co-operation with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is continually growing. The importance of the activities of the ODIHR for Georgia is hard to overestimate. The ODIHR's recommendations contribute substantially to the process of stabilization and democratization in our country. Today Georgia and the ODIHR are working together on the following five projects:

- (1) technical assistance to the Public Defender of Georgia;
- (2) civil society/public awareness;
- (3) training programme on registration of permanent residents of Georgia;
- (4) civic diplomacy and election assistance project; and
- (5) training of district level election administrators.

Undoubtedly, these projects will contribute significantly to the democracy-building processes in Georgia and strengthen the co-operation between ODIHR and the government of Georgia.

Several ODIHR fact-finding missions have visited Georgia during the last few years. They had an opportunity to get a first-hand impression of the ongoing events in the field of democratization and human rights, which are now truly based on legal and constitutional guarantees.

These problems deserve the serious interest of different organizations. Several international organizations are now working simultaneously on the same problems. We think that more co-ordination of their activities is needed and this role could be taken over by the ODIHR. And we appreciate that ODIHR is also ready for such a role. This, undoubtedly, will help us to avoid overlap and duplication.

During a visit of ODIHR to Georgia a common understanding was reached that the government of Georgia and the ODIHR should co-operate in the process of developing a legal basis for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, further strengthening the institution of an Ombudsman and election-monitoring activities.

A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in October 1998 by the then OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Minister Bronisław Geremek, and the President of Georgia, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, to further promote the establishment of democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Georgia by implementing a number of technical assistance projects.

An ODIHR delegation has also visited the Abkhazian region of Georgia. Lack of democracy and violation of human rights have become the normal sequence of events in this region. We are confident that ODIHR can and will contribute substantially to the work of the joint UN/OSCE Human Rights Office in Sukhumi.

Another important OSCE institution with which Georgia co-operates is the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Mr. Max van der Stoel visited Georgia twice in 1998. The HCNM had the opportunity to get an objective picture of the rich historical traditions of peaceful coexistence between different nations in multiethnic Georgia which, along with other democratic values, are now based on legal and constitutional guarantees.

The Georgian authorities found Mr. van der Stoel's visits important and beneficial in the context of peaceful settlement of ongoing conflicts. Regarding Abkhazia, we hope that the High Commissioner's eminence, his impartial and objective attitude, will help all parties to correctly interpret international norms and principles and eliminate differences in their positions.

My government is also thankful to the High Commissioner for the organization of the meetings in The Hague and Vienna on the problems of people deported from the Meskhetian region of Georgia.

The Security Model

For a long time and for well-known reasons, Georgia did not participate in discussions and negotiations on European security issues, which started in

1945 and are still going on. Georgia joined these negotiations only recently, in Helsinki in 1992, and since then has been trying to ensure that its national interests are reflected in all European documents. In our view, there are several factors which play a key role in determining the fate of these negotiations and documents. The most important of them is the end of the open and extremely acute contradictions between two military blocs, although, we believe that these contradictions and the end of the Cold War during recent years had a somewhat ostentatious character. Internal tensions were also clearly perceived against this background of loudly expressed pathos.

"Post-Cold War Europe" has often been characterized as anarchy and chaos, or by the words: "The end of the Cold War is also over", or "the honeymoon is over" etc.

No less significant are the differences and contradictions between the geopolitical interests of the great powers, which are especially obvious in connection with regional conflicts. It is an open secret that these conflicts are often used as a tool for the maintenance of old or new spheres of influence.

The work on the Security Model for the 21st century and particularly on the Charter for European Security has been going on against this background, which puts small countries in quite a difficult position.

In our understanding, the future Charter should not be another document of a general and purely conceptual character. Indeed, the OSCE is not suffering for lack of this sort of document. Instead, the Charter should become the basis for a new European architecture, a new security system which, in addition to its theoretical content, will have certain practical implications as well.

Georgia's interest in the Charter is entirely determined by its interest in the OSCE. Georgia is not a member of any military alliance. Some months ago, Georgia ended its CIS Collective Security Treaty membership, because the Treaty did not respond to the main aim of our membership, that is, restoration of our territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognized borders.

The security of Georgia is still extremely fragile and vulnerable. Under these circumstances, we consider that, more so than any other international organization, in the short term the OSCE could be the best guarantor of our security. In reality, it is the only organization that is universal with respect to its composition as well as its comprehensive spectrum (e.g. the OSCE is involved in conflict management, disarmament issues, and social and economic problems).

There is not any other organization which for the foreseeable future could be more involved in the resolution of our problems than the OSCE. But here we should be honest and say that, regrettably, the OSCE is today very weak and unable to address the most pressing issues. This applies particularly to its operational capabilities - until now it has failed to develop its own peacekeep-

ing function. It does not react adequately to cases of non-compliance with OSCE norms and principles by certain participating States or to those by self-proclaimed regimes. It has failed to develop a well-defined and non-contradictory relationship between two operationally discrepant and mutually exclusive principles: territorial integrity and the right of self-determination.

Georgia, together with other countries and mainly with the GUUAM group, is vitally interested in strengthening the OSCE because the OSCE is committed to and should create firm security guarantees for all of its participating States and establish truly equal co-operation among all of them.

It is also well known that a number of organizations are or claim to be involved in the sphere of European security. Among them are organizations which really do not deserve this status considering their reputation. In our view, in Europe as a whole, this prerogative should belong to the OSCE, although we understand at the same time that the European security system should be based on the co-operation and mutual reinforcement of international organizations, taking into consideration their specific functions and resources.

We do not accept the division of the geographic area of the OSCE into spheres of responsibility or influence by certain organizations (or, especially, states). We also cannot understand the division of labour between the UN and the OSCE - in many cases this is the main reason for negligence, ineffectiveness and inactivity, while one organization is waiting for the other to act. We cannot understand the unjustified caution to intervening in each other's affairs, which has been the case in Georgia. Meanwhile, years pass and separatists benefiting from this long-lasting misunderstanding, have been able to legalize their "victory" and strengthen the effects of "ethnic cleansing". Hundreds of thousands of Georgian refugees still remain under the open sky or, at best, in refugee camps.

We believe that the Platform for Co-operative Security presented by the EU member states should reflect what has been said above and create a firm system for co-operation to solve these problems.

This brings us to another important problem for the Charter: conflict management and peacekeeping operations.

The OSCE, as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, is the primary organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes within a region and its effectiveness to provide early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, including peacekeeping operations, should certainly be reinforced. We view the need for peace enforcement as an integral part of a peacekeeping operation.

We think that conducting peacekeeping operations under the OSCE flag would be most acceptable and welcomed in many regions of the OSCE. The time has probably come to strengthen seriously the OSCE's own peacekeep-

ing potential, *inter alia*, by strengthening its institutions and mechanisms. To reach this goal, the OSCE should develop its previously adopted decisions further.

Another important aspect of the work on the Charter could be the elaboration of mechanisms to monitor compliance with OSCE principles and implementation of OSCE decisions and commitments, especially with regard to conflict prevention and settlement within the OSCE region. The OSCE still has the unfinished task of dealing with violations of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of some of its participating States.

These violations are often committed not only by participating States but also by self-proclaimed regimes, and it is an open secret that these regimes receive extensive support from the governments and non-governmental structures of certain participating States. This aspect of the problem is not being properly addressed and adequately reflected in the existing documents of the OSCE. The situation should be rectified. In this context, all discussions on "consensus" and "consensus minus one" seem quite astonishing. Consensus is a truly golden rule, but we have witnessed more than once the deliberate misuse and exploitation of this rule. It is not hard to imagine that non-compliant states will always refuse to form a consensus on decisions to be adopted against them.

We face a clear contradiction when one side of a conflict - for instance, Georgia - remains faithful to international norms and commitments while the other side - the rebellious Abkhazian regime - seriously violates international humanitarian law by conducting "ethnic cleansing" and terror against the Georgian population without any proper response from international organizations. The "impunity syndrome" (the phenomenon to be able to do such things with impunity) is widespread in Abkhazia and this is a serious threat not only for Georgia but for the whole region as well.

What assessment can we make of the situation when Abkhaz separatists, in the security zone controlled by the "peacekeepers", are mending fences and building a Soviet-style border system, which, on the one hand is an attempt to make the ethnic border between Georgia and Abkhazia permanent and, on the other, seriously hinders the process of repatriation of refugees and the whole political settlement of the conflict?

In this situation, the most extensive possible involvement by the international community could be the only way out. And here, once again, we have to indicate the problems in the implementation of already existing decisions and assessments. Here numerous resolutions of the UN Security Council, decisions of the Budapest OSCE Summit and the Oslo Ministerial, the Lisbon OSCE Summit Declaration, recommendations of the Chairman-in-Office reflected in the Copenhagen Document, as well as decisions of the CIS summits come to mind. This problem has led us to the recent tragic events in the

Gali region where the Abkhaz have repeatedly conducted "ethnic cleansing" against the Georgian population.

The problem of the "free" interpretation of the two main mutually exclusive principles of international law mentioned above - territorial integrity and self-determination - that is at the root of all conflicts in the region, still remains unresolved. Up to the present time the international community has failed to find a proper formulation, which could establish the obligations and responsibilities of states with regard to national minorities while at the same time defining the obligations and responsibilities of national minorities with regard to states and central authorities, in order to preserve their territorial integrity by not violating their internationally recognized borders. We are convinced that without a solution to this problem it will be impossible to create a real security environment within and outside the OSCE area.

In the human dimension of the Charter, our preference is to develop mechanisms for the protection of the rights of refugees and forcibly displaced persons. As stipulated in the Lisbon Document: "Our States will facilitate the return, in safety and in dignity, of refugees and internally displaced persons, according to international standards. Their reintegration into their places of origin must be pursued without discrimination."³

Thus, a lot needs to be done in drawing up the provisions of the Charter. Only the common will and collective efforts of all participating States will enable us to achieve a common and comprehensive security environment in Europe - free of dividing lines and conflicts, irrespective of whether they are ongoing or "frozen".

Conflict Settlement

Our main interest in the OSCE is conditioned by the two so-called "frozen" conflicts which still exist and our desire for the maximum possible involvement of the OSCE in the conflict resolution process.

Firstly, with regard to the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, there is a clear and positive tendency in the conflict resolution process, although much still needs to be done to achieve a real breakthrough. There is still a great need to undertake concrete steps, especially towards a definition of the political status of this region.

In November 1998, the Georgian side handed over the draft of an "Intermediary Document" on political settlement which, together with its Ossetian

3 Lisbon Document 1996, Lisbon 1996, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), OSCE Yearbook 1997, Baden-Baden 1998, pp. 419-446, here: p. 421.

version, will be discussed within the framework of regular meetings. We very much hope that opinions will merge in the near future.

The first meeting of Georgia's State Minister Vazha Lordkipanidze with the Ossetian leadership in January 1999, produced some promising decisions: both parties intend to proceed vigorously on the "Intermediary Document"; revitalization of the Joint Control Commission (JCC); and strengthening the post-conflict economic rehabilitation, *inter alia*, via the new Georgian-Russian Agreement.

The problem of returning refugees to their homes is still acute. Georgia has stated repeatedly that while the process of the spontaneous return of the Georgian population to the villages of the Tskhinvali region is going more or less smoothly, this cannot be said of the officially organized return of refugees to Tskhinvali and other cities of the region. It should also be mentioned that the last visit of representatives of the Migration Service of the Republic of North Ossetia to the Lagodekhi region of Georgia, showed that 25 per cent of registered Ossetian refugees from this region had already returned to their permanent residences. In the near future, the same joint visits will be conducted in other parts of Georgia.

The work of the Joint Control Commission, hampered for a year and a half, not through any fault of Georgia's, has been renewed. Accordingly, the process of political negotiations has also started. Two meetings of an expert group have already been held. Bilateral co-operation in the socio-economic sphere is in progress as well. A recent meeting of the JCC has established a special working group on the return of the housing and other property of refugees and internally displaced persons of both Georgian and Ossetian nationalities.

We are grateful to the EU for the allocation of 3.5 million ECUs for the economic rehabilitation of the region. The OSCE in general, and its Mission in particular, contributed significantly to these positive trends. Unfortunately, financial investment still remains insubstantial. It should be stressed that there is a dire need for more attention, more active involvement, and more practical steps from donor organizations. Their reluctance to become involved in previous years was based on their lack of political initiative and a weakness in the political process, but now there are realistic prospects for a complete resolution of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict if it gets more financial support. We urge all interested organizations and countries to make their contribution.

As for the Abkhazian conflict, the fully stagnating nature of the peace process is obvious. It is ironic that during the last six years, while we have been talking about the same insoluble problems, we did not manage to strengthen the joint UN/OSCE Sukhumi Office, the OSCE and the UN cannot find four officers to perform permanent work there. The OSCE and the UN did not

manage to open the OSCE office in Gali although we witnessed several times how the OSCE made an effort to establish an OSCE presence where there was no willingness for it; we have not been able to end an OSCE presence where there was no need for one any more and not been able to establish one where it is obviously necessary. We have not managed to change the format of peacekeeping operations where peacekeeping is often interpreted as the right to keep this or that piece (of land). We have not managed to establish international control over the uncontained heavy weapon arsenal in Abkhazia. Establishment of international monitoring of the process of the return of refugees appeared to be impossible as well. And so on and so forth.

In our view, the problem lies in the general approach. Unfortunately, we must reiterate again that we have witnessed clearly different treatment and reactions towards different conflicts. We understand that an even simplified comparison with Kosovo may not be correct, but nevertheless, we see a lot of obvious parallels. The Kosovo scenario very much reminds us of the Abkhazian, but with different players and different roles.

We have almost the same number of refugees and internally displaced persons and they have spent their sixth winter out in the open. But we did not have our Albania, Macedonia or Montenegro: the whole burden of our catastrophe was taken on solely by Georgia. We also were subject to ethnic cleansing, which continues, and we do not understand why, unlike Kosovo, ethnic cleansing in our country can be so easily neglected or tolerated. It is also evident that the international community's reaction varies in different cases. So, regrettably, we have had to recognize that there is a principle of "geographic determinism" in the attitudes towards different conflicts. Apparently, some conflicts are central, privileged, and deserving of a great deal of interest while others are forgotten, "frozen", and marginalized. These, according to recent assessments, are the conflicts on the peripheries of Europe. We could hardly accept this approach, even if it were only geographic in meaning; but if the attitude is also politically charged, then it is absolutely unacceptable.

In conversations "on the side" we often hear that the reluctance of international organizations to be more active in our part of the world is conditioned by the fact that the West is preoccupied with the Balkans. Again, we fully understand the importance of Kosovo, but it cannot be a justification for overlooking Abkhazia. God forbid, but if the conflicts in the Balkans or elsewhere last decades or "forever", then we could not even hope to reach a solution to our conflicts. We cannot accept this philosophy of a "selective" classification of conflicts.

While recognizing that international organizations do make a certain political and financial contribution, we must state that their monitoring or registration of facts is followed only by recommendations and appeals that both sides

compromise, engage in a dialogue, and expand contacts. We have serious doubts about their real impact since, first, from the legal point of view, such recommendations have been addressed not to subjects of international law, but to an illegitimate leadership which came to power by military force in one of the autonomous regions of Georgia. Abkhazian separatists, backed by certain foreign forces, do not feel the need to abide by these recommendations. Second, a protracted and complex negotiation process showed a complete lack of desire on the part of the Abkhazian side to implement decisions by international organizations as well as commitments given by the Abkhazians themselves to return forcibly displaced persons to their homes.

Instead the Abkhazian separatists state that they are ready to receive displaced persons only when these people become citizens of the so-called Republic of Abkhazia and renounce their ethnic origin. Recently they announced they would be ready to receive people in the Gali region evicted from there by this very same regime in May 1998. What can the Georgian government do under these circumstances? How and where can Georgia compromise?

We still believe that international organizations, with the OSCE among them, have many resources that could be used to resolve this deadlocked conflict. And the key could be in the implementation of already adopted decisions. Otherwise, the UN and the OSCE will be even weaker and incapable of dealing with these burning issues.

In this respect, we often recall the OSCE Budapest Summit decision, the OSCE Lisbon Summit Declaration, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office's summary at the Copenhagen Ministerial and the OSCE Oslo Ministerial Council decisions. In Budapest, for instance, Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States expressed their "deep concern over 'ethnic cleansing', the massive expulsion of people, predominantly Georgian, from their living areas and the deaths of large numbers of innocent civilians".⁴

In Lisbon, Heads of State or Government condemned "the 'ethnic cleansing' resulting in mass destruction and forcible expulsion of predominantly Georgian population in Abkhazia. Destructive acts of separatists, including obstruction of the return of refugees and displaced persons (...) undermine the positive efforts undertaken to promote political settlement (...)".⁵

In Copenhagen, Ministers stressed that "the peaceful settlement of conflicts in Georgia requires additional measures of transparency on military armament and equipment in the conflict areas".⁶

4 Budapest Document 1994, Budapest, 6 December 1994, in: Arie Bloed (Ed.), *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995*, The Hague/London/Boston 1997, pp. 145-189, here: p. 158.

5 Lisbon Document 1996, cited above (Note 3), p. 424.

6 Sixth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Copenhagen, 18-19 December 1997, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (Ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 1998, Baden-Baden 1999*, pp. 431-457, here: p. 435.

In Oslo we managed to adopt a truly action-oriented decision, which stipulates that the OSCE "appeal(s) to the United Nations and the Group of Friends of the United Nations Secretary-General, as the initiators of the Geneva process, and the Russian Federation, as a facilitator, to activate their efforts with a view to implementing already adopted decisions and undertakings".⁷ Ministers also expressed readiness in assisting in "establishment of a joint local administration in the Gali District with the participation of the returnees (...)".⁸ They also asked "the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to conduct with the United Nations Secretary-General, and within the OSCE, appropriate consultations exploring the utility of the establishment of an OSCE office in the Gali District".⁹

We are far from the idea that the international community in general, and the OSCE in particular, should solve all our problems, but it is natural to hope and expect more active, effective involvement and decisive steps for the implementation of OSCE norms and principles. We would also hope for the implementation of already adopted decisions - with the same intensity and at the same level as the Organization has applied in other cases, especially in the Balkans.

Thus one of the main reasons for the lack of progress in the conflict settlement process is the non-implementation of already adopted decisions of international organizations. We believe that the OSCE and its Mission should concentrate their efforts in this direction as well. Opening an OSCE field office in the Gali region will be the first step towards the implementation of the Oslo Ministerial decisions on Georgia.

We also believe that the upcoming visit of the Chairman-in-Office to Georgia, following the Istanbul OSCE Summit, will help to deal with this very problem. We understand that the conditions and overall situation in the OSCE area are not favourable to a focus on the conflicts in our country and the whole region, but nevertheless, we hope that the OSCE Chairmanship, in co-operation with the Mission to Georgia, will not allow our problems to be forgotten.

7 Seventh Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Oslo, 2-3 December 1998, in the present volume, pp. 455-549, here: p. 460.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 461.

9 *Ibid.*