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OSCE Yearbook 2019

Yearbook on the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

Edited by the IFSH in co-operation with

Pál Dunay, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies,
Garmisch-Partenkirchen

P. Terrence Hopmann, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, Washington

Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Member of the Executive Board of the European
Leadership Network, Warsaw

Andrei Zagorski, Institute of World Economy and International Relations,
Moscow

Editor-in-Chief: Ursel Schlichting, Hamburg

Translator/Editor: Caroline Taylor, Hamburg

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Contents

II. Responsibilities, Instruments, Mechanisms, and Procedures

Conflict Prevention and Dispute Settlement

Comprehensive Security: The Three Dimensions and Cross-Dimensional Challenges

III. Organizational Aspects

OSCE Institutions and Structures

External Relations and Influence

Annexes

Miroslav Lajčák

The Slovak OSCE Chairmanship in 2019: An Appeal for Stronger Multilateralism and More Dialogue

Established almost 45 years ago as an antidote to festering Cold War divisions in Europe, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) reached across the iron curtain and created what was unthinkable at that time: a platform for dialogue between East and West, with an overarching aim for peace, stability and prosperity on the continent.

In 1995, the Conference became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Since then, the OSCE has evolved to become the largest regional security organization in the world, with mandates spanning political and governance support, election observation missions, field operations, human rights, and issues of social, economic, and environmental development. But one fundamental characteristic has remained until today: the OSCE is still the only dialogue platform where 57 participating States from within and beyond Europe come together with equal voices and equal rights – whether big or small, likeminded or not – to discuss a co-operative approach to security.

When Slovakia took over from Italy to lead the OSCE in 2019, we did so deeply humbled by the great honour and the trust that had been placed in a small nation like ours, but also fully aware of the great responsibility it entailed. We did not enter into this naively thinking we could change the fate of multilateral co-operation, the region, or the Organization in only one year. But despite these natural limitations, we were determined to make a difference where it really matters – for the people on the ground, to open up new spaces for dialogue, to recommit to the basics we may forget at times, and we did so fully aware that the stakes were high. So, in 2019, we guided our work for people, dialogue, and stability in the OSCE region, focusing on three areas.

Ongoing Conflicts in Europe – Alarming Trends

Unsurprisingly, the conflict in and around Ukraine was a top priority for us. The number of casualties we have witnessed in eastern Ukraine in the past five years is higher than anything we have seen elsewhere in Europe this century. However, the real tragedy becomes clear only when you look at the hundreds of thousands of people severely impacted by the conflict, living along the contact line in dire humanitarian situations. Their daily struggle does not make headlines on the front pages of our newspapers, but it is very real.

Back in January, things looked bleak. We had just seen a spike in tensions, and the path forward seemed uncertain.

This is why we decided to put our primary focus on people, aiming to find very concrete ways to ease their suffering. Early in the year, we proposed nine simple and tangible confidence-building measures (CBMs) on issues such as improving the situation with regard to checkpoints, facilitating the exchange of detainees, boosting humanitarian demining, and, importantly, repairing the damaged bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska. The bridge became my personal mission in 2019, simply because, during my first trip to Ukraine as Chairperson in January, I was shocked by what I saw: the suffering these people – most of them elderly – had to go through in crossing the bridge. Because of the damage done to the bridge by the conflict, simple tasks like collecting pensions or seeking healthcare put people's lives in danger. This November, however, after intense negotiation, the damaged bridge was repaired, and they can now cross in safety and with dignity – an important symbol of progress and hope.

We have also seen progress through our other humanitarian CBMs. After four trips to Ukraine as OSCE Chairperson, I can attest to the great work being done on the ground by the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) to continue to alleviate the suffering of people. In fact, the more than 1,300 SMM monitors, under the new leadership of Ambassador Yaşar Halit Çevik, are the eyes and ears of the international community on the ground.

In 2019, we also witnessed what none of us predicted: the power of political will with the landslide victory of President Volodymyr Zelensky and his firm determination to end the war in the east. Since then we have seen unprecedented political progress, culminating in the first Normandy Four Summit in Paris in three years, with concrete outcomes such as ceasing fire, additional disengagement, and a second exchange of detainees, which will be followed by another meeting in four months' time. All of these represent real steps towards implementing our best and only chance at a political solution: the Minsk Agreements. And we need to keep this extremely important momentum alive.

Unfortunately, Ukraine is not the only home to hostilities in Europe. People elsewhere continue to suffer the adverse impact of unresolved conflicts. When it comes to Nagorno-Karabakh, there remains a real risk of escalation. In Georgia, people are living with the reality of frequent denials of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of movement. And, in the Transdniestrian settlement process, it is positive that we managed to adopt a Ministerial Statement on the negotiations in the "5+2" format at the Ministerial Council in Bratislava, but without concrete commitments on the way forward, the progress made in recent years is at risk of backsliding. In all these cases, the OSCE's efforts to de-escalate tensions and open channels for new dialogue remain invaluable, and it is clear that the Organization will be the first to offer its support for concrete steps towards peace.

We cannot, however, focus only on the conflicts of today. We must also respond to another trend.

The Uncertainty Surrounding Future Threats to Peace and Security

Slovakia chose the theme "A Safer Future" as a second priority for its Chairmanship. All over the world, challenges to peace and security have changed rapidly in recent years and are not as easy to detect as they used to be. More conflicts are now fought within, rather than across, borders. Regular armed forces are, in many cases, outnumbered by non-state actors. Cyber-attacks or the decision to go down the path of violent extremism do not come with sirens or flashing lights. And, from climate change to anti-Semitism, hate, and intolerance, the drivers of conflict are more expansive and complex than ever.

To achieve security in Europe, we not only have to react to these realities; we must also scan the horizon for new ones. All new and emerging challenges must be on the table – from energy, natural resources, and climate change to cyber threats. We must also seriously exploit opportunities in other areas, such as the full inclusion of women and young people throughout our work, and support longer-term prevention, like Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R). Engaging with OSCE tools like the Structured Dialogue, or indeed ensuring these tools can evolve, for example by modernizing the Vienna Document, are also key areas where positive changes can be made.

I am glad that we managed to adopt two commemorative declarations at this year's Ministerial Council in Bratislava, on the 25th anniversary of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and of the Principles Governing Non-Proliferation respectively. However, commemorative texts are not enough to move our Organization forward.

A serious concern in planning for a safer future is that, although our work around democratic institutions and human rights remains a cornerstone of our understanding of comprehensive security, it is becoming more and more difficult to hold the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) of the OSCE, Europe's largest annual human rights and democracy conference. Spending weeks discussing modalities does not advance security, human rights, or prosperity in the region and it does not help people on the ground. I made this point very clearly to ministers in Bratislava this December, and I hope we see some flexibility and progress in the years ahead.

The Dangers Facing Our Multilateral Order

Finally, the third trend we addressed – and aimed to counter – in 2019 relates to the dangers facing our multilateral order. These days, multilateralism has become a buzzword, but the meaning behind it goes back centuries. It is the idea that we can gain more working together than alone; that co-operation and dialogue can prevent conflict and create opportunity; that as diverse as the 57 participating States of the OSCE region are, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, joint solutions to our common challenges are more likely to stick.

The OSCE is multilateralism in action, but it is not a lone wolf. In fact, it is operating in quite a crowded landscape. In 2019, Slovakia worked to support complementary partnerships across this landscape – from regional organizations, like the European Union, to the global framework of the United Nations. This is why I am glad that we finalized a joint statement with the UN Secretary-General to supplement the framework for co-operation and co-ordination between our two organizations.

Lately, we have heard more and more voices speaking up in support of multilateralism. We also heard the same from the more than 50 decision-makers participating in this year's Ministerial Council in Bratislava. And we have seen it through two countries, Sweden and Poland, showing their commitment to picking up the slack and deciding to lead the Organization in 2021 and 2022 respectively. With Albania as the Chair for 2020, this provides us with continuity and the chance for more long-term planning. And I thank all three countries for taking on the challenge.

However, while speaking up for multilateralism is very positive, and we should continue to do so, our words alone will not change anything. This is why I issued my Bratislava Appeal[1] ahead of the Bratislava Ministerial Council, urging my colleagues to recommit to what we all believe in – co-operation, dialogue, our principles and commitments, and joint solutions – and show our belief in the very fundamentals of the OSCE through the way we conduct our day-to-day affairs.

Multilateralism requires commitment and compromise, or consensus in the case of the OSCE.

And although more than 40 ministers joined me in my call, the outcome of our negotiations painted a different picture. The bleak reality of 2019 is that we are unable to find consensus; to adapt to the changing security environment around us; and we are not well equipped to respond to the challenges of today and tomorrow.

If we cannot even agree on the basics, from our annual budget to agendas for our events, what chance do we have of realizing the full vision of the Helsinki Final Act?

For peace and stability in Europe, a recommitment to multilateralism is crucial.

Throughout the year, whether in our series of Chair's Dialogues with Vienna-based Permanent Representatives, or through our Informal Ministerial Gathering in the Slovak High Tatras mountains, I have heard that the OSCE's 57 participating States believe in our regional multilateral system, in the principles the Organization stands for, in solution-based and interactive dialogue, and in our shared responsibility to the people on the ground.

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1   OSCE, OSCE Chair Lajčák kicks off 26th Ministerial Council with his "Bratislava Appeal"; calls for increased flexibility and willingness to compromise, Bratislava, 5 December 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/441173.

And I myself witnessed the OSCE's irreplaceable role and vast potential in bringing the dream of lasting peace in Europe to life when I visited 15 OSCE field operations.

But I have not seen any manifestations of this spirit in the negotiations during this year's Ministerial Council, which continued after the ministers left Bratislava. And here, once again, I would repeat my appeal to all participating States to show their recommitment through actions and not just words.

Now it is time to hand over the reins to Albania for 2020. And all that is left is my sincere hope that, in 2019, Slovakia made a small but important contribution to strengthening our regional multilateral system and that the benefits will be felt, not just in Vienna, but by people on the ground.

Ursel Schlichting

Preface

The adoption of the Istanbul Charter for European Security in November 1999, and the Platform for Co-operative Security contained therein, was a promising step towards enhanced co-operation between the security organizations operating in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area. This year marks its 20th anniversary, which is honoured in this edition of the OSCE Yearbook with an in-depth and multi-faceted contribution by Loïc Simonet. However, the Platform proved unable to fulfil the expectations placed in it to the extent hoped for. As Simonet writes, "the extensive web of partnerships and vibrant relations that the OSCE has set up with various international and regional organizations since its inception has developed independently from the Platform for Co-operative Security. The OSCE's partner organizations have rarely referred to it, even the EU, whose member states introduced the document and have done much to further its adoption." The year 2019 has not seen many major OSCE anniversaries and it is not until 2020 that we will celebrate the 45th anniversary of the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act and the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the Charter of Paris – and thus the end of the Cold War.

During our research on the topic of "anniversaries", however, we came across an innovative idea in an essay by Douglas Wake from 18 January 2019: "Did the Cold War end in Vienna thirty years ago this week?"[1] In his article, Wake refers to the Concluding Document of the third CSCE Follow-up Meeting adopted on 15 January 1989,[2] which had begun more than two years earlier on 4 November 1986. At the time, the document was considered "a tremendous step forward in European security co-operation" (Wake). For example, in the politico-military sphere, the previous negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures were now structured more clearly. Of particular importance was the launch of separate negotiations on a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) within the CSCE with clear guidelines, for example, for "the scope and areas of application" and for the monitoring of compliance with the provisions of the future treaty through "an effective and strict verification regime which […] will include on-site inspections as a matter of right and

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1   Douglas Wake, Did the Cold War End in Vienna Thirty Years Ago this Week? Security and Human Rights Monitor, 18 January 2019, at: https://www.shrmonitor.org/did-the-cold-war-end-in-vienna-thirty-years-ago-this-week/.

2   Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-Up to the Conference, Vienna 1989 (herein after: Concluding Document), available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/40881.

exchanges of information".[3] Even details such as the agenda and work programme of the negotiations, working methods, and financial issues were specified. The CFE Treaty was signed in November 1990 and advanced soon to become a cornerstone of European security.

In the human dimension, the Concluding Document not only created a mechanism that allows a participating State to raise questions relating to the human dimension in another OSCE participating State,[4] but also contains concrete guidelines for the "agenda, timetable and other organizational modalities" for the meetings on the human dimension, including detailed work programmes for each meeting.[5] The results of the meetings in Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991) in particular are still regarded as milestones for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Although Wake notes that the Vienna Concluding Document "may appear in hindsight as a logical step in [the] development of the OSCE *acquis* from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act to the 1990 Charter of Paris" it was clearly a "tremendous step" given the political situation at the point of departure for its negotiation. However, with Mikhail Gorbachev becoming the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, the mid-80s also became a point of departure for unexpected, rapid, and fundamental political changes in Europe and in international relations – finally, it was indeed the Charter of Paris that ended the Cold War. 2020 will therefore mark a much bigger anniversary in the history of the OSCE.

This year, for the opening chapter of the OSCE Yearbook, "The OSCE and European Security", OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger has authored an article that deals with the questions of how the OSCE contributes to the implementation of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations Agenda 2030, and how the Organization can further strengthen its involvement in the global framework set by the Agenda. The need to involve the OSCE is clear: Its many and varied efforts to strengthen security in Europe and prevent conflicts are, according to Greminger, of fundamental importance for inclusive and sustainable development. In his contribution, Heinz Gärtner notes that Europe's role in world politics is mostly ignored in American academic debates – wrongly, in his view. He argues that Europe has concepts and instruments that have successfully contributed to the management and resolution of conflicts outside the EU area and have lost none of their relevance today, one of these being the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. "Europe's Goal Should Be Helsinki" is therefore the motto at the heart of his contribution. Vladimir F. Pryakhin takes a look back to the time of the Cold War and draws conclusions for the future: He recalls the Scientific Forum of the CSCE, which took place in February and March 1980 at the Congress Centre in Hamburg. Intended to

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3   Concluding Document, Annex III, Chairman's Statement, Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, pp. 43-53, here: p. 45.
4   Cf. Concluding Document, p. 35-36; cf. also OSCE ODIHR, OSCE Human Dimension Commitments, Vol. 1, Thematic Compilation, 3rd edition, Warsaw 2011, p. xx, pp. 15-16.
5   Cf. Concluding Document, Annex X, Agenda, Timetable and other Organizational Modalities of the Meetings on the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, pp. 73-80.

promote scientific exchange in the natural sciences, medicine, and the humanities and social sciences across the rifts between East and West, it proved to be a great success despite previous resistance and differences of opinion at the political level. Forty years later, in the face of today's global problems, Pryakhin advocates a revival of the Scientific Forum: In his eyes, such a revival would provide the international academic community with an opportunity to make an objective prognosis for the development of humanity in the 21st century and the challenges to be met.

In the chapter on domestic developments in individual participating States and their multilateral engagement, Ekaterina Dorodnova describes the developments in Armenia since the peaceful transfer of power in Yerevan in April 2018, an event which is widely regarded as an achievement in democracy building. At the same time, however, she asks whether the still fragile democracy in Armenia can guarantee security there, or whether there is a risk that it will lead to instability in a complex domestic, regional and global context. Using the example of former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Thomas Kunze examines how leaders in Central Asia who plan to voluntarily withdraw from active politics can prepare and steer their political succession in such a way that they can avert the greatest danger they face after leaving office. This danger lies not in the loss of power as such, but in the loss of their financial and physical integrity and that of their families. In his contribution, Vadym Vasiutynskyi deals with socio-psychological aspects of the presidential elections in Ukraine from the disintegration of the Soviet Union to the present day – "from a communist ideologist to an actor-comedian".

Since its outbreak in 2014, the Ukrainian conflict has regularly been the subject of detailed analyses in the OSCE Yearbook. In 2014, the conflict was a focal point, at the heart of which was a contribution by Claus Neukirch on the timely deployment and rapid growth of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) – a prompt and strong OSCE response, a success story that unexpectedly catapulted the Organization into the centre of international attention. In 2015, the conflict continued to be a focus of interest, with a contribution by Heidi Tagliavini, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office from June 2014 until June 2015 in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group, which she moderated, making a central contribution. In 2016, Marcel Peško took stock of the OSCE's response to the crisis; in 2017, Walter Kemp looked at the risks and dangers for a civilian mission operating in a war zone; and in 2018, Lukasz Mackiewicz wrote about the human dimension in the SMM. In 2019, we now focus on another interesting aspect of the SMM: Cono Giardullo of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Walter Dorn of the Royal Military College of Canada, and Danielle Stodilka of the Canadian International Council (CIC) describe the innovative technologies used by the SMM, which include state-of-the-art remote camera systems, satellite images, and long-range unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs). These technologies are used for night-time observation, to monitor areas inaccessible to regular patrols, and to document the consequences of the conflict for the population and infrastructure.

Günther Baechler, Special Envoy of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus from 2016 to 2019 and Co-Chair of the Geneva International Discussions (GID), gives an insider's perspective on the mediation efforts of the international community in the conflict in Georgia and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. He provides a detailed and stimulating explanation and comparison of both negotiation formats and concludes: "If the numerous actors in the South Caucasus were to focus more on economic integration and infrastructural communication channels than on identity and territorial issues, then the educated youth, who are still leaving the region in large numbers, would have a good future ahead of them." Elia Bescotti deals with the conflicts in Georgia from a different perspective. The focus is not on the pragmatic stabilization and calming of the situation in the conflict areas, among other things in order to make life easier for the population, but rather on fundamental solutions to the tension between Georgia's territorial integrity and the status quo of the de-facto states against the background of Russian security interests.

Few conflict resolution efforts have received the same ongoing coverage in the OSCE Yearbooks as the process of political settlement of the Moldova/Transdniestria conflict. This year, too, one article is devoted to this topic – this time, however, the conflict itself is relegated to the background: The turbulent domestic political developments in Moldova prompted the editorial team to approach one of the most renowned experts on the situation in Moldova, William H. Hill, who headed the OSCE Mission to Moldova for many years. After the parliamentary elections in February 2019 failed to produce a clear result, the pro-Russian Party of Socialists and the pro-Western Alliance ACUM agreed on a coalition government shortly before the deadline for new elections had expired. The ruling Democratic Party (PDM) of oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc nevertheless tried to stay in power for a week and refused to leave the government buildings. It was only when Russia, the EU and the US agreed to support the new coalition that the PDM gave up and Plahotniuc fled the country and Maia Sandu became the new prime minister. Hill's contribution this year therefore not only deals with "steps forward and stumbles back" in the conflict resolution process, but also includes an analysis of domestic political events. The chapter closes with a detailed contribution by Namig Abbasov on the federal, regional, and local dimensions of conflict in the North Caucasus, in which he explains his thesis, against a detailed historical background, that the conflict in the North Caucasus has not ended, as Putin announced in February 2008, but is merely "frozen".

Until 2019, Anita Danka was Human Rights Adviser in the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), whose mandate is largely to collect and analyse information on the implementation of OSCE commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms in the OSCE region.

To this end, ODIHR carries out targeted monitoring activities, for example with regard to the right to fair trial, the application of the death penalty, the situation of human rights defenders, and the freedom of peaceful assembly. Using the example of monitoring freedom of assembly in OSCE participating States, Danka illustrates the work of ODIHR human rights observers, in this case their independent, impartial, and objective reporting of demonstrations and protests, including documentation of the conduct of both assembly participants and law enforcement officials, which makes a valuable contribution to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the OSCE participating States.

The assassinations of three journalists – Daphne Caruana Galizia in October 2017, Ján Kuciak in February 2018, and Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 – are just a few prominent examples of the alarming increase in violence against journalists in recent years, as well as the daily harassment, threats, and intimidations. In his contribution, Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir pays tribute to the Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/18 on "Safety of Journalists" of 7 December 2018 and calls on participating States to give greater priority to the safety of journalists and to develop legislation to ensure that attacks on journalists are investigated without exception and the perpetrators brought to justice.

In his contribution, Kurt P. Tudyka notes that the OSCE's involvement in the cultural field of the human dimension has been steadily decreasing over the years and presents a wealth of ideas that could be initiated, supported, or implemented by the OSCE and its institutions, particularly in conflict-prone "hot spots". His ideas include cultural meetings, and events such as exhibitions, film screenings, concerts, festivals, and opera and theatre performances.

The first formal United Nations Security Council debate on the link between climate change and security was held in April 2007, and the topic found its way onto the OSCE agenda that same year. In the OSCE, climate change is dealt with mainly through projects led by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) and implemented in co-operation with international partners and OSCE field operations. In her informative and detailed contribution, Esra Buttanri, senior advisor in the OCEEA, discusses the potential security implications of climate change in both global and OSCE contexts, provides an overview of the international debate, and outlines the OSCE's response to these challenges. In her conclusions, she summarizes possible future actions to address the security implications of climate change, including enhanced multilateral co-operation while combating climate change at the regional level.

In the section on OSCE Institutions and Structures, Lamberto Zannier and Eleonora Lotti present the experience of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in relation to the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies. The Guidelines, which were adopted in 2012, state that it is not enough to simply recognize the culture, identity, and political

interests of minorities. Instead, they recommend that states develop and implement policies to promote the integration and cohesion of ethnically heterogeneous communities. If states do not do this, there is a risk that large communities in particular will become increasingly isolated from one another. Such a development would pose a serious risk to the stability of multiethnic states.[6] As Zannier/Lotti write: "Classic inter-state conflict has almost disappeared. Instead, we are now witnessing acute crises and hybrid conflicts characterized by internal strife, sometimes in the context of failed or dysfunctional states, or violent separatism, in some cases accompanied by quasi-military operations affecting the civilian population." Furthermore, it is increasingly difficult to juggle protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and, at the same time, ensuring the rights of peoples to self-determination, including minorities. Modern conflicts therefore require a shift in the OSCE's approach to conflict prevention, and the HCNM's main working method of quiet diplomacy may therefore have to be complemented by new tools. In addition, according to Zannier/Lotti, "there is also a need to forge and strengthen coalitions with other international players, including the United Nations, regional organizations and arrangements […] as well as with civil society."

As mentioned above, this year we also have an anniversary to celebrate: On 19 November 1999, in the framework of the Istanbul Summit Meeting, the Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States adopted the Platform for Co-operative Security in order to strengthen co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations concerned with comprehensive security within the OSCE area. Twenty years later, Loïc Simonet asks whether and how the OSCE's contribution to "effective multilateralism" can be strengthened. The starting point for Simonet's answer to this question is the assessment that, 20 years after its adoption, the Platform's record is mixed: Its fundamental objective to support the OSCE's role in peacekeeping was never translated into operational arrangements; the Platform's vision of the OSCE as a "key instrument" has proven to be a myth; although international organizations such as the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe have often agreed to act "with" the OSCE, they have shown reluctance to work "through" the OSCE and to be co-ordinated by it. Simonet then presents and discusses a wealth of ideas and prospects for effective multilateralism going forward.

Last but not least, Anastasiya Bayok deals with a very complex topic that is not (yet) at the centre of discussions in Europe: "Challenges and threat perceptions regarding Central Asia in China and the EU". She examines the attitudes of China and the EU to Central Asia in terms of interests and threat perceptions in the region. In her conclusions, she states that, on the one hand,

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6   Cf. Hans-Joachim Heintze, The Significance of the Thematic Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2012, Baden-Baden 2013, pp. 249-265, here: pp.264-265.

China and the EU actually share similar threat perceptions with regard to Central Asia, such as terrorism, religious extremism and radicalization, organized crime, and drug trafficking. On the other hand, she concludes that closer co-operation between China and the EU in combating common security threats, working together on conflict prevention, fighting against corruption, and deepening economic co-operation could be beneficial for the region, as well as for relations between China and the EU. For China, the deeper involvement of the EU in Central Asia has advantages, such as the promotion of economic development and the opportunity for jointly combating terrorism and contributing to maintaining regional security and stability. However, it also has disadvantages related to the intensified competition between the great powers in Central Asia, including the strategies of the US, Japan, Turkey, and Russia.

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The editors would like to take the opportunity to thank all the authors for their dedicated work and the wealth of vivid presentations, detailed analyses, and interesting ideas.

Our special thanks also go to this year's OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák, who combines his foreword to the OSCE Yearbook with an important concern: his "Bratislava Appeal" for stronger multilateralism and more dialogue. Against the backdrop of rapidly changing global challenges to peace and security that can only be met by working together, the threat to the multilateral order in Europe that he has observed takes on particular significance. The source of this danger, however, is the often hopelessly discordant participating States themselves: "We are unable to find consensus" Lajčák writes in his foreword, and continues: "If we cannot even agree on the basics, from our annual budget to agendas for our events, what chance do we have of realizing the full vision of the Helsinki Final Act?" In his Bratislava Appeal, he therefore calls for "increased flexibility and willingness to compromise in order to broaden and strengthen our interactive dialogue" and to "to focus on finding what unites us rather than divides us."[7] It is to be hoped that his appeal will also find resonance in everyday political life.

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7   OSCE, OSCE Chair Lajčák kicks off 26th Ministerial Council with his "Bratislava Appeal"; calls for increased flexibility and willingness to compromise, Bratislava, 5 December 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/441173.

I.
States of Affairs – Affairs of State

The OSCE and European Security

Thomas Greminger

Sustaining Peace, Sustaining Development – The Role of the OSCE

Introduction

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda)[1] created a global framework, a common language, and shared goals that we can all rally around to transform our world. Governments are integrating these goals into national plans and policies. Donors are using them as a benchmark for their support. Business leaders are showing commitment and civil society is mobilizing to help create further momentum. In 2019, we have had significant exchanges on how the OSCE contributes to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and how these Goals help to focus the work of the OSCE. With its inclusive membership, geographical reach, convening power, and depth of expertise on multiple security issues, and with its institutions, field operations, and programmatic activities, the OSCE has significant capacity and potential to support SDG implementation at the national level. While a few OSCE participating States appear reluctant to formally link the OSCE's work with the SDGs, many others have raised their voice in support. They note that the OSCE's comprehensive security concept and the holistic nature of the 2030 Agenda fit together well, and not just in relation to SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). They point out that implementation of the SDGs is a shared responsibility of all UN member states. And they feel that working through regional organizations like the OSCE can be one important way in which states can further their national and collective SDG-related objectives. Even in the absence of a specific OSCE mandate, there are sufficient markers that explicitly link the OSCE to the 2030 Agenda, including in Ministerial Council Decisions in the OSCE's second dimension of security, the Economic and Environmental Dimension. And for all practical purposes, the SDGs have already become an important point of reference for partner organizations far beyond the UN and affiliated agencies. As the world's largest regional security organization, the OSCE can only benefit from aligning its activities with the 2030 Agenda in an open spirit, in a demand-driven manner, and in response to the needs of OSCE participating States.

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1 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, 70/1. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, 21 October 2015, at: https://www.un.org/en/ development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf. See also: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.

The 2030 Agenda

UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda at a summit in September 2015. They committed to achieving 17 SDGs and 169 associated targets by 2030 "in areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet". Compared to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the SDGs are broader, more ambitious, and also more political. They translate legitimate aspirations for social justice into political commitments. Whereas the MDGs mostly targeted developing countries, the SDGs commit 193 countries, including 56 of the OSCE's 57 participating States.[2] Significantly, from an OSCE perspective, the 2030 Agenda reinforces the nexus between development and peace. It firmly introduces peace and security into a development concept that at the UN has traditionally focused on economic, social, and later also environmental aspects. For a security organization, notably one such as the OSCE that is premised on a comprehensive approach to security that incidentally dates back to the mid-1970s, this link is an essential starting point when considering our relationship with the SDGs.

Furthermore, UN member states made a commitment not only to work towards SDG implementation in their own countries, but to also support each other, including at regional and global levels. As the world's largest regional security arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OSCE contributes to global security within its region through conflict management responses in crisis situations, but above all through longer-term structural conflict prevention and confidence-building. The 2030 Agenda promises to re-energize international action to advance development, peace, and security around the globe. It also opens up UN action to a wide network of collaboration and offers a unique opportunity for the OSCE to better articulate its position as a linchpin between the global and national levels of policy development and implementation. Since the 2030 Agenda is the key international framework promoted by the UN, it is difficult to imagine a modern interpretation of Chapter VIII without strong references to the SDGs.

The Five Ps

Both the OSCE and the UN have long focused on peace and security, conflict prevention, the protection of human rights, and many other security-related issues. As we shall see, there is also significant cohesion between the SDGs and the OSCE's commitments and mandates. In fact, the OSCE connects to all 17 SDGs and many of their individual targets, as well as to the five major themes that group some of the Goals: *people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnership.*

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2   The Holy See is a permanent observer at the UN, not a UN member state.

Of these five themes, *peace* is the key theme for us. As stated in the pre-amble to the 2030 Agenda, there can be no sustainable development without peace, and no peace without sustainable development. Diverse OSCE efforts have an impact on peace and development. Today, Europe is living through times of profound mistrust and growing tensions. In the current polarized security environment, the OSCE remains the only platform for inclusive East-West dialogue and co-operation on multiple hard and soft security issues. We contribute to peace by investing in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and conflict resolution, as well as post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE's response to the crisis in and around Ukraine, in particular the deployment of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine in 2014, is a prominent example of the Organization's early action and crisis management capabilities.

The theme of *people* is also of great significance for us. The Helsinki Final Act was not centred on interstate relations alone, but also on *people*. Along with rules for how states should treat each other, it established norms for how states should treat their citizens. It was this approach that made respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in one country a matter of concern for the entire OSCE community. OSCE institutions monitor the implementation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and promote integration in diverse societies. One of our main priorities has always been to reduce the vulnerability of people in conflict-affected areas. Current examples are to be found in Ukraine, where the SMM continues to be instrumental in brokering so-called "windows of silence" to facilitate the repair of critical civilian infrastructure such as water distribution systems disrupted by the fighting. The 2019 Slovak OSCE Chairmanship has put a strong emphasis on improving the lives of individual people.[3] For example, it has pushed hard for the much-needed repair of the Stanytsia Luhanska Bridge as the only crossing point for civilians between government and non-government controlled areas in Luhansk Oblast in eastern Ukraine.

Prosperity is strongly linked to the OSCE's second dimension of security. Our institutions and field operations, and above all the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), promote good economic governance and the rule of law as prerequisites for building peaceful and prosperous communities. Our activities are designed to strengthen cross-border economic co-operation, enhance good governance and the climate for business and investment, and counter corruption.

Planet refers to the environmental challenges that are threatening livelihoods and impacting on security world-wide. The OSCE brings a strong security perspective to the international environmental discourse and fosters cross-border and regional co-operation to address environmental challenges, including at the nexus between climate and security.

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3   OSCE Slovakia 2019 Slovensko, Programme of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship 2019, available at: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/408353.

Finally, *partnership* is critical to making progress towards an ambitious agenda that spans the globe but ultimately has to be implemented locally. The OSCE works with the UN and many other partner organizations to forge effective responses to traditional and emerging challenges. Global and regional partnerships and coalitions that include national governments, international and regional organizations, the private sector, civil society, the research community, and women and youth will be important drivers for implementing the SDGs.

Linkages with the SDGs

For the OSCE, SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) is the Goal that most closely matches our mandates. It sums up a substantive part of what we are trying to achieve. In UN terminology, SDG 16 is now often referred to as SDG 16+ because it is considered an enabler or catalyst for the successful implementation of many other SDGs. So, this makes SDG 16 even more relevant from an OSCE perspective.

The OSCE promotes peaceful, just, and inclusive societies in a number of ways, including through dialogue and confidence-building, capacity-building, and the sharing of good practices in numerous relevant areas, such as police and justice reform, border management, democratic oversight of the security forces, and many other issues. In times of political crisis, OSCE field presences underpin the OSCE's early warning role and its capacity to defuse tensions through dialogue facilitation at the local level. Many of them offer long-term support to make institutions more effective, inclusive, and accountable. They often do so in conjunction with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE's in-house knowledge hub on democratic governance, the rule of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) specializes in free media and the freedom of expression. And the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) engages with governments and national minorities in support of peaceful coexistence in diverse societies.

All of this relates to sustainable peace, and to SDG 16 in particular, but the OSCE also has multiple linkages with the other SDGs. SDG 4 (Quality Education) is one example. Education can play a key role in preventing conflict by fostering a sense of opportunity and belonging, accommodating diversity and languages, or allowing for multiple views on history. The HCNM regularly reminds both government and national minority representatives of the right to education in minority languages on the one hand, and the importance of mastering the state language on the other. ODIHR and the Organization's field operations promote a culture of peace and non-violence through programmes to combat hate crime and promote tolerance in communities and schools. For example, the Mission to Skopje contributed to policy discussions that led to

national education strategies, and the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina has spoken out against segregated schools and is promoting more inclusive approaches.

SDG 4 (Quality Education) in turn links to SDG 1 (No Poverty), because poverty is not only about a lack of income and resources. Its manifestations also include limited access to education and other basic services, social discrimination, as well as a lack of participation in decision-making. Through awareness-raising, capacity-building, and scholarships, the OSCE promotes the social and economic inclusion of minority groups such as Roma and Sinti. The link to the peace element of SDG 16 is equally clear, as growing inequality can undermine social cohesion and increase political and social tensions that may in turn drive instability and violent conflict. There are many examples that demonstrate how the SDGs connect to each other and to the work of the OSCE, reflecting the breadth of our engagement and the comprehensive nature of security.

A further example illustrates this point well. SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-Being) may not seem an obvious Goal to link to the OSCE but it includes a target to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and contamination. Anyone who is aware of our activities to assess risks at industrial legacy sites in Armenia and Georgia, can draw the connection. The OSCE is also assisting Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to minimize the impact of uranium legacy sites on the surrounding communities. And we have supported Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine, and others with the disposal of mélange – a highly toxic, liquid rocket fuel used during the Cold War. There are thus more than just a few connections that can be made, but in many cases the links have not yet been articulated.

The OSCE's Second Dimension

The OSCE's second dimension has been closely connected with sustainable development for many years. The 2003 OSCE Maastricht Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension includes a dedicated section on sustainable development, and further references were included in several subsequent Ministerial Council Decisions. Specific references to the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs appeared in the 2016 Hamburg Ministerial Decision on strengthening good governance and promoting connectivity[4] and the 2018 Milan Ministerial Declaration on the digital economy[5]. And the connections are quite striking. The OSCE fosters co-operation on a variety of economic

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4   OSCE, Ministerial Council, Hamburg 2016, Decision No. 4/16, Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity, MC.DEC/4/16, 9 December 2016, available at: https://www.osce.org/cio/289316.
5   OSCE, Ministerial Council, Milan 2018, Declaration on the Digital Economy as a Driver for Promoting Co-operation, Security and Growth, MC.DOC/2/18, 7 December 2018, available at: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/405920.

issues that are closely linked to SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), including good governance and anti-corruption, labour migration, transport, trade facilitation, connectivity, and the economic empowerment of women.

Meanwhile, our work on energy security has strong economic and environmental components and is linked firmly to SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy). The OSCE brings together energy decision-makers from major energy producing, transit, and consuming countries to share best practices on sustainable and renewable energy, energy efficiency, and the protection of energy infrastructure. OSCE projects include capacity-building in support of an energy road map for renewables in Turkmenistan, developing dam safety rules for hydroelectric reservoirs in Tajikistan, and providing isolated farms in Kyrgyzstan with solar energy. We are also developing a Virtual Competency and Training Centre on the Protection of Critical Energy Networks in close co-operation with the 2019 Slovak Chairmanship.

In the environmental field, the OSCE has long been a leader in promoting accountability, transparency, and environmental participation rights in our region. We promote comprehensive stakeholder consultations and work on climate change mitigation, wildfire management, and water governance. The OSCE-supported network of Aarhus Centres, which now includes 59 Centres in 14 countries, provides tools for civil society to increase public participation and access to information and justice in the sustainable development sphere. This work links up with SDGs 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), and 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production), as well as 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) and 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).

Water is a strategic resource and an essential element of national and regional security. The OSCE's water governance and diplomacy activities have become a centrepiece of our action in the second dimension. Water scarcity and pollution can threaten socio-economic development and political stability, but water can also be a source of co-operation. The OSCE promotes good water governance and supports cross-boundary management of water resources. Achievements include: the Dniester River Basin Treaty and establishment of the Dniester River Basin Commission between Moldova and Ukraine; the establishment of the Chu-Talas River Basin Commission between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; the facilitation of negotiations for a bilateral agreement between Azerbaijan and Georgia on the Kura River Basin; and the promotion of water co-operation between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The OSCE also addresses water-related disasters and assists with the restoration of water-related ecosystems to mitigate floods.

Water and security issues are closely linked to climate change and SDG 13 (Climate Action). Incidents of extreme weather are becoming more frequent and intense. Slow onset events like desertification, glacial melting, land and forest degradation, increasing temperatures, and rising sea levels are threatening food, water, and energy security. The OSCE has helped to identify, map,

and address potential security risks stemming from climate change through participatory approaches engaging governmental agencies, including security actors, civil society, the research community, and others. Even though OSCE participating States have not given the OSCE a specific climate change mandate yet, the OSCE can act as a catalyst in assisting participating States to assess the repercussions of climate change on security and to develop adaptation strategies.

Cross-Cutting and Cross-Dimensional Approaches

In the framework of SDGs, cross-cutting approaches are increasingly important for ensuring policy coherence across the Goals. At the OSCE, we also need to employ horizontal approaches to effectively address increasingly interlinked and complex security challenges. In many of our activities we are consciously making use of the OSCE's toolbox across the three dimensions. Security is truly comprehensive only when we draw strength from the different perspectives that we cover institutionally and programmatically. A rigid separation would artificially limit our scope and effectiveness. Instead, we are increasingly pooling our expertise from different fields of OSCE engagement, for example, when promoting counter-terrorism measures that respect the rights of the individual.

OSCE action to address trafficking in human beings is a prime example of a strongly cross-dimensional OSCE activity. The OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings has been highly successful in co-ordinating with other parts of the Organization and leveraging their expertise for OSCE anti-trafficking activities. Trafficking in persons is specifically mentioned in three targets under three SDGs: 5 (Gender Equality), 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). However, many other SDG targets and goals are relevant because trafficking is closely connected to wider development issues, including poverty, education, child labour, abuse, and exploitation, gender inequality and discrimination, migration, and others.

There are other issues that by their very nature are cross-cutting. Implementing SDG 5 (Gender Equality) is a central challenge but also a critical opportunity for making headway on the Goals in their entirety. The OSCE is committed to ensuring that a gender perspective is integrated into all its programmatic work and operations. Gender equality is a fundamental human right, and equal rights and opportunities for women and men are essential for a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable world. Societies that do well on gender equality are also more resilient and carry a lower risk of conflict. Achieving gender equality and empowering women are cornerstones of our comprehensive security approach, which protects and promotes the human rights and dig-

nity of women and men. We work to prevent and combat violence against women and girls, and we promote women's participation in public, political and economic life. One of the most obvious linkages with the SDGs and the UN in this area is through our work in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security, which recognizes the pivotal role women play in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction.

For a number of years now, the OSCE has stepped up its engagement with and for young people. The 2030 Agenda highlights the critical role of young women and men as agents for creating a better world. From the Helsinki Final Act onwards, OSCE participating States have repeatedly acknowledged the positive role that young people can play in all three dimensions of security. The 2018 Milan Ministerial Declaration on the Role of Youth in Contributing to Peace and Security Efforts was inspired by the two UNSCRs on youth, peace, and security, 2250 (2015) and 2419 (2018). In 2019, the OSCE has accelerated its efforts to develop more opportunities to integrate youth into our security debates and give them more space in OSCE activities. This year, we launched the "Perspectives 20-30" initiative that will see young experts and practitioners develop a youth-driven vision on security and co-operation towards the year 2030 and beyond.

Engaging with the UN on the SDGs, Engaging with the SDGs at the OSCE

The UN-led SDG review process is open to multi-stakeholder contributions, and the OSCE contributes to the UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) that meets in New York each year to review the implementation of the SDGs. In July 2019, the HLPF convened around the theme of "Empowering people and ensuring inclusiveness and equality" and carried out an in-depth review of Goals SDG 4 (Quality Education), SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). The Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities was a lead discussant at the HLPF discussion on SDG 16. On the fringes of the HLPF, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, in co-operation with the 2019 Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, organized a side-event on Preventive Diplomacy in the Changing Landscape of Modern Conflict: The Role of Regional Organizations. The event brought together key regional organizations and other partners to share best practices and foster co-operation on preventive diplomacy.

OSCE meetings are also increasingly addressing sustainable development and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. In June 2019, the Economic and Environmental Committee held a thematic meeting on "Promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development". It was addressed by a high-level official of the UN Secretariat's Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the entity that supports the HLPF review process.

In addition, the Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July 2019 convened around the topic of "Advancing sustainable development to promote security: the role of parliaments".

So, to all intents and purposes, the OSCE is already raising its voice in the SDG review process and there is growing awareness of the importance of this global agenda for the OSCE. But to explore existing and potential roles in greater detail, in June 2019, I organized an informal OSCE Security Days expert round-table on "The OSCE and the Sustainable Development Goals" with speakers from the OSCE, the UN, participating States, academia, and civil society organizations.[6] This event, hosted by the UN Office in Vienna, was probably the most wide-ranging discussion of the OSCE's contribution to the 2030 Agenda to date. One central recommendation from the event was that the OSCE should map out this relationship in greater detail in order to help raise the profile of our work and allow us to contribute to SDG review processes in a more systematic way.

Mapping would be a first important step. However, looking forward, and based on discussions at the event, if mandated by participating States, the OSCE could act as a platform to facilitate SDG-related policy coherence through data and information exchange. The OSCE could also serve as a regional platform for peer learning, mutual support, exchange of best practices, and even contribute its expertise to support voluntary regional or national reporting. The OSCE could also contribute data of its own to help monitor the implementation of certain indicators. For example, recent OSCE research on how women are affected by physical, sexual, and psychological violence in conflict and non-conflict settings[7] is likely to be useful to policy-makers, particularly in relation to SDG 5 (Gender Equality). The research was carried out in parts of the OSCE area where such data had previously been hard to come by or was non-existent. So, if participating States decided to give the OSCE a more specific mandate, there are various ways in which we could contribute to strengthening policy coherence and evidence-based policymaking at the local, national, and regional levels.

SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals)

The SDGs are an indispensable framework for all UN agencies that the OSCE works with and they are gaining in relevance for many other partners as well. These collaborative relationships alone are also pushing the OSCE to consider its own activities in the light of the 2030 Agenda.

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6   For further information, session recordings, and final report, see: Security Days: The OSCE and the Sustainable Development Goals, 4 June 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/secdays/ 2019/OSCE-and-SDGS.

7   The main report of March 2019 and all other publications on the OSCE-led Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women are available at: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/ 413237.

In our programme activities, we often have UN counterparts and have developed action-oriented partnerships with them. Some are at the intersection between OSCE conflict cycle activities and humanitarian and development work. For example, the OSCE works closely with the UNHCR, especially in the context of the Geneva International Discussions, and with the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, as well as with the SMM to Ukraine and the Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine. This co-operation includes joint capacity-building for OSCE and UNHCR staff, and the use of a "Protection Checklist"[8] jointly produced by the UNHCR and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre.

Other partnerships concern environmental co-operation. The Environment and Security (ENVSEC) Initiative draws together the OSCE and various UN counterparts, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). With their specialized, but complementary mandates and expertise, partners in ENVSEC have helped to deliver an integrated response to environment and security challenges since 2003. Programmes delivered through ENVSEC are strongly supportive of relevant SDGs and offer a model for multi-agency programming.

In 2019, I have been particularly proud of the OSCE's co-chairing of the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT), together with UN Women. ICAT is a policy forum mandated by the UN General Assembly to improve co-ordination among UN agencies and other relevant international organizations to facilitate a holistic and comprehensive approach to preventing and combating trafficking in persons.

There are many more examples of how the OSCE works in partnership with UN agencies and other relevant organizations to develop effective responses. As we deepen our multiple partnerships, the OSCE's link to the SDGs can serve as an important catalyst for intensifying our relations and for increasing the OSCE's effectiveness, impact, and visibility.

Our partnerships with UN agencies are likely to benefit also from specific initiatives that are closely related to the 2030 Agenda. One example that fits OSCE priorities is the International Decade for Action on "Water for Sustainable Development" that was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly for the period from 2018 to 2028.

The SDGs are also rapidly becoming an indispensable framework for resource mobilization, prioritization, and allocation. They shape development policies by international organizations, donor states, and international non-governmental organizations. Many international organizations and donor states now explicitly refer to the SDGs in their programme goals. Standing on the side-lines of this global agenda is not an option. Instead we should pro-actively seek opportunities to promote the more co-ordinated approaches that

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8   OSCE/UNHCR, Protection Checklist: Addressing Displacement and Protection of Displaced Populations and Affected Communities along the Conflict Cycle: a Collaborative Approach, February 2014, available at: https://www.osce.org/cpc/111464.

the 2030 Agenda is calling for. On the strength of good examples such as ICAT and ENVSEC, the OSCE should continue to leverage its partnerships to boost implementation of the SDGs.

Effective implementation requires a "whole-of-society approach" and collaboration at all levels, as well as new and innovative partnerships. This also includes collaborative relationships with private businesses, particularly at the intersection of technology and security. For example, the OSCE is working closely with the Tech Against Trafficking Initiative (TAT), a coalition of technology companies that includes Amazon and Microsoft, among other big names in the industry. The reason is simple. Because almost any human trafficking crime has an ICT element and perpetrators use the services and platforms of private technology companies, preventing and combating trafficking cannot be conceived without strong partnerships with these companies.

The OSCE's experience of participating in, creating, maintaining, and growing mutually beneficial and effective partnerships could also be usefully shared with other regional organizations seeking to enhance their impact through co-operation. The OSCE offers a significant forum for taking such collaboration forward at the regional level and is a natural partner for bridging national and global agendas.

The OSCE's Role in UN-led Processes

The question of how and whether the OSCE should fully embrace topics already well-established on the UN agenda is a familiar one. The OSCE's level of engagement depends greatly on the joint political will of participating States to operationalize Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and to see the OSCE play a practical role.

The OSCE has been strongly supportive of certain UN-led processes such as the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, where we continue to build the capacity of OSCE participating States to develop and implement National Action Plans that are called for in UNSCR 1325 (2000). Supporting the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is another example of strong OSCE engagement. In recognition of the OSCE's role, the UN 1540 Committee Chair comes to Vienna once a year to address the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation.

More recent examples of OSCE involvement include Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), which has been a focus of the UN since at least 2005 and is now promoted through the so-called Sendai Framework endorsed by the UN General Assembly. DRR became an OSCE second dimension priority after it was pushed by the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship in 2014. A Basel Ministerial Council Decision on the topic has since facilitated the OSCE's work towards translating global commitments into concrete actions in the field, including on

flood mitigation and wildfire management. These are activities that above all contribute to implementing SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities).

Often there is a considerable time lag before OSCE participating States back up their UN security-related commitments through specific OSCE mandates, and this is far from automatic. For example, developing an OSCE approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) as a potentially useful cross-dimensional concept to guide OSCE work in related areas is progressing only slowly. And efforts to find consensus on a thematic OSCE decision in follow up to UNSCR 2151(2014) on Security Sector Reform SSR have yet to succeed. Meanwhile, there is incremental engagement, but a more comprehensive effort would depend on a stronger, more specific mandate. To give further impetus to SSG/R in the context of the OSCE, the 2019 OSCE Slovak Chairmanship organized a high-level conference in September 2019 that also explored linkages with the SDGs, in particular SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).

The question of OSCE engagement is perhaps most critical when it comes to climate change and security. At the global level, the Paris Accord and SDG 13 (Climate Action) are pointing the way forward. While it is clear that there is no consensus among OSCE participating States to give the OSCE a specific climate change mandate, OSCE activities are already playing a role in assessing and reducing some climate-related risks for security in the OSCE area. Since the adverse impact of climate change on security is growing all the time, greater recognition of this fact is likely to be better reflected in OSCE decision-making in the coming years.

The same is also likely to be true for the SDGs. The 2030 Agenda was adopted in 2015. We have had a few years to get used to the idea of a global framework setting the agenda on topics that are intimately linked to comprehensive security. So, it may now be the right time to consider closer alignment of OSCE priorities with the SDGs. It certainly is time to map out the extent of our existing contribution and for OSCE participating States to intensify their thinking about how the OSCE fits in and how participating States can support each other, using the OSCE to implement these universal commitments.

Conclusion

In 2019, momentum has been building for the OSCE to give greater consideration to how it fits into the global framework set by the 2030 Agenda. Discussion at OSCE events and references to the SDGs in statements made by participating States suggest that sustainable development, in its new, more comprehensive interpretation, will carry greater weight in OSCE debates and activities in the coming years. There is also a growing understanding and appreciation of the OSCE's contribution to implementing the SDGs. While some

OSCE participating States have expressed reservations, others have shown great enthusiasm for more closely and explicitly linking the OSCE's work to the implementation of the SDGs.

The OSCE's diverse efforts to strengthen security and conflict prevention are fundamental to inclusive and sustainable development. The notion that the OSCE should contribute to the 17 Goals is fully compatible with the Organization's security-focused mandate. There is a privileged relationship with SDG 16 since peace, justice, and strong institutions are central to what we do. But due to the integrated, inter-connected, and inclusive nature of the SDGs, our appraisal of them should not be partial or selective as long as they fall into the remit of the OSCE's comprehensive security approach.

Embracing the SDGs would allow us to leverage our partnerships, encourage synergies, and allow OSCE participating States to make use of the OSCE's many relevant tools as levers for sustainable development. Steps that could help overcome remaining doubts about an OSCE role in supporting this critical global agenda include a more systematic mapping of OSCE activities, a more pronounced role in monitoring and reporting, and greater emphasis on exchanging best practices at the regional level.

There now is a renewed sense of urgency and growing pressure on all stakeholders to move faster, which implies more financing, more commitments, more partnerships, and more action. As a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OSCE should join its partners in mobilizing for a more sustainable and safer planet.

Heinz Gärtner

Europe's Goal Should Be Helsinki

Almost all of the challenges faced by the United States and Europe alike are on the global level. They include regional conflicts that involve state and non-state actors, climate change and resource shortages, the danger presented by nuclear weapons, massive human rights violations, and criminal and terrorist organizations who also use cyberspace. In the US academic debate, Europe's role in the future world is largely ignored, however. The debates mainly revolve around the US and China. This is unjustified. Realists and liberals alike look at Europe through a geopolitical lens.

In the same vein, the political debate in Europe mainly focuses on defence issues, even more specifically on the defence expenditure of European NATO-members. Regardless of the fact that Europe's defence expenditure as a whole is not particularly low anyway, Europe has much more to offer to solve global and regional conflicts than merely increased military spending. The European Union (EU) considers itself a peace union[1] and has developed excellent mechanisms to solve conflicts among the member states, but has been less effective with conflicts beyond its borders. However, Europe has developed instruments beyond pure power politics that were successful in the past and are still very relevant. One of these instruments that best expresses European values is the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975.[2]

Europe Is Not a Major Political Factor in the US Academic Debate[3]

Since the end of George W. Bush's presidency in 2009, there has been a debate among US academics about what kind of world will emerge next. Europe plays only a marginal role in this debate. The main concerns of US academics are the decline of the US and the rise of China. Europe is not considered a major power factor in the new world. At best, Europe is seen as a natural ally because it consists of market economies and liberal democracies. At worst, it is perceived as irrelevant because it lacks military capacities with global reach.

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[1] The European Union lists as its primary goal: to "promote peace, its values and the well-being of its citizens", European Union, The EU in brief, Goals and values of the EU, at: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en.

[2] Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1975, available at: https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act.

[3] An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Heinz Gärtner, Occasional Paper: Where is Europe?, 22 May 2019, at: https://homepage.univie.ac.at/heinz.gaertner/?p=2370#more-2370.

Since 2016, there has been a debate regarding whether the liberal order has come to an end. Some scholars argue that the world never has been liberal but it has always been polarized, whether before World War I, during the Cold War, or under conditions of multiple poles.[4] US President Donald Trump has put the US before all other states, including those in Europe.

The "Unipolar Moment" without Europe

The "bipolarity" of the Cold War era is gone. Representatives of both the realist and liberal schools of international relations theories have started to think about how the future world could look. For Charles Krauthammer, "the immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar".[5] And Europe plays a subordinate role: "The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies."[6] During the period of the Bush administrations, some scholars started to talk about a US empire, where European countries were characterized as dependents.[7]

"Bound to Lead" – without Europe!

Even before Krauthammer wrote his essay, the liberal Joseph Nye wrote his book *Bound to Lead*[8] as a response to Paul Kennedy's book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.[9] He argues that although the US is not in decline, Germany and Japan, which had been destroyed during World War II, are now catching up with the US, getting a larger share of the World Gross National Product and world export rates than in the immediate post-war period. Since then, Nye[10] has reiterated time and time again that the US is the only power in the world that can provide all the dimensions of the liberal order: security, economy, global commons, human rights, and liberal values.

Nye states that in the modern world, power is distributed according to a pattern resembling a three-dimensional chess game. The top "chessboard", representing military power, is largely unipolar, and likely to remain the realm of the US for some time. The middle, or economic "chessboard" is multipolar, and it is here that Europe has a role to play. However, economic power has already been multipolar for more than a decade, with the US, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players, and others gaining in importance. The bottom

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4   Cf. Graham Allison, The Myth of the Liberal Order, *Foreign Affairs*, 14 June 2018; Graham Allison, The Truth About the Liberal Order, *Foreign Affairs*, 28 August 2018.
5   Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, *Foreign Affairs*, December/January, 1990/ 1991, at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-02-01/unipolar-moment.
6   Ibid.
7   Cf. Niall Ferguson, Colossus: *The Price of America's Empire,* New York 2004.
8   Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York 1990.
9   Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*: *Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York 1987.
10   Joseph S Nye, *The Powers to Lead*, Oxford 2008. Joseph S Nye Jr., *The Future of Power*, New York 2011.

chessboard is the realm of cross-border transactions that occur outside of government control. Nye[11] rejects the notion of a "post-American world"[12]; he recognizes that the "America of the late twentieth century is over". American primacy remains, however. This means that the United States will be the "first" but not the "sole" world power. The US will most likely remain "primus inter pares" among the other great powers. The preferred outcomes will, according to Nye, require "power with others as much as power over others".

Parochial Europe

Similarly to Joseph Nye, Richard Haass does not support the thesis of the US's decline.[13] Globalization has created a "nonpolar world"[14] of US primacy, but not domination. The US has to restore its economic foundations and foreign policy at home. He argues that the US is underperforming at home and overreaching abroad. For Haass, US primacy still means superiority: The US economy is the largest, American higher education the best, American society the most innovative and adaptive in the world. Europe, by contrast, performs far below its collective economic weight around the globe. This is the result of Europe's "parochialism, its pronounced antimilitary culture, and the unresolved tensions between the pull of nationalism and the commitment to building a collective union".[15] Europe will, according to Haass, be less significant in the half-century ahead than it was in the past half-century. For him, "we are living in a post-European world".[16] In the 21st century, for Haass it is the Asia-Pacific region that will be the centre of gravity of the world's economy rather than Europe – if it can be managed peacefully.

The 19th Century Belonged to Europe – but Not the Future

Parag Khanna makes a similar observation with regard to emerging powers as Zakaria's "post-American world". Zakaria sees the "rise of the rest",[17] while Khanna observes the rise of the "second world",[18] i.e. almost all others except the US and Europe. Their analyses are not necessarily as declinist as Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of Great Power*. For both Khanna and Zakaria, the US

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11   Joseph S. Nye, *Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era*, Princeton, 2013, p. 159.
12   Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World: Release 2.0*, New York 2012.
13   Cf. Richard N. Haass, *Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House on Order*, New York, 2013.
14   Richard N. Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008, p. 4, at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/age-nonpolarity.
15   Haass, Foreign Policy Begins at Home, cited above (Note 13), p. 39.
16   Ibid. ,p. 38
17   Zakaria, cited above (Note 12), p. 1.
18   Parag Khanna, *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*, New York 2008.

will remain the dominant power (especially in military terms), but their argument is that the US will not be able to act alone. In his book *The Future is Asian*, Parag Khanna sees the "Asianization of Asia" as a first step towards the "Asianization of the World"[19]. Europe's heyday – the 19th century – is a matter of the past. The 20th century belonged to America, and the 21st century will be Asian. Europe is now supposedly passé and the world is entering the "Asian century".

Europe as a Consumer of American Liberal Values

Liberal internationalists argue that a liberal international order emerged under US leadership after the Second World War. The order is rule-based, organized around international institutions and market economies. According to John Ikenberry,[20] in the new world order, the US will find itself in the position of sharing its power and relying in part on others. The contested and unstable US-led hegemonic order will not destroy the American-built liberal international order, but rather will make it more inclusive. The strategic relationships that the US formed in Europe and Asia became pillars of the liberal world order during the Cold War. Ikenberry does not talk of a US-European-built order. Europe is a consumer of American values. The new world would be built around rules, norms of non-discrimination, and market openness, creating opportunities for countries – including rising countries on the periphery of this order. Such a liberal international order would create a foundation on which states could engage in reciprocity and institutionalized co-operation. Such an order can be contrasted with closed and non-rule-based relations such as geopolitical blocs, exclusive regional spheres, or closed imperial systems. The order would survive even without US hegemony.

Europe Might Be Absorbed by China Because It Is From Venus

In contrast, Robert Kagan believes that it would make a huge difference to the future world order if the United States eventually had to share global power with a richer and more powerful, but also autocratic China. "The United States and Europe must not give up on each other."[21] If the US declined, defenceless Europe would be absorbed by China, because, Kagan argues, "on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus."[22] Kagan uses the metaphor of ancient Rome: After the fall of the Roman Empire, the Roman order and culture disappeared, too.[23]

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19 Parag Khanna, *The Future is Asian*, New York, 2019, p. 20.
20 John G. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton and Oxford 2011.
21 Robert Kagan, *The World America Made*, New York 2012, p. 135.
22 Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York 2003, p. 3.
23 Cf. Kagan, *The World America Made*, cited above (Note 21), p. 5.

A More Benign View

Charles Kupchan's treatment of Europe is more benign.[24] He sees time running out on the West's global dominance. Power will become more widely distributed around the globe. The next world will belong to no one. Rather, the coming world will be both multipolar and politically diverse. The diffusion of global power ultimately means the diffusion of international responsibility from the Atlantic community of democracies to a broad array of states in all corners of the globe. For Kupchan, the goal would be to forge a consensus among major states about the foundational principles of the next world. The rules must be acceptable to all powers.

European "Vassals"

For Zbigniew Brzezinski, the US system's capacity to compete globally depends increasingly on its ability to confront problems at home. If the US falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor, and would descend into chaos. Through its cultural, ideological, and economic connections, and more concretely through NATO, Europe remains a junior geopolitical partner or even a vassal to the United States.[25]

Liberals and Conservatives Alike

The US debate about the world is very much a domestic one about its own role in the world. The promotion of US interests and values has always been one central tenet to US foreign policy debate, in which the prevalent elements have always been national security and economic interests. Both liberals and conservatives focus on reforming the domestic political and economic structure to reinforce the basis for a strong foreign policy. They both believe that the US should remain the global leader, stay engaged, and influence global and regional developments.

The Concert of Vienna and the Seeds of War

Interestingly, many of these thinkers – liberals and realists alike – seem to support a concert of powers like that which was established after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. It was rediscovered by the Democrat Franklin Roosevelt, and reinvented by the Republican Henry Kissinger. Such a concert would include democracies, such as the US and European states, and non- or semi-democratic

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24   Cf. Charles. A. Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, The Rising Rest, And The Coming Global Turn*, New York 2012.
25   Cf. Zbigniew Brezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, New York 2012.

powers, such as Russia and China, but could lead to peace and more security among world powers. It would be based on both common norms and principles, as well as a balance of power systems.

This seemingly rational model apparently kept the peace for one century until 1914, with the exceptions of the wars of liberation, starting with the Crimean War (1853-1856). However, in the second half of the 19th century, this model already contained the seeds of collapse, almost invisible to most of the politicians and the population, that led to the First World War. This prelude was characterized by nationalistic propaganda, demonization of other nations and governments, and an arms race.

The world is today witnessing the breakdown of multilateralism, the emergence of nationalistic and ethnic xenophobia, the demonization of adversaries, the depreciation of international institutions, the withdrawal of international agreements and treaties, and a new arms race.

Higher Defence Spending Is Not the Solution

US President Donald Trump, like some of his predecessors and their Secretaries of State, requested that European NATO members increase their defence spending, amounting to an accusation that European countries are failing to pull their weight in military affairs. NATO responded with assurances that there is a trend towards higher expenditure anyway and with concepts such as "smart defence"[26] and "pooling and sharing"[27] as a way to reduce costs and set priorities. The request for higher defence expenditure is not related to threat analyses but to fair burden sharing among member states. But why should Europe compete with the US regarding defence expenditure. They are neither enemies nor rivals.

Higher defence expenditures would not enhance Europe's weight in the world. Moreover, Europe's present military capabilities are not negligible either. After all, around 60,000 European troops are deployed in various missions abroad, and European countries spend about half of what the US spends on defence. EU military expenditures account for more than one fifth of total military spending worldwide, compared to US expenditure at about 45 per cent. Europe as a whole spends as much on defence as Russia, China, India, and Brazil combined. Russia spends a little more than the UK and France. If Germany spent two per cent of its GDP on defence, it would equal Russia's military expenditures.[28]

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26   North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Smart Defence, 20 February 2017, at: https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm.
27   European Defence Agency, EDA's Pooling and Sharing, at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/ docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/final-p-s_30012013_factsheet_cs5_gris.
28   Data from SIPRI Yearbook 2019: *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2019, p. 186-222, esp. 207 and table 4.3 on p. 194.

Europe's Deficiencies

The political engagement of the EU is a requirement for many conflict areas. This fact is recognized by the EU Global Strategy: "In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. We will engage responsibly across Europe and the surrounding regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights. […] The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. Retreat from the world only deprives us of the opportunities that a connected world presents."[29] The EU has not been very successful in engaging in international conflicts, however. It does not have independent policies on China, the Middle East, or East Asia. It is mostly reactive to the US concerning trade issues with China, Korea, and Iran.

The EU is considered a peace project. Whatever the causes, there are no tensions between the members of the EU which might lead to a military conflict. However, the geopolitical competition that culminated in the Ukraine crisis after 2014 is reverberated by the stalemate within the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE), the successor to the CSCE, since the fall of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the EU and its treaties will not be able to achieve what the Helsinki Process after 1975 had achieved. The EU does not explicitly recognize other political and social systems. The EU Lisbon Treaty of 2007 states in Article 7a that the EU will develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries aiming to establish "an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union"[30]. The 1967 Harmel Report published by NATO requests strong military deterrence but also dialogue.[31] The Europe of 2020 will not yet have achieved this duality. The aim should be Helsinki 1975. The EU has to be amended by the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

The Leading Document of European Values: The Helsinki Final Act

The document that best expresses European values is the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It does not identify enemies, nor even opponents or adversaries, while most of the security and defence strategies define other states as "opponents", "adversaries", and "enemies". The Helsinki Final Act requests co-operative security and considers security indivisible. It develops a Decalogue

29   Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, pp. 8 and 17, at: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

30   European Union, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Lisbon, 13 December 2007, Article 7a, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12007L%2FTXT.

31   Cf. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Future Tasks of the Alliance. Report of the Council – "The Harmel Report", 13 December 1967, at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm.

of humanitarian values and supports economic co-operation. It allows changing of borders only peacefully and by agreement.

Advocates of deterrence strongly believe that nuclear deterrence does work because there was no nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, in reality we do not know if this is true, since you cannot prove why something did not happen. The avoidance of nuclear war between the two Cold War superpowers would not have been possible without factors such as arms control negotiations, confidence-building measures and co-operation within the CSCE and in other regimes and institutions.

The Helsinki Final Act and the subsequent process could provide a guideline for resolving current conflicts without copying them. The CSCE process was based on three "baskets": bi- and multilateral co-operation relating to security; the fields of economics, science, technology, and the environment; and in humanitarian and other fields (today the OSCE's three dimensions: the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human dimension). The Final Act recognizes the indivisibility of security in Europe as well as the common interest in the development of co-operation throughout Europe. The CSCE participating States pledged to refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention or any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion against another participating State. Accordingly, they would refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities. The participating States reaffirmed their will to intensify such co-operation, irrespective of their systems. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, however, only "in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement".[32] The Final Act also recognizes the right "to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality."[33] At the same time, the Helsinki Final Act was the midwife of the civil society movement Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. Co-operation at the top encouraged opposition building in civil society. Without Helsinki, there would have been no Charter 77.

The Spirit of Helsinki during the Cold War

Even developments during the East-West conflict have been influenced by the Helsinki Final Act. For example, the principle of mutual recognition of systems stood the test of heightened tensions during the Cold War. In spite of US President Ronald Reagan's harsh rhetoric and references to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire", he and his successor George H. W. Bush conscientiously respected the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and acknowledged parity between the superpowers and different systems during their various historic summits in the nineteen-eighties.

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32   Cf. Final Act of Helsinki, cited above (Note 2), p. 4.
33   Ibid.

The Korean Case

European values cannot and should not be imposed on countries outside (or inside) the European Union. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 provides a tool and a frame for co-operation. It can provide a guiding principle for addressing other conflicts. The two Koreas have been in a state of cold war for decades. North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK) possesses nuclear weapons, South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) is protected by the nuclear umbrella of the US. The two countries have very different systems. The DPRK's conventional artillery can reach and destroy large parts of Seoul. Neither regime change nor military intervention are feasible or realistic options for the US to achieve denuclearization. Focusing on humanitarian issues, fostering economic co-operation, and most importantly, common security issues could be carried out according to the three CSCE baskets, and must begin at a low level. Old zones of economic co-operation, trade and investment must be reopened and new ones created. US sanctions on the DPRK and the stalling of demilitarization talks between the US, ROK and DPRK are major obstacles. Unifying families as a humanitarian act could be organized more frequently. Most importantly, both sides must acknowledge that their security is indivisible. War or military intervention would lead to the destruction of both countries. These steps are modest but very different to President Trump's "maximum pressure" policy.

The Iran Example

Iran has been at the centre of the political debate in both the Gulf region and transatlantic relations for almost two decades. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the most comprehensive arms control agreement in existence. It was concluded in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the US, China, Russia, UK, and France – plus Germany, together with the EU on the one side, and Iran on the other. In May 2018 the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement.

The JCPOA does not include provisions on missiles, which is of concern to the some parties to the agreement. Regional arms control negotiations could address the missile issue outside the JCPOA. In this situation, the model of CSCE arms control mechanisms could be helpful. The CSCE process was accompanied by conventional arms control negotiations (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, MBFR, and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, CFE). It should include not only Iran, but other regional powers too. For example, Saudi Arabia's missiles already have a longer range than those of Iran. Other heavy weapons could be included too: the 1990 CFE Treaty[34] could provide a model.

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34   Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 19 November 1990, available at: https://www.osce.org/library/14087.

It covers battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. The talks could be accompanied by confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), such as the exchange of military information and the prior notification of certain military activities. The provisions of the Vienna Document[35] (VD) could serve as an example.

Such talks could well take place within the framework of the Regional Dialogue Forum and the new security networks suggested by Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.[36] The European signatory states of the JCPOA could make efforts to promote such a security dialogue. As early as 1992-94, many Middle Eastern states, including Israel, were engaged in Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks.[37] They failed, however, because of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict over nuclear disarmament. The indivisibility of security of the Gulf States could be underlined by a regional non-aggression pact. It would have to include provisions on the transparency of military activities, such as the notification of large exercises and inviting one another to take part in manoeuvres and other measures aimed at building confidence.

Conclusion

Both liberal and conservative scholars in the US believe that the US should remain a world leader, stay engaged, and influence global and regional developments. Europe is not a major political factor in this US academic debate. Just as in the second half of the 19th century, today the world is witnessing the breakdown of multilateralism, the emergence of nationalistic and ethnic xenophobia, the demonization of adversaries, the depreciation of international institutions, the withdrawal of international agreements and treaties, and an arms race.

These factors amount to a slow-motion breakdown in the values that Europe holds dear: effective multilateralism, functioning international institutions, interdependence and interconnectedness, military restraint and support of peace, engaging adversaries in dialogue, common and co-operative security. Political engagement, rather than higher defence spending, offers a solution for Europe to increase its global leverage. The EU has not been very successful in engaging in international conflicts, however.

The CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975, rather than a concert of powers like that established after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, should provide a

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35   Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 30 November 2011 (first version: VD 1999).

36   Iran-proposed security architecture taken seriously: Zarif, *Tehran Times*, 21 February 2018, at: https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/421471/Iran-proposed-security-architecture-taken-seriously-Zarif.

37   Multilateral discussions on the peaceful settlement in the Middle East that took place in Madrid in 1991 resulted in the formation of a working group on arms control and regional security (ACRS). For more information, see https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/arms-control-and-regional-security-middle-east-acrs/.

model for Europe. The Final Act best expresses European values. It does not identify enemies, nor even opponents or adversaries. It calls for co-operative security and concludes that security is indivisible. The Final Act is not only a guideline to reduce the tensions in Europe, but can provide a model for other conflict areas in the world, for example the relations between the two Koreas. The EU should take its lead from the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

Vladimir F. Pryakhin

Hamburg, Forty Years Later

For the 40th Anniversary of the CSCE/OSCE Scientific Forum

In February 2020, it will be 40 years since the Scientific Forum of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was held in Hamburg. Although the Cold War escalated sharply, scientists from 35 countries participating in the pan-European process worked out recommendations for governments, many of which not only remain significant today, but even appear particularly timely and relevant. Today, scientists' warnings regarding the possible unpredictable consequences of scientific and technological progress (artificial intelligence military use, artificial prolongation of the human life span, deforestation, desertification, unlimited urbanization etc.) are becoming more and more alarming, and the indifference of politicians and diplomats towards them is increasingly obvious and intolerable.

The history of the CSCE (now Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE) is a long series of large and small events on the way to victory over the Cold War. When this victory was won, the hand on the Doomsday Clock[1] was put back seven minutes from the fatal midnight line, and many thought that the CSCE had served its purpose. The events of recent years, however, show the opposite: There is a clear need for a sober and unbiased analysis of the global situation, and a discussion on a respectful consensus basis, with no subordination of the views of one party to those of another. In this context, one of the half-forgotten, but exceptionally interesting events in the history of the CSCE, namely the Hamburg 1980 Scientific Forum, merits attention.

The decision to hold the Forum was taken at the first CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade in order to objectively analyse the global situation and challenges threatening humanity. The German delegations played a significant role in making this decision, in particular Egon Bahr, who at that time occupied a prominent position in the political hierarchy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

However, in the course of the preparatory meeting in advance of the Forum held in Bonn in 1979, the diametrically opposed goals pursued by various

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1   The Doomsday Clock was launched in 1947 by the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists", which was founded in 1945 by University of Chicago scientists who had helped develop the first atomic bomb. Periodically, the cover of the magazine features an image of the clock, with the hour and minute hands showing a few minutes before midnight. The time remaining until midnight symbolizes the tension of the international situation and the progress in the development of nuclear weapons. Midnight symbolizes the moment of a nuclear cataclysm. The decision to move or not to move the minute hand is made every year by the Bulletin's Science and Security Board in consultation with its Board of Sponsors.

parties had already come to light as they prepared to send their representatives to Hamburg. For the United States and its NATO allies, the Forum was designed to be exclusively related to the "third basket" of the Helsinki Final Act (co-operation in the humanitarian and other fields), and was to be used primarily to promote the ideas of free scientific creativity and unhindered exchanges between scientists. The Kremlin, however, was inclined to view the Forum as related to the "second basket" (co-operation in the field of economics, of science and technology, and of the environment), designed to help overcome the technological gap between the USSR and Western countries that became apparent at the beginning of the 1980s.

Besides the main political forces that determined the atmosphere and character of the Hamburg Forum, however, there was also the world academic community. They saw the Hamburg Forum not as a place for opportunistic debates, but as an occasion to freely exchange views with colleagues on global problems and the prospects for the development of civilization in the context of globalization.

On the eve of the Forum in December 1979, the global political situation became even more aggravated due to Soviet troops' invasion of Afghanistan. Two weeks later, the Soviet leadership decided to exile Andrei Sakharov, a nuclear scientist with a worldwide reputation, to Gorky, which caused legitimate indignation both within the broader scientific community and beyond. Letters of protest against the persecution of scientists and fighters for peace streamed into the Kremlin.

Under these conditions, there was a real danger that the Hamburg Forum would be disrupted. On Capitol Hill, there was growing support for rejecting the very idea of a scientists' meeting due to fears that it could be used by Moscow to feed Soviet researchers with information about the latest scientific achievements of the US and its allies. At the same time, the Soviet decision-making bodies were seriously questioning whether they should go to Hamburg if the Forum was likely to be used to criticize Moscow's human rights policy.

At a meeting in the Soviet Foreign Ministry on this issue, one of the leading designers of the USSR's position on the pan-European process, Ambassador Alexander Belonogov, asked a question that was crucial to the Forum's fate: Would the event take place in Hamburg if Soviet scientists did not attend? After some silence, the experts replied that the Forum would still take place without Soviet scientists and Soviet diplomats, and the USSR would not be able to prevent the publication of materials condemning the Kremlin's position on both Afghanistan and Sakharov on behalf of the CSCE. Consequently, they had to go to Hamburg in order to hinder the adoption of anti-Soviet documents.

At the same time, prominent renowned Soviet scholars in the field of natural sciences were included in the delegation. Among them were academics who were well known in the West: Evgeny Velikhov, Mikhail Styrikovich, Anatoly Dorodnitsyn, and Alexey Sozinov, amongst others. Instead of Jermen Gvishiani, son-in-law of the head of the Soviet government and known for his

proximity to the Kremlin, and therefore politically vulnerable, it was Nikolai Blokhin, an oncologist with a worldwide reputation, who was appointed as head of the Soviet delegation. Thus, the two greatest delegations at the Forum, those from the USSR and the US, were headed by an oncologist and the President of the US National Academy of Sciences, Philip Handler, who was fatally ill with cancer. The fact that Blokhin was a native of the Gorky Region and had for a long time worked in the city of Gorky – the place where Andrey Sakharov was exiled – certainly played a role in his selection.

The US candidates for Hamburg faced similar problems. They certainly wanted to attend in order to talk with their Soviet colleagues and exchange views on the subjects of their research, but some decision-makers in the US opposed scientific exchanges because they feared the USSR would learn about the achievements of American scientists in the field of technology. By that time, the US advantage in developing a new type of nuclear warhead delivery system – cruise missiles with high-tech computer software – had become a tangible one, which the decision makers in the Kremlin well understood.

This contradiction between the professional interests of scientists and the fears of political decision-makers was reflected in the statements of the head of the American delegation, Philip Handler. In seeking a positive decision on a trip to Hamburg, at a joint hearing before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of the Committee on Science and Technology, the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held on 31 January 1980, he stated: "We will go to Hamburg, not because, as scientists, we need this opportunity to talk shop. That never was the case from the time the forum was first discussed. The scientific agenda is but another opportunity and catalyst for discussion of enhanced international cooperation and of the status of the human rights of scientists. And we know that there are delegates from other Western countries who feel quite as strongly as do we."[2]

This statement helped to overcome the doubts of some congressional representatives about the appropriateness of American scientists participating in the Forum. All doubts were thus dispelled, and on 18 February 1980, scientists from 35 countries met in Hamburg. As expected, political officers and professional diplomats from all delegations very soon turned the plenary sessions of the Forum into a venue for a collision of directly opposing assessments of the global political situation. It seemed that the scientists became the hostages of their political puppeteers.

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2   The Helsinki Forum and East-West Scientific Exchange, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of the Committee of Science and Technology and the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, January 31, 1980 [No. 89] (Committee on Science and Technology), Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology and the Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 1980, p. 101.

Nevertheless, in the working groups of the Forum, the scholars managed to bring the discussion round to professional issues. Of course, there was an understanding among Western academics and among their Eastern colleagues that the actions of the Soviet government against Andrei Sakharov and other dissidents in the USSR were not only illegal and immoral, but also politically shortsighted and clumsy. However, neither the Soviet scientists nor their colleagues from Eastern European countries had the opportunity to state this openly.

One episode in the working group on food and agriculture was a classic case. The author of this contribution was involved in drafting the final document of this group. Initially, the text included provisions on the need to respect human rights and civil liberties. The experts "guilty" of this "mistake" were severely criticized. Ultimately, these provisions were still included in the text of the final document, despite initially being blocked by political officers of the Soviet delegation.

Admittedly, Moscow did not use all available opportunities to counteract Western propaganda. Even before the Forum, in a democratic Belgium, the gerontologist known as the "vitamin doctor" Herman Le Compte was fined and imprisoned for his bold predictions and ideas about the possibilities of artificially increasing human life expectancy. The Soviet delegation did not use this fact, apparently because, in comparison with Andrei Sakharov, Le Compte's personality seemed excessively eccentric. Just as in the case of Sakharov in the USSR, in the West, all accusations against Le Compte were subsequently disavowed by the European Court of Human Rights, and the verdict of the national court, on the basis of which he was imprisoned, was declared unlawful. The Belgian authorities pledged to pay the victim 77,000 francs in compensation.

Meanwhile, the Forum was in full swing. Meeting with their long-standing acquaintances, scientists from different countries, naturally, could not escape their professional issues and expressed concern regarding the increasingly acute global problems – environmental pollution, population explosion, energy and food shortages, urbanization, etc. The Swedish representatives were particularly active, insisting on including recommendations on the need to increase attention to the safety of nuclear power stations in the final document.

Twenty years later, the Executive Secretary of the Forum, a German scientist and diplomat, Professor Klaus Gottstein, correctly described the atmosphere of the concluding part of the Forum: "All along it was doubtful whether it would be possible to reach consensus on a final report of the Forum. Surprisingly, consensus was reached after all. A list of concrete proposals for co-operation was produced. Western scientists, after having expressed their dismay at Soviet violation of human rights, and Eastern scientists, after having dutifully repudiated these reproaches with accusations of their own, were at

last united in their desire for an improvement in international co-operation in science."[3]

Gottstein rightly pointed out that this success was greatly promoted by the "congenial atmosphere" created by the German organizers of the Forum. Thanks to their efforts, it was possible to salvage something like "a serious scientific enterprise"[4] from a political squabble. But knowing the situation from the other side, the author of this contribution is of the opinion that the Soviet delegation did not deviate in the least from the instructions from the Kremlin, ordering them to give their consent to the text of a constructive final document, provided that there were no allusions to Sakharov and Afghanistan. As a result of two weeks of discussions, a document that did not contain any politically controversial statements, and no mention of Sakharov or Afghanistan, was born. Although it was with these words that Philip Handler completed his speech at the Forum.[5]

On the other hand, however, the text included actual recommendations on a number of practical issues. In particular, in Annex 1: Alternative Energy Sources, it was stated: "All aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle will require continuing efforts to assure its full reliability and safety, in order to ensure public acceptability."[6]

Unfortunately, what should have been a guide for action for governments (primarily that of the USSR) in practice turned out to be nothing more than a gloomy and accurate forecast: The Chernobyl tragedy affected Sweden in particular, whose delegation was especially persistent in promoting this provision in the text of the Hamburg Forum Report. Should this sad lesson not finally lead us to appropriate conclusions? It must surely now be the time to follow the scientists' warnings regarding the dangerous exacerbation of new challenges and threats associated with the triumphal march of globalization and the spread of the achievements of the technological revolution.

In the forty years since the Hamburg Forum, the world's population has almost doubled, from 4.35 billion to 7.7 billion. At the same time, the ethno-demographic structure of the population has changed dramatically. Such transformations are fraught with increasing conflict and the danger of war. Despite the deterioration in the international situation in February 1980, the hand on the Doomsday Clock showed seven minutes to twelve. In 2019, it stood at only two minutes from the fatal midnight line. The risk of a thermonuclear catastrophe has not been so great since 1953. This is due not only to an escalation in

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3   Klaus Gottstein, Catastrophes and Conflicts: Scientific Approaches to Their Control, Aldershot 1999, p. 221
4   Ibid.
5   Cf. Statement of Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences, before the Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Subcommittee on International Security an Scientific Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology, 31 January 1980, in: The Helsinki Forum and East-West Scientific Exchange, cited above (Note 2), pp. 102-105, here: p. 105.
6   Report of the "Scientific Forum" of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Hamburg, 3 March 1980, p. 5, available at: https://www.osce.org/eea/14068.

the confrontation between global nuclear powers, but also to the general unpredictability of the development of the international situation and the weakening of the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Over the same forty years, measured in terms of the earth's ecological carrying capacity, humanity worldwide exceeded the permissible load as early as the mid-1980s; at the beginning of the 21st century, the ecological footprint of humanity is now almost 50 per cent higher than the environmentally compatible level.[7] According to the UN, "there is alarming evidence that important tipping points, leading to irreversible changes in major ecosystems and the planetary climate system, may already have been reached or passed. Ecosystems as diverse as the Amazon rainforest and the Arctic tundra, may be approaching thresholds of dramatic change through warming and drying. Mountain glaciers are in alarming retreat and the downstream effects of reduced water supply in the driest months will have repercussions that transcend generations."[8] To restore the ecological balance, it is necessary, according to estimates by Swiss scientists, to immediately plant young trees on an area equal to the territory of the United States.[9]

However, even before the gloomy predictions in the context of human interaction with nature can come true, people are more at risk of destroying each other in social and interethnic conflicts due to the frightening growth rates of socio-economic disharmony.

Rising inequality leads to escalations in tension. The measure of inequality within the world community usually takes the ratio of the incomes of 20 per cent of the world population living in the richest countries to those of the 20 per cent in the poorest countries. In 1980, this index was about 40; by the beginning of the twenty-first century, it had doubled. To date, according to experts at the authoritative Oxfam fund, almost 82 per cent of the world's wealth was owned by just one per cent of the world's population. At the same time, from 2016 to 2017, the number of billionaires grew unprecedentedly, which, according to experts, indicates not a flourishing economy, but a collapse of the economic order.[10] The dynamics of the corresponding model make it possible to predict the social "explosion of history" in 2022-2025. This calculation coincides with the forecast of the Club of Rome in the 1960s.

The pace of all aspects of human activity increased dramatically in the last century. This means that natural physical limits of vital activity will be

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7   Cf. Lebensqualität dank Ressourceneffizienz [Quality of life thanks to resource efficiency], Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 May 2012, at: https://www.nzz.ch/lebensqualitaet-dank-ressourceneffizienz-1.16896799.

8   United Nations, Climate Change, at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climate-change/.

9   Cf. How trees could save the climate, *Science Daily*, 4 July 2019, at: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/07/190704191350.htm.

10   Richest one per cent bagged 82 per cent of wealth created last year – poorest half of humanity got nothing. Cf. Oxfam International, 22 January 2018, at: https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2018-01-22/richest-1-percent-bagged-82-percent-wealth-created-last-year.

reached by the middle of this one. An example could be the improvements in the field of weapons technology, which has the potential to destroy life on earth several times over. According Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine, upon reaching this point of bifurcation, any dynamic system, including humanity, must undergo some qualitative transformations (transitions to a new stage of development) – or face collapse.[11]

Under these circumstances, politicians and diplomats alone cannot find the way to ensure the sustainable development of the world community. In 2000, the Millennium Summit adopted the United Nations "Millennium Development Goals" programme, which included eight goals to be reached by 2015.[12] None of those goals was achieved. Sustainable development remains only a dream of the global intellectual elite. The picture of contemporary international relations is increasingly beginning to resemble quarrel between children, arguing over who has the most matches while standing in a puddle of petrol. With regard to all of this, remembering the 1980 Hamburg Forum is not nostalgia for the past when the international community managed to put an end to the old Cold War, but as an incentive for a scientifically based search for a way out of the impasse of a new one.

There is a need for a new Scientific Forum as an opportunity for the international academic community to elaborate a clear and reasonable forecast for humanity's development in this century, and to paint a reliable picture of the challenges that threaten our civilization.

For the sake of survival, the OSCE should give this opportunity to the scientific community to address the entire world community – without political intermediaries – with a clear-cut appeal for unification under a democratic global governance. It is necessary to put an end to the dangerous delusion that the fourth industrial revolution is no different from the first three, and that the twenty-first century is the same as all other centuries in the history of mankind. The information technology revolution, or the convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science known as the NBIC-convergence, made us far more different from our ancestors than they themselves differed from our common ancient forebears.

Scientists have long recognized that technological advancement goes hand in hand with mankind's own destruction. For example, the great Italian physicist Enrico Fermi theorized that technological advances should make interstellar travel possible, and remarked on the puzzling absence of extra-terrestrial visitors on earth in the light of this observation. One possible explanation is that we are still not developed enough in technological terms, and they – our extra-terrestrial brothers – destroy themselves as soon as they reach this level of development. It is worth mentioning that the huge Hubble radio telescope,

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11   Ilya Prigogine/Isabelle Stengers, Order out of chaos: Man's new dialogue with nature, London 1984.
12   Cf.. United Nations, Millennium Summit (6-8 September 2000), at: https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/millennium_summit.shtml.

which allowed us to probe the most distant segments of the universe in search of alien life, was created exactly at a time when the danger of a thermonuclear conflict between the USSR and the US was especially high.

However, the designation of danger should not be the evidence of its inevitability. There is no fatality in global threats and challenges. They can be pre-empted, eliminated. Humans can survive and global civilization can continue. German philosopher Karl Jaspers indicated that Homo sapiens would not be able to survive in the conditions of a technological revolution if he did not transform himself.[13] The knowledge of the mechanisms of artificial intelligence allows individuals to transform themselves, to create, instead of Homo sapiens, a new material carrier of the mind. What will this new material carrier be, its ideals and motives for existence? To address these questions, a systemic programme (goal-setting) is required. Such a programme cannot be worked out by a layperson or even by a highly educated, enlightened politician, and should not be any ordinary prognosis, of which we already have plenty. As Einstein famously said: "I want to know God's thoughts – the rest are mere details."[14] To elaborate such a programme would require comprehensive, systemic, synergistic brainstorming by a team of competent and ethically impeccable scientists. Only such a team could correctly evaluate the place of our civilization, and the future of mankind and of the planet.

The paradigm of views presented by Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Vladimir Vernadsky, Alexandr Chizhevsky, and Nikolai Fedorov offered a systemic, albeit schematic, presentation of such goal setting. Their world view, known nowadays as "Russian cosmism", promised eternal life and unification now and for all. Their guiding principle – "to turn all instruments of destruction into instruments of salvation"[15] – could also find resonance today. Their ideas are indeed also used by "transhumanists", who, however, emphasize the achievement of technological benefits for people in the future – an ideology which is mainly attractive to oligarchs who pay billions of US dollars to hire "biohackers" to put into practice their dream of individual immortality. Incidentally, one of the leaders of modern transhumanism, Zoltan Istvan, even ran in the 2016 US presidential election campaign and is planning to repeat his attempt in 2020.

These are all interesting issues for scientific discussion about the future of mankind, but even by stating them, we arrive at the answer to one central question: Is our civilization doomed to self-destruction, or does it have a chance of survival and continuation?

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13 Cf. Karl Jaspers, Philosophie und Welt, Reden und Aufsätze (Philosophy and the World: Selected Essays), Munich 1963, p. 133.
14# BBC, Part 1: Einstein's Unfinished Symphony, 17 September 2014, at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/sn/tvradio/programmes/horizon/einstein_symphony_prog_summary.shtml.
15 George M. Young, Jr., Toward the New Millennium: Ideas of Resurrection in Fedorov and Solov'ev, in: James P. Scanlan (ed.), *Russian Thought after Communism: The Recovery of a Philosophical Heritage*, New York 2015, pp. 62-73, here: p. 66.

An authoritative positive answer to this question from the international academic community would be an important factor in the process of building a new harmonious world order, freed from political rivalry for spheres of influence, markets, and sources of energy. The new Scientific Forum should bring together academic voices across this divide, defining both the advantages and the pitfalls of technological advances overall, as well as opening up debate on more specific topics and pressing issues such as climate change, nuclear and chemical weapons and artificial intelligence.

In 1947, Albert Einstein called for the creation of such a world order in his famous open letter to the United Nations.[16] This world order should be based on raising the level of global governance. Unfortunately, the ambition of some states to extend their spheres of influence and the opposition of other states to the limitation of their sovereignty have served as obstacles to raising this level up to now.

Approached by the academic community, the issue of global governance loses its political content and is filled with functional significance as a means for the survival of the international community and humanity in an unprecedented scientific and technological revolution. The role of the OSCE in raising this issue is unique, since for the first time in world history, at the Scientific Forum, the CSCE made human rights a higher priority than the national sovereignty of states. This was a first important step towards realizing the dream of the world's best minds regarding democratic global governance.

From the nostalgic memories of forty years ago, it follows that the time has come for the second Hamburg Scientific Forum. However, it should be remembered that one of the most pressing issues in the preparation of the first Hamburg Forum was the question of the status of the participants, and whether they could take part in the discussion in their personal capacity. This question is far from procedural. Truth is born in a scientific dispute only when scientists express their point of view, regardless of any external influences. Scientists should not be held hostage by political ideology, and it is only under these conditions that a Second Hamburg Forum could be the starting point for the sustainable development of the international community.

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16   Cf. When Albert Einstein Championed the Creation of a One World Government (1945), *Open Culture*, 6 September 2017, at: http://www.openculture.com/2017/09/when-albert-einstein-championed-the-creation-of-a-one-world-government-1945.html.

The OSCE Participating States:
Domestic Developments and Multilateral Commitment

Ekaterina Dorodnova

The Great Expectations of the Armenian Revolution: Democracy v. Stability?

Introduction

The purpose of this contribution is to explore and discuss one of the most remarkable developments in Armenia over the course of the past two years. Unlike many other incidents that shattered stability in the country following independence, the non-violent yet revolutionary events of April 2018 reverberated positively not only in Armenia, but far beyond its borders too.

One and a half years later, the peaceful transition of power in Armenia is still largely regarded as an undeniable achievement in democracy-building. In many ways, it did exceed the most optimistic expectations of domestic and international observers. However, deeply-rooted and systemic challenges in ensuring the country's security and resilience are mounting, and many remain unresolved despite the high expectations placed on the new authorities.

Given the rapid pace, complexity, and uncertainty of these developments, this contribution reviews the most relevant events that unfolded during and after the revolution, and the most likely further scenarios.

Mobilization and Non-Violence Beyond Expectation

The world applauded the Armenians for the non-violent transfer of power in April-May 2018, known as the "Velvet Revolution" or "the Revolution of Love and Solidarity".[1] Without a single shot being fired, on 23 April 2018, former president-turned-prime minister Serzh Sargsyan handed the reins of power to Nikol Pashinyan after a decade in power. Pashinyan was a former journalist and political prisoner-turned-opposition MP, and an exceptionally charismatic and talented revolutionary leader. Who could have thought that a protest march by the politically marginal Pashinyan and a handful of protesters – triggered by Sargsyan's move to run for prime minister once his second presidential term expired[2] – would result in an almost total popular mobilization in

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1   Cf. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Press release: Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan delivers speech at UN General Assembly, 26 September 2018, at: https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/09/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-speech/.

2   Cf. Richard Giragossian, Armenia 2018: Political Transformation & Transition, A Summary Political Assessment, RSC Regional Studies Center, Yerevan, Armenia, 22 January 2018, at: https://regional-studies.org/images/pr/2018/january/22/RSC_Armenia_Political_Assessment_January_2018.pdf.

only two weeks, with the financial involvement of the Armenian diaspora around the world?

The international community was certainly taken by surprise; so were the old authorities and, most likely, Pashinyan and his closest support circles themselves. The Armenian revolution, in that sense, exceeded all expectations – both in terms of the scale of mobilization, the social composition, and the geography of the protest movement, which covered the whole country and involved many women and young people, and in terms of the response from the ruling elite, who chose not to resort to the use of force. Whether their restraint was due to the approaching Genocide Remembrance Day on 24 April, traditionally a day to mark national unification, their unwillingness to compromise relations with the West, which had given clear signals it would not tolerate the use of force,[3] the lack of clear encouragement from the country's main strategic ally Russia,[4] or the hope for maintaining power through other channels, there was no crackdown on the tens of thousands of protestors. Instead, Sargsyan peacefully resigned.

This puts the situation in Armenia in stark contrast to what was going on, for example, in Nicaragua at roughly the same time, where mass demonstrations led President Ortega to order the massacre of hundreds of peaceful protestors. The recent situation in Venezuela where President Nicolás Maduro's regime resorted to violence, and the situation in Sudan at the time of writing, where military forces cracked down on democratic protestors in Khartoum, killing scores of innocent people, also demonstrate Armenia's great achievement in not losing a single life during the revolutionary events of 2018.

The protesters behaved peacefully throughout the protest marches, turning them into near festivities, with some of the leaders of the movement claiming to have drawn inspiration from the theory and practice of non-violent civil disobedience as taught by Martin Luther King and Mahatma Ghandi. All of this in Armenia, which does have a history of forceful dispersal of rallies and suppression of opposition. The most tragic event of this nature, and the one Armenian society has not come to terms with, occurred on 1 March 2008, when ten people lost their lives as a result of a government crackdown amid street protests over the contested elections that brought Sargsyan to power the first time around. Pashinyan was a prominent opposition figure then, supporting Sargsyan's rival, Armenia's first president Levon Ter-Petrosyan. He was sentenced for inciting mass disorder and spent two years in prison. The violence of 1 March 2008 – extremely traumatic for a small and united Armenia – also had remarkable political ramifications, seen by many as setting the political

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3   Statement by the Delegation of the European Union and EU Member State Embassies in Armenia on recent political developments in Armenia, Yerevan, 19 April 2018, at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/rwanda/43169/statement-delegation-european-union-and-eu-member-state-embassies-armenia-recent-political_en.

4   Cf. "Pochemu Moskva dolzhna vmeshivatsya?" ["Why Should Moscow Interfere?"], *Armenia Sputnik*, 23 April 2019, at: https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/society/20180423/11635410/pochemu-moskva-dolzhna-vmeshivatsya-peskov-o-protestah-v-armenia.html.

price for retaining or gaining power in the country. For years, this anticipated "price" was among the issues that derailed any serious attempt at mobilizing the public for change.

A Purely Armenian Revolution

Observers of other revolutions and power shifts in the post-Soviet space may also have expected a geopolitical twist to the Armenian revolution – after all, in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as in Moldova, it was all about the "integration vector". Corruption and lack of economic progress were associated with maintaining close ties with Russia, whereas democratic reforms, greater freedoms and economic prosperity meant working together with the European Union (EU). There was no such divide in Armenia at all with no expression of geopolitical preferences and no hailing of foreign flags. People rallied under Armenian flags, defending a purely domestic agenda – they mobilized on an anti-corruption platform, expressing indignation with the situation in which the country's wealth had been concentrated in the hands of a few privileged individuals closely linked to the ruling elite, with the rest of the population hardly making ends meet.[5] "Democracy is a system of values for our society, internal belief, not geopolitical orientation"[6] was the message Pashinyan sent repeatedly to Armenia's international partners.

The absence of EU flags may be explained by the lack of a clear pro-EU discourse in the country. Such a discourse would represent an alternative to Armenia's strategic alliance with Russia and its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). This is particularly relevant in view of the fact that in 2013, Armenia unexpectedly and virtually at the last minute rejected the fully negotiated Association Agreement with the EU, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The leaders of the revolution consciously sought not to antagonize Russia in this context.

On the other hand, it was evident that Russia would not proactively support any sort of upheaval in Armenia. Contrary to widely held expectations, Russia also chose not to intervene with visible attempts to reverse the revolution, despite having a credible candidate in place. In spite of the general unease with the revolutionary changes, the recognition of Armenia's inexorable dependence on Russia most likely contributed to this surprising "laissez-faire". Russia chose not to alienate Armenia, which generally remains friendly compared to some other former USSR Republics, for example, despite periodic

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5   Armenia was among the three poorest countries in Europe in 2018 according to GDP per capita; cf. Poorest Countries In Europa, Graphicmaps, at: https://www.graphicmaps.com/poorest-countries-in-europe (last updated on 10 October 2018). Armenia was also facing one of the highest brain drain rates among the former USSR Republics.
6   Democracy is value, not geopolitical orientation: Pashinyan tells Johannes Hahn, News.am, 29 January 2019, at: https://news.am/eng/news/493341.html.

outrages against the sales of arms to Azerbaijan or instances of violent behaviour by the Russian military stationed in Armenia. It was, therefore, in Russia's interest not to create a new hotspot in its neighbourhood and run the risk of losing control over its main ally in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, Moscow sent a clear message that it was inadmissible to escalate the situation at the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh during the days of internal instability in Yerevan.

Another assumption might be that, unlike Moldova and Ukraine, Armenia is a highly ethnically homogeneous society, consolidated around national values such as language and religion. Although Russian is widely spoken as a second language, there is only a very marginal Russian-speaking minority present in the country, constituting less than one per cent.[7] Armenian society may be divided politically and socially, but not ethnically, which means there is a limited basis for propagandistic "kin" minority mobilization on Russia's part. These factors arguably contributed to the consolidation of the mass movement under patriotic pro-Armenian slogans and the absence of any sentiments of third-country affiliation.

The Unexpected Fruits of Democracy

Serzh Sargsyan's expectations with regard to the constitutional changes of 2015 did not seem to materialize. The sweeping reform transformed Armenia from a semi-presidential into a parliamentary republic and was widely believed to have been initiated to give him an opportunity to stay in power as prime minister beyond the decade of his presidential term.[8] Even a public promise not to seek the post of prime minister did not entirely convince the Armenian population – the constitutional amendments were adopted in the national referendum of December 2015, but not without a significant number of electoral violations.[9]

In what may have been perceived as a desperate attempt to cling to power, Sargsyan broke on his promise and was elected by the Republican-dominated Parliament on 17 April 2018 amid public protests. This proved to be the final straw, triggering what became the Velvet Revolution. Within just a week, Sargsyan was forced to resign by the burgeoning movement led by Pashinyan.

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7   According to the 2011 Armenian Census 23,484 people or 0.8 per cent of Armenia's citizens spoke Russian as their first language, 11,862 of the speakers were Armenians, 10,466 speakers were Russians, and the other 1,156 were of other ethnicities. Cf. Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, The Results of the 2011 Population Census of the Republic of Armenia, p. 595, at: https://www.armstat.am/en/?nid=81&id=1512.

8   Cf. Zia Weise, Armenia's disputed move toward true democracy, Politico, 4 June 2018, at: https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-true-democracy-disputed-move-eu-agreement-turkey/ .

9   Cf. OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Armenia, Constitutional Referendum, 6 December 2015, OSCE/ODIHR Referendum Expert Team, Final Report, Warsaw, 5 February 2016, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/220656.

In a system of nuanced control over political players and groups, and of tolerated harmless protests, it remains unknown how much the authorities knew about Pashinyan's plans and at what point the miscalculation brought them to the point of no return.

Only two weeks after Sargsyan's resignation, that same National Assembly elected Nikol Pashinyan as interim prime minister, under the same constitution (albeit in a second attempt, on 8 May 2018). From the legal point of view, everything was done democratically and in accordance with the amended constitution – the one crafted for Serzh Sargsyan. Such a democratic turnaround was clearly beyond the expectations of the Republican Party. This would probably not have happened, had Sargsyan not run for election himself, but left the role of prime minister to the then incumbent Moscow-connected Karen Karapetyan whom he had personally hand-picked, and who had a Karabakhi background. Relatively young, charismatic, experienced, and supported by the Kremlin, Karapetyan seemed popular and ideally positioned to continue the path of slow and largely imitational reforms that would help retain relative stability.

Furthermore, as a result of a transparent and democratic process, snap parliamentary elections were held on 9 December 2018. Pashinyan's My Step Alliance secured over 70 per cent of the vote, while the Republican Party (RPA) did not make it into parliament at all. Ironically, had they not blocked the amendments prepared by the new government's working group in order to make the electoral legislation more credible, transparent, and democratic, the threshold to enter parliament would have been lowered from five per cent to four per cent and the RPA would have been represented.[10] However, they lost the opportunity for even marginal representation.

The fact that the outcome of the early elections reflects the will of the people is beyond doubt, confirmed by observers. According to the International Elections Observation Mission (IOEM), they "were held with respect for fundamental freedoms and enjoyed broad public trust that needs to be preserved through further electoral reforms".[11] Overall, in stark contrast with all previous elections held in Armenia since independence, the 9 December early elections were characterized by a general absence of electoral malfeasance, good administration, and general adherence to procedures.[12] This marked a fundamental change in the electoral culture of Armenia and brought a breath of fresh air into the overall internal political context. Although the electoral

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10   OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Armenia, Early Parliamentary Elections, 9 December 2018, ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Final Report, Warsaw, 7 March 2019, p. 26, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/413555.

11   International Election Observation Mission, Republic of Armenia – Early Parliamentary Elections, 9 December 2018. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, p. 1, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/405890. For the election day, the ODIHR Election Observation Mission (EOM) was joined by delegations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Parliament to form the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM).

12   Cf. ibid.

legislation and practices still need to be revised and improved, the opportunity to cast votes freely, with no vote-buying or other kinds of pressure as in the past, was uplifting for Armenian citizens and inspired the international community.

The 132-member National Assembly significantly differs from the previous legislature in terms of political representation. With 76.5 per cent first-time MPs, it has only three party groups, with the largest My Step Alliance occupying 88 of the seats (two thirds of MPs). Prosperous Armenia won 26 seats (19.7 per cent) and Bright Armenia won 18 (13.6 per cent). 24 per cent of MPs are female. In line with the constitution, the four largest national minorities are represented in parliament with one seat each. The National Assembly formed eleven Standing Committees, eight of which are chaired by My Step Alliance MPs, two by Prosperous Armenia and one by Bright Armenia representatives. An unprecedented number of civil society representatives are now members of parliament.[13]

Prosperous Armenia, led by one of the wealthiest tycoons, was part of the previous ruling regime for almost a decade, but switched camps and supported Pashinyan at a crucial moment of his movement. Bright Armenia, once in an alliance with Pashinyan, however, did not stand by him at the onset of the revolution and bears the fruits of this decision with marginal representation in Parliament. Both opposition parties have carefully distanced themselves from the ousted authorities and claim allegiance to the revolution. In spite of this, the former ties may be easy to restore as soon as the popular support for Pashinyan declines. At the same time, the My Step Alliance in power is struggling to establish itself as the political party of the "new generation". Speaking at the party congress on 23 June 2019, Nikol Pashinyan said the party did not espouse any of the traditional political ideologies but "has rejected 'isms' because hardened ideologies no longer exist in the contemporary world […] In the political sense, we are not liberal, we are not centrist, we are not social democrat; we are a civil party. […] What does this mean? […] This means that we place ourselves beyond ideological standards and we are forming a new ideological plane which is based on four key pillars: statehood, citizenship, national identity and personality."[14]

The process leading up to the snap elections and formation of the stable (rather than interim) new government and parliament can be characterized as rather successful, despite the attempts of parliament, dominated by the former ruling party, to sabotage the new authorities between May and December 2018. For example, on 2 October 2018 there was an attempt to sabotage the prospect

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13   Cf. New Armenia's Parliamentarians, EVN Report, 13 January 2019, at: https://www.evnreport.com/politics/new-armenia-s-parliamentarians.
14   Pashinyan Explains Party Ideology, The Armenian Mirror Spectator, 20 June 2019, at: https://mirrorspectator.com/2019/06/20/pashinyan-explains-party-ideology/.

of snap elections, as the "old guard" mobilized resources to undermine Pashinyan – an attempt that was quickly neutralized.[15]

Democratic reforms planned by the new government are reflected in the five-year government programme adopted on 8 February 2019 as well as in the roadmap for the implementation of the Armenia-EU Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) adopted on 1 June 2019. CEPA, signed in November 2017, has been recognized by the new Armenian government as the blueprint for reform. While Armenia's general geopolitical orientation has not changed due to the revolution, with Russia remaining the country's main strategic ally, there is certainly a genuine openness to embracing European values and further diversifying foreign policy. Engagement with Europe has intensified beyond expectation, bearing in mind the disappointment of 2013.

Democracy-Building Challenges

However, the great expectations that the new authorities would achieve quick gains, especially in the fight against corruption and serving justice in the 1 March 2008 case mentioned above, did not materialize as quickly as planned. The immediate efforts to eradicate corruption were directed at high-profile individuals against whom criminal cases were initiated and whose illegally acquired assets were partially recovered and returned to the state budget, with varying success. The realization of the need to build a more institutionalized and systemic approach to this fight came later, and found expression in the new Anti-Corruption Strategy adopted towards the end of 2019 that envisaged a Corruption Prevention Commission and an Anti-Corruption Court. While the initial ad hoc approach scored the prime minister many points in terms of consolidating popular support, the systemic fight meant putting in place reinforced legislation and dedicated institutions aimed at tackling corruption in all fields, including the judiciary.

Investigation into the 1 March 2008 violence was regarded as a top priority by the new authorities. Shortly after they came to power, in the summer of 2018, an arrest warrant was issued against Armenia's second president Robert Kocharyan, who was placed into pre-trial detention on charges of overthrowing the country's constitutional order while exercising his role as head of state. It soon became obvious that the numerous legal, political, and emotional factors at play put the effectiveness of this measure and its timing into question. Thus, on 17 May 2019, Kocharyan was released under the guarantee of the

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15   On 2 October 2018, the National Assembly, still dominated by the Republican Party, convened an extraordinary session and adopted a draft law, according to which a National Assembly session would be considered interrupted if external forces prevented the session from taking place. Prime Minister Pashinyan called on the people to gather in front of the parliament building, quickly summoning a few thousand protestors. The bill did not survive and ministers belonging to parties that voted in favour – Prosperous Armenia and ARF-D – were subsequently dismissed.

then incumbent "president" of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) Bako Sahakyan, and his predecessor Arkady Gukasyan. Kocharyan had been the leader of the NKR from 1994 to 1997, prior to becoming president of Armenia. The decision to release him infuriated Nikol Pashinyan, who called for a return to the revolutionary means of resistance and asked the people to block all court buildings in the country. This approach caused an outcry in the civil society and the international community, but it also revealed the inherent problems in the long-defunct, unreformed and untargeted judiciary, and the difficulties in addressing them.

The crisis finally led to the conceptualization of the long-overdue large-scale justice reform that involves checking the integrity of judges. However, it also revealed the limits of the room for manoeuvre in the existing constitution for pursuing certain honourable goals in the justice sector. Moreover, it allowed the opposition to consolidate around the figure of Kocharyan and criticize the prime minister for engaging in personal revenge (Kocharyan was re-arrested shortly after). The ensuing attempts to alter the composition of the Constitutional Court, proposing the resignation of the judges appointed under the old regime, raised questions with international organizations, and revealed some gaps in the government's communication strategy. The deterioration of the government's relations with the Nagorno-Karabakh elite, and of Armenia-Russia relations (Kocharyan being a friend of the Russian president) also followed. In addition, radical right-wing groups started raising their heads in attempts to undermine the authorities by playing on conservative, male chauvinistic and homophobic sentiments in society.

Nevertheless, in spite of a number of miscalculations and belated reactions, one and a half years after his accession to power, Nikol Pashinyan still enjoys broad, albeit declining, public support:[16] People surround him wherever he goes, expressing respect and appreciation. However, the burden of problems inherited by the new authorities – including the challenges of good governance, economic underperformance, brain drain, external regional interests and, most importantly, the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh – pose serious questions as to the sustainability of the gains of the unique and impressive Armenian revolution and its impact on security and stability, both internal and external. Combined with exceptionally high expectations among citizens regarding improvements in their well-being, the new authorities are under extreme pressure to deliver on all fronts in a volatile situation that is far from stable.

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16 Two major blows have hit Pashinyan. In the regions, his party lost local elections in Kapan on 23 September 2018, and later in Abovyan on 13 June 2019, where the Republican Party and the Prosperous Armenia Party retained their respective positions of power. However, Pashinyan declared this the triumph of democracy and did not call the results into question. A recent opinion poll by the Centre for Insights in Survey Research illustrates his public popularity further; cf. International Republican Institute (IRI), Center for Insights in Survey Research, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia, July 23-August 15, 2018, p. 49, at: https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018.10.9_armenia_poll_presentation.pdf.

The fear of "rocking the boat" in a country weakened by a protracted conflict was actively cultivated by the former authorities, who instilled the notion of an inverse relationship between democracy and stability, which has become a synonym for security. Success in building stability appeared to be undeniable, as deeply entrenched corruption had in a way consolidated the closely-knit Armenian society. At the same time, the pro-forma democracy and freedom of expression were retained, allowing occasional opportunities for "letting off steam", thus preventing major outbursts of public indignation. Needless to say, the ruling party's near total control over the judicial and the legislative branches of government, in addition to the executive, ensured an almost unquestionable obedience. In addition, widespread poverty meant that daily survival was the primary concern of the majority of the citizens; questioning authority played a secondary role. Widespread corruption and money laundering thrived against this background, and migration was seen as the first choice in escaping inequality and despair, as well as the obligatory military service in the circumstances of an unresolved conflict.

In fact, Serzh Sargsyan's main argument for standing for election as prime minister following constitutional transition, and for breaking his earlier promise not to stand, was based on his long-term experience as chief negotiator with Azerbaijan, maintaining a security partnership with Russia and personal connections to Karabakh. It was argued that if he was no longer chief negotiator, war would be inevitable, as nobody could replace him.

The former authorities have also maintained close personal and, allegedly, business ties with Russia – the only hard security guarantor for the vulnerable Armenia. With a major military base in Gyumri, Russia exercises effective border control on the Armenia-Iran segment of the state border, has observation posts along the closed border with Turkey, exercises joint border control with Armenia at Zvartnots international airport, and has interests in major infrastructure and energy companies. The level of integration with Russia has increased since Armenia joined the EAEU.

However, along with providing security guarantees for Armenia, Russia has also been attempting to export its current political culture. There was an expectation that sacrificing democratic freedoms and human rights for the sake of stability would work in Armenia, and also cultivated perceptions of the necessity to make justified sacrifices in the face of imminent danger from Azerbaijan. However, the events of April-May 2018 proved that the Armenian people did not want the kind of stability offered to them – predictable poverty, inequality, and thriving corruption. The protesters were certainly aware of the possible security risks of the revolution, namely that Azerbaijan could have used the moment of political instability in Armenia to attack. However, even that did not stop them from rising up against the injustices of the existing system. As it turned out, for at least one year following the revolution, relative

stability was retained, and arguably even strengthened, if we consider the protracted period of calm on the line of contact between May 2018 and May 2019.

The April 2016 four-day war, when Azerbaijan attempted to impose a military solution upon the Karabakh issue, highlighted serious problems in the Armenian army, revealing its unpreparedness and resulting in many casualties (this is now being investigated by an ad hoc standing parliamentary committee to inquire into those events set up in 2019 – an unprecedented move in Armenia's recent history). It also triggered a strong wave of suspicion and conspiracy in society regarding the substance of the confidential peace negotiations conducted by President Sargsyan personally. The negotiations represented "a flimsy foundation for a stable and lasting peace process",[17] both preceding and following the April 2016 war. Although for the ruling elite in Armenia, the war solidified the argument for the need for strong control in the name of preventing another attack, the credibility of the negotiators and security guarantee providers was damaged, with the negotiations seen as defeatist by certain segments of society.

These sentiments found their expression in the "hostage crisis" of summer 2016 that ensued following the April war, when a police compound was seized and several hostages were taken by a strongly anti-Russian, nationalistic and radical grouping named "Daredevils of Sasun" *(Sasna Tsrer)*.[18] The incident likely made many in Armenia's powerful circles realize the fragility of the internal peace and showed that the iron-grip stability was not sustainable and could easily be shattered in the absence of democratic legitimacy. Paradoxically, while rejection of violence generally represents a commonly shared value in the Armenian society, the brewing potential for protest resulted in an outward expression of public sympathy to the armed men.

After the revolution, *Sasna Tsrer*, with many of its leaders remaining under trial but released from detention, created a political party in the run-up to the 9 December 2018 early elections, but did not pass the threshold. Its platform calling for the almost total criminalization of the former elite, further militarizing Armenia in preparation for war, and broad territorial claims did not resonate sufficiently in the context of the "revolution of love". The illegitimacy of the former regime, however, was not called into question.

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17   Hans-Joachim Schmidt, The Four-Day War Has Diminished the Chances of Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2016*, Baden-Baden. 2017, pp. 111-123, p. 122.

18   Armenia protesters, police clash over hostage crisis continues, *Al Jazeera*, 21 July 2016, at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/armenia-protesters-police-clash-hostage-crisis-160721052049006.html.

Whether a fragile democracy can survive and thrive in Armenia in a complex domestic, regional, and global context is a question that can only be answered with time.

The new authorities have a different approach to security. As Prime Minister Pashinyan recently articulated in his address to the European Parliament on 4 March 2019: "[…] democracy is not merely one of the viable options for us. Rather, it is a matter of security for us. We believe that for our people and our political culture it is true to claim that democracy provides for stronger and more efficient economic and political institutions, which constitute an important precondition for the development of [the] country."[19]

Along with its vision of security and development through democracy, Armenia also reassured Russia they would plan no major shifts in foreign policy, meaning Armenia still considers Russia its main strategic partner and does not question its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the EAEU. This may seem like a contradiction, and has naturally caused mistrust in Russia as well as raised eyebrows among other partners who are sceptical about Armenia's democratic aspirations being compatible with membership in the aforementioned blocs.

Despite Russia's initial wait-and-see policy, and Pashinyan's attempts to demonstrate harmonious relations with President Vladimir Putin, the first cracks became evident towards the summer of 2018. In July 2018, criminal charges were brought against CSTO Secretary General Yuri Khachaturov over the violent clashes that occurred on 1 March 2008 in the aftermath of contested presidential elections and resulted in ten deaths. The charges were brought through diplomatic channels without any prior warning, and were seen as a blow to the reputation of the Organization, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov making a statement to that effect[20] and finally resulted in side-lining Armenia (who wanted to appoint another Secretary General) and replacing Khachaturov with a Belarusian official. The Armenian side had a lot to explain to convince Moscow that the cases against Khachaturo, as well as that against Kocharyan, were a purely domestic Armenian matter and were under no circumstances intended to damage the bilateral relationship. The atmosphere remains awkward, with Russia showing signs of disapproval. In this context, some of the new authorities' bold measures, including those seeking to ensure justice is done in the March 2008 case and to investigate corruption

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19 The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Press Release: RA Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Visit to Brussels, 4-5 March 2019, at: https://www.primeminister.am/en/foreign-visits/item/2019/03/04/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Brussels/.

20 Russia Claims Political Motives In Armenian Charges Against Ex-Leaders, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1 August 2018, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/lavrov-russia-concerned-armenian-arrest-former-pro-moscow-leaders-kocharian-khachaturov-pashinian/29402249.html.

cases (including in a Russian-owned railway company), have not strengthened relations between Armenia and their main security partner.

It may be argued that what matters to the Kremlin is whether Armenia's democracy infringes upon Russia's vital strategic interests in the country and region, military and economic ones in particular. While those interests are safeguarded and Armenia's democracy is kept in check, the nature of the political regime is only of secondary relevance, but as soon as those interests come under attack, or the country attempts to enhance its sovereignty, shattering Russia's control, its attitude will inevitably change – and this is already becoming obvious. An indication of the change may be seen, for example, in the ten per cent increase in the gas price for Armenia as of 2019.

Democracy in the context of domestic reforms and economic prosperity is arguably a necessary condition to guarantee the security of Armenian society. However, in the unstable regional context and in the context of Armenia's dependency on Russia, it is so far not sufficient to achieve the desired level of security.

Democracy and the Expectation of Peace... or War?

Nikol Pashinyan called the Armenian revolution "a triumph of romanticism over pragmatism".[21] To what extent romanticism can ensure security, both internal and external, is a test now being conducted in Armenia in the context of the unresolved conflict. Against the backdrop of systemic and deeply-rooted problems, it has been a bold experiment to embark on profound internal changes such as eradicating systemic corruption, reforming the judiciary, fostering the economy, attracting investment, protecting human rights, and opening up to the world. The stakes and the risks are even higher when romanticism guides decisions on hard security, namely the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Relations with neighbouring Azerbaijan have not changed much since the period when hostilities even affected the operations of the OSCE in Armenia. "Preparing populations for peace"[22] has become a new buzz phrase on the surface of the Karabakh negotiations. However, the real state of affairs suggests that changing the political system and culture on one side may not be sufficient to achieve peace and stability. There is still a highly militarized environment in Armenia; Azerbaijan remains frustrated over Pashinyan's insistence on giving Karabakh an independent voice in the negotiations; there has been a lack of tangible steps towards land concessions by Armenia, which were expected by Azerbaijan; and there have been escalations of violence on the line of contact involving the deaths of soldiers on both sides. On the contrary, what the

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21 "Armenian revolution was romanticism's triumph over pragmatism" – Pashinyan, *Armenpress,* 7 May 2019, at: https://armenpress.am/eng/news/973968.html.

22 Joshua Kucera, Armenia and Azerbaijan agree to "prepare populations for peace", *Eurasianet*, 17 January 2019, at: https://eurasianet.org/armenia-and-azerbaijan-agree-to-prepare-populations-for-peace.

new government sees as a move based on democratic logic – namely the involvement of Nagorno Karabakh in the negotiations – is perceived as a no-go by Azerbaijan, which does not recognize the de facto authorities there as legitimate interlocutors.

Armenia's prime minister has said he would like the ultimate solution to the conflict to be "acceptable to the people of Armenia, the people of Karabakh and the people of Azerbaijan"[23] and has called on Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to make the same statement. However, there has not been similar language coming from Aliyev. In Armenia's view, this hampers negotiations, as it points to Azerbaijan's rather narrow interpretation of the Madrid Principles;[24] rather, this approach singles out the principle of territorial integrity as the top priority. In fact, Armenia seeks to come to a common interpretation of the Madrid Principles defining the negotiating space and the multitude of options that it could potentially offer – international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh or its full re-incorporation into Azerbaijan being only two of the possible outcomes, and the most radical ones.

Most of Armenia's neighbours (Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey) do not aspire to democratization, Georgia being the only exception. As far as Nagorno-Karabakh is concerned, the extent of the de facto entity's identification with the Armenian revolution remains vague, accompanied by emerging "us" and "them" divisions. In fact, as Aleksey Antimonov describes it, the political system in Nagorno-Karabakh constitutes a "militarised social democracy"[25] surviving thanks to Armenian subsidies. Officially, at least 4.5 per cent of Armenia's national budget is allocated to Nagorno-Karabakh, although the real amount is probably much higher.[26] This has not changed since the revolution, and is unlikely to change despite the obvious benefits of peace highlighted by research. Scholars have argued that:

> In public finances, both Armenia and Azerbaijan would strongly benefit from large savings on conflict-related *fiscal expenditures*. Military expenditures could be reduced by 2% of annual GDP in both countries to a level comparable with other countries at peace. In addition, Armenia

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23 The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Press release, 7 April 2019, at: https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2019/04/07/Erkrapah/.

24 The "Basic" or "Madrid Principles" were first presented to the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers at the OSCE Madrid Ministerial Council in November 2007. In July 2009, within the framework of the G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, the then leaders of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, US President Barack Obama, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, highlighted the six most important of them in a joint statement, urging the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev, to "resolve the few differences remaining between them and finalize their agreement on these Basic Principles […]" OSCE, Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, L'Aquila, 10 July 2009, at: https://www.osce.org/mg/51152.

25 Aleksey Antimonov, Nagorno-Karabakh's militarised social democracy, openDemocarcy, 5 February 2018, at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/nagorno-karabakh-s-militarised-social-democracy/.

26 Cf. ibid.

could save annual expenditures of 0.9% of GDP for supporting the local economy in Nagorno-Karabakh and 0.1% of GDP in interest payments, thus saving 3% of GDP every year. Azerbaijan could eventually save expenditures for supporting displaced people amounting to 0.4% of annual GDP, thus reducing total expenditure by 2.4% of GDP yearly. Such large fiscal savings would enable both countries to sharply reduce budget deficits and at the same time substantially increase spending in socially useful areas such as education or health by eliminating present budgetary pressures.[27]

The necessary conditions for such a scenario, however, are not currently in place. In spite of the occasional optimistic rhetoric reaching the media following some of the meetings between the leaders and foreign ministers, and the 2019 inter-governmental initiative of a journalistic exchange where groups of journalists paid reciprocal visits to both countries, some defence scholars are rather pessimistic in their assessment of progress towards any kind of compromise, let alone full political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[28]

Whether this can be preceded by preparing bottom-up reconciliation is another question. The Armenian position with regard to preparing its population for peace by proposing a public debate and mainstreaming it into policy-making points to the expectation of a similar parallel course of action in Azerbaijan, which is perceived to be a rather remote prospect.

As regards the normalization of relations with Turkey, progress has been slow in the past two years, and is not generally conditioned on democracy-building in Armenia.

How Stable is Armenia's Democracy?

The sustainability of the gains of the Armenian revolution depends on how successfully (and how soon) the authorities can meet the public's high expectations, and on how well they can preserve their domestic as well as international democratic legitimacy. The public expects, first and foremost, tangible results in terms of improved well-being and economic growth. This will only be achievable if deep structural reforms cutting across all policy spheres are pushed through. Such reforms are complex and time-consuming, requiring a great deal of political will on the part of the government and a lot of patience on the part of the citizens. As for preserving democratic legitimacy, this is of

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27   David Saha/Ricardo Giucci/Matthias Lücke/Robert Kirchner/Veronika Movchan/Georg Zachmann, The economic effect of a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on Armenia and Azerbaijan, Berlin 2018, p. 2 at: https://berlin-economics.com/the_economiceffect_of_a_resolution_of_the_nagorno-karabakh_conflict/.
28   Cf. Leonid Nersisyan, Can the South Caucasus Conflicts Escalate into a Regional War? RIAC, 25 June 2019, at: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/military-and-security/can-the-south-caucasus-conflicts-escalate-into-a-regional-war/.

utmost importance for securing the support of many of Armenia's international partners and donors. However, a more difficult task is bringing about a change in mentality among the public at large, instilling democratic values into the hearts and minds of the people, and building a society that would embrace freedom, tolerance, and non-discrimination and a state with viable institutions that could sustain changes of leadership and government.

The successful scenario for Armenia would, thus, consist in thoroughly reforming the whole system of governance inherited from the past without hesitation – the system characterized by corruption, self-enrichment of public figures, a lack of distinction between business and politics, nepotism and monopolization, impunity, and the impoverishment of a large proportion of the population – in essence, a "captured state". The strong desire to do away with this has been a declared priority of the government from the very start – and the key mobilizing factor behind the mass protest movement. There is still public support for Pashinyan, while the perceived improvements in people's daily lives owe more to psychological rather than economic factors. Nevertheless, there is the political will to continue with reforms, to deepen engagement with the European Union under CEPA, to diligently implement the CEPA Roadmap, and to make good use of international donors' support to the reform process, including the highly sensitive security sector reform. Following through on his promises with no deviations from this course of action and without giving in to the temptation to draw out some reforms for the sake of preserving public support, is the only way forward. Achieving this, however, would require a delicate balancing act with Russia and avoiding giving the opponents of liberalism and democracy reasons for criticizing and undermining those in power. Grounds for criticism should also be avoided when it comes to staying true to the proclaimed democratic principles in the conflict with the Constitutional Court, being careful not to abuse the overwhelming political advantages, refraining from actions that may raise eyebrows in international organizations, demonstrating professionalism and communicating it strategically.

Any other course of action would result in backsliding on democracy, losing international legitimacy and falling out of favour both domestically and internationally. This would stem from the failure of the reform process, public discontent with the lack of visible improvements, signs of falling into the trap of either favouritism or politization of the various branches of power, political persecution or silencing of the opponents, losing face in the eyes of the international community, namely the Council of Europe, the EU, and others, disagreements within the ruling alliance and its eventual split, and the formation of a stronger democratic opposition, led by the Bright Armenia party, for example. This would still not present a threat to the democratic order of Armenia as such, but could potentially give rise to alternative opposition forces that could challenge the My Step Alliance and eventually take over.

Gloomier scenarios cannot be ruled out, either. The currently marginal nationalist conservative forces could potentially strengthen their case and force the current prime minister out of power; however, something very grave needs to occur in order for that to happen, such as severe and illegitimate repression of their leaders, and public discontent with them. As the first eighteen months of Pashinyan's rule have shown, the methods used by the radical right in Armenia (open harassment and even physical violence against LGBTI people, widespread hate speech, spreading fake new and disinformation) largely lack real influence on the political process. However, should such forces receive outside support and funding, combined with other aforementioned factors, the situation may change.

As regards the Republican Party returning to power and challenging the democratic order in the country, this prospect cannot be completely ruled out either, but remains unlikely as their opportunities for summoning the necessary public support are almost non-existent, in spite of their business connections and lingering influence on the media.

Armenian democracy could potentially be challenged from outside, or put under strain should the regional situation deteriorate. Whether a democratic society can sustain a high degree of militarization remains an open question. At the moment, in spite of the numerous internal and external challenges, Armenia, under the leadership of its prime minister, appears to be doing its best in undergoing the painful process of democratic transition – a process that seems to have become irreversible.

Thomas Kunze

Political Succession in Central Asia: The Example of Kazakhstan

Introduction

When Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev planned to step down due to his health, his advanced age, and the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in Eurasia, he took many factors into account. However, he had hardly reckoned with protracted protests nationwide, despite the fact that his own rise to power began with protests following a failed succession plan. There were therefore numerous arrangements in place to secure his own power and personal and family security that Nazarbayev had already made some time ago. The events in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan are proof of the risks associated with a change of president in the region. Despite the numerous measures taken to secure his power and that of his family, Nazarbayev's clan will have to expect a long-term loss of power. In the shadow of the ruling elites' power politics, Islamist ideas are spreading among the young, some of whom have no prospects. At the same time, all of Central Asia is becoming the centre of a new geopolitical Great Game between China, Russia, and the West.

The Problem of Succession

The greatest danger for leaders in Central Asia after leaving active politics lies not directly in the loss of power as such, but in the associated danger to their own financial and physical integrity, and that of their families. The European observer should therefore not be surprised if, in order to secure their power, wealth, and lives, they rely above all on family ties and clans. In a political environment in which friendships are a highly unreliable guarantor of loyalty, as former Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev recently experienced, the bond of blood, of the family, is still regarded as the most reliable. In such a political environment, therefore, leaders must put in place numerous safeguards before resigning in order to prevent a power vacuum. The events in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan serve to confirm this: One year after a regulated transfer of power, friction between former political cronies incumbent President Sooronbay Jeenbekov and former President Almazbek Atambayev led to violent unrest and the latter's arrest.

In addition to the danger of leaving a power vacuum behind after the head of state resigns, there is also the not inconsiderable risk of a revolt from below in Central Asia, due to accumulated anger amongst the populous. Furthermore,

in a region that is already known as the Eurasian Balkans[1] due to its heterogeneous population, there is always the risk of ethnic conflict in times of crisis.

In particular, Kazakhstan's neighbour Kyrgyzstan is repeatedly shaken by revolts: In its short history, the country can look back on only two peaceful changes of state. Downfall due to a revolt is a risk that might have been all too familiar to Nazarbayev. A historical review helps in understanding these circumstances.

Nazarbayev's Rise

Nazarbayev's own rise began in 1986 as a result of the Jeltoqsan riots, bloody ethnic unrest in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Mikhail Gorbachev had then appointed Gennady Kolbin, an ethnic Russian, to the head of the Republic in order to oust the Kazakh Dinmukhamed Kunayev. As Leonid Brezhnev's favourite, he had ruled in Alma-Ata (now Almaty) with mismanagement and nepotism, but was extremely popular with the Kazakh population. The appointment of an ethnic Russian to the head of the Republic inflamed the anger of young, nationalistic Kazakhs, as Gorbachev had broken an unwritten law, according to which the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the national Soviet Socialist Republic had to come from the titular nation. The subsequent Jeltoqsan riots claimed several hundred lives. After Kolbin had to be dismissed from the top of the Kazakh Communist Party, Gorbachev appointed Nazarbayev as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR. The explosive detail here is that the accusations of corruption against former First Secretary Kunayev only became public after Nazarbayev, a protégé of his, filed a complaint. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev, a representative of the old guard, remained at the very top of the government – as was the case in most of the Central Asian states. But while the presidents of the neighbouring states either died – like Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov and Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niyazov – or lost their power and were overthrown by public unrest and civil war – like Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akayev and Tajikistan's Rahmon Nabiyev – Nursultan Nazarbayev survived and/or outlasted them all. It was not only in Central Asia, but also in the European former Soviet republics that the first heads of state had long since been voted out of office, and the same applied to the South Caucasus: Zviad Gamsakhurdia was overthrown in 1992, Ayaz Mutalibov was voted out in 1992, Levon Ter-Petrosyan stepped down in 1998.

When in recent years Nazarbayev began to think about stepping down from the leadership of the state, he was the last of the former Soviet leaders.

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1   In his work "The Only World Power", Zbigniew Brzezinski, a US presidential advisor and geopolitical theorist, describes Central Asia as the Eurasian Balkans because of its mixture of peoples and the demarcation across settlement areas.

His only way to influence developments after him was through a voluntary transfer of power, though he must have been aware of the risks involved.

Excursus: Kyrgyzstan. The Unsuccessful Succession

In Kyrgyzstan, it recently became apparent what effects a failed succession plan and an associated power struggle could have on the Central Asian states that still remain less consolidated nationally. In accordance with the constitution, Social Democrat Atambayev, who was in power until 2017, did not run for election as president again. Many observers agree that it would have been in his power to change the constitution in his favour. Prime Minister at the time Sooronbay Jeenbekov, his friend, confidant, and fellow member of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, stood in his place as a candidate. Jeenbekov won the election. In the last two years, however, he has broken with his predecessor. Atambayev, who has since been elected chairman of the Social Democratic Party, became a competitor. In the summer of 2019, Jeenbekov struck the blow. He arranged for Atambayev's immunity to be lifted and security forces stormed the ex-president's estate, which was fiercely defended by his supporters. After the first attempt failed and cost the life of a member of the security forces, Atambayev took responsibility for the deadly shot and was arrested the following day.

Atambayev's arrest not only shattered the political landscape of Central Asia – he was regarded as pro-Russian and President Vladimir Putin's confidant – but was probably a signal to all the autocrats in the region to hold on to power for as long as possible. The democratic system of Kyrgyzstan also suffered a severe blow. Not only was the continuum of peaceful transfers of power interrupted, but the internal Kyrgyz north-south conflict is now also erupting again. Atambayev, who has since been arrested, was credited with tempering this conflict in the past. Coming from Northern Kyrgyzstan himself, Atambayev had chosen in Jeenbekov a Southerner to succeed him. In addition to regional differences, Islamist ideas are spreading on a worrying scale, with the focus on the Fergana Valley. Today, there are already more mosques than schools in the country. This is disastrous in view of the fact that the majority of these mosques are financed and built by Saudi Arabia, which goes hand in hand with the spread of an Islam of Wahabi orientation.[2] This trend towards the creeping Islamization of Kyrgyzstan becomes even more significant in light of the fact that Jeenbekov's brother does business with Qatar, a state known as the patron and donor of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. The signal effect of Atambayev's arrest is likely to have disastrous consequences, as it encourages the ruling autocrats to hold on to power and makes any form of democratic change of government appear dangerous. The failed succession of

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2   Wahhabism is a puristic-fundamentalist direction of Sunni Islam with many transitions to Jihadism and political Islamism.

Atambayev, actually an inner-Kyrgyz affair, is therefore likely to have been closely observed in neighbouring Kazakhstan – even though Nasabayev's succession so far seems to have been successful.

Nazarbayev's Precautions

As illustrated above, a multitude of precautions are required to ensure a safe withdrawal from the top of the state while retaining power. There is a need to prevent, for example, a power struggle between the influential families from breaking out, a revolt from the street that overthrows the system, or the designated successor turning against the former leader.

In the Kazakh presidential palace, plans for an exit must have begun some time ago. The initial measures to maintain power included de facto self-awarding of the titles "First President of Kazakhstan" and "Leader of the Nation" *(Elbasy)* in 2010, which guarantee lifelong criminal immunity. Nazarbayev curtailed the future president's power in 2016 by strengthening the parliament and government in relation to the presidency. More relevant, however, is that Nazarbayev will remain chairman of the National Security Council even after his resignation, meaning that he controls the secret service, which is run by a close confidant. It is precisely his control of the secret service that allows Nazarbayev to retain the real power in the state. For this purpose, the position of the chairman of the Security Council was significantly strengthened in advance when it was transformed from a mere advisory body to the central constitutional one, the cornerstone for which was laid in 2018.

In order to secure the future support of a broad political base, Nazarbayev remains chairman of the ruling party Nur Otan ("Light of the Fatherland"). The family's retention of power is safeguarded by the daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva, who has been appointed chair of the Senate. This is relevant since the chair of the Senate takes office in the event of the president's resignation or death, as in the current case of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the then Senate chair who automatically assumed the function of interim president by constitution after Nazarbayev's resignation. In the economic sphere, too, the Nazarbayev family's power is safeguarded by the influential position of son-in-law Timur Kulibayev as chairman of the Kazenergy Association. Nazarbayev's last major act before his resignation was to dismiss the government in February, giving the government's failure to fulfil its task of increasing the population's prosperity and standard of living as his official reason. There were no real personnel changes, however, in the form of depositions, but rather an exchange of positions, the aim of which was probably to move the members of the government into new working environments with which they first had to familiarize themselves. This measure may have deprived potential candidates for power

of their room for manoeuvre. Any planned attempts at a coup were thus prevented by a pre-emptive strike. The dismissal of the government was President Nazarbayev's last move.

The Successor

Who is the man Nazarbayev chose as his successor? Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, until then chairman of the Senate, is commonly regarded as a popular politician. He is described as an intelligent and balancing personality with many years of experience in diplomacy and government. In the past, he has served as foreign minister, prime minister, and Director-General of the UN Office at Geneva. He is regarded as a politically moderate professional politician who is not expected to bring about major changes. Like Nazarbayev, Tokayev also comes from the Soviet old guard of the former Communist Party. In the 1990s, Tokayev began earning money in the oil and gas industry, building a business empire with members of his family. His son, Timur Tokayev, owns half of the shares in Abi Petroleum Capital LLP. The other half of the company is owned by Mukhamed Izbastin, Timur Tokayev's cousin. Mukhamed Izbastin and Temirtai Izbastin, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's brother-in-law, are in the Kazakh diplomatic service, and they worked together in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Like Nazarbayev and Kunayev, the family to which Tokayev belongs also comes from the Great Horde *(Ulı júz)*, whose ancestral homeland is southern Kazakhstan, around the old capital Almaty. In Kazakhstan, the tribal affiliation to one of the three hordes still plays an important role today. Tokayev, however, has no political base of his own, because too often he has spent time abroad as a diplomat, which is why many observers regard him as a transitional president. In this role, he has a balancing function between the competing groups of Kazakh elites. Despite all the above attributes to recommend Tokayev as a successor, the absolute loyalty to Nazarbayev he has demonstrated so far may have been the most decisive factor in his election.

The Resignation, the Election Campaign, and the Election

Nursultan Nazarbayev announced his resignation from office as president of the Republic of Kazakhstan at 7 p.m. on 19 March 2019, ending his rule over Kazakhstan, which had lasted for more than three decades. Nazarbayev had ruled the country uninterrupted for 33 years since 1986, initially as First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party and later, since independence, as president. The aim of this step was probably to bring about a decision in his chosen moment of economic and political stability. A regular election would have entailed a certain risk that, at the same time, economic or political upheavals could trigger social unrest. In addition to Nazarbayev's age and poor health,

the danger of future geopolitical upheavals in the region may also have played a role. Islam Karimov, the first president of independent Uzbekistan, who died in 2017, had not enthroned a successor. Nazarbayev did not want to repeat something that he regarded as a mistake.

The transfer of power in Kazakhstan was carried out rather swiftly: Tokayev was sworn in as president on 20 March 2019, one day after Nazarbayev's resignation was announced. In April, Tokayev, in his capacity as interim president, announced early elections to legitimize his presidency. The election date was set for 9 June. The short deadline gave potential opponents little time to make themselves known to the masses. At the suggestion of Nazarbayev in his capacity as chairman of Nur Otan, Tokayev himself was unanimously nominated as the party's candidate in an open vote. After one potential candidate, Zhumatai Aliyev, failed the obligatory language test in Kazakh, and Talgat Yergaliyev withdrew his candidacy, Tokayev faced six competitors in the election campaign.

Presidential Election Candidates in Kazakhstan 2019

- Kassym-Jomart Tokayev – Nur Otan (ruling party; conservative, centrist, secularist)
- Amangeldy Taspikhov – Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan
- Amirjan Kosanov – "Ult Tagdyry" (national-patriotic movement)
- Daniya Espayeva – Democratic Party of Kazakhstan "Ak Zhol" (liberal)
- Jambyl Akhmetbekov – Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan (social democrat)
- Sadybek Tugel – "Uly Dala Kyrandary" [Great Steppe Eagle] (republican movement)
- Toleutai Rakhimbekov – People's Democratic-Patriotic Party "Auyl" (social democrat)

Unsurprisingly, Tokayev won the election with 71 per cent. His election programme represented a complete takeover of Nazarbayev's programme and did not reveal any new points of view. The second best result, with about 16 per cent, was achieved by the long-serving Amirjan Kosanov. In the past, Kosanov had joined various parties, before the election he was unexpectedly nominated by the national-patriotic movement Ult Tagdyry. During the election campaign, as Tokayev's main competitor, Kosanov advocated increased co-operation with the EU, environmental improvements, and the transformation of the political system into a parliamentary-presidential one, and argued against the construction of a nuclear power plant. As a member of one family of the Small Horde *(Kişi júz)*, he achieved the best results in their ancestral homelands in the oil-rich but marginalized and impoverished West of Kazakhstan, in some

cases up to 30 per cent. Some observers assume that Kosanov's candidacy provided Tokayev with a sham opponent to make the election appear democratic.

Daniya Espayeva of the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan "Ak Zhol" achieved the third best result with about five per cent. Ak Zhol is the second largest party of the country and is regarded as a cluster of entrepreneurs. Observers classify the party as opposed to the system; in parliament it is loyal to the government.

The Protests

The election, conceived as an act of legitimation, triggered a wave of protests on an unprecedented scale, which had not been expected either at home or abroad. Even in the run-up to the election, rallies had taken place in many larger cities, calling for a boycott of the election and opposing the renaming of the capital and the construction of a nuclear power plant. It was above all Astana being renamed Nur-Sultan – a subsequent act of loyalty to Nursultan Nazarbayev initiated by Tokayev – that stirred up discontent among the population. Within a few hours, 35,000 people had signed a petition against the renaming. The state's monopoly on discourse was questioned on social media, with the discontent centring on the big cities.

The unrest was based on a foundation of increasing socio-economic problems and a crisis of legitimacy that the Nazarbayev administration had been contending with since 2014. Nazarbayev's paternalistic autocracy rested primarily on two pillars of legitimacy: Kazakh identity politics on the one hand, and constantly rising social prosperity based on the steppe state's wealth of resources on the other. The legitimacy resulting from increasing economic prosperity was weakened by the Kazakh economic crisis of 2014-2015. The crisis was triggered by two factors. The first was the fall in oil prices, which had a major impact on the economy, dependent on commodity exports. The second was the close Russian-Kazakh trade relations, with the weakening of the Russian rouble as a result of the 2014 sanctions also having a negative impact on Kazakhstan. A first wave of protests shook the country in 2016, triggered by a land reform that would have allowed Chinese investors, among others, to lease Kazakh land. Anti-Chinese resentment prevails in large sections of the population, and China's increasing economic influence is met with fear of the country being sold out. When the protests reached the metropolises of Almaty and Astana, the government reacted with repression and – at the same time – suspension of the law.

The current protests following the change of government and the election reached all major cities and mobilized thousands of demonstrators. The protest issues, which are not directly related, suggest a broader social dissatisfaction. Individual activists were arrested early on for posts on social networks or single harmless acts, but received only very short prison sentences, or none at all.

For example, an activist in West Kazakhstan, alluding to the lack of freedom of speech, held up an empty placard, whereupon he was immediately arrested and released promptly afterwards. Two other activists had unrolled a banner during a marathon with the inscription "You Cannot Run Away From The Truth #ForFreeElections #IHaveAChoice". They were arrested and given short prison sentences but then released again soon after. The first major rallies took place on 1 May 2019 when several hundred people demonstrated in the larger cities of Nur-Sultan, Almaty, Karaganda, Aktobe, and Semipalatinsk. On 21 May, hundreds of women demonstrated in front of the headquarters of the ruling Nur Otan party. They demanded social improvements. On the day of the election itself, rallies took place in Nur-Sultan, Almaty, and Shymkent, where 500 people were arrested, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On the following day, there were also protests against the outcome of the election. Numerous arrests also followed these protests.

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 300 police officers were injured during the rallies between 9 and 13 June 2019 as a result of the protests and riots. 4,000 people were temporarily arrested.

The Government's Reaction

The Kazakh government later reacted to the protests with a mixture of repression and an offer of participation. The classic carrot and stick policy had repeatedly been employed in the past and had already proved successful. While the demonstrations were violently dispersed, access to social media was disrupted, and there were arrests and media defamation, a new dialogue process was also opened for the people at the same time. This included the establishment of the "National Council for Social Trust" and the creation of an "Alliance of Democratic Organizations". In an analysis carried out by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), this is referred to as an authoritarian policy of civic participation, which constitutes a form of individualized participation beyond parties, groups, associations, and movements. At the same time as creating new opportunities for participation, the government also indicated a fundamental willingness to engage in dialogue on some issues. For example, President Tokayev announced a referendum on the construction of a new nuclear power plant in response to criticism repeatedly voiced during the rallies.

28 Years of Nazarbayev. A Review

What is Nazarbayv's legacy? The fact that today, Kazakhstan is the most prosperous and stable state in Central Asia and has not been shaken by civil war,

separatism, mass exodus, or discrimination against any section of the population must be credited to Nursultan Nazarbayev and his life's work. At the beginning of its independence, the country faced several fundamental problems. In the north of the country there was a homogenous Russian-Slavic population living in a closed settlement area who wanted to join the motherland. The long border with Russia, across the steppe without natural barriers and populated on both sides by members of the Russian ethnic group, offered the perfect conditions for separatist tendencies. The Kazakh people there had become a minority in their own country. In addition, the Kazakh nation faced a question of identity. The concept of the Kazakh people as a nation had only developed through the Soviet Union's nationality policy. The division of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz people was among other things a result of this policy, as was the way the language is written and its standardization. The Kazakh people had organized themselves into nomadic tribes, the hordes, until the Russian conquest, so that a historical state tradition was also lacking. To the present day, every family can be traced back to one of the three hordes. In terms of foreign policy, in the early nineties the young state saw itself at the intersection of competing spheres of influence. The Russian Federation in the north wanted to keep the estate of the USSR within its own sphere of influence, China in the east saw an opportunity to re-establish its historical dominance over the states of Turkestan, and Turkey, with the support of the US, tried to gather the ethnically related states of Central Asia under a pan-Turkish flag. In addition to these domestic and foreign policy problems, Kazakhstan, like all other former Soviet republics, found itself confronted with independence having uncoupled them from the common economy of the USSR.

Nazarbayev approached all these issues with skill. He prevented the secession of the Russian north of the country, which most observers in the 1990s still expected, without causing a massive exodus of the Slavic population groups, as there had been in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. At the same time, he succeeded in reducing the existing tensions between the two major ethnic groups, the Russians and the Kazakhs. In parallel, a separate Kazakh identity emerged. Two factors may have been relevant here: first, the demographic development and second, the establishment of a new capital in the settlement area that was actually Russian. Under Nazarbayev's government, the Kazakh element of the population rose to become the dominant ethnic group. However, there was no significant state discrimination against the Russian population as in the Baltic states. In Latvia and Estonia, too, the titular nations threatened to become minorities in their own countries at the end of the Soviet Union. To counteract this, many members of the Russian ethnic group were not granted citizenship of the two newly formed Baltic states and fell into the category of non-citizens. Nazarbayev also refused to take senseless steps to strengthen identity, such as banning the Russian language or hastily switching to a Latin alphabet.

In terms of foreign policy, Nazarbayev managed the balancing act between Russia, China, and the West: something most of his post-Soviet counterparts have so far failed to do. Since independence, Kazakhstan has consistently pursued what is known as a multi-vector foreign policy with close ties to the Russian Federation. Abrupt changes in foreign policy, such as those Islam Karimov repeatedly carried out in Uzbekistan, or isolationism like that of "Turkmenbashi" Niyazov, were alien to Nazarbayev.

Nazarbayev's most important legacy will probably turn out to be the expansion of the new capital Astana – today Nur-Sultan. The relocation of the capital from peripheral Almaty to centrally located Astana, in the middle of the Russian settlement area, is not only a new constitutive act, important for the identity of the young nation, but at the same time counteracts centrifugal forces. This is not only directed against separatist attempts by the Russian ethnic group, but also has an internal Kazakh component. Nazarbayev belongs to the Great Horde, whose tribal land is composed of the urban south and in which the old capital Almaty lies. Astana, on the other hand, is located in the Middle Horde *(Orta júz)* tribal area. With the expansion of Astana into the capital, a balance was created between the two large tribes and any tribalist tendencies were deprived of their basis.

What Nazarbayev failed to do despite all his efforts was to differentiate the economy. Kazakhstan remains dependent on its commodity exports. It will be up to his successor to solve this problem.

Outlook

Despite the numerous measures taken to secure his power and that of his family, Nazarbayev's clan will have to face a long-term loss of power. Observers suspect that Tokayev is only assuming the function of a transitional president who, although he occupies a balancing position between the power factions of the Kazakh elites due to his lack of a political base, is simultaneously dependent on Nazarbayev's favour and remaining power due to this very lack of a political base. The election win – as an act of legitimation – must therefore not obscure the fact that the question of power in Kazakhstan has not yet been decided. It is precisely the unexpectedly fierce protests before and after the elections that may have convinced any competitors within the elite that a shift in power is possible. An open power struggle can be expected above all if the political system is shaken, for example by protests or a change in the foreign policy environment. It is already evident that the country is in a highly sensitive geopolitical zone. Kazakhstan plays a central role as China's transit corridor and commodity supplier. At the same time, to the east it borders China's troubled province of Xinjiang (East Turkestan). Kazakhstan is likely to occupy a key position in the emerging conflict between China and the US. The recent anti-Chinese protests testify to a dangerous development for the government's

pro-Chinese policy. Russian-Chinese relations hover above all this like a sword of Damocles, fateful for all developments in northern Eurasia.

Tokayev could be the last president of Kazakhstan to come from the old Soviet cadres. Future politicians will have grown up in an independent Kazakhstan with strongly identity-based politics, and their thinking will be correspondingly more national, both with a view to their Chinese neighbours and the Russian minority in the north.

The occurrence of such a development crucially depends on the appearance of one or a group of ambitious candidates for power from among the Kazakh elite. If this does not happen, the establishment of Tokayev – which is tantamount to maintaining the status quo – is both in the interests of the various clans and in those of the two neighbouring great powers, China and Russia.

Vadym Vasiutynskyi

The Psychological Dimensions of the Desacralization of post-Soviet Power in Ukraine: From a Communist Ideologist to an Actor-Comedian

As of 1991, the post-Soviet countries can be divided into two groups according to how the supreme state power is transferred.[1] Already onto its sixth president, Ukraine is amongst the countries where power is regularly transferred by the will of the electorate.

In accordance with the Ukrainian constitution, Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic, with the Ukrainian president thus having significantly less power than, for instance, the presidents of Russia and Belarus. The social and psychological legitimacy of the post of president, however, vests him with much greater powers, approaching those of Vladimir Putin and Alyaksander Lukashenka.

Ukrainian presidents have readily taken advantage of this situation and exceeded the authority vested in them, and the public has largely accepted this without objections, especially those supporting a particular president.[2] This kind of power legitimization and personification means social development is psychologically more dependent upon changes in president, rather than parliament. The downside of this is a biased attitude to the president's actions – it is not only achievements that are attributed to the president, but also failures and drawbacks.

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1   Cf. David Aprasidze, Consolidation in Georgia: Democracy or Power? Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2015*, Baden-Baden 2016, pp. 107-115; Azam Isabaev, Uzbekistan after the Transfer of Power, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2017*, Baden-Baden 2018, pp. 91-108; Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, Pariah State No More: Belarus' International Actorness against the Backdrop of the Ukraine Conflict, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2017*, Baden-Baden 2018, pp. 79-89.

2   Cf. Mykola Riabchuk, Spetsyfichna syla "slavkoyi derzhavy": instytualizatsiya avtorytaryzmu u postradyans'kiĭ Ukrayini [The specific strength of a "weak state": the institutionalization of authoritarianism in post-Soviet Ukraine], Naukovi zapysky Instytuty politychnykh i etnonatsional'nykh doslidzhen' im. I.F. Kurasa [Scientific notes of the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies I.F. Kuras], 4/2013, pp. 105-126, available at: http://ipiend.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/riabchuk_spetsyfichna.pdf. #

The "Communist Ideologist"

The most outstanding event in Soviet political life after the anti-Gorbachev putsch of 19 August 1991 was the all-Ukrainian referendum held on 1 December. It legitimized the dissolution of the Soviet Union that had *de facto* occurred by that time. Ninety per cent of Ukrainians voted for independence.[3] The result was unique as, for the first time in history, the idea of Ukrainian independence dominated public consciousness on such a large scale. The patriotic aspirations of a considerable section of the Ukrainian society, although not a majority, was combined with their desire to avoid trends coming from Russia, namely: increasing instability, economic crisis, and signs of civil war.

Convincing evidence of this was Leonid Kravchuk's victory in the presidential election held at the same time as the referendum. Kravchuk, former Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) responsible for ideology, won 62 per cent of the votes. He overcame three national democratic candidates, who won less than 30 per cent of the votes in total.[4] The public were seized by a national communist mood, idealizing the socialist collective farms (kolkhoz) of a moderately independent Ukraine.

Kravchuk acted in the spirit of Soviet and post-Soviet traditions. Prohibiting the Communist Party *de jure*, he transformed its former committees into public administration departments, and most Communist Party bureaucrats retained their positions, changing state symbols, switching to Ukrainian, and continuing to rule the country according to the principles of the command and control system.

Regional differences became evident. Nationally-oriented politicians gained some power in Western Ukraine, in the capital city Kyiv, and some other major cities. Moving from west to east and south, pro-Soviet trends (which later turned out to be more pro-Russian) strengthened.

On the one hand, such "changes" appealed to the Ukrainian public, who were hoping for change, although preferably small, cautious, and smooth. On the other hand, the alleged "reforms" undertaken could not stop the evolving economic crisis and the political and psychological crises that followed.

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3   Cf. VGO "Komitet Vybortsiv Ukrayiny" [All-Ukrainian Civic Organization "Committee of Voters of Ukraine"], Vybory Prezidenta Ukrayiny 1 grudnya 1991 [Election of the President of Ukraine 1 December 1991], at: http://cvu.org.ua/nodes/view/type:elections/slug:vybory _prezydenta_ukrajiny_1_grudnia_1991.
4   Cf. ibid.

The "Red Director"

The growing disaffection forced Kravchuk to declare early elections in 1994. He lost to "red director" Leonid Kuchma (45 per cent vs 52 per cent)[5] These results demonstrated a society split by identity: more Ukrainian in the west and the centre, and Ukrainian-Russian or purely Russian in the south-east.

In the same year, the Institute for Social and Political Psychology of the National Academy of Educational Sciences (NAES) of Ukraine started researching mass political consciousness with psycho-semantic monitoring based on annual surveys from an all-Ukrainian sample.[6] In the initial years, we identified the main dimension of public opinion: "pro- vs. anti-reform sentiments" – i.e. the public perception of the transition from socialism to capitalism. Since 1994, the attitude to kolkhozes has been central here.

According to our data, in the 1990s, Ukrainians decided whether they wanted to live under socialism or the new conditions of markets, competition, and pluralism. In general, people consciously and gradually accepted the new trends, which is quite clearly reflected in sociological surveys. At an unconscious level, however, there was a consistent desire to avoid tiresome changes.

President Kuchma evolved rather rapidly from a proponent of pro-Russian to one of pro-Ukrainian attitudes in the political sense. As for the economy, he emerged as the father of economic and social oligarchism in general. It was under his presidency that oligarchs became influential in the Ukrainian economy and politics.

However, Ukraine could hardly avoid oligarchization under the conditions of total economic collapse. The dominant "kolkhoz" mentality meant that the people were searching for a "good" leader who would manage and take care of everything. Disappointment in Kuchma in this respect grew over a very short period, but the 1999 elections brought him a rather easy victory in the second round over his key competitor, Communist Petro Symonenko (56 per cent vs 38 per cent)[7] – evidence that most Ukrainians did not want a return to the Soviet past. However, there was neither a clear vision of, nor agreement on the prospects for further development.

The "Orange Patriot"

By 2004, the trends that were structuring society were becoming clearer. Kuchma's second term was close to its end; new presidential elections were

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5   Cf. Dostrokovi prezidents'ki vybory u 1994 [Early presidential elections in 1994], *Mynule ta Teperishe [Past and Present],* 7 June 2016, at: https://mtt.in.ua/ist-ukr_1991-2010_vybory-presidenta-1994/.
6   Cf. Vadym O. Vasiutynskyi (ed.), Psykhologiya macovoyi politichnoyi cvidomosti ta novedinky [Psychology of Mass Political Consciousness and Behaviour], Kyiv 1997.
7   Cf. Tsentral'na vyborcha komiciya, Vibory Prezidenta Ukrayiny, 1999, Redkol.: Mikhaïlo M. Ryabets' (golova) ta in. [Central Election Commission, Election of the President of Ukraine, 1999, edited by: Mikhailo M. Ryabets (Chairman) and others], pp. 287, 289.

approaching. The oligarchic end of the political spectrum offered "sound businessman", Viktor Yanukovych, as a successor. His ideas were attractive to the Russian-speaking population in the south-east. He was opposed by Viktor Yushchenko, heading the faction standing for patriotic reform.

According to opinion polls, Yushschenko had a few per cent lead over Yanukovych in the second round, whereas the national exit poll recorded a nine per cent lead for Yushchenko.[8] Nonetheless, the election outcome was manipulated in favour of Yanukovych, which resulted in people coming to the Maidan to protest – the "Orange Revolution". Yushchenko won the second round with 52 per cent versus 44 per cent.[9]

The election returns highlighted the division of Ukraine even more clearly: The more pro-Ukrainian centre and west voted for Yushchenko, the less pro-Ukrainian south-east voted for Yanukovych. This equal division turned out to be a strong source of social development (in contrast to, for instance, Russia and Belarus, where the absolute majority elected the president they favoured and, subsequently, gave up their own status as political subjects). In Ukraine, representatives of the two sides could do nothing but co-exist, take into account their opponents' opinions, and compromise.

In the 2000s, the dimension of "anti- vs. pro-Russian sentiments" became the most significant issue affecting public opinion. A pivotal choice had to be made by the Ukrainian people: to become either an independent democratic Ukraine that would be part of Europe, or a nationally and ideologically indistinct Ukraine that would belong to the "*Russkiy Mir*" ("Russian world").

The language issue became central to this dimension: the dominance of the Ukrainian language, first and foremost as the only official language, at one extreme; and Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism, with the Russian language often in a position of priority, at the other.

Public expectations of patriotic reform peaked during Yushchenko's presidency. However, his indecisiveness and inactivity, the discord on the "orange" side, and the absence of obvious positive outcomes led to a drop in his popularity.

The "orange" authorities tried to lead society by fostering reform and patriotic spirit. According to our monitoring, however, for the five years from late 2004 till the beginning of early 2010, public opinion shifted in the opposite

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8   Cf. Fond Demokratychni initsiatyvy imeni Il'ka Kycheriva [Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation], Ostatochni rezul'taty Natsional'noho ekzyt-polu"2004 u druhomu turi vyboriv Prezydenta Ukrayiny (za danymy obrobky oryhinaliv anket opytuvannya [Final results of the national exit poll 2004 in the second round of the presidential election in Ukraine (according to the original survey questionnaire)], 27 November 2004, at: https://dif.org.ua/article/ostatochni-rezultati-natsionalnogo-ekzit-polu2004-u-drugomu-turi-viboriv-prezidenta-ukraini-za-danimi-obrobki-originaliv-anket-opituvannya

9   Cf. Vidbulosya pereholosuvannya druhovo turu vyboriv Prezydenta Ukrayiny (2004) [The second round of the Presidential election in Ukraine took place], *Ukrayins'kyĭ kalendar*, 26. December, at: http://www.calendarium.com.ua/ua/vidbulosya_peregolosuvannya_drugogo_turu_viboriv_prezidenta_ukraini_2004.

direction: pro-reform and patriotic spirit in particular weakened, with moderately pro-Russian views gaining the upper hand.

The "Sound Businessman"

Therefore, it was logical that Yanukovych would win the 2010 presidential elections (with 49 per cent of the vote compared with 45 per cent for Yulia Tymoshenko[10]). The oligarchs who changed their tune in the "orange" period promptly restored their economic and political capital.

It should be noted that during Yanukovych's presidency, the economy developed rather successfully. At the same time, the most profitable industries were monopolized; large amounts of capital flooded out of the country in different ways.

As for foreign policy, Yanukovych seemed to support Ukraine's uncertain move from Russia to the West. However, he played the game, signing agreements in turn, either with Russia, or with the West, and avoiding decisive action. This was reflected in an unexpected refusal to sign an agreement with the European Union in December 2013. Again, we recorded a contradiction between official policy and public sentiment: Yanukovych was attempting to push Ukrainian society closer to Russia, leaving reforms aside, but the public "balked" and moved in the opposite direction. The patriotic climate gained momentum again, from 2011 onwards in particular.

Whilst it had previously been a prominent aspect of public sentiment, significant differences in the "attitude to power" were foremost under Yanukovych. People began to realize that development did not occur due to actions of the authorities but arose from the ground up.

After Yanukovych failed to sign the agreement with the European Union, there was a sizeable protest rally in Kyiv, after which a group of young people stayed for an overnight "tea party". The meaningless and brutal expulsion of this small group of young people increased the growing disaffection and brought about the second *Maidan*, or the "Revolution of Dignity".

This was not the only act of violence on the part of the authorities. The two subsequent *Maidan* shootings – one in which a few people were killed, then the mass shooting of the Heavenly Hundred – resulted in an explosion of public outrage. Yanukovych fled the country.

To all intents and purposes, there was no need to flee but the cowardice he had thoroughly concealed in the previous years, using his surroundings to pretend to be a strong and bold leader led him to do so. Such an image was intended to take control of the people and to convince them that the best way to interact with the leadership was obedience and readiness to accept any of its decisions.

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10   Cf. Rezul'taty vyboriv 2010. Druhyĭ typ [Election Results 2010. Second Round], *Ukrayins'ka Pravda*, 7 February 2010, at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2010/02/7/4730368/

It proved to be one of Yanukovych's critical mistakes with regard to psychology: Most people had already abandoned unconditional obedience. The unrest in the Russian-speaking regions that followed the *Maidan* shooting and the flight of Yanukovych triggered the Russian military invasion, occupation, and annexation of Crimea, the partial occupation of the Donbas, and the bloody war that continues there to this day.

The "Hated Saviour"

The governmental crisis at the beginning of 2014 manifested itself in many ways, with the president's flight; early presidential elections; a change of government; the indecisive actions of the armed forces; general perplexity and negative expectations of the future; economic recession; and the rapid growth in social tension. Under these conditions, Petro Poroshenko won the first round of the presidential elections with a convincing vote (55 per cent)[11], which resulted from the unification of society in the face of internal and external threats. Poroshenko promised to end the war, to unify society, and to sell his business.

In 2014-2015, against a background of armed hostilities and economic recession, Ukraine succeeded in restoring its defence capacity and re-equipping the army, gaining global support for Ukraine from Europe and from the US in the first instance. Ukraine undoubtedly owed these achievements to Poroshenko, which most of his enemies recognized.

Important changes in public sentiment followed. Against a background of stronger patriotism, social cohesion increased from the west to the east, and public opinion became more polarized in parallel. Whereas previously Ukrainian society was characterized by a large group of proponents of Ukrainian-Russian linguistic and cultural coexistence, now the majority of those who had adopted a vague or ambivalent position became pro-Ukrainian, and the minority pro-Russian.

Another mark of change was the large-scale volunteer movement that cut across virtually all segments of the population – region, age, profession, and religion. Thousands of volunteers collected money for the army. In the crisis of state institutions, the civil society that was actively taking shape supported, and perhaps even saved, the armed forces.

Since 2016, the situation in the Donbas has stabilized to some extent. Active hostilities have ceased, although constant exchange of fire continues, bringing almost daily news of military and civilian casualties.

In this period, we have witnessed an unexpected phenomenon – a sharp surge in the public disapproval, even active hatred, towards the central Kyiv

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11   Cf. Zakonodavstvo Ukrayini [Legislation of Ukraine], Povidomlennya Tsentral'noyi vyborchoyi komisiyi pro rezul'taty pozachergovykh vyboriv Prezidenta Ukrayiny 25 tranya 2014 roku [Report of the Central Election Commission on the results of the snap election of the President of Ukraine on 25 May 2014], adopted on 3 June 2014, at: https://zakon. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001359-14.

authorities, above all President Poroshenko. For instance, interviews with residents in both Mariupol, the largest city of the Donbas controlled by Ukraine, and Lviv, the biggest Western Ukraine city, show that people, while desiring peace and economic prosperity, hated Poroshenko with equal intensity in both cities. Although this is understandable in Mariupol, it is rather surprising in the pro-Ukrainian Lviv.

At the same time, two more trends can be observed: The first is a certain weakening of patriotic sentiments that is likely to be due to the fatigue of war and the critical reaction to patriotic slogans used by the increasingly less popular authorities. The second is a drastic shift to the left in economic and ideological views and a strengthening of anti-reform sentiments. The gap between the conscious rejection of socialism and the not quite conscious commitment to economic equality and governmental paternalism widened again. According to VoxUkraine, 73 per cent of respondents actually support leftist authoritarian values.[12]

Such a drastic shift to the left was perhaps the main psychological factor behind Poroshenko's failure in the 2019 elections (24 per cent of votes cast in the second round, vs 73 per cent for Volodymyr Zelenskyi[13]). Poroshenko seemed to represent unrealized expectations about the end of the war and the improvement of material well-being.

The pro-Poroshenko arguments that initially had a rather strong influence gradually yielded to negative ratings that would have been less prominent but for the strong impact of highly charged Russian and pro-Russian media. It is sufficient to mention that more than half of the twelve to 14 national television channels were owned by tycoons dissatisfied with Poroshenko's policy to varying degrees.[14] Criticism of him became generalized in the Ukrainian media sphere: His actions were interpreted negatively as a matter of course.

A sort of meme has even become very common: "The enemy is not in the Kremlin, it is in Bankova Street" (the location of the presidential administration). In the all-Ukraine survey we conducted early in 2018, 46 per cent of respondents (vs 39 per cent in 2017 and 41 per cent in 2019) agreed with the statement that it was the current Ukrainian government who unleashed an unnecessary war in the Donbas, that the war continued because Poroshenko benefitted from it, and that it resulted from his agreements with Putin – his "bloody business".

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12   Cf. Tymofiĭ Brik/Oleksiĭ Krimenyuk, Sprava nalivo: shcho dumayut ukrayintsi pro derzhavnyĭ control' ekonomiky ta osobystykh svobod [From right to left: what do Ukrainians think about state control of the economy and personal freedoms]? *VoxUkraine*, 5 June 2019, at: https://voxukraine.org/uk/sprava-nalivo-shho-dumayut-bilshist-ukrayintsiv-pro-derzhavnij-kontrol-ekonomiki-ta-osobistih-svobod/.

13   Cf. Vybory Prezidenta Ukrainy 2019 [2019 Presidential Elections in Ukraine], *Obozrevatel*, 22 April 2019, at: https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/president-2019/rezultati-viboriv-zyavilisya-pershi-dani-tsvk.htm.

14   Cf. Vitaliĭ Chervonenko, Portnov, Medvedchuk i oliharkhy: khto vplyvattyme na TB pid chas vyboriv [Portnov, Medvedchuk and the oligarchs: who will influence TV during the election], BBC News Ukrayina, 31 August 2018, at: https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-45367720

Minor improvements in the economic sector were not duly appreciated, but rather served as a source of irritation. Public opinion was dominated by beliefs such as "there can be no improvements", "everything is bad", "there is nationwide total poverty". No unbiased data, including that from abroad, could shake the conviction of most citizens that life could not be worse anywhere else. Ukrainian citizens felt the need for and took psychological comfort in the sense that they were universally impoverished.

When communicating with the people in his capacity as president, Poroshenko made two major mistakes. The first related to his business links. He claimed to have sold his corporation but the actual success of the business made many people think he had held on to the rewards. And there were too many business partners in Poroshenko's entourage, which to some extent suggested that political power was being used for personal enrichment.

If a significant number of citizens are convinced that their president is dishonest, the president and other authorities should be concerned and prompted to take certain steps. Poroshenko should at least have provided explanations to his citizens in connection with certain specific accusations on many occasions and in detail. For unclear reasons, he did not consider it necessary to do so. His infrequent communication with journalists and answers to topical questions did not serve as an adequate counterbalance to the loud country-wide accusations against him. This lack of necessary public communication was his second, critical, error.

Poroshenko seemed to have realized his dire situation immediately prior to the elections. He rushed to remedy it, but it was too late. Ignoring the public's problems and demands created a negative image of his personality and activities, which led to his defeat.

The Psychological Implications of the Change in the Ukrainian Population's Attitude to the Authorities

The Stages of Societal Psychological Development

The aforementioned changes in presidential power in Ukraine reflect major transformations in the minds and behaviour of its citizens with regard to the function and role of power in their personal and social life. The three stages of change correspond to the three attitudes discussed above: attitudes to reforms, attitudes to Russia, and attitudes to the authorities.

What underlies these changes is likely to be the uncertainty avoidance principle proposed by Geert Hofstede.[15] It can be argued that the Ukrainian people, who were deprived of certainty in 1991, are trying to restore the clarity

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15   Cf. Geert Hofstede/Gert Jan Hofstede/ Michael Minkov, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival, New York 2005, pp. 187-234.

of development benchmarks. As the course of events has prevented them from doing so, they are forced to change their attitude to their present-day reality and future prospects, bypassing sources of uncertainty in order to achieve certainty.

In this sense, the psychological aspect of the first stage in the development of public consciousness in the 1990s – the shift from a socialist discourse to a capitalist one – can be defined as a desire to preserve the status quo under new conditions. The reforms were perceived more at the superficial and symbolic level; they did not produce any tangible effect on deep psychological mechanisms and the nature of social relations. The customary relationship between the overlord state and its vassal citizens persisted.

The obvious inefficiency of such a relationship forced citizens to revise their attitude to the authorities, and in the 2000s, as societal development entered its next stage, the focus shifted to searching for a government capable of introducing changes according to a certain pattern. Ukraine's political orientation became a more fundamental issue. Society divided into two groups: one looking for ways to develop national democracy based on Western examples, the other favouring Russia.

The ideological confrontation under the conditions that brought about alternating victories for each of the groups encouraged citizens to vote "against the other" rather than "for their own" nominee. The trend towards changes "contrary to the anti-model" became obvious: If we do not win, let them lose. In this environment, neither political force was in a position to win significant support amongst the population.

With such a strained attitude to the authorities, the third stage of societal development began in the 2010s, with citizens electing the authorities at random, as if they hoped those who deserved their vote might eventually be elected as a result of several consecutive elections.

The Socio-psychological Dimensions of Political Power

The socio-psychological incarnations of political power we have outlined above seem appropriate to give a more meaningful description of what citizens expected from the authorities. This is related to the public's image of a "perfect" power – a set of ideas of how the authorities should be in order to be successful, attractive, and trustworthy.[16]

The *paternalistic-demagogical* incarnation symbolizes citizens' emotional dependence on the state leadership, and their desire to regard the authorities as a kind and fair guardian, parent, and defender who will provide emotional comfort and security, satisfy hunger and thirst, give praise, and, if necessary, criticize. All that is required of the citizens is to obey and love the authorities.

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16   Cf. Vadym Vasiutynskyi, Interaktsiĭna psykholohiya vlady [Interactive Psychology of Power], Kyiv 2005, pp. 411–432.

Changes in the context of this incarnation follow the path of a gradual, sinusoid reduction of such dependence. When disappointed with the existing authorities, people began to search for a substitute they could "love" again. Each subsequent negative experience weakened their motivation, and the electorate, who had "deceived themselves" once again, expressed much less excitement concerning the new leadership, so the intervals between infatuation and disappointment became shorter and shorter. At the same time, the need to remain dependent is still rather strong, and the lack of this option gives rise to psychological discomfort.

The second incarnation – *pragmatic-regulatory* – concerns the expectation that the authorities will guarantee law and order. This is a desire, for a "strong hand" that sets necessary controls, permitting all good things and prohibiting all bad ones. Development in the context of this incarnation means a transition from loyal sentiments via a decline in the managerial capacities of the authorities and undermining of trust in them, until citizens come to perceive the authorities as an equal partner.

Without a doubt, Ukrainians' now prevalent mistrust in their authorities is an obstacle to establishing a relationship of equal partners between the authorities and society. Most citizens regard the probability of creating a strong and efficient state leadership as low. However, they still feel the need for such a power, and the hope that it will manifest increases at each election or following mass protests.

The third incarnation – *manipulative-paranoid* – embodies social values, citizens' expectations of the authorities with regards to defining the meaning of collective existence and setting attractive benchmarks for social development. The changes that are occurring are leading citizens and society in general to gain agency over their value and meaning.

Soviet society was guided by goals and values defined by the Communist Party. For most Ukrainians, national post-Soviet values and meanings were to replace the Soviet ones, thus filling in the value-and-meaning gap. While a patriotic minority perceived the new circumstances as expected and desirable, the majority passively agreed to the substitution of old values with new ones. The Russian-Soviet oriented minority gave in to the situation to a greater or lesser extent, while preserving their inner value-related non-conformism.

At first, Ukrainian society developed in the context of an opposition between the proponents of national democratic values and those sharing pro-Russian/pro-Soviet values. Under these conditions, the majority, who did not make a choice between the two ideologies, attempted to obtain the necessary direction from the authorities. However, as the authorities' reputation was increasingly undermined, the significance of the values they represented decreased, and threatened even greater anomie. This forced citizens to develop their own values that did not differ from those put forward by the authorities in principle but – importantly – were elaborated and adopted by society itself.

102

In the context of each incarnation, we will now define the leading trends in public opinion reflecting the psychological significance of these changes.

Paternalistic-Demagogical Incarnation: Affective Development Trends

The most significant aspect of the first incarnation was the reduction and weakening of citizens' emotional dependence on the authorities.

Emotional self-regulation. One particular expression of people's considerable, sometimes total, emotional dependence on authorities in the Soviet era was that their emotional state was largely determined by the tone and style of messages citizens received from the authorities. The rulers had in place the tools required to incite various states in individuals: goodness, delight, optimism, enthusiasm, interest, aggression, hatred, despondency, pessimism, and depression. This was facilitated by the absolute prevalence of the Soviet ideology of governmental psychological paternalism. The authorities allegedly took constant care of their citizens, and the citizens responded with gratitude and devotion.

A series of deep disappointments swayed this dependence and forced citizens to look for their own reserves of emotional self-regulation. The long process of transition to emotional independence engendered a paradox. On the one hand, successful or clumsy attempts made by the next government to influence citizens' emotional lives were received with rejection and antagonism. On the other hand, citizens still felt a consistent need to be subjected to emotional influence by the authoritative sources as a mark of "good leadership".

Alienation from authorities. Despite the persistent endeavours of the Soviet authorities to be loved, they remained separated from their citizens by tangible emotional distance. For those who accepted their power, it was close to perfection but, according to Max Weber,[17] also unattainable and bureaucratically cold. And if it was charismatic, its charisma was artificial, created to the tune of the Soviet propaganda.

Each subsequent disappointment with the authorities made them less attractive, dispersed their enchantment and magic, and that of their origins. In the eyes of the citizens, state leadership increasingly became the product of their own choice.

Power as a source of populism. Soviet populism as the basis of the ideological system lost its appeal to most citizens and was partially replaced with populism based on other ideological paradigms. Today's populism in Ukraine often resorts to the promises of universal wellbeing, social justice and – in recent years – quick restoration of peace.

Each subsequent wave of populism rekindles people's interest and even a certain enthusiasm. As a rule, its authors, having gained power, do not make their promises come true. After inevitable disappointment, the desire of some

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17   Cf. Max Weber, Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft [The three pure types of legitimate rule], Preussische Jahrbücher 1-2/1922.

citizens/people to be favoured is revived again, though it is not so strong, and populism retains its hold on society and seems as though it may always do so.

Trust and mistrust in the authorities. The universal trust the Soviet authorities believed they had succeeded in cultivating among their citizens proved a delusion and, under the conditions of the systemic crisis, swiftly turned into prevalent lack of confidence in the Soviet leaders and authorities in general. The crisis of trust is one of the most characteristic features in contemporary Ukraine. For a long time, there has been no individual or entity in which a considerable section of the population could consistently place their trust.

In 2004-2005, Yushchenko secured a greater degree of trust than his predecessors, but generally no politician and no political force could secure sufficiently high and stable public confidence. Situation-based improvements in public trust resulted ultimately in irreversible decline. Moreover, the most popular leaders and parties have a few per cent of the "core" electorate.

Negative emotions. In the Soviet era, citizens' negative sentiments were regulated by directing them towards external or internal enemies. The authorities deliberately cultivated hatred. For example, "class hatred" was used as a tool to fight all sorts of opponents and competitors. Irritation with the authorities was thoroughly concealed and only permitted in certain cases, and with the permission of the authorities.

When emotional freedom was acquired, citizens relished the opportunity to express their hatred freely. Perhaps, this explains the intense hatred in Ukrainian society, which comes to the fore from time to time in relations between different groups of the population – ideological, regional, proprietary - but most commonly in citizens' attitude to the authorities. The authorities proved to be the "emotional" scapegoat, guilty of all possible sins *a priori*. The attitude of a large sector of the population to President Poroshenko in the final years of his presidency was a convincing example of this.

Hatred of the authorities is not a sign of liberation from dependence on them, but rather indicates a change from positive to negative dependence. Further development is likely to lead to a less emotional response and a more restrained attitude to towards the leadership.

A need to blame. High levels of tension in society support substantial expectations and the search for a way out. Finding who is to blame is a primitive but tempting way to take emotional co-ownership.

The desire to identify and punish corrupt officials has proven to be one of the strongest mass sentiments in the final years of the Soviet era and in post-Soviet times. None of the existing systems have lived up to these expectations. The public believes that most corrupt officials have never been punished, which is certainly the case. Moreover, the authorities in each existing system were indeed corrupt. The hope for justice was rekindled at each election, only to end in fresh disillusionment.

Our surveys suggest that the desire to provoke a sense of guilt and repentance is an important motif in the search for those who are to blame and attitudes

to them. In this sense, the authorities are, perhaps, the most convenient object of citizens' respective expectations. However, in the post-Soviet tradition, the authorities typically did not repent for mistakes, errors of judgement, or crimes.

Citizens' liberation from emotional dependence on the authorities in the post-Soviet era was reflected in the shift from seeing authorities as paternalistic and demagogic. People's ability to emotionally self-regulate improved; alienation from the authorities strengthened; populism became less attractive; the criteria for trust in the authorities became more stringent; and the collective readiness to hate and to blame increased.

The Pragmatic-Regulatory Incarnation Rational Development Trends

The second incarnation is bringing about order, which is dominated by a conscious attitude to the authorities and reasonable assessments of their activity.

Authorities' responsibilities. In the Soviet tradition, the authorities are omnipotent, omnipresent, and responsible for everything. The rights and duties of the authorities and citizens, as prescribed in law, are actually determined from the point of view of the authorities. The voice of a party leader at any level of hierarchy is more influential than the law.

The initial idealization of the "always right" authorities gradually turned into understanding and acceptance of the fact that the authorities were far from perfect, could be better or worse, and were made up of people of different levels of competence, ethics, and communicative and managerial skills. Citizens began to "find out" that the power was man-made, not "from God".

Ukrainians are increasingly hypercritical of pre-election claims and try to predict the future behaviour of a political force or political figure if they are elected. The authorities are no longer perceived as the main source of truth. Their resolutions and actions are subject to close and critical attention, not only from their opponents. The increasing establishment of ideological plurality in the media contributes to this trend. In this regard, the competition of oligarch-owned media proved more effective than the single party ideological monopoly.

At present, no public politician can count on favourable treatment by the media. In response to their political aspirations, they experience criticism, including outright lies and a multitude of interpretations of their work. Citizens learn to be more responsible when assessing the authorities' functions and duties, bringing a great deal of personal judgement to these assessments. Depending on their preferences and wishes, they may interpret the competence of the authorities more broadly, for example, when it concerns their duty to ensure social order, or more narrowly, e.g., when it concerns limitations on citizens. Increasingly frequent public discussions on these issues enrich citizens' interaction with the authorities.

Transparency of the authorities. The secrecy and mystery of the authorities has been replaced with a perception of accessibility, facilitated by the dissemination of all sorts of online resources and social media where the authorities are represented by real people and less frequently in the form of abstract images. Their private lives, character traits, intellect, and behaviour are a focus of interest.

Perhaps no politician is able and willing to be fully transparent to society. In this sense, Ukrainian society has not gained sufficient experience in the division between the private and public lives of politicians. Citizens demand to know about their politicians' personal lives, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for politicians to disguise their personalities and intentions, to create and maintain their artificial image.

A display of sincerity is one of the most highly prized skills in a public figure. However, the public can keenly assess integrity and gets wise to insincere public figures quickly. At the same time, politicians' constant psychological exposure causes displeasure amongst the population sooner or later, as it raises doubts regarding their effectiveness.

Citizen-authority relations. Citizens assess the authorities with increasing objectivity and boldness. The fear of state leadership that used to prevail in the past has mostly been dispelled, although the older generation and provincial residents have retained it to a certain extent. Instead, fear of authority is expressed in the fear of immediate bosses with the power to punish or forgive. At the collective level, citizens assess the authorities more captiously.

There is still a long way to go in achieving an equal citizen-authority partnership. However, there are more and more noticeable signs that this possibility and its necessity are gaining recognition amongst the public. Citizens learn about such opportunities from the media rather than their own experience, but they try to adapt the information they receive to their own needs, more or less actively. As for the authorities, they are becoming increasingly dependent on citizens and fear rejection, a fear that increases before elections.

At the same time, a number of beliefs prevail in public opinion and hinder the changes occurring: Those in power have more ample decision-making rights, and their decisions are the only right ones; ordinary citizens have no say, the candidates preferred by those "at the top" are "elected"; power should be given to those who have already stolen since they won't steal anymore, and so on.

Memes such as these were popular in the 1990s, when the electorate was attempting to overcome their post-Soviet lack of experience and thus avoided assuming political responsibility. Nowadays, such judgements are less prevalent and yield to more specific and unbiased opinions on those running for elections. Ukrainian citizens also began to reflect on the authorities' attitude to how they are perceived by the population. Today, citizens are much more competent in assessing how the authorities treat them, using both ideological and psychological criteria.

The efficiency of the authorities. Ukrainians are gradually giving up their habit of electing the authorities that they "just like" and that seem to be convenient and comfortable. More serious criteria such as efficiency are increasing in importance. The public is learning to assess leaders by the totality of their activities, rather than by individual actions. Whereas initially the authorities used to be assessed positively, with citizens only later beginning to oscillate between the positive and negative poles, now they tend towards a more balanced and unbiased assessment.

Before elections in particular, the more active section of the electorate uses and disseminates economic indicators and sociological ratings as arguments, as if to eradicate the magic of fancy language and provide more convincing evidence. The general interdependence of different indicators is hard for the electorate to grasp. For instance, the public finds it difficult to reconcile that any increase in salaries triggers price hikes, that any tax reductions threaten pension payments etc. The desire for things to "go well everywhere" still prevails amongst the masses. If everything is going more or less well, but something somewhere is "a bit poor", the subjective importance of that poor aspect increases, and the authorities are assessed negatively rather than objectively.

Division of power and business. One important aspect of attitudes to the authorities in contemporary Ukraine is citizens' assessment of the government's links with business. In most cases, the separation between the authorities and business that was formally and informally declared has not been implemented. The clearest example is the previous president Poroshenko, who allegedly abandoned his business, albeit so unconvincingly that his real or imputed business interests were one of the most forceful arguments used by his opponents in the election campaign.

Ukrainians cherish the "socialist" ideal of a politician who works altruistically for the benefit of the nation, for a little payment. Even a slight increase in deputies' and ministers' salaries leads to an avalanche of universal indignation. A series of public scandals resulted from the publication, according to a law adopted in 2016, of data on deputies', ministers' and judges' property and income. Information on the politicians' assets registered in their spouses' and relatives' names was a particular subject of discussion.

The systemic nature of state authority. The Soviet authorities taught individuals to perceive them as strong and monumental. The Communist Party's nomenclature boasted of its systemic nature, claiming that it stood for reliability and the highest expediency. Anti-Soviet discourse often concerned the need to "break the system". There was a popular anecdote about a plumber who was wanted by the KGB because of his words about the "need to change the entire system".

However, the systemic nature of authority implied not only strength and reliability, but also a certain alienation from the public, the advantages of which were perceived rather abstractly. Understanding authority as systemic

usually meant it was inert, indifferent to the individual, and its bureaucrats inaccessible.

For most citizens, systemic authority is personified by politicians speaking about problems unrelated to the daily life of ordinary people and, as such, appearing uninteresting and unnecessary. On the contrary, those who focus on ordinary people's problems seem non-systemic, defending individuals' interests sincerely. This creates a large space for populism.

The virtual image of the authorities. Dreaming of perfect authorities and facing constant disappointments, citizens are easily attracted by illusions created by the media, most often as a result of purposeful influence. However, were it not for the need to generate an image of the desired political reality in the public consciousness, and the public's readiness to respond to these tempting images, creating these illusions would be ineffective. Both the enticing image of perfect authorities and the negative image of the current leaders support constant interest in potential/possible changes in power. This is facilitated by the growing technologization of social life and, consequently, the hybridization of public sentiment.

Throughout the three decades of the country's independence, the Ukrainian public has steadily demanded "new faces". Paradoxically, people who seek power without having showcased themselves beforehand are unlikely to win the electorate's support. Where new candidates have been able to establish themselves in politics, they were usually known for their activities in other sectors. The population transferred their previous assessments of these individuals into politics, which had a motivating effect for creating an attractive political future.

In the pragmatic-regulatory incarnation of authority, citizens have made more stringent requirements for the responsibility, transparency, and efficiency of their leadership; citizens' consideration of their attitudes to the authorities has intensified; they perceive the authorities' systemic nature and reliance on business more negatively; and public and political life increasingly takes place in virtual spaces.

The Manipulative-paranoid Incarnation: Value Development Trends

The third incarnation reflects the role the authorities play in the changes in value and meaning in public opinion: that of the author of benchmarks for society.

Political and ideological plurality. The strict suppression of any manifestation of dissenting views by the Soviet authorities not only resulted in fear of repression, but also the profound belief that it was useless having an opinion different from that of the leadership. The official myths prevailing in all areas of social life were perceived as justified and appropriate. Just a small minority of the population welcomed liberation from the Communist Party's dictate; the majority initially felt sceptical and distrustful.

Gradually, citizens got a taste for freedom of opinion and political plurality, although extreme plurality, as it was perceived by many, caused irritation and disquiet, first, because it often forced citizens to determine their standpoint unambiguously, and second, because five to seven parties seemed sufficient. Since they had to make a choice out of two or three hundred parties, many voters had the impression that the parties were too numerous and, as such, confusing.

Pluralism increased disorientation in the world of politics and deepened psychological discomfort. This resulted in the pronounced, then slightly decreasing, and then re-increasing readiness of many citizens to partially reject the advantages of democracy for the sake of societal and ideological order.

Political and ideological polarization and radicalization. Aggravation of social tensions forced individuals to define their political preferences more clearly and gravitate towards different extremes. Dissent was most evident in the attitudes towards Russia. According to our studies, the Russian dimension has the greatest weight in the political structuring of society. Ukrainians' pro- and anti-American, European, Polish, Jewish and other sentiments, taken together, are far behind pro- and anti-Russian ones.

This polarization brought with it the radicalization of certain groups. Society gradually gained experience of the very existence of radical views and standpoints, and of the assertive response to their usually tough talk and dangerous action.

The differentiation of moderately patriotic opinions and radical forces' calls that exacerbate the situation is important from a psychological point of view. If even Western societies, with their much longer experience of dealing with radicals, do not always manage to assess their actions adequately, Ukrainian society is unsophisticated in this respect, and finds it hard to address these objectives. However, a lack of necessary experience does not prevent most citizens from adequately assessing right- and left-wing extremists, who receive less than five per cent of votes in quiet periods. Citizens are increasingly reluctant to express support for radical parties and look to more centrist and respectable ones. At the same time, the centrists, on the one hand, attract voters with their moderate and well-balanced standpoints but, on the other, repel with their incoherent principles and unsteady positions.

Public self-government. Gaining collective agency in different areas is the main psychological basis for the development of public self-government up to the formation of civil society.[18]

Failed or unpopular decisions and actions on the part of the authorities, on the one hand, aggravate citizens' negative attitude to them and, on the other, induce them to independently search for a way out of the situation.

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18   Cf. Iryna Solonenko, Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/ IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2014*, Baden-Baden 2015, pp 219-235.

These trends were most perceptible in three spheres, the first of which was economic wellbeing. When the Soviet welfare system collapsed, the self-sufficient production of food, additional jobs, going abroad to earn a living, and establishing one's own business were key to getting the upper hand in the crisis. In all of these cases, the economic support of the authorities was not highly necessary. Many citizens, especially the middle-aged, got a taste for independent earnings or private entrepreneurship.

The second sphere was civil engagement in political processes. It is worth examining the first and second *Maidan* specifically (the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity), when the feeling of civil dignity surged and the sense of justice became more acute. Once things calmed down, the public mood "relaxed" to some extent, but at a new norm.

The third sphere was only evident for a short period but was strong and impressive. The large-scale volunteer movement in 2014-2015 saved the Ukrainian army from defeat in confrontation with Russian and separatist troops. Thousands of volunteers, supported by millions, took part in the movement.

Psychological legitimization of change. Citizens became more and more convinced that the authorities were dependent on them and established to serve them. Whereas in the past, the leader's word bore greater weight than the law, now the law increasingly yields to the citizens' collective wishes expressed by one politician or another. If a law is not considered good, or is altogether bad, the authorities are seen to be justified if they violate it.

Such "revolutionary expedience" infringes on the system of power but, supported by a majority of the population, pushes the system to change. Of course, to what extent the supposed changes will be beneficial for society cannot be determined in advance. In this sense, we can only express and compare different points of view. And again, the most ancient political and psychological issue – that of the majority's rectitude, be it electoral or revolutionary – re-emerges.

It is also worth considering another aspect of the prospective usefulness of change: the generational aspect. Our studies suggest that age-related political and ideological differences in Ukrainian society were the second factor in terms of significance after regional differences. The previous years' political experience proved that the middle generation's preferences were the most appropriate for development. However, the values and goals set by the youth are more suitable in terms of legitimizing change at the stage when social conflicts arise.

The triumphal victory of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, a comedian, over the systemic politician Poroshenko marked the most important change in the development of Ukrainian society.

It is noteworthy that Zelenskyi was neither an ordinary clown nor a buffoon: There was much acute political satire in his speeches. *The Servant of the People,* a series in which Zelenskyi starred as an ordinary teacher who was suddenly elected president and who acted honestly, wisely, and decisively in his position was a highlight of his career. This image gave rise to a wave of nationwide sympathy that was later extrapolated to Zelenskyi himself. Sociologists began recording the steady rise in his popularity as a nominee to the position of president.

His election was a clear sign that Ukrainians' mentality had changed. Using the development trends outlined above, let us consider their clearest manifestations during the presidential and then parliamentary election campaign and in the post-electoral period.

Undoubtedly, the greatest strength of Zelenskyi and his team, the backbone of which are his peers from the artist's studio, is an easy and prompt response to society's demands in the form of spectacular media appearances, provocative mockery, and aggressive revelation of opponents, using popular memes and fakes.[19]

The clear victory of Zelenskyi and the *Servant of the People* party as a result of its leader's popularity allowed him to strengthen his power while violating procedural and even constitutional norms, actually changing the parliamentary-presidential political system into a presidential-parliamentary one.

The elections triggered the polarization and separation of society into two large factions: Zelenskyi's proponents, and his opponents, who consolidated around Poroshenko. Poroshenko's supporters position themselves as the Ukrainian patriots, in particular in connection with their opposition to Russian aggression, and they condemn Zelenskyi for his willingness to concede to Putin. Most of Zelenskyi's proponents do not renounce Ukrainian patriotism; however, combating corruption, improving welfare, and making agreements with Russia are much more important to them.

Besides political and ideological differences, some demographic and psychological ones were discovered. According to sociologists, demographic differences were mostly regional by nature (Zelenskyi's support increased from west to south east), age-related (he received most support amongst the youth), and educational (support for Zelenskyi correlated with a lower level of education).[20]

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19 Cf. Valeriĭ Pekar, Chomu peremih Zelens'kyĭ: shist' rivniv peremohy [Why Zelensky Won: Six Levels of Victory], at: https://site.ua/valerii.pekar/22052/.

20 Cf. Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, Khto za koho proholosuvav: demografiya Natsional'noho ekzyt-polu' 2019 druhoho turu prezidents'kykh vyboriv [Who

As for psychological qualities, according to the all-Ukraine survey we ran in April between the first and the second rounds of the presidential election, those who voted for Zelenskyi were comparatively less satisfied with life, felt less trust in other people, expressed a greater externality, and preferred intuitive solutions to reasonable ones. The answer to the question "Did you familiarize yourself with the election programme of the presidential nominee you voted for?" was representative: 19 per cent of Poroshenko's proponents and 36 per cent of Zelenskyi's proponents chose the option: "It was clear to me whom to vote for, without the programme".

The electoral results showed that emotions prevailed over logic- and value-based orientations. Comparing Zelenskyi's proponents and opponents using the affective components of the paternalistic-demagogical incarnation of power, it is possible to state that emotional self-regulation is rather poor in both groups: Both are too agitated.

The almost incessant negative emotion and the need to accuse is what "unites" both ends of the political spectrum psychologically. Zelenskyi's opponents mistrust the new authorities, cultivate their alienation from it, and accuse the authorities of all possible sins: lack of competence, populism, betrayal of national interests. The new president's followers are uncritically positive about the authorities, resulting in a record high level of trust in them in Ukraine.

In terms of features of pragmatic-regulatory development, the opponents and proponents of the new authorities share the requirement for the authorities to act with responsibility, openness, efficiency, and separate themselves from business. The former are more irreconcilable and rush to criticize any mistakes made by the authorities. The latter are much more indulgent, believing that the new authorities meet their expectations and turning a blind eye to minor misdemeanours.

Reflecting on their relationships with the authorities, Zelenskyi's opponents assess their actions comprehensively and strategically, while his proponents are satisfied with contextual assessments. The perception of the authorities' systemic nature is related to this assessment, too. The president's opponents favour the preservation or restoration of the authorities' systemic elements, regarding their elimination as a threat to the existence of the state in general. Zelenskyi's followers approve of the signs of the depreciation of the governmental system, they like the fact that those who govern the state are eager young people who act without bureaucratic delay.

Zelenskyi's opponents and proponents share one common feature: the vague and cautious attitude to the virtualization of the authorities' image. New leaders are proactive in introducing such an image into public consciousness

voted what: Demographics of the National Exit Poll 2019 of the second round of the presidential election], 6 May 2019, at: https://dif.org.ua/article/khto-za-kogo-progolosuvav-demografiya-natsionalnogo-ekzit-polu2019-drugogo-turu-prezidentskikh-viboriv; Andriï Sukharyna, Bitva pokolin': Khto, de i I yak holosuvav na vyborakh do Rady [The generation battle. Who, where and how voted in the Council elections], *Ukrayins'ka Pravda*, 13 August 2019, at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/08/13/7223394/.

by insisting on digitalizing the system of governance. Zelenskyi's followers accept these proposals passively, just trusting their authors. The opponents believe that virtualization will help disguise the (in their opinion) unacceptable resolutions and actions of the authorities.

Regarding changes in social values as expressed in the manipulative- paranoid incarnation of political power, we can say that they are exposed to the prevalent influence of affective aspects of development. The political and ideological polarization of views is intensifying and, therefore, behaviour is becoming more radical. Consequently, there is less space for political and ideological plurality. The advantage is an opportunity for dynamic social development, while the drawback is the danger of large-scale social conflicts.

Two essential functions that could ensure positive development in the short term can be expected from the two most active groups of citizens. Zelenskyi's proponents are securing psychological legitimization of these changes. With their majority, they have *carte blanche* to almost any transformation of the state system. Zelenskyi's opponents are standing against any actions that seem ill-substantiated to them, moving society towards public self-governance and the establishment of civil society standards.

II.

Responsibilities, Instruments, Mechanisms, and Procedures

Conflict Prevention and Dispute Settlement

Cono Giardullo/Walter Dorn/Danielle Stodilka

Technological Innovation in the OSCE: The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine

> *The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) is the only organization on the ground in eastern Ukraine that provides impartial facts about a confusing conflict that has been going on since 2014.*[1]

> *Even by United Nations or European Union standards, the SMM was becoming a cutting-edge peace operation.*[2]

Introduction

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) deployed the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) in March 2014, shortly after protests turned violent in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of eastern Ukraine. The SMM mandate is similar to those of traditional UN peacekeeping missions: to establish facts by observing and reporting impartially on the situation; to facilitate dialogue among parties to the conflict; and, later, to help oversee peace accords (Minsk agreements).[3] The SMM deployed unarmed civilians, not military personnel,[4] on the ground in ten different monitoring teams across Ukraine, mostly to the two eastern regions.

Like traditional UN peacekeepers, the SMM observers initially had a limited view beyond their own line of sight, at night, and in dangerous areas. The Mission soon realized that it needed technology to assist with monitoring.[5] So,

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Note: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the OSCE, its SMM or Canada's Department of National Defence.

1   Stephanie Liechtenstein, "OSCE, Keep Going!" *Security and Human Rights Monitor*, 27 April 2017, at: https://www.shrmonitor.org/osce-keep-going.

2   Walter Kemp, Civilians in a War Zone: The OSCE in Eastern Ukraine, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2017*, Baden-Baden 2018, pp 113-123, here: p. 117, at: https://ifsh.de/file/publication/OSCE_Yearbook_en/2017/Kemp-en.pdf.

3   The mandate tasks the SMM, *inter alia*, to gather information and report on the security situation in the area of operation and establish and report facts in response to specific incidents. Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Council, Decision No. 1117, Deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, PC.DEC/1117, 21 March 2014, available at: http://www.osce.org/pc/116747.

4   "[T]he civilian nature of the OSCE Mission is an asset, making it easier for all parties to accept its deployment", Liechtenstein, cited above (Note 1). However, it should be noted that many of the SMM monitors are former military.

5   Point 7 of the Minsk Memorandum, 19 September 2014, and paragraph 3 of the Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements, 12 February 2015, explicitly authorize the use of technologies to help verify the agreements. These texts are available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_140919_MemoImplementati

it started to use Unmanned/Unpersonned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), satellite images, and remote (on-site) cameras. Although the SMM is a relatively new peace operation, its innovative deployment of modern technologies can offer useful lessons for future SMM and OSCE activities, and for other international organizations, including the United Nations, which only adopted its first UAVs in a peace operation in 2013.[6]

The SMM began operating UAVs in October 2014, impressively soon (six months) after the Mission was created.[7] The aerial devices immediately proved their worth. However, they were also attacked both physically and electronically, being shot at (and shot down) and jammed, at a rate of almost twice a week.[8] At least one mini-UAV was seized at gunpoint in 2017 by Russian-speaking forces.[9] In addition, there was some concern that the parties were surreptitiously monitoring the video feeds.[10] These problems, as well as "extended contract negotiations",[11] caused a hiatus of more than 18 months,[12] before the long-range UAV programme was re-started in March 2018.[13] But the UAVs were immediately under attack again by the conflicting parties. A video released by the Mission of surface-to-air missiles fired at a long-range UAV shows one such attack in June 2018.[14] The Mission started losing many long-range UAVs: Three were either shot down or jammed between 27 October 2018 and 18 April 2019,[15] resulting in a loss of operational capabilities for the

onPeacePlan_en.pdf and https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pdf.

6   Publications on the use of technology in UN peace operations can be found at: https://www.walterdorn.net/pub#tech.

7   Two months after the SMM was created, a concept note on UAVs was circulated internally and the following month the decision was made to use UAVs. Showing great speed and flexibility in procurement, the first flight occurred three months later on 23 October 2014. Cf, Claus Neukirch, The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Operational Challenges and New Horizons, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2014*, Baden-Baden 2015, pp. 183-197, here: p. 196.

8   Cf. Digital Forensic Research Lab, Blinding the Eye in the Sky, *Medium*, 10 August 2016, at: https://medium.com/dfrlab/jamming-the-eyes-in-the-sky-over-ukraines-east-5dc10f136cc5.

9   Cf. OSCE, Spot Report by the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Armed men open fire close to SMM in Yasynuvata and Pikuzy, Kyiv, 25 February 2017, at: https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/301821.

10   Information provided to Walter Dorn by a Ukrainian officer, 2017.

11   Marcel Peško, The OSCE's Engagement in Response to the Crisis in Ukraine: Meeting New Challenges with New Solutions, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2016*, Baden-Baden 2017, pp. 23-32, here: p. 30.

12   Cf. John Hudson, International Monitor Quietly Drops Drone Surveillance of Ukraine War,, *Foreign Policy*, 28 October 2016, at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/28/international-monitor-quietly-drops-drone-surveillance-of-ukraine-war/.

13   Cf. OSCE, OSCE SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicles resume monitoring of security situation in eastern Ukraine,Kyiv, 28 March 2018, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/376456.

14   Cf. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, OSCE SMM UAV targeted near Betmanove, 15 June 2018, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sirVhEQ9b8c.

15   Cf. RFE/RL, OSCE Mission's Drone Shot Down After Spotting Russian Missile System In Eastern Ukraine, *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*, 1 November 2018, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-osce-drone-germany-france-suspect-separatists/29577799.html;

Mission and serious financial losses for the contractor. While long-range UAVs accounted for almost 17 per cent of the Mission's budget in 2016 (last data available), it was the contractor providing the service who assumed liability for UAV loss.[16]

Despite the setbacks, there were compelling reasons for the Mission to further improve its technological monitoring. First, the SMM received a volley of criticism and pressure to expand its monitoring beyond daylight hours.[17] Second, the Mission has had its monitoring and freedom of movement increasingly restricted, mostly due to security hazards and threats, which included risks posed by mines, and unexploded ordnance (UXO). For example, the Mission suffered a fatal incident on 23 April 2017, when one SMM patrol member died and two were injured after a vehicle hit a possible mine.[18] Earlier, SMM monitors had been subject to abduction at gunpoint and SMM vehicles had been vandalized.[19] Moreover, they have frequently been harassed and prevented from entering areas, even though they have the right to freedom of movement under the Mission's mandate and under the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements.[20] Thus, it became imperative to find additional ways of gathering information, both for situational awareness, and to carry out the monitoring of the Minsk agreements.

In the first few years, the SMM showed great reluctance to share information about its technologies. But in May 2019, it finally published a video on "OSCE SMM technical monitoring".[21] This video informed the world about technologies the Mission uses to: first, help observe at night; second, monitor the situation in areas not accessible by regular patrols; third, observe the impact

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OSCE, Spot Report by OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM): SMM loses long-range unmanned aerial vehicle near Berdianka, Kyiv, 18 February 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/411776; OSCE, Spot Report by OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle crashes near contact line in Donetsk region, Kyiv, 19 April 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/417773.

16 Cf. Peško, cited above (Note 11), p. 30-31. In 2018, for instance, the general costs related to contracts awarded to external companies for providing the Mission with UAVs related expenses amounted to 26,314,000 euros over a two-year period, at: https://procurement.osce.org/resources/document/contract-awards-2018-0.

17 Cf. Andrew E. Kramer, Keeping Bankers' Hours, European Observers Miss Most of Ukraine War, New York Times, 27 July 2016, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/world/europe/ukraine-war-osce-observers.html.

18 Cf. OSCE, Spot Report: One SMM patrol member dead, two taken to hospital after vehicle hits possible mine near Pryshyb, Kyiv, 23 April 2017, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/312971.

19 Cf. OSCE, Latest news from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) based on information received until 18:00 hrs, 28 May (Kyiv time), Kyiv, 29 May 2014, at: https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/119299; Interfax-Ukraine, OSCE SMM calls for inquiry into spray paint incident involving SMM vehicles, Kyiv Post, 23 July 2015, at: https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/war-against-ukraine/osce-smm-calls-for-inquiry-into-spray-paint-incident-involving-smm-vehicles-394138.html.

20 Cf. OSCE, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 301/2019, issued on 20 December 2019, Kyiv, 20 December 2019, p. 6, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/442867.

21 Cf. OSCE, OSCE SMM technical monitoring, 15 May 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/419582.

of the conflict on civilian population and infrastructure; and fourth, portray the current security situation with 20 camera systems, especially along the 500 km contact line. It included impressive footage from its most flexible monitoring technology: the UAV.

UAVs: Eyes in the Sky

The SMM is the first OSCE mission to deploy UAVs to complement monitoring and reporting by ground personnel. The Mission started flying UAVs within half a year of its creation. An early offer of military UAVs was declined, and instead, the Mission elected to use commercial, civilian UAVs under the direct control of the civilian mission.[22] The SMM UAVs are explicitly permitted in the no-fly zone established by the Minsk Memorandum: along the whole line of contact in a security zone that is at least 30 km wide, i.e., 15 km wide on each side of the line of contact. SMM UAVs have also been deployed up to the internationally recognized border with the Russian Federation, which stretches well beyond the distance of 15 km from the contact line.[23] The SMM deploys more than 50 short and mid-range UAVs. In addition, the mission has several long-range UAVs, though more than one was shot down.[24]

In June 2019, the Mission published its first 3D rendering from UAVs, called "Damage to civilian housing in eastern Ukraine".[25] It was made from two separate flights of mid-range UAVs, whose images were orthorectified using the software Pix4d.[26] The imagery and digital evidence showed that both sides had positioned military hardware and heavy weapons close to civilian housing. The video showed two villages, one on each side of the line of contact, i.e., one under Ukrainian control, and one under the control of the separatist armed forces. The video quickly became one of SMM's most popular videos; it was viewed almost 300,000 times on the Mission's Facebook page in the half year after it was uploaded. Unfortunately, despite the many daily flights of SMM UAVs, no other similar high-resolution and telling video has been released, while this practice should become, in our view, a regular one. At the same time, the long time necessary to orthorectify hundreds of images and build a 3D model cannot be the priority in a mission, which is essentially about reporting on ceasefire adherence on a daily basis.

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22 The offer was made by Germany, France, Italy, and the Russian Federation on 17 October 2014 in Milan. Cf. Neukirch, cited above (Note 7), p. 196.

23 See point 7 of the Minsk Memorandum, cited above (Note 5); cf. also Cono Giardullo/ Ertuğrul Apakan, UAVs for the benefit of people: The use of unmanned aerial vehicles within the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, *Human Rights Quarterly* (forthcoming).

24 Definitions used in this paper regarding the range of SMM drones – long-range, mid-range, and short-range – are essentially SMM terms, which do not necessarily match general technical terminology. In order to compare the tasks, strengths, and flaws of each platform, we kept the Mission's terminology.

25 Cf. OSCE, Damage to civilian housing in eastern Ukraine, 3 June 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/421529.

26 This is evident from the logo in the bottom right of the video published (see Note 25).

In November 2019, the Mission published UAV imagery of co-operation and confidence building to highlight and encourage the reconstruction of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge at the only crossing point between the sides in the Luhansk region. The before and after images of the bridge were shown through image comparisons from short-range UAVs.

Long-range UAVs, Schiebel Camcopter S-100, allow for assessment of more distant and larger areas. An example is shown in Figure 1. This model allows for vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) and has a range of 160 km. These are the only SMM UAVs with infrared imaging sensors, and they are piloted and maintained by external contractors, while the operational activities (flight planning and camera control) rest with the mission.[27] Given the safety and access restrictions preventing SMM ground monitors from operating during the night and on unpaved roads, the long-range UAVs are valuable monitoring tools, together with the fixed cameras and acoustic sensors, that can help overcome the limitations. The long-range UAVs have been hotly debated within the mission, given the difficult experience and ongoing risks of losing expensive technological hardware. This led to risk-sharing agreements with the supplier, which had been selected through a tender procedure. OSCE participating States agreed to pay voluntary contributions to partially fund the cost of expensive long-range UAVs.[28]

The mid-range UAVs, mostly Delair-Tech DT 18,[29] have been in operation since November 2015, and have ranges varying between 15-30 km. Short-range, mini-UAVs – DJI Phantom and Inspire quadcopters with ranges of 3-5 km – have also been used frequently. All of the SMM UAVs are equipped with high definition photo or video cameras. The two categories of UAVs (mid- and short-range) are currently operated by SMM field monitoring officers who are specially trained for this.[30] The UAVs are the principal reconnaissance tool used for observations related to human rights and humanitarian incidents. They also facilitate the observation of disengagement zones (weapons free areas), minefields, and damaged or destroyed infrastructure.

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27 The UAV contractor provides both the pilots and the payload (camera) operators. But during an UAV mission, an SMM monitor usually works alongside the payload operator to provide direction. Cf. Beth Stevenson, Schiebel Camcopter UAV to deploy over Ukraine, *FlightGlobal*, 15 September 2014, at: https://www.flightglobal.com/civil-uavs/schiebel-camcopter-uav-to-deploy-over-ukraine/114474.article.

28 The SMM's first long-range UAVs (contracted from an Austrian company) "could not be flown in certain types of weather (including fog and freezing temperatures), and several were shot down, causing the supplier to terminate the contract due to excessive risk." Kemp, cited above (Note 2), p. 116.

29 Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l'OSCE, Une entreprise française va fournir des drones à la Mission d'observation en Ukraine [French company to supply drones to the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine], 7 October 2016, at: https:// osce.delegfrance.org/Une-entreprise-francaise-va-fournir-des-drones-a-la-Mission-speciale-d.

30 Cf. Giardullo/Apakan, cited above (Note 23).

Figure 1. (A) The long-range UAV used by the SMM, both an electro-optical (visible light) and an infrared (thermal) camera in the pod (undercarriage ball).[31]

31 Sources: (A) OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 28 March 2018 (OSCE/Evgeniy Maloletka), at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/osce_smmu/41325822072; (B) OSCE SMM Ukraine, *Twitter,* 28 September 2017, at: https://twitter.com/osce_smm/status/913309485158031360; (C) screencapture from online video by OSCE SMM, Damage to civilian housing in eastern Ukraine, cited above (Note 25).

Figure 1. (B) Image taken by mid-range UAV's showing artillery equipment in Myrne, a village located in a non-government-controlled area.

D-30 122mm Munitions

4 x 2S1 Gvozdika 122mm

6 x D-30 122mm towed

6 x MT-12 100mm Anti-tank

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Figure 1. (C) Images converted to 3D rendering of war-damaged dwellings.

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The imagery enables comparison pre- and post-shelling, and identification of civilian buildings occupied by armed forces. In the course of this monitoring work, the UAVs have been often subject to shooting and jamming.[32] Electronic counter-measures, including state-of-the-art Russian systems for jamming, are increasingly observed in the conflict zone, suggesting that the current conflict in eastern Ukraine is a training camp and laboratory for some of Russia's electronic warfare equipment and techniques.[33] The SMM's short-range UAVs have been used to try to locate larger drones that have crashed, with mixed outcomes.[34]

Compared to the long-range UAVs, the short- and mid-range models are more limited by inclement weather conditions, fly at lower altitudes, and have lower endurance, all of which increase the exposure to jamming and shooting. The goal of assigning one mini-UAV to each patrol group is close to full realization.

Other Sensors

The deployment of 24 ground-based camera systems to monitor hotspots, checkpoints, and disengagement zones was another effective technological development by the Mission. Cameras were deployed to the hotspot of Shyrokyne village in January 2016, and near Donetsk airport a few months later, as well as in the disengagement areas. Major challenges in their use, in addition to those already mentioned, include obtaining security guarantees from the conflicting parties, ensuring data integrity, and preventing data tampering.[35] The daylight and thermal imaging cameras also monitor crossing points along the line of contact, the three disengagement zones of Petrivske, Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote, and certain dangerous hotspots. Ground cameras are operated remotely on mounts around six metres tall. A few of them are mobile, mounted on vehicle trailers. The recorded data from ground cameras is transmitted via an encrypted satellite communication system to the Technical Monitoring Centre (TMC) at the SMM head office. Data received from the cameras is frequently mentioned in the daily reports of the mission.[36] Some of the thermal-only cameras, manufactured by *Infratec*, were provided as an

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32   Cf. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, SMM long-range UAV comes under fire, 5 April 2019, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-0HNhIu_Gs.
33   See DFR Lab, #MinskMonitor: New Russian Electronic Warfare Systems in Eastern Ukraine, *Medium*, 23 August 2018, at: https://medium.com/dfrlab/minskmonitor-new-russian-electronic-warfare-systems-in-eastern-ukraine-5b913afbb455; DFR Lab, Russian GPS-Jamming Systems Return to Ukraine, *Medium*, 23 May 2019, https://medium.com/dfrlab/russian-gps-jamming-systems-return-to-ukraine-8c4ff7d8dcb8.
34   Cf. OSCE, Spot Report by OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), cited above (Note 15).
35   Cf. Peško, cited above (Note 11).
36   Cf. OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 20 August 2018, Kyiv, 21 August 2018, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/391211.

in-kind contribution from Germany.[37] One of the major downsides of fixed-site cameras is the need for an electricity feed, which can only be guaranteed in some areas by the use of generators. Also, SMM camera systems can be "blinded" using spot lights and aimed lasers, as was attributed to the Lugansk People's Republic.[38]

Acoustic sensors are also used by the Mission, so far without clear success. Little is known about the sensors, though some difficulties in installing the two of them were reported.[39] However, in the words of a former deputy chief observer of the Mission, such sensors can allow the Mission "to detect ceasefire violations, identify the direction from where they originate and under certain circumstances, pinpoint the origin of fire".[40] But too little information has been publicly shared, notably in the Mission's public reports, to allow a proper evaluation of such sensors. Live feeds from the acoustic sensors, as well as from the cameras, are transmitted to the TMC. They help create a "real time situation awareness and a common operating picture for the Mission".[41]

The SMM also adopted satellite imagery early on (June 2015) to help with monitoring.[42] Presently, this support is provided, *inter alia*, by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and amounts to almost six million euros,[43] helping especially with in-depth monitoring of the security situation in areas where no SMM monitors can be deployed. Imagery and analysis are provided by three agencies, among them DigitalGlobe and the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen), with funding provided by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), which is the EU's main mechanism to support "stabilisation initiatives and peace-building activities".[44] For instance, IcSP-

37   Cf. InfraTec., Monitoring compliance with security measures in Ukraine, 27 June 2017, at: https://www.infratec.eu/press/press-releases/details/2017-06-27-monitoring-compliance-with-security-measures-in-ukraine/

38   Cf. OSCE SMM Ukraine,"LPR" use laser to "blind" #OSCE SMM camera at Stanytsia Luhanska, *Twitter,* 6 October 2017, at: https://twitter.com/osce_smm/status/ 916241741606 420480.

39   Cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Statement on "Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea", 24 November 2017, at: https://mfa.gov. ua/en/news/61363-statement-on-russias-ongoing-aggression-against-ukraine-and-illegal-occupation-of-crimea.

40   OSCE SMM: The number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donbas this year exceeds 325,000, *Ukraine Crisis media center*, Kyiv, 3 November 2017, at: http://uacrisis.org/ 61968-osce-71.

41   OSCE, Technical Monitoring Officer/Camera Operator, at: https://jobs.osce.org/vacancies/ technical-monitoring-officercamera-operator-vnsmus00606.

42   "The 12 February package of measures also refers to the possible use of satellite imagery", Stephanie Liechtenstein, Interview with Alexander Hug: Political will has to be translated into operational instructions on the ground, *Security and Human Rights Monitor*, 24 February 2015, at: https://www.shrmonitor.org/interview-alexander-hug-deputy-chief-monitor-political-will-translated-operational-instructions-ground/.

43   Cf. European Union External Action, Further support in the area of satellite imagery to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, *EEAS*, 11 June 2019, https://eeas.europa. eu/topics/sanctions-policy/63915/further-support-area-satellite-imagery-osce-special-monitoring-mission-ukraine_en.

44   European Commission, The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace responds rapidly to crises, builds peace and prevents conflict around the world, at: https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/

supported assistance from the SatCen in 2017 delivered 510 products that contributed to SMM's monitoring efforts. These products covered: identification and description of military activity and equipment; change detection; monitoring of the contact line; training areas and rail stations; and battle damage assessment.[45] There is no evidence that the Mission has purchased sensors for radiation or chemical weapons. But because of the hazard from industrial and explosive gas exposure by either the SMM personnel or the local population, the SMM is procuring chemical detectors for a wide range of hazardous gases, from carbon monoxide to chlorine to hydrogen cyanide. Gas detectors can be installed in fixed locations or carried by monitors.[46] Given years of unverified environmental assessments in the conflict region, the SMM needs to develop a capability for rapid environmental (chemical) assessment.

The monitors currently carry cameras and binoculars, as well as cellular phones that can record still images and videos. Other standard patrol-related equipment includes radios, satellite phones, flak jackets, and helmets. A few camera systems are mounted on vehicle trailers but advanced reconnaissance vehicles (with radars) are not used. Neither are body or helmet-mounted cameras. Furthermore, too often monitors face difficulties in gaining quick access to satellite imagery and making use of aerospace (satellite and UAV) imagery to conduct their tasks. This appears to be due to both a lack of technical knowledge about remote sensing possibilities in conflict zones, and to the centralized tasking structure, which is based at the headquarters Operations Unit.

Data Handling

On a normal day, the SMM collects around 50-60 patrol reports, imagery from satellites, acoustic sensors, static and patrol cameras, and dozens of flights from short-, mid-, and long-range UAVs. To handle the volume of digital reporting, in 2015/16 the Mission established an Information Management Cell, whose status was later elevated to a Centre (IMC), which is staffed with image analysts, geographic information experts, and information, database, and operations data managers.[47]

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what-we-do/instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace-preventing-conflict-around-world_en.

45   Cf. Interim Responses Programme on Ukraine – Further support to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, p. 2, at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2018/EN/C-2018-3108-F1-EN-ANNEX-1-PART-1.PDF.

46   Cf. OSCE, on behalf of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Supply of gas detectors for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, OSCE Procurement reference RFQ/SMM/112/2019 (with Clarification Notes No, 1 and No. 2), 17 December 2019, at: https://procurement.osce.org/tenders/supply-gas-detectors-osce-special-monitoring-mission-ukraine.

47   Cf. Peško, cited above (Note 11), p. 31; see also: OSCE, Senior Information Management Officer, at: https://jobs.osce.org/vacancies/senior-information-management-officer-vnsmus00340.

In 2018, the SMM greatly expanded its technical monitoring capabilities, even converting some positions from field monitoring officers (MOs) to technical monitoring officers (TMOs). It created a Technical Monitoring Centre (TMC), located in Kyiv, where live feeds are received 24/7, including feeds from fixed cameras and acoustic sensors in the field. Under the supervision of the SMM Operations Unit, the TMC co-ordinates with the eastern monitoring teams (MTs) and helps the MTs with their data access and contributions to the mission common operational picture (MCOP).[48] The camera/UAV operators, some operating remotely in the TMC, extract ceasefire violation clips from video feeds – sometimes hundreds per day. Geographic Information System (GIS) specialists analyse the geospatial data to help understand both the capabilities and limitations of the monitoring systems.

Both satellite and UAV imagery should be progressively integrated within a recently developed Enterprise Geographic Information System (EGIS), "using state-of-the art reporting and mapping tools […] to improve the flow of information between the SMM's field teams and its headquarters".[49] While the EGIS was being instituted in 2019, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the International Organizations in Vienna predicted it would "enhance the SMM's awareness of the current situation on the ground and provide the Mission with the capacity to inform on the distance to the contact line while reporting on specific locations and damage to residential areas and military positions".[50]

To rationalize all these processes, a new position was created in 2019. The Senior Technical Project Officer is responsible for the planning, development, and management of activities, and delivery of the project to enhance and maintain the technical monitoring capacity of the mission.[51]

Within the OSCE SMM, there are no levels of information security (e.g., secret or top secret) for personnel, as there are within EU and NATO missions, while UN missions have a highest classification grade of "strictly confidential". Inside the SMM, the most sensitive information is shared on a *need to know* basis, by granting individual mission members electronic access to specific mission folders and briefing notes.

To limit external release, there is only one designation, *OSCE+*, meaning the release of documents is possible only to OSCE participating States, OSCE executive structures and Asian/Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation.

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48   Cf. OSCE, Chief of TMC (Technical Monitoring Centre), at: https://jobs.osce.org/vacancies/chief-tmc-technical-monitoring-centre-vnsmus00836.

49   Ambassador Stefano Toscano, Interviews with HMA Directors: Ambassador Stefano Toscano, The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 1, Article 4, April 2019, p. 2, at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss1/4.

50   OSCE, Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine in response to the update by Ambassador Martin Sajdik and to the report by Ambassador Yaşar Halit Çevik, 4 July 2019, p. 4, available at: https://www.osce.org/permanent-council/425564.

51   Cf. OSCE, Senior Technical Project Officer, at: https://jobs.osce.org/vacancies/senior-technical-project-officer-vnsmus00973.

In 2019, the SMM took much more pride in publicizing its use of drone monitoring than it did in earlier years. While footage is not released frequently, the Mission is remarkably public about its findings from all sources, releasing the findings on a daily basis and making "all of its relevant observations public on the OSCE web site".[52] What the Mission considers "relevant" are violations of the Minsk agreements – mainly ceasefire violations and any presence of military hardware within the agreed withdrawal lines.

While the earliest (2014) mission reports were relatively sparse, the Mission now publishes detailed daily reports of ten or more pages with standard types of information on the observed ceasefire violations. For instance, the daily report of 10 December 2019, noted that mini-UAVs helped spot: first, an excavator in a non-government controlled area, probably used to cover a nearby trench with dirt; second, Ukrainian Armed Force personnel digging; third, anti-tank mines in both government- and non-government-controlled areas; and fourth, a military presence in the security zone more than a dozen times. That daily report extensively tabulated cases where the fixed cameras recorded dozens of ceasefire violations, in addition to tabulated instances where SMM monitors "heard" over a hundred violations (specified as either fire from small arms, cannons, heavy machine guns, or "not known").[53]

As another case in point, a thematic report on the OSCE SMM website shows casualties caused by an anti-tank mine activated near a checkpoint. It also showed the contamination of agricultural fields with explosive objects.[54] Extensive crater analysis – or impact site assessment[55] – is also carried out to show the direction of past mortar or other artillery fire, and UAV images are sometimes used to locate the craters, identify damage to walls, roofs, and fences, and improve the assessments made by field monitors.

Some six years since the beginning of the armed conflict, it is fair to say that UAV images have "democratized" access to the conflict zone, causing a kind of "CNN effect 3.0" – i.e., using shocking images of humanitarian crises that compel influential policymakers to pay attention in situations that would otherwise be forgotten.[56] Greater transparency also served the Mission's purpose to better and more realistically portray the risks and living conditions of

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52   OSCE, OSCE SMM technical monitoring, cited above (Note 21), at 1:01.
53   Cf. OSCE, Daily Report 292/2019, 10 December 2019, available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/441790.
54   Cf. OSCE, Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Thematic Report, The Impact of mines, unexploded ordnance and other explosive objects on civilians in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine: January 2018-October 2019, SEC.FR/838/19, 4 December 2019, pp. 16-17, available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/441170.
55   Cf. OSCE, Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 September 2016, Kyiv, 3 September 2016, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/262386.
56   This revised CNN effect 2.0 uses means and coverage by an international organization, given the quasi-complete absence of media companies along the line of contact. The CNN

residents in eastern Ukraine. Multiple times, UAV images showed military-purposed trenches, roadblocks, and mines creating divisions between close villages,[57] and public and private infrastructure burned and destroyed.[58]

Some of the findings remain extremely sensitive from a political standpoint. This was the case in August and October 2018, when the Mission decided to report that:

> An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle again spotted vehicles, including a truck carrying an armoured personnel carrier, entering and exiting Ukraine via an unpaved road in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities.[59]

Given the exceptional circumstances, the SMM management even released the long-range UAV footage, which was viewed over 350,000 times on YouTube.[60]

Video footage from the fixed cameras has rarely been released, but exceptions include imagery from the thermal camera observations of Shyrokyne in August 2016,[61] and video portraying the fire of howitzers near Svitlodarsk in January 2017.[62]

The decision to publicly release digitally acquired observations rests entirely with the SMM Chief Monitor, the Head of the Mission who "owns" the information obtained by the Mission. Observations are released more frequently, and on the basis of specific advice provided to the Chief Monitor by

effect 3.0 covers the role of emerging global media players, or of social media, in this process. Cf. Piers Robinson, The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?, Review of International Studies 2/1999, pp. 301-309; The Media and 9/11, CNN Effect 2.0, Public Diplomacy and Global Communication 2014d, London Metropolitan University blog, 14 May 2015, at: https://pdgc2014d.wordpress.com/2015/05/14/the-media-and-911-cnn-effect-2-0/.

57   Cf. OSCE SMM Ukraine, *Twitter,* 18 October 2018, at: https://twitter.com/OSCE_SMM/status/1052886051440775169; OSCE SMM Ukraine, *Twitter,* 7 May 2019, at: https://twitter.com/OSCE_SMM/status/1125715872130174977; OSCE SMM Ukraine, *Twitter,* 9 July 2019, at: https://twitter.com/OSCE_SMM/status/1148496428102234112.

58   Cf. OSCE SMM Ukraine, *Twitter,* 12 October 2018, at: https://twitter.com/OSCE_SMM/status/1050710283231084544.

59   OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 12 October 2018, Kyiv, 13 October 2018, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/399674; cf. OSCE, Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 August 2018, Kyiv, 9 August 2018, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/390179.

60   Cf. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, OSCE SMM spotted convoys of trucks entering and exiting Ukraine in Donetsk region, 10 August 2018, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ani2YWDLXl0.

61   Cf. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, OSCE SMM thermal camera observations in Shyrokyne, Donetsk region, 23 August 2016, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLLvCUUQ19g.

62   OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, OSCE SMM UAV: 5 howitzers firing in direction of Svitlodarsk, 12 January 2016, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mHQQd6DYwT0.

the two Deputy Chief Monitors, Heads of Units, and political advisors. The release of such observations to mandated partners and participating States is now more flexible and frequent, with a view to advancing peace negotiations, keeping the States informed at all times and justifying the expensive technological tools used.

The SMM publishes its results on its website.[63] The report for the latest quarter (July-September 2019) is informative: The Mission detected over 50,000 ceasefire violations. Twenty per cent of weapons in violation of withdrawal lines were reported in government-controlled areas (GCAs) and eighty per cent in non-government-controlled areas (NGCAs). Ninety-two per cent of restrictions[64] imposed on SMM movement were in NGCAs and eight per cent in GCAs.

The utility of technology to aid mission reporting is also illustrated. The means used to detect the weapons in violation were: long-range UAVs (44 per cent); patrols (34 per cent); mini-UAVs (14 per cent); aerial/satellite imagery (seven per cent); and mid-range UAVs (0.4 per cent). Thus, the majority of violations were observed with technological means. In addition, some 60 per cent of all ceasefire violations were recorded during the night, mostly using technology. This kind of extensive data from human and technologically-aided observations enables trend analysis to be conducted, mainly by an international Trend Analysis Adviser[65] and one or two National Trend Analysis Officers[66] who are embedded in the Reporting and Political Analysis Unit. The Trend Analysis Advisers and Officers are in close contact with the Operations Unit in order to "help ensure Monitoring Teams receive feedback and guidance on report and other aspects of the implementation of the Mission's mandate".[67] However, the Mission is careful that its analysis does not exceed its political authorization.

Issues: Attribution and Beyond

The SMM is severely constrained by its mandate: It cannot attribute ceasefire violations to a violator, even if one is identified,[68] meaning that the Mission is

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63   OSCE, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine.
64   Including impediments to the use of monitoring technologies: UAVs, cameras, and acoustic sensors.
65   Cf. OSCE, Trend Analysis Adviser, at: https://jobs.osce.org/vacancies/trend-analysis-adviser-vnsmus00611.
66   Cf. OSCE, National Trend Analysis Officer, at: https://jobs.osce.org/vacancies/national-trend-analysis-officer-vnsmun00804.
67   OSCE, Trend Analysis Adviser, cited above (Note 65).
68   This mandate limits the Mission to "establish and report facts […]". OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision No. 1117, cited above (Note 3), p. 1.

in the awkward position of showing the evidence of such violations, but it cannot disclose who committed them.[69] In many cases, the perpetrator can be easily deduced using information provided by the Mission on the location of the violation or the direction of fire recorded. In the course of almost six years of activity, a stauncher, more direct approach was frequently requested, notably by Ukrainian civil society and media. But the political actors who guide the Mission have not changed the mandate. So, the Mission replies, as summarized by former Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug, that the role of deciding on questions of guilt and responsibility is "not for the media and not for the OSCE SMM to assume".[70]

The SMM also prefers not to attribute blame more generally, even when one of its own members is killed or injured by the action of one of the parties. When OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Sebastian Kurz, called for a thorough investigation into the death of the SMM patrol member in 2017,[71] the OSCE Secretariat turned to the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC), based in Switzerland, to carry out the investigation, since the OSCE Secretariat lacked expertise of its own.[72] But the IHFFC was also constrained by a mandate to "establish the facts of the incident [… rather than] establish criminal responsibility or accountability for the incident".[73]

While the practice is sometimes criticized, persons from the conflicting parties are part of the SMM staff, who are all civilians or police personnel (though many are former military). Currently, out of over 1,300 SMM staff members, there are 766 monitoring officers, of whom 41 are Russian, but none is Ukrainian. The Mission has personnel from 45 of the 57 OSCE participating States. Russians are present, but few in number, among the 125 international staff at the Mission headquarters in Kyiv. Ukrainian staff members, whose nation is a direct participant in the conflict, are employed as local (national) staff in the roles of assistants, advisors, translators, and administrative personnel.[74]

Criticism has been raised about the presence of Russian monitors in the past, particularly following several scandals in which personnel allegedly from

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69   This is the case for monitoring the adherence to the ceasefire, but not for monitoring the disengagement process and withdrawal of weapons, when the SMM, by naming the village where military hardware or members of armed forces were spotted, also implies who the violator is.

70   News Agency 112 International, Ending the bloodshed is the task of the sides. International organizations are here to assist and document, – Alexander Hug", *112.ua*, 18 March 2019, at: https://112.international/interview/ending-fighting-is-not-the-task-of-osce-smm-thats-the-task-of-the-sides-alexander-hug-36942.html; see also Amy Mackinnon, Counting the Dead in Europe's Forgotten War, 25 October 2018, at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/25/counting-the-dead-in-europes-forgotten-war-ukraine-conflict-donbass-osce/.

71   Cf. Liechtenstein, cited above (Note 1).

72   Cf. Kemp, cited above (Note 2), p. 119.

73   International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission was not targeted, concludes Independent Forensic Investigation into tragic incident of 23 April 2017, *IHFFC.ORG,* 7 September 2017, at: https://www.ihffc.org/index.asp?mode=shownews&ID=831.

74   Cf. OSCE, Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Status Report, as of 9 December 2019, available at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/442261.

the Moscow security services were said to have infiltrated the Mission. For such a politically sensitive mission as the SMM, it is important to assure the world and the local population that the Mission does not have spies deployed among its monitors and staff. As a former SMM spokesperson stated, the Mission relies on "the good faith of participating states to second monitors to the OSCE who will work on the basis of impartiality".[75] When joining the Mission, monitors must sign a pledge to abide by the code of conduct and they are required to strictly adhere to this.[76]

The Mission's success has been accompanied by requests for expanded mandates. After the escalation of tensions in the Sea of Azov, including Russia's detainment of Ukrainian sailors, the Mission experienced pressure to monitor the area, but shied away from observing the situation in the Sea of Azov too closely with the new technologies, prompting the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July 2019 to call for:

> providing the necessary resources to enhance OSCE SMM capabilities, in particular through the use of technical surveillance equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles and satellite imagery, to monitor the situation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait [...][77]

Meeting such a request would necessitate a major increase in the technological capability of the Mission. It would vastly increase the coverage area and require a substantial increase in resources, both in devices and image analysts, who would need sea-observation expertise. However, the SMM mandate expansion to this region remains a possibility.

Conclusions

The "Normandy Four" agreement in Paris on 9 December 2019 carries new risks for the SMM monitors, particularly with its calls for 24-hour monitoring. The SMM has always deemed it too dangerous to deploy monitors at night.

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75   Allison Quinn, Russian OSCE monitor in Ukraine fired after "drunkenly saying he was a Moscow spy", *The Telegraph*, 30 October 2015, at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11965191/Russian-OSCE-monitor-in-Ukraine-fired-after-drunkenly-saying-he-was-a-Moscow-spy.html; see also OSCE surprised by Russian intelligence penetrating its Ukraine mission, *Euractiv*, 19 July 2018, at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/osce-surprised-by-russian-intelligence-penetrating-its-ukraine-mission/.

76   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE Code of Conduct for Staff/Mission Members, available at: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/31781.

77   Resolution on the Militarization by the Russian Federation of the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, in: OSCE PA, Luxembourg Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Twenty-Eighth Annual Session, Luxembourg, 4-8 July 2019, pp. 30-32,, para. 19, at: https://www.oscepa.org/documents/annual-sessions/2019-luxembourg/3882-luxembourg-declaration-eng/file.

Technologies were deployed in the SMM for three main reasons: first, to overcome the limitations of night monitoring, though the SMM already claimed to have a 24-hour presence on the ground;[78] second, to reduce risks in the daytime, particularly after the death of US paramedic Joseph Stone; and third, to broaden the field of view beyond that of ground monitors, who often experience restrictions from ongoing hostilities or deliberate blockage. The renewed call for true 24-hour monitoring, made at the level of heads of state, now becomes an imperative, and the Mission is obliged to adapt. Technologies should again help the SMM to implement the December 2019 proposals of the "Normandy Four" heads of state.[79]

The technologies reviewed above have proven extremely useful to the SMM to fulfil its monitoring mandate. The imagery has shown thousands of clear violations of the Minsk agreements, while making the lives of the monitors on the ground safer and more effective. In addition, the local population is better informed about risks and developments. Although not a panacea, the technology has enabled the Mission to achieve greater range, flexibility, and duration of observation. Technology permits night-time monitoring that is otherwise extremely dangerous for human observers.[80] It has become an indispensable tool in the OSCE's most expensive mission, which, in 2018, had a budget of around 105 million euros, of which almost 85 million euros came from the OSCE's assessed contributions.[81]

SMM monitoring in Ukraine, whether by personnel or using technological means, has a deterrent effect on belligerents, helping to prevent outright attacks, reducing human rights violations, and being "an integral element ensuring the progress achieved" by the Mission.[82] But it is still insufficient to eliminate the low-level fighting and many violations.

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78   OSCE, Who we are, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/who-we-are.

79   Cf. RFE/RL, Ukraine, Russia Agree On Full Cease-Fire, "All-For-All" Prisoner Swap By End of 2019, *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*, 9 December 2019, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-agree-on-full-cease-fire-all-for-all-prisoner-swap-by-end-of-2019/303166 24.html; Katya Gorchinskaya, The Normandy Summit Ended With No Breakthroughs. What Has It Achieved? *Forbes*, 10 December 2019, at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyagorchinskaya/2019/12/10/the-normandy-summit-ended-what-has-it-achieved;
Stephanie Liechtenstein, Normandy Summit discusses expanding mandate of OSCE monitors in Ukraine, *Security and Human Rights Monitor,* 19 December 2019, at: https://www.shrmonitor.org/normandy-summit-discusses-expanding-mandate-of-osce-monitors-in-ukraine/.

80   Cf. Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, *Ukrinform*, 17 October 2018 (answer to question 7: "It is known that OSCE SMM observers were working, mainly, on daylight […]"), at: https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/2560584-alexander-hug-principal-deputy-chief-monitor-of-the-osce-special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine.html.

81   Cf. Kemp, cited above (Note 2), p. 116. Also cf. OSCE, Annual Report 2018, p.70, available at: https://www.osce.org/annual-report/2018.

82   OSCE, A full and comprehensive ceasefire crucial for success and implementation of security measures, says OSCE SMM Chief Monitor to OSCE Permanent Council, Kyiv, 13 December 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/442150.

It is remarkable that a young mission like the SMM, operating with a relatively small budget compared to most UN peacekeeping operations (though more expensive than some UN observer missions), has so quickly adopted sophisticated technologies, namely UAVs and remotely-monitored ground cameras for hotspots. The deployment of these technologies has faced many challenges, not least that some are targeted by belligerents. Despite the risks and costs, the tools reviewed here have proven of great value in helping to fulfil the monitoring mandate of the Mission.

Not only does the OSCE SMM experience with monitoring technologies lay the foundation for future OSCE progress, the technological successes and challenges of the Mission provide valuable lessons for peace operations more generally.

Günther Baechler

Using the Status Quo as an Opportunity: OSCE Conflict Management Exemplified by the South Caucasus

In discussions on European security after 1989, the break-up of the Soviet Union is repeatedly described as relatively non-violent. From a distance, this is probably true, but this conclusion does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Beginning in 1992, there was a series of armed local conflicts that stretched from north to south across Europe to the Caspian Sea. The conflicts not only claimed a lot of the war-ravaged population's blood. They also led to sustained human rights violations, flight and displacement, ethnic cleansing, and, ultimately, continued marginalization, poverty, and youth emigration. The affected conflict zones at the seam between West and East threaten to become the militarily disputed poor houses and old people's homes of Europe.

The OSCE is involved in all local conflicts with various instruments of mediation, crisis prevention, and conflict management. Although the conflicts in Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh each have their own specific characteristics, in all four contexts there are also clearly comparable patterns in the dynamics of the conflict and in the methods of dealing with it. Based on my own experience, I will discuss the OSCE's mediation activities in the South Caucasus below.[1] I will concentrate on the negotiation formats and examine the question of the limits and possibilities of international peace mediation. My conclusions will be combined with a number of recommendations, leaving it to more qualified observers to apply them to the contexts of Ukraine and Moldova not discussed here.[2]

The Negotiation Format in the Georgia Conflict

Since the outbreak of the war between Georgia and Abkhazia, which was striving for independence, on 14 August 1992, there have been numerous talks

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1   From 2016 to 2018, the author was Special Representative of three successive OSCE Chairpersons-in-Office for the South Caucasus. In this capacity, he was one of the three Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions (GID) on the conflict in Georgia, along with the representatives of the UN and the EU.

2   See also: Sabine Fischer (ed.), Not frozen! The Unresolved Conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the Light of the Crisis over Ukraine, SWP Research Paper 2016/RP 09, September 2016, available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/not-frozen-conflicts-in-the-post-soviet-area/.

and negotiations to bring the civil war in Georgia to an end.[3] However, the short but violent August war in 2008 between Georgia on the one hand and South Ossetia and Russia on the other represented a turning point in peace efforts. The UN and the OSCE had to close their missions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia under pressure from Russia. Russia became the power protecting the two areas and stationed military and border guards in the region. In addition, Moscow subsequently recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states with which it entered into strategic partnership agreements. The borders between Georgia and the two regions were fortified, guarded, and increasingly transformed into closed dividing lines that could only be crossed at a few places. The six-point agreement between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the European Council at the time, ended the five-day war and established the Geneva International Discussions (GID).[4]

The international talks on modalities for security and stability in South Ossetia and Abkhazia began in Geneva on 12 October 2008. The format of the GID, which was supposed to complete its task within a few weeks, would prove to be extremely tough. Since then, 49 rounds have been held to discuss the guarantee of security and stability in the region, the solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and all other open questions by mutual agreement. The contents are set by the six-point plan. The agenda must therefore be strictly adhered to and cannot be changed unless the parties decide to do so by consensus at the highest level. A high-level round of talks is therefore repeatedly brought up for discussion (comparable to the Normandy format in Ukraine), but is not realistic in the foreseeable future. This means that questions regarding Georgia's sovereignty, the status of the two regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, more broadly, a comprehensive peace treaty could not and cannot be discussed.

Representatives of Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia participate in the GID in their personal capacity and in their capacity as experts – and not as official delegates. Georgia still does not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as parties to the conflict. This is also the reason that there is no plenary session, apart from the rudimentary plenary during lunch in the UN building in Geneva; the participants from the two areas are not allowed to sit at the plenary table, but have to spread out between other tables. Meetings are conducted in two parallel working groups, which take place at expert level and are facilitated by the three Co-Chairs or Co-Moderators. The primus inter pares is the Co-Chair from the EU, i.e. the organization that made the ceasefire possible and assumed non-use of force guarantees for Georgia. The other two are

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3   Neither the history of the conflict nor all previous discussion formats can be discussed in detail here. See the extensive literature on this subject, including Thomas de Waal, *The Caucasus: An Introduction*, Oxford 2010. See also earlier editions of the OSCE Yearbook, including Eva-Maria Auch, The Abkhazia Conflict in Historical Perspective, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2004*, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 221-235, especially pp. 226-235.
4   The agreement and additional agreements can be found at: http://www.civil.ge/Archive.

nominated by the UN and the OSCE respectively, i.e. the two organizations that maintained their missions in Abkhazia or South Ossetia before the August war. In addition, there is the representative of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. The United States takes part in the discussions as an observer and probably also as an ally of Georgia. Russia does not consider itself a party to the conflict, but a mediator or observer too. While the Russians and the Americans sit opposite the three Co-Chairs, the Georgians and Abkhazians/ South Ossetians sit to the left and right of the Co-Chairs on both sides of the rectangular table, de facto opposite one another as parties to the conflict. Incidentally, the participation of women at the negotiating table is minimal (also on the part of the international organizations).

The mandate of the Co-Chairs is predefined by the six-point plan and is therefore strictly limited. The conflict parties assume that all participating experts are essentially equal. Nevertheless, the three representatives from the EU, the UN, and the OSCE try to make the best possible use of the given scope, or expand it as far as possible. It is now accepted on all sides that at the beginning of the talks, the Co-Chairs remind the participants of the basic rules that have been adopted by all parties and call for adherence to them. The Co-Chairs are also responsible for ensuring that the predefined agenda can be completed in the two working groups. They also present their own reports on security and stability in the region. These are supplemented by the EUMM on the basis of information from daily patrols. In addition, they endeavour to give substance to the discussions, for example, through regular information sessions on the eve of the GID and by stimulating and moderating technical working meetings or informal talks on the margins or outside Geneva. Topics include: non-use of force, environmental problems in the region, multilingual education, freedom to travel, archives, and cultural heritage. The goal of a joint declaration on the renunciation of violence has been pursued for years and continuously requires the Co-Chairs to act sensitively, mediate resolutions to disputes, and moderate patiently – even in the long corridors of the UN building. The GID, which take place every three months, are prepared relatively intensively with a visit by the Co-Chairs and their teams to Tbilisi, Sukhumi, Tskhinvali, and Moscow. In addition, there are talks in New York and Washington D.C. On the day before the actual GID, bilateral meetings with all participants – including the US – and an informal reception are held in the UN building. The discussions are mostly objective and the atmosphere is generally good. The individual experts certainly find ways of approaching one another on a personal level, even if they represent the position of their respective government or de facto government with toughness and intransigence during the discussions.

As early as 2009, the participants decided to introduce two local crisis mechanisms in addition to the GID: the "Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms" (IPRM), which usually take place monthly on the "Administrative Boundary Line" (ABL, non-recognized border) between Georgia and Abkhazia or South Ossetia. All sides agree that the IPRM have developed into

key instruments for solving problems at the border or on the ABL and are indispensable – even if some IPRM have been suspended for a longer period of time due to current crises. The IPRM, which are moderated by the UN, or by the OSCE and the EUMM, can last for hours. The agendas are therefore also tightly packed. This applies above all to the IPRM meeting in a tent at the closed Ergneti border crossing (South Ossetia), where considerably more issues are dealt with than at the IRPM in Gali (Abkhazia). In addition to the current security situation, topics such as combating wild fires, water use, cleaning irrigation systems, the exchange of persons arrested at the ABL, persons missing since the war, etc. are discussed in a solution-oriented way. There are repeated heated debates about the violation of "the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia" – a border that does not exist from the Georgian point of view. The representative of the Georgian state security must avoid the Russian border guards' skilfully presented proposals for marking the border together so that the local population knows where the border is and therefore fewer violations and arrests occur. While militarily relevant violations and confrontations are extremely rare, in recent years, the unexplained deaths of arrested Georgians have led to emotional debates at both IPRMs.

The Negotiation Format in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The current conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh also dates back to the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence from Azerbaijan on 2 September 1991, to which it belongs under international law according to four UN resolutions[5] of 1993. Since a bloody war, Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas, and the ceasefire line of 12 May 1994 have been held by the Defence Army of Nagorno-Karabakh (the self-proclaimed "Republic of Artsakh") and the Armenian Army.[6]

Diplomatic peace activities remained erratic and without consequences for a long time after the ceasefire. As early as March 1992, the OSCE (then CSCE) established the Minsk Group, originally with 13 participating States. Since the goal of a peace conference was never achieved, the group primarily monitors the course of the conflict. In addition, the OSCE has repeatedly attempted to reduce tensions and make proposals for conflict resolution. Nonetheless, positions remained entrenched and the situation at the line of contact (ceasefire line) and, in part, at the state border between Azerbaijan and Armenia remained strained. Thus, there were regular casualties and gunfights almost

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5   United Nations Security Council, Resolutions 822 (30 April 1993), 853 (29 July 1993), 874 (14 October 1993), 884 (12 November 1993).
6   For the history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, cf. Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden – Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*, New York 2003.

daily, which were repeatedly interpreted by international observers during particularly tense times as signs of a military solution to the conflict by Azerbaijan. Indeed, provocations on both sides of the line of contact or border have come and go. Against the background of an alarming military threat and increasing armament on both sides, the three Co-Chairs, nominated from three members of the Minsk Group (USA, Russia, France), presented a catalogue of principles at the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting in Madrid in November 2007, which was intended to lead to a comprehensive peace process. The Madrid Principles should serve as a package solution formula for negotiations that are both comprehensive and gradual.[7]

According to the principles, Nagorno-Karabakh would be granted an interim status, including security guarantees and self-governance. This status should remain in force until all other issues have been negotiated and implemented. A legally binding referendum should then be held to determine the will of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh regarding the future status of the region.[8]

Although the Madrid Principles were to form the basis of all future OSCE initiatives as well as Russia's offers of talks to the conflict parties, there has been no significant change in the status quo since then. Neither the initiatives of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, nor the high-level talks held at the invitation of the Russian Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin over the past ten years in Sochi have led to a significant rapprochement between the two presidents or a softening of the polarized positions. Even the demand from Nagorno-Karabakh, which is at the centre of the conflict, to participate in the talks has so far been unsuccessful. Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azerbaijani community expelled from the region are only recognized as "interested parties".

The format of the Nagorno-Karabakh talks basically consists of various, rather ad hoc individual initiatives and the efforts of the three Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group to bring the parties together. These include the annual or biennial bilateral meetings of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Paris, Bern, St. Petersburg, Geneva, etc.[9] While the presidents hold discussions for one or

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7   As early as March 1996, the Foreign Minister of Switzerland and Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, Flavio Cotti, presented the first draft of a comprehensive package solution.

8   Cf. Basic principles for a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, transmitted at the OSCE Ministerial Council (Madrid, 29 November 2007) as an official proposal of France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, as Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, for consideration by the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The full text of the Madrid Principles was first published by an Armenian NGO on 11 April 2016. Cf. Madrid Principles – Full Text, at: ANI, Armenian Research Center, 11 April 2016, at: https://www.aniarc.am/2016/04/11/madrid-principles-full-text/.

9   On 8 May 2018, there was a change of power in Yerevan due to continuing protests. The activist and newly elected Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, met Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev on 28 September at a CIS summit in Dushanbe. This was the first conversation between the two, during which they reaffirmed the ceasefire and their will to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. They also agreed on an operational mechanism for establishing prompt contact between relevant authorities on both sides. The proposal put

two hours in private and without an agenda, the foreign ministers meet together with the Co-Chairs in an adjoining room, although they certainly have no concrete negotiating mandate. Sporadic meetings between the foreign ministers at international conferences (such as the Munich Security Conference) complement the talks between the heads of state. In addition, there is the "shuttle diplomacy" of the three Co-Chairs. The OSCE Chairperson's Personal Representative, who has been in office for over twenty years, plays a special confidence-building role in times of crisis and high tension – for example during and after the military escalation at the line of contact in April 2016. In addition, since the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship in 2014, experts have met repeatedly at an academic level to deepen the analysis of the conflict and concretize the Madrid Principles. The OSCE's monitoring at the ceasefire line and the state borders, including on the Nakhichevan side, under the leadership of the Personal Representative, is limited to two missions a month, conducted by a total of six monitors. Monitoring requires strict security measures to ensure that OSCE staff do not accidentally fall victim to an exchange of fire. Standardized and precise reporting emphasizes linguistic and factual neutrality so that the mission cannot be attacked or even terminated by one side or the other.

Comparison of the Two Conflict Management Processes

Both unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus are concerning territories or independence in the post-Soviet space. Both conflicts share comparable patterns: Russia is a key actor in both regions – both in terms of conflict dynamics and peace diplomacy. In each, one state (Georgia and Azerbaijan) insists on restoring territorial integrity and sovereignty under international law over the entire state territory. Secessionist forces in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh claim their independence. From the point of view of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the independence aspirations are untrustworthy, since both assume that the secessions were driven by Russia and Armenia (in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh) respectively.

Despite comparable initial conditions and similar influencing factors, there are major differences in the dynamics and management of the conflicts:

-   In Georgia there are neither existing principles for a comprehensive negotiated solution, nor elements of a peace process. It would not occur to anyone today to even think about anything like "definitive solutions", let alone put them on paper. Questions regarding the status of the territories, which, from the Georgian point of view, are occupied, are excluded from all discussion formats. If one of the Co-Chairs wanted to discuss such

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forward by Pashinyan to involve Nagorno-Karabakh in the peace negotiations in the future was apparently not pursued any further. It remains to be seen whether the dynamics of conflict management will be different under Pashinyan.

issues in Geneva, they would be declared persona non grata the next day. The GID are currently carrying out technical renegotiations on the 2008 ceasefire. There is only a vague six-point plan in place, which is intended to regulate the ceasefire and the measures taken by the parties once it comes into force. The additional measures specify the military steps, the disengagement and return of troops to pre-war positions. For the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, on the other hand, the Madrid Principles provide a far-reaching proposal that includes both a step-by-step approach and a package solution. The Principles deal centrally with questions regarding the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh and offer the prospect of a referendum to resolve the conflict.

- As far as discussion formats are concerned, it was possible to establish a relatively stable architecture for the Georgia conflict. Although this architecture is constantly at risk of collapse, it has survived for ten years. The GID format forces a pragmatic approach of small steps and technical solutions at the local level. It is successful in aspects concerning individual fates (of detainees) and concrete solutions to problems common to all (water, fire prevention, pest control in agriculture), but less successful when it comes to problems concerning entire groups (internally displaced persons, language groups) or strategic issues (freedom to travel). No comparable format could be established in Nagorno-Karabakh; there is neither anything like the GID, which take place in a regulated framework, nor a crisis mechanism such as the IPRM. Monitoring does not stand up to comparison: In Georgia the EUMM comprises over 400 monitors, in Nagorno-Karabakh there are six OSCE monitors. However, the latter are allowed to observe the line of contact from both sides simultaneously, with the actual focus being on monitoring as a confidence-building measure: The OSCE monitors establish radio contact between commands on both sides, which then communicate directly with each other and provide security guarantees. The EUMM, on the other hand, may only patrol the ABL from the side controlled by Tbilisi, since Russia considers its border patrols on the other side of equal rank to the EUMM.

- The three Co-Chairs were able to develop a reliable role in the GID context. As a rule, their independence and willingness to engage in dialogue are not questioned due to their origin (UN, OSCE, EU). Within the Minsk Group, the three Co-Chairs represent three OSCE participating States: Russia, the US, and France. Their "neutrality" is far less obvious and their role less clearly defined. Much depends on the initiatives of the three representatives and the assigned Personal Representative. It is probably no exaggeration to say that it is thanks to their great commitment that bilateral meetings of presidents and foreign ministers take place at all.

- Finally, as far as conflict dynamics are concerned, the security situation in the Georgian context is relatively calm and stable, while in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh, at least until autumn 2018, there were almost daily

gunfights and dangerous military escalations with numerous victims. Since then, the situation has stabilized.[10] It is certainly no coincidence that volatility is greater here, i.e. in places where a constitutional solution is emerging, so to speak, at least in principle (referendum), than where talks are still focused almost exclusively on stabilizing the ceasefire. The referendum promised in Nagorno-Karabakh would require the implementation of many individual steps – steps for which no side seems truly prepared so far.

Despite the differences in content and format outlined above, the results of conflict management in the two contexts are again surprisingly similar. A dynamic of persistent lack of movement and results has emerged, which increasingly frustrates the parties involved. It seems that the long-lasting fixation on the status quo with no real change or clearly visible progress is politically desired and follows a certain pattern. While the international community is struggling for solutions and principles, all parties to the conflict – including those not recognized as such – seem to have come to terms with the status quo and settled into it, at least for a lengthy and unclear period of time.

Among observers, it has been established that the status quo above all reflects the interests of Russia, i.e. one of the conflict parties, which plays a dominant and at the same time differentiated role in both contexts. It is by no means the case that the Russian government cannot imagine settling the conflicts in one way or another. Essentially, from the Russian point of view, at least the Georgia conflict has already been resolved through the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, as long as at least one side questions this supposed solution (Georgia) or – in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – threatens with violence (Azerbaijan), changes, especially when they are supported by international third parties, are undesirable or unnecessary from Moscow's point of view. Moscow is aware of its dual role as a conflict party and as a mediator. At the same time, it is aware that its strength lies in the military power to project and assert its interests in the South Caucasus. Its role as facilitator and impartial go-between is apparently limited, as has repeatedly been observed in the various discussion formats. In concrete terms and for both contexts, this means that Russia, for one thing, is interested in a stable peace solution in the Caucasus, but at the same time it is the greatest obstacle to such a solution. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, Russia is the largest arms supplier for both parties to the conflict, Azerbaijan and Armenia. This gives Moscow a key role in security policy and military terms, and ultimately a control function too. As long as other powers do not dispute Russia's influence (USA, NATO, Turkey, Iran), or a popular movement does not try to push Russia back, the insistence on the status quo should prove its worth.

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10   It appears that the conversation mentioned above has indeed had an impact (see footnote 9).

Georgia and Azerbaijan are not likely to be satisfied with anything less than a maximum solution to the conflict, i.e. the verdict under international law on the right to secession of the breakaway regions and thus the restoration of the territorial integrity of the two states. As long as such a legal solution to the conflicts seems unlikely and distant, both states are also likely to have a keen interest in maintaining the status quo. The fact that the discussion formats and the commitment of the international community constantly focus public attention on the conflicts means that the pressure on Russia can be maintained and the recognition of the breakaway regions can be prevented. At the same time, both Georgia and Azerbaijan have been able to establish themselves over the years as reliable members of the international community and attract considerable interest despite or even because of the conflicts – Azerbaijan because of its economic development and gas and oil reserves, and Georgia because of its democratic reforms and its stable Western orientation. Any change in the status quo would also entail risks: new acts of violence, an enhancement of the status of the breakaway regions, a stronger Russian influence, etc.

Meanwhile, the secessionists in the breakaway regions are fighting tirelessly for their international recognition. Admittedly, they seem to be in a rather hopeless position, since hardly any UN members seem willing to give the entities international status. As long as this goal seems a long way off, de facto governments will be satisfied with the status quo, the expansion of de facto statehood, and protection by either Russia or Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh was able to develop relatively well within the framework of the status quo, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia were able to push forward a steady expansion of de facto state institutions, not least thanks to the strategic partnership agreements with Russia. Therefore, more can be expected from maintaining the status quo than from peace solutions that would push the breakaway regions back into some form of autonomy within or confederation with one of the three South Caucasian states.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Against this complex backdrop, it is increasingly difficult for the international community and its organizations to propose concrete steps that go beyond humanitarian containment to improve the situation of the population affected by the war. Possible solutions have been outlined for some time without any prospect of success. In view of the polarized international situation, which also has an impact on the discussion formats and tends to have a negative effect on both contexts, interest in far-reaching steps is likely to remain rather low.

In the years to come, if not decades, the status quo is likely to continue to inscribe itself into the fissured geography of the conflicts, with the corresponding "borders", dividing lines, settlements of displaced persons, human rights

violations, and background military threats or even gunfights. The coming generations, who did not experience the wars, will continue to distance themselves from one another and thus actually widen the dividing lines. Mutual social interest will decline further and influence people's everyday lives less than in times of war. Lack of interest does not necessarily mean an increased security risk or military activities. On the contrary: Future generations will perhaps regulate status and border issues in a way that is new and different from the approach of today's rulers and actors.

Against the background outlined above, what are the prospects and possibilities for international conflict management?

It is rather inadvisable to press for rapid or substantial change. First, all actors – for various reasons – are focusing on the status quo. Second, Russia is a key factor in any new scenario for a peace order in the South Caucasus. Since Russia continues to rely on its traditional strength in exercising or projecting military power, Moscow is likely to have a particularly keen interest in maintaining the status quo; the influence of its "soft" or "convening power", on the other hand, is limited. And third, local conflicts can only be resolved permanently within the framework of a European security and peace architecture. The foundations for this must first be worked out anew within the framework of the OSCE.[11]

It therefore makes sense not only to take a negative view of the status quo, but also to see it positively as a relatively stable window open for various social and political processes.

For conflict management in Georgia, this could mean strengthening the GID through a combination of improved concrete problem solving, technical agreements, humanitarian and human rights measures, and confidence building (dealing with the past). New ideas for security mechanisms that are less susceptible to crises would have to be developed in the framework of additional working meetings for further consideration by the GID. These include status-neutral steps towards military confidence-building on the one hand, and package solutions to urgent issues such as the return of displaced persons, freedom of travel for all people in the region, and schooling and language education on the other.

If the status quo is accepted by all sides for a longer period as the basis for the talks, then Georgia and Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia can more easily meet for direct informal talks to discuss the aforementioned issues. All parties concerned could also focus more on factors that unite them, both verbally and in the media, than emphasizing the divisive aspects, as is currently the case in press releases.

Instead of wasting time on the same statements and accusations, GID participants should agree to develop a paper on facilitating everyday life and social exchange while preserving the status quo. Such a paper could keep the two

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11   Back to Diplomacy: Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project, November 2015.

148

working groups and expert meetings busy for some time. The product could serve as a basis for an initial meeting at the highest level. Georgia could further strengthen its democratic institutions and thus again become a point of attraction for the de facto governments wishing to expand their de facto statehood.

In the context of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Madrid Principles could be further elaborated, while at the same time a comprehensive peace agreement could certainly be targeted here. The project would have to face the dilemma of simultaneity and parallelism versus sequencing and a step-by-step approach. If the Madrid Document already threatens to fail in implementing the first steps, then little is gained for the future of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories. The experiences from various peace processes, which were decided on with a "comprehensive peace agreement", could be consulted. In the meantime, it should help to stabilize the situation at the line of contact, for example by enabling the parties to agree on a kind of crisis mechanism involving the locally deployed security forces. Increased monitoring together with an investigation mechanism on ceasefire violations, provocations and the like could contribute to relative stability to the advantage of the local agricultural populations on both sides of the line of contact.

The concepts for a structured negotiation architecture put forward by the Swiss and German OSCE Chairmanships would help to use the status quo for discussions that are as productive and technically sound as possible – in the interest of all those who do not currently wish to surrender the status quo.

In short: In the context of Georgia, the actors need more principles and content in order to avoid the death of the established GID format as a result of useless discussions. In the context of Nagorno-Karabakh, the actors need more pragmatism and GID-format structures for the strategic further development of the Madrid Principles at the negotiating table and for stabilizing the situation in the region. As in the Georgian context, ceasefire violations should be dealt with by a serious crisis mechanism and removed from the strategic agenda of the parties to the conflict as quickly as possible.

If the numerous actors in the South Caucasus were to focus more on economic integration and infrastructural communication channels than on identity and territorial issues, then the educated youth, who are still leaving the region in large numbers, would have a good future ahead of them. As a bridge between East and West and North and South, the South Caucasus could become an even more economically and culturally interesting region with an appeal to the neighbouring states of Russia, Turkey, and Iran.

Elia Bescotti

A Non-Resolution Limbo: Better Status Quo than Settled?

Georgian Territorial Integrity, Russian Security Interests, and the Status of De Facto States in the Peace Process

Introduction

December 2019 saw the 50th round of the Geneva International Discussions over the conflict in Georgia. The last year has been particularly worrisome in view of the deterioration of the peace process over the administrative boundary lines between Georgia and both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Events such as frequent incidents and blockages due to the borderization process have often claimed lives and create an unpleasant and dangerous situation for the people who attempt to cross the lines for any reason.[1] Furthermore, despite the implementation of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms in Gali and Ergneti,[2] the negotiation process has not seen any concrete positive development. President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili criticized the Geneva format, saying that it has only been able to discuss technical issues and has not been oriented towards political questions.[3] However, this is hardly surprising, as the decennial deadlock over the resolution of the conflict demonstrates.

As in the other unresolved conflict in the post-Soviet space, in particular those where Russia is involved as sponsor or patron state of the de facto governments in the breakaway regions, there are deep misunderstandings, or rather misrecognition of the actual role of the parties involved in the conflict. This plagues the negotiation formats, leading to the lack of a basic framework for a peaceful settlement. Georgia, like Moldova and Ukraine, insists that Russia is the other part of the conflict. Coherent with its sense of territorial integrity, Georgia has thus refused to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent actors since the 2008 war and addresses Moscow as an occupying

1 Cf. Edward Boyle, Borderization in Georgia: Sovereignty Materialized, Eurasia Border Review 1/2016, pp. 1-18.
2 Cf. Paata Gaprindashvili/Mariam Tsitsikashvili/Gogi Zoidze/Vakhtang Charaia, One step closer – Georgia, EU-integration, and the settlement of the frozen conflicts? , Tbilisi 2019, p. 9, at: https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/GRASS_Research_Draft_19.02.2019.pdf.
3 Cf. Thea Morrison, Georgian President Suggests Changing Format of Geneva Int'l Discussions, *Georgia Today*, 28 March 2019, at: http://georgiatoday.ge/news/15022/Georgian-President-Suggests-Changing-Format-of-Geneva-Int%E2%80%99l-Discussions.

power, liable for anything that happens under its occupation.[4] Russia, on the other hand, sees itself as a mediator and rejects Georgian claims that those areas are occupied territories, recognizing the two breakaway regions as sovereign states. Indeed, the violation of Georgia's territorial integrity is one of the drivers of Tbilisi's interests, openly clashing with those of Moscow and irreconcilable with those of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali over their recognition as independent states as a further step towards peace.

The situation is particularly puzzling and delicate, and there are no short-term prospects of conflict resolution. Confidence-building measures are useful but too long-term oriented, fragile, and not necessarily influential at the political level. Although progress over technical issues continues, the recent deaths of Georgian citizens over the administrative boundaries with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and other incidents such as the Gaprindashvili case,[5] mean that relations between Tbilisi on one side and Sukhumi and Tskhinvali on the other remain highly tense despite the engagement. Furthermore, Russian, Abkhazian and South Ossetian delegates leaving the negotiation table to hijack the discussions over the fate of internally displaced people remains problematic for the prospect of conflict resolution. This is not only highly sensitive for the Georgian side, but has strong demographic implications that could disrupt the current ethnic balance of the breakaway regions.

The First Sparks of the Conflict: Legal and Armed Skirmishes at the Collapse of the Soviet Union

Just as in the other parts of the Soviet Union, the turmoil in Georgia started during the process that led to the collapse of the federation in 1991, although its historical roots date back to the Sovietization of the Southern Caucasus in 1920-21.[6] As in the rest of the socialist bloc, anti-Soviet rhetoric paved the way to independentist and nationalist mobilization across many of the Union Republics, Georgia included. Such a position was perceived by the local autonomous administrative entities – the Abkhaz ASSR, the Adjar ASSR and the South Ossetian AO[7] – as a direct threat to their prerogatives and survival. Basing their claims on historical reasons, societal security and leaning towards

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4   Cf. The Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories, 23 October 2008, Article 7, available at: https://smr.gov.ge/en/page/21/strategic-documents.

5   Cf. Georgian Doctor Vazha Gaprindashvili Released from Tskhinvali Custody, *Civil.ge*, 28 December 2019, at: https://civil.ge/archives/333211.

6   Cf. Arsène Saparov, Aux origines de l'autonomie sud-ossète, in: Aude Merlin/Silvia Serrano, *Ordres et désordres au Caucase*, Brussels 2010, pp. 27-45.

7   ASSR is the acronym for Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which was an autonomous administrative unit with the status of a republic within one of the 15 Union Republics. AO stands for Autonomous Oblast (region, in Russian), which benefited from a lower degree of autonomy compared to the ASSR. ASSRs and AOs usually included in their names the ethnic minorities which populated them and their status often depended on their degree of loyalty to the Union Republic they belonged to, on Moscow or on other historical reasons, such as the active participation and support to the Bolshevik Revolution and/or the process of Sovietization, as well as deliberate personal decisions of the Soviet leaders.

a pro-Soviet polarization in opposition to the nationalists, these republics began to mobilize. Abkhazia and South Ossetia tried to raise their legal status (to a Soviet Socialist Republic/SSR and ASSR respectively) and supported their permanence in the USSR, which was seen from Tbilisi as a threat to the territorial integrity of the Republic.[8]

In March 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia declared the sovereignty of the Republic. In an attempt to prevent the secession of the Union Republics, a series of laws were passed in Moscow in April 1990 that established the same prerogative for each subject of the federation, regardless of their status, including secession from their SSR.[9] This led to a series of legal battles between Tbilisi on the one hand, and Tskhinvali and Sukhumi on the other that eventually escalated into a series of demonstrations and clashes, during which the new nationalist president Zviad Gamsakhurdia failed to impose the Georgian constitutional order on the breakaway regions. Gamsakhurdia was eventually ousted in a coup in January 1992, allowing the Chairman of the Parliament and former Soviet minister of foreign affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, to take his place. An agreement was reached with South Ossetia, with the establishment of the Joint Control Commission which included Russian, Georgian, and North and South Ossetian personnel.[10]

If the new Georgian leadership temporarily settled the odds with Tskhinvali, it escalated the conflict with Abkhazia, which had previously negotiated a solution with Gamsakhurdia. Abkhazia vigorously campaigned for secession and independence, having been a Union Republic before its association and integration with Georgia in 1931 on Stalin's orders.[11] Against the backdrop of the turmoil that started after the coup against Gamsakhurdia and the civil war between its supporters and Tbilisi, Georgian forces entered Abkhazia in August 1992. The Abkhaz reaction, supported by volunteers from Northern Caucasus, was unexpectedly powerful and led to a massive exodus, or cleansing, of ethnic Georgians from the region: More than 200,000 people fled or were expelled from Abkhazia, bringing about the end of the conflict and the establishment of a Russian peacekeeping mission under the mandate of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and UN observation in June 1994, after Tbilisi joined the CIS in December 1993 and ratified its charter in April 1994.[12] The conflict, however, remained unresolved.

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8   Cf. Christoph Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, New York and London 2007, pp. 123-124.
9   These laws were respectively issued on 3, 10, and 26 April. Article 1 of the 26 April law explicitly mentioned "free self-determination" for the subjects of the federation. Cf. James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, Philadelphia 2007, p. 16.
10   Cf. Zürcher, cited above (Note 8), pp. 124-126.
11   Cf. Viacheslav A. Chirikba, The International Legal Status of the Republic of Abkhazia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, Sukhum 2014, pp. 4-5.
12   Cf. Zürcher, cited above (Note 8), p. 131.

As they say in Georgia nowadays, a president (or a ruling political formation) does not last two mandates. Eduard Shevardnadze, who was elected president in 1995, was peacefully ousted at the end of 2003 by Mikheil Saakashvili during the protests which became known as the Rose Revolution. The new political establishment, formed by many young personalities, energetically sought the modernization of the country, a pro-Western foreign policy trajectory, and the full establishment of Georgia's territorial integrity. One of the first steps towards this latter aim was bringing back the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, at the time a personal administration of Aslan Abashidze, under constitutional order. Although Adjara had never declared its secession from Georgia, Tbilisi had never been able to exercise its sovereignty over the region before Saakashvili took over the Autonomous Republic. Despite being filled with tensions, the process was relatively peaceful due to a series of missteps taken by Abashidze, and the support of the Adjarian people for the new president of Georgia. Abashidze resigned in May 2004 and fled in exile to Moscow. The Sukhumi and Tskhinvali perceived this as a threat to their own de facto independence. Although Georgia had started to become more attractive to the breakaway regions in terms of economic performance,[13] Saakashvili remained determined to preserve the territorial integrity of Georgia by any means, although the military option always remained the last resort, albeit still an option.

2008 was an unfortunate year for Georgia, culminating in the unresolved situation we are still witnessing today. One of the crucial moments for the re-escalation of the conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be found in the unilateral declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo on 17 February 2008, and subsequently recognized by most of the Western countries, but strongly opposed by the Russian Federation, both in support of Serbia and in opposition to the NATO intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999, which was not approved by the UN Security Council and which Russia has always considered a violation of international law. The recognition of Kosovo became, in the Russian vision, the precedent for justifying the recognition of other de facto states.[14] But the NATO Bucharest Summit was also held in 2008, at which Ukraine and Georgia were promised that one day, they would eventually become members of the transatlantic alliance.[15] Interpreted by Saakashvili as giving full support to Georgia's agenda, and by Russia as a direct threat to its influence and security in the post-Soviet space, the tensions between Tbilisi

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13   Cf. The World Bank, Data on Georgia, at: https://data.worldbank.org/country/Georgia?view=chart.

14   Cf. Sam Cage, Russia issues new warning over Kosovo independence, *Reuters,* 12 February 2008, at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-serbia-kosovo/russia-issues-new-warning-over-kosovo-independence-idUSL1262709220080212.

15   Cf. David Brunnstrom/Susan Cornwell, NATO promises Ukraine, Georgia entry one day, *Reuters,* 3 April 2008, at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato/nato-promises-ukraine-georgia-entry-one-day-idUSL0179714620080403.

and Moscow came to a climax, exacerbated by a policy of "passportization" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which resulted in 90 per cent of the inhabitants of these regions holding Russian citizenship.[16]

What happened afterwards is still debated. Georgia attacked South Ossetia as a reaction to the heavy shelling of some Georgian villages on the administrative border and faced a disproportionate reaction from Moscow, which claimed it was intervening to protect its citizens and prevent a genocide.[17] The ceasefire was mediated by France as the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union at that time. The Russo-Georgian war had a clear outcome: Saakashvili failed to restore the constitutional territorial integrity of Georgia, and the Russian Federation recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.[18] However, in having these entities internationally recognized, Russia was not as successful as the West had been in the case of Kosovo: Only Nicaragua, Venezuela, Tuvalu, Nauru, and Vanuatu recognized the breakaway regions as sovereign states (followed by Syria in 2018). However, Vanuatu and Tuvalu withdrew their recognition as their governments changed.[19] The independence of the two breakaway regions is still strongly opposed internationally, as it is considered in violation of the norms of *jus cogens*, which deem their recognition as invalid.[20]

At the Negotiation Table: A Process of Risks and Tricks Stuck in a Deadlock

As called for by the Protocol of Agreement signed by the parties to the conflict, as well as by France on behalf of the European Union, the international discussions over the resolution of the conflict were started in Geneva in October 2008. The Geneva International Discussions (GID) are co-chaired by the EU, the OSCE, and the UN, and involve Georgia, Russia, and the United States, as well as delegates from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in their personal capacities, participating in the working groups on security and human rights.[21] Despite the technical achievements and the fact that the GID remains the only platform for

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16 This is especially true for South Ossetia; cf: Kristopher Natoli, Weaponizing Nationality: An Analysis of Russia's Passport Policy in Georgia, Boston University International Law Journal, Summer 2010, pp. 389-417. The ethnic composition of Abkhazia saw Georgians/ Megrelians hold their Georgian citizenship.

17 Cf. Dmitri Medvedev, Why I had to recognise Georgia's breakaway regions, *Financial Times,* 26 August 2008, https://www.ft.com/content/9c7ad792-7395-11dd-8a66-0000779fd18c.

18 Cf. Ibid.

19 Cf. Donnacha Ó Beacháin/Giorgio Comai/Ann Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili, The secret lives of unrecognised states: Internal dynamics, external relations, and counter-recognition strategies, Small Wars & Insurgencies 3/2016, pp. 440-466.

20 Cf. Lina Laurinavičiūtė/Laurynas Biekša, The relevance of remedial secession in the post-Soviet "frozen conflicts", International Comparative Jurisprudence 1/2015, pp. 66–75, available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/international-comparative-jurisprudence/vol/1/issue/1.

21 Cf. Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, Geneva International Discussions, at: https://smr.gov.ge/en/page/26/jenevis-saertashoriso-molaparakebebi.

discussion on the Georgian conflicts at the international level, the Geneva talks are not status-related: This is one of the first major problems in terms of conflict resolution prospects. Second, there are two main practical issues related to the status issue that imply changes to the military and demographic status quo: the problem of internally displaced people (IDPs) caused by the conflicts, and the ban on the use of force to achieve a peaceful solution.

The issue of internally displaced people is still a particularly sensitive topic in the context of the resolution of the conflict in Georgia, although the GID are aimed at dealing with the consequences of the 2008 war with Russia. The UNHCR estimated the number of Georgian IDPs at 282,381 as of the end of 2018,[22] most of whom are ethnic Georgians and come from the breakaway regions. It is worth noting that the number of IDPs alone is roughly equal to the total population living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,[23] and the number of IDPs from each region is more or less equal to their actual estimated population. Although there are also IDPs from Abkhazia and especially Ossetia, the return of the ethnic Georgian IDPs to the breakaway regions would result in a disproportionate demographic imbalance in favour of ethnic Georgians. This population – whether in its entirety or in part – must be added to those ethnic Georgians already living under the de facto administrations. In 2015, these amounted to around 43,000 people for Abkhazia, mostly concentrated in the Gali district (in southern Abkhazia, contiguous to the territory under Tbilisi administration).

It is thus no surprise that the breakaway regions are not interested in welcoming all these people back since it would constitute a direct threat to their de facto independence. Until Georgia pushes for discussing this severe issue vis-à-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or the de facto authorities allow the IDPs to return, is hard for the negotiations to progress. The last decade showed that Georgia is still pursuing a policy in favour of returning IDPs to their home territories, as it has repeatedly proposed – and approved – resolutions on the issue at the UN General Assembly since 2008.[24] Nevertheless, demographic balances can shift over time, although Abkhazia has failed to achieve a demographic shift in its favour beyond forms of ethnic cleansing against Georgians, as the de facto authorities have tried to attract the Abkhaz diaspora, mostly from Turkey and the Middle East, but without true results.

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22   UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR Statistics, Georgia, at: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=2.247651847.1819197378.1578493796-1063448361.1578493796.
23   In 2015, the presidency of Abkhazia estimated that 242,756 people lived in the region – only half of which was counted as Abkhaz – while in South Ossetia the estimated population was of 53,559 as of 2015. Cf. President of the Republic of Abkhazia, Brief Information, 2015, at: http://presidentofabkhazia.org/en/respublika_abkhazia/respublika-abkhaziya-obshchaya-informatsiya/; *UNPO Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization*, 16 February 2015, at: https://unpo.org/members/7854; How many people live today in South Ossetia?, *Jam News,* 20 February 2016, at: https://jam-news.net/how-many-people-live-today-in-south-ossetia/.
24   Cf. UN General Assembly passes Georgia IDP Resolution, *Georgian Journal,* 5 June 2019, at: https://www.georgianjournal.ge/politics/35879-un-general-assembly-passes-georgia-idp-resolution.html.

The question of IDPs, however, is not unresolvable, nor that of the ethnic balance of the region. Yet, given the impact that their return could theoretically have on the de facto regions, the negotiations are destined to hit a brick wall. Any resolution of the issue implies a clear understanding of what would be the final asset of the Georgian territory. This is a problem that any negotiation format would be unable to address, given the situation Georgia finds itself in. Whether the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Russian Federation (and others) is legally founded and valid or not, the symbolic value of such a recognition has irremediably doomed the conflict to remain unresolved. Any solution for one of the breakaway regions is tied to the same solution for the other one, and South Ossetia, more than Abkhazia, is located in a geographical area which Georgia does not consider divisible. Georgia simply cannot accept losing the territory of South Ossetia to Russia or a new independent state for security reasons: The Tskhinvali region is located at the very heart of Georgia, just a few miles away from Tbilisi. This, coupled with the fact that South Ossetia is pursuing an irredentist policy of integration with North Ossetia and Russia, makes any theoretical recognition of the two breakaway regions from Georgia unthinkable.

This is not to say that the Geneva International Discussions are useless, on the contrary: They are currently necessary, since they are the only discussions at the international level. However, they are not suitable for addressing a range of issues besides technical ones, which are still important and represent those "islands of agreement" that help to pave the way to normalization.[25] Moreover, at this very moment, any theoretical solution from the Georgian side regarding the recognition of the breakaway territories is pure speculation. Yet, it is precisely for this reason that such a negotiation format is not suitable for conflict resolution: Fundamental issues must be addressed to reconcile what is truly at stake, namely the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Georgia, and that of the breakaway regions.

Another issue with regard to the GID is that the parties involved do not recognize Russia in the same manner: Moscow does not recognize its role as a part of the conflict, with all the consequences that such a role entails. For instance, by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states at the expense of Georgia, Russia does not consider itself liable for what happens on the territories of the de facto states, while Georgia does consider Russia responsible, as stated in its Law on Occupied Territories.[26] Moscow, instead, argues that their negotiations and agreements with the breakaway regions are based upon their own sovereign decisions. This, for Tbilisi and its supporters,

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25   "Islands of agreement" is a concept developed by Gabriella Blum, defined as "areas of asylum from which the conflict may be excluded and within which the rivals may be able to exchange some mutual commitments and be reminded of their respective interests". Gabriella Blum, Islands of Agreement: Managing Enduring Armed Rivalries, Cambridge, MA, 2007, p. 19.
26   Cf. The Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories, Article 7, cited above (Note 4).

contradicts the provisions of the six point-Protocol of Agreement between Russia and Georgia regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops. Nevertheless, such a provision remains ambiguous, since point 5 of the Protocol also states: "While awaiting international protection, Russian security forces shall implement additional security measures."[27] The military treaties signed by Russia with the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia respect this provision, at least from the Russian point of view. Yet Georgia and its supporters consider these treaties invalid.

There is, however, another ambiguity that plagues the Protocol of Agreement. Point 6 states that: "International discussions shall begin on security and stability measures to be taken in Abkhazia and South Ossetia."[28] This led to the establishment of the GID. However, the original version of the Protocol is in French and Russian, and the two versions of point 6 have a different meaning: While the French version (as in the English translation here provided), calls for the "ouverture de discussions internationales sur les modalités de sécurité et de stabilité en Abkhazie et en Ossetie du Sud", the Russian version provides for "p. nachalo mezhdunarodnogo obsuzhdeniya putej obespecheniya prochnoj bezopasnosti Yuzhnoj Osetii i Abkhazii"[29] using the genitive case for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This makes a crucial difference because, according to the Russian version, the security is that *of* South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Russia recognised as independent, and not merely *in* the region. This nuance is relevant because the Russian version, which was signed by President Medvedev, is just as official as the French one. Although the de facto states are not mentioned with their alleged official names, the Russian Federation, recognizing them as sovereign states, gives a crucially different interpretation of these provisions compared to Georgia and the United States.

Russia's self-appointed role of mediator also has negative effects on the other aspect contributing to the deadlock in the negotiations: the commitment to the non-use of force to resolve the conflict. To avoid recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia by signing a treaty with them, Georgia unilaterally declared its commitment to the non-use of force in 2010.[30] Russia does not see itself as a part of the conflict and does not recognize any need to commit to such declarations. Instead, it supports bilateral agreements between the de facto states and Georgia, although unilateral declarations have been recognized by the

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27   Protocol of Agreement, 12 August 2009, point 5, as translated by the University of Edinburgh, available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/724.

28   Ibid*., point 6.

29   Protocole d'accord (in French and Russian), available at: https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/724.

30   Rati Fazisari, "Georgia Will Never Use Force to Restore Its Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty", *Georgian Journal*, 25 November 2010, at: https://www.georgianjournal.ge/weekly-digest/1520-georgia-will-never-use-force-to-restore-its-territorial-integrity-and-sovereignty.html.

International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission as binding.[31] From the Georgian point of view, signing such agreements means implicitly recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, which Tbilisi considers an unacceptable solution. Indeed, the status of the breakaway regions is one of the disrupting issues concerning technical procedures too, since technical discussions are easily susceptible to the politicization of the status issue.[32]

Prospects for Resolution? Better Unresolved than Any Disadvantageous Settlement

Currently, there are no concrete prospects for a positive resolution of the dispute, at least not under the current international legal framework and in today's geopolitical setting. Although each side claims its position is legally grounded, they are all subject to different interpretations of the international legal norms.

One of the biggest issues at stake is Georgia's territorial integrity. From the Georgian point of view, as for any state, territorial integrity is not only one of the defining criteria of statehood.[33] It is also necessary for ensuring the right to self-determination of its people,[34] as one of the utmost prerogatives of states such as their survival and their sovereignty. Conversely, separatism and secession often represent some of the biggest threats to the survival of a state as such. It is true that, in some limited cases, secession has been beneficial to the stability of a country (for instance, when Malaysia forced Singapore to abandon the federation in 1965). Georgia fears that allowing any secession from its territory would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the country itself.[35] Even though ethnic Georgians represent the majority of the population of the country, the biggest minority groups are Armenians and Azeri,[36] mostly located in the southern areas of Georgia closer to the Armenian border. In fact, there would not be such a strong presence of Abkhaz and Ossetian in a unified Georgia to significantly affect the demographic balance of the small multinational

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31 Cf. United Nations, Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations, with commentaries thereto. Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission's report covering the work of that session (A/61/19), New York 2006, at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_9_2006.pdf.

32 Cf. Gaprindashvili/Tsitsikashvili/Zoidze/Charaia, cited above (Note 2), p. 9.

33 Cf. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, 26 December 1933 (in force as of 26 December 1934), at: https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml.

34 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, European Journal of International Law 1/1990, pp. 4-32, here: p. 30; Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1/1997, pp. 31-61.

35 Cf. Karli Storm, Language, Law and Nation-Building in Georgia, in: Rico Isaacs/Abel Polese (eds.), Nation-Building and Identity in the Post-Soviet Space: New tools and approaches, London and New York 2016, pp. 118-137.

36 Cf. CIA World Factbook, Georgia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html.

country. Yet, in practice, the return of IDPs to their hometowns would be a game-changer in such a context.

It would be possible to spend a long time speculating on possible solutions for a unified Georgia, such as a federative structure where ethnic minorities, as well as the breakaway regions, are strongly represented, or on solutions for state associations between Georgia and separatist de facto states, or indeed an autonomous status for Abkhazia and South Ossetia based on other models, such as South Tyrol in Italy.[37] However, these speculations ceased to have any meaning once the war in 2008 broke out, and the Russian Federation recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For the identity and goals of the de facto states, this represents a game-changer. Moreover, the fact that Russia actively lobbies for other states to recognize the breakaway regions as independent gives Abkhazia and South Ossetia sufficient grounds for asserting their status as subjects of international law, and provides justification for their claim to sovereignty.[38]

Georgia, however, contests such claims, and finds support well beyond its Western partners.[39] It also adheres to policies of counter-recognition and reconciliation/reintegration through its tentative, albeit active, engagement with the two breakaway regions and their citizens, who, according to Georgian law, are formally Georgian nationals.[40] Nonetheless, Tbilisi has not been able to persuade Moscow to respect the commitment of the Protocol of Agreement to withdraw its troops from the breakaway regions, nor to respect Georgian territorial integrity despite the policy of normalization pursued since the Georgian Dream coalition came into power. This is particularly true in the case of South Ossetia, which is geographically located in a sensitive and strategic area of Georgia.

Thus, it is no surprise that Georgia continues to pursue its pro-NATO and pro-EU foreign policy, even though there is little prospect of complete integration with the transatlantic community in the short- and mid-term. Nor is any true rapprochement with Russia a popular option in the country, especially considering that Moscow responds harshly to any political development that could indirectly affect its interests, let alone the anti-government protests which took place in June.[41] In any case, Russia also made clear that it is in its

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37 Such a solution has been shyly pledged by Abkhaz delegates visiting the Italian region with Georgian authorities in 2005. Cf. Abkhazia and Georgia Debates "South-Tirol Model", *UNPO Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization*, 13 April 2005, at: https://unpo.org/article/2320.

38 Cf. Chirikba, cited above (Note 11); see also Political and legal foundation of sovereignty of South Ossetia, Renaissanse, Special Issues, HDIM.NGO/0254/11, 30 September 2011.

39 Georgian policymakers, academics, and think-tank researchers often point to Cuba as one of the most respectful states holding this position, arguing that Cuba has a particular interest in and commitment to conducting its diplomacy according to international law. Information from private conversations of the author with a Georgian MP and former government official.

40 Cf. Nina Caspersen, Recognition, Status Quo or Reintegration: Engagement with de facto States, Ethnopolitics 4/2018, pp. 373-389, here: p. 376.

41 Despite being labelled as anti-Russian, Georgian current and former policy-makers and politicians from the opposition claim the June protests were anti-government, arguing that allowing Sergei Gavrilov, a member of the Russian Duma, to sit in the chair of the Speaker

security interest to prevent Georgia from joining NATO, and maintaining a Russian presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia guarantees that this will not happen, even if Georgia recognizes the two breakaway regions as independent states.[42] Nor is it in the Georgian interest to do so. Recognizing South Ossetia as independent would mean that it would join the Russian Federation, even though Moscow has shown little enthusiasm for the region, as Russia would face more costs than benefits. South Ossetia is not as politically, historically, and strategically important as Crimea. Moreover, without Georgian recognition, the political costs for annexing South Ossetia would be extremely high vis-à-vis the international audience. Finally, since its military presence in the breakaway regions gives Moscow great influence over Tbilisi, the truly important piece of the geopolitical chessboard, Russia has no interest in changing the status quo.

As for Abkhazia, which has higher strategic importance for Moscow due to its location on the Black Sea, the status issue remains the true key question. The small republic is not satisfied with its relations with Russia: Georgia may have some room for manoeuvre if it were able to reach an agreement with Abkhazia. Yet, maintaining status-neutral agreements hardly works, as the views on the future relations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi are irreconcilable: Abkhazia maintains recognition as its priority goal.[43] Although Georgia could theoretically (and, perhaps, pragmatically) agree on Abkhazian independence, and only on certain conditions (such as the return of IDPs), such a move would have irremediable consequences for South Ossetia. Finally, it is important to remember that Tbilisi views only Moscow as the other side of the conflict, also arguing that Russia has de facto annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia – a situation that is ongoing. In these conditions, Tbilisi has no interest in unfreezing the situation for any solution that could compromise its territorial integrity, which is internationally recognized by almost all the members of the United Nations, and is coherent with international legal norms and practices on state recognition. Moscow, and Sukhumi and Tskhinvali in particular, see things differently, and none of them is interested in taking a step back, whether for geopolitical, strategic, or status-related reasons.

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of the Parliament during the meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy and to address the audience in Russian with no formal protest was but the last act of submission to Russia. Cf: Thousands of protesters try to storm Georgia parliament, *Euractiv*, 21 June 2019, at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/thousands-of-protesters-try-to-storm-georgia-parliament.

42   Cf. Andrew Osborn, Russian PM warns NATO admission of Georgia could trigger "terrible conflict", *Reuters*, 6 August 2018, at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-georgia/russian-pm-warns-nato-admission-of-georgia-could-trigger-terrible-conflict-idUSKBN1KR1UQ.

43   Cf. Gaprindashvili/Tsitsikashvili/Zoidze/Charaia, cited above (Note 2), p. 19.

William H. Hill

Moldova/Transdniestria: Progress and Political Crisis

Introduction

The continuing, steady progress in the OSCE's "results-based" approach to the Transdniestrian political settlement process was not the big news from Moldova during the past year. Instead, an upheaval in domestic politics, with an encouraging outcome to date, has dominated the country's news in 2019. The February parliamentary elections produced an inconclusive result, with the legislature divided almost equally between three competing blocs. Most observers expected that early elections would be necessary, but by the deadline, the pro-Russian Party of Socialists (*Partidul Socialiştilor din Republica Moldova*, PSRM) and the pro-Western alliance ACUM[1] reached agreement on a coalition government. The ruling Democratic Party (*Partidul Democrat din Moldova*, PDM), controlled by the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, attempted for a week to hold onto power by manipulating the Constitutional Court and refusing to vacate government buildings.

When the Russian Federation, the European Union, and the United States all weighed in to support the new coalition, the PDM abandoned office; Plahotniuc and several close associates fled the country. In its three months in office (June-September) the unexpected coalition has focused on "de-oligarchization", a programme aimed at reforming the electoral system, judiciary, prosecutor, and police, and fighting corruption. While work has continued in the Transdniestrian settlement process, it has been a relatively low priority for the coalition. There are also significant differences between the PSRM and ACUM leadership on how to proceed towards a settlement.

The Transdniestrian Settlement Process: Continued Progress

The participants of the Transdniestrian settlement process, in particular representatives from Chişinău and Tiraspol, continued to work hard, with tangible results, through to the end of 2018 and into 2019. Internationally recognized Moldovan neutral design license plates for residents of the Transdniestrian region were launched on 1 September 2018. Following this, Moldovan and Transdniestrian negotiators and thirteen expert working groups continued to meet frequently, both to ensure the steady implementation of the six agree-

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1   ACUM (English translation: "Now") is an electoral alliance between the Dignity and Truth Platform Party (*Partidul Platforma Demnitate şi Adevăr*, PPDA) and the Party of Action and Solidarity (*Partidul Actiune si Solidaritate*, PAS).

ments reached since November 2017, and to pursue progress on the two remaining issues from the "package of eight" – telecommunications and outstanding criminal cases.[2]

As the Milan OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting approached, working relations between Chişinău and Tiraspol had undergone a remarkable transformation from what they had been only three to four years earlier. Automobile traffic was moving across the Gura Bîcului Bridge, and experts would soon begin investigating whether and how the bridge might handle heavy truck traffic. Eight Latin-script schools were operating in the Transdniestrian region without the usual recurring problems of access for students and teachers. The mechanism for the apostolization of Transdniestrian diplomas by Moldovan authorities was working effectively. Moldovan farmers in the Dubossary region had regained regular, unhindered access to their lands in Transdniestrian-controlled territory. In addition to the issues from the package of eight, working groups began to extend their discussions to areas such as banking, phytosanitary questions, civil document certification, and human rights.[3]

The three mediators (Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE) and two observers (the EU and US) maintained their consensus and effective co-operation during this process, and produced another sweeping statement – for the fourth year in a row – on the Transdniestrian settlement process at the Milan Ministerial Council on 6-7 December 2018.[4] The statement reviewed and welcomed the progress achieved during 2018. The statement also called on the sides not only to work towards implementing all of the agreements reached in the 5+2 meeting held in May 2018 in Rome and the Vienna and Berlin protocols, but to seek progress in all three "baskets" of the agreed agenda for the negotiation process, including political and security issues.

The Milan Ministerial Statement also reflected the longstanding consensus among all OSCE participating States, including Russia, that any settlement must be based on Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity, with a special status for Transdniestria. As in previous years, the Transdniestrian "Foreign Ministry" disputed this point at once, demonstrating the wide gap between Tiraspol and Chişinău (and the international community) on fundamental political and security issues.[5] The Transdniestrian statement also took issue with the Moldovan intervention at Milan, specifically with respect to calls for the

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2   For background, see William H. Hill, Moldova/Transdniestria: Steps Forward, Stumbles Back, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/ IFSH (ed.), *OSCE Yearbook 2018*, Baden-Baden 2019, pp. 193-204.

3   Cf. ibid.; for a good summary, see also Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Annual Report 2018, Vienna 2019, pp. 68-69, available at: https:// www.osce.org/annual-report/2018.

4   Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ministerial Council, Milan 2018, Ministerial Statement on the Negotiations on the Transdniestrian Settlement Process in the "5+2" Format, MC.DOC/1/18, 7 December 2018, available at: https:// www.osce.org/chairmanship/405917.

5   Cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pridnestrovian Moldovian Republic, Comment by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PMR, 9 December 2018, at: http://mfa-pmr.org/en/mzv.

removal or transformation of the Russian peacekeeping force and "questions of security in general".

While Transdniestria emphasized its traditional position that the purpose of the settlement process was to define and improve the relationship between two equal partners – Chişinău and Tiraspol – Transdniestrian officials continued to participate actively and often constructively in the working groups and other contacts. For the OSCE, the incoming Slovak Chairmanship pushed early on for continued progress in the settlement process. The new Chairperson-in-Office, Minister of Foreign Affairs Miroslav Lajčák visited Moldova on 19 January 2019, only a week after formally assuming his position. Lajčák pledged his and the OSCE's support, noting that: "We need to keep taking small concrete steps forward. Some of the progress we have seen was almost unimaginable a few years ago. The more we engage in dialogue, the more trust we will build."[6] In order to ensure the continuity of the process, the Slovak Chairmanship retained former Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini as Special Representative for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process.

Despite ominous political clouds gathering over Moldova, the OSCE continued to work productively with Moldovan and Transdniestrian negotiators and officials through the winter of 2018/2019 and spring of 2019. Most of the work was relatively low profile, involving implementation of existing agreements, discussion of details on subjects under negotiation, and increasing identification of other areas where both sides might benefit from practical contacts and co-operation. Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Claus Neukirch, intervened publicly to put out fires, such as tensions caused by the Transdniestrian authorities' imposition of restrictions on access to the Moldovan-controlled town of Varnita in the Bendery region, and Tiraspol's opening of a "social-cultural centre" in Moscow.[7] After several months of work on these issues, in early May, Neukirch welcomed Transdniestrian resolution of the issues involving Varnita.[8] At the end of May, Neukirch also welcomed Chişinău's agreement to certify civil documents for Transdniestrian residents, documenting marriages, divorces, births, and deaths.[9] Special Representative Frattini visited Moldova on 10-11 May, urging continued progress in meetings

6   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák, on official visit to Moldova, says advancing Transdniestrian Settlement Process high on Slovak Chair's agenda, Chisinau, 19 January 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/409467.

7   Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), OSCE Head of Mission calls on the Sides to the Transdniestrian settlement to keep to the course of constructive interaction and confidence building, Chisinau, 31 January 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/410564.

8   Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Head of OSCE Mission to Moldova welcomes commitment by leaderships of both Sides to continue constructive dialogue, underpinned by concrete steps, Chisinau, 13 May 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/419408.

9   Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Head of OSCE Mission praises decision by Moldova's Government to certify civil status facts of Transdniestrian residents, Chisinau, 29 May 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/421175.

with leaders from both sides, and held out the prospect of a formal 5+2 meeting in Bratislava sometime later in the year.[10]

Moldova's Parliamentary Elections: The Gathering Storm

Moldova had been in a state of political turmoil for the past five years, but as the February 2019 parliamentary elections grew closer, the situation grew worse. The 2014 parliamentary elections in Moldova coincided with the so-called "theft of the century" – the disappearance of some one billion dollars from three Moldovan banks through fraudulent, non-performing loans and insider manipulation. The Moldovan economy eventually recovered, but the country's political structures arguably never did. Vladimir Plahotniuc's PDM gradually increased its representation in parliament, until a PDM-dominated coalition government headed by Prime Minister Pavel Filip was installed in January 2016, to the vocal disapproval of large demonstrations from both the left and right.

The Filip government ended the 2014-2015 revolving door of governments and prime ministers, and professed a pro-European orientation. However, the increasingly obvious dominance of Plahotniuc, democratic backsliding, and rampant corruption – epitomized by the failure to identify and punish members of the elite clearly implicated in or responsible for the theft of the century – produced widespread disillusion within Moldova and ruptures with its most important international partners After PDM-leaning judges annulled the victory of Dignity and Truth Platform Party (PPDA) leader Andrei Năstase in the Chişinău mayoral elections in the summer of 2018, popular indignation with Plahotniuc's "captured state" exploded into mass protests.

Plahotniuc resorted to a wide variety of administrative resources and measures to bolster his finances and boost his support. Controversial money-for-citizenship and capital amnesty laws sought to counter the EU's withdrawal of assistance. Having already modified the electoral system in 2017 over the objections of Moldova's international partners, Plahotniuc held a referendum on reducing the number of deputies in parliament from 101 to 61 alongside the February 2019 election. Meanwhile, the PDM government sought to obtain Washington's support by earmarking the old, decaying Republic Stadium in the centre of Chişinău as the site for a new American embassy.[11]

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10   Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Visiting Moldova, OSCE Chair's Special Representative Franco Frattini urges Sides to step up efforts to maintain positive dynamic in settlement process, Chisinau, 11 May 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/419276.

11   At least this was a widespread popular view in Chişinău. Cf. Mihai Popşoi, State of Play Ahead of Moldova's Parliamentary Elections, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 14 December 2018, at: https://jamestown.org/program/state-of-play-ahead-of-moldovas-parliamentary-elections/.

The election campaign was heated, competitive, and marked by what many long-time observers of Moldovan politics considered a higher than usual number of complaints and violations.[12] Plahotniuc's PDM and the allied Shor Party – the vehicle of Ilan Shor, Mayor of Orhei Mayor and fellow oligarch – spent enormous sums on the campaign, in total roughly three times as much as all other parties registered in the campaign taken together.[13] The PDM was widely accused of using government resources, funding for local projects, and pressure to further its campaign. However, the Central Election Commission (CEC), widely believed to be under the influence of the PDM, formally warned the PSRM and Igor Dodon because the president had allegedly violated the non-partisan nature of his office by openly demonstrating his sympathy for the Socialist Party.[14]

The PSRM received clear, strong support from Moscow. President Dodon met frequently with President Putin and emphasized the need for Moldova to have good relations and economic ties with Russia.[15] In a meeting with Dodon on 30 January, Putin agreed to make an exception to current Russian practice and allow Moldovan goods shipped to Russia to transit Ukraine, a clear electoral concession to his Moldovan colleague.[16] In a strange departure from the comity within the 5+2 format, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a sharp criticism of alleged US interference in Moldova's domestic affairs after US Ambassador Dereck J. Hogan made a rather anodyne, non-partisan call for Moldova to hold free and fair elections.[17]

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12   Cf. European Parliament/OSCE ODIHR/OSCE PA/Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, International Election Observation Mission: Republic of Moldova – Parliamentary Elections, 24 February 2019; Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/412346. I also reached this conclusion based upon my experience of following election campaigns and elections in Moldova since 1998.

13   Cf. the Moldovan election website: Alegerile parlamentare din 2019 în Republica Moldova, *alegeri.md*, at: http://alegeri.md/w/Alegerile_parlamentare_din_2019_%C3%AEn_ Republica_Moldova.

14   Cf. European Parliament/OSCE ODIHR/OSCE PA/Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, cited above (Note 12), p. 14; see also Parliamentary Elections 2019: Party of Socialists was sanctioned by CEC with warning, *Publika*, 9 February 2019, at https:// en.publika.md/parliamentary-elections-2019-party-of-socialists-was-sanctioned-by-cec-with-warning_2655751.html.

15   Cf. Anna Nemtsova, As Elections Approach, Moldova's President Tries to Prove He's Putin's Mini-Me No More, *Daily Beast*, 19 February 2019, updated 15 June 2019, at: https://www.thedailybeast.com/as-elections-approach-moldovas-president-tries-to-prove-hes-putins-mini-me-no-more; see also Vadim Ghirda, AP interview: Moldova president says country needs Russia, *AP News*, 21 February 2019, at: https://www.apnews.com/ e69fb771689c47dbbe3561338bfe98a4.

16   Cf. Dodon, Putin agree on Moldovan goods' supplies to Russia via Ukraine, *Kyiv Post*, 30 January 2019, at: https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/dodon-putin-agree-on-moldovan-goods-supplies-to-russia-via-ukraine.html?cn-reloaded=1.

17   Cf. U.S. Embassy in Moldova, Ambassador Hogan's speech at FRISPA, MSU: A Crucial Test – Moldova's Parliamentary Elections and Future Relations with the United States, 5 February 2019, at: https://md.usembassy.gov/ambassador-hogan-delivers-a-speech-at-frishpa-a-crucial-test-moldovas-parliamentary-elections-and-future-relations-with-the-united-states/; see also Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossijskoj Federatsii [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation], Kommentarij Departamenta informatsii i

In earlier elections, Plahotniuc and the PDM had presented themselves as a pro-Western party, dedicated to European integration. However, in the light of steadily worsening relations with the EU, culminating in a formal condemnation from the European Parliament in 2018 and withdrawal of economic aid, Plahotniuc redefined his part as "pro-Moldovan." The sizeable segment of the Moldovan population that supported closer relations with the West, in particular the EU, moved to support two new parties growing out of the anti-government demonstrations of the winter of 2016: the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), headed by former World Bank official and 2016 presidential candidate Maia Sandu, and the Dignity and Truth Platform Party (PPDA), headed by protest leader and 2018 Chişinău mayoral candidate Andrei Năstase. For the 2019 elections, PAS and PPDA formed the electoral bloc ACUM. Although ACUM was clearly critical of the PSRM's pro-Russian orientation, the primary focus of the alliance was on "de-oligarchization" of the country, directed especially against Plahotniuc and the PDM.[18]

With the new electoral system comprising 51 single mandate districts, and the other 50 deputies elected from nationwide party lists, most observers predicted that the PDM and PSRM would win most of the single mandate contests and dominate the next parliament. The results proved to be a surprise.

The PSRM took first place in the nationwide polling with 31 per cent of a total vote of slightly more than 1.45 million.[19] The big surprise was the performance of the pro-European electoral bloc ACUM, which beat the PDM to second place by a clear margin, 26.84 per cent to 23.62 per cent. The only other party to make it past the five per cent national barrier was the Shor Party, led by Mayor of Orhei and oligarch Ilan Shor, with 8.2 per cent of the nationwide vote. The results in the single mandate districts were also somewhat surprising. As expected, the PSRM did well, winning 17 out of the 51 seats available. However, the PDM did not meet expectations, winning only 17 of the districts, while ACUM took twelve single mandate seats, all around Chişinău and in the two districts in Western Europe and North America.

The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission concluded that the "24 February 2019 parliamentary elections were competitive and fundamental rights were generally respected".[20] However, many long-time observers considered this the dirtiest election – and election day in particular – in the history of independent post-Soviet Moldova. The OSCE/ODIHR report noted: "The

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pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s vovlechennost'yu SShA v predvybornuyu situatsiyu v Moldavii [Comment by the MFA Information and Press Department on US Involvement in the Pre-Election Situation in Moldova], 12 February 2019, at: http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3513260.

18   Cf. William H. Hill, Moldova's Upcoming Election: What's at Stake?, *The Russia File*, Kennan Institute, 14 February 2019, at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/moldovas-upcoming-election-whats-stake.

19   For results of the election, see the Moldovan NGO website: http://alegeri.md/w/Alegerile_parlamentare_din_2019_%C3%AEn_Republica_Moldova#Rezultatele_alegeril or; and the IFES website: http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3120/.

20   European Parliament/OSCE ODIHR/OSCE PA/Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, cited above (Note 12), p. 1.

campaign took place against the backdrop of disaffection with public institutions and was tainted by allegations [of] pressure on public employees, strong indications of vote buying and the misuse of state resources."[21] There were widespread reports and videos uploaded on social media of organized bussing of voters from the Transdniestrian region to the polls. Many of these voters alleged they had been paid as much as 20 euros for their votes. Notwithstanding all of the complaints, the results were accepted relatively quickly by all of the contestants.

The worst fears of the opposition were not realized, as there was neither a clear PDM victory nor a PDM-PSRM dominium. Instead, the distribution of seats pointed towards a hung parliament, in which all parties faced considerable difficulties in putting together a majority coalition:

PSRM	35
PDM	30
ACUM	26
Shor Party	7
Independents	3

Even if the Shor Party and independent deputies could all be counted on to vote with the PDM, Plahotniuc needed to reach an agreement with either the Socialists or the parties in the ACUM bloc in order to form a government.

From Deadlock to Crisis: Forming a Government

The election results were certified by the CEC on 9 March, and a couple of weeks later the new parliament convened to begin the task of forming a majority within that body, electing its officers, and choosing a new government. In the meantime, Filip remained in office in a caretaker role. Each of the three major actors – the PDM, PSRM, and ACUM – had serious reservations about negotiating or co-operating with the other two, so the process was drawn out and difficult. Of the three, Plahotniuc and the PDM were most ready to make a deal, while ACUM was the most standoffish, unwilling to deal with Plahotniuc at all and extremely wary of the PSRM's pro-Moscow orientation.

The PSRM leadership consulted frequently with Moscow; at one point all of the PSRM deputies were reported to have visited Moscow for consultations. The Russian leadership pushed for a coalition against Plahotniuc. Russian authorities had filed two new money-laundering cases against the PDM leader during the campaign. Most remarkably, in a weekly news roundup at the end of March, the renowned Russian television news personality Dmitry Kiselev devoted several minutes of his Sunday evening show to warning the

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21   Ibid.

PSRM not to join with Plahotniuc and the PDM, calling such a possible coalition a "poisoned apple".[22] The PSRM and ACUM warily investigated the possibility of a coalition for several weeks, with the latter stressing a desire to deal primarily, if not exclusively, with "de-oligarchization" of the country.

By the end of May, most Moldovans and outside observers expected the stalemate to continue, and to result in early, "snap" elections sometime in the autumn. But then, events came to a head during the week of 3 June, as the 9 June deadline for forming a government approached. On 3 June, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn, and US State Department Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs Brad Freden all visited Chişinău and met with representatives of all three parties, the government, and President Dodon. In the wake of their meetings, ACUM and the PSRM began negotiating in earnest, and announced their agreement on a coalition on 8 June.[23]

Plahotniuc and the PDM refused to recognize the new coalition, and the PDM caretaker government refused to vacate the government offices and buildings. While the new ACUM-PSRM ministers held the parliament building, plainclothes toughs surrounded other official buildings, supporting Plahotniuc's bid to retain power. An obedient, PDM-dominated Constitutional Court conveniently ruled that the coalition agreement had been reached too late, and the president was obligated to dissolve parliament and call new elections. The Moldovan constitution specifies that the president "may" dissolve parliament if a government cannot be formed after a period of three months; the Court ruled that this meant 90 days, not three calendar months.

The international community demonstrated an uncommon unity, as the Russian Federation, European Union, and United States all weighed in to support the PSRM-ACUM coalition, and call on Plahotniuc and the PDM to respect the law and give up power.[24] This took about a week, as on 14-15 June,

22   A video of Kiselev's 31 March broadside was published in 1 April on the Moldovan news website *NewsMaker*. See "Otravlennoe yabloko pokatilos' k Dodonu." Moskva otkryla ogon' po "svoim" ["The poisoned apple rolled towards Dodon." Moscow opened fire on "its own guys"], *NewsMaker*, 1 April 2019, at https://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/ otravlennoe-yabloko-pokatilos-k-dodonu-moskva-otkryla-ogon-po-svoim-42710.

23   Cf. Alexander Tanas/Matthias Williams, Moldovan parties agree to form government after months of deadlock, *Reuters,* 8 June 2019, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-politics/moldovan-parties-agree-to-form-government-after-months-of-deadlock-idUSKCN1T90MT.

24   There were numerous statements by governments, international organizations, and press around the globe in support of the ACUM-PSRM coalition and denouncing the PDM's refusal to transfer power. For example, see: EU External Action Service, Statement by High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the political situation in the Republic of Moldova, Bruxelles, 9 June 2019, at: https:// eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/63826/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-and-commissioner-johannes-hahn_en; U.S. State Department, Press Statement, Morgan Ortagus, Department Spokesperson Washington, DC, Moldovan Elections, Press Statement, 9 June 2019, at: https:// www.state.gov/moldovan-elections/; Swiss Cooperation in Moldova, 10 June 2019, at: https://www.facebook.com/SwissCooperationMoldova/posts/2;The Ministry of Foreign

PDM officials and backers vacated the government buildings and agreed to go into opposition. Plahotniuc, Shor, and a number of their supporters left Chişinău and apparently fled abroad. (In a video sent on Moldova's Independence Day in August, Shor turned up in Israel. Plahotniuc's whereabouts remain officially unknown, although he is active on Facebook and rumoured to be in Florida.[25])

In the new government, the PSRM took the posts of speaker of parliament, deputy prime minister for reintegration (the portfolio handling the Transdniestrian settlement talks), minister of defence, and head of the security and intelligence service (SIS), while ACUM was allotted most of the ministerial posts, including prime minister, and foreign and interior ministers. Several of the ACUM ministers, such as Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu and Finance Minister Natalia Gavriliţa, had been working abroad in international posts. Incoming Prime Minister Maia Sandu acknowledged that the PSRM-ACUM coalition was not a "natural partnership", and said the main aim would be to fight corruption, reverse the effects of oligarchic control in the country, and to restore the rule of law.[26] Both ACUM and PSRM leaders noted that the arrangement was temporary (although without any specified term or end date), and undertook to concentrate on domestic reform, while avoiding geopolitical issues which might easily split the two.

It seems too early, at the time of writing, to reach any firm conclusions on the results of and prospects for this unusual East-West, left-right coalition. International support has been forthcoming and enthusiastic from almost all quarters, one of those rare issues on which the EU, US, and Russia appear to remain in continued agreement. The new government has concentrated on a few general issue areas. One of the first priorities was to adopt legislation abolishing the electoral "reform" of 2017 and returning the country to a system of nationwide proportional representation.[27] Personnel remains an important issue that is gradually being addressed. The entire composition of the Constitutional Court has been replaced, and candidates are being screened for the

Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statement by the Foreign Ministry in connection with the events in the Republic of Moldova, 10 June 2019, at: https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/md/-/asset_publisher/dfOotO3QvCij/content/id/3677863; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Press Release, Republic of Moldova: joint statement by the UK, France, Germany, Poland, and Sweden, 10 June 2019, at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-republic-of-moldova-by-the-uk-france-germany-poland-and-sweden.

25 For an account of the events of June 2019 in Chişinău, cf. William H. Hill/David J. Kramer, The Fight for the Poorest Country in Europe, in: *The American Interest*, 2 July 2019, at: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/07/02/the-fight-for-the-poorest-country-in-europe/.

26 Cf. Congressional Research Service, Moldova: An Overview, 11 July 2019, at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10894.pdf.

27 For a brief review of reform measures adopted, see the relatively new series of weekly reports (Moldova Weekly) at sic.md, a new Moldovan news and public affairs website with support from the Soros Foundation and the Black Sea Trust. The bulk of the news on the site is in Romanian. The English language weekly series began on 10 August 2017.

procuracy. Various dubious business and government deals from the Plahot-niuc era are being unravelled, while the 2014 "theft of the century" is being investigated with greater vigour.

There have been bumps in the road for the coalition. ACUM deputies were indignant when a PSRM appointee was quickly elected head of the new Constitutional Court, apparently because one of the ACUM appointees voted for him in the secret ballot. (With only six judges voting, and the political af-filiation of all well known, most expected a negotiation before a head was chosen). Several deputies from both parties have called for the coalition agree-ment to be further formalised and extended, generally with the expressed wish of making the unprecedented arrangement more stable and lasting. An invita-tion from President Dodon to Russian Defence Minister Sergej Shoigu to at-tend the 24 August celebration of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Chişinău by Soviet forces drew a rebuke from Prime Minister Sandu, who complained that the government had not been consulted, and thus the visit must be personal and not official.[28]

Despite irritants such as these, both the ACUM and PSRM leaders seem dedicated to making the coalition work and continue through the winter. Inter-national support for the current government also appears to continue to be strong. President Dodon visited Moscow in early September to hold talks on the price and amounts of gas supplied to Moldova from Russia. Foreign Min-ister Popescu then held an apparently constructive meeting with his Russian counterpart, which is widely bruited to be in preparation for Prime Minister Sandu's visit to Moscow. In the meantime, after one delay due to scheduling difficulties from the US side, Sandu is expected to visit Washington in mid-September. The successful left-right collaboration in Chişinău has already ceased to be a novelty, although – given Moldova's often troubled recent po-litical history – it does continue to be something of a surprise.

The OSCE and the Transdniestrian Settlement Process: What Next?

The Transdniestrian settlement process is not a top priority for ACUM, nor for Prime Minister Sandu in particular. This is not surprising, given the importance of anti-corruption, anti-oligarch actions for her and her ACUM colleagues. Further, her major experience with the Transdniestria portfolio during her prior service in government as minister of education was primarily dealing with the trouble created by Tiraspol for the eight Latin-script schools on the left bank. The prime minister has been clearly in tune with most in the centre and on the right in Chişinău political circles in opposing "federalization" as a solution to

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28   Cf. Sandu to Analyze Shoigu's Visit to Moldova, *Regional Trends Analytics*, 27 August 2019, at: https://regtrends.com/en/2019/08/27/sandu-to-analyze-shoigu-s-visit-to-moldova/; see also Vladimir Solov'ev, Rossiya dast boj svoim boepripasam [Russia will deploy its ammunition], *Kommersant'*, 24 August 2019, at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4072458 ?from=four_mir.

the conflict, and appears to share rising fears that the renewed involvement of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak means that Moscow will attempt to revive his Memorandum. In her most recent statements on the Transdniestrian question, the Prime Minister has stressed the need for any settlement to end the corruption supported by smuggling through the Transdniestrian region.[29]

Since June, the Transdniestrian portfolio has been handled by Deputy Prime Minister Vasilii Șova, who served in roughly the same post under President Vladimir Voronin, and most recently (since 2017) as an advisor to President Dodon on this issue. Șova is well known by Transdniestrian and Russian negotiators (not always a positive recommendation to representatives of other political parties in Moldova) and has accompanied Dodon to many of his meetings in the Kremlin over the past two years. Șova worked on the Transdniestrian issue in the 1990s and the 2000s, so he comes as close as any Moldovan official to having an institutional memory of the ups and downs of the settlement process.

Șova was reportedly the driving force behind the composition and distribution of the "Comprehensive Package for Moldova" by President Dodon at the 2019 Munich Security Conference. This initiative envisions the creation of a favourable international environment, specifically calling for win-win EU-Russia co-operation, to promote reintegration of the Transdniestrian region into an internationally recognized neutral Moldova.[30] Dodon and Șova have been promoting variants of this general approach for well over a year, but the proposal has yet to find real resonance in Moldova's population and political circles. The initiative did not attract the attention the Moldovans hoped for at Munich, but it probably remains indicative of the general approach the PSRM is likely to pursue as a partner in the new government.

Meanwhile, the OSCE is continuing with its active, result-based approach to the settlement process. The government crisis in Chişinău slowed, but did not entirely stop work by experts. During the spring, Transdniestrian negotiators expressed frustration to several Western visitors that Moldova was taking so long to form a new administration and get back to work after the elections.[31] Indeed, once the June crisis was resolved, contacts and work resumed relatively quickly. On 12 July, representatives of the mediators, including Special Representative Frattini, and the observers visited Chişinău and Tiraspol, and met with President Dodon, Prime Minister Sandu, Deputy Prime Minister

29 Cf. Government of Republic of Moldova, OSCE prepared to provide assistance in process of withdrawing ammunition from Transnistria's Cobasna depot, 11 September 2019, at: https://gov.md/en/content/osce-prepared-provide-assistance-process-withdrawing-ammunition-transnistrias-cobasna-depot.

30 Presentation of the Idea of "Comprehensive Package for Moldova": International Security Conference (Munich, February 2019), was a small book distributed by the Moldovan delegation, headed by President Dodon, to delegates at the Munich Security Conference in February 2019, in Romanian, Russian, English, German, and French. The initiative is referred to most often by its abbreviated Russian title Bol'shoj Paket.

31 Statements by Transdniestrian negotiators, OSCE officials to author, April-May, 2019.

Șova, Transdniestrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky, and Transdniestrian chief negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev. Șova and Ignatiev agreed to resume "1+1" meetings soon (one was held on 24 July), while all the participants endorsed the possibility of a formal "substantive" 5+2 meeting in Bratislava within the next three months, and a retreat for expert group members in Bavaria, Germany organized by the OSCE Mission in the autumn.[32]

Another development in late summer involving a longstanding security issue somewhat unexpectedly held out the possibility of further progress in the settlement process. A portion of the small detachment of Russian military forces in Moldova's Transdniestrian region has as its sole purpose guarding a depot in the village of Colbasna containing some 22,000 metric tons of Cold War era ammunition. About one half of the original stocks of munitions stored at Colbasna was removed to the Russian Federation with the support of the OSCE Voluntary Fund and assistance of the OSCE Mission. However, the last train of ammunition left Moldova for Russia in March 2004; there have been no further shipments since that time, and no international inspection of the munitions for over a decade. Although the issue has been discussed from time to time in the OSCE and among participants in the Transdniestrian settlement process, nothing has come of these discussions.

Then, according to President Dodon, during his 24 August visit to Moldova Russian Defence Minister Shoigu proposed the destruction of the ammunition stored at Colbasna.[33] During a meeting with Foreign Minister Popescu on 11 September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov confirmed that Shoigu had made such a proposal, and noted that both President Dodon and Transdniestrian leader Krasnoselsky had welcomed it.[34] According to Lavrov, the Shoigu proposal envisioned the destruction of at least some of the ammunition, as its age and deteriorating condition might make it unsuitable for shipment back to Russia, as had been done in the early 2000s. Neither Lavrov nor Shoigu have publicly specified any details of this Russian proposal. The initiative was welcomed by the OSCE, and Secretary General Thomas Greminger scheduled a visit to Chişinău and Tiraspol on 17-19 September to discuss the

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32   Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Joint Statement by the mediators and the observers in the Permanent Conference on Political Issues in the Framework of the Negotiation Process on the Transdniestrian Settlement in the 5+2 format following their 12 July 2019 visit to Chisinau and Tiraspol, Chisinau, 12 July 2019, at: https://-www.osce.org/chairmanship/425576; for a photo of the 1+1 meeting on 24 July 2019, see Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Conflict prevention and resolution, at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/104529.

33   Cf. Solov'ev, cited above (Note 28).

34   Cf. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossijskoj Federatsii [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation], Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's statement and answers to media questions at a joint news conference following his talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova Nicu Pepescu, Moscow, 11 September 2019, at: https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches//asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWV mR//content/id/3782852?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_7OvQR5KJWVmR&_101_INSTAN CE_7OvQR5KJWVmR_languageId=en_GB.

settlement process, and in particular the proposed destruction or removal of the ammunition.[35]

Conclusion

It is clearly too early to presume any results from the Russian Federation's revival of the prospect of removing or eliminating the ammunition stored at Colbasna. However, the possible significance is clear. First, while there has been great progress in the settlement process over the past three to four years, Transdniestrian representatives have steadfastly resisted any discussion of status, and Russian representatives have generally avoided discussing security issues, despite continued, regular calls from Chişinău for the withdrawal of the remaining Russian troops stationed in the Transdniestrian region. Second, the ammunition in Colbasna – the one remaining vestige of the Soviet forces stationed in Cold War Moldova – has been a continuing impediment to withdrawal of the Russian troops, since Moscow insists they need to stay to guard the facility. While one can never assume the success of subsequent negotiations, removal of the ammunition would eliminate one clear, significant obstacle to progress. The OSCE has funds to support the process; what remains to be determined is the extent of political will.

On a more general level, the replacement of the PDM government, the flight of Plahotniuc, and the formation and first steps of Moldova's unusual coalition government engender both optimism and questions. First, one can hope but cannot presume that the coalition and the international consensus behind it will hold together. There is a great opportunity for Moldova to make long needed progress in its fight against corruption and for greater rule of law. Success in these areas will have ripple effects, including in support of the settlement process. But the possibility of failure, backsliding, and renewed or continued crisis also remains great, and international attention will necessarily remain focused on these issues.

Second, for good or ill, one of the factors contributing to recent progress in the settlement process has been co-operation between leaders and/or oligarchs – Moldova's Plahotniuc, Ukraine's Petro Poroshenko, and Transdniestria's head of Sheriff, Viktor Gushan. With both Poroshenko and Plahotniuc now gone, it is not entirely clear how these changes in Kyiv and Chişinău will affect the settlement process.

Third, Russia on the one hand, and the EU and the US on the other, have demonstrated a remarkable degree of agreement both on the resolution of the June political crisis in Chişinău and on the direction of the settlement process and the 5+2 in general. The current state of both East-West and transatlantic

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35   Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger to visit Republic of Moldova from 17 to 19 September, Chisinau, 16 September 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/429857.

relations raises unavoidable questions as to whether and for how long such comity might be maintained. This is not meant to contend that agreement among the mediators and observers in the Moldova-Transdniestria political settlement process is doomed, but that in today's OSCE, indeed today's world, it is highly unusual, and should be welcomed and nurtured.

Shortly after this chapter went to press, in mid-November 2019 the left-right coalition in Moldova collapsed. The proximate cause was a dispute over appointment of a new Procurator General, but the government's fall followed a lengthy dispute within the ruling coalition over reform of the judicial system. The Sandu administration was replaced by a minority "technocratic" government composed largely of senior members of President Dodon's staff and PSRM colleague. The new government was supported in Parliament by the PDM, but Plahotniuc's former colleagues did not formally participate in the government or form a formal parliamentary fraction with the PSRM. The future of this new government remains cloudy, and Moldova's domestic politics deeply divided and troubled.

Namig Abbasov

Still Waters Run Deep: Federal, Regional, and Local Dimensions of Conflict in the North Caucasus

Introduction

In his February 2008 speech at the State Council before handing over the Russian presidency to Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin stated that his administration had managed to terminate the war in the North Caucasus. He argued that the Russian army had made "a decisive and crushing blow" against the separatist and terrorist activities in the region, and asserted: "Chechnya is now a full-fledged region within the Russian Federation."[1] Some others were quick to agree. A Guardian journalist visited Chechnya after the war ended and contended that "it is over, and Putin won".[2] The Russian propaganda machine repeated Putin's message: North Caucasus had been "pacified".[3]

In this contribution, I argue the opposite: The conflict in the North Caucasus has not been pacified, but frozen. The central mechanism for stability and order is based on support for Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov from Putin, who became Russian President again in 2012, with the strong personal ties between the two leading to a superficial peace in the region, while deeper grievances and tensions remain.

At the local level, North Caucasians are increasingly dissatisfied with the brutal and corrupt regimes established by their leaders. Although these leaders, Kadyrov in particular, have brought order and security to the region, the grievances among the local people within the region's republics are growing. Many Chechens are resentful of Kadyrov's brutal regime in Chechnya. His personal ties to President Putin have allowed him to set up a repressive persecution machine in Chechnya and brutally suppress anyone who goes against his regime and clan. While, in general, older Chechens viewed Russian forces as their enemy, many younger Chechens who did not fight in the Russo-Chechen wars see pro-Russian Chechen forces as their major target. The Chechen leader's idiosyncratic rule and maltreatment of his citizens have even stirred up some resentment amongst the *Kadyrovtsy*, his personal army.

At the regional level, there are rising tensions among ethnic groups and leaders in the North Caucasus and many people are alarmed by Kadyrov's increasing influence in the region. The first line of ethnic tensions goes between

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1   President of Russia, President Vladimir Putin, Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia's Development Strategy through to 2020*,* The Kremlin, Moscow, 8 February 2008, at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24825.

2   Jonathan Steele, It's over, and Putin won, The Guardian, 30 September 2008, at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/sep/30/russia.chechnya.

3   Quoted in: John Russell, Kadyrov's Chechnya-Template, Test or Trouble for Russia's Regional Policy? In: *Europe-Asia Studies* 3/2011, pp. 509-528, p. 510.

the Chechens and Ingush people. Although both share the same historical ethnic root (Vainakh) and were part of the same oblast during the Soviet Union (the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), the growing Chechen influence in the North Caucasus has led to Chechen-Ingush clashes. President Putin's support for Kadyrov has left the Ingush leaders unable to address local grievances amongst their people, but led them to agree to the Chechnya land swaps, which the people deeply resented, as they had already lost some of the territories they considered their historical lands during the war with North Ossetia. The Dagestani people are also in a state of alarm, fearing similar land swaps, and tensions are rising between the Chechens and Dagestani Avar settled in the area some Chechens view as part of Chechnya. The recent ethnic clashes between the Chechens and the Avars in the small Dagestani localities of Leninaul and Kalininaul and a Chechen convoy marching from the Chechen capital Grozny provided direct evidence that regional ethnic tensions in the North Caucasus are far from pacified but growing. Kadyrov was quick to blame the Dagestani officials for their failure to adequately address the concerns of Dagestan's Akkin Chechen minority. Should President Putin withdraw his support for Kadyrov, the other leaders and ethnic groups are likely to retaliate.

At the federal level, Russian law enforcement bodies are resentful of Kadyrov's growing influence, not only in the North Caucasus, but across the Federation as a whole, and of his disrespect for federal laws. The antagonism between the Russian Federal Security Service (*Federalnaya sluzhba bezopasnosti*, FSB) and Kadyrov has grown, in particular, since the assassination of the Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in 2015, coming close to open clashes many times. Kadyrov has used his strong personal relationship with President Putin to counterbalance pressures from Russian law enforcement services and expand his influence in the North Caucasus. It is only thanks to Putin's personal support that Kadyrov has not been subjected to large-scale violence. Should this support wane, federal forces may also retaliate, which may drag the region into civil war.

The Federal Dimension

The federal dimension of conflict in the North Caucasus is directly linked to Ramzan Kadyrov's growing influence in Russia and the growing antagonism between him and Russian law enforcement agencies. The Russian *siloviki*[4]

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4   "*Siloviki*" (derived from Russian "sila", "force", "strength", "power") is generally used to describe members of the so-called "power ministries" or "power structures" ("*silovye struktury*") who hold influential positions or management functions and usually have a military or intelligence background. The power structures or "power ministries" include, among others, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and other secret services as well as law enforcement agencies. Cf. Michael Rochlitz, The Power of the Siloviki: Do Russia's Security Services Control Putin, or Does He Control Them? In: Russian Analytical Digest No. 223, 12 September 2018, pp. 2-4;

have been deeply angered by the Chechen leader's idiosyncratic rule and autonomous behaviour that has many times surpassed the Chechen borders. Under President Putin's Chechenization policy, Russian federal forces withdrew from the North Caucasus and ceded power in Chechnya to the pro-Russian Chechen forces,[5] and empowered them under Kadyrov's leadership to curtail insurgency in the North Caucasus, providing stability and order in the region. When Kadyrov's father Akhmad was President of Chechnya, Ramzan headed his presi-dential security service and former separatist militia, the *Kadyrovtsy*. As soon as Ramzan turned thirty, the required minimum age for the post of presidency, he was nominated by Putin, and the Chechen parliament appointed him President of Chechnya, granting him ultimate power and authority in the republic.[6]

Since taking full control in Chechnya, Kadyrov's influence has been growing in the North Caucasus and in the rest of the Russian Federation. After the withdrawal of the federal forces from Chechnya, Kadyrov strengthened the *Kadyrovtsy*, which was a central guarantor for security in Chechnya after the Second Russo-Chechen War. Kadyrov has built a strong reputation, not only in the North Caucasus, but also in the rest of the Federation. He has been repeatedly engaged in federal politics and actively involved at the federal level. The Chechen leader has appeared to readily participate in the release of Russian citizens arrested abroad, including, for example, the Russian journalists detained in Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian tensions after the Euromaidan.[7] Kadyrov even helped a Russian navy officer to escape captivity in Libya.[8] Kadyrov's proactivity has been evident in providing assistance to the victims of ISIS, helping bring minors who had joined ISIS back to Russia.[9] One four year old child, Bilal, was traced in war-torn Mosul and brought back to his grandmother in Grozny.[10]

Although federal laws forbid forced marriages, the Chechen leader has approved them in Chechnya. Under police intimidation, one Chechen girl was forced to marry a police officer and Kadyrov supported the marriage despite its illegality under federal law. This incident seemed to suggest that: "Chechen

Marc Oprach, Dimitri Medwedjew – Präsident auf Abruf oder ebenbürtiger Nachfolger Putins? [President on Demand or Equal Successor to Putin?], in: KAS-Auslandsinformationen 2/2008, S. 6-30, Executive Summary, pp. 6-10, here: p. 6.

5   Cf. John Russell, Ramzan Kadyrov: The Indigenous Key to Success in Putin's Chechenization Strategy? In: *Nationalities Papers* 4/2008, pp. 659-687.

6   Roland Dannreuther and Luke March, 'Chechnya: has Moscow won?', in: *Survival* 50/ 2008, pp. 97-112.

7   Cf. Causasus Report, Chechen Leader Claims Credit For Release Of Russian Journalists, *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty,* 26. May 2014, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-kadyrov-claims-freed-journalists/25399432.html.

8   Cf. Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Is Chechnya Taking Over Russia? *New York Times*, 17 August 2017, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/opinion/chechnya-ramzan-kadyrov-russia.html.

9   Cf. Marcin Mamon, The Lost Children of ISIS, *Foreign Policy*, 2 January 2018, at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/02/the-lost-children-of-isis/.

10   Sokirianskaia, cited above (Note 8).

tradition [is] standing above Russian law" in some circumstances.[11] Kadyrov's personal security force has also been blamed for killing anti-Chechen political figures in Russia. Many have asserted that Kadyrov's inner circle was involved in the assassination of Boris Nemtsov, once an important opposition figure in Russia.[12] In calling the suspected murderer of Boris Nemtsov a "true patriot of Russia", Kadyrov seemed to demonstrate that he had little respect for federal laws.[13] He also appeared to intervene in Russian foreign policy when he explicitly said that he would protest against the federal government if they refused to sign the UN resolution on the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, calling upon Chechens to organize demonstrations in front of the Myanmar embassy in Moscow to protest against their ill-treatment.

These actions have brought the Chechen leader into a direct confrontation with the Russian *siloviki*. Some security circles have even viewed the success of President Putin's Chechenization policy as a "victory in a mine field"[14]. Kadyrov has attempted to dictate federal security services in Chechnya where the federal forces have kept their symbolic authority.[15] When he learned about the Russian security services' attempts to conduct security operations in Chechnya without his approval, Kadyrov even ordered his personal security force to open fire "if anyone appears on your territory without your knowledge [...] whether they're from Moscow or Stavropol".[16]

The relationship between President Putin and Kadyrov resembles a kind of indirect rule, "one of the means that central authorities have long employed in hopes of defusing communal conflict and civil war in multicultural societies".[17] Indirect rule is a system central leaders establish in their relationship with local rulers to contain rising violence and ethnic conflicts in peripheries.[18] It enables the central rulers to set up an administrative unit in the peripheries of multicultural countries where co-ethnic rulers sustain order and security by

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11   Anna Arutunyan, Why Putin won't get tough on Kadyrov, *European Council on Foreign Affiairs,* 25 April 2017, at: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_why_putin_wont_get_tough_on_kadyrov_7278.

12   Cf. Emil Souleimanov, Nemtsov's Assassination and the Chechen Trace, *The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 18 March 2015, at: https://cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13164-nemtsov%E2%80%99s-assasination-and-the-chechen-trace.html.

13   Cited in: Mikhail Fishman/Daria Litvinova, The Man Who Definitely Didn't Kill Boris Nemtsov, *The Moscow Times*, 21 April 2017, at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/04/21/the-man-who-definitely-didnt-kill-boris-nemtsov-a57779.

14   Uwe Klußmann, Russia Claims Victory in Chechnya, *Spiegel Online*, 17 April 2009, at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-long-war-in-the-caucasus-russia-claims-victory-in-chechnya-a-619532.html.

15   Cf. Vladimir Isachenkov, Chechen leader threatens foes in bid to gain Putin's support, *AP News*, 10 February 2016 at: https://www.apnews.com/26980c1b47734726a4a7d16de77218a4.

16   Paul Sonne, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov Gives Shoot-to-Kill Order on Outside Forces, *Wall Street Journal*, 23 April 2015, at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/chechen-president-ramzan-kadyrov-gives-shoot-to-kill-order-on-outside-forces-1429812489.

17   David Siroky/Valeriy Dzutsev/Michael Hechter, The differential demand for indirect rule: Evidence from the North Caucasus, in: *Post-Soviet Affairs* 3/2013, pp.268-286.

18   Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism, Oxford, 2000.

controlling their ethnic groups. Rather than directly controlling from the centre, the central leaders devolve power to the local rulers. Thus, the withdrawal of Russian federal forces and ceding power to the pro-Russian forces in Chechnya constituted the institution of indirect rule in the North Caucasus. Local rulers are also supposed to lend some assistance to the central rulers, as Kadyrov has done, by providing military personnel for the Russian army involved in the war in Syria[19] and for pro-Russian forces in Ukraine.[20] While indirect rule is an effective way of maintaining peace and security in multicultural ethnic countries, as President Putin's success in curtailing insurgency in the North Caucasus has shown, it also has some drawbacks. The primary challenge is the principal-agent problem that has been widely identified by many in political science[21] and economics[22]. The principal-agent problem occurs when agents (indirect or local rulers) fail to accomplish the tasks the principals (central rulers) assign to them.[23] In particular, the principal-agent problem arises when the principle and the agent have more diverging preferences than overlapping ones.[24] Kadyrov and President Putin have a common interest in curtailing insurgency in the North Caucasus and providing peace and security in the region. While Kadyrov has successfully accomplished this task, he has also attempted to challenge Russian law enforcement bodies and increase his power outside of the North Caucasus. The Chechen leader's ambition for power and his increasing influence have taken him away from the tasks his principal set for him. This principal-agent problem led directly to the confrontation between Kadyrov and the Russian *siloviki*. On several occasions, Grozny has clashed with Moscow regarding oil exploration in Chechnya. Kadyrov's men appeared to challenge Gazprom[25] and Russia's largest bank in Chechnya. Grozny has persistently pushed for economic autonomy in the exploration of Chechnya's oil resources.[26] However, in spite of Kadyrov's rising influence, President Putin has expressed his support for the Chechen leader from time to

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19   Cf. Neil Hauer, Putin Has a New Secret Weapon in Syria: Chechens, *FP,* 4 May 2017, at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/04/putin-has-a-new-secret-weapon-in-syria-chechens/.

20   Cf., Shaun Walker, "We like partisan warfare." Chechens fighting in Ukraine – on both sides*, The Guardian,* 24 July 2015, at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24 chechens-fighting-in-ukraine-on-both-sides.

21   Cf. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, in: *The Academy of Management Review* 1/1989, pp. 57-74.

22   Cf. Sanford J. Grossman/Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, in: *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 1/1983, pp. 7-45.

23   Cf. Barry M Mitnick, The Theory of Agency and Organizational Analysis, in: Norman E. Bowie/Edward Freeman (eds), *Ethics and Agency Theory: An Introduction*, New York, 1992, pp. 75-96.

24   Cf. Ethan Corbin, Principals and Agents: Syria and the Dilemma of Its Armed Group Allies, in: *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 2/2011, pp.25-46.

25   Cf. Tony Wesolowsky, A Chechen Court Ruled To Forgive $135 Million In Gas Debt. Gazprom Isn't Happy*, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*, 23 January 2019, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/a-chechen-court-ruled-to-forgive-100-million-in-citizens-gas-debt-gazprom-isn-t-happy-/29726966.html.

26   Cf. Liz Fuller, Chechnya to Acquire Federal Oil Industry Assets On Its Territory, *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*, 6 January 2016, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-report-chechnya-oil-refinery/27472661.html.

time. For instance, during his meeting with Kadyrov in April 2017, Putin had stated that "some issues are still unresolved, but they'll be settled soon – I see it happening now – and that's a good thing".[27] These remarks suggest that Kadyrov still had Putin's support.

Hence, the Chechen leader's direct personal ties with President Putin have allowed him to expand his influence in Russia and control Chechnya "with its own laws, security services, taxation system and even foreign policy"[28]. His growing power and disrespect for federal laws has angered Russian law enforcement bodies, and it is only Putin's strong support that has kept them at bay. Once the FSB's rising dissatisfaction looks likely to "undermine elite support for his regime",[29] Putin will probably withdraw his backing. There is also a chance that this could lead to civil war in the North Caucasus as the regional ethnic groups and leaders are also likely to retaliate against Kadyrov's growing influence in the region.

The Regional Dimension

The second dimension of the conflict in the North Caucasus is regional. While Putin's Chechenization policy has brought peace and security in the North Caucasus, ethnic grievances still remain among some groups, and have led to rising tensions, which are directly linked to the Chechen expansionism in the region. However, these tensions have a long history.

The Ingush are the first to be affected by Chechen expansionism in the North Caucasus, although these two Caucasian ethnic groups share the same historical root. In 2018, the Ingush people were shocked to hear about a land swap deal between Kadyrov and Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, the Ingush leader, transferring around 20,000 hectares of the Ingushetia land to Chechnya.[30] They were also surprised to come across Chechen construction workers and security forces on their territory near the Chechen border.[31]

The root of the current border issue between Chechnya and Ingushetia goes back to 1992. Both were part of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR; from May 1991 Checheno-Ingush Republic). Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Dzhokhar Dudayev, the Chechen leader at the time, declared the independence of Chechnya, but Ingushetia refused to join Chechnya in the independence declaration and preferred to stay in the

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27   Fishman/Litvinova, cited above (Note 11).
28   Sokirianskaia, cited above (Note 7).
29   Amanda Taub, Is Putin's elite security service feuding with his own puppet regime in Chechnya? *Vox,* 11 May 2015, at: https://www.vox.com/2015/5/11/8585661/putin-kadyrov-fsb.
30   Cf. Neil Hauer, Ramzan Kadyrov's Next Target*, Riddle,* 12 May 2018, at: https://www.ridl.io/en/ramzan-kadyrovs-next-target/.
31   Cf. Neil Hauer, Putin's Bubbling Crisis in the North Caucasus, *The Moscow Times (Op-Ed)*, 5 October 2018, at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/10/05/putin-bubbling-crisis-in-the-north-caucasus-opinion-a63103.

Russian Federation under President Yeltsin's leadership.[32] This led to the official split of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR into two separate republics, Chechnya and Ingushetia, in June 1992. Although the sides officially separated, the official borderline had never been demarcated.

The land transfers to Chechnya frustrated the Ingush, as they had already lost some territories they considered their historical lands. After the Ingush were deported in 1944, the Prigorodny region was given to North Ossetia. On returning from exile in Central Asia (1957-1959) the Ingush were never able to go back to the Prigorodny region, which, in the meantime, had been inhabited by North Ossetians. The Ingush-Ossetian war in November 1992 left the Ingush with some territory losses, some dead, and many displaced.[33] These traumatic memories provided the backdrop to massive protests against the land swap in Magas, Ingushetia's capital. In response, Kadyrov publicly threatened the protesters and even visited Ingushetia with a large entourage of armed men to challenge a leader of the protests.[34] Although their confrontation ended without violence, it "raised concerns about the possibility of a regional conflict in Russia" and "amplified concerns about the power and influence of the Kremlin-backed Kadyrov […]".[35] The Ingush were even concerned about the eventual annexation of the whole of Ingushetia to Chechnya.[36] Their leader Yevkurov resigned in June 2019 after his popularity in Ingushetia decreased dramatically.[37]

Ingushetia is not the only republic affected by Kremlin-backed Kadyrov's rising influence in the North Caucasus. After the land swap deal with Ingushetia, Chechnya turned its sights towards a Dagestani border region where some local Akkin Chechens are settled in a district near to the Chechen border. The Chechens call this area Yurt-Aukh, or simply Aukh. The historical Aukh district is among "Kadyrov's latest quest[s] to expand his influence beyond the borders of the Chechen Republic".[38] This historical district has recently been

32   Cf. Varvara Pakhomenko, Ingushetia abandoned, *Open Democracy*, 16 August 2009, at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ingushetia-abandoned/.
33   Cf. Svante E. Cornell, Conflicts in the North Caucasus, in: *Central Asian Survey* 17/1998, pp. 409-441.
34   Cf. Russian Constitutional Court Says Controversial Chechen-Ingush Border Deal Legal, *Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty*, 6 December 2018, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-constitutional-court-says-controversial-chechen-ingush-border-deal-legal/29640892.html.
35   Thousands Rally In Ingushetia To Protest Chechnya Land Swaps, *Radio FreeEurope/ Radio Liberty*, 26 March 2019, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/thousands-rally-in-ingushetia-to-protest-chechnya-land-swaps/29843003.html.
36   Cf. Paul Goble, Kadyrov Says Chechnya Won't Absorb Ingushetia, Rejects Amalgamation Elsewhere as Well, *Window on Eurasia*, 28 October 2018, at: http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/10/kadyrov-says-chechnya-wont-absorb.html.
37   Head of Russia's Volatile Ingushetia Region Resigns Amid Border-Deal Tensions With Chechnya, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 June 2019, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/head-of-russia-s-volatile-ingushetia-region-resigns-amid-border-deal-tensions-with-chechnya/30018903.html
38   Hauer, Ramzan Kadyrov's Next Target, cited above (Note 30).

the locus of ethnic tensions, the root of which goes back to long before Kadyrov came to power in Chechnya.[39]

Established in 1943 within the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Aukh district had been predominantly populated by the Akkin Chechens until 1944, when the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin deported North Caucasus's Chechens and Ingush to Central Asia. In 1957 after Stalin's death, the Chechens and Ingush were able to return to their historical homelands and resettle in their previous lands except the Prigorodnyi district, which had been inhabited by the North Ossetians, and the Aukh district, which had been settled by the Avars and Laks. While the Chechens were in exile in Central Asia, the Aukh district had been renamed Novolaksky district within the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Avars and Laks had moved to its areas.[40] Leninaul and Kalininaul, two important villages that cover around 40 per cent of the former Aukh district and that are now home to the Akkin Chechens, Avars, and Laks, have been the locus of ethnic tensions in the North Caucasus since the Chechens returned from exile in 1957. Although an agreement was reached to restore the historical Aukh district in 1991, it was never put into practice due to instability and a shortage of funds. Meanwhile, the Chechens had attempted to grab the Aukh district in 1999 by force. However, Saigidpasha Umakhanov, the Avar leader, had organized a militia group of Avar men and prevented a Chechen takeover of the district. Fighting against the Chechens in the 1990s had allowed Umakhanov to secure Moscow's support.[41] Thus, the former Aukh district has remained in Dagestan and the area has become the centre of ethnic clashes between the Avars and Akkin Chechens.

Since Kadyrov came to power in Chechnya, he has attempted to challenge Umakhanov.[42] Aside from a brief rapprochement in 2009, the sides have verbally attacked each other repeatedly.[43] Kadyrov has lambasted Dagestani officials many times for their failure to take care of Chechens in the former Aukh region. While the Laks have generally avoided clashes with the local Chechens and tended to move to the area in the northern city of Makhachkala, the Avars have been reluctant to move and have come into conflict with the local Chechens many times. The sides live separately with very little interethnic integration and they even pray at separate mosques. Ethnic tensions between the Avars and the local Chechens escalated in summer 2017, when intercommunal fighting between the Akkin Chechens and Avars broke out on 7 June 2017 thus

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39   Cf. Gordon M. Hahn, Russia's Islamic threat, New Haven/London 2007, p. 114.
40   Cf. Ekaterina Neroznikova , The burning land of Lenin-Aul, *Open Democracy*, 11 August 2017, at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/burning-lands-leninaul-dagestan/.
41   Cf. Robert Bruce Ware, Recent Russian federal elections in Dagestan: Implications for proposed electoral reform, in: *Europe-Asia Studies* 57/2005, p. 586.
42   Cf. Mairbek Vatchagaev, Tensions Heighten Between Chechnya's Leader and Influential Dagestani Figure, in: *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 11/2014.
43   Cf. Ivan Sukhov, Why Russia Won Nothing in Chechnya, *Moscow Times*, 18. March 2015 at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/03/18/why-russia-won-nothing-in-chechnya-a44887.

threatening peace and security in the North Caucasus. Within hours, Chechen vehicles rushed toward the Dagestani border to help their ethnic kin, and some Avars settled in Khasavyurt were also quick to head to the area to do the same. While guns were fired and some were injured, the Chechen officials were finally able to stop a full-scale ethnic conflict.[44]

However, the tensions are far from pacified. After the Ingush-Chechen land swaps, the Avars were alarmed to learn that border delineation talks between Chechnya and Dagestan had also been started. A map on the website of the Chechen assembly marked some Dagestani land near the Chechen border as a part of Chechnya.[45] The ethnic groups living in Dagestan near the Chechen border feared a repeat of "the Ingush scenario". The Chechen and Dagestani officials then stated that they had suspended the border delimitation talks amid the massive protests against land swaps in Ingushetia.[46]

Kadyrov has attempted to rule "through repressive measures and has created a climate of impunity for security forces in the North Caucasus" and President Putin has given him "free rein because [… Putin] relies on him to rein in separatists and militants after two wars in Chechnya".[47] Putin's personal support for Kadyrov has left the regional forces in the North Caucasus unwilling to challenge him, but should Putin withdraw his support other leaders and ethnic groups could retaliate.

The Local Dimension

At the local level, grievances and tensions within the North Caucasian republics are growing. Many Chechens have been angered by Kadyrov's brutal regime in Chechnya. Younger Chechens, who did not participate in the Russo-Chechen wars, view pro-Russian Chechen forces as their primary enemy.[48] The grievances in Ingushetia reached a new level following the Chechen-Ingush land swap agreement. Some local people including the Kumyk and the Nogais in Dagestan have been protesting against the Dagestani officials' failure to address their concerns.

First, some local Chechens have been resentful of Kadyrov's repressive regime in Chechnya. Since the Chechen leader came to power, he has taken

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44 Cf. Neil Hauer, Ethnic clashes in southwest Dagestan incite Chechen nationalism, *Medium*, 20 September 2017, at: https://medium.com/@NeilPHauer/ethnic-clashes-in-southwest-dagestan-incite-chechen-nationalism-3c6d407333f1.

45 Cf. Chechen authorities ascribe Dagestani territories in a new map, *Caucasian Knot*, 11 November 2018, at: https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/45136/.

46 Cf. Russia's Dagestan, Chechnya Halt Border Talks Amid Ingushetia Unrest, *The Moscow Times*, 17 April 2019, at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/17/russias-dagestan-chechnya-halt-border-talks-a65268.

47 Thousands Rally In Ingushetia To Protest Chechnya Land Swaps, cited above (Note 35).

48 Cf. Emil Aslan Souleimanov/Namig Abbasov/David S. Siroky, Frankenstein in Grozny: vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov's rule, in: *Asia Europe Journal* 1/2019, pp. 87–103, here: p. 89.

harsh measures to fight anyone who attempts to criticize him and his clan. Recently, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported "torture; enforced disappearances; and extrajudicial executions" and other "very serious human rights violations" and abuses in Chechnya.[49] The OSCE report states that "a special regime of impunity is tolerated for the sake of stability"[50] in Chechnya. Kadyrov once threatened to "break fingers and tear out tongues" of anyone who "insult[s] my blood, my clan, my family, my people".[51]

After the end of the Chechen war, local Chechens were oppressed by pro-Russian Chechens rather than Russians. The *Kadyrovtsy* appeared to be "much more dangerous for local residents in terms of persecuting entire families […]".[52] Chechen forces have proved to be more effective to curtail insurgency, since they had more information about the local Chechens. They could effectively "identify insurgents within the population" and "issue credible threats against civilians for noncooperation".[53] Having some insurgency experience also allowed the Chechen soldiers to fight it effectively in the North Caucasus. The *Kadyrovtsy* did not only target the insurgents, they also used collective punishment methods, torturing the families and relatives of the insurgents and burning their houses.[54] Several mass graves found in Chechnya have been associated with the *Kadyrovtsy* killings.[55]

These repressive measures alienated many Chechen youth who are biding their time to take their revenge against the Kadyrov regime. The harsh measures did "little to convince radicalised parts of the population to give their allegiance to the Russian state", but seemed instead to "stimulate a new generation of disillusioned youth to 'join the forest' […] in search of revenge or a

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49   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), OSCE Rapporteur's Report under the Moscow Mechanism on alleged Human Rights Violations and Impunity in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, ODIHR.GAL/76/18/Corr.1, 21 December 2018, pp. at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/407402; pp. 2, 32 (34); cf. also OSCE Cites Torture, Executions Among "Grave" Rights Violations In Chechnya, *Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty*, 20 December 2018, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/osce-cites-torture-executions-among-grave-rights-violations-in-chechnya/29667900.html.

50   OSCE Rapporteur's Report, cited above (Note 48), p. 32; OSCE Cites Torture, Executions Among "Grave" Rights Violations In Chechnya, cited above (Note 48).

51   Quoted in Chechen Leader Threatens To "Break Fingers And Tear Out Tongues", *Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty*, 13 June 2019, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/chechen-leader-threatens-to-break-fingers-and-tear-out-tongues-/29997721.html.

52   Rights Activists: Kadyrovtsy Are Chechnya's Main Problem, *The Jamestown Foundation – North Caucasus Weekly*, at: https://jamestown.org/program/rights-activists-kadyrovtsy-are-chechnyas-main-problem-2/.

53   Jason Lyall, Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War, in: *American Political Science Review* 1/2010, pp. 1-20, here: p. 1.

54   Lawrence Uzzell, Ramzan Kadyrov Embraces Collective Punishment, *The Jamestown Foundation – North Caucasus Weekly*, at: https://jamestown.org/program/ramzan-kadyrov-embraces-collective-punishment-2/.

55   Cf. Emil A. Souleimanov/Huseyn Aliyev, Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya, in: *Journal of Strategic Studies* 5/2015, pp. p. 691.

different political order".[56] "Blood revenge, the practice of seeking blood retribution for a grave offense committed against an individual or his or her relatives",[57] is one mechanism that has pushed local Chechens to retaliate against the oppression of their families and relatives, motivating them to join anti-regime forces and prepare for future revenge. When different clans fight based on blood revenge, "[c]onflict is sure to spread like wildfire".[58]

Thus, local Chechens are "antagonized by the brazen-facedness and impunity of kadyrovtsy and local police"[59] and their grievances have been growing since Kadyrov took control of Chechnya. Young Chechens who attacked the Chechen police in 2016 in Grozny and in 2017 in the village of Geldagan and the town of Shali grew up during Kadyrov's regime and did not experience the Chechen-Russian wars. This new generation of Chechens view Kadyrov, his clan, and his Kadyrovtsy as their main enemy.[60] It is only President Putin's strong support of Kadyrov and fear of brutal persecution at the hands of his personal army that keep potential avengers at a bay.

Second, local grievances have been growing in Ingushetia since the Ingush-Chechen land swaps. Despite the preventive police force, thousands of Ingush protested against the controversial deal after the news about the transition of the Ingush lands to Chechnya spread around. A public referendum on the deal and the resignation of Yunus-bek Yevkurov were among the major demands of the protesters. Ingushetia's Constitutional Court ruled that the land swap agreement was illegal because "it changes the territory of [the] Republic of Ingushetia" without a public referendum.[61]

Despite the rejection of the agreement by Ingushetia's Constitutional Court, the Ingush leader took the issue to Russia's Federal Constitutional Court, who approved it.[62] This intensified the protests, forcing Yevkurov to step down in June 2019.[63]

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56   International Crisis Group, The North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (II), Islam, the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency', Europe Report 221, 19 October 2012, p. i.

57   Emil A. Souleimanov/Huseyn Aliyev, Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars, in: *International Security* 2/2015, pp. 158-180, here: p. 158.

58   Emil Souleimanov/Ondrej Ditrych, The Internationalisation of the Russian-Chechen Conflict: Myths and Reality, in: *Europe-Asia Studies* 7/2008, pp. 1199-1222, here: p. 1220.

59   Emil Souleimanov, Attacks in Chechnya Suggest Opposition to Kadyrov is Far from Eradicated, The *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, 24 March 2017, at: https://cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13436-attacks-in-chechnya-suggest-opposition-to-kadyrov-is-far-from-eradicated.html.

60   Cf. Liz Fuller, Will Kadyrov Reap The Whirlwind In Chechnya?, *RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty*, 10 February 2017, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-report-chechnya-kadyrov-attacks/28302929.html; cf. also Souleimanov/Abbasov/Siroky, cited above (Note 47), p. 89.

61   Quoted in: Russian Constitutional Court Says Controversial Chechen-Ingush Border Deal Legal, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 6 December 2018, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-constitutional-court-says-controversial-chechen-ingush-border-deal-legal/29640892.html.

62   Cf. ibid.

63   Cf. Head Of Russia's Volatile Ingushetia Region Resigns Amid Border-Deal Tensions With Chechnya, Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty, 25 June 2019, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/head-of-russia-s-volatile-ingushetia-region-resigns-amid-border-deal-tensions-with-chechnya/30018903.html.

Finally, the Dagestani leaders also have failed to address the local grievances within Dagestan. In particular, the Kumyk and the Nogais, two Turkic ethnic groups, have long resented the Dagestani officials' unwillingness to tackle the challenges they have faced in Dagestan.[64] In particular, these ethnic groups have attempted to press the Dagestani government to find solutions to their land problems. There is some evidence that the activism of these two Turkic groups, as well as the protests of other ethnic groups "contributed to Ramazan Abdulatipov's forced resignation from his post" as head of the Republic of Dagestan.[65]

Conclusion

Given the growing grievances and ethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, I have argued that the conflict in the region has not been pacified, but frozen. Although President Putin's support for Ramzan Kadyrov has led to a superficial security and order in the North Caucasus, deeper grievances and tensions remain across three dimensions: local, regional, and federal. At the federal level, the antagonism between Russian *siloviki* and Kadyrov is growing. At the regional level, the ethnic tensions are increasing in the republics of the North Caucasus, with many people alarmed by Kadyrov's rising power in the region. At the local level, the brutal and corrupt regimes established by leaders in the North Caucasus are causing tensions to rise.

It is only President Putin's personal support to Kadyrov that has prevented large-scale violence in the North Caucasus so far. At the federal level, the Russian *siloviki* have avoided open confrontation with Kadyrov because of the President's support, and at the regional level, the ethnic groups and leaders in the North Caucasus have hesitated to openly challenge him because he is backed by the Kremlin. At the local level, Putin's support has allowed Kadyrov to establish his persecution machine in Chechnya and other local leaders, too, have set up regimes to repress the unrests among the local population. Should President Putin's support for Kadyrov's rule decline, the local, regional, and federal forces may retaliate, potentially dragging the region into civil war.

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64   Cf. Paul Goble, Ethnic Conflicts in Dagestan Multiply, Threatening Far More Than Only That Republic, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11 July 2017.

65   Mikhail Kaplan, Seventy years on, the Kumyk people in Dagestan are still fighting territorial claims, *Open Democracy*, 2 May 2018, at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/kumyk-people-are-still-fighting-territorial-claims/.

Comprehensive Security: The Three Dimensions and
Cross-Dimensional Challenges

Anita Danka

The Contribution of ODIHR's Assembly Monitoring to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in the OSCE Region

Introduction

Human rights monitoring is the "*active collection, verification and immediate use* of information to address human rights problems".[1] It involves an evaluation process in which the information collected is checked against relevant international human rights standards, and this assessment is normally published in a report. The purpose of human rights monitoring is to improve the protection of, and respect for, human rights.[2] Assessing the impact of any human rights monitoring work is a very complex endeavour, as any improvement in the enjoyment of human rights is difficult to measure. Establishing a causal link between a positive change and a concrete recommendation from a human rights assessment is a daunting task. Perhaps it is even more challenging when the monitoring organization is an international body, located far away from where the recommendations are to be implemented and there is no systematic effort to measure change. Nevertheless, it is worth attempting to measure the impact of independent human rights monitoring to understand the role it plays in the full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This contribution explores the positive impact of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a result of its assembly monitoring activities. It showcases some concrete examples of when the ODIHR assembly monitoring recommendations were used to protect and promote the freedom of peaceful assembly in the OSCE region. It argues that independent monitoring contributes to the accountability of the actors who have the duty to facilitate the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms and therefore play an important role in their full enjoyment. Based on the positive role independent human rights monitoring such as that carried out by ODIHR plays in the full enjoyment of human rights, this work should be enabled and actively facilitated by the OSCE participating States.

Note: Anita Danka is an independent human rights expert. Between 2012 and 2019, she worked as a Human Rights Adviser/Monitoring and Response Co-ordinator at the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) responsible for the freedom of peaceful assembly portfolio. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of ODIHR or any organizations with which the author is affiliated.

1   Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Professional Training Series No. 7, Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, United Nations, New York and Geneva 2001, p. 9, at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training7Introen.pdf (emphasis in the original).

2   Cf. ibid., p. 3

191

OSCE participating States "categorically and irrevocably" declared that the "commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE [today: OSCE] are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned".[3] Therefore, OSCE participating States are not in a position to invoke the non-intervention principle to avoid discussions about human rights issues within their countries. Such dialogue typically takes place at OSCE human dimension events.

ODIHR, as the chief human rights institution of the OSCE, is mandated to provide assistance to OSCE participating States in the implementation of their human dimension commitments. Human rights monitoring is one of the key areas of ODIHR's work. Monitoring is used as a means of assistance and is an important diagnostic tool, which enables more targeted and needs-based support to be provided to the OSCE participating States. Through its independent monitoring, ODIHR collects, analyses, and disseminates information on the implementation of OSCE commitments relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms in the OSCE region. By monitoring the implementation of human dimension commitments and assessing compliance, ODIHR not only identifies gaps, but also recommends solutions to particular – often entrenched – human rights issues. It also conducts targeted thematic monitoring activities with regard to, for example, the right to fair trial, application of the death penalty, freedom of peaceful assembly or the situation of human rights defenders. The outputs of human rights monitoring include country assessment visits and reports, thematic monitoring reports, and the collection of trends, challenges, and good practices. The results of monitoring also help shape other ODIHR technical assistance and capacity-building activities.

In the past, ODIHR conducted large-scale, country-specific monitoring activities responding to crisis situations, as well as smaller-scale, thematic monitoring activities. The objective of country-specific situation monitoring was to document the general human rights situation, identify concerns and offer solutions in the form of targeted recommendations. Such monitoring took place, for example, in Ukraine in 2014[4] and in Georgia in 2008.[5] ODIHR has

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3   Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Moscow, 3 October 1991, in: Arie Bloed (ed.), The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993, Dordrecht 1993, pp. 605-629, here: p. 606; also available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14310.

4   In response to an invitation issued by the government of Ukraine to ODIHR and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), a Human Rights Assessment Mission (HRAM) was deployed to Ukraine in March-April 2014. The results of the assessment were published in a report on 12 May 2014. OSCE HCNM/OSCE ODIHR, Human Rights Assessment Mission in Ukraine, Human Rights and Minority Rights Situation, ODIHR HRAM: 6 March – 1 April 2014, HCNM HRAM: 8 March – 17 April, The Hague/Warsaw, 12 May 2014, available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/118454.

5   In Georgia in 2008, ODIHR assessed the human rights and minorities situation in the war-affected areas. The Joint Declaration of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the OSCE High-

also conducted country-specific human rights assessments at the request of participating States to identify challenges to the implementation of OSCE commitments and offer assistance.[6]

In its thematic monitoring function, ODIHR aims to map the realization of specific human rights, and to identify gaps and good practices. ODIHR is best known for its election observation, which is carried out in the OSCE participating States to assess the extent to which elections respect fundamental freedoms and are characterized by equality, universality, political pluralism, confidence, transparency, and accountability using a long-term, comprehensive, consistent, and systematic election observation methodology.

Trial monitoring is widely regarded as a powerful tool to support the process of judicial reform in line with domestic and international guarantees of a fair trial.[7] ODIHR has developed a methodology to carry out trial on the basis of rigorous principles.[8] ODIHR conducted trial monitoring projects in Azerbaijan in 2003-2004[9], and in Uzbekistan[10], Kazakhstan[11], and Kyrgyzstan[12] in 2005-2006. ODIHR also monitored trials in the aftermath of the 1-2 March

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Level "2+2" Meeting of 15 September 2008 called for, in particular, the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE HCNM as well as other relevant CoE and OSCE institutions and structures to continue to assess the overall human rights situation in the war-affected areas, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This was followed up by a letter from the OSCE Chairman-in-Office in which he requested that ODIHR assess the human rights and minorities situation in the war-affected areas in Georgia, in close co-operation with the HCNM and the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, and provide a report with the assessment and recommendations to the OSCE Chairmanship.

6   Such assessments took place in Moldova and Mongolia.

7   The OSCE participating States have undertaken a number of significant commitments to comply with international standards and principles in the administration of criminal justice (Vienna 1989, Copenhagen 1990, Paris 1990, Moscow 1991). Foremost among these is the commitment to ensure the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial tribunal. States also undertook a commitment to accept the presence of observers at proceedings before courts as a confidence-building measure, as provided for in national legislation and international law, cf. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 June 1990, para. 12, in: Bloed (ed.), cited above (Note 3), pp. 439-465, here: p. 448; also available at: https://www.osce.org/de/odihr/elections/14304.

8   Based on the experiences of twelve OSCE field operations and of ODIHR, ODIHR collected field-tested methodologies and techniques to enhance the capacities and effectiveness of trial-monitoring programmes. This work resulted in the 2012 publication of: Trial Monitoring: A Reference Manual for Practitioners, at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/94216. The Legal Digest of International Fair Trial Rights aims at building the capacity of legal practitioners to conduct professional trial monitoring by providing them with a comprehensive description of fair trial rights coupled with practical checklists based on the experience of OSCE trial monitoring operations. For more information, see: https://www.osce.org/odihr/94214.

9   OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE Office in Baku, Report from the Trial Monitoring Project in Azerbaijan 2003-2004, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/14120.

10   OSCE/ODIHR, Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial Monitoring in Uzbekistan – September/October 2005, Warsaw, 21 April 2006, at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/18840.

11   OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE Centre in Astana, Report: Results of Trial Monitoring in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2005-2006, available at: https://www.osce.org/astana/24153.

12   OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Results of Trial Monitoring in the Kyrgyz Republic, 2005-2006, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/29615.

2008 post-election violence in Yerevan[13] and monitored the trials of individuals who were criminally charged in the aftermath of the events in central Minsk following the elections on 19 December 2010 in Belarus.[14] In 2014, ODIHR monitored the trials of persons who held high political office in the former government in Georgia.[15]

ODIHR monitors the implementation of the OSCE Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE Area, adopted at the Maastricht Ministerial Council in 2003.[16] In this context, ODIHR issued a *Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area* in 2008, 2013, and 2018. Moreover, it carried out field assessment visits to Romania in 2007, Italy in 2008, Hungary in 2009 and 2015, the Czech Republic in 2012, and Ukraine in 2014.

In order to support participating States in the implementation of their commitments on freedom of assembly, ODIHR has been monitoring public assemblies since 2011. The monitoring results are collected in thematic reports, which highlight emerging trends, good practices, and challenges in facilitating public gatherings throughout the OSCE area, and have been published in November 2012[17], December 2014[18], December 2016[19], and September 2019[20] respectively.

ODIHR also monitors developments relevant to the use of the death penalty in the OSCE region and reports on the issue through its annual publication

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13   OSCE/ODIHR, Final Report, Trial Monitoring Project in Armenia (April 2008 – July 2009), Warsaw, 8 March 2010, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/41695.
14   OSCE/ODIHR, Report, Trial Monitoring in Belarus (March – July 2011), Warsaw, 10 November 2011, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/84873.
15   OSCE/ODIHR, Trial Monitoring Report Georgia, Warsaw, 9 December 2014, at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/130676.
16   The Action Plan mandates the ODIHR Contact Point on Roma and Sinti Issues (CPRSI) to "assume a proactive role in analysing measures undertaken by participating States, as well as in particular situations and incidents relating to Roma and Sinti people. Towards this end CPRSI will establish and develop direct contacts with participating States and will offer advice and opinions to them." Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area, Chapter IX, para. 129, Annex to Decision No. 3/03, Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area, MC.DEC/3/03, pp. 62-77, here: p. 76, in: OSCE, Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 1 and 2 December 2003, MC.DOC/1/03, Maastricht, 2 December 2003, pp. 61-77.
17   OSCE/ODIHR, Report, Monitoring of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Selected OSCE Participating States (May 2011 – June 2012), Warsaw, 9 November 2012, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/97055.
18   OSCE/ODIHR, Report, Monitoring of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Selected OSCE Participating States (May 2013 – July 2014), Warsaw, 17 December 2014, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/132281.
19   OSCE/ODIHR, Report, Monitoring of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Selected OSCE Participating States (April 2015 – July 2016), Warsaw, 16 December 2016, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/289721.
20   OSCE/ODIHR, Report, Monitoring of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Selected OSCE Participating States (May 2017–June 2018), Warsaw, 19 September 2019, available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/430793.

– Background Paper on the Status of the Death Penalty in the OSCE Area –, which has been issued ever since 1999.[21]

OSCE participating States have made a number of commitments to combating hate crime, and ODIHR supports states in their implementation of those commitments. For example, ODIHR produces an annual report on hate crime *– Incidents and Responses –* to highlight the prevalence of hate crimes and good practices that participating States and civil society have adopted to tackle them.[22]

Comparison of ODIHR's Human Rights Monitoring with UN and CoE Systems

In most cases, the work of treaty monitoring bodies and special procedures within the United Nations (UN) and Council of Europe (CoE) bodies is limited to a process of assessing the legal framework and practices, and producing and disseminating reports based on their findings. On the other hand, the aim of ODIHR monitoring is not only to assess the compliance and identify shortcomings, but also to recommend action to improve the situation and identify areas where ODIHR could provide assistance. Well-documented monitoring reports can be used to engage in a constructive dialogue with the authorities in the states concerned and to devise targeted programmes of assistance. They are an important source of information, not only for human rights NGOs carrying out their advocacy work, but also for policy makers at all levels, who can use the data collected to identify existing gaps in law, policy, and practice, as well as to provide examples of good practice.

The assessment framework for ODIHR monitoring includes international and regional human rights standards, and OSCE human dimension commitments. The OSCE human dimension commitments are underpinned either by the directly corresponding human rights provisions of UN or CoE origin, or by supplementing the thematic reporting of these organizations. However, they

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21 At the 1990 Copenhagen Meeting, participating States agreed to "exchange information within the framework of the Conference on the Human Dimension on the question of the abolition of the death penalty and keep that question under consideration". Copenhagen Document 1990, cited above (Note 7) para 17.7.

22 Monitoring is based on the mandate given by the Ministerial Council decision on hate crime in Brussels in 2006, which focused on ODIHR's role in combating hate crime and encouraged the Office, within the scope of its resources, "to continue to serve as a collection point for information and statistics on hate crimes and relevant legislation provided by participating States and to make this information publicly available through its Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System and its report on Challenges and Responses to Hate-Motivated Incidents in the OSCE Region"; "to strengthen […] its early warning function to identify, report and raise awareness on hate-motivated incidents and trends and to provide recommendations and assistance to participating States, upon their request, in areas where more adequate responses are needed". Decision No. 13/06, Combating Intolerance and Discrimination and Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding, MC.DEC/13/06 of 5 December 2006, in: OSCE, Fourteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 4 and 5 December 2006, Brussels, 5 December 2006, pp. 40-43, here: p. 43.

include not only the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also the promotion of rule of law and (parliamentary) democracy, including democratic elections and governance, and international humanitarian law.[23] In addition, the OSCE's commitments are much more concrete in their wording and therefore easier to implement. The OSCE's human dimension *acquis* also has the advantage of being with immediate effect with no lengthy ratification procedure, and no possibility of filing reservations. Moreover, the interpretation of these standards in the assessment is based on best practices, guidance documents, and jurisprudence from other jurisdictions. The internationally recognized good practices are used as a benchmark for the assessment of practice documented by the ODIHR monitors, and monitoring places a particular emphasis on identifying and promoting good or promising practices in implementing human rights obligations and complying with OSCE commitments.

The existing OSCE human dimension monitoring system does not provide for a general monitoring instrument that would cover all participating States and all human dimension commitments at regular intervals.[24] Monitoring within the OSCE concentrates on particular issues, rather than giving a systemic overview of the whole human dimension. There are a handful of thematic areas where ODIHR has concrete tasks to monitor the relevant developments regularly or on an ad hoc basis. Most of ODIHR's monitoring work is not carried out at regular intervals, but is largely dependent on the needs and commitments of the participating States to engage with ODIHR. At the same time, monitoring options available within the OSCE might allow a faster and more timely reaction to emerging trends and challenges compared to other human rights monitoring systems.

Much of ODIHR monitoring relies on first-hand information gathering through direct observation. This is because ODIHR places emphasis on the need to base its monitoring – as far as possible – on first-hand information collected in adherence with the principles of transparency, accuracy, and impartiality. In addition, the presence of observers may, in some cases, have a deterrent effect by helping to ensure that the authorities act in the most appropriate manner, in line with international human rights principles and standards, and can therefore have an immediate effect on compliance. Field presences can contribute to ODIHR's monitoring of the implementation of human dimension commitments in certain parts of the OSCE area.

The actual monitoring modalities used are based on an agreement between ODIHR and the participating State where the monitoring is conducted. The most common output of monitoring consists in the issuance of a report

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23 Cf. Arie Bloed, Monitoring the Human Dimension of the OSCE, in: Gudmundur Alfredsson/Jonas Grimheden/Bertrand G. Ramcharan/Alfred Zayas (eds.), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, 2nd rev. ed., Leiden 2009, pp. 549-559, here: p. 550.
24 Cf. Jens Narten, Options for a General OSCE Human Dimension Monitoring Instrument, CORE Policy Paper, Hamburg 2006, p. 9.

including: *first,* a description of the main findings, *second,* an analysis of the issues of concern, third, the identification of good practices, and *fourth*, the provision of specific recommendations. Reports are usually public and they result from a consultation process in which national authorities are given the opportunity to comment and rebut findings and conclusions contained in the draft, while final editorial authority rests with the Office.

The political nature of the processes within the OSCE means that the Organization lacks monitoring instruments of a legal or quasi-legal nature. It does not have judicial tools or complaints procedures similar to those available in other systems.[25] Monitoring tools at the OSCE's disposal do not include the right to take sanctions against any wrongdoers, as the Organization basically only has the right to raise concerns in a political way without the possibility to undertake action against the will of any of its participating States.[26]

The legally non-binding nature of nature of OSCE commitments may on the one hand mean there are few incentives for the participating States to comply with them. However, their politically-binding nature makes States more likely to apply them so as to avoid punishment for incomplete implementations. Moreover, one should also consider that even in systems with legally binding standards, member states often do not comply with reporting obligations and fail to (fully) implement the recommendations of the treaty monitoring bodies or court judgments.

ODIHR has developed a range of tools and assistance programmes that could be used to address the shortcomings identified by its monitoring. However, the UN and the CoE human rights monitoring systems have limited this assistance to follow-up mechanisms on the ground.

ODIHR Monitoring of the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association confirmed that the right to peaceful assembly not only covers the right to hold or participate in an assembly, but also protects the rights of those monitoring peaceful assemblies. It called on states to ensure the protection of those monitoring and reporting on violations and abuses in the context of peaceful assemblies and to respect and facilitate the right to observe and monitor all aspects of an assembly.[27] The right to monitor public assemblies is

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25   Cf. Bloed, cited above (Note 23), pp. 551-552.
26   Cf. ibid., p. 553.
27   Cf. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, Summary, p. 1, and, more detailed, para. 94; Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/31/66, 4 February 2016, para. 70.

part of the more general right to seek and receive information, which is a corollary to the right to freedom of expression and therefore protected by international human rights norms.[28] The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders called on states to allow human rights defenders to operate freely in the context of freedom of assembly in order to enable them to perform their monitoring role.[29] The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has highlighted that everyone – whether a participant, monitor, or observer – enjoys the right to record an assembly, which also includes the right to record a law-enforcement operation. Confiscation, seizure, and/or destruction of notes and visual or audio recording equipment without due process should be prohibited and punished.[30]

Human rights defenders have an important role to play in providing independent, impartial, and objective coverage of demonstrations and protests, including a factual record of the conduct of participants and law-enforcement officials alike, which is a valuable contribution to the effective enjoyment of the right to peaceful assembly.[31]

OSCE participating States have committed to ensuring that everyone can enjoy the freedom of expression and to respecting the right of everyone, individually or in association with others, to freely seek, receive, and impart views and information on human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights to disseminate and publish such views and information.[32] Freedom of expression, including the right to information, is protected in numerous international human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, Article 19) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, Article 10).

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28   Cf. Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, cited above (Note 27), para. 68.
29   Cf. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights defenders, United Nations, General Assembly, A/62/225, 13 August 2007, paras. 91, 101(f)(i). The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights confirmed that the "right to monitor the observance of human rights in a given society includes the right to engage in active observation of an assembly and to collect, verify, and use information related to the assembly. All persons have the right to seek and receive information and to freedom of expression, and enjoy the right to observe and independently monitor public assemblies without fear of reprisal. This includes civil society organisations, human rights defenders, monitors, journalists and other media workers." African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Guidelines for the Policing of Assemblies by Law Enforcement Officials in Africa, para. 8.6.
30   Cf. Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, cited above (Note 27), para. 71.
31   OSCE ODIHR/CoE Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2nd ed., Warsaw 2010, p. 21, Principles 5.9 and 5.10; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights defenders, cited above (Note 29), para. 91; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, cited above (Note 27), para. 48.
32   Cf. Copenhagen Document 1990, cited above (Note 7), para. 10.1.

In the Moscow Document of 1991, it is confirmed that OSCE commitments require participating States to seek ways to further strengthen modalities for contacts and exchange of views between NGOs and relevant national authorities and governmental institutions; to facilitate visits to their countries by NGOs from within any of the participating States in order to observe human dimension conditions; to welcome NGO activities, and to, *inter alia*, observe compliance with OSCE commitments in the field of the human dimension and to allow NGOs, in view of their important function within the human dimension, to convey their views to their own governments and the governments of all the other participating States during the future work of the OSCE on the human dimension.[33]

ODIHR is the only inter-governmental body in Europe that engages in direct observation of public gatherings as part of its human rights monitoring.[34] Assemblies that, due to their nature, size, duration, or complexity – constituted a specific challenge for the authorities and/or the organizers were selected to be monitored by the Office. ODIHR has also looked at assemblies convened by minority groups espousing views that are unpopular with, or perceived as controversial by mainstream society. Assemblies such as high-level summits and governmental meetings in the OSCE area are, in many cases, accompanied by large and complex demonstrations, often lasting several days, with the participation of local protesters as well as demonstrators from third countries. Policing such assemblies presents a number of challenges, stemming from security considerations arising from the presence of numerous high-ranking officials, the potential presence of violent protesters (in otherwise largely peaceful demonstrations), and the sheer complexity and size of the protests. In these cases, ODIHR has been interested in how authorities strike the balance between safety and security considerations and the respect for freedom of peaceful assembly.

The assembly monitoring methodology is unique, in the sense that information gathering is dominated by first-hand information from direct observation, complemented by desk research and information from secondary sources. Monitoring is carried out by trained observers using a standard methodology involving the observation of public gatherings and, in particular, the conduct of and interaction between the participants, law enforcement agents, other public authorities, and other relevant actors, such as representatives of the media or counter-demonstrators.

Data gathered during monitoring is complemented by information obtained in interviews before and after the events, also with a view to obtaining details of any administrative, judicial, or other decisions affecting the full enjoyment of freedom of peaceful assembly. Research includes interviews *inter*

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33   CF. Moscow Document 1991, cited above (Note 3), para. Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1991), paras 43.1, 43.2, 43.3, 43.4.
34   Cf. Monitoring Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 29 April 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/418400.

alia with representatives of municipal and law enforcement authorities as well as with the organizers of the events and other relevant organizations. Background information is obtained through desk research, media monitoring, and ongoing contact with interlocutors.

The Results of ODIHR's Assembly Monitoring

To date ODIHR, has conducted 35 assembly monitoring exercises in 31 OSCE participating States. All but one OSCE participating State approached by ODIHR facilitated the Office's assembly monitoring work. Over the years, ODIHR's assembly monitoring has gained a higher profile, which has led to new opportunities, such as an invitation by the Hamburg authorities to observe assemblies related to the G20 Summit in Hamburg in July 2017, a year after ODIHR assessed the facilitation of the assemblies related to the G7 Summit at Schloss Elmau, Gemany.

Four thematic reports have been published, including general recommendations on how to advance the implementation of human dimension commitments in the area of freedom of peaceful assembly in the OSCE region. The recommendations have been used by several actors. In the 2013 "flags dispute" in Northern Ireland, the police drew heavily upon the guidance offered by ODIHR's first assembly monitoring report, which was published just one month before the dispute erupted and which was provided to the Assistant Chief Constable responsible for Operational Support by his Human Rights Legal Adviser.[35] Recently, ODIHR's assembly monitoring recommendations were also cited by the Northern Ireland Parades Commission Determination.

In the Netherlands, the evaluation of the Law on Public Assemblies of the Netherlands cites extensively from the ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and deals with the specific criticisms of ODIHR's second assembly monitoring report. The assembly monitoring exercise to the Netherlands in the second assembly monitoring cycle also led to a co-operation with the Amsterdam municipality, which requested that ODIHR provide input to the Dutch Police Book on Assemblies, published in 2019 and shared with each mayor of the country.

In Germany, an assembly monitoring organization translated the recommendations of ODIHR's third assembly monitoring report[36] and used them in their relevant advocacy work. For example, when they were preparing to observe the demonstration accompanying the summit of the G20 finance ministers in Baden-Baden, they quoted ODIHR's recommendations on access and restrictions for assembly monitors in their letter to the police informing them

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35 Cf. Speaking Note for Paul Welsh, First Secretary Political, UK Delegation to OSCE on EU Side Event on the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly.

36 Cf. Demobeobachtung-Südwest, OSZE-Empfehlungen [Demo observation South-west, OSCE recommendations], at: http://demobeobachtung-suedwest.de/osze-empfehlungen/.

of their presence. Some assembly monitoring organizations, for example Leipzig and Göttingen, discussed the recommendations and adopted them as the basis for their work.

ODIHR assembly monitoring findings and recommendations have been used by NGOs in tools and standard setting documents, such as Amnesty International's publication on "Police and Human Rights Defenders".[37]

The Office has been advocating for the recognition of the contribution of independent monitoring to the full enjoyment of peaceful assembly. In the context of the consultation process regarding the drafting of the General Comment to Article 21 of the ICCPR, civil society organizations reiterated ODIHR's recommendations on the facilitation of independent monitoring of assemblies.[38] In addition, in 2017 the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship decided to initiate a Ministerial Council decision on the facilitation of independent monitoring of assemblies in the OSCE area.

The recognition of the legitimacy of assembly monitoring as an assistance tool and ODIHR's assembly monitoring methodology is underpinned by the high number of training requests from NGOs, Ombuds Institutions and OSCE structures to ODIHR.[39]

Conclusions

Good policing is effective, fair and accountable, for which human rights compliance is a prerequisite. Ian Tomlinson, a 47-year-old newspaper vendor collapsed and died in the City of London after being struck and pushed by a police officer during the 2009 G20 Summit protests. A citizen journalist's video of the incident helped to create accountability for the police officer, whose unnecessary use of force caused Tomlinson's death.

Human rights defenders have an important role to play in providing independent, impartial, and objective coverage of demonstrations and protests, including a factual record of the conduct of participants and law-enforcement officials alike, which is a valuable contribution to the effective enjoyment of the right to peaceful assembly.[40] Independent monitoring of the exercise of

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37   Cf. Amnesty International Dutch Section, Police and Human Rights Defenders, Police and Human Rights Programme, Short paper series No. 4, Amsterdam, July 2018, at: https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2018/07/AMN_18_38_police-and-human-right-defenders_FINAL_web0307.pdf?x28615.

38   Cf. International Observers Network/Youth Human Rights Movement/Human Rights House Foundation, Written Contribution to the Half-Day General Discussion on Article 21 of the Covenant, para. 7.5, at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GC37/InternationalObserversNetwork.pdf.

39   ODIHR has conducted assembly monitoring capacity building activities for civil society in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Serbia, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. ODIHR has also trained over 100 staff members from the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

40   Cf. The OSCE ODIHR/CoE Venice Commission, cited above (Note 31), p. 21, Principles 5.9 and 5.10; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights

freedom of peaceful assembly can contribute to police accountability. By making law enforcement more accountable, their work becomes more legitimate. This will increase the public's trust and confidence in them, which in turn will lead to more efficiency.

The authorities should recognize and raise awareness about the important contribution independent monitoring can make to the full enjoyment of the freedom of peaceful assembly. They should actively enable the independent monitoring of and reporting on the facilitation and protection of assemblies by international and local monitors. This should include facilitating the gathering of information on all anticipated assemblies by National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) or other relevant independent oversight or monitoring bodies, or civil society organizations working in the area of freedom of assembly. They should also refrain from imposing unnecessary or disproportionate restrictions on assembly monitoring activities, and ensure that any restrictions that may be imposed on monitored assemblies, such as during curfews, dispersals, or arrests, do not limit the ability of international or local monitors to carry out their activities unimpeded and to observe all aspects of an assembly.

It should be ensured that assembly monitors, participants, media, or observers are able to photograph or otherwise record actions and activities at public assemblies, and that such visual or audio recordings cannot be confiscated, seized, and/or destroyed without due process. State authorities should demonstrate willingness to engage with monitors before, during and after the assembly when such engagement is sought. They should give due consideration to monitors' findings and recommendations resulting from their assessment of the facilitation of assemblies, so as to inform institutional learning and, more broadly, the drafting of legislation and policies affecting the enjoyment of freedom of peaceful assembly.

Uniquely among other inter-governmental actors, the OSCE provides for the monitoring of public assemblies through direct observation by one of its independent institutions, ODIHR. It therefore effectively facilitates ensuring greater transparency in the implementation of commitments, identifying challenges and good practices in the protection and promotion of the freedom to assemble peacefully in the OSCE space.

Authorities should facilitate ODIHR's independent assembly monitoring, including by issuing a standing invitation to ODIHR to carry out independent assembly monitoring in participating States in order to observe assemblies on the basis of ODIHR's established methodology, without prejudice to ODIHR's responsibility to select events to be monitored. OSCE participating States where ODIHR has conducted assembly monitoring exercises should engage with ODIHR with a view to giving due consideration to its assembly monitoring findings and to implementing its recommendations, including by taking

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defenders, a.a.O. (Anm. 29), para. 91; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, cited above (Note 27), para. 48.

advantage of ODIHR tools and assistance regarding the freedom of peaceful assembly.

Harlem Désir

Safety of Journalists as a Priority for the OSCE

Journalists' safety is rapidly deteriorating in many countries in the OSCE region. In recent years, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) has intervened in some 200 cases dealing with journalists' safety annually, including attacks and death threats, but also hundreds of criminal investigations launched against critical voices.

Harassment and intimidation have reached unprecedented heights with acts of violence against journalists taking place nearly every day throughout the OSCE region and beyond. No country or region has been immune. The assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia in Malta in October 2017, of Ján Kuciak in Slovakia in February 2018, the shooting at Olivera Lakić in Montenegro in May 2018, the killing of five Capital Gazette staff in the US in June 2018, the murder of Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi in his consulate in Istanbul in October 2018, the shooting of the young journalist Lyra McKee in Northern Ireland in April 2019, the death of Vadym Komarov in June 2019, a few weeks after he was brutally attacked and left in a coma in the city of Cherkasy in May, and, before that, the killing of Pavel Sheremet in Ukraine in July 2016 and the terrorist attack against the Charlie Hebdo journalists in France in January 2015; these are among some of the shocking and terrible examples of the environment confronting media actors today.

These journalists and their colleagues do not only deserve admiration for their work and daily courage. First and foremost, they deserve protection and justice for the crimes committed against them.

It is not only journalists that are attacked, but the very foundations of democracy; it is the role of the press to hold those in power accountable that is under attack. It is freedom of speech and freedom of opinion. It is the right of citizens to be informed about corruption, or any other matters that affect their daily lives. When journalists are targeted, it is everyone's freedoms that are at risk.

I am particularly alarmed by the combination of threats against the free media for political, economic, or ideological reasons. With the systematic denigration of the press, more and more people now consider it acceptable to attack the messenger because they do not like the message, despite working in very different contexts.

Today, at a time of increasing risks and challenges to the press and press freedom, we need to build a network of awareness and solidarity at the international level to defend press freedom. And, above all, to enhance our joint efforts in promoting a safe environment for journalists; one that is safe from intimidation, safe from harassment, and safe from violence.

The 57 OSCE participating States recognized the importance of this issue in Milan in December 2018, when they unanimously adopted an OSCE Ministerial Decision on Safety of Journalists, the first in 20 years, in which they acknowledged the gravity of the situation and claimed that they are "deeply concerned by all human rights violations and abuses committed in relation to the safety of journalists, including those involving killing, torture, enforced disappearance, arbitrary arrest, arbitrary detention and arbitrary expulsion, intimidation, harassment and threats of all forms, such as physical, legal, political, technological or economic, intended to suppress their work."[1]

The participating States also urged "political leaders, public officials and/ or authorities to refrain from intimidating, threatening or condoning – and to unequivocally condemn – violence against journalists, in order to reduce the risks or threats that journalists may face and avoid undermining trust in the credibility of journalists as well as respect for the importance of independent journalism".[2]

The Ministerial Decision also recognized that female journalists bear the brunt of online violence, harassment, and intimidation, as women and as journalists. Indeed, we have been astonished by the specific type of gender-based violence that female journalists face online, in particular the barrage of sexually explicit and misogynistic abuse.[3] And we have seen the development of these attacks in all the countries of the OSCE region.

This type of online intimidation and harassment is used against investigative journalists in an attempt to have them renounce their work; it targets reporters by exercising pressure on them; it is used against critical voices to try to silence them; but it is also increasingly being used against female journalists whatever their field of work in the media.

By adopting Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/18, the OSCE participating States confirmed that we urgently need to act to improve the safety of journalists. Now the time has come to implement this decision.

What does it mean? In addition to violence against journalists, intimidation, and harassment, there is a staggering lack of prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes. It is unacceptable that most of the threats and attacks against journalists and media outlets are not fully investigated or thoroughly and effectively addressed. The research conducted by my Office in 2017 into the cases of the more than 400 killed journalists in the OSCE region over the last 25 years showed that, in 85 per cent of cases, perpetrators or masterminds were not brought to justice and impunity prevailed. We cannot allow this trend to continue. It is among the key obstacles to ensuring journalists' safety; it results in self-censorship and a chilling effect on freedom of the media.

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1 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Milan 2018, Decision No. 3/18, Safety of Journalists, MC.DEC/3/18, 7 December 2018, p. 2, available at: https://www.osce.org/ chairmanship/406538.
2 Ibid., p. 4.
3 Cf. ibid., p. 3.

This impunity is not inevitable and it would be a terrible setback for states to admit otherwise. We need to bring an end to any form of indulgence or protection for the killers of journalists.

Journalists' safety must become a higher priority for governments that claim to support the work of the media and uphold OSCE commitments. Political commitments to protect media freedom are important, but without effective and timely prosecution and punishment of those responsible for crimes against journalists, nothing will change. This means:

- Government and law enforcement authorities must send out a clear message that attacks against journalists will not be tolerated;
- swift and efficient investigations must be conducted every time a journalist is the victim of an attack;
- evidence must be taken in a professional manner with the goal of prosecuting all responsible parties;
- prosecutors need to be trained to understand the nature of media work and how it renders members of the media vulnerable to harm, intimidation, and harassment;
- judges must apply criminal sanctions and sentences for these crimes in full accordance with the law and proportionate to the offenses committed.

The OSCE Ministerial Council Decision also requests states to "establish […] national data collection, analysis and reporting on attacks and violence against journalists".[4]

We are ready to support this, and we propose the establishment in every participating State of a national committee for the safety of journalists which would gather representatives of the prosecutor's office, the police, and journalist associations to verify that all attacks and threats are properly investigated, improve procedures if needed, propose protection measures when necessary, and implement preventive action to reinforce the security of journalists.

It is paramount that effective legislation is developed to ensure that all attacks are investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice.

What we witness today is that emerging technologies are too often increasing the potential for online abuse, and rarely come with the measures designed to reduce online risks. We have to defend and promote freedom of expression online, but there must be a discussion on the abuse, and the use of certain tools. Algorithms and automated systems like chatbots can flood journalists' accounts with hundreds of hateful messages in an instant. Think about how often these tools are used against journalists, in the case of doxing – publishing private or identifying data online without an individual's consent – or other malicious online attacks.

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4   Ibid., p. 4.

It is encouraging to see that media outlets, civil society, and others have started to develop online safety protocols, offering support to journalists. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that other media actors are self-engaged and work remotely, within their online spaces. Many freelance journalists are, for these reasons, more vulnerable and face greater obstacles, which prevent them from accessing these systems of protection. Another phenomenon that has also caught my attention recently is the plethora of new, alternative, forms of support that are fully operational in the online space and providing support for journalists targeted with online harassment.

To conclude, the participating States have a special responsibility, and duty, which is to implement the OSCE Ministerial Decision adopted in Milan:

- They should, if necessary, adapt their legislation to better tackle the safety of journalists;
- they should ensure that law enforcement agencies train staff to identify threats to safety within the framework of the legislation, in line with international human rights standards;
- they should encourage strategic co-ordination among the police, prosecutors and media organizations, and promote reciprocal understanding;
- we encourage the states to co-operate with non-state actors, most notably civil society, journalists associations, internet intermediaries, and social media platforms on the means to prevent the risks and improve protection mechanisms;
- all actors should also offer support and encourage new programmes and initiatives to counter the online harassment of female journalists;
- the media outlets, on their side, should have internal policies and mechanisms to support journalists when they face threats; such support should also be developed for freelance journalists;
- Media outlets should pay attention to the diversity of their newsrooms, ensuring they reflect that of their societies, so as to contribute to ensuring a multitude of perspectives.

In order to ensure genuine plurality and a diversity of voices, it is crucial that global efforts take a multi-faceted approach, including gender sensitivity, addressing layers of threats and obstacles to free expression.

Kurt P. Tudyka

Where Is the OSCE's Cultural Engagement? Promised – to Be Forgotten or Awakened – to Be Renewed? An Interjection

The Helsinki Document of 1975, the Charter of Paris of 1990 and many subsequent statements of the Ministerial Councils until the recent past had repeatedly stressed the importance of cultural contact and co-operation for promoting understanding and peaceful coexistence among peoples. What has become of these abstract proclamations? To what extent has the OSCE itself made a specific commitment in this area? On what occasions and in what declarations or reports is the topic of culture mentioned? What importance is attached to it? Is the framework for action referenced bilateral, multilateral, or international? What activities have been carried out as examples? To begin with, it is assumed that there is an astonishing discrepancy between words and deeds, indeed a deplorable lack of action. Should such shortcomings be remedied, and if so, how? Using the declarations, decisions, and reports of the responsible CSCE/OSCE bodies and institutions, this contribution explores and examines these questions, and makes a proposal for future action.

From the beginning, the topic of "culture" was embedded in the so-called third basket, today known as the human dimension, alongside human rights, protection of minorities, freedom of the press, promotion of science, and so on. Its scope has gradually and conspicuously shrunk over the course of the series of Summit Meetings and Ministerial Councils.

In the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 1973, basic statements on culture are made in a separate, dedicated section and many activities are proposed for the detailed treatment of cultural issues.[1] The Helsinki Document of 1975, the "constitution" of the CSCE/OSCE, then incorporates them in a correspondingly concrete, detailed, and comprehensive manner.[2]

Normatively, "culture" is credited with contributing to the "development of mutual confidence and the further improvement of relations between the participating States".

In general, "cultural exchanges and co-operation" are repeatedly mentioned as a means to this end. This idea is associated with the expectation that they will "contribute to a better comprehension among people and among peo-

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[1]   Cf. Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, Helsinki 1973, p. 12, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/40213.

[2]   For the following, see: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki Final Act, 1 August 1975, pp. 45-51, available at: https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act.

ples, and thus promote a lasting understanding among States." As a justification for this assumption, it is stated that at the multilateral level, "interest was [already] manifested in the active participation of the broadest possible social groups in an increasingly diversified cultural life".

What intentions are mentioned? "Cultural exchange" should be substantially expanded, both in terms of persons and works and in all fields of culture, on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Active co-operation should be developed among them and, with it, "the mutual exchange of information with a view to a better knowledge of respective cultural achievements". "Within their cultural policies", the interest in the cultural heritage of the other participating States should be promoted, "conscious of the merits and the value of each culture".

The means are also considered, with the demand "to improve the facilities for the exchange and for the dissemination of cultural property" and "to promote access by all to respective cultural achievements". Who is meant here by "all" can be interpreted as all "states" or all "people".

As a framework for action on expanded co-operation and links in the field of culture at various levels, reference is made to the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements between state institutions and non-governmental organizations, and between "people engaged in cultural activities", among whom direct contact and communication should be encouraged. It is worth noting the reference to developing "contacts and co-operation among persons active in the field of culture". In addition, they are encouraged to "seek new fields and forms of cultural co-operation". There is specific emphasis on the intention "to contribute […] to the development of contacts and co-operation […] especially among creative artists and people engaged in cultural activities", among other things by making efforts to "promote […] travel and meetings", especially with a view to "their working together, making known their works in other participating States or exchanging views on topics relevant to their common activity". In addition, attention is called to the "exchanges of trainees and specialists and the granting of scholarships for basic and advanced training in various fields of culture. There is also a call for "the exchange of experience in the training of organizers of cultural activities [...]"and "the organization of international meetings among creative artists, especially young creative artists, on current questions of artistic and literary creation […]".

Interestingly, the Helsinki Document does not only use the general term "culture", which can mean many things. It makes very concrete operational and institutional proposals. It mentions, for example, promoting "such forms of cultural co-operation and […] joint projects as: international events in the fields of the plastic and graphic arts, cinema, theatre, ballet, music, folklore, etc.; book fairs, and exhibitions […] as well as performances given by soloists, instrumental ensembles, orchestras, choirs and other artistic groups, including those composed of amateurs." Writer and composer exchanges and meetings are explicitly named and justified as worthy of promotion. The document even mentions the promotion and organization of "more frequent book exhibitions"

and refers to the possibility of "organizing periodically in Europe a large-scale exhibition of books from the participating States". Even seemingly marginal proposals are made, such as "the exchange of information among interested parties concerning events of a cultural character foreseen in the participating States". Music, theatre and visual arts are emphasized as worthy of promotion, with the aim of "contributing to the compilation and publication of a calendar of such events, with the assistance, where necessary, of the appropriate international organizations". The "search for new fields and forms of cultural co-operation" and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and arrangements between interested parties are cited as worthy of support.

It is interesting to look at what kind of international events are in focus. The plastic and graphic arts, cinema, theatre, ballet, music, folk art, book fairs and exhibitions, joint performances of operas and dramatic works, as well as performances by soloists, instrumental ensembles, orchestras and choirs are specifically listed. Particular mention is made of amateur groups, the organization of international cultural youth events and exchanges between young artists. It is also stressed that "works by writers and composers from the other participating States [should be included] in the repertoires of soloists and artistic ensembles".

In summary, the Helsinki Document of 1975 identified norms, objectives, expectations, intentions, operational proposals, and institutional areas for various cultural fields. How has the relationship of the CSCE/OSCE to "culture" evolved since?

At a CSCE seminar in Venice in 1984, "the value and usefulness of instruments of cultural co-operation" were recognized, and the following were listed: "cultural agreements; […] national and international cultural institutions, whether governmental or other, operating in the area; more contacts and co-operation among persons engaged in the field of culture from different countries".[3]

In the 1990 Charter of Paris,[4] there is a section on culture in its own right, which states, among other things, that "our common European culture" makes an "essential contribution […] in overcoming the division of the continent". It highlights the importance of the Krakow symposium and the high expectations in the consideration of guidelines for intensified co-operation in the field of culture. "In order to promote greater familiarity amongst our peoples, we favour the establishment of cultural centres in cities of other participating States as well as increased co-operation in the audio-visual field and wider exchange in music, theatre, literature and the arts."

At the aforementioned Krakow Symposium of 1991, all sorts of cultural aspects were discussed in detail. However, it is striking to see how culture is

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3   Report of the OSCE Venice Seminar on Economic, Scientific and Cultural Co-operation in the Mediterranean within the Framework of the Results of the Valetta Meeting of Experts, Venice, 26 October 1984, p. 6, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/16225.

4   For this para., see: OSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 21 November 1990, p. 11, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/39516.

also instrumentalized and treated functionally. In the concluding document, the participating States take note of "the interrelationship between cultural life and the well-being of their peoples, and the special importance that this has for democratic countries in transition towards a market economy". It is also striking how culture is invoked with reference to the past: "They encourage support, as already undertaken, and the on-going assistance to those countries in preserving and protecting their cultural heritage. The participating States respect the irreplaceable uniqueness of all their cultures and will endeavour to promote continued cultural dialogue among themselves and with the rest of the world. They reaffirm their belief that respect for cultural diversity promotes understanding and tolerance among individuals and groups. […] The participating States are resolved to promote mutual knowledge of their respective cultures. Accordingly, they will encourage co-operation and exchanges in all fields of culture and creative work."[5] After the previous declarations and promises, which may have raised many expectations, it is all the more surprising that there is no mention of culture in the Declaration at the end of the Helsinki Summit in 1992.[6]

Two years later, at the 1994 Budapest Summit, the participating States reiterated that they "will further encourage and facilitate human contacts, cultural and educational exchanges and co-operate in accordance with CSCE provisions. They will continue to implement their commitments in the cultural field, as laid down in the Document of the Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE participating States and other relevant CSCE documents. They will encourage public and private efforts aimed at the preservation of the cultural heritage in their States. […] The Permanent Council will explore the possibility of holding informal meetings on the issues mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs."[7] If a qualitative limitation and a shift with regard to cultural engagement can already be seen here, these continued at the Lisbon Summit in 1996. The Summit Declaration states: "Among the acute problems within the human dimension, the continuing violations of human rights, such as involuntary migration, and the lack of full democratization, threats to independent media, electoral fraud, manifestations of aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, continue to endanger stability in the OSCE region. We are committed to continuing to address these problems."[8]

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5   Document of the Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE Participating States, 6 June 1991, pp. 2, 3 (pt. 8), available at: https://www.osce.org/library/24396.
6   Cf. Helsinki Summit Declaration, 10 July 1992, in: Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992 Summit, Helsinki, 9-10 July 1992, CSCE Helsinki Document: The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/39530.
7   CSCE, Budapest Document 1994, Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Area, Corrected version 21 December 1994, pp. 36-37, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/39554.
8   Lisbon Summit Declaration, in: OSCE, Lisbon Summit 1996, Lisbon Document 1996, DOC.S/1/96, Lisbon, 3 December 1996, pp. 5-9, here: p. 6, at: https://www.osce.org/mc/39539.

In the declarations of the following Summit Meeting in Istanbul in 1999, there is also no mention of the theme of culture, and cultural issues were again absent from the declarations and decisions of the Tenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council in Porto in 2002. This is especially surprising, as the Portuguese Chairmanship deliberately did a great deal to promote the human dimension. However, their attention focused on the freedom and protection of the media and the rights of minorities, especially Sinti and Roma. This was particularly evident at the following Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council in Maastricht in 2003. There, the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) commented in detail on this topic and produced an in-depth report. "The HCNM will continue to elaborate and disseminate guidelines for policy-makers on the use of State broadcast media in multicultural communities aimed, *inter alia*, at encouraging support for minority broadcasters, including Roma and Sinti broadcasters, and improving their access to the media."[9] In this context, there were also reports on the activities of various OSCE institutions and structures in collaboration with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).[10] ODIHR, for example, organized three meetings on the human dimension, dedicated to Roma and Sinti, freedom of religion and belief, and the prevention of torture.

If we look at other bodies, the Permanent Council once made a comment on the protection of cultural goods as cultural heritage in the context of the conflict in Georgia. The question regarding the cultural activities of the OSCE missions still remains. The OSCE Mission to Moldova financed and organized various cultural events, such as plays, jazz festivals, classical concerts, and rock festivals. However, culture was always a means to an end, i.e. the events served to build confidence or to convey other messages about tolerance or anti-trafficking. Other Missions are likely to present a similar picture. Concerts and performances at OSCE celebrations are also very common, but there were no events with culture as the actual centre of focus.

In summary, it is clear that the field of "culture" has contracted more and more, and has ultimately been neglected and abandoned. Most recently, there was no commitment regarding culture by the Milan Ministerial Council in 2018.

What reasons could lie behind the OSCE's general, recognizable abstention in the field of culture? Perhaps this can be put down to the social and political changes that have occurred since the 1970s, or international organizations that have occupied this sphere, such as UNESCO, the Council of Europe, or the European Union. However, on closer examination, such arguments cannot suffice when it comes to the performance of OSCE-specific cultural engagement. Certainly, there has been an increase in the number of international,

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9   Decision No. 3/03, Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area, MC.DOC/1/03, in: OSCE, Eleventh Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 1-2 December 2003, Maastricht, 2 December 2003, pp. 61-77, Annex, p. 66 at: https://www.osce.org/mc/40533.

10   Cf. ibid.

Europe-wide cultural events taking place on a continuous basis since the time of the 1992 Helsinki Summit. Nowadays, there are staggering numbers of pageants and festivals. However, they are almost all of country-specific significance. One exception is the European Union's nomination of one or more locations as "European Capital of Culture".

It is testament to the poverty of the OSCE if it does not provide any cultural impetus. What action would be possible, and in particular desirable, on the part of the OSCE? The tasks of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) could be expanded and complemented by including the promotion of culture. One could imagine them initiating, sponsoring, carrying out, and supporting cultural meetings, events such as exhibitions, film screenings, concerts, opera and theatre performances, and festivals, especially in "hot spots", such as the South Caucasus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. In the field, the OSCE is often present through its field operations, the HCNM, ODIHR, and RFOM, whose mandates, competences, and facilities could be strengthened to support this endeavour. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act proposed the creation of a "'Scientific Forum' in the form of a meeting of leading personalities in science from the participating States to discuss interrelated problems of common interest concerning current and future developments in science and to promote the expansion of contacts, communications and the exchange of information between scientific institutions and among scientists".[11] Taking this proposal from the past and replacing the word "science" with "culture" would have the effect of creating a cultural forum.

An "OSCE cultural prize" could be created, which would be awarded for cultural achievements in line with the OSCE's goals. A much more far-reaching, perhaps still utopian, idea: Why not create an OSCE radio and television station for the whole of Europe? All kinds of countries have international broadcasters, i.e. programmes for other countries. Based on the premises of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris and their development, such a station would acquire relevant significance – for information, education, and cultural enrichment with substance and quality.

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11   Helsinki Final Act, cited above (Note 2), p. 54.

Esra Buttanri

Climate Change, Global Security, and the OSCE

Introduction

Climate change and its implications for security are increasingly under discussion at an international level. The UN Security Council has been addressing the links between climate change and security since 2007. At a national level, states are increasingly recognizing climate change as a security concern. The 2030 Agenda[1], with its focus on peace as one of its five pillars – people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnerships – and a dedicated Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) on Climate Action (Goal 13), demonstrates the interaction between sustainable development and climate change. In the OSCE, the discussion on climate change started at the same time as it did in the UN, and was referred to in a number of OSCE Ministerial Council Decisions and Declarations. Furthermore, the links between climate change and security were discussed in various OSCE forums and addressed through dedicated projects, led by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) and implemented together with its international partners and the OSCE field operations. This contribution provides an overview of the potential security implications of climate change, the international debate on this topic, and the OSCE response.

An Overview of the Links between Climate Change and Security

Climate change is recognized as a "threat multiplier", exacerbating existing risks to security, and increasing environmental stress, adding to pressures that can push the responsive capacities of governments to their limits. The threat comes not from climate change itself, but rather, from the way it interacts with existing security conditions,[2] primarily in three ways. First, the increased frequency and intensity of climate-induced extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, heat waves, and wildfires exerts pressure on natural resources, particularly water and land, and pose a threat primarily to water and food security. Second, climate change creates risks to critical infrastructure,

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Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed to the OSCE or any other organization.

1   United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, 70/1. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, 21 October 2015, at: https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf.

2   Cf. Is climate change a security risk? Climate Security 101, A Project of The Center for Climate and Security, at: https://climatesecurity101.org/faqs/is-climate-change-a-security-risk/.

such as energy or military installations, due to rising sea levels and extreme weather events. Third, climate change puts livelihoods at risk, especially for those who depend on natural resources, which could push them to migrate, turn to illegal sources of income, or to riot, which in turn heightens the risk of instability. On a positive note, co-operation and diplomatic activities in this field offer entry points and means for strengthening good neighbourly relations, building trust and confidence.

The Global Risks Reports of the World Economic Forum for the last seven years in a row have identified the "failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation" as among the top five global risks in terms of impact.[3] In the Global Risks Report 2019, this failure is identified as the second highest risk, both in terms of likelihood and impact.[4]

Overall, climate change is a threat to many decades of sustainable development progress and is hindering the advancement of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. On the other hand, tackling climate change provides an opportunity to accelerate sustainable development gains through enhanced resilience, improved public health, decreased vulnerability, and greater security for nations and economies.

The International Debate on Climate Change and Security – How Did it Evolve?

Over the last decade, global leaders, policy-makers, and relevant stakeholders have been dedicating special attention to the link between climate change and security and have reflected their concerns in various political and academic documents. Below is a summary of how the climate change and security discussion has evolved since 2007, highlighting major international developments of relevance to the OSCE region.

The UN Security Council held its first formal debate on climate change and its potential security impacts on 17 April 2007. The debate mainly focused on the compatibility of the agenda item with the mandate of the Council under the UN Charter and there was no formal outcome.[5] By the time of writing, there had not been much change in this situation.

The issue was brought onto the agenda of the UN General Assembly in June 2009 by the small-island developing states of the Pacific Ocean. The debate led to a General Assembly resolution, which, among other things, requested that the UN Secretary-General submit a comprehensive report on the

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3   All Global Risks Reports published by the World Economic Forum from 2006 on are available at: https://www.weforum.org/global-risks/archive.

4   Cf. World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2019, 14th Edition, Figure 1, p. 5, available at: https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2019.

5   Cf. Security Council Report, Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Impact of Climate Change, July 2011 Monthly Forecast, 30 June 2011, at: https://www. securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2011-07/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_7535735. php.

possible security implications of climate change. The UN Secretary-General presented his report "Climate change and its possible security implications" on 11 September 2009. Identifying climate change as a "threat multiplier" that exacerbates existing threats, the report emphasized that climate change could affect security through multiple channels that challenge the ability of states to maintain stability.[6]

The second formal debate of the UN Security Council was held on 20 July 2011, focussing on the impact of climate change on maintaining international peace and security. The outcome of the debate was a presidential statement, which reaffirms that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change "is the key instrument for addressing climate change" and at the same time, expressed concern that "possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security".[7]

Furthermore, climate change was discussed in the context of broader topics that were addressed by the UN Security Council. Some examples of such occasions include the high level briefing on "new challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention" on 23 November 2011, the open debate organized on 30 July 2015 on "peace and security challenges facing small island developing states", and another open debate on 22 November 2016 around the theme of "water, peace and security". The latter explored issues such as the relationship between climate change and water scarcity and the management of transboundary waters.

Another format that enabled the UN Security Council to address climate change is the so-called Arria-formula meetings[8] – informal meetings of the members of the Security Council convened on the initiative of one or more of its. The discussion on "the security dimensions of climate change" held on 15 February 2013, as well as the discussion on "the role of climate change as a threat multiplier for global security" held on 30 June 2015, are some examples of meetings in this format.

A key milestone in climate change discussion globally was the Fifth Assessment Report issued in 2014 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations body for assessing the science related to climate change. The report draws attention to climate-security links and states: "Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplifying

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6   Cf. United Nations, General Assembly, Climate change and its possible security implications, Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/350, 11 September 2009, pp. 5-8, at: https://www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/543e73f69/climate-change-its-possible-security-implications-report-secretary-general.html.

7   United Nations, Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2011/15, 20 July 2011, at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CC%20SPRST%202011%205.pdf.

8   Cf. Security Council Report, Arria-Formula Meetings, UN Security Council Working Methods, 17 October 2019, at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/arria-formula-meetings.php.

well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks […].”[9]

2015 was an important year for climate change. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030[10] that was adopted by all UN member states in March 2015 acknowledges the close link between climate change, disasters, and sustainable development, and points to the need for a collaborative governance approach on climate change adaptation and disaster risk mitigation for reducing disaster losses across institutions at all levels. This was followed by the adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing of Development[11] in July 2015. From seven action areas, four make explicit reference to climate change, and mostly alongside disaster resilience. These are the action areas for domestic public resources, international development co-operation, addressing systemic issues, and science, technology, innovation, and capacity-building. In September 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was adopted by Heads of State and Government at a special UN summit. It defines climate change as one of the greatest challenges of our time and emphasizes that the adverse impacts of climate change undermine the ability of all countries to achieve sustainable development. Combatting climate change is at the core of the 2030 Agenda, cutting across all of its five pillars. Through the SDG 13, the UN member states expressed their determination to take urgent action on climate change. Finally, in December 2015 the landmark Paris Agreement[12] on climate change was adopted. It represents the first agreement that brought 197 parties together for a common cause, to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects. Its central aim is to keep the increase in the global average temperature in this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Additionally, it aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change, primarily through financial support, co-operation, technology transfer, and capacity building. The Paris Agreement, through its Article 4, paragraph 2, requires each party "to prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that it intends to achieve" and "to pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions".[13]

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9   IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team/Rajenda K. Pachauri/Leo A. Meyer (eds.)], Geneva 2014, p. 16, at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf.

10   United Nations, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, at: https://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf.

11   United Nations, Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, New York 2015, at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2051AAAA_Outcome.pdf.

12   United Nations, Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf.

13   Ibid., p. 4.

Since early 2017, there has been an increased momentum in the Security Council's consideration of climate change-related security issues. On 31 March 2017, the Security Council took a major step by adopting Resolution 2349 on the conflict in the Lake Chad basin region, which recognizes "the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity [...]".[14] Subsequently, the outcomes of discussions on several other African issues have incorporated language on climate change, largely drawn from resolution 2349, such as the UN Security Council Resolution 2408 on Somalia.[15]

In 2017, there were also two Arria-formula meetings, one on "Security implications of climate change: sea level rise" on 10 April 2017, and another on 15 December 2017 on "Preparing for security implications of rising temperatures", in which many countries underlined the need for a clear and strong role for the UN Security Council.

This was followed by the third formal UN Security Council debate that took place on 11 July 2018 on "Understanding and addressing climate-related security risks". The debate considered several concrete proposals, including the further recognition of the effects of climate change on global security, the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Climate and Security, and the establishment of an institutional home for climate security within the United Nations system as a hub for knowledge and practices. The need for improved climate-related security risk assessments and management strategies was emphasized, along with the need to facilitate increased regional, subregional, and cross-border co-operation on climate-related security risks.[16]

The efforts to elevate the climate security debate in the UN system continued to gain momentum in the rest of 2018.

In August 2018, Germany, together with Nauru, launched of a Group of Friends of Climate and Security to co-operate in developing solutions for the impact of climate change on security policy, raise public awareness, and boost the involvement of the United Nations in this area.

In November 2018, the UN established the Climate Security Mechanism as a pilot co-ordination mechanism for climate and security. This interagency initiative of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Environment Programme (UNEP) is tasked to provide integrated climate risk assessments to the Security

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14 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2349 (2017), Adopted by the Security Council at its 7911th meeting, on 31 March 2017, S/RES/2349 (2017), 31 March 2017, para. 26, available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/863830.

15 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2408 (2018), Adopted by the Security Council at its 8215th meeting, on 27 March 2018, S/RES/2408 (2018), 27 March 2018, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1479010.

16 Cf. United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 30 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2018/749, 31 July 2018, Annex, at: https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2018/749.

Council and other UN bodies.[17] An independent Expert Working Group supports this mechanism. Hosted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks aims to reinforce climate risk informed decision-making and produce timely climate security assessments.[18]

The release of the special IPCC report on "Global Warming of 1.5°C" in October 2018 was a turning point, as it brought alarming evidence that climate change is happening much faster than predicted and that climate-related risks to human security, along with water supply, health, economic growth, livelihoods, and food, are projected to increase with global warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius and increase further with 2 degrees Celsius.[19] Its call for "rapid and far-reaching" transitions was reflected in the international debate on climate change and security too.

Against this background, the UN Security Council held its fourth formal debate on 25 January 2019 around the theme of "addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security". The debate revealed that most countries consider climate change a serious challenge to peace and security and would like the Security Council to address these security-related impacts, complementing the responsibility of other relevant UN bodies. The debate also featured some concrete policy recommendations, such as creating institutional mechanisms and tools for a better and more systematic understanding of how climate change and disasters impact peace and security; better early warning capabilities and early action enabled by integrated risk assessments and risk management strategies at the level of national governments, regional organizations and United nations regional offices; better integration of climate-related factors into the mandates and capabilities of UN field missions; and the need for supporting developing countries in financing, capacity-building and technology transfers.[20]

17　Dan Smith, Malin Mobjörk, Florian Krampe, Karolina Eklöw, Climate Security: Making it #Doable, Clingendael Report, February 2019, p.15, at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/Climate_Security_Makingit%23doable_0.pdf.

18　Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks, available at: https://www.sipri.org/research/peace-and-development/climate-change-and-risk/expert-working-group-climate-related-security-risks.

19　Cf. IPCC, Summary for Policy Makers, *Global Warming of 1.5°C*. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Valérie Masson-Delmotte/Panmao Zhai/Hans-Otto Pörtner/Debra C. Roberts/James Skea, Priyadarshi R. Shukla/Anna Pirani/Wilfran Moufouma-Okia/Clotilde Péan/Roz Pidcock/Sarah Connors/J.B. Robin Matthews/Yang Chen/Xiao Zhou/Melissa I. Gomis/Elisabeth Lonnoy/Tom Maycock/Melinda Tignor/Tim Waterfield (eds.)], Geneva 2018, at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/ SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf.

20　Cf. United Nations, Security Council, Letter dated 4 February 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2019/113, 7 February 2019, Annex, pp. 7-8, at:

Parallel to these global debates, there is also significant attention paid to the topic at regional level in a number of international organizations, including the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Since 2008, the EU has been at the forefront of the efforts to draw attention to the security implications of climate change. The conclusions on climate diplomacy issued by the Council of the European Union in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2018, and 2019 reiterate that climate change has serious implications for peace and security across the globe, and underline the importance of cross-border co-operation.

In the case of the AU, most recently on 6 August 2019, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the Union convened on the theme of "Natural and Other Disasters on the Continent: Beyond the Normative Frameworks". In its press statement, the Council "stressed that natural disasters and climate change contribute to exacerbating the existing tensions among communities, threaten the availability and access to vital resources and, disproportionately, affected the most vulnerable" and "emphasized the need for Member States to reinforce measures to address effects of climate change, environmental degradation and natural disasters, particularly in conflict-affected areas."[21]

In the ASEAN, on the other hand, climate-related security risks are predominately framed using a human security approach, specifically stressing developmental and livelihood challenges.[22]

There are also other initiatives, such as the Brussels Dialogue on Climate Diplomacy (BDCD), which is an informal network for the exchange of information and promotion of co-operation among European institutions, international organizations, think tanks and NGOs active in the nexus between climate change and security[23]. The OSCE has been one of the members of this network since its establishment in 2016, along with other international and regional organizations, including the UN, EU, and NATO.

Climate Change in the OSCE Context

As the world's largest regional security organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OSCE is paying ever more attention to the link between the

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https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E 4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_113.pdf.

21   African Union, Peace and Security Council, 864th Meeting, Press Statement, PSC/PR/BR.(DCCCLXIV), Addis Ababa, 6 August 2019, pp. 1-2, at: http://www. peaceau.org/uploads/psc-864-press-statement-natural-disasters-eng.pdf.

22   Florian Krampe/Roberta Scassa/Giovanni Mitrotta, Responses to Climate-Related Security Risks: Regional Organizations in Asia and Africa, *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security* 2/2018, August 2018, p. 3 available at: https://www.sipri.org/publications/2018/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/responses-climate-related-security-risks-regional-organizations-asia-and-africa.

23   Brussels Dialogue on Climate Diplomacy, at https://www.brusselsdialogue.net/

environment and security in its comprehensive approach to security. The Organization capitalizes on environmental co-operation as a tool for good neighbourly relations, strengthening trust and building confidence. It is also working towards tackling environmental challenges that could become potential sources of tension or conflict. Climate change is addressed by the OSCE primarily within the context of its environmental activities. The issue came onto the Organization's agenda in 2007, at the same time as the UN Security Council started debating the security implications of climate change, and has been addressed since then in various ways. The OSCE's different levels of engagement in this field can be clustered into three groups. The OSCE:

- facilitates and reinforces high-level political commitment on a wide range of issues that are influenced by climate change;
- provides a platform for raising awareness and enabling a dialogue on climate change and security at the political level;
- implements activities to assess and address potential security risks stemming from climate change.

The OSCE as a Catalyst for High-Level Political Commitment on Issues Related to Climate Change

The OSCE has the capacity and the tools to address issues related to climate change, particularly in a cross-border context. Although the climate change-security nexus is not yet a mainstream issue on the OSCE's security agenda, the Organization has covered a lot of ground in the field of climate change as part of its comprehensive approach to security.

Against this background, below is a summary of the OSCE's political commitments that are directly or indirectly related to climate change.

Already in 1975, the Helsinki Final Act, the founding document of the OSCE, identified climate change as a field of co-operation among the participating States within the framework of the *Fundamental research, monitoring, forecasting and assessment of environmental changes.*[24]

The 1997 OSCE Permanent Council Decision No.194 established the position of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities who, among other things, should draw on the expertise of relevant international and regional organizations, institutions, and initiatives active in the economic and environmental fields "in working to assess potential security risks stemming, wholly or in part, from economic, social and environmental factors".[25]

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24   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) : Final Act of Helsinki, 1 August 1975, p.29, available at: https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act.

25   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Council, Decision No. 194, Mandate for a Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, PC.DEC/194, 5 November 1997, available at: https://www.osce.org/pc/40173.

Climate change, as a long-term global environmental challenge with severe social implications and high economic costs, constitutes one of these factors.

The 2003 OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension (Maastricht Strategy) calls for the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) to contribute to the OSCE activities in the field of early warning and conflict prevention by monitoring economic and environmental challenges, as well as threats to security and stability in the OSCE region. It also makes a specific reference to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the context of international environmental legal instruments and commits to supporting the full implementation of these instruments by states that are parties to them.[26]

The 2007 Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security recognizes that "climate change is a long-term challenge" and acknowledges that "the United Nations climate process is the appropriate forum for negotiating future global action on climate change, and the OSCE, as a regional security organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, has a complementary role to play within its mandate in addressing this challenge in its specific region".[27] Among its conclusions, it states: "Environmental degradation, including both natural and man-made disasters, and their possible impact on migratory pressures, could be a potential additional contributor to conflict. Climate change may magnify these environmental challenges."[28] Furthermore, it emphasizes the role of the OSCE to "raise awareness on the potential impact on security of environmental challenges, by using its forum for dialogue and exchange of experiences and best practices and also by integrating these considerations into its activities".[29]

In 2009, the challenge of climate change was elaborated in the context of migration. The 2009 Athens Ministerial Council Decision on Migration Management tasks the OSCE with contributing "to international efforts to assess the possible impact of environmental degradation on migratory pressures, which climate change may magnify, in order to ensure better preparedness in this area".[30]

From the energy perspective, the 2009 Athens Ministerial Council Decision on Strengthening Dialogue and Co-operation on Energy Security in the

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26   Cf. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Maastricht 2003, OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension, MC(11).JOUR/2, 2 December 2003, Annex 1, pp. 9-10, available at: https://www.osce.org/eea/20705.

27   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Madrid 2007, Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security, MC.DC//4/07, 30 November 2007, p. 1, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/29550.

28   Ibid., p. 2.

29   Ibid.

30   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Athens 2009, Decision No. 5/09, Migration Management, MC.Dec/5/09, 2 December 2009, p. 3, available at: https://www.osce.org/cio/40711.

OSCE Area underlines that "the interrelated challenges of climate change, energy security and efficient use of energy resources are amongst the most important issues to be tackled in the strategic perspective of ensuring sustainable development" and "encourages the participating States, with a view to addressing energy challenges in the OSCE region, to promote awareness of the G8 St. Petersburg principles and objectives on strengthening global energy security", including in "addressing climate change and sustainable development".[31] Furthermore, the 2013 Kyiv Ministerial Council Decision on Improving the Environmental Footprint of Energy-Related Activities in the OSCE Region recognizes that "a responsible and sustainable management of natural and energy resources can improve the environment, curb climate change, boost economic growth and contribute to security and stability".[32]

The 2014 Basel Ministerial Council Decision on Enhancing Disaster Risk Reduction links disaster and climate change. Through this decision, the OSCE participating States take note of "the exacerbating effect climate change may have on the frequency and magnitude of disasters, and therefore the importance of climate change mitigation and adaptation to effectively reducing disaster risk". Furthermore, it encourages participating States "to develop, co-ordinate and implement, where appropriate, disaster risk reduction measures with climate change adaptation and mitigation plans at all appropriate levels".[33]

The OSCE as a Platform for Raising Awareness and Enabling a Dialogue at the Political Level on Climate Change and Security

To bring climate change and security issues to the attention of high-level policy-makers, the OSCE uses its platforms such as the Ministerial Council, Permanent Council, Economic and Environmental Committee, annual Economic and Environmental Forums, its co-operation mechanisms with its Mediterranean and Asian Partners, and the Parliamentary Assembly. The OSCE Security Days organized regularly by the OSCE Secretary General also provide an open and interactive platform for debate. They identify emerging trends and priorities for action for select security issues, including climate change. All these opportunities help national security authorities in the OSCE

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31 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Athens 2009, Decision No. 6/09, Strengthening Dialogue and Co-Operation on Energy Security in the OSCE Area, MC.Dec/6/09, 2 December 2009, p. 2, available at: https://www.osce.org/cio/40708.

32 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Kyiv 2013, Decision No. 5/13, Improving the Environmental Footprint of Energy-Related Activities in the OSCE Region, MC.Dec/5/13, 6 December 2013, p. 1, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/109342.

33 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Basel 2014, Decision No. 6/14, Enhancing Disaster Risk Reduction, MC.DEC/6/14, 5 December 2014, pp. 1, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/130406.

participating States and Partners for Co-operation to focus on the security benefits of ambitious and co-operative climate action, as foreseen by the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In 2009, the OSCE contributed to the afore-mentioned UN Secretary General's report entitled "Climate change and its possible security implications". This was followed by the organization of an OSCE Chairmanship conference on the security implications of climate change in the OSCE region in Bucharest on 5-6 October 2009. The conference highlighted the potential threats and impact of climate change across the OSCE region and discussed ways to enhance dialogue and co-operation on the security-related aspects of climate change.

Climate change and its impact on security also constituted an important part of the deliberations within the OSCE's annual Economic and Environmental Forums. Since 2007, these Forums have addressed issues such as environment and security, migration, energy, disaster risk reduction, water governance, and green economy, and also incorporated extensive discussion on climate change.

Since 2014, the link between "climate change and security" has also been examined in the context of the OSCE Security Days[34] dedicated to water diplomacy (2014), climate change and security (2015), migration (2016), and sustainable cities (2017). The Security Days on "The OSCE and the Sustainable Development Goals" that took place on 4 June 2019 extensively discussed the interactions between climate change and sustainable development, particularly in relation to SDG 13 on Climate Action, and in a broader context within the peace pillar of the 2030 Agenda. The discussion demonstrated the need for a greater sense of urgency in the implementation of the SDGs, particularly in relation to climate change and security, and the OSCE's catalyst role in supporting the work of its participating States in assessing and addressing the repercussions of climate change on security.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, including through its Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment, also pays particular attention to climate change.

The OSCE as a Facilitator for Assessing and Addressing Potential Security Risks Stemming from Climate Change

Between 2010 and 2013, the OSCE partnered with the European Environment Agency and Adelphi – a leading think tank on climate, environment, and de-

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34   Launched in 2012, OSCE Security Days gather prominent experts from government, think tanks and academic institutions, civil society, youth, and the media, to engage with each other and with the OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation in an informal and interactive discussion on 21st-century security threats and challenges.

velopment – and convened expert roundtables and scenario workshops to discuss how climate change will have an impact on security and stability in the OSCE region.

In 2013, the OSCE, together with its partners in the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC),[35] embarked on a multi-partner, multi-stakeholder and multi-year project to address climate change and security challenges in three regions, namely Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Funded by the European Union, through its Instrument for Stability (replaced in 2014 by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, IcSP), and the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the project's overarching goal was to support regional stability through transboundary co-operation on adaptation to the consequences of climate change. To achieve this goal, the project had two specific objectives: first, to enhance the understanding and awareness of climate change as a security challenge and the consequent need for regional and transboundary co-operation on adaptation in three regions; and second, to increase national and regional capacities to anticipate, prevent, and mitigate potential security risks resulting from climate change effectively and in a timely manner.

The OSCE led the implementation of this ambitious project between 2013 and 2017 in close collaboration with its partners in the ENVSEC Initiative, its Field Operations, and most importantly with its national counterparts, both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders at all stages of the project implementation.

The project was implemented in eleven countries: Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine in Eastern Europe; Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in the South Caucasus; and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia. The project included four related but distinct components. The first component aimed for a participatory assessment of security impacts of climate change in each region. The second concerned training key stakeholders on the links between climate change and security and good practices in climate change adaptation, including in a cross-border context. The third dealt with raising the awareness of decision-makers and other stakeholders including via wide dissemination of information generated through the project. The fourth component aimed to demonstrate the benefits of transboundary co-operation on climate change adaptation through a pilot initiative in the Dniester River Basin shared by Moldova and Ukraine. A brief overview of main results under each component is provided below.

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35   The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), founded in 2003, is a partnership of the OSCE, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UN Environment), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), and the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) to jointly provide an integrated response to environment and security challenges.

Component 1: Participatory Climate-Related Security Risk Assessments
Following a desk review of climate change/security issues for each region, national consultation workshops were organized in each of the eleven countries. These workshops brought together a wide spectrum of representatives from governmental agencies in charge of environment, water, energy, agriculture, tourism, health, industry, defence, and others along with civil society, academia, and business to discuss climate-security links from the perspective of different sectors and stakeholders, and map geographical hotspots where climate change and security converge.

The results of national consultations then fed into the regional consultations that convened governmental and non-governmental stakeholders from each of the countries in the respective regions. These regional consultations provided a platform to exchange views and information among the countries and to discuss climate security issues at a regional level. Most importantly, they identified and mapped transboundary hotspots and generated policy recommendations. The results of regional consultations were then compiled in the Regional Assessment Reports on Climate Change and Security.[36]

Overall, more than 550 national stakeholders participated in this assessment process in eleven countries in three regions, and 35 geographical hotspots were identified and prioritized for which policy recommendations were developed.

Component 2: Training and Capacity Building
Seventy-five participants from eleven countries received in-depth training on how to make use of the outcomes of the assessment reports in decision-making and planning processes.

Component 3: Awareness-raising and Information Dissemination
Regional public hearings were organized in each of the three regions to share the results of the regional assessments, and share good practices and lessons learnt from other regions. Furthermore, the regional assessment reports in English and Russian were disseminated widely.

Component 4: Transboundary Adaptation Strategy for the Dniester River Basin
This component built on the longstanding engagement of the OSCE and its partners in the Dniester River Basin. Since 2004, at the request of Moldova and Ukraine, the OSCE and the UNECE have facilitated transboundary cooperation in the basin. This includes a series of successive projects in the areas of flood management and adaptation to climate change, protection of biodiversity, transboundary monitoring, information and data sharing, and public awareness raising. As a result of this continued support, Moldova and Ukraine

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36   Regional assessment reports for each region are available at: https://www.osce.org/projects/climate-change-and-security.

signed the Dniester River Basin Treaty in November 2012. The Treaty significantly broadens the existing co-operation to cover the entire river basin and major sectors. Building on this strong basis of co-operation, this project supported the countries in the development of a transboundary adaptation strategy for the Dniester River Basin. This strategy was endorsed formally by the ministers of environment of both countries in 2015. It was then followed by the development of an Implementation Plan, which identified 25 groups of measures for implementing the adaptation strategy in the short, medium, and long term with a total budget of 235 million euros.

To date, the OSCE has continued its involvement in the Dniester River Basin through a project funded by Global Environment Facility (GEF) that started in 2017 in partnership with the UNECE and the UNDP. This project supports Moldova and Ukraine in implementing the bilateral Dniester Treaty, with a particular focus on the climate-related challenges and measures as identified within the framework of the above project.

New OSCE Initiatives on the Ground

A new project entitled "Strengthening Responses to Security Risks from Climate Change in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia" has recently been initiated. Through this project, the OSCE will support the identification and mapping of hotspots through participatory assessments in South Eastern Europe using the same participatory assessment methodology for Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. It will also replicate the Dniester example and support the development and implementation of climate change and security risk reduction measures in selected transboundary hotspots in all four regions. This project will have a greater focus on awareness-raising and capacity building through dedicated programmes for media, NGOs, and parliamentarians. Furthermore, in this new initiative, the OSCE intends to conduct a gendered analysis of climate change and security in the OSCE region.

The OSCE is also preparing for a new initiative for the Mediterranean region in partnership with the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and in close collaboration with the OSCE's Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. This joint OSCE-UfM initiative will enable the replication of the OSCE's good practices to address climate-related security challenges in the Mediterranean region making best use of the political platforms offered by the UfM and the OSCE.

Conclusion and the Way Forward

Today, the world is witnessing severe climate-induced disasters including floods, droughts, hurricanes, wildfires and heat waves that echoed the worrisome findings of the IPCC's Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius On the other hand, climate change has been high on the global political agenda. The Climate Action Summit and the SDG Summit in September 2019 offered the avenues to pledge for more. In 2020, many countries are expected to renew their commitment to implementing the Paris Agreement through hopefully more ambitious nationally determined contributions.

It is a good moment for the OSCE, especially in its second dimension, to take a closer look at its past experience and draw conclusions and lessons for possible future action, which could be summarized as follows:

- Adapting and mitigating the risks associated with climate change requires multilateral co-operation.
- Climate change co-operation and climate diplomacy can be good entry points for facilitating good neighbourly relations, strengthening trust, and building confidence.
- Addressing climate change at a regional level is critical as it links the efforts undertaken at the global and national levels.
- The complexity of climate-security challenges requires whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, as well as new management arrangements to balance the needs and interests of different sectors, primarily water, energy and agriculture. Regarding the latter, a nexus approach offers opportunities both within and across countries.
- The OSCE, together with its partners, has gained valuable experience in carrying out climate-related security risk assessments and developing and supporting transboundary adaptation measures, which can be further utilized for strengthening national capacities and designing and implementing regional responses.

The fast pace of environmental degradation, growing resource scarcity and the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters pose a major risk to security and stability globally, and also in the OSCE region. These compound risks are further aggravated by climate change. The increasingly pressing challenges that we are already witnessing today will not wait for us to take appropriate action. On the contrary, action is needed more than ever. Preventing and mitigating these challenges and risks requires collective action at all levels, and the OSCE, as a consensus-based organization, can be instrumental in providing the platform and the means to make this happen.

III.

Organizational Aspects

OSCE Institutions and Structures

Lamberto Zannier/Eleonora Lotti

Integration of Diverse Societies as a Tool for Conflict Prevention – The Experience of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities

An Evolving Geopolitical Landscape

The end of the Cold War profoundly affected the global security environment and fundamentally transformed the nature of conflict. Classic inter-state conflict has almost disappeared. Instead, we are now witnessing acute crises and hybrid conflicts characterized by internal strife, sometimes in the context of failed or dysfunctional states, or violent separatism, in some cases accompanied by quasi-military operations affecting the civilian population.

Meanwhile, societies have become more diverse. It appears increasingly difficult to achieve a balance between protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states on the one hand, and the right of peoples to self-determination, including minorities, on the other. This is especially true for those relatively young states that are still undergoing nation-building processes. They frequently face the challenge of reconciling ongoing efforts to unify and homogenize their often diverse societies – through language, education, historical narratives, and symbols – with the need to protect the multiple identities that have historically coexisted there. More recent waves of immigration have diversified the demographic composition of society, posing additional challenges. Against this backdrop, states often see the principle of fostering the progressive integration of societies in an inclusive manner through balanced policies as unrealistic. At the same time, minorities sometimes resist integration, demanding levels of protection that would effectively isolate them from the rest of the society of the country where they reside.

The re-emergence of nationalism, populism and identity politics all over Europe is detrimental to the goal of social integration with respect for diversity. At best, these phenomena tip the balance towards the assimilation of minority groups. In the worst case scenario, however, they create a situation in which minority rights and identities are seen as a disintegrating element and minorities are perceived as a security problem. At the same time, along with the increasing appearance of inflammatory language in mainstream political discourse, hate crimes and hate speech are on the rise. These dynamics can pave the way to further marginalization and, in some cases, radicalization and extremism.

In addition to these internal dynamics, we are witnessing the emergence of other, equally concerning, external dynamics. For example, the practice of politicizing minorities abroad, who are sometimes used by their so-called "kin-states" as proxies in local crises or conflicts, is on the rise. Domestically, this

erodes the possibility for mixed identities and slows down integration processes. Internationally, while a certain level of interest in one's ethnic "kin" may be considered legitimate to a certain extent, one state's efforts to support and protect minorities abroad can easily be understood as meddling in another's internal affairs, which can affect bilateral relations. The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), established at the CSCE Helsinki Summit in 1992, proposes a balanced approach to these challenges in *The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations*.[1]

These phenomena are increasingly demonstrating the centrality of the minority file to international peace and security. Indeed, today's crises in and around Europe often emerge over minority-related issues: legislation that is seen as infringing on rights, attempts by states to grant privileges and protection to minorities in other states, and questions related to language, education, citizenship, historical legacies. These are just a few thematic areas where the HCNM is regularly engaged. Furthermore, even where minority issues are not the main cause of conflict, how states choose to handle diversity can determine how strong and resilient societies are to internal or external threats. This is why the minority file – often associated with the human rights sphere – and its potential to ignite crises and conflict cannot be underestimated. This is also why the High Commissioner attaches huge importance to the management of diversity as a powerful conflict prevention strategy.

Modern Conflicts Require a Shift in the OSCE's Approach to Conflict Prevention

The changes outlined above – and the growing realization of the relevance of minority-related issues to international peace and security – force the OSCE, but also the multilateral system in general, to rethink the effectiveness of traditional conflict prevention methodology. Refocusing the states' efforts on policies aimed at increasing societies' resilience to conflict by stepping up the degree of their integration appears to be the key. With the re-emergence of nationalism and the return of geopolitics to the international agenda, inclusive platforms such as the OSCE can prove extremely useful for opening up a space for dialogue and joint efforts. However, higher levels of confrontation often lead to a total disregard for the tools of co-operative security and a refusal to engage in good-faith dialogue to try to solve problems that are becoming increasingly complex. The space allowed for efforts to find common ground between different parties has shrunk. States are increasingly urging the international community to take action against other states' policies that negatively

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1   OSCE HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations & Explanatory Note, June 2008, available at: https://www.osce.org/hcnm/bolzano-bozen-recommendations.

affect their communities residing there, while, in some cases, resisting requests to vet their own policies affecting internal minority groups.

It is exactly in this polarized environment that the HCNM can play a particularly relevant role. The HCNM has a two-fold mandate: first, to provide early warning and early action to prevent ethnic tensions from developing into conflict, and second, to assist the OSCE participating States in developing and implementing policies that facilitate the integration of diverse societies. At a time when the degree of diversity in our societies has dramatically increased, the promotion of policies that facilitate integration is one of the most effective tools for preventing conflicts.

This approach entails the use of a very broad set of policies and a strong focus on longer-term trends to address the root causes of possible future instability. Impartial good offices based on recognized international practices are essential to address misperceptions and, in some cases, to successfully correct perceived imbalances, through phased implementation, for example. This is where the HCNM's Recommendations and Guidelines have proven to be particularly useful tools.

While they do not represent a consensual set of principles agreed upon by the participating States, the HCNM's Recommendations and Guidelines draw their authority from the prestige of the office of the High Commissioner, the high quality of experts and contributing partners, and, most importantly, the personal accountability of the High Commissioner to the membership of the Organization. The existing set of Recommendations and Guidelines covers the most relevant and sensitive policy areas related to minority protection and the integration of diverse societies. These Recommendations and Guidelines range from the overall processes of integration (*The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies*[2]) or inter-State relations (*The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations*) to others which address more specific angles, such as education, language, participation, media, policing in minority areas, or access to justice. The office invests considerable resources to ensure that they remain relevant and up-to-date and, most importantly, that they are well known and used by governments and parliaments as guiding principles for all policies that have an impact on minorities and diverse societies in general. Efforts are made to ensure that the HCNM Recommendations and Guidelines are accessible and user-friendly, and they are often translated into many languages. They are also promoted locally through round tables and other events that target local officials. At the same time, emerging needs and new challenges in the geopolitical landscape may necessitate the conceptualization of new advice, which the office develops in the form of new Guidelines or Recommendations. Key anniversaries of older Guidelines or Recommendations are often used to revisit these documents and take stock of progress since their publication.

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2   OSCE HCNM, The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies, November 2012, available at: https://www.osce.org/hcnm/ljubljana-guidelines.

Focusing on Thematic Work to Depoliticize and Offer Solutions to Minority-related Issues

In 2019, on his travels to various regions of the OSCE area, the HCNM continued to observe tensions in a number of fields relevant to his mandate. These tensions warrant the further strengthening and promotion of the office's thematic toolbox as a depoliticized way to deal with sensitive issues.

Language and Education

Education is a key tool for preventing conflict but, if misguided, it can divide societies and provoke clashes and crises. This is a central consideration in a number of the HCNM's thematic Recommendations and Guidelines. *The Hague Recommendations regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities,*[3] *The Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities,*[4] and *The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations* place the question of minority education on the conflict prevention agenda. *The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies* also place the special role of education within integration policies in the context of cross-community dialogue and interaction.[5]

Over the years, the attention of successive High Commissioners has focused in particular on overcoming ethnicity-based segregation, which still persists in many contexts in which the High Commissioner operates, and on the language in which education is delivered. In this regard, in many of the places he visited in 2019, the High Commissioner called for approaches based on multilingual education as a way to achieve a balance between protecting minorities' mother tongues, and the need for fluency in the state language(s) to ensure minorities are fully engaged in public life and can realize their full potential in society, wherever they live.

In several multi-ethnic societies in the OSCE area, new trends towards more investment in teaching in the state language (which is undeniably important for integration) are creating tensions, as the reduced investment in multilingual education is perceived as undermining the identities of minority communities. These tensions are often fuelled or exploited by external players, who may use minorities as proxies in the wider geopolitical game. In particular, in 2019 the High Commissioner witnessed steps to accelerate the introduction of new legislation to strengthen the use of the state language by countries where

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3   OSCE HCNM, The Hague Recommendations regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities & Explanatory Note, October 1996, available at: https://www.osce.org/hcnm/hague-recommendations.

4   OSCE HCNM, The Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities & Explanatory Note, February 1998, available at: https://www.osce.org/hcnm/oslo-recommendations.

5   Cf. The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies, cited above (Note 2), p. 21.

minority languages had traditionally been given a stronger profile in the education system. In other places, he observed continued segregation in education based on ethnicity.

In addition to providing policy advice, the office also implements projects that provide concrete examples of multilingual and integrated education. For example, the multi-year *Central Asia Education Programme* supports multilingual and multicultural education in Central Asia and Mongolia, and aims at building expertise through teacher training, pilot multilingual education programmes, and exchanging experiences. In 2019, the High Commissioner signed a Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation in the field of multilingual education with the government of Tajikistan.[6] In the Western Balkans, the office of the HCNM, together with a number of partners, has promoted the creation and further development of the Bujanovac Department, a branch of the Subotica Faculty of Economics of the University of Novi Sad. This is the first truly multilingual and multi-ethnic higher-education institute in southern Serbia, where Albanian and Serbian students study together in a shared space. A number of bilingual dictionaries and other educational materials have also been published in several regions.

Participation

The effective participation and representation of persons belonging to national minorities in public life continues to be one of the main focuses of the work of the High Commissioner, as it is indicative of their level of inclusion and integration in society as a whole. The core message is that minority participation in decision-making is an asset that generates substantive gains, both for the minorities themselves and for the state. As such, minority participation is approached not only from a rights-based perspective, but also from that of conflict prevention. A meaningful level of representation and participation of minorities in all aspects of a country's public life, such as elected assemblies, executive structures, the public sector, the courts, and the civil service, is vital to foster loyalty to and trust in state institutions. This helps ensure ownership of decision-making processes by all members of society, which in turn positively affects social cohesion. A balanced approach to education and language in diverse societies is a prerequisite and starting point for ensuring the participation and representation of all members of society, taking into account their own specific identities. The participation of minorities in public life, as a vehicle to social cohesion, is indeed one of the end goals of the HCNM's policy advice in these specific fields too.

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6   Cf. OSCE, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities promotes multilingual education in Tajikistan, 24 June 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/hcnm/423926.

The principles above are articulated in the HCNM's *Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life*,[7] the 20th anniversary of which was celebrated on 14 November 2019 in Lund, Sweden. The event marking this anniversary addressed issues of political representation, as well as economic participation and cross-border co-operation, and offered a specific gender angle.

In 2019, the HCNM continued to support participating States by reviewing and advising on legislation and policies in a way that fosters the participation and representation of all social groups in the public life of a state. In this context, attention to the participation of (minority) women and youth was a priority. While women lag behind in terms of representation in most spheres of public life, in the case of minority women, gender intersects with other social categories of identity, such as ethnicity and language, often exposing them to two (or more) types of discrimination. Therefore, opportunities to voice their concerns were integrated into the High Commissioner's engagements, both with minorities and authorities, and related considerations were reflected in the HCNM's policy advice.

With regard to youth, the HCNM hosted a panel discussion on 19 July 2019 at the United Nations (UN) in New York, in co-operation with the UN and the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship. This built on the success of a similar event held in 2018. The event explored ways to strengthen the contribution of regional organizations to conflict prevention under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, with a focus on the role of youth in peace and security. In particular, participants were encouraged to reflect and exchange experiences on how integration policies in fields such as education, language and participation can foster the inclusion and empowerment of youth, so they can play a central role in conflict prevention efforts. In addition, with a view to encouraging the participation of national minorities in political life in Georgia, since 2014 the HCNM has been supporting a project to create opportunities for dialogue between political parties and minority representatives. One of the main project components was aimed at equipping minority youth with the skills required to get involved in politics through internships with political parties and capacity-building workshops. In 2019, two former minority youth HCNM-supported interns ran as candidates in the municipal by-elections for mayor of the city of Marneuli, home to a large ethnic Azeri community.

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7   OSCE HCNM, The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life & Explanatory Note, September 1999, available at: https://www.osce.org/hcnm/lund-recommendations.

*Th*e principles of participation also apply to the judiciary and law-enforcement agencies. The High Commissioner called for increased participation and representation of all ethnic groups in these key sectors in a number of places he visited in 2019.

As articulated in the *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies*,[8] when the police and the military are representative of the composition of society and are responsive to the wishes and concerns of all ethnic communities, they have the potential to promote stability within the state and increase its legitimacy in the eyes of society, including among minorities. A police service that is seen to incorporate sections of society that are otherwise excluded or marginalized will be more likely to secure the acceptance and co-operation of members of all communities, leading to sustainability. The presence of representatives of minority communities in these bodies also improves the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies, as it brings more operational information, increased sources for intelligence gathering, and additional language and cultural expertise. Both law enforcement agencies and minorities therefore have much to gain from working closely together.

The same notions apply to the judiciary. A lack of adequate representation of minority communities in the judiciary diminishes minorities' confidence in the justice system. The failure to adequately prosecute crimes that disproportionately affect minority communities, such as hate crimes committed against them by members of the majority, can also affect confidence, thereby also diminishing the deterrent effect of the system. In multi-ethnic societies, access to justice for national minorities should be promoted by the state through positive measures, such as ensuring that there are not disproportionate socio-economic barriers to accessing legal advice. These are some of the key elements of *The Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities*.[9]

In the course of 2019, one of the themes that emerged in certain contexts in relation to access to justice is the issue of language, and in particular minorities' inability to make formal use of documents and services in a language that they understand, even in cases where they speak a language that is recognized by law as an official language in that context. While reiterating the importance of fully mastering the state language for all social groups, the High Commissioner noted how, in these situations, a lack of multilingual personnel within the judiciary, shortcomings in translation, and inaccuracies in the translated versions of the laws can be detrimental to the right of all to access justice. They can also impact the credibility of the justice system, and create an environment

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8   OSCE HCNM, Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies, February 2006, available at: https://www.osce.org/hcnm/policing-recommendations.

9   OSCE HCNM, The Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities & Explanatory Note, November 2017, available at: https://www.osce.org/hcnm/graz-recommendations.

of legal uncertainty, paving the way to further divisions within society. This is when access to justice, which is often addressed from a human rights perspective as part of efforts to promote states' compliance with their politically and legally binding human rights commitments, becomes part of conflict prevention work, and therefore relevant to the mandate of the High Commissioner.

The office held a number of events in 2019 on issues related to the rule of law and policing. In Pristina, the High Commissioner addressed a panel discussion on access to justice for non-majority communities, organized in the context of an EU-funded project on strengthening judicial and prosecutorial capacities. In Kazakhstan, he addressed a regional event on policing in multi-ethnic societies, targeting the police and organized in co-operation with the OSCE Transnational Threats Department (TNTD). In Georgia, the office contributed to a training module on hate crime, organized by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and targeting the police and officials of the Ministry of the Interior.

Historical Narratives and Legacies

Another recurring issue that the High Commissioner observed in the OSCE region is the damaging impact of competing and confrontational historical narratives on inter-ethnic relations. The way people understand, remember, and value history is an important factor affecting the self-image and personal identity of a community. When remembering the past, people have a tendency to glorify and commemorate their achievements, victories, and sufferings, while glossing over the darker chapters concerning the tragedies and suffering their people may have inflicted on others. As a result, different groups often attribute different meanings to the same events. Variations in the way people see and remember history can divide societies, even along ethnic lines, for decades or even centuries after the events have occurred. This is what Joke van der Leeuw-Roord refers to as the "mirror of pride and pain"[10], where the pride of one group corresponds to the pain of the other.

The state has an important role to play in addressing these issues. While it is up to the central or local authorities to decide whether to permit or ban commemorations, to erect or remove statues, to name or rename public spaces, and to organize how history is taught and learned in schools, these political choices may provoke strong reactions from within a society and can sometimes fuel tension and trigger conflict. With strong trends towards identity politics emerging as a result of the increasing diversity of our societies, governments need to be all the more aware that if they impose singular historical narratives and prohibit alternative interpretations in "memory laws", they draw a line in

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10   Cf. Joke van der Leeuw-Roord, A Textbook for Europe: Could the "History of Europe" Avoid the Traditional European Mirror of Pride and Pain? Internationale Schulbuchforschung, Vol. 18, No. 1, Europa/Europe (1996), pp. 85-95, at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43057019?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

the sand that could continue to divide societies for generations to come. Differences in historical interpretations and commemoration practices can have a negative effect on bilateral relations between states, which in turn fuel instability and conflict. Governments should instead strive to create conditions for a tolerant, inclusive debate on historical memory with respect for human rights.

In 2019, the High Commissioner continued to deepen the office's understanding of these dynamics by engaging with a number of partners working in this field. For example, in March, he was invited to Oxford, United Kingdom, to address a task force meeting of the *Contested Histories in Public Spaces* project, implemented by the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation and the Salzburg Global Seminar. During his visit to the United States in July 2019, he met with the New York City Commission on City Art, Monuments, and Markers and had a chance to hear their proposed recommendations on how to deal with controversial monuments in a way that reflects and respects all existing historical narratives constructively. According to this principle, in many relevant contexts, the High Commissioner pointed to the value of addressing multiperspectivity in history constructively.

Media

In 2019, the HCNM, in co-operation with the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, launched the most recent addition to its set of thematic Guidelines and Recommendations: *The Tallinn Guidelines on National Minorities and the Media in the Digital Age*.[11] Estonia's President Kersti Kaljulaid also participated in the event held in the capital Tallinn.

Named after the city, which is a pioneer in the use and promotion of digital technologies, the *Tallinn Guidelines* emanated from the observation that the fundamental transformations in the media landscape during the past decade have multiplied opportunities to access an abundance of diverse content, as well as tools for individualized and interactive participation in public debate. The media's ability to disseminate information and to reach and connect people has been exponentially amplified. So too has its potential to defuse or, alternatively, ignite conflict.

This is particularly relevant for diverse societies. In societies where minorities and majorities live side by side, the media can offer all groups enhanced opportunities to shape their own identities and explore different viewpoints. As the media increasingly transcends borders, minorities can easily form transnational networks, which in turn can play a key role in supporting the preservation of cultures and traditions. Regrettably, however, the media also carries risks for peace and stability. Transnational networks involving mi-

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11   OSCE HCNM, The Tallinn Guidelines on National Minorities and the Media in the Digital Age & Explanatory Note, February 2019, available at: https://www.osce.org/hcnm/tallinn-guidelines.

norities spread across various states have the potential to interfere in, and possibly damage, bilateral relations. New media carries the risk of political manipulation, and minorities can be instrumentalized. A rise in inflammatory language in global political discourse has led to the spread of xenophobic and racist language.

The *Tallinn Guidelines* appeal to the responsibility and the interest of states to ensure that the media and the opportunities it offers are used in a way that minimizes these risks, and instead, catalyses the integration of diverse societies. Crystallized in 37 concrete recommendations, the proposed recipe is a mix of multilingualism reflecting the linguistic diversity in society; the participation of various groups, including minorities, in media content production and delivery; and restraint by states in their interference in other countries' affairs.

On most of his visits to countries in the OSCE region, the High Commissioner engaged with media outlets and stressed the importance of including minority representatives in the media, providing a wide range of information, featuring topics of interest and relevance to minorities, and conveying content in minority language(s).

Conclusion

As minorities become an increasingly important pawn in the geopolitical game, a set of basic principles and rules applied equally to all can serve as a valuable tool to prevent crises and reduce tensions. However, the work of the High Commissioner does not take place in a political vacuum and relies upon the continuous support of the participating States. In that sense, the HCNM's Recommendations and Guidelines are only effective tools for conflict prevention if they are integrated in the policies of participating States and operationalized accordingly. Regrettably, however, the geopolitical climate is far from conducive. Insufficient investment in co-operative platforms by the international community only reinforces the current geopolitical polarization and weakens existing tools for common reflection, dialogue, and concerted preventive action.

The High Commissioner's main working method of quiet diplomacy may therefore have to be complemented by new tools. New horizons need to be explored, and new partnerships created. Quiet diplomacy must be accompanied by high-profile initiatives aimed at better informing governments and the public about the key Recommendations and Guidelines and suggested policies, and promoting their implementation. There is also a need to forge and strengthen coalitions with other international players, including the United Nations, regional organizations and arrangements operating under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, as well as with civil society. The stronger engagement of women and youth should be actively promoted. This is the direction that the High

Commissioner intends to follow in the time to come. Sharing tried and tested tools that have proven to be effective in many contexts as widely as possible is one of the HCNM's key contributions to the longer-term sustainable development agenda.

External Relations and Influence

Loïc Simonet

Twenty Years after the Istanbul Platform for Co-operative Security: How Can the OSCE's Contribution to "Effective Multilateralism" Be Strengthened through Co-operation with Other International and Regional Organizations?

One vital element of international co-operation is the mutual reinforcement of the joint efforts of international and regional organizations, and of collaboration between the United Nations and regional arrangements. The Platform for Co-operative Security was attached to the Charter for European Security as an operational document. The Charter was adopted at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul on 19 November 1999, reaffirming and strengthening the OSCE's role as an inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making, and co-operation in the region.[1] It was designed as the conceptual and practical foundation for the OSCE's interaction with other security organizations and institutions operating in the Euro-Atlantic/Eurasian area, and as a tool for advancing political and operational coherence among them.

The Platform advocates strengthening "the mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between those organizations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area",[2] in order to "mak[e] better use of the resources of the international community"[3] and avoid duplication of effort. For Sandra Sacchetti, political and operational "coherence" in the Platform is key.[4]

While identifying a set of basic principles on which the OSCE could work co-operatively with other organizations and institutions, the Platform also outlines practical modalities of co-operation, for example, in the field, and in responding to specific crisis situations.[5]

Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the OSCE and its participating States. The author warmly thanks Alice Nemcova, OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague, for her support and suggestions, and Michael Raith, Conflict Prevention Centre, for his review.

1   Cf. Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 1999, in: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Istanbul Summit 1999, Istanbul Document 1999, Istanbul 1999, January 2000/Corr., pp. 1-45, para. 7, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/39569. William H. Hill recalls the premises and challenges of the Charter, cf. William H. Hill, No Place for Russia: European Security Institutions Since 1989, New York 2018, pp. 153-157.

2   Operational Document – the Platform for Co-operative Security, in: Charter for European Security, cited above (Note 1), p. 43-45, here: p. 43.

3   Charter for European Security, cited above (Note 1), para. 1.

4   Cf. Sandra Sacchetti, The OSCE's Platform for Co-operative Security: An Opportunity for Multilateral Coherence, Security and Human Rights 1/2014, pp. 119-129.

5   The Platform did not cover the OSCE's relations with organizations operating outside of its area. This gap had to be filled in the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and

In parallel, the Charter for European Security offers the OSCE, "when appropriate, as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster co-operation, through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particular strengths", and as "a forum for subregional co-operation".[6] This acknowledges the growing importance of subregional co-operation as an element to enhance security across the OSCE area, and as a catalyst for integrating countries into broader structures.

Underlying the Platform is the fundamental consideration that no one organization alone can effectively address the multi-faceted challenges to security that have arisen since the beginning of the 21st century. In addition to fostering the emergence of a real culture of co-operation, the 1999 document was also intended to contribute to the creation of a common security space for Europe, based on a comprehensive, indivisible and co-operative notion of security, and free of dividing lines.

Twenty years after its adoption, the Platform's record is undoubtedly mixed. Its political context was soon overtaken by evolving reality. In particular, its fundamental objective to support the OSCE's role in peacekeeping, conceptualized seven years before at the Helsinki Summit,[7] was never translated into operational arrangements since it became clear, in the mid-2000s, that the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo would remain historical, specific, unique, and pioneering cases, unlikely to recur. Similarly, the Platform's vision of the OSCE as a "key instrument" has proven to be a myth. The context of the early 1990s, which had raised the hope of a "triumph of multilateralism", was soon replaced by a more competitive, indeed at times confrontational co-existence between security actors in the Euro-Atlantic/Eurasian region. The 1999 Istanbul Summit may well be seen as the OSCE's "apogee", to take William H. Hill's words,[8] but Sandra Sacchetti is right when she explains that, at the beginning of the 2000s, the OSCE would

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Stability in the Twenty-First Century, adopted at the OSCE Maastricht Ministerial Council in 2003, which invites the OSCE to develop further contacts with regional organizations beyond the OSCE area when addressing threats emanating from "adjacent regions", cf. OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, para. 23, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/17504. Even before, the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism had already made reference to the need to broaden dialogue with partners outside the OSCE area, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, then: the Organisation of the Islamic Conference), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the African Union (AU), cf. The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, para. 28, MC(9).DEC/1, 4 December 2001, Annex, available at: https://www.osce.org/atu/42524.

6   Charter for European Security, cited above (Note 1), paras 12 and 13.
7   "Peacekeeping constitutes an important operational element of the overall capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management [...]", CSCE Conference for [sic!] Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992 Summit, Helsinki, 9-10 July 1992, CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, The Challenges of Change, Helsinki Decisions, Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management (Including Fact-Finding and Rapporteur Missions and CSCE Peacekeeping), Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, para. 17, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/39530.
8   Hill, cited above (Note 1), p. 157.

not be given primary responsibility for security on the European continent, and was even starting to be pushed into a "peripheral position". As a result, the OSCE "could not credibly establish itself as a hub for strategic discussions between international, regional and subregional organizations".[9] While some international organizations such as the European Union (EU), NATO, and the Council of Europe (CoE) have often agreed to act "with" the OSCE, they have shown reluctance, despite some exceptions, to work "through" the OSCE and to be co-ordinated by it, even flexibly.

The extensive web of partnerships and vibrant relations that the OSCE has set up with various international and regional organizations since its inception has developed independently from the Platform for Co-operative Security. The OSCE's partner organizations have rarely referred to it, even the EU, whose member states introduced the document and have done much to further its adoption.

All in all, the Platform for Co-operative Security may well have remained "an abstract concept, the result of a diplomatic mind game far removed from the operational requirements of international organizations".[10] But let us play the devil's advocate.

The adoption of the Platform put a political "varnish" on a practice which, until 1999, had mainly been driven by the field and the post-Cold War adjustments in the Eurasian region. Formally, it gave a mandate to the OSCE to develop co-operation with other international organizations in a more coherent and institutional way. It allowed the Secretariat to function and structure itself to this end.[11]

The 20th anniversary of the Platform for Co-operative Security coincides with an intense debate over effective multilateralism, one of the priorities of the 2019 Slovak Chairmanship of the OSCE. Multilateral co-operation has lost

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9   Sandra Sacchetti, cited above (Note 4), p. 126.
10   Ibid., p. 125.
11   In 2000, the OSCE Permanent Council "place[d] the External Co-operation Section under the direct supervision of the Secretary General" and stated that: "Together with other Sections within the Secretariat it will be responsible for the implementation of the modalities of co-operation in accordance with part II of the Operational Document of the Charter for European Security" (meaning the Platform), Organization for a Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Council, Decision No. 364, Strengthening the OSCE Operational Capacities (REACT, Operation Centre, Restructuring of the OSCE Secretariat), PC.DEC/364, 29 June 2000, p. 3. In 2002, the Porto Ministerial Council mandated the OSCE Chairmanship with the overall responsibility "for the external representation of the OSCE" and further stipulated that "especially in order to ensure effective and continuous working contacts with other international organizations and institutions" the Chairmanship shall "be assisted by the Secretary General, to whom representational tasks are delegated as appropriate". Decision No. 8, Role of the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office, MC(10).DEC/8, in: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Tenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 6 and 7 December 2002, Porto, 7 December 2002, pp. 48-50, here: p. 49. The Sofia Ministerial Council Decision No. 15/04 confirmed the role of the Secretary General as the representative of the Chairperson-in-Office, including by "ensuring the effective and continuous working contacts with other international organizations and institutions". Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Sofia 2004, Decision No. 15/04, Role of the OSCE Secretary General, MC.DEC/15/04, 7 December 2004, p. 1.

the power of attraction that it once had, with its key institutions being questioned and at risk of being weakened.[12] In this context, this commemoration presents a good opportunity to explore how the OSCE and the other institutional actors with which it co-operates could better promote shared values and common interests, maximize their complementarity, effectiveness, and added value in tackling global challenges, respond more quickly in concert at the outset of a crisis, and learn from each other. Ultimately, it also presents an opportunity to examine how this co-operation could enhance the OSCE's effectiveness, since mutually reinforcing co-operation and regular institutional links, both in the field and in the headquarters, contribute to a strengthened OSCE.

"Positive Overlap" Rather than a Strict Division of Labour

The notion of "effective multilateralism" has often been linked to a clear division of labour and ownership of functionally and geographically defined areas of responsibility, each organization playing to its strengths and comparative advantages. In line with this logic, NATO would be responsible for the military security of its members; the EU dealing with the social and economic agenda of Western Europe and neighbouring countries; the OSCE responsible for dialogue on comprehensive security, the guardian of important treaties and documents in the field of arms control and confidence-building measures, and a well-tested forum for discussion on these matters; and the CoE setting standards of democratic behaviour and monitoring their implementation. Such a clearly defined division of labour was implemented in the context of the agreements which ended hostilities in South-Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s, for instance the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) with the EU being responsible for the "political track", NATO for the "security track", and the OSCE for the "police development track". The CoE demonstrated the highest degree of "obsession" with defining its particular sphere of action and the division of responsibilities between the main European organizations, as well as building a specific *modus operandi* with organizations working to promote democratic principles.[13]

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12 Cf. G. John Ikenberry, The Future of Multilateralism: Governing the World in a Post-Hegemonic Era, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 3/2015, pp. 399-413, at: https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/the_future_of_multilateralism-august_2015.pdf; Julia C. Morse/Robert O. Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, The Review of International Organizations, 4/2014, pp. 385–412, also at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267761740_Contested_Multilateralism; Elena Lazarou, The future of multilateralism: Crisis or opportunity? European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing, May 2017, PE 603.922, also at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/603922/EPRS_BRI(2017)603922_EN.pdf.

13 Cf. Common Catalogue of Co-operation Modalities between the Council of Europe and the OSCE, 12 April 2000, available at: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/7/30/99ef6a46-9489-4cf8-97a7-d0d806e4d929/publishable_en.pdf. This document was signed by the Secretary General of the CoE and his OSCE counterpart and circulated under

Of course, co-operation is easier if the mandates of the international organizations are clear, as often advocated by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC).[14] In some cases, there is no contest when it comes to effectively sharing the burden, for instance between the OSCE and the EU on election monitoring.[15] What the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions calls the "niche strategy" – more focused functions and activities on the basis of the strategic needs emerging with respect to the maintenance of peace and international stability[16] – might sometimes be relevant: Nobody would dispute the OSCE's recognized expertise on politico-military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). But, generally speaking, the vision of a strict division of labour is unsustainable, and has been irreversibly obviated by new arising threats, the changes in the global order, and the geographical and thematic expansion of international organizations' competencies "out of area", taking on new functions in the field of security and undergoing functional de-specialization/generalization. Even NATO has started to devote reflexion and brain-storming to "human security", a concept which includes women, peace and security, child protection, and the responsibility to protect. And what about new avenues for co-operation which are transversal by nature (climate change, UN Sustainable Development Goals, resilience and early recovery from crisis, building connectivity, artificial intelligence)? Which international actor could be in the position to claim ownership of these?

Therefore, we believe that the cross-dimensional nature of co-operation between international organizations should be preserved and developed. A certain degree of "positive overlap" may not be a bad thing *per se*, as this can help partners to mutually reinforce their activities and their impact.

Improving the OSCE's Ability to Work with Others on the Conflict Cycle

Defusing tensions and preventing conflicts, actively contributing to the peaceful settlement of disputes, and building sustainable peace and security remain central tasks for the OSCE. Our Organization, as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and a primary organization

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SEC.GAL/30/00, 4 April 2000; cf. also Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1506 (2006), External relations of the Council of Europe, paras 11, 15.3, and 21.2, at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=17451&lang =en.

14 Cf. OSCE, The Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, Co-ordination and Co-operation among International Actors in Support of the Host Country, Food-for-Thought Paper, SEC.GAL/77/11, 28 April 2011, p. 3, available at: https://www.osce.org/cpc/77264.

15 The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in co-operation with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA), monitors the elections in the OSCE region; the EU does so in other parts of the world.

16 Cf. Teija Tiilikainen (ed.), Reviving Co-operative Security in Europe through the OSCE, Contribution of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions to the Panel of Eminent Persons, 2015, available at: https://www.osce.org/networks/188176, p. 13.

for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region,[17] is a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, and peacebuilding, as acknowledged by the 2011 MC Decision on "Elements of the Conflict Cycle".[18] The OSCE, over the past decade, has demonstrated its capacity to respond successfully to a crisis situation, prevent the spillover of tensions, and promote post-conflict rehabilitation in co-ordination with other players, as demonstrated by the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan[19] and the co-operation between the OSCE, the EU, and NATO in managing the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in the then FYROM. The joint contribution of the UN, the OSCE, and the EU in the Geneva International Discussions, set up straight after the armed hostilities between Georgia and the Russian Federation in 2008, also constitutes a unique international platform where three major international actors manage conflict resolution together.[20]

Paradoxically, with the notable exception of a structured working-level dialogue launched in March 2019 between the CPC and the Directorate Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP) of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the conflict cycle does not always appear to be the most common topic for day-to-day co-operation, probably due to its political sensitivity. The following ideas could be further explored or more systematically brought into practice.

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17   At the 1992 Helsinki Summit, the participating States declared the OSCE (then CSCE) to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, a status which had been granted by the UN General Assembly on 28 October 1992 (UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/10), cf. Helsinki Summit Declaration, in: CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, cited above (Note 7), para. 25. In 1993, the United Nations gave the CSCE observer status. In the 1999 Charter for European Security, participating States reaffirmed their full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and "the OSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and as a primary organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes within its region and as a key instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation", while recognizing "the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and its crucial role in contributing to security and stability in [the OSCE] region." Charter for European Security, cited above (Note 1), paras 7, 11.

18   Cf. Organization for a Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Vilnius 2011, Decision No. 3/11,Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE's Capabilities in Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, , MC.DEC/3/11, 7 December 2011, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/86621.

19   "In Kyrgyzstan this year we have shown what we can do together", Address by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at the opening of the Astana Summit Meeting, on 1 December 2010, SUM.DEL/74/10, 14 December 2010; cf. also case study on Kyrgyzstan (2010), in: United Nations Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy in Action, pp. 10-11, June 2018, at: https://dppa.un.org/en/united-nations-conflict-prevention-and-preventive-diplomacy-action, and OSCE Annual Report 2010, Vienna 2011, p. 112, at: https://www.osce.org/ secretariat/76315.

20   On the conflict in Georgia, and especially on the role of international actors, cf. Cécile Druey/ Eliane Fitzé (eds), The Caucasus Conflicts: Frozen and Shelved?, Politorbis, no. 60, 2/2015, especially pp. 49-73, at: https://www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/downloads/Articles/575f80b44f/caucasus-conflicts-frozen-shelved-15-politorbis-caucasus-swisspeace.pdf.

- *Developing joint training programmes* or at least improving the compatibility of training programmes. In 2001, the EU Commission suggested developing common modules/programmes with the OSCE for staff training for field operations, in relation to the OSCE system of Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT).[21] "We could consider joint training and education for our own staffs before we deploy them", NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen proposed again at his opening of the Annual Security Review Conference in 2011.[22] Pending the availability of funding, the OSCE could supervise "horizontal training" and joint table-top exercises to increase the operational coherence of various international organizations in response to crises. Institutions such as the OSCE Academy in Bishkek or the facilities of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UN DPPA) at the Turin System Staff College (UNSSC) for training in early warning and conflict prevention could be promoted. Protection of civilians could be seen as a topic for expertise and knowledge-sharing through training, in order to jointly define a role model and a protection checklist.
- *Mutual secondment:* In 2002, for instance, the European Communities assigned one senior and one junior police expert to the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, assisting in the long-term development of police reforms in accordance with the Ohrid Framework Agreement. One can only regret that, beyond the monitors seconded by OSCE participating States (including many EU member states), no international or regional partner organization has seconded a liaison officer or observer to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine.
- *Intensifying and continuously strengthening the sharing of early warning indicators and check lists for root causes of conflicts*, including the role of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as well as socio-economic factors; undertake periodic reviews, develop watch lists, and improve methodology for early warning; set-up a joint database to facilitate problem-solving in the field of conflict settlement activities, as suggested by the Russian Federation.[23]
- *Continuing and further developing co-ordination of policies at a country/region-specific level*, following the example of the annual consultation

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21 Cf. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, Brussels, 11. April 2001, COM(2001)211 final, p. 28. A Joint Pilot Workshop on Human Rights Training for Field Missions was co-organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR/UNHCHR), the Council of Europe, the European Commission and the OSCE from 11-16 July 1999. The aim of the pilot course was to develop a coherent and quality-based approach to training on human rights monitoring with a focus on skills development.

22 Cited in: OSCE, Joint responses needed to promote stability in Europe and neighbouring regions, says NATO Secretary General at OSCE security conference, Press Release, SEC.PE/243/11, 30 June 2011, also at: https://www.osce.org/cio/80465.

23 Cf. Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the OSCE, Draft of a section of the Charter on European Security, PC.SMC/84/98, 11 September 1998, para. 11, p. 3.

between the OSCE Secretariat and the EU Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) on the EU "enlargement package" in South-Eastern Europe.[24]
- *Making information sharing more systematic and targeted*, including "tool boxes", in order to enhance "network multilateralism", as UN Secretary-General António Guterres suggested at the High-Level Interactive Dialogue with Heads of Regional and Other Organizations held on 12 and 13 June 2018 at Greentree Estate, New York.
- *Co-operation between Situation Rooms*, promoted by Javier Solana in 2001,[25] is already well on track, but could be enhanced and include joint threat scenarios.[26] The 2018 OSCE Conflict Cycle Seminar: "Strengthening the OSCE's Capacities for Conflict Prevention and Resolution — Good practices and lessons learned" provided timely recommendations in that regard, including on establishing a network of situation and crisis rooms in the OSCE area.[27]
- *Issuing joint political messages and statements*: a powerful advocacy tool, as demonstrated by repeated initiatives of the Heads of Mission of the EU, the NATO Liaison Office, the OSCE, and the United States in Skopje since 2013, to urge all sides in FYROM/North Macedonia to enhance political dialogue, to focus on the country's strategic priorities, and to put the best interests of the country and its citizens first.[28]
- *Strengthening co-ordination between envoys and special representatives*. The co-operation between the OSCE Meditation Support Team at the CPC and the German Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) on Inter-organizational High-level Peer-to-Peer Exchange on Approaches and Good Practices for Mediation in Protracted Conflicts might be considered good practice.[29]

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24 "It is not a deficiency for a country that is looking towards the EU to make use of all the possibilities offered by the OSCE to bring its practices and standards up to the level of EU criteria", statement by Ambassador Ivo Petrov, Head of the Bulgarian Delegation to the OSCE and Chairman of the Permanent Council, welcoming the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Christopher Patten, Press Release, SEC.PR/423/04, 15 July 2004, also at: https://www.osce.org/pc/56531.

25 Cf. Address to the OSCE Permanent Council by Dr Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, PC.DEL/27/01, 18 January 2001, para. 28.

26 Calls for a "global SitCenter" were expressed at the UN Secretary-General's 2018 High-Level Interactive Dialogue with Heads of Regional and Other Organizations.

27 Cf. Perception Paper on OSCE Conflict Cycle Seminar: "Strengthening the OSCE's Capacities for Conflict Prevention and Resolution — Good practices and lessons learned" (Vienna, 5 October 2018), CIO.GAL/179/18, 28 November 2018.

28 Cf. SEC.PR/38/13, 14 February 2013, and OSCE, Joint statement of the Heads of EU Delegation, US Embassy, OSCE Mission and NATO Liaison Office in Skopje on yesterday's incidents at the Parliament, Press Release, 28 April 2017, at: https://www.osce.org/mission-to-skopje/314491.

29 Cf. Center for International Peace Operations, Inter-organizational High-level Peer-to-Peer Exchange on Approaches and Good Practices for Mediation in Protracted Conflicts, 28 May 2019, at: https://www.zif-berlin.org/en/about-zif/news/detail/article/hochrangiger-inter-institutioneller-fachaustausch-zu-vermittlung-im-kontext-verschleppter-konflikte.html.

- *Concerted exploration of new forms of joint action in crisis regions.*[30]
- *"Policy transfer" and lessons learned*: conduct a joint evaluation of experiences in a common field of activity, with a view to developing common lessons learned – a joint exercise like this was envisaged between the EU and the OSCE after the August 2008 conflict in the Caucasus; establish guidelines, databases and repertories of best practices, possibly in form of a compendium of the peacebuilding and conflict prevention capabilities of the United Nations and regional organizations, as suggested at the third meeting between the UN and the regional organizations in 1998.
- *Pooling resources or co-operation in the establishment of joint or shared facilities*, as already suggested by the Danish OSCE Chairmanship in 1997.[31] In this regard, the OSCE should pursue its efforts to gain access to UN strategic deployment stocks and UN support for operational planning.[32]
- Linked to pooling resources, *fully exploiting new technologies* in an effort to increase co-operation with other regional and international organizations.[33]

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30   On the way to the adoption of the Platform for Co-operative Security, the OSCE participating States had imagined implementing "democratization teams", cf. Status Report by the Chairman of the Permanent Council on the Security Model Discussion in 1997, in: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Sixth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 18-19 December 1997, MC.DOC/1/97, Copenhagen, 16 March 1998, pp. 31-35, here: p. 32, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/40427. The idea of "country co-ordination teams" was expressed at the Regional EU Conference on Conflict Prevention "Partners in Prevention" held in Helsingborg, Sweden, on 29-30 August 2002, cf. The Helsingborg Agenda, Chairman's Conclusions, circulated under SEC.DEL/182/02, 3 September 2002, para. 8 iv, p. 4, and Secretary General Ján Kubiš's speech under SEC.GAL/164/02, 17 September 2002, p. 3.

31   Cf. Modalities for a Platform for Co-operative Security, annexed to PC.SMC/2/97, 4 September 1997.

32   A Letter of Understanding was signed in 2018 with the UN Department of Field Support (DFS), aiming at providing the OSCE access to UN Systems Contracts and technical training. The proposal, made by the Executive Director of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in 2018 to put the CTBTO's new permanent facility for inspector training in Seibersdorf, Austria, at the OSCE's disposal, is also worth mentioning.

33   Although put on standby, the experience of the Crisis Response Executive Advisory Team (CREATE) might be recalled here. The main goal of CREATE, which comprised the OSCE, UN, EU, and NATO under the aegis of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and his Crisis Management Initiative, was to increase the awareness and understanding among international organizations about their shared needs in information and communications technology (ICT) issues, and to provide the concrete means to enhance the interoperability of their ICT systems. CREATE focused on technical standardization of management tools for administrative processes (i.e. international organizations' reporting to member states, using standardized formats), common situational awareness in the field (military, political, incident reporting, security status), risk management, and early warning.

The 1999 Platform commits the OSCE to co-operate with organizations and institutions "concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area"[34] and whose members subscribe to the UN Charter and to a series of principles (transparency and predictability in the spirit of the Vienna Document 1999; openness and free will in their membership of international organizations; the OSCE's concept of common, comprehensive and indivisible security, and a common security space free of dividing lines; etc.). "It has however remained unclear who decides on which organizations fit the above criteria and which might not and the procedure for doing so"[35], Oleksandr Pavlyuk rightly observes.

Against the backdrop of the deep political confrontation and distrust between the Russian Federation and the West, which has often hampered the efficient utilization of existing co-operative security institutions in the Euro-Atlantic region, there has been a tendency to marginalize certain regional organizations created in the 1990s which, for some participating States, do not correspond to the OSCE's "values". Although these organizations are duly mentioned in OSCE documents such as the 2001 Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism or the 2003 Maastricht Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, and regularly invited to the UN retreats of regional organizations, they are not credited with the same level of respectability as the historical main players. The following EU statement, expressed in 2010 before the Astana Summit, is particularly revealing:

> We believe that this can be achieved through co-operation between the OSCE and a *select few organisations* with expertise in the OSCE region, rather than measuring the effectiveness of such co-operation in terms of the sheer number of organisations attending OSCE meeting. […] we wish to stress that in assessing the merits of such co-operation, it is paramount to consider the actions and decisions of an organisation and *their compatibility with OSCE values*. The EU is particularly interested in synergies with *organisations with a proven track record in honouring principles the OSCE stands for* […].[36]

Unsurprisingly, the EU suggested focusing on the United Nations and the Council of Europe "as the two Organisations that the OSCE should actively pursue co-operation with", but also encouraged OSCE-NATO co-operation

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34 Operational Document – the Platform for Co-operative Security, cited above (Note 2), p. 43.
35 Oleksandr Pavlyuk, The Platform for Co-operative Security: Ten Years of Co-operation, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2009, Baden-Baden 2010, pp. 343-359, here: p. 349.
36 EU Statement on Co-operation with international, regional and sub-regional organizations, institutions and initiatives, OSCE Review Conference, Vienna, 22 October 2010, RC.DEL/281/10, 22 October 2010 (author's emphasis).

where there is added value, which *de facto* implies excluding the organizations "East of Vienna". NATO member states' reservation about "Russia-driven" organizations has grown even stronger; the open appeal of the foreign ministers of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to their NATO counterparts in May 2019, for strengthening mutual trust and developing co-operation, has remained unanswered.[37] Russia's behaviour vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance often proceeds from a similar degree of sensitivity and mistrust, for instance when the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to NATO expressed concerns about representatives of the SMM in Ukraine briefing the North Atlantic Council. Since 2015, this mutual exclusiveness has led to an impasse on the modalities of the Ministerial Council.

In our opinion, the OSCE has no alternative but to be inclusive. The Platform's underlying principles are inclusiveness, equality, transparency, comprehensiveness, and complementarity. The importance of a non-discriminatory and inclusive approach to all relevant actors (international, regional, and sub-regional organizations and institutions) has been underlined from the very beginning. "We should respect the principle of inclusiveness and involve all relevant players", Secretary General Ján Kubiš emphasized in his address to the Regional EU Conference on Conflict Prevention "Partners in Prevention", held in Helsingborg in 2002.[38] A dynamic and responsive multilateral system cannot be based on a fixed "balance-of-power" arrangement. On the contrary, "the potential of the emerging organizations in the Eastern part of the OSCE space should be acknowledged and they should be integrated into co-operation networks".[39] If the system is to function, there is a constant need to work with partners. This means entering into dialogue and outreach, in order to discern where common purpose with those partners may lie. And it means making efforts to listen to and understand the perspectives of others in order to achieve overall positive results and inter-institutional progress.[40]

Further Revitalizing Chapter VIII

As a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OSCE is genuinely interested in increasing interaction with the UN. The OSCE is already strongly invested in UN-led global processes on issues ranging from

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37 Cf. SEC.DEL/207/19, 24 May 2019.
38 Cf. SEC.GAL/164/02, 17 September 2002, p. 2.
39 Wolfgang Zellner (co-ordinator)/Yves Boyer/Frank Evers/Isabelle Facon/Camille Grand/Ulrich Kühn/Łukasz Kulesa/Andrei Zagorski, Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: From Vision to Reality, Hamburg/ Paris/Moscow/Warsaw 2012, p. 26, at: https://interaffairs.ru/i/IDEAS.pdf.
40 Cf. Christina Kokkinakis/Christoph Weidinger, Concept note for the Austrian MFA Retreat at the European Forum Alpbach 2018: The Resilience of Values: Reconciling Diversity and Universality, 25-26 August 2018, p. 3.

counter-terrorism[41] and the fight against violent extremism to climate change, migration governance, or sustainable development. In particular, the OSCE has a complementary role to play within its mandate in addressing the challenges postulated in the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN General Assembly and the Sustaining Peace Agenda. However, the 2014 Security Day on The OSCE and Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter: Confronting Emerging Security Challenges in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Space[42] did not exhaust all aspects of this issue in terms of aligning the OSCE agenda with the global initiatives and commitments of the UN, complementarity of OSCE efforts with those in the UN – indeed the vital cornerstone of multilateral responsibility and action – mainstreaming UN strategies at regional level, and bringing the regional-global partnership to a new level of clarity, practicality, and seriousness.

Focusing on Chapter VIII, missions could allow the OSCE to reconnect with its role as a "flexible framework for co-operation" (Platform for Co-operative Security, para. II, 7) and a "forum for subregional co-operation" (Charter for European Security, para. 13). On several occasions in the past, the OSCE has successfully taken upon itself the bridging role offered by the 1999 Platform. In 2002, Secretary General Ján Kubiš, building on the OSCE's mandate as a forum for subregional co-operation, convened a meeting with regional and subregional organizations and initiatives on preventing and combating terrorism. For the first time ever, representatives of some 25 organizations, among them almost all of the regional and subregional organizations and initiatives operating in the OSCE area, as well as the OSCE's traditional partners (the UN, CoE, EU, and NATO), came together to exchange information on their activities and projects on countering terrorism and to identify modalities for future co-operation. "I was surprised to see such a strong positive response

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41   The OSCE's co-operation with the UN on countering terrorism is multi-faceted and includes: preventing violent extremism, border security and management, countering terrorist financing, countering the use of Internet for terrorist purposes, critical infrastructure protection and soft target protection, biometrics, and advance passenger data. See the OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism, adopted on 7 December 2012, PC.DEC/1063, 7 December 2012, Annex, para. 16, in: Organization for a Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Council, Decision No. 1063, OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism, PC.DEC/1063, 7 December 2012, at: https://www.osce.org/pc/98008. Based on this mandate, the Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) within the OSCE Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) also promotes the implementation of the international legal framework against terrorism and assists participating States in the ratification and implementation of the 19 universal UN counter-terrorism instruments (UATI). As of April 2018, the ratification rate among the OSCE participating States in relation to the 17 UATI then in force was approximately 83 per cent. Cf. OSCE, Status of the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols as well as other International and Regional Legal Instruments related to Terrorism and Co-operation in Criminal Matters in the OSCE Area, July 2018 Update, p. 4, available at: https:// www.osce.org/atu/17138.

42   See OSCE Security Days, The OSCE and Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter: Confronting Emerging Security Challenges In the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Space, Vienna, 27 May 2014, Report, SEC.DAYS/13/14, 1 July 2014, available at: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/120607.

from subregional organizations and their endorsement of this move, considered to be an expression of a natural role for the OSCE", Kubiš noted.[43]

Of course, this was in 2002, and as previously observed, international and regional partner organizations have often shown reluctance to be "co-ordinated" by the OSCE. Nonetheless, our Organization can certainly play a significant role bridging inter- and intra-regional initiatives. In the last few years, there have been numerous calls for convening a high-level meeting of the heads of subregional organizations and initiatives operating in the OSCE area, to share information and experience, to analyse prospects, and to identify areas and modalities for closer co-operation. "To develop the dialogue on pan-European security we propose a meeting of the heads of key international organizations – OSCE, NATO, the EU, the CIS and CSTO – on the basis of the Platform for Co-operative Security which we accepted within the framework of the OSCE […]. The theme of this meeting would be to examine the security strategies of each of these organizations", Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proposed in 2009.[44] If French President Emmanuel Macron's recent call for a new confidence and security architecture that would go from Lisbon to Vladivostok were to materialize,[45] it would need to be supported by all the institutions operating in the region. The OSCE, as the most inclusive platform for dialogue in the northern hemisphere, could play a significant role in oper-ationalizing these views.

Effective Multilateralism in the Field

OSCE field operations are at the heart of the OSCE's work, and one of the Organization's major assets. All of them share information, co-operate and, as necessary, co-ordinate in implementing projects and other practical activities with other organizations present in their respective country, in accordance with their individual mandates. Co-operation in the field has led to considerable de-velopment of practical instruments and work modalities and has established

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43 Keynote Address by the OSCE Secretary General, Ambassador Ján Kubiš, at the International Peace Academy Conference: The UN, the EU, NATO and Other Regional Actors in the 21st Century: Partners in Peace? SEC.GAL/210/02, 20 November 2002.

44 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov opening the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference on 23 June 2009, cited in: OSCE, Collective response urgently needed to address indivisible security, Russian Foreign Minister tells OSCE states", Press Release, SEC.PR/281/09, 23 June 2009, also at: https://www.osce.org/pc/51076. See also: Revitalizing the OSCE Role as a Forum for Sub-regional Co-operation, Lithuania, Food-for-Thought Paper, PC.DEL/483/10, 4 June 2010, p. 2.

45 Cf. Christian Losson/Pierre Alonso/Hala Kodmani, Fort de Brégançon: entre Macron et Poutine, un petit pas et ça repatine [Fort de Brégançon: between Macron and Poutine, one small step and it's back on track], Libération, 19 August 2019, at: https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2019/08/19/fort-de-bregancon-entre-macron-et-poutine-un-petit-pas-et-ca-repatine_1746105, and President Macron's speech at the Ambassadors' Conference on 27 August 2019, at: https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/08/27/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-a-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs-1.

pragmatic complementarity between international organizations where it counts most.

Paradoxically, co-operation in the field is probably the area where the modalities of the 1999 Platform have been least concretely implemented. "Regular information exchanges and meetings" are of course routine, but neither "joint needs assessment missions", nor "secondment of experts by other organizations to the OSCE, appointment of liaison officers, development of common projects and field operations, and joint training efforts" seems to be common practice.

Therefore, as rightly emphasized by the CPC, there is room to further strengthen international co-operation and co-ordination in the field.[46] As there is sometimes a multitude of international actors present in the host country, each with its own mandate and agenda, effective interaction among international actors and with the host country is imperative in order to maximize their impact, avoid duplication, competition, and waste of resources, and, in certain areas, make sure that the host country will not relapse into conflict or crisis.

"In general, sharing operational information is more easily achieved than formulating joint strategic policy",[47] but jointly elaborating viable strategies assisting and promoting regional solutions and co-operation should remain an objective. Joint missions should be revisited, in light of historical precedents.[48] Since 2018, OSCE regional heads of mission meetings have provided a useful forum for exchanging information, experience, and ideas with the heads of EU missions in South-Eastern Europe and in Central Asia, and for familiarizing them with the challenges faced by the OSCE field operations and with opportunities for co-operation.[49] In the future, an invitation to such regional meetings could also be extended to the heads of UN country teams, especially in the Western Balkans. Once set up with the consent of participating States, OSCE Thematic Centers/Hubs on economic and environmental issues could also become a catalyst for creating a network to facilitate exchange between international stakeholders.[50]

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46   Cf. OSCE, The Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, cited above (Note 14), p. 4.
47   Ibid., p. 3.
48   A joint visit to Tirana, Albania, by the OSCE and the CoE was followed by a declaration issued by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, the President of the EU Council, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE, and the Chairman-in-Office of the Western European Union (WEU) Council on 23 September 1998, calling upon the government and the opposition to show moderation. Joint assessment missions were also carried out by OSCE/ODIHR and the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE. During his visit to the EU Institutions in Brussels in February 2001, Secretary General Ján Kubiš suggested that an OSCE representative could be invited to participate in the visits of the EU Troika to regions where the OSCE was particularly present and active.
49   In particular, the Regional Meeting of Heads of Field Operations in South-Eastern Europe, held in Pristina, Kosovo, on 30 September-1 October 2019, provided the occasion for a fruitful half-day exchange on the challenges and opportunities for co-operation with the five heads of EU missions and senior officials from the EEAS and the EU Commission.
50   See Ambassador Ivo Petrov/Dr Luis Gomez-Echeverri/Matthias Boss, draft feasibility study on the establishment of OSCE Thematic Hubs or Centres for Analysis and Research in the Second Dimension, 28 August 2019, p. 21.

Is There a Need for a New Inter-institutional Setting for Co-operation?

At a time when calls for multilateralism are on everyone's lips, the observer in 2019 cannot help but acknowledge the overall deterioration, not of the substance, but of the institutional framework for co-operation between international and regional organizations. A good example of this lies in the relationship between the UN and the OSCE. The resolution on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 December 2002, was the last of its kind.[51] This might well, in Oleksandr Pavlyuk's opinion, mirror the consistent failure by the OSCE participating States to agree on a political declaration since the Porto Ministerial Council in 2002.[52] With the end of this tradition, the UN Secretary-General's practice of drawing up a report on cooperation between the UN and the OSCE, sending it to the OSCE Secretariat to keep it informed early on, also disappeared.[53] There is an obvious contrast between the level of preparation and follow-up of the UN High-Level Meetings with regional organizations in the 2000s, and nowadays. The fifth High-Level Meeting on "New challenges to international peace and security, including international terrorism", held in New York on 29-30 July 2003, was followed by a detailed report officially transmitted by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to all participants. The report included the conclusions of the Chairman, Annan's own opening remarks, and the Framework for Cooperation in Confronting New Challenges to International Peace and Security, including International Terrorism that was agreed upon by participating organizations on that occasion.[54] As for the sixth High-Level Meeting on "United Nations-regional organizations: partnership for a more secure world", which took place in New York on 25-26 July 2005, not only a concept for discussion with guiding questions was submitted to the participating organizations, but also: the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change related to the question: "What is our response?"; the conclusions of the six working groups established at the fifth High-Level Meeting in 2003, in view of their adoption; and finally, new areas for action. In contrast, only an invitation letter and a short agenda reached the OSCE in 2018, as well as a rather informal two pages-summary note after the event.

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51 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 57/298. Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, A/RES/57/298, 6 February 2003, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/482289. A draft resolution to be adopted by the 59th session of the UN General Assembly in 2004 was prepared, but failed to be adopted (draft circulated under CIO.GAL/94/04, 6 October 2004).

52 Cf. Pavlyuk, cited above (Note 35), p. 355 (there: Note 32).

53 Cf. United Nations, General Assembly, Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/217, 16 July 2002, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/473090.

54 Cf. UN Doc. A/58/444-S/2003/1022, 17 October 2003, circulated by OSCE Secretary General Perrin de Brichambaut under SEC.GAL/197/03, 5 November 2003.

The number of co-operation mechanisms and frameworks that have disappeared since 2000, or are simply dormant, is striking. Some of these mechanisms fulfilled their tasks and ceased to operate for obvious historical reasons, such as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, placed under the auspices of the OSCE in 1999 and developed into a genuine framework for co-operation among international organizations active in the region until 2008, when it was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC). For some others, quite worryingly, a lack of political willingness and the deterioration of the overall political environment in Europe might have simply prevailed.

Tripartite high-level meetings took place annually from 1993 onwards between the respective Secretaries General of the OSCE and the CoE, as well as the Director of the UN Office in Geneva.[55] These aimed to build mutual awareness of the organizations' respective activities in order to facilitate practical co-operation in conflict prevention and democratic institution-building, share information, and improve practical co-operation by drawing on each other's expertise and know-how, but are no longer convened. In 2011, it was acknowledged that the outcome of this tripartite consultation no longer corresponded to its aim. Despite the efforts of the CoE, which circulated a "Concept of structure and modalities of Tripartite CoE-OSCE-UN meetings as from 2012" suggesting, *inter alia*, regularly inviting the EU as an "affiliate member" with a view to possibly changing the format into a quadripartite meeting, the format did not survive any further.

With the EU, the practice of holding Troika meetings biannually since 2002, both at the ministerial and ambassadorial levels, was interrupted in 2014, due to growing difficulties with scheduling. Finally, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a forum for political dialogue and consultation between NATO and partners able to identify and discuss early warning and conflict prevention issues, was put on hold in 2013, due to the deterioration of the NATO-Russia relationship.[56]

Do these mechanisms need to be replaced? Could establishing a joint consultative structure lead to better co-ordination of international efforts? The failure of the *ad hoc* consultative mechanism put forward in the OSCE Maastricht Strategy[57] is not very encouraging. According to Oleksandr Pavlyuk, it was

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55   Beginning with 1996, their composition has been enlarged to include the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Director of ODIHR, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UNHCHR, the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In 2000, for the first time, the European Commission was also invited to participate.

56   Cf. Loïc Simonet, The OSCE and NATO: Side by Side in a Turbulent World, in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2017, Baden-Baden 2018, pp. 279-313, here: p. 310.

57   "More effort should be devoted to enhancing the functioning of the Platform for Cooperative Security in order to meet common threats more effectively and efficiently. To accomplish this, it will be proposed to establish a new ad-hoc consultative mechanism, in consultation with other international organizations and institutions, as part of the overall

perceived as "untimely and/or offering no added value", hence the lukewarm response from partner organizations.[58] Similarly, the Peacebuilding Commission, meant to offer a forum for co-ordination in the area of post-conflict peace-building between the UN system and regional and subregional organizations, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1645 (2005) and General Assembly resolution 60/180, has apparently not been very effective. Based on these experiences, it may simply not be realistic to crystallize any structure or framework for co-operation with other actors, considering their different memberships, mandates and priorities, different methodologies, and even different cultures, and also the need for flexibility and to adjust co-operation to specific circumstances. Having said that, some past suggestions deserve to be kept in mind and cannot be automatically ruled out under the pretext of "flexibility".

The participants in the fifth High-Level Meeting between the UN and the regional organizations in 2003 in New York, in which Secretary General Perrin de Brichambaut participated, agreed "to establish a coordination centre/informal advisory council, at a high or working-level, between the UN and regional organizations to confront new challenges to international peace and security".[59] To this end, an interim, full-time secretariat was established in the then UN Department of Political Affairs (UN DPA) in March 2005, and the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Programme of the UN University (UNU-CRIS) started to provide research and analytical support to the six working groups settled in June 2004 to implement the decisions of the meeting. The concept of an "interlocking mechanism of regional-global peace and security" was discussed at the sixth High-Level Meeting. Again, at the UN Secretary-General's retreat with heads of regional and other organizations in Greentree Estate in 2010, the LAS suggested establishing a permanent commission or a group – a "G" – for co-ordination among international and regional organizations to enhance the multilateral system, under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General.

At a time when centres of excellence are proliferating (NATO alone has 25 accredited centres of excellence), it would be conceivable to build-up a "centre of excellence on effective multilateralism" placed under the *aegis* of the UN, which could, *inter alia*, support the co-ordination of international efforts with food for thought, concepts (including in better understanding the root causes of conflict), and strategies; collect lessons learned and best practices;[60]

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effort to jointly analyse and cope with threats. The OSCE offers this tool as a flexible framework for consultation by initiating contacts with relevant organizations and institutions as a specific threat arises or intensifies." OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, cited above (Note 5), para. 57.

58   Pavlyuk, cited above (Note 35), p. 357.
59   UN Doc. A/58/444-S/2003/1022, OSCE Doc. SEC.GAL/197/03, cited above (Note 54).
60   In 2014, Luk Van Langenhove, director of UNU-CRIS, suggested "creating a global mechanism of learning transfer from one organization to another or from one case to another" as a way to build trust between the different regional organizations and the UN at the highest level. Luk Van Langenhove, Chapter VIII, in: Security Community 2/2014, pp. 19-21, here: p. 20, available at: https://www.osce.org/magazine/122525.

and harmonize and standardize trainings in order to make the recruitment and deployment of experts more effective. The sustainability of such an institution, also in terms of capacity and resources, would, however, remain a big question mark.

In more operational terms, alliances and *ad hoc* coalitions could help conduct dialogue on specific themes; what UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, at the 2010 retreat, called "creative and case-specific" partnerships. The models of the Friends of Albania Group[61], ENVSEC[62] or the Alliance against Trafficking in Persons, which has served as a platform for joint advocacy by international, regional and subregional organizations dealing with combating trafficking in human beings since 2004, could be replicated to areas such as arms control, climate change, cyber/ICT security, and artificial intelligence. Such forms of "flexible multilateralism" would be particularly useful in the case of insufficient consensus among governments to move ahead.

Revitalizing the Secretary General's Annual Report to the Permanent Council on Interaction between Organizations and Institutions in the OSCE Area

The 1999 Platform for Co-operative Security actually provides that "the Secretary General shall prepare an annual report for the Permanent Council on interaction between organizations and institutions in the OSCE area" (para. 8). Unfortunately, this practice was promptly overtaken by a Permanent Council Decision on Improving Annual Reporting on the Activities of the OSCE, stating that: "The Annual Report [of the Secretary General] will include the report on interaction between organizations and institutions in the OSCE area, as requested in the 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security, the Platform for Co-operative Security, as a separate chapter" (PC.DEC/495, 5 September

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61   A pragmatic example of OSCE co-ordination of activities by the international community, the Friends of Albania Group was initiated by the OSCE and co-chaired by the OSCE Presence in Albania and the EU Mission. This flexible co-ordinating framework for international efforts, which held its inaugural meeting in Brussels in September 1998, was open to countries and international institutions that wished to actively support Albania in its development efforts. It brought together bilateral and multilateral donors, together with a number of major non-governmental organizations, and provided a forum for information sharing, consultation, and co-ordination between international actors engaged in Albania.

62   The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) includes the OSCE, the UNDP, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UNECE; one of ENVSEC's original partners, the Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe (REC), has been dissolved in the meantime, and NATO has left the initiative. ENVSEC addresses environmental problems that may threaten security and offers joint expertise and resources in co-operation with relevant national ministries, national experts, NGOs, and think-tanks. Cf. OSCE, ENVSEC – The Environment and Security Initiative: Transforming Risks into Co-operation, 7 June 2016, at: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/245211, and ENVSEC Environment and Security, Transforming Risks into Cooperation: The Environment and Security Initiative 2003-2013, at: http://www.envsec.org/publications/ENVSECTransforming Risks.FINAL.web.pdf. A new Memorandum of Understanding between the four partners was signed in 2019.

2002) and a decision of the Maastricht Ministerial Council on the Annual Report of the Secretary General: "It will include, as a separate chapter, a report on the results of interaction between organizations and institutions in the OSCE area, as requested in the Charter for European Security adopted at the Istanbul Summit, the Platform for Co-operative Security, and a report on interaction with Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation", the latter allowing reporting about interaction with regional organizations outside the OSCE area (MC.DEC/1/03, 24 October 2003). The result is a loss of visibility of this particular aspect of the OSCE's co-operation with other institutional actors, now merged into a voluminous annual report, at the end of the document.

It is true that information on meetings with other organizations and institutions is regularly provided in the weekly reports of the Secretary General to the PC. Nonetheless, one might regret the abandonment of this tradition of a special report to the PC and advocate for its resumption, as Secretary General Lamberto Zannier did explicitly in 2016.[63]

Conclusion: "Make Multilateralism Great Again" through Co-operation between International Organizations

"We need a recommitment to multilateralism", Minister Miroslav Lajčák said when he presented the priorities of the Slovak Chairperson-in-Office.[64] Even if "the world will not return to a 'golden era' of multilateral governance",[65] effective multilateralism is still a "life or death" issue in 2019.

Co-operation among organizations is an ever-moving target. It requires constant attention and effort at all levels. It needs the political will and guidance by member and/or participating States. Such commitment actually begins in the capitals.[66] For the Warsaw Reflection Group in 2005, "effective multilateralism" required states "to co-operate more intensively not only within the organisations but also across the structures. The responsibility for organising this co-operation should not only rest with the group of delegates designated

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63   Cf. talking points of the OSCE Secretary General on "Co-operation with International and Regional Organizations", as delivered at the 1117th Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 3 November 2016, SEC.GAL/166/16, 9 November 2016.

64   OSCE Slovakia 2019, Statement by the Chairperson in Office, H.E. Miroslav Lajčák, Presentation of Priorities, Vienna, Austria, 10 January 2019, CIO.GAL/4/19, 10 January 2019, at: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/408602.

65   Ikenberry, cited above (Note 12), p. 410.

66   The 2005 Declaration on Co-operation between the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation calls for "more active involvement of the Member and participating States, in order to produce synergies and avoid unnecessary duplication, giving the fullest account however to the different nature and membership of the two Organizations, and make best use of their comparative advantages" and for "better co-ordination within the national administrations of the Member and participating States [...]". PC.DEC/670, 28 April 2005, Annex to: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Permanent Council, Decision No. 670, Co-operation between the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe, 28 April 2005, p. 1, available at: https://www.osce.org/pc/14503, p. 1.

by states to represent their interests within a particular institution. There should be an equal responsibility for the officials in capitals that are in charge of different organisations to consult and co-operate when developing their thinking about agendas and activities".[67] The responsibility in taking decisions on co-ordination and co-operation between organizations, as well as making priorities and allocating resources, lies ultimately with the member and participating States.

The problem is that political will is often lacking. To some extent, states may sometimes be seen as the main obstacles to effective multilateralism. In this regard, it is difficult to understand why some participating States object to the opening of OSCE liaison offices in capital cities hosting major international organizations (such as Brussels, New York, or Geneva). One of the proposals made by OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger in his 2018 "Fit for Purpose" strategy paper, after decades of advocacy by his predecessors and many states, and dozens of proposals and food-for-thought papers, was that such liaison arrangements would further operationalize the OSCE strategic relationship with key partner organizations and significantly improve the scope and effectiveness of our co-operation. It would also contribute to balancing the OSCE's loss of comparative advantage in comparison with other international and regional organizations represented abroad by substantive and long-standing presences.[68] Paradoxically too, one of the two OSCE participating States promoting an "alliance for multilateralism" reaching out to "all members of the international community, international organizations, regional institutions and other relevant actors, as essential and active partners",[69] has been one of the fiercest advocates of the "zero nominal growth" policy which is endangering the Organization's ability to effectively monitor, prevent, and respond to a growing number of complex crises and challenges.

The political will of all states to rely on multilateral responses to challenges must be strengthened. "Co-ordination will be very difficult if participating States themselves do not have a clear vision of the role of the OSCE, of their own responsibilities to implement OSCE commitments and of how they

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67 Dena W. Gurgul/Grzegorz Sieczak (eds), Towards Complementarity of European Security Institutions: Achieving Complementarity between NATO, EU, OSCE and the Council of Europe, Report of the Warsaw Reflection Group, 31 January-1 February 2005, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Warsaw 2005, p. 7.

68 The CoE (in 2011), the LAS, NATO (in 2018, following a non-permanent liaison arrangement set up two years earlier), the UN (a liaison office representing the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs/DPPA, Peace Operations/DPO, and Operational Support/DOS has been set up in 2016), and the UNHCR (in 1998) have all opened a permanent presence in Vienna, whereas the EU is represented by its delegation to the international organizations in Vienna; something that the OSCE has been unable to reciprocate.

69 Cf. Permanent mission of France to the United Nations in New York, Alliance for Multilateralism – Building the Network and Presenting Results. Side-event at UNGA74, 26 September 2019, Statement by the Co-Chairs, at: https://onu.delegfrance.org/Alliance-for-Multilateralism-Building-the-Network-and-Presenting-Results. Cf. also Jean-Yves Le Drian/Heiko Maas, Non, le multilatéralisme n'est pas dépassé [No, multilateralism is not outdated], Le Figaro, 12 November 2019, at: https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/jean-yves-le-drian-et-heiko-maas-non-le-multilateralisme-n-est-pas-depasse-20191111.

wish to see the OSCE interact with other international organisations. Effective co-operation between international organisations can only be developed if there is basic political will to do so among the participating States of the organisations involved."[70] This starts with the Chairperson-in-Office whose responsibility, both as Foreign Minister of a participating State and as leader of the political work ahead of the next Ministerial Council, makes it vital for bilateral contacts with other organizations, as clearly underlined by the 1999 Platform.[71]

Beyond participating States, effective multilateralism through co-operation between institutional actors is also an issue of broader communication. Indeed, what matters is not only the OSCE's own perceptions about its role and capabilities, and therefore its added value, but also whether our perceptions are known, understood, shared, and respected by others, particularly our key institutional partners. "To win support, our added value must become more apparent", Secretary General Greminger highlighted in a speech at Princeton University in 2018.[72]

This may be achieved by enhancing the capacity of the OSCE as a whole to speak with one voice to the "outside world". As a precondition for effective co-operation with other organizations, "the OSCE should mainstream the culture of co-operation and solidarity within its structures" and "assess current forms of intra-institutional co-operation", as advocated by several participants in the 2014 OSCE Human Dimension Seminar.[73] Respect for the Secretary General's pre-eminence as the representative of the Chairman-in-Office in "ensuring the effective and continuous working contacts with other international organizations and institutions"[74] and sharing information between the Secretariat and its departments, the institutions, and the field operations, are essential to ensure continuity, coherence, and oversight of efforts with regard to co-operation with external partners, especially with the EU in Brussels.

The renewal of multilateralism to address current challenges and emerging trends should also include focusing on reinvigorating popular support for

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70   Lars-Erik Lundin, Working together: the OSCE's relationship with other relevant international organisations, Nine steps to effective OSCE engagement, Food-for-thought paper commissioned by the CiO, CIO.GAL/83/12/Corr.1, 9 July 2012, p. 9, available at: https://www.osce.org/cio/92009.

71   "Participating States encourage the Chairman-in-Office, supported by the Secretary General, to work with other organizations and institutions to foster co-ordinated approaches that avoid duplication and ensure efficient use of available resources." Operational Document – the Platform for Co-operative Security, cited above (Note 2), p. 45.

72   OSCE, "The future of European Security", Keynote by OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University, 28 September 2018, SEC.GAL/151/18, 8 October 2018, p. 3, also available at: https://www.osce.org/secretary-general/399071. "Sharpening and raising the OSCE's profile" is one of the seven areas for reforms in Secretary General Greminger's "Fit for Purpose" agenda.

73   OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE Human Dimension Seminar, Improving OSCE Effectiveness by Enhancing Its Co-operation with Relevant Regional and International Organizations, Warsaw, 12-14 May 2014, , Consolidated Summary, ODIHR/GAL/37/14, 14 July 2014, p. 7, also available at: https://www.osce.org/odihr/121099.

74   Sofia Ministerial Council Decision No. 15/04, cited above (Note 11), p. 54.

the multilateral order. This vision of multilateral institutions "built for people"[75] was well understood by the 2019 Slovak Chairmanship, whose priority has been to bring the OSCE "closer to the people it is working for, in terms of both goals and impact".[76]

The Platform for Co-operative Security adopted in Istanbul twenty years ago was a milestone for the first generation of the OSCE's external relations with international and regional partner organizations. Based on twenty years of experience, there is now a need to bring this co-operation to a new generation. In the words of the UN Secretary-General's message on the first observance of the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace on 24 April 2019, "networked multilateralism" through close co-operation among international and regional organizations, is not enough: We need an "inclusive multilateralism", rooted in partnerships with civil society, businesses, the academia, and other stakeholders, including women as well as young people;[77] we need a "meaningful multilateralism", "one that brings added value to national efforts and is not the result of abstract plans or bureaucratic processes".[78] The OSCE is ideally suited to achieving this "effective multilateralism".

The current Chairmanship's focus on effective multilateralism will remain highly relevant as we move into 2020. The 30th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) and its call for a "Europe whole and free" will certainly allow for a review of the contribution made by international organizations in addressing this challenge. The UN's 75th anniversary in 2020 will also offer an opportunity to capture the collective commitment of member states to multilateralism and their shared vision for a common future.[79]

Let us give the final word to NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, addressing the PC in 2001:

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75 "Our multilateral institutions were built for people. Not for politicians. Not for diplomats. But people. If we lose sight of that, we lose sight of our overall mission", Slovakia's Foreign and European Affairs State Secretary Lukáš Parízek addressing the OSCE Permanent Council, Press Release, SEC.PR/387/18, 19 July 2018; also at: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/388631.

76 OSCE Slovakia 2019, Programme of the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship 2019, p. 11, at: https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/408353.

77 Cf. The Secretary-General, Message on the International Day of Multilateralism and Diplomacy for Peace, 24 April 2019, *United Nations Information Service*, UNIS/SGSM/928, 23 April 2019, at: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/ 2019/unissgsm928.html.

78 Remarks by Secretary General Thomas Greminger at the workshop "International Institutions in Turbulent Time", University of Oxford, 14 May 2018.

79 Cf. United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 June 2019, 73/299. Commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, A/RES/73/299, 18 June 2019, at: https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/299; cf. also An Innovation Agenda for UN 75 – The Albright-Gambari Commission Report and the Road to 2020, , The Stimson Center, 2019, and its Roadmap for Maximizing Results at the UN 75 (2020) Leaders Summit, ibid., pp. 56-63, at: http://www.platformglobalsecurityjusticegovernance. org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ Innovation-Agenda-for-UN-75-June-2019.pdf.

Our institutions are not rivals but partners. The emerging Euro-Atlantic security architecture is not a system of competing institutions, nor is it a Darwinian system of "survival of the fittest." Of course, our institutions are continuing to evolve; and of course, the relations between them are evolving as well. But this is a very positive evolution: towards common philosophies, common approaches to problem solving, and – I hope – regular institutional links between our two organizations.[80]

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80   NATO, Intervention by Secretary General at the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, Austria, 2 November 2000, at: https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001102a.htm, circulated under PC.DEL/668/00, 2 November 2000.

Anastasiya Bayok

Challenges and Threat Perceptions Regarding Central Asia in China and the EU

Introduction: China and the EU in Central Asia

Since the end of the Cold War, Central Asia has gradually become a platform for competition and, to a certain extent, co-operation between Russia, the EU, China, and the United States. The Central Asian region plays a very important role for all these actors: It is a direct neighbour of China and Russia with a high degree of significance, both strategically and in terms of security, and a neighbour of the EU's Eastern neighbourhood. The region's internal political and social stability and economic development are crucial for China, Russia, and the EU. Despite diverging intentions and motivations, all the actors involved are interested in containing and curtailing Islamic extremism in the region, reducing terrorist threats, and preventing these developments from crossing the borders and becoming part of their own domestic realities. Economic, cultural, and humanitarian co-operation with Central Asian states represents another pillar of mutual interest for China, the EU, and Russia. The new economic opportunities available to these powers depend as much on the security and stability of the Central Asian region as on good and constructive relationships between China, the EU, Russia, and Central Asia. Pursuing similar goals, China, Russia, and the EU use different methods of engaging with Central Asia, have different leverage in the region, and enjoy different levels of political and social acceptance within and among Central Asian states. Security and socio-economic relations provide opportunities for co-operation between these actors, which could bring benefits not only for them but for the Central Asian states too. However, from the realist point of view, China, Russia, and the EU are focusing on pursuing their own interests. Successful co-operation is complicated by a few fundamental problems and political disagreements in the relationship between the EU and Russia, a lack of mutual understanding between the EU and China, and a lack of trust between all three parties. This creates incentives for further contradictions, competition, and even possible conflicts among these powers over their interests in Central Asia.

The EU, China, and Russia build relationships with Central Asian states not only based on their interests and goals in the region, but also on their own perceptions of threats emanating from the Central Asian region. Some of these threat perceptions are shared among all the actors, while others are unique to each of them.

In this contribution, I focus on the threat perceptions of China and the EU with regard to Central Asia. China, despite having long-lasting historical relationships with Central Asian states, started engaging with Central Asia in the

273

1990s and has recently become more active and present in the region, especially after the introduction of the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in 2013, as it was known at the time, which crosses Central Asia on its way from China to Europe. The EU has always been interested in deepening its relationships with and increasing its presence in the region: It started developing its links with Central Asian states in the 1990s, and launched the "EU Central Asian Strategy" in 2007. However, despite its willingness, the EU does not have a well-established presence in Central Asia, and has not intensified its relationships with the states in the region to the extent it wished to. Recent Chinese engagement has stimulated an ever-growing European interest in Central Asia once again and strengthened Brussels' realization of the importance of deeper EU involvement in the region and the development of co-operation with China there. A "Joint Communication on the EU and Central Asia: New opportunities for a stronger partnership" endorsed by the European Commission on 15 May 2019, and conclusions on a new EU strategy on Central Asia adopted by the EU Council on 17 June 2019 serve as a vivid example for this.

It is worth analysing this new tendency towards an ever-growing Chinese economic presence and subsequent influence in the region; the EU's increasing desire to be involved and visible there; and some of the EU's concrete measures in this direction in greater detail. The opportunities for these two actors to co-operate in Central Asia depend not only on them and the conditions created by and within Central Asia, but also on their threat perceptions of this region. Russia's involvement, influence and threat perceptions with regard to Central Asia deserve separate analysis. Due to its historically established relations and perception of Central Asia as its own sphere of influence, Russia undoubtedly remains at present the main and only power projecting decisive political, military-security, and cultural influence in the region. Russia exercises its power in Central Asia bilaterally and through organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and recently through the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) too. Although I will not conduct a direct analysis of Russia in this contribution, I will nevertheless refer to the "Russia factor" throughout, since Russia's role in the Central Asian context is incomparably greater than the impact of China or the EU, and is recognized as such by the latter.

China in Central Asia: Interests, Image, and Threat Perceptions

Central Asia is a strategically important region with severe security implications for the vulnerable Xinjiang province of western China. At the same time,

274

it provides perfect opportunities for economic co-operation and the implementation of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and offers a source of energy diversification for China.[1]

China's main interests in Central Asia include border security, the fight against "East Turkestan" separatist forces, energy supply, economic interests, geopolitical security, and the further and successful development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). All of these are interconnected and influence each other. Although these factors all have an important meaning for Chinese foreign policy, their role in it is not fixed, which means that at various times, certain factors play a more decisive and crucial role than the others. At the same time, border security, geopolitical security, and the development of the SCO are part of Chinese security strategy in Central Asia. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China has entered a process of developing and adjusting its interests in Central Asia, and this process is still ongoing. Until 2001, China did not perceive Central Asia as a threat in any respect, which is why it did not occupy a position of priority in Beijing's foreign policy: At that time, Central Asia was perceived as stable and secure. In 2001, the situation changed, and security issues took on a greater role in Chinese policy towards Central Asia, with the main focus on combating terrorism, religious extremism, separatism, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. The SCO, originating from the Shanghai Five, was established the same year. Its tasks were to tackle the aforementioned security issues and promote economic development among its member states. It is worth noting that despite Central Asia occupying a very important place in Chinese foreign policy, it cannot become the number one priority due to the fact that the region is not a great power and cannot play a decisive role in world affairs. Central Asia is China's strategic backyard and plays an auxiliary role for China.[2]

Despite the turbulent and unpredictable security environment outside Central Asia, Chinese analysts believe that there is no threat of military intervention in any of the Central Asian states from outside, but the main threats lie within Central Asia itself and the "hot spots" surrounding it. A number of factors have created new conflicts and intensified existing ones, leading to a structural imbalance in the local societies and encouraging tendencies towards radicalization and extremism. These include the authoritarian political system in Central Asian countries; the concentration of power in the president's hands; an unsuccessful economic transition, which led to economic inequality; the poor economic development of rural areas; enormous differences in the development of the region and among countries; and loss of jobs. In other words,

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1   Cf. Guo Junping/Xu Tao/Hu Aijun, Dangqian zhongguo zai zhongya diqu mianlin de anquan tiaozhan ji zhengce sikao [China's current security challenges and policy considerations in Central Asia], *Heping yu fazhan [Peace and Development]* 6/2014, pp. 43-50, here: p.44.

2   For more on the position of Central Asia in Chinese foreign policy priorities, cf. Zhao Huasheng, *Zhongguo de zhongya waijiao [China's Central Asian Diplomacy],* Beijing: Shishi chuban she, 2008.

security challenges in Central Asia are of a non-traditional character and come from a deeper socio-economic level.[3]

There are at least six groups of challenges Central Asia currently presents to China.[4]

First, the transformation of Chinese Central Asian foreign policy is a challenge that comes from within China and its definition of its interests and priorities in the region.

Second, in addition to changes in the external environment, political, security, and economic priorities in Central Asian states are reflected in the priorities for multilateral co-operation and within multilateral institutions,[5] as well as bilaterally. This means that challenges arise from the changing situation in Central Asia and the foreign policy of Central Asian states towards China. At the same time, important security threats for China with regard to changes within the region come from the Central Asian states' lack of capacity to respond to emergencies and border control related issues, especially in the border areas of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan adjacent to the northwest of China, which is sensitive in political and security terms. This will inevitably lead to transboundary effects, affecting social stability of China's northwestern frontier.[6]

The third group of challenges arises from the relationships between the great powers in the region, especially the China-Russia axis. From a geopolitical point of view, the Central Asian security situation is diverse and mutually restrictive. The region is a "battlefield" of various great powers, each with their own interests in the region and perceiving the growing Chinese presence and influence as a threat to them. They try to counterbalance China and reduce its influence there. Russia-led economic and security integration processes and mechanisms, including the CSTO and EAEU, prevent China from being part of these processes, thus limiting China's options for co-operation.[7] Of all the powers involved, Russia has the biggest influence on China in Central Asia. Moscow and Beijing pursue common interests and compete with each other, and both continually stress that their two countries are important strategic partners and the bilateral relations between them continue to flourish. The reality looks quite different, with existing mutual distrust and antagonism in many areas. As soon as the BRI was announced, Russia regarded it as a sign of rivalry in the post-Soviet space and between the BRI and the EAEU. Beijing's initiative undermined Moscow's ambition to serve as a bridge between East and West on the Eurasian continent. The unfavourable economic, political and social situation within Russia, combined with the Western sanctions against it, brought Moscow closer to Beijing, willingly or not. Russia was left with China

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3 Cf. Sun Zhuangzhi, Dangqian zhongya diqu anquan xingshi ji qi dui zhongguo de yingxiang [The current security situation in Central Asia and its impact on China], *Aisixiang*, 2017.
4 For more on the first five principles, see Zhao, cited above (Note 2), pp. 51-53.
5 Cf. Sun, cited above (Note 3).
6 Cf. Guo/Xu/Hu, cited above (Note 1), p. 46.
7 Cf. Sun, cited above (Note 3).

as the only major power still on its side, which put the former into a relatively vulnerable and dependent position towards the latter. In 2015, Russia and China signed a declaration on a "Greater Eurasian Partnership", with the goal of synchronizing the BRI and the EAEU. The wording has then gradually changed to "comprehensive Eurasian partnership" in 2016[8] and to "Eurasian Economic partnership" in 2017[9] This was a tactical position for both sides, whereas Russia hoped to benefit economically and geopolitically from this co-operation.[10] After an agreement on merging the EAEU with the BRI was signed, Russia stopped talking about a rivalry with China, at least for the time being. China, on the other hand, continues to stress that the bilateral co-operation with Russia is crucial to the success of the BRI and seeks to strengthen this partnership within the BRI, at the same time calling for stability and transparency in its relationship with Russia.[11] China accepts the role of Russia as a security provider and guarantor in Central Asia and sees Russia as the leader in the field of security in the region.[12] The concepts of the BRI and the EAEU are quite different and not conflicting: The complementarity and inclusivity of the BRI means the EAEU can be integrated into the BRI.[13] Another example of such complementarity and inclusivity is that Kazakhstan's own state programme of infrastructure development *"Nurly Zhol"* was integrated into the BRI in 2016.[14]

The fourth source of challenges is the Afghan issue. Afghanistan is also a source of security threats such as religious extremism, international terrorism, and cross-border drug trafficking in Central Asia. It is in China's economic and security interests to promote peace, stability, and reconstruction in Afghanistan through economic assistance and multilateral political participation.[15]

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8   Nadège Rolland, A China-Russia Condominium over Eurasia, *Survival,* Volume 61, Issue 1, January 2019 , pp.7-22.

9   Li Yongquan, The greater Eurasian partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Can the two be linked? *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Volume 9, Issue 2, July 2018, pp. 94-99, here: p. 97, available at: https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/ S1879366518300198?token= 814930E846527952B98B60A8CD1622CF9FCAA708862699D33DCD6CA526574A423 ACB8C30C0D891899B2AF685F0BD75FE.

10   Cf. Sebastien Peyrouse, The Evolution of Russia's Views on the Belt and Road Initiative, *Asia Policy* 24/2017, pp. 96-102, here: p. 96.

11   Cf. Hu Biliang/Liu Qingjie/Yan Jiao, Adding "5 + 1" to China's Belt and Road Initiative, *Eastasiaforum*, 25 October 2017,at: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/25/adding-5-1-to-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/.

12   Cf. Sun, cited above (Note 3).

13   For more about the advantages of connecting the EAEU with the SREB, cf. Konstantin Syroezhkin, Sopryazhenie EAES i EPShP [The Alignment of the EAEU and the SREB], *Strategiya i Politika* 2/2016, pp. 37-55.

14   Cf. Rashmini Koparkar, Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for Central Asia, *Vivekananda International Foundation*, 14 June 2017, at: https://www.vifindia.org/article/ 2017/june/14/belt-and-road-initiative-implications-for-central-asia.

15   Luo Yingjie, Zhongya anquan xingshide bianhua ji qi yingxiang [Changes in the security situation in Central Asia and their impact], *Guoji anquan yanjiu [International Security Studies]* 2/2016, pp. 13-124, here: p. 124.

Fifth, the smooth and successful development of the SCO is very important for China, since it is one of the mechanisms for China to project its economic influence in Central Asia on a multilateral basis, and the only platform where China and Russia, as well as Central Asian states, come together to address security issues in an institutionalized way.

Sixth, economic threats and challenges intensified following the deepening of the relationship between China and the Central Asian states, especially after the implementation of the BRI. Chinese economic interests face tangible threats in Central Asia. China is one of the biggest investors and trading partners with Central Asian states, with many Chinese businesses located in the Central Asian region. For this reason, the financial and personal security of the Chinese citizens residing and working in Central Asia are of central importance in investment projects, infrastructure, energy, and industry. China is sensitive to political turmoil in the countries, since they lead to big financial losses for China, as occurred during the political unrest in Kyrgyzstan. Another issue of concern to Beijing is the possibility of a debt risk. China is one of the biggest creditors in Central Asia and has provided numerous loans, but the poor economic situation in the region creates risks too.[16] The possibility of tense relationships between Central Asian states, leading to instability and uncertainty within the region, is also crucial for Chinese economic security. For example, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are the source and transit countries of the Central Asian-China gas pipeline, so conflicts between them and with Uzbekistan threaten its successful functioning and China's investment security in Central Asia in general.[17] At the same time, threat perceptions of China among Central Asian states play a crucial role for the economic success of China in the region. Central Asian countries' risk perceptions are based on the inability to predict the success of the BRI, uncertainty regarding the economic and political developments within China, and the increasing debt leverage of Chinese companies in Central Asia. Major risks are associated with labour migration, lack of jobs for the local population, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, the instability of local currencies, and environmental pollution.[18] In terms of economy and finance, Kyrgyzstan's biggest debt is to China. The state already heavily depends on China, leaving almost no room for manoeuvre with regard to decision-making in co-operation with China. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan's main wish to increase job opportunities for the local population cannot be fulfilled by the BRI. The central concerns are thus related to a huge amount of loans which might lead the Central Asian countries into a debt trap and an influx of Chinese labour. There are further concerns that as China gets generally stronger and its economic presence in Central Asia becomes more visible, it will inevitably lead to China transforming itself into the security guarantor in Central Asia.[19]

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16   Cf. Sun, cited above (Note 3).
17   Cf. Luo, cited above (Note 15).
18   Marlene Laruelle (ed.), *China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Impact in Central Asia*, Washington, D.C., 2018.
19   Cf. Koparkar, cited above (Note 14).

The regimes in Central Asian states, and particularly their high levels of corruption, present an important threat to Chinese economic involvement in the region. The decision-making processes in Central Asia are not transparent and it is hard to find evidence of the conditions on which the BRI projects are based, whether they have local content, or are being imposed unilaterally.[20]

To these important security, political, and economic threats, we could add some socio-cultural threats originating from China's image in Central Asia and perceptions and acceptance of Chinese culture, way of life, socio-political system, and model of economic development within Central Asian societies.

There are many reasons Central Asian states do not favour China's deeper involvement in the region. These include an existing distrust of China, among others, due to a lack of understanding of its goals, motivations and culture, coupled with the absence of a Chinese official document on its aims, code of conduct, or the main principles of the BRI, a lack of consideration of local interests and risks in the region, as well as existing Sinophobia. Interestingly, Sinophobia and Sinophilia are closely intertwined in Central Asia, and quite often both are expressed by the same people depending on the issue at hand.[21] Culture, language, religion, traditions, and way of life should not be underestimated either. There is an existing imbalance between strong state-to-state relations and rather weak people-to-people relations and attitudes towards one another. People in Central Asia, despite being China's neighbours, do not know much about China, its culture, and traditions. This is mostly due to their long-term interactions with Imperial Russia and then the Soviet Union. They do not admire China in cultural or political terms, and do not want to see China's model as an alternative to theirs, politically or culturally. This can be partially explained by wider acceptance of Russia within these societies.[22]

Among Central Asian societies, interest in China is not of a cultural character, but has more to do with Chinese socio-economic advances and foreign policy choices. There is a lot of anti-migration and anti-Chinese sentiment in the media and within Central Asian societies, especially in Kyrgyzstan, where the issue with Chinese migrant workers is acute. It is worth noting that the responsibility for this does not just lie with China, which does indeed prefer to engage its own workers and neglects the employment needs of the local population. The Central Asian governments are also accountable for the fact that they do not provide official, transparent, and accessible data on migrant workers in their countries, thus exacerbating concerns and leading to exaggerations in media reports and public opinion. Central Asian governments make the mistake of not trying to integrate migrant workers into local societies, and instead

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20 Cf. ibid.
21 Cf. Sébastien Peyrouse, Discussing China: Sinophilia and Sinophobia in Central Asia, *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 7/2016, pp. 14-23.
22 Cf. Sheng Rui, Yidai yilu zhanlüe xia zhongguo he zhongya guojia hezuo zhong de jiyu yu tiaozhan [Opportunities and Challenges in Cooperation between China and Central Asian Countries under the "Belt and Road" Initiative], *Journal of Shandong Youth University of Political Science*, Volume 3, May 2017, pp. 28-32, here: p. 30.

of facing the problems openly and directly, brush the issue under the carpet in order to reduce its visibility.[23] In addition, China is often dragged into political struggle in Central Asia, making China a victim of domestic political competition. In such cases, China is often a target of suspicion rather than praise, which damages China's image overall.[24]

The EU in Central Asia: Interests and Threat Perceptions

As mentioned in the introduction, the EU and China share similar interests in preserving security and stability and forging economic development in Central Asia. Nevertheless, the two actors' methods of involvement in the region vary, as do some of their threat perceptions and challenges.

Like China, the EU established and began intensifying its relations with Central Asian states in the early 1990s. In 2007, the EU adopted its first strategy on Central Asia. Ever since, the EU has been emphasizing the importance of strengthening relations with Central Asian states, promoting European values such as democracy, rule of law, good governance, and human rights in the region. At the same time, it continues to recognize that not much has been done to achieve these goals,[25] especially in the field of human rights. Despite its objectives, the EU has a rather limited interest in the region on behalf of member states and subsequently limited resources to implement its ideas and visions. The EU takes a rather passive stance and responds only when it perceives security threats originating in or coming from Central Asia. Similar to Chinese experts, European experts suggest that the interactions between key actors in Central Asia should be viewed against the background of global developments and geopolitical changes. The role of Afghanistan was of great importance during the revision of the EU's Central Asia strategy in 2012. The situation has changed since 2014, when the EU started paying more attention to its relationship with Russia in Central Asia, and the wider effects of the war in Ukraine. The consequent worsening in relations between Russia and the EU has led to an inability to co-operate on urgent issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking.[26]

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23   Cf. Laruelle, cited above (Note 18), p. 152.
24   Cf. Zhao Huasheng, Xingxiang jianshe: zhongguo shenru zhongya de bijing zhilu [Image Construction: The Only Way for China to Go Deep into Central Asia], *Xinjiang shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban)* [Journal of Xinjiang Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)], Volume 26, Issue 4, July 2015, pp. 65-75, here: p. 69.
25   Cf. Jos Boonstra/Tika Tsertsvadze Implementation and review of the European Union-Central Asia Strategy: Recommendations for EU action, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, January 2016, p. 4, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO_IDA%282 016%29535019.
26   Cf. Michal Romanowski, The EU in Central Asia: The regional context, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, January 2016, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference= EXPO_IDA(2016)535020.

The long-term EU objectives are less visible than reactions to acute geo-political changes. This could be partially explained by the fact that, unlike China, the EU does not see Central Asia as its strategic and geopolitical prior-ity.[27] Geographical proximity to the region should not be underestimated either. Central Asia is relatively far from the EU, they do not share common borders, and as long as the Central Asian region is stable and does not present a threat to the EU or its interests there, the EU does not undertake much in this regard. For example, in 2014, the position of an EU Special Representative for Central Asia was even abolished, although it was revived in 2015, when, des-pite certain improvements to the 2007 Strategy, the EU still maintained a low profile in the region. In addition, the 2015 adjustments to the Strategy did not incorporate views from civil society in Central Asia,[28] which clearly demon-strates the EU's rather weak engagement in the region.

Another important factor and challenge for the EU's involvement in Cen-tral Asia is the lack of interest on the side of Central Asian states. Their inabil-ity to institutionalize the High-Level Political and Security Dialogue in 2013, and the cancellation of a second meeting planned for 2014 in Tajikistan,[29] demonstrate this clearly. However, since 2015, High-Level Political and Secu-rity Dialogue meetings have been held regularly, with the most recent taking place on 28 May 2019 in Brussels, to which Afghanistan was invited as a spe-cial guest. This was a special meeting for the EU and Central Asia, as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission adopted a Joint Communication on "The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership" on 15 May. The sides discussed important issues such as border management, the fight against illicit drug traf-ficking, strengthening co-operation on counterterrorism and preventing violent extremism, co-operation on new security challenges such as hybrid threats and enhancing co-operation in the field of connectivity between Europe and Asia, as well as ensuring the latter is sustainable, open and rules-based.[30]

Since around 2017, the EU has been intensifying its activities regarding Central Asia. The process of drafting a new EU Strategy for Central Asia started in 2017 and was finalized in June 2019. Although the transformation process in Central Asia – especially Uzbekistan's gradual opening and increas-ing readiness to enhance regional co-operation and engagement with the EU since 2016[31] – favours greater active involvement in the region on the part of the EU, this does not sufficiently address the question as to why the EU has

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27   Cf. Boonstra/Tsertsvadze, cited above (Note 25), p. 5.
28   Cf. ibid., p. 4.
29   Cf. ibid., p. 5.
30   Cf. European Union External Action, The EU and the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan hold High-level Political and Security Dialogue, Bruxelles, 28 May 2019, at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/63320/eu-and-countries-central-asia-and-afghanistan-hold-high-level-political-and-security-dialogue_en.
31   Cf. Martin Russell, The EU's new Central Asia strategy, European Parliament, European Parliamentary Research Service, January 2019, pp. 2 and 11, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2019)633162.

refocused its foreign policy on Central Asia. The main factor is China's BRI and its implementation both in Central Asia and in the EU itself. Although not directly referred to in the EU new strategy on Central Asia, the BRI has triggered the EU's anxiety and brought them to recognize the importance of having a stronger presence in Central Asia and enhancing their relationships with the states in the region.

The EU perceives not only economic but also political threats from Chinese involvement in Central Asia and the EU. Brussels takes a rather critical view of Chinese non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and the lack of political conditionality on providing loans and assistance, since this could be viewed as indirect support of non-democratic regimes. Quite often, the lack of information and transparency of Chinese co-operation with Central Asian states, both from the Chinese and Central Asian sides, might also suggest some hidden political motives and conditionality.

There is a view that China's active role within the EU under its BRI framework and BRI-related activities provided China with a basis for influencing EU policies. This happened, for example, in 2017, with Greece blocking an EU statement at the UN Human Rights Council. In the same year, Hungary refused to sign a joint letter denouncing the reported torture of detained lawyers in China.[32] These failures to make joint statements in international organizations, and some member states breaking EU consensus on international issues are worrisome tendencies for Brussels. The EU used to have no unified position towards many of China-related issues, including the BRI, human rights, or the South China Sea. However, the European Parliament resolution on the state of play of EU-China relations, adopted in September 2018, emphasises the importance for the EU of speaking with one voice in its relationship with China, and the participation in the 16+1 co-operation format (16 Central and East European states, among which eleven are EU member states, plus China) should enable this.[33]

If we try to draw a parallel between China's challenges and threat perceptions with regard to Central Asia analysed above, and those of the EU, we can see that the latter could also be organized into similar categories.

First are the challenges related to the EU policy towards Central Asia, namely the formulation of the policy on the EU level and its consequent implementation on the ground. The ability to speak with one voice and interest plays a very important role here. It is crucial for the EU to co-ordinate policies

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32   Cf. Erik Brattberg/Etienne Soula, Europe's Emerging Approach to China's Belt and Road Initiative, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 19 October 2018, at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/19/europe-s-emerging-approach-to-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-pub-77536.

33   Cf. Gisela Grieger, State of play of EU-China relations, European Parliament, European Parliamentary Research Service, January 2019, p. 3, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2019)633149.

and actions among its institutions and member states in order to avoid the challenges and risks of duplications and inefficiency.[34]

Second, the challenge of the EU's involvement into the region also depends on its acceptance among the Central Asian states. As discussed above, the Central Asian states have recently begun to welcome the EU's involvement in the region, both from an economic perspective and a political one, as a counterbalance to Russia and China. The EU is also popular in Central Asian societies in terms of languages, literature, culture, education, and way of life.

Thirdly, the relationships between the great powers in the region and interaction between them play the same important role for the EU in Central Asia as for China. The aforementioned EU-Russian relations are decisive for the level of EU involvement in Central Asian region, since, like China, the EU recognizes Russia as the state with the greatest influence there. For instance, Kyrgyzstan, in its efforts to democratize, is politically important for the EU, but there is also a very strong Russian influence in the country, which could turn it into a battlefield if EU relations with Russia worsen.[35]

China presents a rather new challenge for the EU, especially in terms of engaging and co-operating within connectivity projects between Europe and Asia, which has recently become an EU priority. The EU published its EU-Asia connectivity strategy in September 2018, prior to the October 2018 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), with the main emphasis on sustainability and transparency in its future co-operation with all Asian partners. The Strategy is informed by principles of sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-based connectivity.[36] The EU places an emphasis on supporting educational exchanges, mainly through Erasmus+ and the CAREN project, and helping to dismantle trade barriers, nevertheless, its activities have not attracted the same attention as China's BRI.[37] The EU's vision of connectivity was presented in September 2018 by the EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini. For Europe, connectivity is "the physical and non-physical infrastructure through which goods, services, ideas and people can flow unhindered".[38] As a response to the BRI-

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34   Cf. Anna Gussarova/Māris Andžāns (eds.), Political and security relations. Mapping EU-Central Asia relations, *SEnECA Policy Paper*, no. 1, September 2018, p. 3, at: https://www.seneca-eu.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/SEnECA_Policy_Paper_01_2018.pdf.
35   Cf. Boonstra/Tsertsvadze, cited above (Note 25), p. 7.
36   Cf. European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU Strategy, Brussels, 19 September, 2018, especially pp. 2-3, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/50708/connecting-europe-and-asia-building-blocks-eu-strategy_en.
37   Cf. Martin Russell, Connectivity in Central Asia. Reconnecting the Silk Road, European Parliament, European Parliamentary Research Service, April 2019, p. 1, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282019%29637891.
38   Connecting Europe and Asia: time to move up a gear, Delegation of the European Union to Kazakhstan, 20 September 2018, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/50900/connecting-europe-and-asia-time-move-gear_en.

related concerns, the EU also stresses "the need for transparently managed, sustainable connectivity that is economically viable, good for the environment, and does not leave partner countries with unmanageable debts",[39] in which it is easy to read the criticism of and a response to China's BRI. The Strategy does not explicitly mention the BRI, however, its principles can be seen as an answer to some of the criticisms of Beijing.[40] This explains why many see it as a response to the BRI, although the EU has not presented it as such.[41]

Fourth, the Afghan issue is a troublesome one for the EU too. Recently, Afghanistan has been increasingly viewed as an opportunity and not a threat by the Central Asian states, so within the EU, awareness of the positive role Central Asian states could play in stabilizing Afghanistan is also growing. Afghanistan should become a transit country for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI) pipeline and the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) power line, and Uzbekistan is helping to build a new railway in the country and has already transformed Afghanistan into its sixth-largest export market.[42] Afghanistan, in turn, also has the economic benefit of dealing with Central Asia as a transit state, as well as security and political advantages when Central Asian states engage in peace processes between the government and Taliban rebels, as Uzbekistan started doing in 2018.[43]

Fifth, there are economic challenges. The EU and China both focus on the economy, but while the Chinese influence is spread across the whole region, the EU's main focus lies on Kazakhstan, where the EU invests a lot, but also imports a lot.[44] Both actors pursue the same goals of developing Central Asia economically, but use different methods. The EU stresses progress in governance, the judicial system, civil society, and the relationship between the state and its citizens, and all this against the background of democracy and respect for human rights. China does not stress norms and values and sticks to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. China-led infrastructure-building is very appealing to Central Asian states, especially when no normative conditions are imposed on them.[45] Given that the EU money is limited and spread across a wide range of priorities, the EU does not generally fund major infrastructure projects in the region, with the exception of the World Bank-led CASA-1000 power line.[46] The EU does not oppose China in Central Asia, but wants to engage and co-operate with it. At the same time, despite a comprehensive strategic partnership between the two actors and their ties being highly institutionalized, the interaction between two different economic systems

39   Russell, The EU's new Central Asia strategy, cited above (Note 31), p. 11.
40   Cf. Russell, Connectivity in Central Asia, cited above (Note 37), p. 11.
41   Cf. Grieger, cited above (Note 33), p. 3.
42   Cf. Russell, The EU's new Central Asia strategy, cited above (Note 31), pp. 11-12.
43   Cf. ibid., p. 12.
44   Cf. Boonstra/Tsertsvadze, cited above (Note 25), p. 7.
45   Cf. Romanowski, cited above (Note 26), pp. 8, 10.
46   Cf. Russell, Connectivity in Central Asia, cited above (Note 37), p. 11.

might lead to competition.[47] The high level of corruption and absence of transparency in Central Asia create the same threats and risks for the EU's economic involvement in the region as they do for China's engagement there.

Concluding Remarks: Co-operation between the EU and China in Central Asia

China and the EU share the same risk perceptions with regard to Central Asia. Fighting terrorism, religious extremism, and radicalization, organized crime, drug trafficking, and security issues related to returning fighters in Central Asia all pose security threats both to China and the EU when they cross their state borders.

Aside from all its benefits, connectivity in Central Asia, regardless of whether it is set according to the standards and principles promoted by Beijing or Brussels, does not only bring positive results. Enhanced connectivity can lead to an increase in the prevalence and lucrativeness of drug trafficking, which is already a significant problem in Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyzstan, which are on the main drug transport route from Afghanistan to Europe. As well as increasing drug trafficking, road connectivity will facilitate the flow of migrants, both legal and illegal, and individuals interested in terrorist activities.[48] What is clear is that closer co-operation between China and the EU in combating their common security threats, working together on conflict prevention in the region, fighting against corruption in Central Asia[49] and deepening economic co-operation, including infrastructure and investment projects, could be beneficial for the region, as well as for relations between the EU and China.

From the Chinese point of view, the deeper involvement of the EU in Central Asia has both advantages and disadvantages for co-operation with Central Asia. Among the advantages is the promotion of economic development, and the opportunity for jointly combating terrorism and religious extremism, thus maintaining regional security and stability. Among the perceived disadvantages is the intensified and diversified competition between the great powers in Central Asia, including the strategies of the US, Japan, Turkey, and Russia in the region. Despite not having a geographical advantage in Central Asia, the EU is popular there, especially in the humanitarian and economic fields. This also means the EU has an advantage in competition for Central Asian energy resources, which could negatively influence energy co-operation between China and the Central Asian states. At the same time, in order to achieve positive results on a continuous basis, China should look for common interests with other powers present in the region and pursue co-operation as

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47   Cf. Grieger, cited above (Note 33), p. 1.
48   Cf. Troy Sternberg/Ariell Ahearn/Fiona McConnell, Central Asian "Characteristics" on China's New Silk Road: The Role of Landscape and the Politics of Infrastructure, *Land* 3/2017 available at:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/6/3/55.
49   Cf. Boonstra/Tsertsvadze, cited above (Note 25), p. 6.

well as competition,[50] and the EU could be Beijing's most welcome counterpart in this regard.

Although the European and Chinese visions on connectivity vary, the EU does not view these two approaches as competing, but perceives them as complementary. All parties involved could benefit from a situation in which Chinese investments could be combined with European know-how and law practices,[51] as well as with EU expertise and experience in fields of connectivity, such as education, person-to-person contact, and free movement of people, services, and goods.[52] China and the EU could also reduce their economic risk in the region by addressing corruption issues in Central Asia together.

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50   Cf. Zhang Ye, Zhongya diqu de daguo juezhu ji dui zhongguo yu zhongya quyu jingji hezuo de yingxiang [The competition of great powers in Central Asia and its impact on regional economic co-operation between China and Central Asia], *Xinjiang shehui kexue [Xinjiang Social Sciences]* 3/2009, pp. 59-63, here: p.63.
51   Cf. Boonstra/Tsertsvadze, cited above (Note 25), p. 6.
52   Cf. Russell, The EU's new Central Asia strategy, cited above (Note 31), p. 11.

Annexes

Forms and Forums of Co-operation in the OSCE Area

Group of Seven (G7)
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Council of Europe (CoE)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
Partnership for Peace (PfP)
NATO-Russia Council
NATO-Ukraine Charter/NATO-Ukraine Commission
NATO Partners across the Globe

European Union (EU)
EU Candidate Countries
EU Association Agreements
European Economic Area (EEA)
Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA)

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

Baltic Assembly/Baltic Council of Ministers
Barents Euro-Arctic Council
Observers to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council
Nordic Council
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)

Regional Co-operation Council (RCC)
South Eastern European Co-operation Process (SEECP)
Central European Free Trade Agreement/Area (CEFTA)
Central European Initiative (CEI)
Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC)

North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)/United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA)[1]

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
Observer States to the SCO
SCO Dialogue Partners

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1   The USMCA was signed on 30 November 2018 but is still to be ratified.

Sources:
OECD: *www.oecd.org*
Council of Europe: *www.coe.int*
NATO: *www.nato.int*
EU: *europa.eu*
EEA: http://www.efta.int/eea
CIS: *www.cis.minsk.by*
EAEU: *www.eaeunion.org*
CSTO: *www.odkb-csto.org*
Baltic Assembly/Baltic Council of Ministers: *www.baltasam.org*
Barents Euro-Arctic Council: *www.beac.st*
Nordic Council: *www.norden.org*
CBSS: *www.cbss.org*
RCC: *www.rcc.int*
CEFTA: *www.cefta.int*
CEI: *www.ceinet.org*
BSEC: *www.bsec-organization.org*
NAFTA: *www.naftanow.org*
SCO: *www.sectsco.org*

The 57 OSCE Participating States – Facts and Figures[1]

1. Albania

Date of accession: June 1991
Scale of contributions: 0.125 per cent[2] (OSCE ranking: 40)[3]
Area: 28,748 km² (OSCE ranking: 46)[4]
Population: 2,866,376 (OSCE ranking: 42)[5]
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars)[6]: 13,326
GDP growth[7]: 4.0 per cent (OSCE ranking: 19)[8]
Armed forces (active): 8,000 (OSCE ranking: 43)[9]
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1995), NATO (2009), EAPC, EU Candidate Country, RCC, SEECP, CEFTA, CEI (1996), BSEC.

2. Andorra

Date of accession: April 1996
Scale of contributions: 0.125 per cent (40)
Area: 468 km² (52)
Population: 77,006 (53)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): n/a
GDP growth: 1.6 per cent (46)
Armed forces (active): none
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1994), special agreement with the EU (1990)[10].

3. Armenia

Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.05 per cent (49)
Area: 29,743 km² (45)
Population: 2,951,776 (41)

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1   Compiled by Jochen Rasch, assisted by Alina Steinmann.
2   This results in a total of 99.998 per cent.
3   Of 57 states.
4   Of 57 states.
5   Of 57 states.
6   The international dollar is the hypothetical unit of currency used to compare different national currencies in terms of purchasing power parity. PPP is defined as the number of units of a country's currency required to buy the same amounts of goods and services in the domestic market as one US dollar would buy in the United States. See *The World Bank, World Development Report 2002*, Washington, D.C., 2002. Because the data in this category comes from various years, it does not make sense to compare states or provide a ranking.
7   Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
8   Of 51 states.
9   Of 53 states.
10   1990 agreement establishing a customs union (covering industrial goods) and 2004 (partial) co-operation agreement. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2050/andorra-and-eu_en.

GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 10,325
GDP growth: 5.2 per cent (6)
Armed forces (active): 44,800 (17)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (2001), EU-Armenia
Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (2017),[11] EAPC, PfP
(1994), CIS (1991), Eurasian Economic Union, CSTO, BSEC, SCO Dialogue
Partner.

4. Austria
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 2.503 per cent (13)
Area: 83,871 km² (30)
Population: 8,847,037 (25)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 55,510
GDP growth: 2.7 per cent (31)
Armed forces (active): 21,200 (31)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1956), EAPC,
PfP (1995), EU (1995), RCC, CEI (withdrawn 2018).[12]

5. Azerbaijan
Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.05 per cent (49)
Area: 86,600 km² (29)[13]
Population: 9,942,334 (21)[14]
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 18,012[15]
GDP growth: 1.4 per cent (48)[16]
Armed forces (active): 66,950 (13)[17]
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (2001), EU-Azerbaijan
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1999),[18] EAPC, PfP (1994), CIS
(1991), BSEC, SCO Dialogue Partner.

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11   The EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was
      signed on 24 November 2017. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
      homepage/896/armenia-and-eu_en.
12   Austria withdrew from CEI in December 2018. See: https://www.cei.int/news/8336/cei-
      summit-successfully-held-in-zagreb.
13   This figure includes the area of Naxcivan Autonomous Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh
      region.
14   Population of the Nagorno-Karabakh region: 148,000. See: http://stat-nkr.am/files/
      yearbooks/2019/4_%20naselenie_36-57.pdf, p. 36.
15   Figures for the Nagorno-Karabakh region are not available.
16   Figures for the Nagorno-Karabakh region are not available.
17   Nagorno-Karabakh: separatist forces 18,000–20,000 estimated.
18   See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/916/azerbaijan-and-eu_
      en.

6. Belarus
Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.28 per cent (30)
Area: 207,600 km² (20)
Population: 9,485,386 (23)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 19,960
GDP growth: 3.0 per cent (28)
Armed forces (active): 45,350 (16)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: EAPC, PfP (1995), CIS (1991),
Eurasian Economic Union, CSTO, CEI (1996), Observer State to the SCO.

7. Belgium
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 3.229 per cent (11)
Area: 30,528 km² (44)
Population: 11,422,068 (16)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 50,367
GDP growth: 1.4 per cent (48)
Armed forces (active): 26,550 (26)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1949), NATO
(1949), EAPC, EU (1958).

8. Bosnia and Herzegovina
Date of accession: April 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.125 per cent (40)
Area: 51,197 km² (37)
Population: 3,323,929 (39)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 14,348
GDP growth: 3.1 per cent (26)
Armed forces (active): 10,500 (39)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (2002), EAPC, PfP (2006), EU
membership application,[19] RCC, SEECP, CEFTA, CEI (1992).

9. Bulgaria
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.546 per cent (26)
Area: 110,879 km² (24)
Population: 7,024,216 (27)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 21,960
GDP growth: 3.1 per cent (26)
Armed forces (active): 31,300 (21)

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19 On 15 February 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina officially submitted its application for EU
    membership. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/bosnia-
    herzegovina.

Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1992), NATO (2004), EAPC, EU (2007), RCC, SEECP, CEI (1996), BSEC.

10. Canada
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 5.53 per cent (7)
Area: 9,984,670 km² (2)
Population: 37,058,856 (11)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 48,107
GDP growth: 1.9 per cent (42)
Armed forces (active): 66,600 (14)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: G7 (1976), OECD (1961), NATO (1949), CETA,[20] EAPC, Observer to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, RCC, NAFTA/USMCA.

11. Croatia
Date of accession: March 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.19 per cent (33)
Area: 56,594 km² (36)
Population: 4,089,400 (36)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 27,505
GDP growth: 2.6 per cent (33)
Armed forces (active): 15,200 (35)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1996), NATO (2009), EAPC, EU (2013), RCC, SEECP, CEI (1992).

12. Cyprus
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.189 per cent (35)
Area: 9,251 km² (50)[21]
Population: 1,189,265 (48)[22]
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 36.155[23]
GDP growth: 3.9 per cent (21)
Armed forces (active): 15,000 (36)[24]
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1961), EU (2004).

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20   The provisional application of the agreement started on 21 September 2017. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/640/canada-and-eu_en.
21   Greek sector: 5,896 km², Turkish sector: 3,355 km².
22   Total of Greek and Turkish sectors.
23   2017.
24   Turkish sector: 3,000 and 33,800 foreign forces (Turkey).

13. Czech Republic
Date of accession: January 1993
Scale of contributions: 0.57 per cent (25)
Area: 78,867 km² (31)
Population: 10,625,695 (18)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 39,744
GDP growth: 3.0 per cent (28)
Armed forces (active): 23,200 (28)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1995), CoE (1993), NATO (1999), EAPC, EU (2004), RCC, CEI (1993).

14. Denmark
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 2.094 per cent (14)
Area: 43,094 km² (40)
Population: 5,797,446 (31)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 55,105
GDP growth: 1.5 per cent (47)
Armed forces (active): 14,500 (37)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1949), NATO (1949), EAPC, EU (1973), Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Council (1952), CBSS (1992), RCC.

15. Estonia
Date of accession: September 1991
Scale of contributions: 0.189 per cent (35)
Area: 45,228 km² (39)
Population: 1,320,884 (47)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 35,450
GDP growth: 3.9 per cent (21)
Armed forces (active): 6,600 (46)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (2010), CoE (1993), NATO (2004), EAPC, EU (2004), Baltic Assembly/Baltic Council of Ministers, CBSS (1992).

16. Finland
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 1.843 per cent (16)
Area: 338,145 km² (14)
Population: 5,518,050 (32)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 47,930
GDP growth: 1.7 per cent (44)
Armed forces (active): 21,500 (29)

295

Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1969), CoE (1989), EAPC, PfP (1994), EU (1995), Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Council (1955), CBSS (1992), RCC.

17. France
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 9.364 per cent (2)
Area: 643,801 km² (7)[25]
Population: 66,987,244 (5)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 45,342
GDP growth: 1.7 per cent (44)
Armed forces (active): 203,900 (5)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: G7 (1975), OECD (1961), CoE (1949), NATO (1949), EAPC, EU (1958), Observer to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, RCC.

18. Georgia
Date of accession: March 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.05 per cent (49)
Area: 69,700 km² (33)[26]
Population: 3,731,000 (37)[27]
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 11,421[28]
GDP growth: 4.7 per cent (12)[29]
Armed forces (active): 20,650 (32)[30]
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1999), EAPC, PfP (1994), EU Association Agreement,[31] BSEC.

19. Germany
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 9.35 per cent (3)
Area: 357,022 km² (13)
Population: 82,927,922 (3)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 53,735

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25 This figure includes the area of the overseas regions of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, and Reunion.
26 This figure includes the area of Abkhazia (8,665 km², see: http://mfaapsny.org/en/helpful-information/general_information) and South Ossetia (3,900 km², see: http://www.mfa-rso.su).
27 This figure excludes the population of Abkhazia (242,826, see: http://mfaapsny.org/en/helpful-information/general_information) and South Ossetia (53,532, see: http://ugosstat.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Itogi-perepisi-RYUO.pdf, p. 11).
28 Excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
29 Excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
30 Territory, where the government does not exercise effective control: 7,000 Russian forces.
31 The EU-Georgia Association Agreement entered into force on 1 July 2016. The EU and Georgia have also entered into a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). See: https:// eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1237/georgia-and-eu_en.

GDP growth: 1.4 per cent (48)
Armed forces (active): 179,400 (6)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: G7 (1975), OECD (1961), CoE (1950), NATO (1955), EAPC, EU (1958), Observer to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, CBSS (1992), RCC.

20. Greece
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.978 per cent (20)
Area: 131,957 km² (23)
Population: 10,727,668 (17)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 29,592
GDP growth: 1.9 per cent (42)
Armed forces (active): 142,350 (9)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1949), NATO (1952), EAPC, EU (1981), RCC, SEECP, BSEC.

21. The Holy See
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.125 per cent (40)
Area: 0.44 km² (57)
Population: 453 (57)[32]
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): n/a
GDP growth: n/a
Armed forces (active): none[33]
Memberships and forms of co-operation: none.

22. Hungary
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.598 per cent (24)
Area: 93,028 km² (26)
Population: 9,768,785 (22)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 30,673
GDP growth: 4.9 per cent (9)
Armed forces (active): 27,800 (24)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1996), CoE (1990), NATO (1999), EAPC, EU (2004), RCC, CEI (1989).

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32   Population: 453, citizens: 618, per 01.02.2019. See: https://www.vaticanstate.va/it/stato-governo/note-generali/popolazione.html.
33   Authorized strength 110 members of the Swiss Guard, see: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/swiss_guard/500_swiss/documents/rc_gsp_20060121_informazioni_it.html.

23. Iceland
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.19 per cent (33)
Area: 103,000 km² (25)
Population: 353,574 (52)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 57,311
GDP growth: 4.6 per cent (13)
Armed forces (active): none
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1950), NATO (1949), EAPC, EEA (1994),[34] Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Council (1952), CBSS (1995).

24. Ireland
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.75 per cent (21)
Area: 70,273 km² (32)
Population: 4,853,506 (35)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 83,203
GDP growth: 8.2 per cent (1)
Armed forces (active): 9,500 (41)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1949), EAPC, PfP (1999), EU (1973), RCC.

25. Italy
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 9.337 per cent (5)
Area: 301,340 km² (17)
Population: 60,431,283 (7)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 41,630
GDP growth: 0.9 per cent (53)
Armed forces (active): 171,050 (7)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: G7 (1975), OECD (1962), CoE (1949), NATO (1949), EAPC, EU (1958), Observer to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, RCC, CEI (1989).

26. Kazakhstan
Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.36 per cent (28)
Area: 2,724,900 km² (4)
Population: 18,276,499 (14)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 27,831

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34   In March 2015, Iceland's government requested that "Iceland should not be regarded as a candidate country for EU membership". At: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/15864/iceland-and-eu_en.

GDP growth: 4.1 per cent (16)
Armed forces (active): 39,000 (18)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: EAPC, PfP (1994), Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,[35] CIS (1991), Eurasian Economic Union, CSTO, SCO.

27. Kyrgyzstan
Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.05 per cent (49)
Area: 199,951 km² (21)
Population: 6,315,800 (29)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 3,878
GDP growth: 3.5 per cent (23)
Armed forces (active): 10,900 (38)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: EAPC, PfP (1994), Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1999),[36] CIS (1991), Eurasian Economic Union, CSTO, SCO.

28. Latvia
Date of accession: September 1991
Scale of contributions: 0.189 per cent (35)
Area: 64,589 km² (35)
Population: 1,926,542 (46)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 30,692
GDP growth: 4.8 per cent (11)
Armed forces (active): 6,210 (47)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (2016), CoE (1995), NATO (2004), EAPC, EU (2004), Baltic Assembly/Baltic Council of Ministers, CBSS (1992), RCC.

29. Liechtenstein
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.125 per cent (40)
Area: 160 km² (54)
Population: 37,910 (55)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): n/a
GDP growth: n/a

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35   Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) between the EU and Kazakhstan, signed on 21 December 2015. On 1 May 2016, most of the Trade and Business chapters of the EPCA provisionally entered into force. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1367/kazakhstan-and-eu_en.

36   In December 2017 the EU and Kyrgyzstan launched negotiations on a new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1397/kyrgyz-republic-and-eu_en.

Armed forces (active): none[37]
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1978), EEA (1995).

30. Lithuania
Date of accession: September 1991
Scale of contributions: 0.189 per cent (35)
Area: 65,300 km² (34)
Population: 2,789,533 (43)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 35,343
GDP growth: 3.5 per cent (23)
Armed forces (active): 19,850 (33)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (2018), CoE (1993), NATO (2004), EAPC, EU (2004), Baltic Assembly/Baltic Council of Ministers, CBSS (1992).

31. Luxembourg
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.47 per cent (27)
Area: 2,586 km² (51)
Population: 607,728 (50)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 111,103
GDP growth: 2.6 per cent (33)
Armed forces (active): 900 (51)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1949), NATO (1949), EAPC, EU (1958).

32. Malta
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.125 per cent (40)
Area: 316 km² (53)
Population: 483,530 (51)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 42,567
GDP growth: 6.6 per cent (4)
Armed forces (active): 1,950 (49)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1965), EAPC, PfP (1995/2008[38]), EU (2004).

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37   In 1868, the armed forces were dissolved, see: https://web.archive.org/web/201305080754
      11/http://www.liechtenstein.li/index.php?id=60&L=1.
38   Malta joined the PfP in April 1995, but suspended its participation in October 1996. Malta
      re-engaged in the Partnership for Peace Programme in 2008, see: http://www.nato.int/
      docu/update/2008/04-april/e0403e.html.

33. Moldova

Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.05 per cent (49)
Area: 33,851 km² (43)[39]
Population: 3,545,883 (38)[40]
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 7,301[41]
GDP growth: 4.0 per cent (19)[42]
Armed forces (active): 5,150 (48)[43]
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1995), EAPC, PfP (1994), EU-Moldova Association Agreement (2014), CIS (1991), RCC, SEECP, CEFTA, CEI (1996), BSEC.

34. Monaco

Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.125 per cent (40)
Area: 2.00 km² (56)
Population: 38,682 (54)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): n/a
GDP growth: n/a
Armed forces (active): none
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (2004), EU customs territory.[44]

35. Mongolia

Date of accession: November 2012
Scale of contributions: 0.05 per cent (49)
Area: 1,564,116 km² (5)
Population: 3,170,208 (40)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 13,735
GDP growth: 6.9 per cent (3)
Armed forces (active): 9,700 (40)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: NATO Partners across the Globe, Observer State to the SCO.

36. Montenegro

Date of accession: June 2006
Scale of contributions: 0.05 per cent (49)
Area: 13,812 km² (49)

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39   This figure includes the area of Transdnistria (4,163 km², see: http://mfa-pmr.org/en/about_republic).
40   This figure excludes the population of Transdnistria (475,665 in 2015). See: http://gov-pmr.org/item/6831.
41   Excluding Transdnistria.
42   Excluding Transdnistria.
43   Transdnistria: 1,500 Russian forces (estimated, including 400 peacekeepers).
44   Monaco is part of the EU customs territory. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2290/monaco-and-eu_en.

Population: 622,345 (49)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 20,495
GDP growth: 4.9 per cent (9)
Armed forces (active): 1,950 (49)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (2007), NATO (2017), EAPC,
EU Candidate Country,[45] RCC, SEECP, CEFTA, CEI (2006).

37. Netherlands
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 4.351 per cent (9)
Area: 41,543 km² (41)
Population: 17,231,017 (15)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 56,329
GDP growth: 2.6 per cent (33)
Armed forces (active): 35,400 (20)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1949), NATO
(1949), EAPC, EU (1958), Observer to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.

38. North Macedonia[46]
Date of accession: October 1995
Scale of contributions: 0.125 per cent (40)
Area: 25,713 km² (47)
Population: 2,082,958 (44)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 16,359
GDP growth: 2.7 per cent (31)
Armed forces (active): 8,000 (43)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1995), EAPC, PfP (1995), EU
Candidate Country,[47] RCC, SEECP, CEFTA, CEI (1993).

39. Norway
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 2.05 per cent (15)
Area: 323,802 km² (15)
Population: 5,314,336 (34)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 65,599
GDP growth: 1.4 per cent (48)
Armed forces (active): 23,250 (27)

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45   See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/27529/montenegro-and-eu_en.
46   The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia renamed itself Republic of North Macedonia on 12 February 2019. See: https://vlada.mk/node/16763?ln=en-gb.
47   See: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/north-macedonia_en.

Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1949), NATO (1949), EAPC, EEA (1996), Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Council (1952), CBSS (1992), RCC.

40. Poland
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 1.35 per cent (17)
Area: 312,685 km² (16)
Population: 37,978,548 (10)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 31,343
GDP growth: 5.1 per cent (7)
Armed forces (active): 117,800 (11)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1996), CoE (1991), NATO (1999), EAPC, EU (2004), Observer to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, CBSS (1992), RCC, CEI (1991).

41. Portugal
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.98 per cent (19)
Area: 92,090 km² (27)
Population: 10,281,762 (19)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 33,041
GDP growth: 2.1 per cent (41)
Armed forces (active): 27,200 (25)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1976), NATO (1949), EAPC, EU (1986).

42. Romania
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.6 per cent (23)
Area: 238,391 km² (19)
Population: 19,473,936 (13)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 28,206
GDP growth: 4.1 per cent (16)
Armed forces (active): 69,300 (12)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1993), NATO (2004), EAPC, EU (2007), RCC, SEECP, CEI (1996), BSEC.

43. Russian Federation
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 6 per cent (6)
Area: 17,098,242 km² (1)
Population: 144,478,050 (2)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 27,147

GDP growth: 2.3 per cent (40)
Armed forces (active): 900,000 (2)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD Accession Process,[48] CoE (1996), EAPC, PfP (1994), NATO-Russia Council (2002),[49] CIS (1991), Eurasian Economic Union, CSTO, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, CBSS (1992), BSEC, SCO.

44. San Marino
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 0.125 per cent (40)
Area: 61 km² (55)
Population: 33,785 (56)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 63,037[50]
GDP growth: n/a
Armed forces (active): none
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1988).

45. Serbia
Date of accession: November 2000[51]
Scale of contributions: 0.14 per cent (39)
Area: 88,361 km² (28)[52]
Population: 6,982,084 (28)[53]
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 17,404[54]
GDP growth: 4.3 per cent (15)[55]
Armed forces (active): 28,150 (23)[56]
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (2003), EAPC, PfP (2006), EU Candidate Country, RCC, SEECP, CEFTA, CEI (2000), BSEC.

46. Slovakia
Date of accession: January 1993
Scale of contributions: 0.28 per cent (30)
Area: 49,035 km² (38)
Population: 5,447,011 (33)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 33,917

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48   In March 2014, the accession process to the OECD of the Russian Federation was postponed.
49   In April 2014 NATO, suspended all practical cooperation with Russia. Political dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council has been continued only at the Ambassadorial level and above. In 2019, two meetings of the NATO-Russia Council took place. See: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_50091.htm.
50   2017.
51   Yugoslavia was suspended from 7 July 1992 to 10 November 2000.
52   This figure includes the area of Kosovo (10,887 km²).
53   This figure includes the population of Kosovo (1,845,300).
54   This figure does not include Kosovo (11,367).
55   This figure does not include Kosovo (4.1 per cent).
56   This figure does not include Kosovo Security Force: 2,500.

GDP growth: 4.1 per cent (16)
Armed forces (active): 15,850 (34)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (2000), CoE (1993), NATO (2004), EAPC, EU (2004), RCC, CEI (1993).

47. Slovenia
Date of accession: March 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.219 per cent (32)
Area: 20,273 km² (48)
Population: 2,067,372 (45)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 38,209
GDP growth: 4.5 per cent (14)
Armed forces (active): 7,250 (45)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (2010), CoE (1993), NATO (2004), EAPC, EU (2004), RCC, SEECP, CEI (1992).

48. Spain
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 4.584 per cent (8)
Area: 505,370 km² (9)
Population: 46,723,749 (8)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 39,915
GDP growth: 2.6 per cent (33)
Armed forces (active): 120,350 (10)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1977), NATO (1982), EAPC, EU (1986), RCC.

49. Sweden
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 3.231 per cent (10)
Area: 450,295 km² (11)
Population: 10,183,175 (20)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 52,725
GDP growth: 2.4 per cent (39)
Armed forces (active): 29,750 (22)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1949), EAPC, PfP (1994), EU (1995), Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Council (1952), CBSS (1992), RCC.

50. Switzerland
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 2.81 per cent (12)
Area: 41,277 km² (42)
Population: 8,516,543 (26)

GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 68,096
GDP growth: 2.5 per cent (38)
Armed forces (active): 21,450 (30)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1963), EAPC,
PfP (1996), EU Association Agreement (withdrawn 2016),[57] RCC.

51. Tajikistan
Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.05 per cent (49)
Area: 144,100 km² (22)
Population: 9,100,837 (24)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 3,444
GDP growth: 7.3 per cent (2)
Armed forces (active): 8,800 (42)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: EAPC, PfP (2002), EU-Tajikistan
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (2010),[58] CIS (1991), CSTO, SCO.

52. Turkey
Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 1.01 per cent (18)
Area: 783,562 km² (6)
Population: 82,319,724 (4)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 27,893
GDP growth: 2.6 per cent (33)
Armed forces (active): 355,200 (3)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: OECD (1961), CoE (1950), NATO
(1952), EAPC, EU Candidate Country,[59] RCC, SEECP, BSEC, SCO
Dialogue Partner.

53. Turkmenistan
Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.05 per cent (49)
Area: 488,100 km² (10)
Population: 5,850,908 (30)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 19,270
GDP growth: 6.2 per cent (5)
Armed forces (active): 36,500 (19)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: EAPC, PfP (1994), CIS (1991).

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57 Switzerland formally withdrew its application for accession to the European Economic
    Community (EEC) of 20 May 1992 on 27 July 2016. See: https://web.archive.org/web/
    20161022054616/https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/dea/fr/documents/bundesrat/160
    727-Lettre-retrait-adhesion-CH_fr.pdf/.
58 See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/750/tajikistan-and-eu_en.
59 The accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/
    headquarters/headquarters-homepage/49963/turkey-and-eu_en.

54. Ukraine

Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.68 per cent (22)
Area: 603,550 km² (8)[60]
Population: 44,622,516 (9)[61]
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 9,233[62]
GDP growth: 3.3 per cent (25)
Armed forces (active): 209,000 (4)[63]
Memberships and forms of co-operation: CoE (1995), EAPC, PfP (1994), NATO-Ukraine Charter/NATO-Ukraine Commission (1997), EU Association Agreement and DCFTA,[64] CIS (withdrawn 2018)[65], CEI (1996), BSEC.

55. United Kingdom

Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 9.35 per cent (3)
Area: 243,610 km² (18)
Population: 66,488,991 (6)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 45,489
GDP growth: 1.4 per cent (48)
Armed forces (active): 148,350 (8)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: G7 (1975), OECD (1961), CoE (1949), NATO (1949), EAPC, EU (1973),[66] Observer to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, RCC.

56. USA

Date of accession: June 1973
Scale of contributions: 11.5 per cent (1)
Area: 9,833,517 km² (3)
Population: 327,167,434 (1)

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60   This figure includes the area of Crimea, Sevastopol and the territories where the government does not exercise effective control.
61   41,960,033 excluding Crimea and Sevastopol according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine estimate as of 1 October 2019. See: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/eng/news/op_popul_e.asp.#
62   Figures for the area of Crimea, Sevastopol and the territories where the government does not exercise effective control are not available.
63   In addition, there are: Paramilitary: Ukraine 88,000; separatist forces: Donetsk 20,000 (estimated), Luhansk 14,000 (estimated); foreign forces: Donetsk and Luhansk 3,000 (reported); Russian forces: Crimea 28,000.
64   The EU Association Agreement came into full force on 1 September 2017. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1937/ukraine-and-eu_en.
65   Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has signed a decree on the recall of all representatives of Ukraine from all statutory bodies of the CIS on 19 May 2018. See: https://www.unian.info/politics/10123172-poroshenko-signs-decree-on-final-termination-of-ukraine-s-participation-in-cis-statutory-bodies.html.
66   The UK will withdraw from the EU. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit-preparedness/brexit-notices-explanation_en.

GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 62,641
GDP growth: 2.9 per cent (30)
Armed forces (active): 1,359,450 (1)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: G7 (1975), OECD (1961), NATO (1949), EAPC, Observer to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, RCC, NAFTA/USMCA.

57. Uzbekistan

Date of accession: January 1992
Scale of contributions: 0.35 per cent (29)
Area: 447,400 km² (12)
Population: 32,955,400 (12)
GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars): 7,020
GDP growth: 5.1 per cent (7)
Armed forces (active): 48,000 (15)
Memberships and forms of co-operation: EAPC, PfP (1994), CIS (1991), SCO.

Sources:
Date of accession:
http://web.archive.org/web/20100826040207/http://www.osce.org/about/131 31.html and http://www.osce.org/de/mc/97738 (Mongolia)

Scale of contributions:
OSCE, decision of the Permanent Council, PC.DEC/1325, 11 April 2019. https://www.osce.org/permanent-council/417152?download=true

Area:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/rawdata_2147.txt

Population:
(Total population, 2018 midyear estimates, last updated 28. October 2019) http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?downloadformat=ex cel

GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars):
(as of 2018, unless stated to the contrary, last updated 28. October 2019) http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?downloadfo rmat=excel

GDP growth:
(as of 2018, unless stated to the contrary, last updated 28 October 2019)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries

Armed forces (active):
International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), The Military Balance 2019,
London 2019

OSCE Conferences, Meetings, and Events 2018/2019

2018

5-7 September	OSCE Chairmanship/Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA): Concluding Meeting of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum on "Promoting economic progress and security in the OSCE area through innovation, human capital development, and good public and corporate governance", Prague
10-21 September	OSCE Chairmanship/OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 2018, Warsaw
24-26 September	OSCE Mission to Moldova/OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)/Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Italian Embassy in Moldova: OSCE-organized study visit on multilingual education, Chişinău/Bolzano
27-28 September	OSCE Chairmanship/Transnational Threats Department (TNTD): 2018 OSCE-wide Conference on Cyber/ICT Security, Rome
1 October	OSCE Chairmanship/ODIHR/OSCE Gender Section: Conference on "Women in the Security Sector: Challenges for the OSCE Area and Beyond", Vienna
1-5 October	OSCE Chairmanship/TNTD/Border Security and Management Unit (BSMU)/OSCE Mission to Montenegro/Ministry of Culture of Montenegro: Regional workshop on combating illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property, Podgorica
3 October	HCNM/Italian Permanent Representation to the United Nations: Panel Discussion with regional organizations on co-operation in conflict prevention, New York
3-6 October	OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA): 17th Autumn Meeting on "Promoting Security Dialogue in Central Asia and Beyond", Bishkek
8 October	OSCE Chairmanship: Meeting of the OSCE Political Directors, Rome
8-9 October	OSCE Chairmanship/ODIHR: Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting III – Human Rights and Education: Promoting human rights, peaceful coexistence and security in the OSCE region through education, Vienna

16-17 October	ODIHR/Balkans Independent Disability Framework: Regional conference on political and electoral participation of persons with disabilities, Belgrade
22-23 October	OSCE Chairmanship/TNTD/Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU): 2018 Annual Police Experts Meeting, Vienna
23 October	OSCE Chairmanship/ODIHR: Conference on "Combating Intolerance and Discrimination, with a Focus on Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Towards a Comprehensive Response in the OSCE Region", Rome
25-26 October	ODIHR/Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Belarus/Belarusian State University/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA): Second International Forum of Women Leaders, Minsk
25-26 October	Chairmanship of the OSCE Mediterranean Contact Group/Spain/OSCE Secretariat: OSCE Mediterranean Conference, Malaga
30 October	OSCE Chairmanship/OSCE Gender Section: Conference on "Digital Transformation – Challenges and Opportunities for Women to Shape Economic Progress in the OSCE Area", Vienna
5-6 November	OSCE Chairmanship: OSCE Asian Conference, Canberra
7-8 November	OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM): 20th Central Asia Media Conference, Astana
9 November	HCNM/Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands: 25th Anniversary Celebration and 2018 Max van der Stoel Award Ceremony, The Hague
12-13 November	OSCE Chairmanship/International Affairs Institute/ LUISS University: Conference on "Developing anti-corruption strategies for the digital age: recent trends and best practices in the OSCE area", Rome
14 November	ODIHR: Conference on "Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime", Vienna
27-29 November	ODIHR: Seventh Expert Forum on Criminal Justice for Central Asia, Bishkek
3-7 December	HCNM/ORLEU National Centre for Professional Development: Central Asia Regional School on Multilingual and Multicultural Education for Integration and Sustainable Development, Almaty
6-7 December	OSCE Chairmanship: 25th OSCE Ministerial Council, Milan

12 December	OSCE Secretariat: EU-OSCE annual high-level meeting, Brussels
18 December	OSCE Chairmanship: Conference on behalf of the 2018 International Migrants Day, Vienna

2019

1 January	Slovakia takes over the OSCE Chairmanship from Italy. Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák becomes Chairperson-in-Office
10 January	OSCE Chairmanship: OSCE Chairperson-in-Office addresses Permanent Council outlining the priorities of Slovakia's 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, Vienna
14-20 January	ODIHR/European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR): Winter School on Political Parties and Democracy, Warsaw
28 January	OSCE Chairmanship/Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA): First Preparatory Meeting of the 27th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum on "Promoting economic progress and security in the OSCE area through energy co-operation, new technologies, good governance and connectivity in the digital era", Bratislava
5-7 February	OSCE Chairmanship: Conference on Combating Anti-Semitism in the OSCE Region, Bratislava
6 February	ODIHR/OSCE Mission to Skopje: Conference on enhancing the electoral participation of persons with disabilities, Skopje
12 February	RFOM/Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights: Safety of Female Journalists Online (#SOFJO) Conference "Increasing Opportunities for Freedom of Expression and Media Plurality", Vienna
22-23 February	OSCE PA: 2019 Winter Meeting, Vienna
20 March	OSCE Chairmanship/OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC): Meeting on best practice examples of and perspectives on Security sector governance and reform (SSG/R), Vienna
25-26 March	OSCE Chairmanship/OSCE Secretariat: Counter-Terrorism Conference, Bratislava
1-2 April	OSCE Chairmanship/ODIHR: Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting I – Upholding the Principles of Tolerance and Non-Discrimination including in the

	Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief, Vienna
5 April	OSCE Chairmanship: High-Level Meeting on the Reform of the Scales of Contributions, Bratislava
8-9 April	OSCE Chairmanship/OSCE Secretariat: 19th Alliance against Trafficking in Persons Conference, Vienna
9-10 April	OSCE Chairmanship/TNTD/BSMU: 13th Annual Meeting of the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Points Network, Bratislava
11 April	HCNM/Ministry of Education, Culture and Research of Moldova: Conference on "Multilingual education in the OSCE region: experiences and perspectives for Moldova", Chişinău
12 April	RFOM: Conference on "Journalists Under Attack: a threat to media freedom", Vienna
18 April	OSCE PA/Interparliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States/UN agencies: International Conference on Counter-Terrorism, St. Petersburg
24 May	OSCE Chairmanship/TNTD/Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior: Conference on "Crime in the Digital Age", Vienna
27-28 May	OSCE Chairmanship/OCEEA: Second Preparatory Meeting of the 27th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum, Bratislava
3-7 June	ODIHR/European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI): National Human Rights Institutions Academy, Venice
4 June	OSCE Chairmanship/OSCE Secretariat: Regional event on security sector governance and reform, Belgrade
4 June	OSCE Secretariat/United Nations Office: OSCE Security Days, Vienna
5 June	Permanent Representations of Denmark, Switzerland, Austria to the OSCE/OSCE Chairmanship/ODIHR: Conference on "Effective multilateralism in the fight against torture: Trends in the OSCE region and the way forward", Vienna
6-7 June	ODIHR/Parliament of Georgia/OSCE PA/National Democratic Institute: Conference on parliamentary oversight, Tbilisi
17-18 June	OSCE Chairmanship/TNTD: Conference on "Cyber/ICT Security for a Safer Future: The OSCE's Role in Fostering Regional Cyber Security", Bratislava

19 June	RFOM/OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sixth OSCE RFOM South East Europe Media Conference, Sarajevo
25-27 June	OSCE Chairmanship: 2019 Annual Security Review Conference, Vienna
4-8 July	OSCE PA: 28th Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on "Advancing Sustainable Development to Promote Security: The Role of Parliaments", Luxembourg
5 July	OSCE Chairmanship/OSCE Gender Section/OCEEA/ Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE: High-Level Discussion on "Promoting the Role of Women in Addressing Environment and Security Challenges", Vienna
8-9 July	OSCE Chairmanship: Informal Ministerial Gathering, High Tatras
15-16 July	OSCE Chairmanship/ODIHR: Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting II on Effective Multilateralism in the OSCE Human Dimension, Vienna
17-18 July	RFOM: 21st Central Asia Media Conference, Bishkek
2 September	OSCE Chairmanship/Asian Partners for Co-operation: 2019 OSCE Asian Conference, Tokyo
9-10 September	OSCE Chairmanship: Conference on Security Sector Governance and Reform, Bratislava
11-13 September	OSCE Chairmanship/OCEEA: 27th OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum, Prague
16-27 September	ODIHR: 23rd Annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 2019, Warsaw
23-24 September	OSCE Chairmanship/TNTD/SPMU: 2019 Annual Police Experts Meeting "Artificial Intelligence and law enforcement – an ally or adversary?", Vienna

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Abbreviations

ABL	Administrative Boundary Line
ACRS	Arms Control and Regional Security
ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AIAM	Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting
AO	Autonomous Oblast
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ARF-D	Armenian Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutyun
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASRC	Annual Security Review Conference
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
ATU	Action against Terrorism Unit
AU	African Union
BMSC	Border Management Staff College
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSMC	Border Security and Management Concept
BSMU	Border Security and Management Unit
CACO	Central Asian Cooperation Organization
CASA-1000	Central Asia-South Asia Power Project
CBMs	Confidence-Building Measures
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States
CEC	Central Election Commission
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI	Central European Initiative
CEPA	Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement
CERD	Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFE Treaty	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CFV	Cease-Fire Violation
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CiO	Chairperson-in-Office
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CoE	Council of Europe
CORE	Centre for OSCE Research
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre

CPRSI	Contact Point on Roma and Sinti Issues
CPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
CREATE	Crisis Response Executive Advisory Team
CSBMs	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (since January 1995 OSCE)
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DFS	Department of Field Support
DGAP	German Council on Foreign Relations
DG NEAR	Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DPR	Donetsk People's Republic (self-declared)
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Commission
EC	European Community
ECB	European Central Bank
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECHR/ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECPR	European Consortium for Political Research
ECRI	European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EED	Economic and Environmental Dimension
EEF	Economic and Environmental Forum
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zones
EGIS	Enterprise Geographic Information System
ENNHRI	European Network of National Human Rights Institutions
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENVSEC	Environment and Security Initiative
EOM	Election Observation Mission
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union

EUMM	EU Monitoring Mission
FOPs	Field Operations
FSB	Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii/ Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
G7	Group of Seven
G20	Group of Twenty
GA	General Assembly
GCAs	Government-Controlled Areas (in Ukraine)
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GID	Geneva International Discussions
GIS	Geographic Information System
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HDIM	Human Dimension Implementation Meeting
HLPF	High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
HLPG	High-Level Planning Group
HLTF	High-Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control
HRAM	Human Rights Assessment Mission
ICAT	Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEOM	International Election Observation Mission
IFOR	Implementation Force
IHFFC	International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMC	Information Management Centre (previously: Cell)
IMEMO	Institut mirovoj ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenij/ Institute of World Economy and International Relations

IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IOs	International Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPI	International Peace Institute
IPRM	Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism
ISP	Integrated Approach for Security and Peace
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti/Committee for State Security
LAS	League of Arab States
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersexual
LLP	Limited Liability Partnership
LPR	Lugansk People's Republic (self-declared)
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MC	Ministerial Council
MCOP	Mission Common Operational Picture
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGIMO	Moskovsky gosudarstvennyi institut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (universitet)/Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University)
MO	Monitoring Officer
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MPCs	Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation
MT	Monitoring Team
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAES	National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBIC	Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology, and Cognitive Science
NGCAs	Non-Government-Controlled Areas
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHRI	National Human Rights Institution
NKR	Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty/Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OCEEA	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFA	Ohrid Framework Agreement
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OM	Observer Mission
OS	Treaty on Open Skies
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSR/CTHB	Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
PA	Parliamentary Assembly
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PAS	Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate/Party of Action and Solidarity
PC	Permanent Council
PCRM	Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova/Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova
PCU	Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine
PDM	Partidul Democrat din Moldova/Democratic Party of Moldova
PEP	Panel of Eminent Persons
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PISM	Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych/Polish Institute of International Affairs
PMR	Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika/Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic
PPDA	Partidul Platforma Demnitate și Adevăr/Dignity and Truth Platform Party
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSRM	Partidul Socialiștilor din Republica Moldova/Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova
RCC	Regional Cooperation Council
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams
REC	Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe
RFOM	Representative on Freedom of the Media
ROK	Republic of Korea
RPA	Republican Party of Armenia
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement

SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SatCen	EU Satellite Centre
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SECI	Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
SEECP	South-East European Cooperation Process
SG	Secretary General
SHDM	Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SIS	Security and Intelligence Service
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit
SSG	Security Sector Governance
SSG/R	Security Sector Governance and Reform
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/German Institute for International and Security Affairs
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline
TAT	Tech Against Trafficking Initiative
TCG	Trilateral Contact Group
THB	Trafficking in Human Beings
TMC	Technical Monitoring Centre
TMO	Technical Monitoring Officer
TNT	Transnational Threats
TNTD	Transnational Threats Department
TNTD/ATU	Transnational Threats Department's Action against Terrorism Unit
TNTD/BSMU	Transnational Threats Department's Border Security and Management Unit
TNTD/SPMU	Transnational Threats Department's Strategic Police Matters Unit
UATI	Universal Anti-Terrorism Instruments
UAV	Unmanned/Unpersonned Aerial Vehicle
UCAV	Unmanned/Unpersonned Combat Aerial Vehicle
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UK	United Kingdom
UN/UNO	United Nations/United Nations Organization
UNCHR	United Nations Commission on Human Rights

UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UN DOS	United Nations Department of Operational Support
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN DPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UN DPO	United Nations Department of Peace Operations
UN DPPA	United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UN Environment/ UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCHR/ UNOHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/United Nations Refugee Agency
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSSC	United Nations System Staff College
UNU-CRIS	United Nations University Programme on Comparative Regional Integration Studies
USA/US	United States of America/United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VD	Vienna Document
VERLT	Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism
VTOL	Vertical Take-Off and Landing
WCO	World Customs Organization
WEF	World Economic Forum
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZIF	Center for International Peace Operations

Contributors

Namig Abbasov, PhD Student, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University; Tempe

Dr Günther Baechler, 2010-2015 The Ambassador of Switzerland to Georgia, with a side accreditation in Armenia; he was also responsible for the Good Offices (interest mandate) between the Russian Federation and Georgia; 2016-2019 Special Envoy of the three consecutive OSCE Chairmanships (Germany, Austria, Italy) for the South Caucasus; Bern

Dr Anastasiya Bayok, Graduate School of East Asian Studies (GEAS), Freie Universität Berlin; Berlin

Elia Bescotti, Research Associate with the project group "Between Conflict and Cooperation: The Politics of International Law in the Post-Soviet Space", funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS); Regensburg

Esra Buttanri, Senior Advisor, Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities; Vienna

Dr Anita Danka, independent human rights expert; 2012-2019 Human Rights Adviser/Monitoring and Response Co-ordinator at the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), responsible for the freedom of peaceful assembly portfolio; Warsaw

Harlem Désir, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media; Vienna

Prof. Walter Dorn, Royal Military College of Canada & Canadian Forces College; Toronto

Ekaterina Dorodnova, European External Action Service (EEAS); Brussels

Prof. Heinz Gärtner, Political Analyst, International Institute for Peace (IIP) and University of Vienna; former academic director of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs; Chair of the Advisory Committee for Strategy and Security Policy of the Scientific Commission at the Austrian Armed Forces; Vienna

Cono Giardullo, Associate Fellow within the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Programme of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI); Rome

Dr Thomas Greminger, Ambassador, Secretary General of the OSCE; Vienna

William H. Hill, Ambassador, US foreign service officer (ret.), Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova from June 1999 to November 2001, and January 2003 to August 2006; Washington, D.C.

Dr Thomas Kunze, Head of the Moscow Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation; Moscow

Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia, 2019 OSCE Chairperson-in-Office; Bratislava

Eleonora Lotti, Personal Advisor to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities; The Hague

Prof. Vladimir F. Pryakhin, Doctor of Political Sciences, Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow); Ambassador, Head of the OSCE Missions to Armenia (2003-2007) and to Tajikistan (2007-2009); Moscow

Ursel Schlichting, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH); Hamburg

Dr Loïc Simonet, Senior External Co-operation Officer, External Co-operation Section, Office of the Secretary General, OSCE Secretariat; Vienna

Dr Danielle Stodilka, Senior Fellow, Canadian International Council (CIC); Toronto

Prof. em. Kurt P. Tudyka, long-serving Editor-in-Chief of the OSCE Yearbook; Bonn

Prof. Vadym Vasiutynskyi, Institute for Social and Political Psychology, National Academy of Educational Sciences (NAES) of Ukraine; Kyiv

Lamberto Zannier, Ambassador, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities; Secretary General of the OSCE 2011-2017; The Hague