



IFAR² Fact Sheet

Current Ballistic Missile Defense Program and Discussions in Turkey

NATO Missile Defense System and Turkey's Stance

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On 17 September 2009, President Obama approved a phased and adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe that will feature deployments of sea- and land-based missile interceptors, primarily upgraded versions of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), and a range of sensors in Europe to defend against the growing ballistic missile threat posed by Iran. Accordingly, the Department of Defense developed four phases from 2011 to 2020.

At the **Lisbon Summit** in November 2010, NATO heads of state and government agreed to identify territorial missile defense as an integral part of overall alliance objective, and adopted it as a NATO program in response to the threat of ballistic missile proliferation in accordance with the above mentioned US plan for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). In this context, US EPAA was welcomed as a national contribution to the NATO missile defense architecture. Under

the phase one, Turkey agreed to host a US forward deployed radar. In addition to that, Aegis ballistic missile ships as well as SM-3 IA interceptors were deployed to eastern Mediterranean following an agreement with Spain where Aegis ships will be based in naval station *Rota*. Also, deployment of land based interceptors in Romania will be key element within phase two context. Other two phases foresee the deployment of further land based interceptors in Poland that envisaged for 2018.

One component of this NATO missile defense system became operational in Turkey with a memorandum of understanding that was signed between USA Ambassador to Turkey Francis Ricciardone and Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Siniroğlu on 14 September 2011. Thus, the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/TPY-2) had agreed to be deployed in the southeastern city of

Kürecik, in Malatya province, about 700 kilometers away from Iranian border. It is a transportable X-Band, high-resolution, phased-array radar and was developed and built by *Raytheon Company*. In forward based mode, it plays a vital role by acting as “eyes” for the ballistic missile defense systems such as detecting ballistic missiles early in their flight and providing precise tracking information for interception. Also, in terminal mode, it serves as the search, track and discrimination and fire control radar.

Turkey was reluctant to station the early warning radar system in the first place, therefore on one level it resisted the old “functional” role but had a long term strategic interest to be involved in the EPAA. Because of the fact that, while Turkey committed to the NATO missile defense architecture, is also planning to set up its own national ballistic missile defense system. Therefore, in June 2011, Turkey’s largest defense company, *Aselsan* and its prime subcontractor as missile specialist *Roketsan* were awarded one billion dollar contract to develop all radar, fire control, command-and-control and communication systems for both the low-level and medium-altitude components of the program for air and missile defense, also develop missile payloads and data links. In that area, further initiatives can also be seen such as Turkey’s leading software and systems company *Havelsan* and Boeing’s missile defense partnership and *Aselsan-Raytheon* partnership for the co-development of a major end item for the Patriot air and missile defense system. Turkey is also planning to except bids for a new Turkish long range air and missile defense systems (T-LORAMIDS) in

response to increasing regional tensions, specifically the issue had intensified in the aftermath of the recent Syrian – Turkish incidents concerning downed jet crisis. Accordingly, the US PAC-3 Patriot air defense system, Russia's S400, China's FD2000 and the SAMP-T Aster 30 missile produced by the French Italian consortium *Eurosam* are under consideration.

Although, Turkey has a long standing aim to acquire national missile defense system, it also highly **insisted on three points concerning the missile defense system project**; firstly, the system should not be placed against a certain country which means Iran or Syria should not be named; secondly, it should cover all Turkish territory – although Turkey’s current BMD plans abstain from using this point against the threats posed by the spread of cruise missiles in the Middle East and beyond, but if there is not a specific threat from a country, one can legitimately ask what are these attempts for?; and thirdly, its components on Turkish territory should be operated by the Turkish military. Although, during the run-up to the radar deployment, Turkey’s current BMD program maintains that the system should not worsen the relationship with neighbouring countries, the foreign policy objective of Turkey - zero problems with neighbouring countries – began to be questioned. Ankara’s decision to host the early warning radar system in Malatya has provoked Tehran. In mid-December 2011, *Hussein Ibrahim*, the acting president of the Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Policy and National Security Commission, stated that Iran would target NATO’s missile shield in Turkey if it were threatened by military action. Thus, the deterioration of

Turkey's relationship with Iran is likely to have consequences for the importance attached by Turkish policymakers to their security relationship with the United States and the credibility of NATO's extended deterrence.

On the domestic level, NATO radar system stimulated the **tensions between the ruling party AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the oppositions CHP (Republican People's Party) and MHP (National Movement Party)**. The AKP government underlined that the deployment of the early-warning radar is solely an issue within the framework of NATO activities and the government has delicately worked in coordination with the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry concerning the details of the radar system. Additionally, the government justified the hosting radar referring to tangible security benefits to the citizens and interoperability with the NATO components. The opposition, MHP, worried about the system's territorial coverage and Turkey's threat assessment concerning whether or not the system would be used to protect Israel. *Oktay Vural*, MHP's parliamentary group deputy chairman, indicated that the "government has to explain where the threat is coming from and the necessity of such an involvement in the missile defense system and if a threat really stems from Iran, the government should also clearly explain the extent of this threat". Additionally he continued that "the government's decision will make Turkey a target for missiles and it is obvious that the government's move is related to Washington's interests rather than Turkey's security and that this step is being taken in line with Israeli demands."

Moreover, *Faruk Logoglu*, vice president of the main opposition CHP, drew attention to the AKP-led government's failure to share with the Turkish public the facts surrounding the radar station to be based in Malatya and focused again on Israel but not concerning the intelligence sharing instead he claimed that "AKP is bashing Israel for domestic political gains and as a jumping platform for its pretensions to regional leadership on the one hand and conceals the truth about the declared intention of the U.S. government to use the radar in question to help Israel". He urged AKP to be more open and share the truth with the public also NATO to be more responsive to the needs of non-member states and to support the different Alliance programs to enhance relations with them.

On the other hand, deployed radar system in Turkey **intensified the public opposition and witnessed demonstrations and protests**. The "Initiative Against the Missile Shield in Kürecik" carried their struggle against the early warning radar system as part of the NATO missile shield. The President of the Kürecik Social Aid and Solidarity Association, *Ibrahim Duman* pointed out that "Turkey had no enemies who were going to attack with missiles and the justification of "protection of citizens" only applied to the protection of Israel from Iran and that the US was using Turkey as a live shield according to its international interests". He also stressed adverse effects on the environment and human health as well as the livestock as the city's main source of income.

Apart from Kürecik issue, missile defense discussions in Turkey are deepening with

the current Patriot deployments by the late 2012 and early 2013. On 21 November 2012, Turkey has invoked Article 4 of the Washington Treaty – which provides consultations- and decided formally to request the deployment of Patriot missile defense system from NATO against national security threats posed by the ongoing crisis in Syria.

Thus, on 27 November 2012 onwards, **Turkey agreed to deploy Patriot Air Defense System against possible Syrian attack.** The U.S. as well as Netherlands and Germany announced to reinforce defensive measures with Patriot systems that are expected to be deployed in Adana, Kahramanmaraş and Gaziantep, southeastern provinces of Turkey. By the year of 2013, two air defense system and nearly 400 personnel for each country begin to arrive at these provinces. The systems are expected to become operational later of the January.

Germany also agreed to promote the system with “AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)” which provides immediate available airborne command and control, air and maritime surveillance and battle space management capability.

According to opinions and statements concerning the deployment, Foreign Minister of Germany, *Guido Westerwelle*, especially emphasized the defensive purposes. *Philipp Missfelder*, Christian Democratic Union, said that “without Turkey, we cannot reach a solution about Syria.” NATO Secretary General *Anders Fogh Rasmussen* stated accordingly that “Turkey’s deploying Patriots was a real response to a real threat.” On the domestic sphere, *Volkan Bozkir*, chairman of Turkish Parliamentary Foreign Affairs

Committee, remarks that “Patriot missile defense systems to be deployed in Turkey would serve as an effective deterrent.” Turkish National Defense Minister, *İsmet Yılmaz* declared also that “the Patriot air systems deployed in Turkey were for defensive purposes. If no one has the intention to attack Turkey, then the Patriot systems will never be used.” On the other hand, main opposition, Republican People’s Party called the deployment an imperialist act of the government. RPP Deputy, *Muharrem İnce* points out the cooperative relations between Turkey and Syria and claimed the deployment is just to protect Israel.

Mustafa Kibaroglu, a Turkish academic and expert on security and missile defense issues, comments on the current process as such; “European countries might have felt like they should provide assurance to Turkey that Turkey will be defended against scenarios involving bigger conflict in the region with Iran and Israel.” He claims also the deployment of Patriot missiles along the Turkish border is significant as it represents the first time Turkey and its NATO allies appear to be on the same page regarding threats stemming from the Middle East.

In conclusion, Turkey is shaping up its own national ballistic missile defense system by way of domestic developments, international partnerships as well as American led initiatives and NATO system. According to the Turkish Government, the deployment of AN/TPY-2 ballistic missile defense radar in southeastern side of Turkey represents an important step in achieving the US Administration’s EPAA that provides an anti-missile umbrella to protect Europe as

well as US assets and personnel from short and intermediate range ballistic missile attacks from Iran. Moreover, deployment of Patriot missile defense systems in the same area opens up new discussions about threat assessments concerning the Middle

East. Despite the controversial background within Turkey's internal politics regarding external political issues, Turkey's regional role has arguably become even more prominent from a wider framework.

Quellen & weitere Informationen

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Die Interdisziplinäre Forschungsgruppe Abrüstung, Rüstungskontrolle und Risikotechnologien (IFAR²) beschäftigt sich mit dem komplexen Zusammenspiel von rüstungsdynamischen Faktoren, dem potenziellen Waffeneinsatz, der Strategiedebatte sowie den Möglichkeiten von Rüstungskontrolle, Non-Proliferation und Abrüstung als sicherheitspolitische Instrumente. Weitere Informationen unter <http://www.ifsh.de/IFAR>.

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